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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/17897.txt b/17897.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bdf7e35 --- /dev/null +++ b/17897.txt @@ -0,0 +1,54650 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima +Secundae), by Saint Thomas Aquinas, Translated by Fathers of the English +Dominican Province + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) + From the Complete American Edition + + +Author: Saint Thomas Aquinas + + + +Release Date: March 1, 2006 [eBook #17897] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PART I-II (PARS +PRIMA SECUNDAE)*** + + +E-text prepared by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and supplementation +by David McClamrock + + + +SUMMA THEOLOGICA + +PART I-II ("Prima Secundae") + +Translated by +Fathers of the English Dominican Province + +BENZIGER BROTHERS +NEW YORK +________________________ + +DEDICATION + +To the Blessed Virgin +Mary Immaculate +Seat of Wisdom +________________________ + +NOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION + +The text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra +K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian +Classics Ethereal Library <http://www.ccel.org>. I have eliminated +unnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in +transcription, and added the dedication, tables of contents, +Prologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they +appeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers. +Each article is now designated by part, question number, and article +number in brackets, like this: + +> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2] + +> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil? + +In a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger +Brothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text +of the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in +brackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first +sentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: "Not only is it +impossible that anything should be created by God...." By reference +to the Latin, "non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari" +(emphasis added), this has been corrected to "Not only is it [not] +impossible that anything should be created by God...." + +This electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers +edition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the +original page numbers and headers): + +* The repetitive expression "We proceed thus to the [next] Article" +does not appear directly below the title of each article. + +* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end, +_like this._ Quotations and other "quotable" matter, however, are +ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this +edition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they +were set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers +edition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear +in the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in +parentheses. + +* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated +by colons, like this: "Dan. 7:10"--not like this: "Dan. vii. 10." +Small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in +citations to books other than the Bible. + +* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers +edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the +footnote mark appeared. + +* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration. + +* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines. + +* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and +at certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line +for each topic. + +* Titles of questions are in all caps. + +Anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to +the content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a +defect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock). + +________________________ + +CONTENTS + +FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART (QQ. 1-114) + +Question + +1. Of Man's Last End +2. Of Those Things in Which Man's Happiness Consists +3. What Is Happiness +4. Of Those Things That Are Required for Happiness +5. Of the Attainment of Happiness +6. Of the Voluntary and the Involuntary +7. Of the Circumstances of Human Acts +8. Of the Will, in Regard to What It Wills +9. Of That Which Moves the Will +10. Of the Manner in Which the Will Is Moved +11. Of Enjoyment, Which Is an Act of the Will +12. Of Intention +13. Of Choice, Which Is an Act of the Will with Regard to the Means +14. Of Counsel, Which Precedes Choice +15. Of Consent, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means +16. Of Use, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means +17. Of the Acts Commanded by the Will +18. Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General +19. Of the Goodness and Malice of the Interior Act of the Will +20. Of Goodness and Malice in External Human Actions +21. Of the Consequences of Human Actions by Reason of Their Goodness + and Malice +22. Of the Subject of the Soul's Passions +23. How the Passions Differ from One Another +24. Of Good and Evil in the Passions of the Soul +25. Of the Order of the Passions to One Another +26. Of the Passions of the Soul in Particular: and First, of Love +27. Of the Cause of Love +28. Of the Effects of Love +29. Of Hatred +30. Of Concupiscence +31. Of Delight Considered in Itself +32. Of the Cause of Pleasure +33. Of the Effects of Pleasure +34. Of the Goodness and Malice of Pleasures +35. Of Pain or Sorrow, in Itself +36. Of the Causes of Sorrow or Pain +37. Of the Effects of Pain or Sorrow +38. Of the Remedies of Sorrow or Pain +39. Of the Goodness and Malice of Sorrow or Pain +40. Of the Irascible Passions, and First, of Hope and Despair +41. Of Fear, in Itself +42. Of the Object of Fear +43. Of the Cause of Fear +44. Of the Effects of Fear +45. Of Daring +46. Of Anger, in Itself +47. Of the Cause That Provokes Anger, and of the Remedies of Anger +48. Of the Effects of Anger + +TREATISE ON HABITS + +49. Of Habits in General, As to Their Substance +50. Of the Subject of Habits +51. Of the Cause of Habits, As to Their Formation +52. Of the Increase of Habits +53. How Habits Are Corrupted or Diminished +54. Of the Distinction of Habits +55. Of the Virtues, As to Their Essence +56. Of the Subject of Virtue +57. Of the Intellectual Virtues +58. Of the Difference Between Moral and Intellectual Virtues +59. Of the Moral Virtues in Relation to the Passions +60. How the Moral Virtues Differ from One Another +61. Of the Cardinal Virtues +62. Of the Theological Virtues +63. Of the Cause of Virtues +64. Of the Mean of Virtue +65. Of the Connection of Virtues +66. Of Equality Among the Virtues +67. Of the Duration of Virtues After This Life +68. Of the Gifts +69. Of the Beatitudes +70. Of the Fruits of the Holy Ghost +71. Of Vice and Sin Considered in Themselves +72. Of the Distinction of Sins +73. Of the Comparison of One Sin with Another +74. Of the Subject of Sin +75. Of the Causes of Sin, in General +76. Of the Causes of Sin, in Particular +77. Of the Cause of Sin, on the Part of the Sensitive Appetite +78. Of That Cause of Sin Which Is Malice +79. Of the External Causes of Sin +80. Of the Cause of Sin, As Regards the Devil +81. Of the Cause of Sin, on the Part of Man +82. Of Original Sin, As to Its Essence +83. Of the Subject of Original Sin +84. Of the Cause of Sin, in Respect of One Sin Being the Cause + of Another +85. Of the Effects of Sin, and, First, of the Corruption of the + Good of Nature +86. Of the Stain of Sin +87. Of the Debt of Punishment +88. Of Venial and Mortal Sin +89. Of Venial Sin in Itself + +TREATISE ON LAW + +90. Of the Essence of Law +91. Of the Various Kinds of Law +92. Of the Effects of Law +93. Of the Eternal Law +94. Of the Natural Law +95. Of Human Law +96. Of the Power of Human Law +97. Of Change in Laws +98. Of the Old Law +99. Of the Precepts of the Old Law +100. Of the Moral Precepts of the Old Law +101. Of the Ceremonial Precepts in Themselves +102. Of the Causes of the Ceremonial Precepts +103. Of the Duration of the Ceremonial Precepts +104. Of the Judicial Precepts +105. Of the Reason for the Judicial Precepts +106. Of the Law of the Gospel, Called the New Law, Considered in Itself +107. Of the New Law As Compared with the Old +108. Of Those Things That Are Contained in the New Law +109. Of the Necessity of Grace +110. Of the Grace of God as Regards Its Essence +111. Of the Division of Grace +112. Of the Cause of Grace +113. Of the Effects of Grace +114. Of Merit +________________________ + +FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART +["I-II," "Prima Secundae"] +________________________ + +TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ. 1-5) +________________________ + +PROLOGUE + +Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be +made in God's image, in so far as the image implies "an intelligent +being endowed with free-will and self-movement": now that we have +treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came +forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains +for us to treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the +principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his +actions. +________________________ + +OF MAN'S LAST END +(In Eight Articles) + +In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; +and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards +this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever +is ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is +stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; +(2) happiness. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end? + +(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature? + +(3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end? + +(4) Whether there is any last end of human life? + +(5) Whether one man can have several last ends? + +(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end? + +(7) Whether all men have the same last end? + +(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 1] + +Whether It Belongs to Man to Act for an End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for +an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, +implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But +that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this +preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it +does not belong to man to act for an end. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. +But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher +states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end. + +Obj. 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts +deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation, +sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when +one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent +on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end. + +_On the contrary,_ All things contained in a genus are derived from +the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human +operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it +belongs to man to do everything for an end. + +_I answer that,_ Of actions done by man those alone are properly +called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from +irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions. +Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man +is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and +will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty and will +of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which +proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in +man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly "human" +actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear +that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power +in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the +will is the end and the good. Therefore all human actions must be for +an end. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet +it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way +that it is a cause. + +Reply Obj. 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be +voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action +is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by +the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited +by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is +impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. +For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is +color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of +seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object; +so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of +willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last +end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some +action of man, at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore +whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even +when he does that action in which the last end consists. + +Reply Obj. 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions; since +they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the +proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an +imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 2] + +Whether It Is Proper to the Rational Nature to Act for an End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature +to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, +never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many +things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they are +altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because +they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as irrational +animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for +an end. + +Obj. 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an +end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to +things that lack reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But +"the will is in the reason" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for +an end belongs to none but a rational nature. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not +only mind but also nature acts for an end." + +_I answer that,_ Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, +in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, +the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all +causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does +not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for +nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does +not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were +not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing +rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a +determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some +certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this +determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational +appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is +caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural +appetite." + +Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its +action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to +the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as +an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer +who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are +possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have +dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the +"faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend +to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not +by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, +and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be +ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature +is in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as +stated above (I, Q. 22, A. 2, ad 4; Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3). Consequently +it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing +(_agens_) and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the +irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, +whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do not +apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether +void of knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the +end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when +he acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's +compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it +is thus with irrational creatures. + +Reply Obj. 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs +itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that +which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an +irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason. +Reply Obj. 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in +universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that +lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; +but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate +to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are +moved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends +the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular +departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason +are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational +will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 3] + +Whether Human Acts Are Specified by Their End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their +end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified +by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by +their end. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist +before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a +human act does not derive its species from the end. + +Obj. 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But +one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. +Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): +"According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds +worthy of blame or praise." + +_I answer that,_ Each thing receives its species in respect of an act +and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of +matter and form are established in their respective species by their +own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For +since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each +of these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act +which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is +the terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is +nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while +heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: +and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And either +way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as +passions, receive their species from the end. For human acts can be +considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by +himself. Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that acts are called +human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the +object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear +that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the +end. In like manner it is their terminus: for the human act +terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural +agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to the form of +the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) +"morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking +receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as +human acts. + +Reply Obj. 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because +it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just +this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, +considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as +passion. + +Reply Obj. 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, +pertains to the will, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). And it is thus +that it gives the species to the human or moral act. + +Reply Obj. 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds +once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which +it has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of +which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an +act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to +several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but +one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an +end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: +the result being that there would be several acts in different species +of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in +another, an act of vice. For a movement does not receive its species +from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which +is its _per se_ terminus. Now moral ends are accidental to a natural +thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to +morality. Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same +considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered +in their moral species, and conversely. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 4] + +Whether There Is One Last End of Human Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, +but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as +Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds +from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other +good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has +the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends. + +Obj. 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to +infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same +reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, +the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is +consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that +there is also an infinite series of ends. + +Obj. 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But +the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can +will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. +Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and +there is no last end of the human will. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to +suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the +good is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary +to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is +necessary to fix one last end. + +_I answer that,_ Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed +indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in +whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if +the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of +necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. +viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, +because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can +the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first +mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends--the order +of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders +there must be something first. For that which is first in the order of +intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; +consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to +move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is +that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be +taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the +intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the +first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, on +neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no +last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its +term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there +is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would +begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would +continue indefinitely. + +On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that +are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for +accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that +there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the +end. + +Reply Obj. 1: The very nature of good is that something flows from +it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good +has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this +argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the +end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards +those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if +we considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite. +But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, +to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a +certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the +flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods +share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods +does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis. 11:21), God +disposes all things "in number, weight and measure." + +Reply Obj. 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from +principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. +Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no +infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process +of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one +another. But in those things which are accidentally connected, +nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is +accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or +unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders +the reason from an indefinite process. + +Reply Obj. 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on +itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the +fact that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on +itself indifferently once or several times. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 5] + +Whether One Man Can Have Several Last Ends? + +Objection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed +at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says +(De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four +things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue." +But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place +the last end of his will in many things. + +Obj. 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not +exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in +opposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing +is the last end of the will does not exclude others. + +Obj. 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one +thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its +last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something +else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in +pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. +Therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the +same time to several things, as last ends. + +_On the contrary,_ That in which a man rests as in his last end, is +master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of +life. Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is +their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures +of the belly. Now according to Matt. 6:24, "No man can serve two +masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore +it is impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained +to one another. + +_I answer that,_ It is impossible for one man's will to be directed +at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may +be assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its +own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he +desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. +Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it +passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be +complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill +man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. +Which is not possible, if something else be required for his +perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to +tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good. + +The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, +the principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of +the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that +which is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature +tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the +rational appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will +tends, as to its last end, is one. + +The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their +species from the end, as stated above (A. 3), they must needs receive +their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as +natural things are placed in a genus according to a common form. +Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as +such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more +because in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end +has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last +end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last +end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of +all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual +man must be fixed on one last end. + +Reply Obj. 1: All these several objects were considered as one +perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the +last end. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although it is possible to find several things which +are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's +perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's +perfection. + +Reply Obj. 3: The power of the will does not extend to making +opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to +tend to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above +(ad 2). +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 6] + +Whether Man Wills All, Whatsoever He Wills, for the Last End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he +wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said +to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to +serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to +the last end. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his +Metaphysics (i. 2) that speculative science is sought for its own sake. +Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. +Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last +end. + +Obj. 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of +that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that +he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for +the last end. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the +end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas +we love it for its own sake." + +_I answer that,_ Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he +desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, +because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. +And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, +he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, +because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its +completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of +art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete +perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, because +the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as +the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary +moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first +mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the +appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, +which is the last end. + +Reply Obj. 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external +end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford +him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end. + +Reply Obj. 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is +desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect +good, which is the ultimate end. + +Reply Obj. 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end, +whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first +intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every +desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be +not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the +road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 7] + +Whether All Men Have the Same Last End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. +For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of +man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. +Therefore all men have not the same last end. + +Obj. 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last +end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not +have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false. + +Obj. 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of +individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet +they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men +have not the same last end. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men +agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness. + +_I answer that,_ We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, +considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the +thing in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to +the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all +desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this +fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above (A. 5). +But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not +agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their +consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to +every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine +is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something +similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant +things, in which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In +like manner that good is most complete which the man with well +disposed affections desires for his last end. + +Reply Obj. 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last end +really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the +last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things. + +Reply Obj. 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason +of the various things in which men seek to find their last end. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their first +principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated +above (A. 5). +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 8] + +Whether Other Creatures Concur in That Last End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's +last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's +beginning--i.e. God--is also the beginning of all else. Therefore +all other things concur in man's last end. + +Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all +things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's last +end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De +Doctr. Christ. i, 5, 22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man's +last end. + +Obj. 3: Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the +object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all. +Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end. + +_On the contrary,_ man's last end is happiness; which all men desire, +as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3, 4). But "happiness is not +possible for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, +qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is +twofold--the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing +itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or +acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of +a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower +place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money as "thing," or +possession of money as "use." + +If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the +end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the +last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of +man's last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational +creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other +rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: +this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, +in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, +or live, or even know. + +Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness +means the acquisition of the last end. +________________________ + +QUESTION 2 + +OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS +(In Eight Articles) + +We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) +what it is; (3) how we can obtain it. + +Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether happiness consists in wealth? + +(2) Whether in honor? + +(3) Whether in fame or glory? + +(4) Whether in power? + +(5) Whether in any good of the body? + +(6) Whether in pleasure? + +(7) Whether in any good of the soul? + +(8) Whether in any created good? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 1] + +Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Wealth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth. +For since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which +has the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it +is written (Eccles. 10:19): "All things obey money." Therefore man's +happiness consists in wealth. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is +"a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." +Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the +Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be +a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. +Therefore happiness consists in wealth. + +Obj. 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, +it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than +anything else; since "a covetous man shall not be satisfied with +riches" (Eccles. 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth. + +_On the contrary,_ Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather +than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), "wealth +shines in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, +whereas the generous man is applauded." Therefore man's happiness +does not consist in wealth. + +_I answer that,_ It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in +wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), +viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man +as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, +cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which +is not a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art +of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things +salable. + +Now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural +wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something +else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be +man's last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore +in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for +him, according to Ps. 8:8: "Thou hast subjected all things under his +feet." + +And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of +natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its +means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently +much less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore +it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to +consist in wealth. + +Reply Obj. 1: All material things obey money, so far as the +multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material +goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our +estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just +as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge +whether a thing is palatable. + +Reply Obj. 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so +spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov. +17:16): "What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot +buy wisdom." + +Reply Obj. 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite: +because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire +for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered +concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear +(Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than +the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the +sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things +despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence +it is written (Ecclus. 24:29): "They that eat me shall yet hunger." +Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, +the contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise +them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (John +4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water," by which temporal goods are +signified, "shall thirst again." The reason of this is that we realize +more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact +shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good does not consist +therein. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 2] + +Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Honors? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors. +For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher +says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that +by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). +Therefore happiness consists especially in honor. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great +excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect +good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). +Moreover, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): "To . . . the only God be +honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But +nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers +loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. +Therefore happiness consists in honor. + +_On the contrary,_ Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the +honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to +the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore +happiness does not consist in honor. + +_I answer that,_ It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. +For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and +consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is +in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion, +especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its +parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. +And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot +principally consist therein. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not +that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive +honor from men by way of reward, "as from those who have nothing +greater to offer." But virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for +which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would +no longer be a virtue, but ambition. + +Reply Obj. 2: Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence +as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that +honor makes them excellent. + +Reply Obj. 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises from his +natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated +above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on +whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 3] + +Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Fame or Glory? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory. +For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints +for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: +for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): "The sufferings of this time are +not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be +revealed in us." Therefore happiness consists in glory. + +Obj. 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius +(Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge of +others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to +Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory consists "in +being well known and praised." Therefore man's happiness consists in +glory. + +Obj. 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems +to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a +fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): "You seem to beget unto +yourselves eternity, when you think of your fame in future time." +Therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory. + +_On the contrary,_ Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that +fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "many +owe their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can +anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must +needs blush at their own praise." Therefore man's happiness does not +consist in fame or glory. + +_I answer that,_ Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or +glory. For glory consists "in being well known and praised," as +Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing +known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's +knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas +God's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the +perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused +by human knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness +proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness +itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot +consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends on +God's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends, +as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; according to +Ps. 90:15, 16: "I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will +fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation." + +Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, +especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this +reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be +deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. +10:18): "He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth." + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is +with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence +it is written (Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the +glory of His Father, before His angels" [*St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38 +with Luke 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the +fact that he was quoting from memory]. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the +knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived +from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes +perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does +not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who +is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make +man happy. + +Reply Obj. 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by +false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But +happiness endures of itself, and for ever. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 4] + +Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all +things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first +beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the +similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture +they are called "gods" (Ex. 22:28), "Thou shalt not speak ill of the +gods." Therefore happiness consists in power. + +Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest +perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to +those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power. + +Obj. 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is +contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than +aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore +happiness consists in power. + +_On the contrary,_ Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most +imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), "the power of man +cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path +of anxiety": and further on: "Think you a man is powerful who is +surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom +he fears still more?" + +_I answer that,_ It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; +and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of +principle, as is stated in _Metaph._ v, 12, whereas happiness has the +nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good and +evil: whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore +some happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is by +virtue, rather than in power itself. + +Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness +consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, +since happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any +evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil +men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to +"satisfy of itself," as stated in _Ethic._ i, 7, having gained +happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any +one of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods that are +necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. +Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil can +accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for +it is written (Eccles. 5:12) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the +hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three. +Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles +that are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four +goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most +cases to fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune. +Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the +foregoing. + +Reply Obj. 1: God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His +power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it +is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, +unless he become like Him in goodness also. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good +use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a +bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil. + +Reply Obj. 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: +therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme +good consists in power. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 5] + +Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Any Bodily Good? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily +goods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above +the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that +which is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body. + +Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better +than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows. But +for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. +Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that +health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the +principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the +greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the +efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the +causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, +just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the +last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself +is that which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness +consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the +health of the body. + +_On the contrary,_ Man surpasses all other animals in regard to +happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for +instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by +the stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist in +goods of the body. + +_I answer that,_ It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in +the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a +thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot +consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not +intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, +since a ship is ordained to something else as its end, viz. to +navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he +may steer its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; +according to Ecclus. 15:14: "God made man from the beginning and left +him in the hand of his own counsel." Now it is evident that man is +ordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. +Therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the +preservation of man's being. + +Secondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be +the preservation of man's being, it could not be said that the end of +man is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and +body; and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the +being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I, +Q. 75, A. 2); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its +form, and the instruments for the man that puts them into motion, +that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the +body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. +Consequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in +goods of the body. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, +so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it +is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external +goods, which are signified by "riches," just as the good of the soul +is preferred to all bodily goods. + +Reply Obj. 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection of +being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself +includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we +consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which +does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect +being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that +being itself together with an additional perfection is more +excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that +live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than +living things. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this +argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in +Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their +proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being, +some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this +belongs to few. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 5] + +Whether Man's Happiness Consists in Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. +For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something +else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than +to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive +in wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists +principally in pleasure and delight. + +Obj. 2: Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect +than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end +consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that +which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. +Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far +absorbs man's will and reason, that it causes him to despise other +goods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness, +consists principally in pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all +desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and +even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. +Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that +chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that +pleasures had a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there +is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy +too." + +_I answer that,_ Because bodily delights are more generally known, +"the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, +13), although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not +consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its +essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one +thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a +risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a +proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of +happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has +some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in +memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is +precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of +happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. +Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from +the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something +resulting therefrom as its proper accident. + +But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that +way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power +of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to +the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For +since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that +part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a +certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul +which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a +way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a +fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is +independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which +is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate +through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of +matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and +contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident +that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily +delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, +but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it +is written (Wis. 7:9) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a +little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness +itself, nor a proper accident of happiness. + +Reply Obj. 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire +delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus +it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne +downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is +desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for +anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the final cause. But +if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is +desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object +of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its +form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in +the thing desired. + +Reply Obj. 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises +from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the +principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that +sensible pleasures are desired by the majority. + +Reply Obj. 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: +and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, +as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight +is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results +from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the +essential and supreme good. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 7] + +Whether Some Good of the Soul Constitutes Man's Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes +man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: +external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But +happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the +body, as shown above (AA. 4, 5). Therefore it consists in goods +of the soul. + +Obj. 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than +the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we +desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man +desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more +than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which +is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and +desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: +not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is +perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness +is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to +the body, as shown above (A. 5). Therefore it is something belonging +to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul. + +_On the contrary,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that +which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own +sake." But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is +in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in +no good of the soul. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end is twofold: +namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, +namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak +of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul +itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in +itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes +knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually +virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is +for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in +potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot +be its own last end. + +In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, +habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect +good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, +is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a +participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none +of them can be man's last end. + +But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession +thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an +end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his +last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the +thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes +happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is +called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something +belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is +something outside the soul. + +Reply Obj. 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man +can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or +act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in +this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes +happiness is a good of the soul. + +Reply Obj. 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned, +happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend +is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves +himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases. +As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of +friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the +soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes +happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, +as stated above. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 8] + +Whether Any Created Good Constitutes Man's Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's +happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom +"unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things," +from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches +the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. +Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated +in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1), it seems that man's happiness +consists in man somehow reaching the angel. + +Obj. 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in +relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for +its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, +is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as +perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole +universe of creatures. + +Obj. 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural +desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good +surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include +that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that +man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created +good constitutes man's happiness. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul +is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom +it is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (Ps. +143:15)." + +_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created good to constitute +man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the +appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something +yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's +appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect +is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's +will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any +creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by +participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, +according to the words of Ps. 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with +good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness. + +Reply Obj. 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the +angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as +in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of +good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as +being the infinite and perfect good. + +Reply Obj. 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a +further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole +itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which +man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is +ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is +not the good of the universe, but God himself. + +Reply Obj. 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is +capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is +less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which +is infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in +the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good. +________________________ + +QUESTION 3 + +WHAT IS HAPPINESS +(In Eight Articles) + +We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things +are required for it. + +Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated? + +(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation? + +(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the +intellectual part? + +(4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an +operation of the intellect, or of the will? + +(5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an +operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect? + +(6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it +consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? + +(7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances +viz. angels? + +(8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His +Essence? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 1] + +Whether Happiness Is Something Uncreated? + +Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For +Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "We must needs confess that God is +happiness itself." + +Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God +to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme +goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God. + +Obj. 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends +naturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an end, but +to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. +Christ. i, 5, 22). Therefore happiness is the same as God. + +_On the contrary,_ Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is +something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, +3): "Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy." Therefore +happiness is not something uncreated. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), our end is +twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: +thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the +attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; +thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money; +and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. +In the first sense, then, man's last end is the uncreated good, +namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy +man's will. But in the second way, man's last end is something +created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the +attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called +happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause or +object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to +the very essence of happiness, then it is something created. + +Reply Obj. 1: God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by +acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. +On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), +by participation; just as they are called "gods," by participation. +And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said +to be happy, is something created. + +Reply Obj. 2: Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is +the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good. + +Reply Obj. 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way +as the attainment of the end is called the end. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 2] + +Whether Happiness Is an Operation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For +the Apostle says (Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto +sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an +operation, but the very being of living things. Therefore the last +end, which is happiness, is not an operation. + +Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a +state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But state +does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + +Obj. 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy +one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of operation +does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather +something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an +operation. + +Obj. 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation +does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + +Obj. 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations +are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation. + +Obj. 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But +human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some +other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an +operation. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that +"happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." + +_I answer that,_ In so far as man's happiness is something created, +existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For +happiness is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in +so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. +Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is +evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the +Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that +which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows +is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, +too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). +Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation. + +Reply Obj. 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being +of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been +shown (Q. 2, A. 5) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may +consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true +that His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation +of the living, by which operation the principle of life is made +actual: thus we speak of active and contemplative life, or of a life +of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last +end, as is clear from John 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may +know Thee, the only true God." + +Reply Obj. 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness +in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and he +signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by +the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that the state of a +happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle +expressed the very essence of happiness, showing by what man is +established in this state, and that it is by some kind of operation. +And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good" +(Ethic. i, 7). + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Metaph._ ix, 7 action is twofold. One +proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and +"to cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an +operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather +of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an +action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and +to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent. +And such an operation can be happiness. + +Reply Obj. 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection; +according as various things capable of happiness can attain to +various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings +applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; +since His very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other +than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect +of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: +and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, +according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in +respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this +operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one +only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for +this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be +attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's +happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and +after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as +men." But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as +the angels . . . in heaven" (Matt. 22:30). + +Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: +because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God +by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in +as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation +so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a +participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation +can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, +which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the +contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the +contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged +in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and +since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself +otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were, +continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are +evident. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 3] + +Whether Happiness Is an Operation of the Sensitive Part, or of the +Intellective Part Only? + +Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of +the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than +that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the +intellective operation depends on the sensitive: since "we cannot +understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness +consists in an operation of the senses also. + +Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a +state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some +goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. +Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for +happiness. + +Obj. 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in +_Ethic._ i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby +in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by +sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for +happiness. + +_On the contrary,_ Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in +common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. +Therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation. + +_I answer that,_ A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) +essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of +sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness +consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which +is his last end, as shown above (A. 1): to Which man cannot be united +by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as +shown above (Q. 2, A. 5), man's happiness does not consist in goods +of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the +operation of the senses. + +Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, +both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of +imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the +operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; +consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; +because at the resurrection, "from the very happiness of the soul," +as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) "the body and the bodily senses +will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their +operations"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat +of the resurrection (Suppl. QQ. 82-85). But then the operation +whereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses. + +Reply Obj. 1: This objection proves that the operation of the senses +is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had +in this life. + +Reply Obj. 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes +the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal +source of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in +this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods that +suffice for the most perfect operation of this life. + +Reply Obj. 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in +the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in +the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance +from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher +part. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 4] + +Whether, If Happiness Is in the Intellective Part, It Is an Operation +of the Intellect or of the Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of +the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10, 11), that man's +happiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3): +"Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']". But peace +pertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the +object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of +the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus +the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the +general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to +operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we +shall state further on (Q. 9, AA. 1, 3). Therefore happiness regards +the will. + +Obj. 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's +most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of the +will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an +operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13). +Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will. + +Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he +who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." And a little +further on (6) he adds: "He is most happy who desires well, whatever +he desires: for good things make a man happy, and such a man already +possesses some good--i.e. a good will." Therefore happiness consists +in an act of the will. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 17:3): "This is eternal life: +that they may know Thee, the only true God." Now eternal life is the +last end, as stated above (A. 2, ad 1). Therefore man's happiness +consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 2, A. 6) two things are needed +for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, +that is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected +with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is +impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident +from what has been said (AA. 1, 2; Q. 2, A. 7) that happiness is the +attainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not +consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the +end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is +delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire +itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement +towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being +present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact +that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present to +him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the +will. + +This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the +acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous +man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at +the moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in +his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money +got. And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to +attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made +present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will +rests in the end when attained. + +So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the +intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to +the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that +happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the +consummation of happiness. + +Reply Obj. 1: Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were +the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and +consequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are +removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: +consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains +at peace, his desire being at rest. + +Reply Obj. 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as neither +is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. +Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as +the will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as +its act. + +Reply Obj. 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: +yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the +will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the +end, viz. delight or enjoyment. + +Reply Obj. 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge +precedes love in attaining: for "naught is loved save what is known," +as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an +intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain +a sensible end by an act of sense. + +Reply Obj. 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he +has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the +act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, +as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among +the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an +inclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus +of its terminus, for instance, "alteration" to the genus "quality." +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 5] + +Whether Happiness Is an Operation of the Speculative, or of the +Practical Intellect? + +Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the +practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in +becoming like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, +which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his +speculative intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. +Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical +intellect rather than of the speculative. + +Obj. 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical +intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative +intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be +good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but +not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, +according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding. +Therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical +intellect rather than of the speculative. + +Obj. 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the +speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; +whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to +man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's +happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather +than of the speculative. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation +is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the +everlasting perfection of our joys." + +_I answer that,_ Happiness consists in an operation of the +speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident +for three reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation, +it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation +is that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and +his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the +Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the +speculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in +such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And +since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him," +according to _Ethic._ ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is +most proper to man and most delightful to him. + +Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought +principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect +is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these +very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that +the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the +practical intellect. + +Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative +life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God +and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things +pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in +common with man, although imperfectly. + +Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life +to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, +such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an +operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and +passions, as stated in _Ethic._ x, 7, 8. + +Reply Obj. 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God +is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in +relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the +likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and +"information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be +answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, which is His +Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which is +outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. +the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole +man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical +intellect has not; but it directs man thereto. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his own +last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and +passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is +something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an +operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness +consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of +the practical intellect. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 6] + +Whether Happiness Consists in the Consideration of Speculative Sciences? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the +consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says +(Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect +virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than +three speculative virtues--"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," +which all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences. +Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of +speculative sciences. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be +man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative +sciences; because, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1, "all men naturally +desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that +speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore +happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. + +Obj. 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything +is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act. +But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of +speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of +these sciences, man's final happiness consists. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 9:23): "Let not the wise man +glory in his wisdom": and this is said in reference to speculative +sciences. Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the +consideration of these. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 4), man's happiness is +twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness +we are to understand that which attains to the true notion of +happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain +thereto, but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus +perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be +done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who +are possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works +similar to works of prudence. + +Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the +consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe +that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend +beyond the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire +science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first +principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, +as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the +_Metaphysics_ (i, 1), and at the end of the _Posterior Analytics_ +(ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences +cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's +final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the +knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something +lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher. +Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is +lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the +form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain +likeness to that which is above the human intellect, viz. the +intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by +something else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore man's +final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above +the human intellect. But it has been shown (I, Q. 88, A. 2), that man +cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of separate +substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it +follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the consideration of +speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a +participation of the higher substances, so the consideration of +speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect +happiness. + +Reply Obj. 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of +imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above +(A. 2, ad 4). + +Reply Obj. 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but +also any likeness or participation thereof. + +Reply Obj. 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the +consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and +perfect act. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 7] + +Whether Happiness Consists in the Knowledge of Separate Substances, +Namely, Angels? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the +knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in +a homily (xxvi in Evang.): "It avails nothing to take part in the +feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels"; by +which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of +the angels by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final +happiness consists in contemplating the angels. + +Obj. 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be +united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect +figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of +human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as +Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the +human intellect consists in contemplating the angels. + +Obj. 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher +nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the +spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, +are the angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect +is to be united to the angels by contemplation. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 9:24): "Let him that glorieth, +glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me." Therefore man's +final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), man's perfect happiness +consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some +participation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is +evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as +the proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper +object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of +whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with +its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the +same in being and in truth (Metaph. ii, 1); whatever are beings by +participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by +participation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as +shown in the First Part (Q. 44, A. 1). It follows that contemplation +of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we +should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation +of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of +speculative science. + +Reply Obj. 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by +contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God +Himself. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to those that hold human souls to be created +by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should +consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, +of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in the +First Part (Q. 90, A. 3). Wherefore the final perfection of the human +intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of +the creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel +enlightens as a minister, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 2, +ad 2). Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to +happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness. + +Reply Obj. 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. +First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus +man's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a +contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is +attained by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is +to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 8] + +Whether Man's Happiness Consists in the Vision of the Divine Essence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in +the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) +that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God +as to something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its +essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of +the intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen +in His Essence. + +Obj. 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher +nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the +Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human +intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something less. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 3:2): "When He shall appear, +we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as +He is." + +_I answer that,_ Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing +else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two +points must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so +long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that +the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its +object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. +the essence of a thing, according to _De Anima_ iii, 6. Wherefore the +intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a +thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect, +whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to +know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect cannot be said to +reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the +effect the knowledge that the cause is. Consequently, when man knows +an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in +the man the desire to know about the cause, "what it is." And this +desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the +beginning of the _Metaphysics_ (i, 2). For instance, if a man, +knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some +cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from +wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he +arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause. + +If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created +effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of +that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there +remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is +not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the +intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And +thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that +object, in which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above (AA. +1, 7; Q. 2, A. 8). + +Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers +journeying towards happiness. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end has a twofold +acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in +this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower +nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8). +Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the +higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to their +respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, +Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than +that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not. +________________________ + +QUESTION 4 + +OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS +(In Eight Articles) + +We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: +and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether delight is required for happiness? + +(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision? + +(3) Whether comprehension is required? + +(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required? + +(5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness? + +(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary? + +(7) Whether any external goods are necessary? + +(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 1] + +Whether Delight Is Required for Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. +For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "vision is the entire reward +of faith." But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the +Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides +vision is required for happiness. + +Obj. 2: Further, happiness is "the most self-sufficient of all +goods," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which +needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence +of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 8); +it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness. + +Obj. 3: Further, the "operation of bliss or happiness should be +unhindered" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of +the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, +5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is +"joy in truth." + +_I answer that,_ One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. +First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is +necessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is +necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from +without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, +as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is +necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for +happiness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good +attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the +attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant +delight. + +Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, +the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists +delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of +reward. + +Reply Obj. 2: The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he +who sees God cannot need delight. + +Reply Obj. 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the +intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in +_Ethic._ x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care +and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to +the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the +attention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to +those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one +thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on +account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to +reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the +estimate of the speculative intellect. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 2] + +Whether in Happiness Vision Ranks Before Delight? + +Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before +vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). +But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight +ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision. + +Obj. 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet +more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight +they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those +operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual +and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. +Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the +intellect, which is vision. + +Obj. 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or +enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as +the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks +before vision. + +_On the contrary,_ The cause is greater than its effect. But vision +is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight. + +_I answer that,_ The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, +4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, +the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank +before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. +Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of +the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will +reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness +of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; +for thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been +disproved above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2;Q. 3, A. 4): but it seeks to be at +rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. +Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will +reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects +operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. +Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a +perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species. + +Reply Obj. 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the +universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And +consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in +animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the +intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which +results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather +than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the +Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the +operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply +according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather +according to the order of the intellectual appetite. + +Reply Obj. 3: Charity does not seek the beloved good for the sake of +delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good +gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its +end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to +charity. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 3] + +Whether Comprehension Is Necessary for Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for +happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. +Serm. xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): "To reach God with the mind is +happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible." Therefore happiness is +without comprehension. + +Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his +intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the +intellect and will, as stated in the First Part (QQ. 79 and +following). But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing +God, and the will by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for +comprehension as a third. + +Obj. 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations +are determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects, +the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and +good to delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a +third. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): "So run that you +may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']." But happiness is the goal of the +spiritual race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7, 8): "I have fought a good +fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the +rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice." Therefore +comprehension is necessary for Happiness. + +_I answer that,_ Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, +those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from +the way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an +intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his +will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect +knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, +first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; +secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which +relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present +to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is +not present, and it is impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is +not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is +raised above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have +it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that +which he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a search for the +end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness +itself. For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect +knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; +but delight in the end now present results from love, as already +stated (A. 2, ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with +Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the +intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; +and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the +object beloved. + +Reply Obj. 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the +comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended +by the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus +comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means +nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: +thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend [*In English we +should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense +comprehension is necessary for Happiness. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it +is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while +not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, +since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein. + +Reply Obj. 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; +but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even +vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the +object of comprehension. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 4] + +Whether Rectitude of the Will Is Necessary for Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not +necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an +operation of the intellect, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 4). But +rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of +heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect: +for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said +in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to +know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of +heart, know many truths." Therefore rectitude of the will is not +necessary for Happiness. + +Obj. 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But +the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will. +Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, +does not depend on rectitude of the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not +necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance, +after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of +virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness +once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean +of heart; for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace +with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God." + +_I answer that,_ Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both +antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of +the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end +in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to +matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be +duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly +ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without +rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above (Q. 3, +A. 8), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, +Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of him who +sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in +subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not God's +Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common +notion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the +will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without +a right will. + +[Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of knowledge of truth that is +not the essence of goodness itself.] + +Reply Obj. 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the +intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of +the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect +which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is +required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a +right course in order to strike the target. + +Reply Obj. 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with +the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, +such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer +necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order to the end +is necessary. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 5] + +Whether the Body Is Necessary for Man's Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. +For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of +nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the +soul, without the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is +naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while +separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without +the body. + +Obj. 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above +(Q. 3, AA. 2, 5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since +nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, +therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from +the body, just as neither has a part, while separate from its whole; +it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body. + +Obj. 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, +without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the +soul separated from the body. + +Obj. 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) "the +operation of bliss," in which operation happiness consists, is "not +hindered." But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; +because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul "has a +natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is +held back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the +heavenward journey," i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. +Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body. + +Obj. 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. +But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to +be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). +Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body. + +Obj. 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the +soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says +(Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 14:13): "Happy [Douay: +'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord." + +_I answer that,_ Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had +in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. +Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this +life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the +intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the +intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in +a bodily organ, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 84, AA. 6, 7). +Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in +a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the +vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the +soul separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, +when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness +until the Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back +again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. +By authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): "While we are in +the body, we are absent from the Lord"; and he points out the reason +of this absence, saying: "For we walk by faith and not by sight." Now +from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by +sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present +to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, +are in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: "But we are +confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and +to be present with the Lord." Whence it is evident that the souls of +the saints, separated from their bodies, "walk by sight," seeing the +Essence of God, wherein is true Happiness. + +Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the +body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it +looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the First Part (Q. 84, +A. 7). Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by +means of phantasms, as stated in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 3). +Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of +the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the body. Consequently, +without the body the soul can be happy. + +We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's +perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof; +thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as +necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of +perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does +not belong in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet +it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's +nature, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more +perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness +consists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) +"whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the +dead separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the +Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for some +other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to +rule the body." + +Reply Obj. 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of +the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of +the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the +body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect +of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that +natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body. + +Reply Obj. 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same as +that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any +individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, +when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the +animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual +being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the +whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite +after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the +form is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the +composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the +First Part (Q. 75, A. 2). It follows, therefore, that after being +separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it +can have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect +specific nature. + +Reply Obj. 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: +and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness. +Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be +white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction. + +Reply Obj. 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by +way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such a +hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of +some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not +all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a +hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but +prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that +separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending +with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul +desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may +overflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore, as long as +it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at +rest in that which it has, in such a way, that it would still wish +the body to attain to its share. + +Reply Obj. 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, +as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which +suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the +desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it +would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been +resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent. + +Reply Obj. 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect +that "the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do," is not +to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even +now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the +angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it +refers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the +lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have, +whereas the separated souls of the saints have not. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 6] + +Whether Perfection of the Body Is Necessary for Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not +necessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is +a bodily good. But it has been shown above (Q. 2) that Happiness does +not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the +body is necessary for man's Happiness. + +Obj. 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine +Essence, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 8). But the body has no part in +this operation, as shown above (A. 5). Therefore no disposition of +the body is necessary for Happiness. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, +the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the most +perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be +abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a +disposition of the body necessary for Happiness. + +_On the contrary,_ Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is +written (John 13:17): "You shall be blessed, if you do them." But the +reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and +enjoy God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it +is written (Isa. 66:14): "You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, +and your bones shall flourish like a herb." Therefore good +disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness. + +_I answer that,_ If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire +in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity +required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in "an operation according to perfect +virtue"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition +of the body, from every operation of virtue. + +But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no +disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is +necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence +Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said +that "for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything +corporeal." But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the +soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection +of the soul to exclude its natural perfection. + +Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is +necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness +which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine +says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), "if the body be such, that the +governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which +is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from +that vision of the highest heaven." Whence he concludes that, "when +this body will no longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it +be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which +erstwhile was its burden." Consequently, because from the Happiness +of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this +too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad +Dioscor.) that "God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from +its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption +overflows into the lower nature." + +Reply Obj. 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its +object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to +Happiness. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although the body has no part in that operation of the +intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a +hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, +lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up. + +Reply Obj. 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed +that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which +weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be +wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the +Third Part of this work (Suppl., Q. 82, seqq.). +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 7] + +Whether Any External Goods Are Necessary for Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for +Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs +to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for +instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Luke +22:30): "That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom": and +(Matt. 6:20): "Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven": and (Matt. +25:34): "Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom." +Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is +"a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But some +of man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as +Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are +necessary for Happiness. + +Obj. 3: Further, Our Lord said (Matt. 5:12): "Your reward is very +great in heaven." But to be in heaven implies being in a place. +Therefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 72:25): "For what have I in +heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?" As though to +say: "I desire nothing but this, "--"It is good for me to adhere to my +God." Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness. + +_I answer that,_ For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this +life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence +of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which +consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. For +man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the +operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active +virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of +which to perform its operations. + +On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for +perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is +that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support +of the animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human +life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that +perfect Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the +soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then +no longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are +nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the +animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, +as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of action to the +likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need +of these goods of the body as stated in _Ethic._ x, 8. + +Reply Obj. 1: All those material promises contained in Holy +Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture +is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things +corporeal, in order "that from things we know, we may rise to the +desire of things unknown," as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus +food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the +sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to +union of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: These goods that serve for the animal life, are +incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness +consists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate +of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we +shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness. + +Reply Obj. 3: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte +i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of +the saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. +Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be +appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of +a certain fitness and adornment. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 8] + +Whether the Fellowship of Friends Is Necessary for Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. +For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the +name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the +notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for +Happiness. + +Obj. 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6] says that "there is no +delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it +with us." But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship +of friends is also necessary. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity +includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that +fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to +me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in +contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for +Happiness. + +_I answer that,_ If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy +man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, +indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to +delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation +of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may +do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and +again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order +that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in +those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends. + +But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly +Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness; +since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the +fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence +Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures +receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, +and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from +without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and +rejoice in God, at their fellowship." + +Reply Obj. 1: That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that +which man has, not with man but with God. + +Reply Obj. 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession of +good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question +under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of +every good. + +Reply Obj. 3: Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to +the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if +there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though +having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, +love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, +friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness. +________________________ + +QUESTION 5 + +OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading +there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether man can attain Happiness? + +(2) Whether one man can be happier than another? + +(3) Whether any man can be happy in this life? + +(4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost? + +(5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers? + +(6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher +creature? + +(7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may +obtain Happiness of God? + +(8) Whether every man desires Happiness? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 1] + +Whether Man Can Attain Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just +as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is +above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in +several passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive +nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore +neither can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of the +intellectual nature, which is Happiness. + +Obj. 2: Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure +Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material +things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the +phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness. + +Obj. 3: Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. +But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle. +Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount +is midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot +attain Happiness. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 93:12): "Blessed is the man +whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord." + +_I answer that,_ Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. +Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain +Happiness. Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved +both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect +good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can +attain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that man is +capable of seeing God, as stated in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 1): in +which vision, as we stated above (Q. 3, A. 8) man's perfect Happiness +consists. + +Reply Obj. 1: The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise +than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational +exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its +knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the +universal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the +intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing +the same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps +forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry +of reason, as was made clear in the First Part (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, +A. 8). Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which +the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain +Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but +otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith +after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a +time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end. + +Reply Obj. 2: To man in the present state of life the natural way of +knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this +state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the First +Part (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 89, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature +so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an +operation of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the +angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it, +he will be perfectly happy. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 2] + +Whether One Man Can Be Happier Than Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than +another. For Happiness is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher +says (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of +virtue; because it is written (Matt. 20:10) that all who labor in the +vineyard "received every man a penny"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix +in Evang.), "each was equally rewarded with eternal life." Therefore +one man cannot be happier than another. + +Obj. 2: Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can +surpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be +surpassed by another's. + +Obj. 3: Further, since Happiness is "the perfect and sufficient good" +(Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire is not +at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack +nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. +Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other +Happiness can be greater. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 14:2): "In My Father's house +there are many mansions"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii +in Joan.) signify "the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal +life." But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to +merit, is Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of +Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), Happiness +implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign +Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As to that +Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one +Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one +Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. +But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be +happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the +happier he is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, +happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment +of Him. And in this sense one man can be happier than another. + +Reply Obj. 1: The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its +object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the +divers degrees of enjoyment. + +Reply Obj. 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as +it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good. + +Reply Obj. 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; +since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is "the good of all +good," as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be +happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same +good. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness, +since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): "He who knows Thee, and others +besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing +Thee alone." +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 3] + +Whether One Can Be Happy in This Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For +it is written (Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who +walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore +one can be happy in this life. + +Obj. 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does +not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be +happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good +in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. +Therefore man can be happy in this life. + +Obj. 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: +since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature +does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in +this life, as appears from Ps. 143:15: "They have called the people +happy that hath these things," to wit, the good things in this life. +Therefore one can be happy in this life. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 14:1): "Man born of a woman, +living for a short time, is filled with many miseries." But Happiness +excludes misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life. + +_I answer that,_ A certain participation of Happiness can be had in +this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. +This may be seen from a twofold consideration. + +First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a +"perfect and sufficient good," it excludes every evil, and fulfils +every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For +this present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance +on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of +the appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as +Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the +desire for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires +the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present +life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally +desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally +shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness +in this life. + +Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, +viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in +this life, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 11). Hence it is +evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on +account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, +according to Rom. 8:24: "We are saved by hope"; or on account of a +certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment +of the Sovereign Good. + +Reply Obj. 2: The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to +one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, +which is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the +nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the +part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, +in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the +way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy +the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an +operation, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 2), the true nature of Happiness +is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the +subject. + +Reply Obj. 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be +had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness. +And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 4] + +Whether Happiness Once Had Can Be Lost? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness +is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected +according to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his +nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in +a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose +Happiness. + +Obj. 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and +the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed to +opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation +whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy. + +Obj. 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's +Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore +it seems that it has an end. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 25:46) of the righteous that +"they shall go . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated +(A. 2), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases +not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost. + +_I answer that,_ If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be +had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of +contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for +instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by +certain occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from +contemplation. + +This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be +changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that +happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain +unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, +in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it +away altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby +man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the +happiness of this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be +contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher +state (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, +but "as men," whose nature is subject to change. + +But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this +life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following +the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy +after the final Happiness. + +This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the +general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect and +sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude +every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he +has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity +be troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing +that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness +that man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he +possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never will +lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he +should have a false opinion: because the false is the evil of the +intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2. +Consequently he will no longer be truly happy, if evil be in him. + +Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of +Happiness. For it has been shown above (Q. 3, A. 8) that man's +perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now +it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to +see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be +without, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being +desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, +by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine +Essence fills the soul with all good things, since it unites it to +the source of all goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall +be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good +things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of +wisdom. In like manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to +it; because it is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): +"Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any +tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake +Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, +through God taking it away from him. Because, since the withdrawal of +Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just +Judge, except for some fault; and he that sees God cannot fall into a +fault, since rectitude of the will, of necessity, results from that +vision as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 4). Nor again can it be withdrawn +by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised +above all other things: and consequently no other agent can sever the +mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time +goes on, man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; +because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as +are subject to time and movement. + +Reply Obj. 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes +every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has +it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which +raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all +change. + +Reply Obj. 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things which +are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, to +the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to +wish to be happy. + +Reply Obj. 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the +participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the +good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning +of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 5] + +Whether Man Can Attain Happiness by His Natural Powers? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his +natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But +nothing is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last +end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man +can attain Happiness by his natural powers. + +Obj. 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, +it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational +creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more +therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers. + +Obj. 3: Further, Happiness is a "perfect operation," according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs to +the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the +imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, +is subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own +actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i.e. +Happiness, by his natural powers. + +_On the contrary,_ Man is naturally the principle of his action, by +his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, +surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor. +2:9) "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into +the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love +Him." Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers. + +_I answer that,_ Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, +can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as +virtue, in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak +further on (Q. 63). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q. +3, A. 8), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the +vision of God's Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but +also of every creature, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 4). +For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the +mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De +Causis; Prop. viii) that "it knows things that are above it, and +things that are below it, according to the mode of its substance." +But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created +substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which +infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, +nor any creature, can attain final Happiness by his natural powers. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, +although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it +provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with +which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it +fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal +to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him +free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy. +"For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by +ourselves" (Ethic. iii, 3). + +Reply Obj. 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although it +needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble +condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains +some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order +to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is +better disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by +means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, +without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, +which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine +assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational +creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains +some imperfect good by its natural powers. + +Reply Obj. 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, +they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of +necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that +can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final +perfection. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's +natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation +which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its +object. Consequently the argument does not prove. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 6] + +Whether Man Attains Happiness Through the Action of Some Higher +Creature? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the +action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a +twofold order in things--one, of the parts of the universe to one +another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside +the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end +(Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is +dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the +order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the +parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the +lower, as stated in the First Part (Q. 109, A. 2): while happiness +consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, +i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz. +an angel, acting on him. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced +to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially hot, +is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is +potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually happy by an +angel who is actually happy. + +Obj. 3: Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect +as stated above (Q. 3, A. 4). But an angel can enlighten man's +intellect as shown in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1). Therefore an +angel can make a man happy. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give +grace and glory." + +_I answer that,_ Since every creature is subject to the laws of +nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: +that which surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of +any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above +nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to +life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been +shown above (A. 5) that Happiness is a good surpassing created +nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the +action of any creature: but by God alone is man made happy, if we +speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect +happiness, the same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose +act it consists. + +Reply Obj. 1: It often happens in the case of active powers ordained +to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the +last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that +last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of +sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a +ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of +the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of +his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: +whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which +is God. + +Reply Obj. 2: When a form exists perfectly and naturally in +something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for +instance a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in +something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle +whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the _intention_ of +color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed +can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something +else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to +infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is in God +perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly +and by likeness or participation. Consequently no creature can +communicate its Happiness to another. + +Reply Obj. 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a +lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as to +the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the First Part (Q. +106, A. 1): since in order to see this, all are immediately +enlightened by God. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 7] + +Whether Any Good Works Are Necessary That Man May Receive Happiness +from God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he +may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite +power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of +matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man's works, +since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause +thereof, as stated above (A. 6), can be required only as +dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not require dispositions +before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so +is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established +nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or +action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect +forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows +Happiness on man without any previous works. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:6) that Happiness is of the +man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works +of man are necessary for attaining Happiness. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 13:17): "If you know these +things, you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is +obtained through works. + +_I answer that,_ Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 4), +is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right +order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for +obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order +to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man +need precede his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right +tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as +sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the +form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be +thus; for as is stated in _De Coelo_ ii, 12, "of those things that +have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one has it without +movement, some by one movement, some by several." Now to possess the +perfect good without movement, belongs to that which has it +naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. +Therefore it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards Happiness +by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every +created nature, no pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, +without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the +angel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according +to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, +as was explained in the First Part (Q. 62, A. 5); whereas man obtains +it by many movements of works which are called merits. Wherefore also +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward +of works of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; +not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows +Happiness, but that the order in things be observed. + +Reply Obj. 2: God produced the first creatures so that they are +perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of +the creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the +various species, that through them nature might be propagated to +their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed +on others through Christ, who is God and Man, "Who," according to +Heb. 2:10, "had brought many children into glory"; therefore, from +the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any +previous meritorious operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for +Christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, +though they have no merits of their own; because by Baptism they are +made members of Christ. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which +is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account +of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness +is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends towards +Happiness. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 8] + +Whether Every Man Desires Happiness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man +can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object +of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness +is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin. +xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the +body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in other things." Therefore +not all desire Happiness. + +Obj. 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine +Essence, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 8). But some consider it +impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire +it not. Therefore all men do not desire Happiness. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he +who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all do not +desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish +to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor +had said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,' +he would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge +in his will." Therefore everyone desires to be happy. + +_I answer that,_ Happiness can be considered in two ways. First +according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, +every man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness +consists in the perfect good, as stated above (AA. 3, 4). But since +good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that +which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happiness +is nothing else than to desire that one's will be satisfied. And this +everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its +specific notion, as to that in which it consists. And thus all do not +know Happiness; because they know not in what thing the general +notion of happiness is found. And consequently, in this respect, not +all desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the +intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real +distinction, there may be a distinction according to the +consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same +thing is desired in one way, and not desired in another. So that +happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is +the general notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of +necessity tends thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered +under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation +itself, or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the +object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity. + +Reply Obj. 3: This definition of Happiness given by some--"Happy is +the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is +fulfilled," is a good and adequate definition, if it be understood in +a certain way; but an inadequate definition if understood in another. +For if we understand it simply of all that man desires by his natural +appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is +happy: since nothing satisfies man's natural desire, except the +perfect good which is Happiness. But if we understand it of those +things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, +thus it does not belong to Happiness, to have certain things that man +desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the +possession of such things hinders man from having all that he desires +naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things +that are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through +taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to include +perfect Happiness--that he "desires nothing amiss": although the +first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, that "happy is he +who has all he desires." +________________________ + +TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ. 6-21) +________________________ + +QUESTION 6 + +OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY +(In Eight Articles) + +Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, +we must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what +acts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from +obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with +things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete +unless it take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, +therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the +general principles; and secondly matters of detail. + +In treating of the general principles, the points that offer +themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) +their principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others +are common to man and animals. And since Happiness is man's proper +good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection +with Happiness than have those which are common to man and the other +animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to +man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other +animals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a +twofold consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What +distinguishes human acts? + +And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, +because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we +must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary. + +First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in +general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited +by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those +acts which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue +from the will through the medium of the other powers. + +And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to +which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider +the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances +of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under +the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts? + +(2) Whether in irrational animals? + +(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action? + +(4) Whether violence can be done to the will? + +(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness? + +(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness? + +(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness? + +(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 1] + +Whether There Is Anything Voluntary in Human Acts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human +acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself." +as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De +Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the +principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since +man's appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is +outside him, and is as a "mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10). +Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in +animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from +without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal. +Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and +therefore there is nothing voluntary in them. + +Obj. 3: Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But +this is not true of man; for it is written (John 15:5): "Without Me +you can do nothing." Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human +acts. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the +voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation." Now such are +human acts. Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts. + +_I answer that,_ There must needs be something voluntary in human +acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the +principle of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that +which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is +outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this +movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, +the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things +that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some +not. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an +end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2); those are perfectly moved by an +intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of +movement but of movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be +done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, +whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has +some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its +act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other +hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an +intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle +of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in +something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end +is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle +of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like +things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. +But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move +themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not +only act but also act for an end. And consequently, since both are +from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act +for an end, the movements of such things are said to be voluntary: +for the word "voluntary" implies that their movements and acts are +from their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the +definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [*See +Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as having "a principle +within" the agent, but also as implying "knowledge." Therefore, since +man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his +acts especially is the voluntary to be found. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, +although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be +within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of +the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by +an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary +act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet again it +must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be first +in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things subject +to alteration, the first principle of alteration is a heavenly body, +which nevertheless is not the first mover simply, but is moved +locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the +voluntary act, i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first +principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved +by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement. + +Reply Obj. 2: New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a +motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by +means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with +something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite. +Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him, +begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far as some +extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as +in the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by +the motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the +power of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens +that through some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to +the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of +voluntariness, as stated above (ad 1), for such movements caused by +an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement. + +Reply Obj. 3: God moves man to act, not only by proposing the +appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but +also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the +will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as +it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from +God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God +moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, +that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. +Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this in common, +that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within +the agent. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 2] + +Whether There Is Anything Voluntary in Irrational Animals? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in +irrational animals. For a thing is called "voluntary" from _voluntas_ +(will). Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it +cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything +voluntary in them. + +Obj. 2: Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said +to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters +of their actions; for "they act not; rather are they acted upon," as +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no such +thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals. + +Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that "voluntary +acts lead to praise and blame." But neither praise nor blame is due +to the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not +voluntary. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "both +children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary." The +same is said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa +[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii.]. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it is essential to the +voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with +some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold; +perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not +only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it +under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that +end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But +imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the +end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship +of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by +irrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative +power. + +Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect +voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from +deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, +to gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the +imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but +does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the +voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature: +whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even +irrational animals. + +Reply Obj. 1: The will is the name of the rational appetite; and +consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word +"voluntary" is derived from "voluntas" (will), and can be extended to +those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of +likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to +irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through +some kind of knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 2: The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to +his being able to deliberate about them: for since the deliberating +reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be +inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness is in +irrational animals, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act, +wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in +irrational animals. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 3] + +Whether There Can Be Voluntariness Without Any Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any +act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing +can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act +of the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will, +so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish. But not +to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness. +Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will +ceases. + +Obj. 3: Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated +above (AA. 1, 2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore +voluntariness cannot be without some act. + +_On the contrary,_ The word "voluntary" is applied to that of which +we are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to +act, to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will +are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will. + +_I answer that,_ Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one +thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which +sense something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; +for instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense +something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus +the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having +ceased to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows +from want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only +then when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were +unable to steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to +him, the sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although +it might be due to his absence from the helm. + +Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes +ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and +not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And +thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes +without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one +wills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when +one does not will to act. + +Reply Obj. 1: We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that which +proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to that +which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction. + +Reply Obj. 2: "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as though +it were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish." Consequently +just as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is, "I wish not +to read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to wish not to +read," and in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness. +Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of the will is +affirmed. And in this sense "not to wish" does not imply +involuntariness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same +way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in +one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to +wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is +voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 4] + +Whether Violence Can Be Done to the Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For +everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there +is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. +Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him. + +Obj. 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active +principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force: +for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is +sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it +is compelled. + +Obj. 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to +nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature; +as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to +nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the +movement of the will can be compelled. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is +done by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under +compulsion is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the +will, cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to +act. + +_I answer that,_ The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate +act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an +act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of +some other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which are +commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power. + +As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer +violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from +executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, +violence cannot be done to the will. + +The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than +an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge: +just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an +interior principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or +violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to +the nature of the will's own act, that it should be subject to +compulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the nature of +a natural inclination or movement. For a stone may have an upward +movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its +natural inclination is impossible. In like manner a man may be +dragged by force: but it is contrary to the very notion of violence, +that he be dragged of his own will. + +Reply Obj. 1: God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move +the will of man, according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is +in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But +if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the +will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against +the will. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not always a violent movement, when a passive +subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is done +against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise +every alteration and generation of simple bodies would be unnatural +and violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural +interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In +like manner when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, +by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary. + +Reply Obj. 3: That to which the will tends by sinning, although in +reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless +is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as +it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some +vicious habit. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 5] + +Whether Violence Causes Involuntariness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that violence does not cause +involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness +in respect of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as +shown above (A. 4). Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, +as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, +5) say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved +thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness. + +Obj. 3: Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But +some violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when a man +with a heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a +way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does +not cause involuntariness. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De +Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that "things done under compulsion are +involuntary." + +_I answer that,_ Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as +likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this +in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas +violence is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as +in things devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against +nature: so in things endowed with knowledge, it effects something +against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be +"unnatural"; and in like manner that which is against the will is +said to be "involuntary." Therefore violence causes involuntariness. + +Reply Obj. 1: The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has +been said (A. 4) that not only the act, which proceeds immediately +from the will, is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the +will. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the +will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above (A. 4): +wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the +commanded act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this +respect violence causes involuntariness. + +Reply Obj. 2: As that is said to be natural, which is according to +the inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is +according to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be +natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an +active principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. +Secondly, according to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is +in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic +principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by +reason of the natural aptitude in a heavenly body to receive such +movement; although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. +In like manner an act is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in +regard to action, for instance, when one wishes to be passive to +another. Hence when action is brought to bear on something, by an +extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in +the passive subject, there is not violence simply: for although the +patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being +willing to suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the movement of +an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural +inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is +nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which it is natural +to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent, +not simply but in a certain respect. The same remark applies in the +case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary to their +natural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect, i.e. +as to that particular limb; but not simply, i.e. as to the man +himself. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 6] + +Whether Fear Causes Involuntariness Simply? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply. +For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the +time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. +But violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes +involuntariness simply. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever +be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it +remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done +through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with the +addition of fear, it is involuntary. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is +such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any +condition, is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a +condition, is necessary in some respect: but what is necessary +absolutely, is necessary simply. But that which is done through +fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a +condition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided. +Therefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary simply. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and +the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done +through fear are "voluntary rather than involuntary." + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise +Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such +things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly +voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, +considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in +this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared. + +But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary +rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but +involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, +according as it is in act; but according as it is only in +apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect. Now that +which is done through fear, is in act in so far as it is done. For, +since acts are concerned with singulars; and the singular, as such, +is here and now; that which is done is in act, in so far as it is +here and now and under other individuating circumstances. And that +which is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and +now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it +hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the +cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear +of the danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And +hence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary, +because its principle is within. But if we consider what is done +through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is +repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. +And consequently what is done through fear is involuntary, considered +in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of +the case. + +Reply Obj. 1: Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only +according to present and future time, but also in this, that the will +does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done +through compulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes +voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its +own sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to +avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act +are satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary: +since the voluntary is not only what we wish, for its own sake, as an +end, but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end. +It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will +does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will +does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. +Hom. xxx.] says, in order to exclude things done through fear, a +violent action is defined as not only one, "the princip[le] whereof +is from without," but with the addition, "in which he that suffers +violence concurs not at all"; because the will of him that is in +fear, does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear. + +Reply Obj. 2: Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever +be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but +things that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared +with different things. For what is big in comparison with one thing, +is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be +voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were absolutely; but also +for the sake of something else, as it were relatively. Accordingly, +nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with +one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared with another. + +Reply Obj. 3: That which is done through fear, is voluntary without +any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but +it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such +a fear were not threatening. Consequently, this argument proves +rather the opposite. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 7] + +Whether Concupiscence Causes Involuntariness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness. +For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes +involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so +too. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to +that which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through +concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. +Therefore concupiscence does so also. + +Obj. 3: Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But +concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, +5) that "delight," or the lust of pleasure, "destroys the judgment of +prudence." Therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24): "The +involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with +regret." But neither of these can be said of that which is done out +of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause +involuntariness. + +_I answer that,_ Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on +the contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to +be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now +concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of +concupiscence. Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make +something to be voluntary rather than involuntary. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fear regards evil, but concupiscence regards good. Now +evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with +the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to +cause involuntariness. + +Reply Obj. 2: He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the +will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts +from concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent man, does not retain his +former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; +for his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he +repudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is +involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from +concupiscence is nowise involuntary. For the man who yields to +concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but +not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts +counter to that which in itself he desires now. + +Reply Obj. 3: If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, +as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would +follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet +properly speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary, +because in things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor +involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done from +concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the +power of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual +consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this +itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is +in the power of the will, for example "not to act" or "not to will," +and in like manner "not to consider"; for the will can resist the +passion, as we shall state later on (Q. 10, A. 3; Q. 77, A.) +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 8] + +Whether Ignorance Causes Involuntariness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not cause +involuntariness. For "the involuntary act deserves pardon," as +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But sometimes that which is +done through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to 1 Cor. +14:38: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore +ignorance does not cause involuntariness. + +Obj. 2: Further, every sin implies ignorance; according to Prov. +14:22: "They err, that work evil." If, therefore, ignorance causes +involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary: which +is opposed to the saying of Augustine, that "every sin is voluntary" +(De Vera Relig. xiv). + +Obj. 3: Further, "involuntariness is not without sadness," as +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But some things are done out +of ignorance, but without sadness: for instance, a man may kill a +foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing +a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the +Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is done through ignorance +is involuntary." + +_I answer that,_ If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is in so far +as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of +voluntariness, as was declared above (A. 1). But it is not every +ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we must +take note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of +the will: in one way, "concomitantly"; in another, "consequently"; in +a third way, "antecedently." "Concomitantly," when there is ignorance +of what is done; but, so that even if it were known, it would be +done. For then, ignorance does not induce one to wish this to be +done, but it just happens that a thing is at the same time done, and +not known: thus in the example given (Obj. 3) a man did indeed wish +to kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill a +stag. And ignorance of this kind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. +iii, 1), does not cause involuntariness, since it is not the cause +of anything that is repugnant to the will: but it causes +"non-voluntariness," since that which is unknown cannot be actually +willed. Ignorance is "consequent" to the act of the will, in so far +as ignorance itself is voluntary: and this happens in two ways, in +accordance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary (A. 3). First, +because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance: as +when a man wishes not to know, that he may have an excuse for sin, +or that he may not be withheld from sin; according to Job 21:14: "We +desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." And this is called "affected +ignorance." Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary, when it +regards that which one can and ought to know: for in this sense "not +to act" and "not to will" are said to be voluntary, as stated above +(A. 3). And ignorance of this kind happens, either when one does not +actually consider what one can and ought to consider; this is called +"ignorance of evil choice," and arises from some passion or habit: or +when one does not take the trouble to acquire the knowledge which one +ought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of +law, which one to know, is voluntary, as being due to negligence. +Accordingly, if in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it +cannot cause involuntariness simply. Nevertheless it causes +involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the +movement of the will towards the act, which movement would not be, if +there were knowledge. Ignorance is "antecedent" to the act of the +will, when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's willing +what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some +circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result +being that he does that which he would not do, if he knew of that +circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, +may not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots +an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness +simply. + +From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the +first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know. +The second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain +extent, as stated above. The third, with that ignorance which is +concomitant with the act of the will. +________________________ + +QUESTION 7 + +OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head +there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) What is a circumstance? + +(2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of +human acts? + +(3) How many circumstances are there? + +(4) Which are the most important of them? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 1] + +Whether a Circumstance Is an Accident of a Human Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of +a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a +circumstance is that from "which an orator adds authority and +strength to his argument." But oratorical arguments are derived +principally from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as +the definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which also +Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a +circumstance is not an accident of a human act. + +Obj. 2: Further, "to be in" is proper to an accident. But that which +surrounds (_circumstat_) is rather out than in. Therefore the +circumstances are not accidents of human acts. + +Obj. 3: Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts +themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not +accidents of acts. + +_On the contrary,_ The particular conditions of any singular thing +are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. +iii, 1) calls the circumstances particular things [*_ta kath' +ekasta_], i.e. the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the +circumstances are individual accidents of human acts. + +_I answer that,_ Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), +"words are the signs of what we understand," it must needs be that in +naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now +our intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the less +known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are +transferred so as to signify things less obvious: and hence it is +that, as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4, "the notion of distance has been +transferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of +opposition": and in like manner words that signify local movement are +employed to designate all other movements, because bodies which are +circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And hence it is that +the word "circumstance" has passed from located things to human acts. + +Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is +outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, +whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in +some way touch the human act, are called circumstances. Now what is +outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is +called its accident. Wherefore the circumstances of human acts should +be called their accidents. + +Reply Obj. 1: The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first +place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the +circumstances of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first, +through being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it +fraudulently, or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, +and so forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly that +the orator "adds strength to his argument," as though this were +something secondary. + +Reply Obj. 2: A thing is said to be an accident of something in two +ways. First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said to be +an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that +thing in the same subject: thus, whiteness is an accident of the art +of music, inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch +one another, as it were. And in this sense circumstances are said to +be the accidents of human acts. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (ad 2), an accident is said to +be the accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in the +same subject. But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two +accidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation +to one another; as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates. +Secondly, when such accidents are related to one another; as when the +subject receives one accident by means of the other; for instance, a +body receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one +accident said to be in another; for we speak of color as being in the +surface. + +Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For +some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent +otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person; +whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner +in which the act is done. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 2] + +Whether Theologians Should Take Note of the Circumstances of Human +Acts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of +the circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider +human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. +But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for +a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is +outside it; but by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should +not take note of the circumstances of acts. + +Obj. 2: Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one +thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the +Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers +accidental being, except only the art of sophistry." Therefore the +theologian has not to consider circumstances. + +Obj. 3: Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the +orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not +a theologian's business to consider circumstances. + +_On the contrary,_ Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be +involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and +Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness +excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the +theologian. Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the +theologian. + +_I answer that,_ Circumstances come under the consideration of the +theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian +considers human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to +Happiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should be +proportionate to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end +by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due +circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the +circumstances. Secondly, because the theologian considers human acts +according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and +this diversity depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on +(Q. 18, AA. 10, 11; Q. 73, A. 7). Thirdly, because the theologian +considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is +proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be +voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary, +according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above +(Q. 6, A. 8). Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances. + +Reply Obj. 1: Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this +implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. +i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in +the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according to +that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which +is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and +"left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the +goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing +hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion +to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them. + +Reply Obj. 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected +by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such +like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because +circumstances although, as stated above (A. 1), they are extrinsic to +the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being +related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the +consideration of art. + +Reply Obj. 3: The consideration of circumstances belongs to the +moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far +as with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue +in human acts and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in +so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of +excuse or indictment. In different ways, however: because where the +orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this +consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all +the other arts are subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and +vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and +politician he considers acts according as they are deserving of +reward or punishment. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 3] + +Whether the Circumstances Are Properly Set Forth in the Third Book of +Ethics? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the circumstances are not properly +set forth in _Ethic._ iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is +described as something outside the act. Now time and place answer to +this description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to wit, +"when" and "where." + +Obj. 2: Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is +well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore +all the circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of +acting." + +Obj. 3: Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an +act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance. +Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act +itself. Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about what," are +circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to +the final cause, and "about what" to the material cause. + +On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in _Ethic._ iii, +1. + +_I answer that,_ Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives +seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse: + +"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando-- + +"Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when." + +For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or +"instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he +did it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in _Ethic._ iii, 1 +adds yet another, to wit, "about what," which Tully includes in the +circumstance "what." + +The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a +circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the +act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: +first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as +it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the +effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as +"time" and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting." +It touches the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the +cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why"; +as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about +what"; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance +"who"; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the +circumstance "by what aids." + +Reply Obj. 1: Time and place surround (_circumstant_) the act by way of +measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other +way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act. + +Reply Obj. 2: This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance, but +results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a +quality of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a +man walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth. + +Reply Obj. 3: A condition of the cause, on which the substance of the +act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional +condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of +theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to the +substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same +applies to the other circumstances which are considered in reference +to the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a +circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act +_valiantly for the sake of_ the good of the virtue o[f] fortitude, is +not a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the +delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The +same is to be said with regard to the circumstance "what"; for that a +man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a +circumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a +chill, or scald him; heal him or harm him, these are circumstances. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 4] + +Whether the Most Important Circumstances Are "Why" and "In What the +Act Consists"? + +Objection 1: It would seem that these are not the most important +circumstances, namely, "why" and those "in which the act is, [*_hen ois +e praxis_]" as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1. For those in which the act is +seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most +important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most +extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things in which the act is are +not the most important circumstances. + +Obj. 2: Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it +is not the most important circumstance. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to +each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the +person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which +it is done. Therefore these two circumstances seem to be of the +greatest importance. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.] +says that "the most important circumstances" are "why it is done" and +"what is done." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), acts are properly +called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and +object of the will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the +most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, +viz. the circumstance "why": and the second in importance, is that +which touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance +"what he did." As to the other circumstances, they are more or less +important, according as they more or less approach to these. + +Reply Obj. 1: By those things "in which the act is" the Philosopher +does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that are +affixed to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De +Nat. Hom. xxxi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the +Philosopher, instead of the latter's term--"in which the act +is"--said, "what is done." + +Reply Obj. 2: Although the end is not part of the substance of the +act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it +moves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly +by the end. + +Reply Obj. 3: The person that does the act is the cause of +that act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is +chiefly in this respect that he is directed to the act; while other +conditions of the person have not such an important relation to the +act. As to the mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in +an act the substantial form depends on the object and term or end; but +it is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act. +________________________ + +QUESTION 8 + +OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS +(In Three Articles) + +We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first +place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as +being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded +by the will. + +Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must +therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to +the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it +seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end; +viz. "volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1) +volition; (2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three +things must be considered: + +(1) Of what things is the will? + +(2) By what is the will moved? + +(3) How is it moved? + +Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the will is of good only? + +(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means? + +(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end +and to the means, by the same movement? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 8, Art. 1] + +Whether the Will Is of Good Only? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the +same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white and +black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only +of good, but also of evil. + +Obj. 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite +purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will +is a rational power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in _De +Anima_ iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and +consequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to +evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is +directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we +wish "not to walk," or "not to speak"; and again at times we wish for +future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not +of good only. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is +outside the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good." + +_I answer that,_ The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite +is only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is +nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing +towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and +suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, +inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be +that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the +Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all +desire." + +But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a +form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature +of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or +rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an +apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to +good existing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends +to a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will +tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very +truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher +says (Phys. ii, 3) that "the end is a good, or an apparent good." + +Reply Obj. 1: The same power regards opposites, but it is not +referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred +both to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by +shunning it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called "volition" +[*In Latin, 'voluntas'. To avoid confusion with "voluntas" (the will) +St. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may +appear superfluous.], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is +in this sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other +hand, the shunning of evil is better described as "nolition": +wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite +purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object; +for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of +the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite +purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at +rest, to speak or to be silent, and such like: for the will can be +directed to either under the aspect of good. + +Reply Obj. 3: That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a +being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said to +be "beings of reason." In this way, too, future things, in so far as +they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as such like +are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is +thus that the will is directed to them. Wherefore the Philosopher +says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered as a good." +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 8, Art. 2] + +Whether Volition Is of the End Only, or Also of the Means? + +Objection 1: It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of +the end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition +is of the end, while choice is of the means." + +Obj. 2: Further, "For objects differing in genus there are +corresponding different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the +end and the means are in different genera of good: because the end, +which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus +"quality," or "action," or "passion"; whereas the good which is +useful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus "relation" (Ethic. +i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means. + +Obj. 3: Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are +perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical +arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the +use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the) +helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the +end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition +is of the end, it is not of the means. + +_On the contrary,_ In natural things, it is by the same power that a +thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. +But the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives +at the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is +also of the means. + +_I answer that,_ The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power +of the will, sometimes its act [*See note to A. 1, Reply Obj. 1]. +Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both +to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things +in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in +any way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever +that are in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the +object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, +but also in the means. + +If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly +speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated +from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to +understand" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the +simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the +object of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is +the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. +On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, +but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, +only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in +them, is the end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things +that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not +speak of understanding with regard to things known through first +principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things. +For in morals the end is what principles are in speculative science +(Ethic. viii, 8). + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to +the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power of the will. + +Reply Obj. 2: There are different powers for objects that differ in +genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color are +different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and +sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but +are as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to +another. Now such like objects are always referred to the same power; +for instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by +which color is seen. + +Reply Obj. 3: Not everything that diversifies habits, diversifies the +powers: since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain +special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end +and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the +end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it +commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers the +means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the +end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every +practical art there is an end proper to it and means that belong +properly to that art. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 8, Art. 3] + +Whether the Will Is Moved by the Same Act to the End and to the Means? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to +the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic. +iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one." +But the will does not will the means save on account of the end. +Therefore it is moved to both by the same act. + +Obj. 2: Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just as +light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen +by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, +whereby it wills the end and the means. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is one and the same natural movement which tends +through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are in +comparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus. +Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it is directed +to the end and to the means. + +_On the contrary,_ Acts are diversified according to their objects. +But the end is a different species of good from the means, which are +a useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same +act. + +_I answer that,_ Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the +means, as such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the +will can be moved to the end, without being moved to the means; +whereas it cannot be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved +to the end. Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: +first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason +for willing the means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by +one and the same movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the +means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby the +will is moved to the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes +the other in time; for example when a man first wills to have health, +and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send +for the doctor to heal him. The same happens in regard to the +intellect: for at first a man understands the principles in +themselves; but afterwards he understands them in the conclusions, +inasmuch as he assents to the conclusions on account of the +principles. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument holds in respect of the will being moved +to the end as the reason for willing the means. + +Reply Obj. 2: Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light is +seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In like +manner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the +end; but not the conversely. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle +space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural +movement sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the +terminus; so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining +the end. But in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) +the end comes to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the +conclusions through the principles which are called "means." Hence it +is that sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not +proceed thence to the conclusion. And in like manner the will +sometimes wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means. + +The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what +has been said above (A. 2, ad 2). For the useful and the righteous +are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is +for its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else: +wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the +other; but not conversely. +________________________ + +QUESTION 9 + +OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there +are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect? + +(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite? + +(3) Whether the will moves itself? + +(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle? + +(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body? + +(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic +principle? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 1] + +Whether the Will Is Moved by the Intellect? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the +intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to +long for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire +follows sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds +delight us not." But it would not be so, if the will were moved by +the intellect: because movement of the movable results from motion of +the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to +the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in +representing the appetible object to the sensitive appetite. But the +imagination, in presenting the appetible object, does not remove the +sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no +more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all +(De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the +same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the +intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the +will. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the +appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover +moved." + +_I answer that,_ A thing requires to be moved by something in so far +as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in +potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to +do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in +potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to +acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. +Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and +sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a +mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and +as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part +of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: +while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the +act is specified. + +The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since +every agent acts for an end, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 2), the +principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the +art which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art +which is concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing +commands the art of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, +which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. +Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the +soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. +For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under +the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or +power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the +arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the +universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common +good--i.e. the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of +the captains, who intends the order of one company. + +On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after +the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions +are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is +universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect. +And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as +presenting its object to it. + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does +not move, but that it does not move of necessity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of +fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so +neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of +goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect +that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9). + +Reply Obj. 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its +act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the +intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. +But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from +the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is +apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal +true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in +the same respect. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 2] + +Whether the Will Is Moved by the Sensitive Appetite? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the +sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to +be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the +sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the +intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect. +Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. +But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows +the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the +movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the +universal apprehension of the intellect. + +Obj. 3: Further, as is proved in _Phys._ viii, 5, the mover is not +moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal +motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the +sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite +does not move the will. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 1:14): "Every man is tempted +by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But man +would not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were +moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. +Therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), that which is apprehended as +good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing +appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from +the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it +is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it +depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it +is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being +fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, +5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him." + +Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive +appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according +as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, +which does not seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems +good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. +And in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part +of the object. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in +itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly +the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in +respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he +is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent. + +Reply Obj. 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars. +Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a +particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that +something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in +which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and +concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a +slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic +sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can +nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and +concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing +hinders the will from being moved by them at times. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 3] + +Whether the Will Moves Itself? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For +every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in +potentiality; since "movement is the act of that which is in +potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 1]. Now the same is +not in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore +nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself. + +Obj. 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But +the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, +it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false. + +Obj. 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above +(A. 1). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the +same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems +unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself. + +_On the contrary,_ The will is mistress of its own act, and to it +belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not +the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the will to +move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's +object. Now, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 2), the end is in things +appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is +evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, +reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the +conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, +through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will moves +itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in +potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually +wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect +of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually. + +Reply Obj. 2: The power of the will is always actually present to +itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not +always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. +Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself. + +Reply Obj. 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by +itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: +whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in +respect of the end. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 4] + +Whether the Will Is Moved by an Exterior Principle? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything +exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is +essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, +just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of +the will is not from anything exterior. + +Obj. 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above +(Q. 6, A. 4). But the violent act is one "the principle of which is +outside the agent" [*Aristotle, _Ethic._ iii, 1]. Therefore the will +cannot be moved by anything exterior. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs +not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently. +Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior. + +_On the contrary,_ The will is moved by the object, as stated above +(A. 1). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered +to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior. + +_I answer that,_ As far as the will is moved by the object, it is +evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as +it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be +moved by some exterior principle. + +For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another +time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it +is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously +it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by +something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above +(A. 3), in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the +act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of +counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how +this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the +conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. +But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of +necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be +healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of +necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some +previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. +Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to +its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior +mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics +(vii, 14). + +Reply Obj. 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle +be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward +principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though +the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its +first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of +the natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves +nature. + +Reply Obj. 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that its +principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of +him that suffers violence." This does not happen when the will is +moved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though +moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were +counter to the movement of the will: which in the present case is +impossible; since then the will would will and not will the same +thing. + +Reply Obj. 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and +in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot +move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to +be moved by another as first mover. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 5] + +Whether the Will Is Moved by a Heavenly Body? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly +body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to +their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as +is proved in _Phys._ viii, 9. But human movements are various and +multiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. +Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the +heavens, which is uniform according to its nature. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the lower +bodies are moved by the higher." But the movements of the human body, +which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of +the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the +heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will. + +Obj. 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers +foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the +will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move +man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the +heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts." But they would be, +if the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the +heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly +bodies. + +_I answer that,_ It is evident that the will can be moved by the +heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is +to say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through +being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the +sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies. + +But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the +human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as +to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as +stated in _De Anima_ iii, 9, "is in the reason." Now the reason is a +power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows +that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it +is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the +reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more +formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever. +Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the +intellect or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) +ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the +theory that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father +of men and of gods bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to +Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the +sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved +accidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being +moved, whose acts they are. + +But since it has been stated (A. 2) that the intellectual appetite is +moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the +heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will; in so far as +the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive +appetite. + +Reply Obj. 1: The multiform movements of the human will are reduced +to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and +will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior +immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of +the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its +cause. + +Reply Obj. 2: The movements of the human body are reduced, as to +their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the +disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the +influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive +appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, +in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the +movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to +will or not to will something; for instance, when the body is +chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the +will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the +part of an inward instigation. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Cf. I, Q. 84, AA. 6, 7), the sensitive +appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason +why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like +passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by +reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led by +the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the +majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the +observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as +Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v), "the wise man governs the stars"; +which is a though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes +his will, which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the +heavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies. + +Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that +when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most +hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without +knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man, it must +be the work of the lying spirits." +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 6] + +Whether the Will Is Moved by God Alone, As Exterior Principle? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as +exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by +its superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. +But there is something which is higher than the will of man and below +God, namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel +also, as exterior principle. + +Obj. 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the +intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, +but also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. +Hier. iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by +an angel. + +Obj. 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things, +according to Gen. 1:31: "God saw all the things that He had made, and +they were very good." If, therefore man's will were moved by God +alone, it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby +"we sin and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9). + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh +in us" [Vulg.'you'] "both to will and to accomplish." + +_I answer that,_ The movement of the will is from within, as also is +the movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to +move a natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet +that alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature, can +cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards +by a man, who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this +movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the +stone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore +it is said in _Phys._ vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy +and light things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes +moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary +movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his +will, is impossible. + +Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is +evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the +rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was +stated in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 2). Secondly, it is evident from +the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore +nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is +the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, +and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a +universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is +potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent. + +Reply Obj. 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the +cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural +forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of +the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to +man's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a +creature from without, as stated above (A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 3: God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the +universal object of the will, which is good. And without this +universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines +himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent +good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing +of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom +He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (Q. 109, A. 2). +________________________ + +QUESTION 10 + +OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under +this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally? + +(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object? + +(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite? + +(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is +God? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 1] + +Whether the Will Is Moved to Anything Naturally? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything +naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary +agent, as stated at the beginning of _Phys._ ii, 1. Therefore the will +is not moved to anything naturally. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as +"being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will. +Therefore no movement is natural to the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will +is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing naturally. + +_On the contrary,_ The movement of the will follows the movement of +the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. +Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally. + +_I answer that,_ As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the +Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a +manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle +in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the +material form, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 1. In another sense nature +stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, +that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of +its substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now +all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which +they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that +thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense, +it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be +a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for +the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like +manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something +naturally willed. + +Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as +does each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which +stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first +principles of demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking +generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer +according to his nature. For it is not only things pertaining to the +will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each +power, and to the entire man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only +the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to +the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the +intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard +the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of +the will, as so many particular goods. + +Reply Obj. 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of +cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are +done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that +is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the +manner proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since +the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement +proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what +belongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because +in every thing, being itself, which is from nature, precedes +volition, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills +something naturally. + +Reply Obj. 2: In the case of natural things, that which is natural, +as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is +in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not +always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because +form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is "the act +of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 1). +Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard +to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always +move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [*The +Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven, +i.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner it is not necessary that the +will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills +something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it +is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is +pure act, is always in the act of volition. + +Reply Obj. 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding, +proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a +genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as +species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the +individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since, +therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some +one general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good; +just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, +which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in +general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the +will determined. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 2] + +Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by Its Object? + +Objection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its +object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover +to movable, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 10. But a mover, if it be +sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be +moved of necessity by its object. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the +intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as +stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, +by its object: therefore the will also, by its object. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something +ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily: +because it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which +principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason for +willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also +necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object. + +_On the contrary,_ The rational powers, according to the Philosopher +(Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational +power, since it is in the reason, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 9. +Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not +moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites. + +_I answer that,_ The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the +exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, +derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the +will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's +power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. +But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one +object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by +its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the +power. For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color +actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it +moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes away; which +belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted +with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in +some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of +necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the +object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it. +Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good +the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object +which is good universally and from every point of view, the will +tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it +cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered +an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend +to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a +non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking +in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this +is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they +are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this +point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which +can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view. + +Reply Obj. 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object +that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power. +If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move +of necessity, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object +which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that +which may be either true or false--viz. by that which is contingent: +as we have said of the good. + +Reply Obj. 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is +the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end, +and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to +live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be +gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as +he who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the +conclusions, without which the principles can still be true. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 3] + +Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by the Lower Appetite? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a +passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): "The +good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": +and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion. +Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 5, "according as a man is, +such does the end seem to him." But it is not in man's power to cast +aside a passion at once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to +will that to which the passion inclines him. + +Obj. 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular +effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the +universal reason does not move save by means of a particular +estimation, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 11. But as the universal +reason is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the +sensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something +particular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the +sensitive appetite happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a +passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 4:7): "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The +lust thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over +it." Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower +appetite. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 9, A. 2), the passion of the +sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by +its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such +and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, +which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this +influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his +reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as +happens in those who through a violent access of anger or +concupiscence become furious or insane, just as they may from some +other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place +without some change in the body. And of such the same is to be said +as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of +their passions: for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor, +consequently, of will. + +Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the +passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, +its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain +degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not +subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does +not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. +Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, +and the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of +the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement of +concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil +which I will not, that I do--i.e. I desire"; yet it is in the power +of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. +And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual +and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of +his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject +to his reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely +engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason +is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains free. And +in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at +least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion. +For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed according to +the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise +according to his reason, than it does according to a passion. + +Reply Obj. 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good +apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. +Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a +passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things +without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in +those cases wherein reason resists passion. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 4] + +Whether the Will Is Moved of Necessity by the Exterior Mover Which Is +God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by +God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But +God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it +is written (Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore God moves +the will of necessity. + +Obj. 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills +naturally, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3). But "whatever God does in a +thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). +Therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves +it. + +Obj. 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows +from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the +supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it: +because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual. Therefore +it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves +it. Therefore it wills it of necessity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from +the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." +Therefore He does not of necessity move man's will. + +_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to +Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of +things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their +conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, +effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects +follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active +principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent +relation to many things, God so moves it, that He does not determine +it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and +not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Divine will extends not only to the doing of +something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in +a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it +would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be +moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it +to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature. + +Reply Obj. 2: That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it +that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a +thing, according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not +wish that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for +instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to +be natural to each thing--that it be subject to the Divine power. + +Reply Obj. 3: If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible +with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is +not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will +is moved by God necessarily. +________________________ + +QUESTION 11 + +OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power? + +(2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to +irrational animals? + +(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end? + +(4) Whether it is only of the end possessed? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 1] + +Whether to Enjoy Is an Act of the Appetitive Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the +appetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the +fruit. But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as +shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), that receives the fruit of human life, +which is Happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the +appetitive power, but of the intellect. + +Obj. 2: Further, each power has its proper end, which is its +perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the +hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is +its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to +the appetite. + +Obj. 3: Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible +delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for the +same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore +enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive +power. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De +Trin. x, 10, 11): "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for +its own sake." But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore +also to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power. + +_I answer that,_ _Fruitio_ (enjoyment) and _fructus_ (fruit) seem to +refer to the same, one being derived from the other; which from +which, matters not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the +one which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those things +are most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it +seems that the word "fruition" is derived from sensible fruits. But +sensible fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce in the +last place, and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. +Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight +which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. Now +the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power. Wherefore +it is evident that fruition is the act of the appetitive power. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, +under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision +of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an +end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: +so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but +the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and +enjoying the end attained. + +Reply Obj. 2: The perfection and end of every other power is +contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is +contained in the common, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Hence the +perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs +to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the +other powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of +them reaches the end. + +Reply Obj. 3: In delight there are two things: perception of what is +becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency +in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the +appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 2] + +Whether to Enjoy Belongs to the Rational Creature Alone, or Also to +Irrational Animals? + +Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For +Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men +to enjoy and to use." Therefore other animals cannot enjoy. + +Obj. 2: Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational +animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to +enjoy. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the +intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the +sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite, +it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural +appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot +delight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: +and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so +absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily +pleasure." + +_I answer that,_ As was stated above (A. 1) to enjoy is not the act +of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that +commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the +appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of +achieving an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy body +has a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency. +Yet the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in +some higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in +things endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other powers to +their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge, +although they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is +only for those that are endowed with knowledge. + +Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect +knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is +the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and +the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On +the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the +good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational +animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are +moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. +Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect +degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not +at all. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment. + +Reply Obj. 2: Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of +that which each one chooses for his last end. + +Reply Obj. 3: The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so +the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 4: Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment. +This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it is not +so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it would +be, if one were to say that they "use." +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 3] + +Whether Enjoyment Is Only of the Last End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end. +For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in +the Lord." But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in +a man. Therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end. + +Obj. 2: Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says +(Gal. 5:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and +other like things, which are not in the nature of the last end. +Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end. + +Obj. 3: Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for I +will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will: +since "it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De +Trin. x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end +of man is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. +Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not +enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else." But the +last end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of +something else. Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) the notion of fruit implies +two things: first that it should come last; second, that it should +calm the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing +is last either simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to +nothing else; relatively, if it is the last in a particular series. +Therefore that which is last simply, and in which one delights as in +the last end, is properly called fruit; and this it is that one is +properly said to enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself, +but is desired, only as referred to something else, e.g. a bitter +potion for the sake of health, can nowise be called fruit. And that +which has something delightful about it, to which a number of +preceding things are referred, may indeed be called fruit in a +certain manner; but we cannot be said to enjoy it properly or as +though it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit. Hence Augustine +says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the delighted +will is at rest therein." But its rest is not absolute save in the +possession of the last end: for as long as something is looked for, +the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached +something. Thus in local movement, although any point between the two +terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered as an +actual end, except when the movement stops there. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), "if he had +said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would seem +to have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he +set his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him": as if +we were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as +a term but as a means. + +Reply Obj. 2: Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it, and +another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it, it is +compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final +object of his longing and the consummation of his delight. +Accordingly these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called +because they are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore +they are called "fruits of the spirit": but not as though we are to +enjoy them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are +called fruits because "we should desire them for their own sake": not +indeed as though they were not ordained to the last end; but because +they are such that we ought to find pleasure in them. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), we speak of +an end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing itself; +secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are not, of course, two +ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to +something else. Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is +ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of +this last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment +of God, another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, +and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to +created happiness which consists in enjoyment. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 4] + +Whether Enjoyment Is Only of the End Possessed? + +Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end +possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to +use joyfully, with the joy, not of hope, but of possession." But so +long as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of +hope. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 3), enjoyment is not properly +otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the +appetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the +end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end +possessed. + +Obj. 3: Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does +not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end. +Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed. + +_On the contrary,_ "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for +its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this +is possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our +possession. Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it +be not possessed. + +_I answer that,_ To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to +the last end, according as the will has something by way of last end. +Now an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. +Perfectly, when it is possessed not only in intention but also in +reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect +enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect +enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in +intention. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment. + +Reply Obj. 2: The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest. +First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last +end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one +who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of +it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent +depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or +imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent. +Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment +properly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment. But +enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly +speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it +is possessed. + +Reply Obj. 3: One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only +in reality, but also in intention, as stated above. +________________________ + +QUESTION 12 + +OF INTENTION +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will? + +(2) Whether it is only of the last end? + +(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time? + +(4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the +means? + +(5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 1] + +Whether Intention Is an Act of the Intellect or of the Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect, +and not of the will. For it is written (Matt. 6:22): "If thy eye be +single, thy whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to +Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention. +But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive +power. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the +apprehensive power. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that +Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Matt. 6:23): +"If the light that is in thee be darkness," etc. But light pertains +to knowledge. Therefore intention does too. + +Obj. 3: Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end. But +to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs not to the +will but to the reason. + +Obj. 4: Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the +means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called +volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from +which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act of the will. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4, 8, 9) that "the +intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the +images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's +inner thought." Therefore intention is an act of the will. + +_I answer that,_ Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, "to +tend to something." Now both the action of the mover and the movement +of thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing +moved tends to anything, is due to the action of the mover. +Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which +moves to the end: hence we say that an architect or anyone who is in +authority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now +the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown +above (Q. 9, A. 1). Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly +speaking, is an act of the will. + +Reply Obj. 1: The eye designates intention figuratively, not because +intention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes +knowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the latter +moves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our +bodies. + +Reply Obj. 2: Intention is called a light because it is manifest to +him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness because a man +knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as +Augustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13). + +Reply Obj. 3: The will does not ordain, but tends to something +according to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention" +indicates an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason +orders something to the end. + +Reply Obj. 4: Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. +Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, +absolutely; and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely +to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its +place of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it +considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained; +and thus "intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending +to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will +have it by means of something else. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 2] + +Whether Intention Is Only of the Last End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end. +For it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The +intention of the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of +the human heart. Therefore intention is always regards the last end. + +Obj. 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated +above (A. 1, ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore +intention always regards the last end. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as intention regards the end, so does +enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore +intention is too. + +_On the contrary,_ There is but one last end of human wills, viz. +Happiness, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7). If, therefore, intentions +were only of the last end, men would not have different intentions: +which is evidently false. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 4), intention regards the +end as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of +movement may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, +when the movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole +movement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one +part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in +the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B +is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both. +Consequently though intention is always of the end, it need not be +always of the last end. + +Reply Obj. 1: The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not +that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our +intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, +which intention has the force of a cry. + +Reply Obj. 2: A terminus is something last, not always in respect of +the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part. + +Reply Obj. 3: Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to +the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end, +not rest. Wherefore the comparison proves nothing. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 3] + +Whether One Can Intend Two Things at the Same Time? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one cannot intend several things at +the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14, 16, +17) that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God +and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to +any other two things. + +Obj. 2: Further, intention designates a movement of the will towards +a terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same direction +of one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several things at +the same time. + +Obj. 3: Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the +intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things at +the same time," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). +Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things at the same +time. + +_On the contrary,_ Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two +purposes by means of one instrument: thus "the tongue is for the +purpose of taste and speech" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the +same reason, art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to +two ends: so that one can intend several ends at the same time. + +_I answer that,_ The expression "two things" may be taken in two +ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if +they be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been +said, that a man can intend several things at the same time. For +intention is not only of the last end, as stated above (A. 2), but +also of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both +the proximate and the last end; as the mixing of a medicine and the +giving of health. + +But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus +also a man can intend several things at the same time. This is +evident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because +it is the better of the two. Now one of the reasons for which one +thing is better than another is that it is available for more +purposes: wherefore one thing can be chosen in preference to another, +because of the greater number of purposes for which it is available: +so that evidently a man can intend several things at the same time. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time +direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last +ends: since, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5), one man cannot have +several last ends. + +Reply Obj. 2: There can be several termini ordained to one another, +of the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless they +be ordained to one another. At the same time it must be observed that +what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason. Now +intention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by +the reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Wherefore where we have +many things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, in +so far as the reason takes them as one: either because two things +concur in the integrity of one whole, as a proper measure of heat and +cold conduce to health; or because two things are included in one +which may be intended. For instance, the acquiring of wine and +clothing is included in wealth, as in something common to both; +wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from +intending both the others. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 10; Q. 58, A. 2; +Q. 85, A. 4), it is possible to understand several things at the same +time, in so far as, in some way, they are one. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 4] + +Whether Intention of the End Is the Same Act As the Volition of the +Means? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the intention of the end and the +volition of the means are not one and the same movement. For +Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 6) that "the will to see the window, has +for its end the seeing of the window; and is another act from the +will to see, through the window, the passersby." But that I should +will to see the passersby, through the window, belongs to intention; +whereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the volition of the +means. Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means +are distinct movements of the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, acts are distinct according to their objects. But +the end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore the intention +of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the +will. + +Obj. 3: Further, the willing of the means is called choice. But +choice and intention are not the same. Therefore intention of the end +and the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will. + +_On the contrary,_ The means in relation to the end, are as the +mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that +passes through the mid-space to the terminus, in natural things. +Therefore in things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end +is the same movement as the willing of the means. + +_I answer that,_ The movement of the will to the end and to the means +can be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved +to each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are +really two movements of the will to them. Secondly, it may be +considered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake +of the end: and thus the movement of the will to the end and its +movement to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say: "I +wish to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than +one movement of my will. And this is because the end is the reason +for willing the means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it +is an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same act of +sight that perceives color and light, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad +2). And the same applies to the intellect; for if it consider +principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a distinct +act; but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the +principles, there is but one act of the intellect. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of +seeing, through the window, the passersby, according as the will is +moved to either absolutely. + +Reply Obj. 2: The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that +end, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is +the formal object in willing the means, they are one and the same +object. + +Reply Obj. 3: A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ, +according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end, +as in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in +so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to +the end, it is called "choice": but the movement of the will to the +end as acquired by the means, is called "intention." A sign of +this is that we can have intention of the end without having +determined the means which are the object of choice. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 5] + +Whether Intention Is Within the Competency of Irrational Animals? + +Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals intend the end. For +in things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational +nature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals. But +nature intends the end even in things void of reason, as is proved in +_Phys._ ii, 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the +end. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as intention is of the end, so is enjoyment. +But enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated above (Q. 11, A. +2). Therefore intention is too. + +Obj. 3: Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts for an end; +since to intend is nothing else than to tend to something. But +irrational animals act for an end; for an animal is moved either to +seek food, or to do something of the kind. Therefore irrational +animals intend an end. + +_On the contrary,_ Intention of an end implies ordaining something to +an end: which belongs to reason. Since therefore irrational animals +are void of reason, it seems that they do not intend an end. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), to intend is to tend to +something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According, +therefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is said to +intend the end, thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved +to its end by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this +way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to +something by natural instinct. The other way of intending an end +belongs to the mover; according as he ordains the movement of +something, either his own or another's, to an end. This belongs to +reason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in +this way, which is to intend properly and principally, as stated +above (A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes intention in the sense of being +moved to an end. + +Reply Obj. 2: Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to +another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end. + +Reply Obj. 3: Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though +they thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this +belongs to one that intends; but through desiring the end by natural +instinct, they are moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another, +like other things that are moved naturally. +________________________ + +QUESTION 13 + +OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means. +There are three of them: to choose, to consent, and to use. And choice +is preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice: +secondly, counsel; thirdly, consent; fourthly, use. + +Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason? + +(2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals? + +(3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end? + +(4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves? + +(5) Whether choice is only of possible things? + +(6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 1] + +Whether Choice Is an Act of Will or of Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that choice is an act, not of will but of +reason. For choice implies comparison, whereby one is given preference +to another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an +act of reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is for the same faculty to form a syllogism, and +to draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the reason +that forms syllogisms. Since therefore choice is a kind of conclusion +in practical matters, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 3, it seems that it +is an act of reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the +cognitive power. Now there is an "ignorance of choice," as is stated +in _Ethic._ iii, 1. Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to +the will but to the reason. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice +is "the desire of things in our power." But desire is an act of will. +Therefore choice is too. + +_I answer that,_ The word choice implies something belonging to the +reason or intellect, and something belonging to the will: for the +Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice is either "intellect +influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect." Now +whenever two things concur to make one, one of them is formal in +regard to the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. +xxxiii.] says that choice "is neither desire only, nor counsel only, +but a combination of the two. For just as we say that an animal is +composed of soul and body, and that it is neither a mere body, nor a +mere soul, but both; so is it with choice." + +Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act +belonging essentially to some power or habit, receives a form or +species from a higher power or habit, according as an inferior is +ordained by a superior: for if a man were to perform an act of +fortitude for the love of God, that act is materially an act of +fortitude, but formally, an act of charity. Now it is evident that, in +a sense, reason precedes the will and ordains its act: in so far as +the will tends to its object, according to the order of reason, since +the apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite. +Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to +it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is +materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now +in such like matters the substance of the act is as the matter in +comparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore choice +is substantially not an act of the reason but of the will: for choice +is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good +which is chosen. Consequently it is evidently an act of the appetitive +power. + +Reply Obj. 1: Choice implies a previous comparison; not that it +consists in the comparison itself. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the +conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called "a decision" or +"judgment," to be followed by "choice." And for this reason the +conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to that which +results from it. + +Reply Obj. 3: In speaking "of ignorance of choice," we do not mean +that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of +what ought to be chosen. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 2] + +Whether Choice Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals? + +Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals are able to +choose. For choice "is the desire of certain things on account of an +end," as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 2, 3. But irrational animals desire +something on account of an end: since they act for an end, and from +desire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals. + +Obj. 2: Further, the very word _electio_ (choice) seems to signify +the taking of something in preference to others. But irrational +animals take something in preference to others: thus we can easily +see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another. +Therefore choice is in irrational animals. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vi, 12, "it is from prudence +that a man makes a good choice of means." But prudence is found in +irrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of _Metaph._ i, +1 that "those animals which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are +prudent by instinct." We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of +sagacity manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees, +spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a +crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or +the second road: and if he find that the stag has not passed there, +being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent; +as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the +stag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the +others, and there is no other road. Therefore it seems that +irrational animals are able to choose. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] +says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from +choice." Therefore choice is not in irrational animals. + +_I answer that,_ Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference +to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that +can be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether +determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference +between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above +(Q. 1, A. 2, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one +particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will, +although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according +to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of +particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, +and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals +have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is +called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing +from another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be +moved to several things. + +Reply Obj. 2: An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to +another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing. +Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its +imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is naturally +inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just +as fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its making any +choice. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Phys._ iii, 3 "movement is the act of the +movable, caused by a mover." Wherefore the power of the mover appears +in the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things +moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is evident, +although the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow +through the motion of the archer goes straight towards the target, as +though it were endowed with reason to direct its course. The same may +be seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put together by +the art of man. Now as artificial things are in comparison to human +art, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine art. And +accordingly order is to be seen in things moved by nature, just as in +things moved by reason, as is stated in _Phys._ ii. And thus it is +that in the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of +sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about +their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the +Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called +prudent or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any +choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share +in one nature, invariably act in the same way. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 3] + +Whether Choice Is Only of the Means, or Sometimes Also of the End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For +the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "virtue makes us choose +aright; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to +direct aright those things which are to be done for its sake." But +that for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore +choice is of the end. + +Obj. 2: Further, choice implies preference of one thing to another. +But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be +preference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can +be of means. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that +"volition is of the end, but choice of the means." + +_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 1, ad 2), choice results from +the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a +practical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a +practical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things +the end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion, +as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end, as such, is +not a matter of choice. + +But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of +one demonstration or of one science, from being the conclusion of +another demonstration or science; while the first indemonstrable +principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration or science; +so too that which is the end in one operation, may be ordained to +something as an end. And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus +in the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it is not a +matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. Now the +health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently +with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may +be a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:10): "For when +I am weak, then am I powerful." But the last end is nowise a matter +of choice. + +Reply Obj. 1: The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as +to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 5), there is but one last +end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the +subject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 4] + +Whether Choice Is of Those Things Only That Are Done by Us? + +Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only in respect of +human acts. For choice regards the means. Now, not only acts, but +also the organs, are means (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore choice is not +only concerned with human acts. + +Obj. 2: Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice +has a place even in contemplation; in so far as one opinion is +preferred to another. Therefore choice is not concerned with human +acts alone. + +Obj. 3: Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular or +ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard. +Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "no man +chooses save what he can do himself." + +_I answer that,_ Just as intention regards the end, so does choice +regard the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And +when the end is a thing, some human action must intervene; either in +so far as man produces the thing which is the end, as the physician +produces health (wherefore the production of health is said to be the +end of the physician); or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses or +enjoys the thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money or the +possession of money is the end. The same is to be said of the means. +For the means must needs be either an action; or a thing, with some +action intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the +means, or puts it to some use. And thus it is that choice is always +in regard to human acts. + +Reply Obj. 1: The organs are ordained to the end, inasmuch as man +makes use of them for the sake of the end. + +Reply Obj. 2: In contemplation itself there is the act of the +intellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action +that is put in contradistinction to contemplation. + +Reply Obj. 3: When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or some high +position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that post. +Else, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop or +official, he would have no right to choose. Likewise, whenever we +speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in +conjunction with some action of the chooser. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 5] + +Whether Choice Is Only of Possible Things? + +Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only of possible +things. For choice is an act of the will, as stated above (A. 1). Now +there is "a willing of impossibilities" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore +there is also a choice of impossibilities. + +Obj. 2: Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above (A. +4). Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing is +concerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself, or +that which is impossible to the chooser. Now it often happens that we +are unable to accomplish what we choose: so that this proves to be +impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible. + +Obj. 3: Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But the +Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command +what is impossible, it should be attempted. Therefore choice can be +of the impossible. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "there +is no choice of impossibilities." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), our choice is always +concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us, is possible +to us. Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible +things. + +Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an +end. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end. A sign of this +is that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is +impossible to them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the +business. + +Again, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the +reason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are to the +end, as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an +impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle. +Wherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now +no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently no one would tend to +the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible. +Therefore the impossible is not the object of choice. + +Reply Obj. 1: The will stands between the intellect and the external +action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the +will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement +in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends +something under the universal notion of good: but the term or +perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the +action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the +movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the +perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for +one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the +complete act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and +good for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in +respect of the impossible; and by some is called "velleity," because, +to wit, one would will (_vellet_) such a thing, were it possible. But +choice is an act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the +chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is +possible. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, +we must judge of the object of the will according as it is +apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something +which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is +choice sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the +chooser, and yet impossible to him. + +Reply Obj. 3: The reason for this is that the subject should not rely +on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible; +but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 6] + +Whether Man Chooses of Necessity or Freely? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end +stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that +which follows from the principles, as declared in _Ethic._ vii, 8. But +conclusions follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man +is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the +means). + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2), choice follows the +reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of +necessity about some things: on account of the necessity of the +premises. Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity. + +Obj. 3: Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved +to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato says +(Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions +of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not moved +towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this +in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if +that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be +chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less +(eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of which +one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of +the others. Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is +chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to +something that seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is +made necessarily. + +_On the contrary,_ Choice is an act of a rational power; which +according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to +opposites. + +_I answer that,_ Man does not choose of necessity. And this is +because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now +the reason why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be +gathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will, +act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or +that. The reason of this is seated in the very power of the reason. +For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. +Now the reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to will" +or "to act," but also this, viz. "not to will" or "not to act." +Again, in all particular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of +some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect of evil: +and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as +to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which is +Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as +lacking in any way. Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity, +nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice +is not of the end, but of the means, as stated above (A. 3); it is +not of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular +goods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely. + +Reply Obj. 1: The conclusion does not always of necessity follow from +the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true if the +conclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not always +necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the means are +not always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if +they be such, they are not always considered in that light. + +Reply Obj. 2: The reason's decision or judgment of what is to be done +is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such +matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles +that are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally; +as, for instance, "If he runs, he is in motion." + +Reply Obj. 3: If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, +nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular +point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one +rather than towards the other. +________________________ + +QUESTION 14 + +OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether counsel is an inquiry? + +(2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means? + +(3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do? + +(4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do? + +(5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis? + +(6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 1] + +Whether Counsel Is an Inquiry? + +Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "an act of +the appetite." But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore +counsel is not an inquiry. + +Obj. 2: Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for +which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not +discursive, as we have shown in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 7). But +counsel is ascribed to God: for it is written (Eph. 1:11) that "He +worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Therefore +counsel is not inquiry. + +Obj. 3: Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is given +in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (1 Cor. +7:25): "Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but +I give counsel." Therefore counsel is not an inquiry. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] +says: "Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a +counsel." + +_I answer that,_ Choice, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 1, ad 2; A. 3), +follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now +there is much uncertainty in things that have to be done; because +actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of +their vicissitude, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and +uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous +inquiry: wherefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry +before deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called +counsel. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is +the "desire of what has been already counselled." + +Reply Obj. 1: When the acts of two powers are ordained to one +another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other +power: consequently each act can be denominated from either power. +Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to +the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according +to the reason's direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently +there is to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act +of the will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of +reason, something of the will--both as matter (since counsel is of +what man wills to do)--and as motive (because it is from willing the +end, that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And +therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice +"is intellect influenced by appetite," thus pointing out that both +concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, +22) that counsel is "appetite based on inquiry," so as to show that +counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by +whose impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes +the inquiry. + +Reply Obj. 2: The things that we say of God must be understood +without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us +science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to +effects: but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all +effects in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like +manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His +knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry +of counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this +respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says (De +Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes not counsel: those only take counsel +who lack knowledge." + +Reply Obj. 3: It may happen that things which are most certainly good +in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in +the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently +in such things counsel may be given. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 2] + +Whether Counsel Is of the End, or Only of the Means? + +Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but +also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of +inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a +doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since therefore +inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel +can be of the end. + +Obj. 2: Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some +human actions are ends, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 1. Therefore counsel +can be of the end. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] +says that "counsel is not of the end, but of the means." + +_I answer that,_ The end is the principle in practical matters: +because the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the +principle cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in +every inquiry. Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of +the end, but only of the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what +is the end in regard to some things, is ordained to something else; +just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is the +conclusion of another: and consequently that which is looked upon as +the end in one inquiry, may be looked upon as the means in another; +and thus it will become an object of counsel. + +Reply Obj. 1: That which is looked upon as an end, is already fixed: +consequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not looked +upon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be +counsel not about the end, but about the means. + +Reply Obj. 2: Counsel is about operations, in so far as they are +ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it +will not, as such, be the matter of counsel. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 3] + +Whether Counsel Is Only of Things That We Do? + +Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we +do. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible +for many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and +are not the result of our actions, such as the nature of various +things. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do. + +Obj. 2: Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are +laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those who +seek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore +counsel is not only of things that we do. + +Obj. 3: Further, some are said to take consultation about future +events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel is +not only of things that we do. + +Obj. 4: Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no one +would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly +untrue. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] +says: "We take counsel of things that are within our competency and +that we are able to do." + +_I answer that,_ Counsel properly implies a conference held between +several; the very word (_consilium_) denotes this, for it means a +sitting together (_considium_), from the fact that many sit together in +order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that in +contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for +certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances +into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are +considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes +note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and +universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more +absolute and simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to +consider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, +properly speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of +the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of +itself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it +is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on +things singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, +counsel is about things done by us. + +Reply Obj. 1: Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about +what is to be done, for the reason given above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although that which is laid down by the law is not due +to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him +in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing +something. + +Reply Obj. 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about +whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak +of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do +or omit something, through the knowledge of future events. + +Reply Obj. 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far +as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of +affection--thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, +as though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument, +for the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, +since one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about +what he would do through his servant. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 4] + +Whether Counsel Is About All Things That We Do? + +Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we +have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as +stated above (A. 1). But choice is about all things that we do. +Therefore counsel is too. + +Obj. 2: Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But, whenever +we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the +reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we +do. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it +appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take +counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but +if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this." +But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore +counsel takes place in all things that we do. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] +says that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to +science or art." + +_I answer that,_ Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above +(A. 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; +hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a +reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, +_Topic._ ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts +admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because +certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means: as +happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of +action; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters, +for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little +matters whether it is done this or that way; this occurs in minute +matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed +at; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently +there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they +conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, +minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as in +works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of +conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of +Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.]. + +Reply Obj. 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or +decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident +without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel. + +Reply Obj. 2: In matters that are evident, the reason makes no +inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel +in all that is done by reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in +different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished +by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the +means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then there is +no need of counsel. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 5] + +Whether the Process of Counsel Is One of Analysis? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of +analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of +our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz. +from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always +proceed by way of analysis. + +Obj. 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason +proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according to +the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present, +and the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel +one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is +not an analytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one +of analysis. + +Obj. 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to +us, according to _Ethic._ iii, 3. But the question as to whether a +certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or +unable to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the +inquiry of counsel should begin from things present. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who +takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze." + +_I answer that,_ In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. +And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the +process is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause +to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple +than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the +order of being, the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment +deals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple +causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which +precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution. +Hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning +that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and +continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once. + +Reply Obj. 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their +reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about +actions is contrary to the order of actions. + +Reply Obj. 2: Reason begins with that which is first according to +reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time. + +Reply Obj. 3: We should not want to know whether something to be done +for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that end. +Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, +before considering whether it be possible. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 6] + +Whether the Process of Counsel Is Indefinite? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite. +For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which +action is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the +process of counsel is indefinite. + +Obj. 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what +is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action can +be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason. +Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely. + +Obj. 3: Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on +indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are +self-evident, which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty +is not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and +uncertain. Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely. + +_On the contrary,_ "No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly +reach" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the +infinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one +would begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue. + +_I answer that,_ The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both +sides, on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a +twofold principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is +proper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to +operation: this is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is +taken for granted as its principle, as stated above (A. 2). The other +principle is taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in +demonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from +another, without inquiring into them. Now these principles which are +taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received +through the senses--for instance, that this is bread or iron: and +also any general statements known either through speculative or +through practical science; for instance, that adultery is forbidden +by God, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of such +things counsel makes no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that +which we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in +the light of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of +a conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done +first, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the +inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel from being +infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may +present themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel. + +Reply Obj. 1: Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only +potentially. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is +not always at hand. Consequently it is not always necessary to take +counsel about removing the obstacle. + +Reply Obj. 3: In contingent singulars, something may be taken for +certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it +concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a +necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues +to sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact. +________________________ + +QUESTION 15 + +OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive +power? + +(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals? + +(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means? + +(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul +only? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 1] + +Whether Consent Is an Act of the Appetitive or of the Apprehensive +Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that consent belongs only to the +apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) +ascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is an +apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive +power. + +Obj. 2: Further, consent is "co-sense." But sense is an apprehensive +power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect to +something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect, which +is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an +apprehensive power. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "if a +man judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no +sentence," i.e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive +power. Therefore consent does also. + +_I answer that,_ Consent implies application of sense to something. +Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for +the imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even +in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while +the intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend +indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since +the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing +itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so +far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of +sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing +to which it cleaves, in so far as it takes complacency in it. Hence +it is written (Wis. 1:1): "Think of (_Sentite_) the Lord in goodness." +And on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _De Anima_ iii, 9, "the will is in the +reason." Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he +takes reason as including the will. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive +faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies seeking +acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: _Assentire_ (to assent) is, to speak, _ad aliud +sentire_ (to feel towards something); and thus it implies a certain +distance from that to which assent is given. But _consentire_ (to +consent) is "to feel with," and this implies a certain union to the +object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the +thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the +intellect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards the +thing, but rather the reverse, as we have stated in the First Part +(Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 4; Q. 59, A. 2), is more properly said to +assent: although one word is wont to be used for the other [*In Latin +rather than in English.]. We may also say that the intellect assents, +in so far as it is moved by the will. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 2] + +Whether Consent Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals? + +Objection 1: It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational +animals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one +thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one +thing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational animals. + +Obj. 2: Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what +follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore +there were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act +accomplished; which is clearly false. + +Obj. 3: Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do something, +through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But irrational +animals act through passion. Therefore they consent. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after +judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, +and this is called the sentence," i.e. consent. But counsel is not in +irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent. + +_I answer that,_ Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational +animals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of +the appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the +appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to the subject +in whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is +an action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so that it +touch the stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the +stick. But irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive +movement; for this is in them through natural instinct. Hence in the +irrational animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but +it does not apply that movement to some particular thing. And hence +it is that the irrational animal is not properly said to consent: +this is proper to the rational nature, which has the command of the +appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this +or that thing. + +Reply Obj. 1: In irrational animals the determination of the appetite +to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent implies a +determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely +passive. + +Reply Obj. 2: If the first be removed, then what follows is removed, +provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only. But if +something can follow from several things, it is not removed by the +fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect of +heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen +water is hardened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not +follow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an act +follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the +appetite, such as is found in irrational animals. + +Reply Obj. 3: The man who acts through passion is able not to follow +the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power. Hence +the comparison fails. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 3] + +Whether Consent Is Directed to the End or to the Means? + +Objection 1: It would seem that consent is directed to the end. +Because that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. +But it is on account of the end that we consent to the means. +Therefore, still more do we consent to the end. + +Obj. 2: Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as +the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man +consents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end. + +Obj. 3: Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above (Q. +13, A. 1). If therefore consent were only directed to the means it +would nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be false by +the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that +"after the approval" which he calls "the sentence," "comes the +choice." Therefore consent is not only directed to the means. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the +"sentence," i.e. the consent, takes place "when a man approves and +embraces the judgment of his counsel." But counsel is only about the +means. Therefore the same applies to consent. + +_I answer that,_ Consent is the application of the appetitive movement +to something that is already in the power of him who causes the +application. Now the order of action is this: First there is the +apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel +about the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends +to the last end naturally: wherefore the application of the appetitive +movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of +simple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration +after the last end, in so far as they are directed to the end, they +come under counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far +as the appetitive movement is applied to the judgment resulting from +counsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to +counsel: rather is counsel applied to it, because counsel presupposes +the desire of the end. On the other hand, the desire of the means +presupposes the decision of counsel. And therefore the application of +the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent, properly +speaking. Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, +properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the +principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not +science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent +to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not +consent but something greater, namely, volition. + +Reply Obj. 2: Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the +end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he +consents to that act. + +Reply Obj. 3: Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, +a certain relation to something to which something else is +preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. +For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found +conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, +consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have +given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one meets with +approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only +in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according +as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer +it to those that do not meet with our approval. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 4] + +Whether Consent to the Act Belongs Only to the Higher Part of the +Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that consent to the act does not always +belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and +perfects it, just as beauty perfects youth" [*_oion tois akmaiois he +hora_--as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4). +But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says +(De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act does not belong only +to the higher reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary. +But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts. Therefore +the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act. + +Obj. 3: Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the +contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine says +(De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal, +but for temporal reasons, or even on account of some passion of the +soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher +reason alone. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is +impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that +mental faculty which has the sovereign power of urging his members +to, or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become +its slave." + +_I answer that,_ The final decision belongs to him who holds the +highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as +long as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the +final decision has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs +to the higher reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that +we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human +principles we judge according to Divine principles, which is the +function of the higher reason. Wherefore as long as a man is +uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine principles, +no judgment of the reason can be considered in the light of a final +decision. Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to +the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason; +but in that sense in which the reason includes the will, as stated +above (A. 1, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the +higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to +delight in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower +reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises +judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an +action; and in like manner on the delight that results. But in so far +as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it +belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something +else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it +is ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called +the master or principal art. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that +we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of each +power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above (A. 1, +ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named. + +Reply Obj. 3: The higher reason is said to consent not only because +it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but also +because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons. +________________________ + +QUESTION 16 + +OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether use is an act of the will? + +(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals? + +(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also? + +(4) Of the relation of use to choice. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 1] + +Whether Use Is an Act of the Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that use is not an act of the will. For +Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that "to use is to refer that +which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else." But +"to refer" something to another is an act of the reason to which it +belongs to compare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the +reason and not of the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that man "goes +forward to the operation, and this is called impulse; then he makes +use (of the powers) and this is called use." But operation belongs to +the executive power; and the act of the will does not follow the act +of the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last. +Therefore use is not an act of the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "All things that +were made were made for man's use, because reason with which man is +endowed uses all things by its judgment of them." But judgment of +things created by God belongs to the speculative reason; which seems +to be altogether distinct from the will, which is the principle of +human acts. Therefore use is not an act of the will. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "To use is to +apply to something to purpose of the will." + +_I answer that,_ The use of a thing implies the application of that +thing to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing +is called its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of +a stick is to strike. Now we apply to an operation not only the +interior principles of action, viz. the powers of the soul or the +members of the body; as the intellect, to understand; and the eye, to +see; but also external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is +evident that we do not apply external things to an operation save +through the interior principles which are either the powers of the +soul, or the habits of those powers, or the organs which are parts of +the body. Now it has been shown above (Q. 9, A. 1) that it is the +will which moves the soul's powers to their acts, and this is to +apply them to operation. Hence it is evident that first and +principally use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as +directing; and to the other powers as executing the operation, which +powers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the +instruments are compared to the principal agent. Now action is +properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, +as building is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools. Hence it is +evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of the will. + +Reply Obj. 1: Reason does indeed refer one thing to another; but the +will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else. +And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another. + +Reply Obj. 2: Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to +the executive powers. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to +the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative +reason is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the will, in the +same way as the other powers. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 2] + +Whether Use Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals? + +Objection 1: It would seem that use is to be found in irrational +animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine +says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something +else which we are to enjoy." But enjoyment is to be found in +irrational animals, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 2). Much more, +therefore, is it possible for them to use. + +Obj. 2: Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But +irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance, their +feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible for +irrational animals to use. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a +rational animal can make use of a thing." + +_I answer that,_ as stated above (A. 1), to use is to apply an active +principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive +movement to the desire of something, as stated above (Q. 15, AA. 1, +2, 3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to +something else; and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer +it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore +none but a rational animal consents and uses. + +Reply Obj. 1: To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite +to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite +to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare +use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better +than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better than +that which is appetible only as directed to something else. But if we +compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them, +greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to direct +one thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend +something absolutely is within the competency even of sense. + +Reply Obj. 2: Animals by means of their members do something from +natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their members +to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply +their members to action, nor do they use them. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 3] + +Whether Use Regards Also the Last End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For +Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "Whoever enjoys, uses." But man +enjoys the last end. Therefore he uses the last end. + +Obj. 2: Further, "to use is to apply something to the purpose of the +will" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything else, is +the object of the will's application. Therefore it can be the object +of use. + +Obj. 3: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "Eternity is in the +Father, Likeness in the Image," i.e. in the Son, "Use in the Gift," +i.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the +last end. Therefore the last end can be the object of use. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly +uses God, but one enjoys Him." But God alone is the last end. +Therefore we cannot use the last end. + +_I answer that,_ Use, as stated above (A. 1), implies the application +of one thing to another. Now that which is applied to another is +regarded in the light of means to an end; and consequently use always +regards the means. For this reason things that are adapted to a +certain end are said to be "useful"; in fact their very usefulness is +sometimes called use. + +It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two +ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual. For +since the end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), signifies +sometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or +possession of that thing (thus the miser's end is either money or +the possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last +end is the thing itself; for the possession of money is good only +inasmuch as there is some good in money. But in regard to the +individual, the obtaining of money is the last end; for the miser +would not seek for money, save that he might have it. Therefore, +simply and properly speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places +his last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he +is said to use it. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so far as +it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man seeks +in that end. + +Reply Obj. 2: The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that +the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end, +which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the +end. But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only in +being used as means, but as ordained to something else in which the +will finds rest. + +Reply Obj. 3: The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable +to rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may +be said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated +above. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that "this love, delight, +felicity, or happiness, is called use by him." +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 4] + +Whether Use Precedes Choice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing +follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to +the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also. + +Obj. 2: Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the +less relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two +relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the +other, of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it is +preferred; whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore +use precedes choice. + +Obj. 3: Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it +removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above (Q. 9, +A. 3). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to act. But it +does this when it consents. Therefore there is use in consent. But +consent precedes choice as stated above (Q. 15, A. 3, ad 3). +Therefore use does also. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "the +will after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards +it uses (the powers)." Therefore use follows choice. + +_I answer that,_ The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed. +One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing +subject, by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed. +Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain +end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus +is to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to +perfection. And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite +tend to have the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly. +This is the second relation of the will to the thing willed. + +Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the +last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means, +is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing +the means fully. Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second +relation of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization +of the thing willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice; +provided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in +moving it. But since the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and +uses it, we may take the use of the means, as consisting in the +consideration of the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end. +In this sense use precedes choice. + +Reply Obj. 1: The motion of the will to the execution of the +work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use +belongs to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and +execution. + +Reply Obj. 2: What is essentially relative is after the +absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come +after. Indeed, the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the +effects to which it has relation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the +same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the +choice of another. And since the acts of the will react on one +another, in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice +and use; so that we may say that the will consents to choose, and +consents to consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And +such acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede also. +________________________ + +QUESTION 17 + +OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (In Nine Articles) + +We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head +there are nine points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason? + +(2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals? + +(3) Of the order between command and use; + +(4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct? + +(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded? + +(6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded? + +(7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded? + +(8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded? + +(9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 1] + +Whether Command Is an Act of the Reason or of the Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that command is not an act of the reason +but of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna +says that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by +disposing, by commanding, and by counselling." But it belongs to the +will to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above (Q. 9, +A. 1). Therefore command is an act of the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is +subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most +free. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore +to command belongs to the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act of +the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges that a +thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is +not an act of the reason, but of the will. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] +and the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the appetite obeys +reason." Therefore command is an act of the reason. + +_I answer that,_ Command is an act of the reason presupposing, +however, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note +that, since the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to +bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing, +and the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of the +reason precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And since the +power of the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it +happens sometimes that there is an act of the will in so far as it +retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we have +stated in reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there is +an act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something of +an act of the will. + +Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the +commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of +intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or +declaring is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate or +declare something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation +is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person +says to another: "This is what you should do." Sometimes, however, +the reason intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and +this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as +when it is said to someone: "Do this." Now the first mover, among the +powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as stated +above (Q. 9, A. 1). Since therefore the second mover does not move, +save in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very fact that +the reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will. +Consequently it follows that command is an act of the reason, +presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by +its command, moves (the power) to the execution of the act. + +Reply Obj. 1: To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating +and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; +but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely +towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have +various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will +as being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason +is the root of liberty. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that command is an act of reason +not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 2] + +Whether Command Belongs to Irrational Animals? + +Objection 1: It would seem that command belongs to irrational +animals. Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands +movement is the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in +the muscles and nerves." But both powers are in irrational animals. +Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals. + +Obj. 2: Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives +commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to his +master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is +commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are +composed of soul and body. + +Obj. 3: Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action. +But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be +found in irrational animals. + +_On the contrary,_ Command is an act of reason, as stated above (A. +1). But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore, +is there command. + +_I answer that,_ To command is nothing else than to direct someone to +do something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the +proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational +animals should command in any way, since they are devoid of reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: The appetitive power is said to command movement, in so +far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man. In +irrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a +commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion. + +Reply Obj. 2: The body of the irrational animal is competent to obey; +but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent +to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander and +commanded; but only of mover and moved. + +Reply Obj. 3: Impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise +than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the +directing reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the +other hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural +instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the +unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid. +Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do +not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not +command. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 3] + +Whether Use Precedes Command? + +Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes command. For command is +an act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above +(A. 1). But, as we have already shown (Q. 16, A. 1), use is an act of +the will. Therefore use precedes command. + +Obj. 2: Further, command is one of those things that are ordained to +the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the end. +Therefore it seems that use precedes command. + +Obj. 3: Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called +use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q. 16, +A. 1). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as +stated above (A. 1). Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the +common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse +to action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command. +Therefore command precedes use. + +_I answer that,_ use of that which is directed to the end, in so far +as it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as +stated above (Q. 16, A. 4). Wherefore still more does it precede +command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, +in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command; +because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for +one does not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But +command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the +command is given: for it naturally precedes its fulfilment, +sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Consequently it is evident +that command precedes use. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not every act of the will precedes this act of the +reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz. +choice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after +counsel's decision, which is reason's judgment, the will chooses; and +after choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was +chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins to use, by +executing the command of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when +one commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, +when he commands himself to do something. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as act ranks before power, so does the object rank +before the act. Now the object of use is that which is directed to +the end. Consequently, from the fact that command [itself is directed +to the end, it may be concluded that command] precedes, rather than +that it follows use. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as the act of the will in using the reason for the +purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say that +this act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a command +of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one another. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 4] + +Whether Command and the Commanded Act Are One Act, or Distinct? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the +command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves +distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command +to another; since one is the power that commands, and the other is +the power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is +not one with the command. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever things can be separate from one another, +are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes the +commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command +is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a +distinct act from the act commanded. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever things are related to one another as +precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally +precedes the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "where +one thing is by reason of another, there is but one." But there is no +commanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one. + +_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in +one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is +one in some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a +difference is to be observed in this, that some are simply many, and +one in a particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now +"one" is predicated in the same way as "being." And substance is +being simply, whereas accident or being "of reason" is a being only +in a certain respect. Wherefore those things that are one in +substance are one simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus, in +the genus substance, the whole composed of its integral or essential +parts, is one simply: because the whole is being and substance +simply, and the parts are being and substances in the whole. But +those things which are distinct in substance, and one according to an +accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus +many men are one people, and many stones are one heap; which is unity +of composition or order. In like manner also many individuals that +are one in genus or species are many simply, and one in a certain +respect: since to be one in genus or species is to be one according +to the consideration of the reason. + +Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of +matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though he has +many parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act +of a lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of +a higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the +higher power moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is +as the form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is +evident that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as +a whole is one, yet in its parts, many. + +Reply Obj. 1: If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another, +their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of the +other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the act of the +mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys. iii, 3). + +Reply Obj. 2: The fact that command and the commanded act can be +separated from one another shows that they are different parts. +Because the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet +they form one whole. + +Reply Obj. 3: In those things that are many in parts, but one as a +whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the +soul, in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 5] + +Whether the Act of the Will Is Commanded? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded. +For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind to +will, and yet it does not." But to will is the act of the will. +Therefore the act of the will is not commanded. + +Obj. 2: Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can +understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command; +for the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to +understand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded. + +Obj. 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same +reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are +commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the +will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above (A. 1); +for if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will be +preceded by another act of the reason, and so on to infinity. But to +proceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act of the will +is not commanded. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever is in our power, is subject to our +command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; +since all our acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are +voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), command is nothing else than +the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to +act. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the +will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it +can direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an +act of the will can be commanded. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind +commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that +sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it +commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that +the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: +wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command +perfectly. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as each of the members of the body works not for +itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body +that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the +intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; +and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. +Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will, +commands the act of the will for himself. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act is +commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will +is not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of +nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 4). +Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 6] + +Whether the Act of the Reason Is Commanded? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be +commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But +it is the reason that commands, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the +act of the reason is not commanded. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is essential is different from that which +is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by reason, +is rational by participation, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. Therefore +the act of that power, which is essentially rational, is not +commanded. + +Obj. 3: Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to +know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always +in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded. + +_On the contrary,_ That which we do of our free-will, can be done by +our command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the +free-will: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his +free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves." Therefore the +acts of the reason can be commanded. + +_I answer that,_ Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it +directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act. +Consequently its act can be commanded. + +But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in +two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus, +the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to +be attentive, and to use one's reason. Secondly, as to the object; in +respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is +the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is +not in our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or +supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the +reason is not in our power, and cannot be commanded. The other act of +the reason is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, +therefore, that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally +assents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our power to +assent or dissent to the like: assent follows naturally, and +consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. But +some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to +such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at +least suspend its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or +other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is +subject to our command. + +Reply Obj. 1: Reason commands itself, just as the will moves itself, +as stated above (Q. 9, A. 3), that is to say, in so far as each power +reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another. + +Reply Obj. 2: On account of the diversity of objects subject to the +act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating in +itself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the +knowledge of the conclusions. + +The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 7] + +Whether the Act of the Sensitive Appetite Is Commanded? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is +not commanded. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:15): "For I do not that +good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man +lusts, although he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the +sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is +not subject to our command. + +Obj. 2: Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect of +formal transmutation, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 65, A. 4; Q. +91, A. 2; Q. 110, A. 2). But the act of the sensitive appetite is +accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat +or cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject +to man's command. + +Obj. 3: Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive +appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is +not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or +imagination. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not +subject to our command. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] +says: "That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the +irascible," which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act +of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. + +_I answer that,_ An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is +in our power, as stated above (A. 5). Consequently in order to +understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is +subject to the command of reason, we must consider in what manner it +is in our power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite +differs from the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in +the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, +whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a +corporeal organ, depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on +the disposition of that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision +depends on the power of sight, and on the condition of the eye, which +condition is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act +of the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, +but also on the disposition of the body. + +Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows +apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a +particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, +which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by +a universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the +sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other +hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the +command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of +the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the +command of reason. + +Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive +appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the +imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the +command of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it +foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason +governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a "despotic +supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a +"politic and royal supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are +not wholly subject to command. + +Reply Obj. 1: That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due +to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is +hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence +the Apostle adds (Rom. 7:15): "I see another law in my members, +fighting against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a +sudden movement of concupiscence, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation +to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it: thus a +man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to +this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man +becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not +subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature, +or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once. But the +condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it +results from the local movement of the heart, which has various +movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since the external sensible is necessary for the +apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend +anything by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which +presence of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then +that man can use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some +obstacle on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the +apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, +in proportion to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power. +For that man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers, +is either because they cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal +things; or because of the weakness of the imaginative power, due to +some organic indisposition. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 8] + +Whether the Act of the Vegetal Soul Is Commanded? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are +subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of +higher rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive +soul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are +the powers of the vegetal soul. + +Obj. 2: Further, man is called a "little world" [*Aristotle, +_Phys._ viii. 2], because the soul is in the body, as God is in the +world. But God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the +world obeys His command. Therefore all that is in man, even the +powers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as +are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the +nutritive and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, +virtue and vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their +contrary virtues. Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to +the command of reason. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] +says that "the nutritive and generative power is one over which the +reason has no control." + +_I answer that,_ Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others +from the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent +desires an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow +from some apprehension, as [d]o the animal and the intellectual +appetite. But the reason commands by way of apprehensive power. +Wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the animal +appetite, can be commanded by reason: but not those acts that proceed +from the natural appetite. And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; +wherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says "that +generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers." +Consequently the acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the +command of reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, +and the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very +fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that +they rank lowest. + +Reply Obj. 2: The comparison holds in a certain respect: because, to +wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But it does +not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the body out +of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason the world is +wholly subject to His command. + +Reply Obj. 3: Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect the +acts themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i.e. +digestion, and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts +of the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation +and nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of +taking food or in the act of generation, and the right or wrong use +thereof. ________________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 9] + +Whether the Acts of the External Members Are Commanded? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey +reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the +body are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal +soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as +stated above (A. 8). Therefore much less do the members of the body +obey. + +Obj. 2: Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But +the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason: +for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that "the +pulse is not controlled by reason." Therefore the movement of the +bodily members is not subject to the command of reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that "the +movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not +desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is +warm with desire, the body remains cold." Therefore the movements of +the members are not obedient to reason. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind +commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, +that scarcely can one discern obedience from command." + +_I answer that,_ The members of the body are organs of the soul's +powers. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in +respect of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand +in respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to +the command of reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore +all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are +subject to the command of reason; whereas those movements of members, +that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of +reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: The members do not move themselves, but are moved +through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer +contact with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul. + +Reply Obj. 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which +is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are +derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally +known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of +the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So +also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. Now +the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the +heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, +and not according to the will: for like a proper accident, it results +from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the +movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial +form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator, +as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 4). Wherefore this movement is +called "vital." For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. +Hom. xxii) says that, just as the movement of generation and +nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a +vital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which +is indicated by the pulse veins. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17, 20) it is in +punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey +reason: in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion +against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin +is transmitted to posterity. + +But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our +first parent was that his nature was left to itself, through the +withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we +must consider the natural cause of this particular member's +insubmission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. +Animal.) who says that "the movements of the heart and of the organs +of generation are involuntary," and that the reason of this is as +follows. These members are stirred at the occasion of some +apprehension; in so far as the intellect and imagination represent +such things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions +these movements are a consequence. But they are not moved at the +command of the reason or intellect, because these movements are +conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, which +change is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case with +these two organs in particular, because each is as it were a separate +animal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the +principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of +the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal +virtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have +their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be +natural, as stated above (Reply Obj. 2). +________________________ + +QUESTION 18 + +OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (In Eleven Articles) + +We must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a +human act is good or evil; secondly, what results from the good or +evil of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt. + +Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the +first will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general; the +second, of the good and evil of internal acts; the third, of the good +and evil of external acts. + +Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions? + +(2) Whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its +object? + +(3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance? + +(4) Whether it is derived from the end? + +(5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species? + +(6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end? + +(7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the +species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely? + +(8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species? + +(9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent? + +(10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of +good or evil? + +(11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, +places the moral action in the species of good or evil? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 1] + +Whether Every Human Action Is Good, or Are There Evil Actions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every human action is good, and that +none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not, +save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the +good. Therefore no action is evil. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a +thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as its +potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is +perfected by act, it is good, as stated in _Metaph._ ix, 9. Therefore +nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is +good. Therefore every action is good, and none is evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as +Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect +which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action +is good. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 3:20): "Every one that doth +evil, hateth the light." Therefore some actions of man are evil. + +_I answer that,_ We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good +and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act +that it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has +being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the +First Part (Q. 5, AA. 1, 3). But God alone has the whole plenitude of +His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its +proper fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it +happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and +yet they are lacking in the fulness of being due to them. Thus the +fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body, having +all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement: wherefore +if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due +to the fulness of his being. So that as much as he has of being, so +much has he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in goodness, +and is said to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of goodness +inasmuch as he lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That, +however, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to +be either evil or good. But since this same fulness of being is of +the very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of +being, it is not said to be good simply, but in a certain respect, +inasmuch as it is a being; although it can be called a being simply, +and a non-being in a certain respect, as was stated in the First Part +(Q. 5, A. 1, ad 1). We must therefore say that every action has +goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in +goodness, in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its +fulness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it +lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or +something of the kind. + +Reply Obj. 1: Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For if there +were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor +possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, +there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient +good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain +respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in +act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the +power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is +deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he +walks. + +Reply Obj. 3: An evil action can have a proper effect, according to +the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of +human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, +but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 2] + +Whether the Good or Evil of a Man's Action Is Derived from Its Object? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not +derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But +"evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," as +Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the good or +evil of a human action is not derived from their object. + +Obj. 2: Further, the object is compared to the action as its matter. +But the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather from +the form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is not +derived from their object. + +Obj. 3: Further, the object of an active power is compared to the +action as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not +depend on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or +evil in actions is not derived from their object. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Osee 9:10): "They became abominable +as those things which they loved." Now man becomes abominable to God +on account of the malice of his action. Therefore the malice of his +action is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same +applies to the goodness of his action. + +_I answer that,_ as stated above (A. 1) the good or evil of an +action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its +lack of that fulness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fulness +of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just +as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has +its species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore +just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its +form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral +action is derived from its suitable object: hence some call such an +action "good in its genus"; for instance, "to make use of what is +one's own." And just as, in natural things, the primary evil is when +a generated thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, +if instead of a man, something else be generated); so the primary +evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance, +"to take what belongs to another." And this action is said to be +"evil in its genus," genus here standing for species, just as we +apply the term "mankind" to the whole human species. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although external things are good in themselves, +nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that +action. And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such +actions, they have not the quality of goodness. + +Reply Obj. 2: The object is not the matter "of which" (a thing is +made), but the matter "about which" (something is done); and stands +in relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its +species. + +Reply Obj. 3: The object of the human action is not always the object +of an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way, passive; +in so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a +principle of human actions. Nor again have the objects of the active +powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are already +transformed: thus food when transformed is the effect of the +nutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in +relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it +exercises its operation. Now since the object is in some way the +effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its +action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since +movement derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the +goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, +yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a +good effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its +effect is the measure of its goodness. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 3] + +Whether Man's Action Is Good or Evil from a Circumstance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a +circumstance. For circumstances stand around (_circumstant_) an action, +as being outside it, as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1). But "good and evil +are in things themselves," as is stated in _Metaph._ vi, 4. Therefore +an action does not derive goodness or malice from a circumstance. + +Obj. 2: Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered +principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances are +accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of +art: because "no art takes notice of what is accidental" (Metaph. vi, +2). Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a +circumstance. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its +substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But good +and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an +action can be good or evil in its genus as stated above (A. 2). +Therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance. + +_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a +virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in +respect of the other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the +vicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or +where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances. +Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances. + +_I answer that,_ In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole +fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere +substantial form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives +much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and +the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, +evil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its +goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain +additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such +are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is +requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they +are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents +thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the +essence. + +Reply Obj. 2: Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for +some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And +thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the +doctrine of morals. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since good and being are convertible; according as +being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good +predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in +respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things and +in moral actions. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 4] + +Whether a Human Action Is Good or Evil from Its End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil in human actions +are not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "nothing +acts with a view to evil." If therefore an action were good or evil +from its end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly false. + +Obj. 2: Further, the goodness of an action is something in the +action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is not +said to be good or bad according to its end. + +Obj. 3: Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an evil +end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely, an +evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft +committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action +is not good or evil from its end. + +_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Differ. _Topic._ ii) that "if the +end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing +also is evil." + +_I answer that,_ The disposition of things as to goodness is the same +as their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does +not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their +being absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on +something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their +being in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as +the being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the +goodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, +Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is +not taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the +goodness of which depends on something else, have a measure of +goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness +which is in them absolutely. + +Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. +First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because +as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as +stated above (A. 1). Secondly, it has goodness according to its +species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has +goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its +accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is +compared as to the cause of its goodness. + +Reply Obj. 1: The good in view of which one acts is not always a true +good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. +And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless +due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent to +the action. + +Reply Obj. 3: Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the +ways mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus +it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its +circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an +action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since +"evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete +cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 5] + +Whether a Human Action Is Good or Evil in Its Species? + +Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not +make a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil in +actions is in conformity with their existence in things, as stated +above (A. 1). But good and evil do not make a specific difference in +things; for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man. +Therefore neither do they make a specific difference in actions. + +Obj. 2: Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But +non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher +(Metaph. iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the +species, it seems that an action is not constituted in a species +through being evil. Consequently good and evil do not diversify the +species of human actions. + +Obj. 3: Further, acts that differ in species produce different +effects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from an +evil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock. +Therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species. + +Obj. 4: Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from a +circumstance, as stated above (A. 3). But since a circumstance is an +accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human +actions do not differ in species on account of their goodness or +malice. + +_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) "like +habits produce like actions." But a good and a bad habit differ in +species, as liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad +actions differ in species. + +_I answer that,_ Every action derives its species from its object, as +stated above (A. 2). Hence it follows that a difference of object +causes a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed +that a difference of objects causes a difference of species in +actions, according as the latter are referred to one active +principle, which does not cause a difference in actions, according as +they are referred to another active principle. Because nothing +accidental constitutes a species, but only that which is essential; +and a difference of object may be essential in reference to one +active principle, and accidental in reference to another. Thus to +know color and to know sound, differ essentially in reference to +sense, but not in reference to the intellect. + +Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to +the reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "the good of +man is to be in accordance with reason," and evil is "to be against +reason." For that is good for a thing which suits it in regard to its +form; and evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is +therefore evident that the difference of good and evil considered in +reference to the object is an essential difference in relation to +reason; that is to say, according as the object is suitable or +unsuitable to reason. Now certain actions are called human or moral, +inasmuch as they proceed from the reason. Consequently it is evident +that good and evil diversify the species in human actions; since +essential differences cause a difference of species. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as +something is according to nature, and something against nature, +diversify the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are +not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in +accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against +reason, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral species. + +Reply Obj. 2: Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting +some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its species, +not because it has no object at all; but because it has an object in +disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's +property. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it +can constitute the species of an evil act. + +Reply Obj. 3: The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason, +differ specifically and have effects specifically different; because +the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and +punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not +differ in species; and thus they have one specific effect. + +Reply Obj. 4: A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential +difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can +specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance +transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would not +make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 6] + +Whether an Action Has the Species of Good or Evil from Its End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the +end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their +species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the +object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not +diversify the species of an action. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the +species, as stated above (A. 5). But it is accidental to an action to +be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give alms from +vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to species, +according to the good and evil which are from the end. + +Obj. 3: Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to the +same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues +and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are +taken from the end, do not diversify the species of action. + +_On the contrary,_ It has been shown above (Q. 1, A. 3) that human +actions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in +respect of the end diversify the species of actions. + +_I answer that,_ Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they +are voluntary, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Now, in a voluntary +action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the +will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its +object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the +will: while the object of the external action, is that on which the +action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action +takes its species from the object on which it bears; so the interior +act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own +proper object. + +Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that +which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses +the limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any +measure of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. +Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with +regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the +external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he +who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more +adulterer than thief." + +Reply Obj. 1: The end also has the character of an object, as stated +above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although it is accidental to the external action to be +ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior +act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as form +to matter. + +Reply Obj. 3: When many actions, differing in species, are ordained +to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part +of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the +internal action. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 7] + +Whether the Species Derived from the End Is Contained Under the +Species Derived from the Object, As Under Its Genus, or Conversely? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the species of goodness derived from +the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the +object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when +a man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its +species from its object, as stated above (AA. 2, 6). But it is +impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this +species be not contained under the proper species of that thing; +because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that +are not subordinate to one another. Therefore the species which is +taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken +from the object. + +Obj. 2: Further, the last difference always constitutes the most +specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems to +come after the difference derived from the object: because the end is +something last. Therefore the species derived from the end, is +contained under the species derived from the object, as its most +specific species. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more formal a difference is, the more specific +it is: because difference is compared to genus, as form to matter. +But the species derived from the end, is more formal than that which +is derived from the object, as stated above (A. 6). Therefore the +species derived from the end is contained under the species derived +from the object, as the most specific species is contained under the +subaltern genus. + +_On the contrary,_ Each genus has its determinate differences. But an +action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained +to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to +an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species +derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from +the object, as under its genus. + +_I answer that,_ The object of the external act can stand in a +twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself +ordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to +victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to +take what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving +of alms. Now the differences that divide a genus, and constitute the +species of that genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, +12), divide that genus essentially: and if they divide it +accidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to say: +"Animals are divided into rational and irrational; and the irrational +into animals with wings, and animals without wings"; for "winged" and +"wingless" are not essential determinations of the irrational being. +But the following division would be correct: "Some animals have feet, +some have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two feet, +some four, some many": because the latter division is an essential +determination of the former. Accordingly when the object is not of +itself ordained to the end, the specific difference derived from the +object is not an essential determination of the species derived from +the end, nor is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species +is not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under +two species that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that +he that commits theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty of a +twofold malice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of +itself ordained to the end, one of these differences is an essential +determination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be +contained under the other. + +It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the +other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that +the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the +more specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an +agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the +more remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it +corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the +end intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of +this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower +officers. From all this it follows that the specific difference +derived from the end, is more general; and that the difference +derived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a +specific difference in relation to the former. For the will, the +proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect +of all the powers of the soul, the proper objects of which are the +objects of their particular acts. + +Reply Obj. 1: One and the same thing, considered in its substance, +cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to the +other. But in respect of those things which are superadded to the +substance, one thing can be contained under different species. Thus +one and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one +species, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, under the +species of sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as +to its substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to +the moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two species, +as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3, ad 3). + +Reply Obj. 2: The end is last in execution; but first in the +intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive +their species. + +Reply Obj. 3: Difference is compared to genus as form to matter, +inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is +considered as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is +something more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts +of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is +stated in _Phys._ ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal +cause of the species; and so much the more formal, as it is more +universal. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 8] + +Whether Any Action Is Indifferent in Its Species? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no action is indifferent in its +species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine +(Enchiridion xi). But privation and habit are immediate contraries, +according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not +such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though +it were between good and evil. + +Obj. 2: Further, human actions derive their species from their end or +object, as stated above (A. 6; Q. 1, A. 3). But every end and every +object is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is good or +evil according to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its +species. + +Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 1), an action is said to be +good, when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when it +lacks that complement. But every action must needs either have the +entire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. +Therefore every action must needs be either good or bad in its +species, and none is indifferent. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) +that "there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done +with a good or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment." +Therefore some actions are indifferent according to their species. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 5), every action takes its +species from its object; while human action, which is called moral, +takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of +human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an +action includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will +be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms +to a person in want. On the other hand, if it includes something +repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to +its species; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what +belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action +does not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for +instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, +and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to their +species. + +Reply Obj. 1: Privation is twofold. One is privation "as a result" +(_privatum esse_), and this leaves nothing, but takes all away: thus +blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, +life. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be no +medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation "in +process" (_privari_): thus sickness is privation of health; not that it +takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the +entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of +privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary +of the opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, as +Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories: because it does +not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be +something between good and evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at +least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or +malice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated +above. And it is of this that we are here treating. + +Reply Obj. 3: Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to +its species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may not +contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it +is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it specifically +good. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor +wicked. +________________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 9] + +Whether an Individual Action Can Be Indifferent? + +Objection 1: It would seem that an individual action can be +indifferent. For there is no species that does not, or cannot, +contain an individual. But an action can be indifferent in its +species, as stated above (A. 8). Therefore an individual action can +be indifferent. + +Obj. 2: Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in +_Ethic._ ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher +says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal +disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not +good, since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in +respect of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are indifferent. + +Obj. 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil +belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain +a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end. +Therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle +word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the +motive of just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an +evil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of +judgment" (Matt. 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just +necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is +either good or bad. For the same reason every other action is either +good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent. + +_I answer that,_ It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent +in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. +And the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above (A. +3), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes +its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its +accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason +of his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason +of his species. And every individual action must needs have some +circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the +intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; +if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to +the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has +the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in +accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it +must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. +Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, +if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad. + +If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from +some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or +moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not +moral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be +indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions. + +Reply Obj. 1: For an action to be indifferent in its species can be +understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species +demands that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along +this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus: since +no object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good +or evil, either through its end or through a circumstance. Secondly, +specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far +as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it +can be made good or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his +species is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a +condition of his species that he should not be black or white; but +blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than +those of his species. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly +speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, he says that +the prodigal is not evil, because he hurts none save himself. And the +same applies to all others who are not hurtful to other men. But we +say here that evil, in general, is all that is repugnant to right +reason. And in this sense every individual action is either good or +bad, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it +belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some +vice. Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose +of his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he +direct his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly +applies to other actions. +________________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 10] + +Whether a Circumstance Places a Moral Action in the Species of Good +or Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral +action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action +is taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object. +Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species. + +Obj. 2: Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the +moral action, as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1). But an accident does not +constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute +a species of good or evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, one thing is not in several species. But one action +has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not place a +moral action in a species of good or evil. + +_On the contrary,_ Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral +action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from +a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral +action to be specifically good or bad. + +_I answer that,_ Just as the species of natural things are +constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions +are constituted by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident +from what was said above (A. 5). But since nature is determinate to +one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must +needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after +which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in +natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken +as a difference constituting the species. But the process of reason +is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still +proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken +as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can +again be taken by the directing reason, as the principal condition of +the object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate +another's property is specified by reason of the property being +"another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species of +theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or +time, then this will be an additional circumstance. But since the +reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that +the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered +as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids +damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy +place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus +place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is +considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as +itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance +has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must +needs specify the moral action whether good or bad. + +Reply Obj. 1: A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is +considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as +being, as it were, a specific difference thereof. + +Reply Obj. 2: A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, +does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but +when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does +specify the action. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is not every circumstance that places the moral +action in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance +implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one +action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in +many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should +not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as said above (A. +7, ad 1; Q. 1, A. 3, ad 3). +________________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 11] + +Whether Every Circumstance That Makes an Action Better or Worse, +Places a Moral Action in a Species of Good or Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every circumstance relating to +good or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific +differences of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a +difference in the goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a +specific difference, which is the same as to make it differ in +species. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it +differ in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in +species. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better +or worse, constitutes a species. + +Obj. 2: Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the +character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot +make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot +make a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater +evil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this +very reason it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every +circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new +species of good or evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is +caused by each single defect." Now every circumstance that increases +malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds +a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance +that increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just +as every unity added to a number makes a new species of number; since +the good consists in "number, weight, and measure" (I, Q. 5, A. 5). + +_On the contrary,_ More and less do not change a species. But more +and less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. +Therefore not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or +worse, places it in a species of good or evil. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 10), a circumstance gives the +species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a +special order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance +does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil, +except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from +which the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to +take something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the +order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other +condition be presupposed, from which the action takes its malice or +goodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which +makes the action to be discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what +belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the +species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the +sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions. Consequently not +every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes +its species. + +Reply Obj. 1: In things which can be more or less intense, the +difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by +differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is +not changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that +which makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make +the action differ in species. + +Reply Obj. 2: A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the +goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself, +but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above. +Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness +or malice derived from this other condition of the action. + +Reply Obj. 3: A circumstance does not always involve a distinct +defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to +something else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add +further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for +as much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, +it does not always change the species of good or evil. +________________________ + +QUESTION 19 + +OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL +(In Ten Articles) + +We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; +under which head there are ten points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object? + +(2) Whether it depends on the object alone? + +(3) Whether it depends on reason? + +(4) Whether it depends on the eternal law? + +(5) Whether erring reason binds? + +(6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against +the law of God? + +(7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends +on the intention of the end? + +(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on +the degree of good or evil in the intention? + +(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the +Divine Will? + +(10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, +to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 1] + +Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on the Object? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not +depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than +to what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the will +depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will +is good, and none bad. + +Obj. 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the +goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But, +according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is +the end, but goodness of making is never the end": because the latter +is always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the +goodness of the act of the will does not depend on any object. + +Obj. 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to be. +But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness of +nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. +Therefore the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the +object. + +_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is +that habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly, +virtue is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good +will is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the +goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is +good. + +_I answer that,_ Good and evil are essential differences of the act +of the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; +just as truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is +divided essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for as +much as an opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and +evil will are acts differing in species. Now the specific difference +in acts is according to objects, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5). +Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly +from the objects. + +Reply Obj. 1: The will is not always directed to what is truly good, +but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure of +good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence +it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although an action can, in a certain way, be man's last +end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as stated +above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: Good is presented to the will as its object by the +reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the +moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: +because the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as +stated above (Q. 18, A. 5). +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 2] + +Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not +depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to +the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers +derive goodness not only from the object but also from the end, as +we have shown above (Q. 18, A. 4). Therefore the act also of the +will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end. + +Obj. 2: Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only from +the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above (Q. 18, +A. 3). But according to the diversity of circumstances there may be +diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will: for +instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as he +ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore the +goodness of the will depends not only on the object, but also on the +circumstances. + +Obj. 3: Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the +will, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8). But it would not be so, unless +the goodness or malice of the will depended on the circumstances. +Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend on the +circumstances, and not only on the object. + +_On the contrary,_ An action does not take its species from the +circumstances as such, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 10, ad 2). But good +and evil are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated +above (A. 1). Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend, +not on the circumstances, but on the object alone. + +_I answer that,_ In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more +simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus +primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first +things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one +principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human +actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness +and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the +goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things. + +Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not +something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto: +because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as +to its principle. Therefore the goodness of the will's act depends on +that one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and +that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which are +accidents, as it were, of the act. + +Reply Obj. 1: The end is the object of the will, but not of the other +powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived +from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the +end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps +accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one act of +the will on another. + +Reply Obj. 2: Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, +no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is said +that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, +this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this circumstance +is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not +fixed on something good: since to will to do something when it ought +not to be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so that the +circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is +impossible to will something good when one ought not to, because one +ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in +so far as a man by willing some particular good, is prevented from +willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that +time. And then evil results, not from his willing that particular +good, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the +other circumstances. + +Reply Obj. 3: Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, +in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to +say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which +he wills. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 3] + +Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not +depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what +follows. But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to +reason, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 9, A. 1). +Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the +goodness of the practical intellect is "a truth that is in conformity +with right desire." But right desire is a good will. Therefore the +goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness of the will, +rather than conversely. + +Obj. 3: Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved, +but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers, +as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore the goodness of the will +does not depend on reason. + +_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly will +that persists in its desires in opposition to reason." But the +goodness of the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the +goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the goodness of the will +depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed to +it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object +of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not +to the will but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to +the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive +appetite tends only to the particular good, apprehended by the +sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on +reason, in the same way as it depends on the object. + +Reply Obj. 1: The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible, +pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered +as true it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of +goodness, pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a +good that is not previously apprehended by reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect, +in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this +respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means, the +rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of +a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on +the part of reason a right apprehension of the end. + +Reply Obj. 3: The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves +the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above +(Q. 9, A. 1). +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 4] + +Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on the Eternal Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does +not depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule +and one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its +goodness depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will +does not depend on the eternal law. + +Obj. 2: Further, "a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured" +(Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with the human +will. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the +goodness of the human will depends. + +Obj. 3: Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal +law is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which the +goodness of our will depends. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin +is a deed, word or desire against the eternal law." But malice of the +will is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to +goodness, the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law. + +_I answer that,_ Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one +another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second +cause: since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now +it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that human +reason is the rule of the human will, from which the human derives +its goodness. Hence it is written (Ps. 4:6, 7): "Many say: Who +showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is +signed upon us": as though to say: "The light of our reason is able +to show us good things, and guide our will, in so far as it is the +light (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance." It is therefore evident +that the goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much +more than on human reason: and when human reason fails we must have +recourse to the Eternal Reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: To one thing there are not several proximate measures; +but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other. + +Reply Obj. 2: A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing +measured; a remote measure is not. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as +it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known to us +somewhat, either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its +proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 5] + +Whether the Will Is Evil When It Is at Variance with Erring Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at +variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the +human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as +stated above (A. 4). But erring reason is not derived from the +eternal law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human +will. Therefore the will is not evil, if it be at variance with +erring reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower +authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher +authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something +that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes +proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God +Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring reason +does not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance +with erring reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of +malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not +reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason +err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to +do so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will +is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason. + +_On the contrary,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 13), +conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some +action. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will is at +variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such +will is evil; for it is written (Rom. 14:23): "All that is not of +faith"--i.e. all that is against conscience--"is sin." Therefore the +will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason. + +_I answer that,_ Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason, +for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in +the First Part (Q. 19, A. 13), to inquire whether the will is evil +when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire +"whether an erring conscience binds." On this matter, some +distinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically; +some are indifferent; some are evil generically. And they say that if +reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good +generically, there is no error: and in like manner if it tell us not +to do something which is evil generically; since it is the same +reason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is evil. On the +other hand if a man's reason or conscience tells him that he is bound +by precept to do what is evil in itself; or that what is good in +itself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like +manner if a man's reason or conscience tell him, that what is +indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, +is forbidden or commanded, his reason or conscience errs. They say, +therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in matters of +indifference, either by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so +that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil +and sinful. But they say that when reason or conscience errs in +commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good in +itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in +such cases the will which is at variance with erring reason or +conscience is not evil. + +But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will +that is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some +way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the +will depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is +in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by +reason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of +the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (A. +3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as +being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the +case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good +or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can receive +the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which +is good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil, +can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason +apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is +good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it +is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose +it as an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil. +Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that +which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through +being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe +in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the +will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the +reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something +evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were +evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the +apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, +9) that "properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not +follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also one who does not +follow false reason." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely +speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or +erring, is always evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the judgment of an erring reason is not +derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as +being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is +all truth. + +Reply Obj. 2: The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known +that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the +command of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the +command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in +scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of +the emperor. In like manner if a man were to know that human reason +was dictating something contrary to God's commandment, he would not +be bound to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely +erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being +commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn +the commandment of God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it +apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being +something contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for +some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species +of malice. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 6] + +Whether the Will Is Good When It Abides by Erring Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is good when it abides by +erring reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason, +tends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with +reason, it tends to what reason judges to be good. But the will is +evil when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore +even when it abides by erring reason, the will is good. + +Obj. 2: Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the +commandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's +commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, +even when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by +erring reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring +reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring +reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction +with erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be in a +dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable. +Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring reason. + +_On the contrary,_ The will of those who slew the apostles was evil. +And yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to John +16:2: "The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that +he doth a service to God." Therefore the will can be evil, when it +abides by erring reason. + +_I answer that,_ Whereas the previous question is the same as +inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds"; so this question is +the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses." Now +this question depends on what has been said above about ignorance. +For it was said (Q. 6, A. 8) that ignorance sometimes causes an act +to be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral good and evil +consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above +(A. 2); it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be +involuntary, it takes away the character of moral good and evil; but +not, when it does not cause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has +been stated above (Q. 6, A. 8) that when ignorance is in any way +willed, either directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to +be involuntary. And I call that ignorance "directly" voluntary, to +which the act of the will tends: and that, "indirectly" voluntary, +which is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to know +what he ought to know, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8). + +If then reason or conscience err with an error that is voluntary, +either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what +one ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does +not excuse the will, that abides by that erring reason or conscience, +from being evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some +circumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to +be involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses the +will, that abides by that erring reason, from being evil. For +instance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go to another +man's wife, the will that abides by that erring reason is evil; since +this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound +to know. But if a man's reason, errs in mistaking another for his +wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it, his +will is excused from being evil: because this error arises from +ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and causes the +act to be involuntary. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from +the entire cause, evil from each particular defect." Consequently in +order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it +suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended +as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways. + +Reply Obj. 2: The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can. +Consequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always +right, nor is it always in accord with the eternal law. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one +absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one +absurdity, others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek +vainglory, he will sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or +whether he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter: +because he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, suppose +a man's reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance, +then evil must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in a +dilemma: because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is +vincible and voluntary. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 7] + +Whether the Goodness of the Will, As Regards the Means, Depends on +the Intention of the End? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not +depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above (A. +2) that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as +regards the means, the object of the will is one thing, and the end +intended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the +will does not depend on the intention of the end. + +Obj. 2: Further, to wish to keep God's commandment, belongs to a good +will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to +vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of +temporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on +the intention of the end. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do they +diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on the +malice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order +to give alms, has an evil will, although he intends a good end. +Therefore neither does the goodness of the will depend on the +goodness of the end intended. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards +the intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore +the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end. + +_I answer that,_ The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the +act of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following +[*Leonine edn.: 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of +the will causally, when we will something because we intend a certain +end. And then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the +goodness of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast +for God's sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good from +the very fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the +goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as +stated above (AA. 1, 2), it must, of necessity, depend on the +intention of the end. + +On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is +added to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to +do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the +goodness of the previous act of the will does not depend on the +subsequent intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with +the subsequent intention. + +Reply Obj. 1: When the intention is the cause of the act of willing, +the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of +the object, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an +evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give +an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in +itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it +is evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is +subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be good: and +the intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but +that which is repeated. + +Reply Obj. 3: As we have already stated (A. 6, ad 1), "evil results +from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire +cause." Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even +under the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil, +it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, +it must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words, +it must will the good for the sake of the good. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 8] + +Whether the Degree of Goodness or Malice in the Will Depends on the +Degree of Good or Evil in the Intention? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will +depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Matt. +12:35, "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth +forth that which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good as +he intends." But the intention gives goodness not only to the +external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated above (A. +7). Therefore the goodness of a man's will is according to the +goodness of his intention. + +Obj. 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. But +the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will. +Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good. + +Obj. 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his +intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous +intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same +reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good +intended. + +_On the contrary,_ The intention can be good, while the will is evil. +Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the +will less good. + +_I answer that,_ In regard to both the act, and the intention of the +end, we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the +object, by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; +the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man +wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent. + +If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of +view of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does +not depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the +external act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object +that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that +end; for instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not +realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred +pounds. Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in +regard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to +remove: for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters +obstacles, which prevent him from going. On the other hand, with +regard to the interior act of the will, this happens in only one way: +because the interior acts of the will are in our power, whereas the +external actions are not. But the will can will an object that is not +proportionate to the intended end: and thus the will that tends to +that object considered absolutely, is not so good as the intention. +Yet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the +will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass +that the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act +of the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great +good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a +good, is not proportionate to that good. + +But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act, +according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the +intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the +will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of +form, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 12, A. 4; Q. 18, +A. 6). And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, +the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially +speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much +intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless +the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal +principle, upon the intense volition of medicine. + +We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or +exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when +a man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And +yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the +quantity of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend +on the quantity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it +is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because +the quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we +shall show later on (Q. 20, A. 4; Q. 114, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of God, +Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore another +gloss says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart is the +intention, according to which God judges our works." For the goodness +of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the +goodness of the will, which makes even the external act to be +meritorious in God's sight. + +Reply Obj. 2: The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of +a good will. Hence the argument does not prove. + +Reply Obj. 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the +will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention is +evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated +above (ad 2). +________________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 9] + +Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on Its Conformity to the +Divine Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does +not depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is +impossible for man's will to be conformed to the Divine will; as +appears from the word of Isa. 55:9: "As the heavens are exalted above +the earth, so are My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts +above your thoughts." If therefore goodness of the will depended on +its conformity to the Divine will, it would follow that it is +impossible for man's will to be good. Which is inadmissible. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so +does our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge +does not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows +many things that we know not. Therefore there is no need for our will +to be conformed to the Divine will. + +Obj. 3: Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action +cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be +conformed to His. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 26:39): "Not as I will, but +as Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be +upright and to tend to God," as Augustine expounds in the Enchiridion +[*Enarr. in Ps. 32, serm. i.]. But the rectitude of the will is its +goodness. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its +conformity to the Divine will. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 7), the goodness of the will +depends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human +will is the Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; +Q. 3, A. 1). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to +be ordained to the Sovereign Good, that is, to God. + +Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine +will, as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any genus +is the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover, +everything attains to rectitude and goodness, in so far as it is in +accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will +be good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will. + +Reply Obj. 1: The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God +so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human +knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows +truth: and human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it +is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way of +equality. + +From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third +Objections. +________________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 10] + +Whether It Is Necessary for the Human Will, in Order to Be Good, to +Be Conformed to the Divine Will, As Regards the Thing Willed? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be +conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we +cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object +of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills. Therefore +the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing +willed. + +Obj. 2: Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about +to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his will +to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow +that a man is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial +piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes +be contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death +of a father: if his son were to will it also, it would be against +filial piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the +Divine will, as to the thing willed. + +_On the contrary,_ (1) On Ps. 32:1, "Praise becometh the upright," a +gloss says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills." +But everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is +bound to will what God wills. + +(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every +act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will, +it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed. + +(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different +things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has +an evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the +Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will. + +_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been said above (AA. 3, +5), the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the +reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways by the reason, +so as to appear good from one point of view, and not good from +another point of view. And therefore if a man's will wills a thing to +be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and the +will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as it +appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing +a thief to be put to death, because this is just: while the will of +another--e.g. the thief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put +to death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, is also good. + +Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or +intellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the +more universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in +the example given above: because the judge has care of the common +good, which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death, +which has the aspect of good in relation to the common estate; +whereas the thief's wife has to consider the private good of the +family, and from this point of view she wishes her husband, the +thief, not to be put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is +that which is apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of +all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of +the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the +whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension of a creature, +according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to +that nature. Now a thing may happen to be good under a particular +aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as +stated above. And therefore it comes to pass that a certain will is +good from willing something considered under a particular aspect, +which thing God wills not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa. +And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in +respect of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects, +they wish a particular thing to be or not to be. + +But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he +refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite +of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is +the end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing +whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man +will some particular good with a right will, he must will that +particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, +formally. Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the +Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound to +will the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed +materially, for the reason given above. + +At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed +to the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is +conformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, +it is conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch +as it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed +materially, it is conformed to that will considered as efficient +cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the +particular apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing +from God as its efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that a +man's will, in this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because +it wills what God wishes him to will. + +There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal +cause, consisting in man's willing something from charity, as God +wills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal +conformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is the proper +object of charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: We can know in a general way what God wills. For we +know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good. +Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a +will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing +willed. But we know not what God wills in particular: and in this +respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will. + +But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he +wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that +particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in +all things not only formally, but also materially. + +Reply Obj. 2: God does not will the damnation of a man, considered +precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered precisely as +death, because, "He wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4); but He +wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to +such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of God's +justice and of the natural order. + +Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident. + +To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said +that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect of reason of +the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who +conforms his will to God's, in the point of the very thing willed; +because the will tends more to the end, than to that which is on +account of the end. + +To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act +are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the +object considered materially. + +To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills +when several people desire different things, but not under the same +aspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same +aspect, one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is +no question of this here. +________________________ + +QUESTION 20 + +OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTIONS +(In Six Articles) + +We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: +under which head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or +in the external action? + +(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action +depends on the goodness of the will? + +(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same +as those of the external action? + +(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that +of the interior act? + +(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its +goodness or malice? + +(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and +evil? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 1] + +Whether Goodness or Malice Is First in the Action of the Will, or in +the External Action? + +Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external +action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives +goodness from its object, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 1, 2). But the +external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a +man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms. +Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in +the act of the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since +what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its +relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an +end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2), the act of another power can +be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to +being in the act of the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to +the external action, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 6). But that which is +formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter. +Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in +the act of the will. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the +will that we sin, and that we behave aright." Therefore moral good +and evil are first in the will. + +_I answer that,_ External actions may be said to be good or bad in +two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances +connected with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required +conditions be observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said +to be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of +alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the +will's proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, +which the external action derives from its relation to the end, is to +be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the +external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the +external action has of itself, on account of its being about due +matter and its being attended by due circumstances, is not derived +from the will, but rather from the reason. Consequently, if we +consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes +from reason's ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the +goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as +it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the +goodness of the will, which is its principle. + +Reply Obj. 1: The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch +as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and +ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act +of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the +action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will. + +Reply Obj. 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows +in the order of execution. + +Reply Obj. 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter +in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order of +nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in +every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its +efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as +existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 2] + +Whether the Whole Goodness and Malice of the External Action Depends +on the Goodness of the Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the +external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written +(Matt. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can +an evil tree bring forth good fruit." But, according to the gloss, +the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it +is impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the +external action evil, or vice versa. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin +without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there +will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or +malice of the external action depends on the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now are +differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential +division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12). +Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that +goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there +are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make +good." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), we may consider a twofold +goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due +matter and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the +end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends +entirely on the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or +circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends +the goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it. + +Now it must be observed, as was noted above (Q. 19, A. 6, ad 1), that +for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it +to be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point +only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be +good, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that +the external action is good. But if the will be good from its +intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action +good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of +the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the external +action is evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: If the good tree be taken to signify the good will, it +must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed +and from the end intended. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil +end; but also when he wills an evil act. + +Reply Obj. 3: Voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of +the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from +the will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and evil +is applicable to both the interior and external act. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 3] + +Whether the Goodness and Malice of the External Action Are the Same +As Those of the Interior Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness and malice of the +interior act of the will are not the same as those of the external +action. For the principle of the interior act is the interior +apprehensive or appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle +of the external action is the power that accomplishes the movement. +Now where the principles of action are different, the actions +themselves are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the +subject of goodness or malice: and the same accident cannot be in +different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot +be the same as that of the external action. + +Obj. 2: Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and +renders its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective +virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in +the power commanded, as is declared in _Ethic._ i, 13. Therefore the +goodness of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, +is distinct from the goodness of the external action, which belongs +to the power commanded. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since +nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act is the +cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as +stated above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in +each. + +_On the contrary,_ It was shown above (Q. 18, A. 6) that the act of +the will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that +which results from the material and formal element is one thing. +Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 4), the interior act of +the will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act. +Now it happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has +several aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it has but +one. Hence we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the +interior act is the same as that of the external action, and +sometimes not. For as we have already said (AA. 1, 2), these two +goodnesses or malices, of the internal and external acts, are +ordained to one another. Now it may happen, in things that are +subordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely from being +subordinate; thus a bitter draught is good merely because it procures +health. Wherefore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of +health, and the other the goodness of the draught; but one and the +same. On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is +subordinate to something else, has some aspect of goodness in itself, +besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good: thus a +palatable medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable +good, besides being conducive to health. + +We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness +or malice from its relation to the end only, then there is but one +and the same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards +the end, and of the external action, which regards the end through +the medium of the act of the will. But when the external action has +goodness or malice of itself, i.e. in regard to its matter and +circumstances, then the goodness of the external action is distinct +from the goodness of the will in regarding the end; yet so that the +goodness of the end passes into the external action, and the goodness +of the matter and circumstances passes into the act of the will, as +stated above (AA. 1, 2). + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that the internal and external +actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as they are +in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral order, +as stated above (Q. 17, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated in _Ethic._ vi, 12, a moral virtue is +ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were, +of that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained +to things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues are +necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has +no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the +goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as +from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both: +thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from +the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same specifically. +But when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to +analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in both: thus the +healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from the +healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to urine +and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the body of an +animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It +is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived +from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the +order of one to the other. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 4] + +Whether the External Action Adds Any Goodness or Malice to That of +the Interior Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the external action does not add any +goodness or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom +says (Hom. xix in Matt.): "It is the will that is rewarded for doing +good, or punished for doing evil." Now works are the witnesses of the +will. Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order +to know how to judge; but for the sake of others, that all may +understand how just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated +according to God's judgment rather than according to the judgment of +man. Therefore the external action adds no goodness or malice to that +of the interior act. + +Obj. 2: Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and external +acts are one and the same, as stated above (A. 3). But increase is +the addition of one thing to another. Therefore the external action +does not add to the goodness or malice of the interior act. + +Obj. 3: Further, the entire goodness of created things does not add +to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom. But +sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived from +the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as stated +above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore neither of them adds to the goodness or +malice of the other. + +_On the contrary,_ Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil. +If therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be +added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, +does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable. + +_I answer that,_ If we speak of the goodness which the external +action derives from the will tending to the end, then the external +action adds nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will +in itself is made better in good things, or worse in evil things. +This, seemingly, may happen in three ways. First in point of number; +if, for instance, a man wishes to do something with a good or an evil +end in view, and does not do it then, but afterwards wills and does +it, the act of his will is doubled and a double good, or a double +evil is the result. Secondly, in point of extension: when, for +instance, a man wishes to do something for a good or an evil end, and +is hindered by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres in the +movement of the will until he accomplish it in deed; it is evident +that the will of the latter is more lasting in good or evil, and in +this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in point of intensity: for +there are certain external actions, which, in so far as they are +pleasurable, or painful, are such as naturally to make the will more +intense or more remiss; and it is evident that the more intensely the +will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is. + +On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external +action derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus it stands +in relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds +to the goodness or malice of the will; because every inclination or +movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term. +Wherefore the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the +opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove impossible, +as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation if it +could; the lack of perfection derived from the external action, is +simply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves neither +punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil deeds, so +neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple +involuntariness fail to do good or evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's will +is complete, and does not refrain from the deed save through the +impossibility of achievement. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument applies to that goodness which the +external action derives from the will as tending to the end. But +the goodness which the external action takes from its matter and +circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end; +but it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act +willed, to which it stands in the relation of measure and cause, +as stated above (AA. 1, 2). + +From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 5] + +Whether the Consequences of the External Action Increase Its Goodness +or Malice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the consequences of the external +action increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists +virtually in its cause. But the consequences result from the action +as an effect from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in +actions. Now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its +virtue, since a virtue "makes that which has it to be good" (Ethic. +ii, 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of +an action. + +Obj. 2: Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences +resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these +redound to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from Phil. 4:1: +"My dearly beloved brethren, my joy and my crown." Therefore the +consequences of an action increase its goodness or malice. + +Obj. 3: Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault +increases: wherefore it is written (Deut. 25:2): "According to the +measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." But the +punishment is increased on account of the consequences; for it is +written (Ex. 21:29): "But if the ox was wont to push with his horn +yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did +not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox +shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death." But he +would not have been put to death, if the ox, although he had not been +shut up, had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase +the goodness or malice of an action. + +Obj. 4: Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by +striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does not +contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore +the consequence of an action increase its goodness or malice. + +_On the contrary,_ The consequences do not make an action that was +evil, to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if +a man give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by +committing a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, +in like manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the +wrongdoer is not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences of an +action doe not increase its goodness or malice. + +_I answer that,_ The consequences of an action are either foreseen or +not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the +goodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may +follow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom, +this shows his will to be all the more inordinate. + +But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. +Because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the +majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the +goodness or malice of that action: for it is evident that an action +is specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and +specifically worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On +the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, +then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action: +because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to +it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of +itself. + +Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that +flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by +accident. + +Reply Obj. 2: The good actions done by the hearers, result from the +preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature. +Hence they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such +is his intention. + +Reply Obj. 3: The consequences for which that man is ordered to be +punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed +to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable. + +Reply Obj. 4: This argument would prove if irregularity were the +result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of +the fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 6] + +Whether One and the Same External Action Can Be Both Good and Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one and the same external action can +be both good and evil. For "movement, if continuous, is one and the +same" (Phys. v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both good and +bad: for instance, a man may go to church continuously, intending at +first vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and +the same action can be both good and bad. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3), action +and passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as Christ's +was; and the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore one and the +same act can be both good and evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it were, of his +master, the servant's action is his master's, just as the action of a +tool is the workman's action. But it may happen that the servant's +action result from his master's good will, and is therefore good: and +from the evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore +the same action can be both good and evil. + +_On the contrary,_ The same thing cannot be the subject of +contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same +action cannot be both good and evil. + +_On the contrary,_ The same thing cannot be the subject of +contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same +action cannot be both good and evil. + +_I answer that,_ Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as +it is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to +another genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the +genus of quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to the genus +of color, if it be partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, +nothing hinders an action from being one, considered in the natural +order; whereas it is not one, considered in the moral order; and vice +versa, as we have stated above (A. 3, ad 1; Q. 18, A. 7, ad 1). For +continuous walking is one action, considered in the natural order: +but it may resolve itself into many actions, considered in the moral +order, if a change take place in the walker's will, for the will is +the principle of moral actions. If therefore we consider one action +in the moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good +and evil. Whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity, it +can be both good and evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: This continual movement which proceeds from various +intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one in +the point of moral unity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Action and passion belong to the moral order, in so far +as they are voluntary. And therefore in so far as they are voluntary +in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and +good can be in one of them while evil is in the other. + +Reply Obj. 3: The action of the servant, in so far as it proceeds +from the will of the servant, is not the master's action: but only in +so far as it proceeds from the master's command. Wherefore the evil +will of the servant does not make the action evil in this respect. +________________________ + +QUESTION 21 + +OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS +AND MALICE (In Four Articles) + +We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason +of their goodness and malice: and under this head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being +good or evil? + +(2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame? + +(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious? + +(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 1] + +Whether a Human Action Is Right or Sinful, in So Far As It Is Good or +Evil? + +Objection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in +so far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature" +(Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered +outside the order of nature. Now things that are produced according +to art and reason imitate those that are produced according to nature +(Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its +being inordinate and evil. + +Obj. 2: Further, sin, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 8 occurs in nature and +art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained. But the +goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the +intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore it seems that +the malice of an action does not make it sinful. + +Obj. 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it +follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false: +since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an +action is not sinful by reason of its being evil. + +_On the contrary,_ As shown above (Q. 19, A. 4), the goodness of a +human action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently +its malice consists in its being in disaccord with the Eternal Law. +But this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. +xxii, 27) that "sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the +Eternal Law." Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its +being evil. + +_I answer that,_ Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good +than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an +evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain +end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end +is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, +this rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When +therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the +natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right: +since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not +swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an +action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin. + +Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is +the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal Law. When, +therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of +reason and of the Eternal Law, then that action is right: but when it +turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it +is evident from what has been said (Q. 19, AA. 3, 4) that every +voluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason and of the +Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with +reason and the Eternal Law. Hence it follows that a human action is +right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result from +a sin in nature's action. + +Reply Obj. 2: The end is twofold; the last end, and the proximate +end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in respect of +the last end, which is the perfection of the thing generated; but it +does not fail in respect of any proximate end whatever; since when +nature works it forms something. In like manner, the sin of the will +always fails as regards the last end intended, because no voluntary +evil action can be ordained to happiness, which is the last end: and +yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate end: intended and +achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the very intention of +this end is ordained to the last end, this same intention may be +right or sinful. + +Reply Obj. 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by its action: and +therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end, +consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment regards +the person of the sinner, as was stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. +5, ad 4; A. 6, ad 3). +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 2] + +Whether a Human Action Deserves Praise or Blame, by Reason of Its +Being Good or Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise +or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens even in +things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not +deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action +does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and, +consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its being +good. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it +happen in the productions of art: because as stated in _Phys._ ii, 8 +"it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give +the wrong medicine." But the artist is not blamed for making +something bad: because the artist's work is such, that he can produce +a good or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that +neither is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact +that it is evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak and +incapable." But weakness or inability either takes away or diminishes +guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that +"virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to +virtue deserve censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous; +because "virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action +good" (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. +Therefore a human action deserves praise or blame, through being good +or evil. + +_I answer that,_ Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is +sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve +praise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise +or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice +or goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when +it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is +through his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made +clear above (Q. 1, AA. 1, 2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in +voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and +in such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing. + +Reply Obj. 1: Natural actions are not in the power of the natural +agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And, therefore, +although there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame. + +Reply Obj. 2: Reason stands in different relations to the productions +of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is directed +to a particular end, which is something devised by reason: whereas in +moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life. +Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since +therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as stated +above (A. 1), sin may occur in two ways, in a production of art. +First, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist: +and this sin will be proper to the art; for instance, if an artist +produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or +produce something good, while intending to produce something bad. +Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then +he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does +so in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin is +not proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the +former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he +is blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we +take into consideration the order of reason to the general end of +human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order +of reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed +for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the +Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art, he who sins voluntarily +is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which +prudence directs, "he is the reverse." + +Reply Obj. 3: Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to +man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 3] + +Whether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious in So Far As +It Is Good or Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or +demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of +merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save +in matters relating to another person. But good or evil actions are +not all related to another person, for some are related to the person +of the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is +meritorious or demeritorious. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he +chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys what +belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what +belongs to another. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a +man does not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action +to a good or evil purpose. + +Obj. 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not +on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and the same +applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and +perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action is his evil. +Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does +a good or an evil deed. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 3:10, 11): "Say to the just +man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to +the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him." + +_I answer that,_ We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to +retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution +according to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having +done something to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be +observed that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, +a part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, +done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, +who hurts the hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good +or evil to another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit or +demerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to +him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in +respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now +when a man ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the +whole society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by +the whole society; secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas +when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or +disadvantage, then again is retribution owed to him, in so far as +this too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a part of society: +although retribution is not due to him, in so far as it conduces to +the good or harm of an individual, who is identical with the agent: +unless, perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of +resemblance, in so far as man is said to be just to himself. + +It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or +blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will: that it is right +or sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit +or demerit depends on the recompense for justice or injustice towards +another. + +Reply Obj. 1: A man's good or evil actions, although not ordained to +the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless ordained to +the good or evil of another, i.e. the community. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far as he +belongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he forms part, he +merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill: +just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his, +in respect of which he is bound to serve the community. + +Reply Obj. 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by +his action, redounds to the community, as stated above. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 4] + +Whether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious Before God, +According As It Is Good or Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not +meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated +above (A. 3), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for +good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does +no good or harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6, 7): "If thou +sin, what shalt thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly, what +shalt thou give Him?" Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not +meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. + +Obj. 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the +sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the +instrument belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the +instrument of the Divine power which is the principal cause of his +action; hence it is written (Isa. 10:15): "Shall the axe boast itself +against him that cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself +against him by whom it is drawn?" where man while acting is evidently +compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing +in God's sight, by good or evil deeds. + +Obj. 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through +being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are +ordained to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires +merit or demerit in God's sight. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 12:14): "All things that +are done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or +evil." Now judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak +of merit and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and +evil, acquires merit or demerit in God's sight. + +_I answer that,_ A human action, as stated above (A. 3), acquires +merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by +reason of himself, or by reason of the community: and in each way, +our actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of +God. On the part of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man's last end; +and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as +stated above (Q. 19, A. 10). Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, +not referable to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our +last end. On the part of the whole community of the universe, because +in every community, he who governs the community, cares, first of +all, for the common good; wherefore it is his business to award +retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community. +Now God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in +the First Part (Q. 103, A. 5): and especially of rational creatures. +Consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or +demerit in reference to Him: else it would follow that human actions +are no business of God's. + +Reply Obj. 1: God in Himself neither gains nor loses anything by the +action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God, or +offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the +order instituted by God. + +Reply Obj. 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that, at the +same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained above +(Q. 9, A. 6, ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or +demerit in God's sight. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to +all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action +of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic. But +all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to God: and +therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or +demerit in the sight of God, as far as the action itself is concerned. +________________________ + +TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ. 22-48) +________________________ + +QUESTION 22 + +OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS +(In Three Articles) + +We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general; +secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four +things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference +between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and +goodness. + +Under the first head there are three points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul? + +(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the +apprehensive part? + +(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the +intellectual appetite, which is called the will? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 1] + +Whether Any Passion Is in the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. +Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of +matter and form, as stated in the First Part (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore +there is no passion in the soul. + +Obj. 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in _Phys._ iii, 3. +But the soul is not moved, as is proved in _De Anima_ i, 3. Therefore +passion is not in the soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every +passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in +_Topic._ vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion +is in the soul. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5): "When we were in the +flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in +our members." Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore +passions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the +soul. + +_I answer that,_ The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in +a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive, +although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is +passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to +be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper +sense, when something is received, while something else is taken +away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost +is unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and +loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to +be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And +here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is +said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a +thing recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it +appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in _De Generat._ i, 3 +it is stated that when a more excellent thing is generated from a +less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a +particular respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more +excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways +it happens that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere +reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind of +passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of +something, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore +passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, +in so far, to wit, as the _composite_ is passive. But here again we +find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, +it has more of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the +better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy. + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to +lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those +things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as +implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in +anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not +composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in +respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive, +according as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated +in _De Anima_ iii, 4. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in +itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as +stated in _De Anima_ i, 3. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument is true of passion accompanied by +transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not +found in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is +corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 2] + +Whether Passion Is in the Appetitive Rather Than in the Apprehensive +Part? + +Objection 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part +of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is +first in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in +that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in _Metaph._ ii, 1. +Now passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the +appetitive part: for the appetitive part is not affected unless there +be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is +in the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive. + +Obj. 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is +contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than the +apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the +apprehensive part. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a +corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But +passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily +transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive +appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the +movement of the soul, which the Greeks called _pathe_, are styled by +some of our writers, Cicero [*"Those things which the Greeks call +_pathe_, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases" (Tusc. +iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; +while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call them +passions." From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are +the same as affections. But affections manifestly belong to the +appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions +are in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part. + +_I answer that,_ As we have already stated (A. 1) the word "passion" +implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. +Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than +by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its +appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves: hence +the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the +objects of the appetitive power, "are in things themselves." On the +other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is +in itself; but knows it by reason of an "intention" of the thing, +which "intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence +we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that "the true and the false," +which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind." +Consequently it is evident that the nature of passion is consistent +with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part. + +Reply Obj. 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the +opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in +things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the +approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing +approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing +possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with +light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the +more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, +intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but [o]n +receding from that which is perfect; because therein consists the +very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing +recedes from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the +result is that at first we always find some small defect, which +afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, +because it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality. +Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, +i.e. to God, there is but little potentiality and passion: while in +other things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the +supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power of the soul, passion is found +less than in the other powers. + +Reply Obj. 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active, because +it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the +exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more +passive, namely, its being related to things as existing in +themselves: since it is through the external action that we come into +contact with things. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 78, A. 3) the organs of +the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in +respect of which the organ receives an "intention" of the object. And +this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is +the eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by +receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of +another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition; +for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar +change. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of +the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied +through gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity +of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the +sensitive appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions +of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the +organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood +about the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is +more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with +that of the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a +corporeal organ. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 3] + +Whether Passion Is in the Sensitive Appetite Rather Than in the +Intellectual Appetite, Which Is Called the Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive +than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. +ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike +instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by +suffering (_patiens_) them." But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" +Divine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore +passion is in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the +sensitive appetite. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense +the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which is +the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object +of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore +passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the +sensitive appetite. + +Obj. 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are +to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive +appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God +and the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive +than in the intellectual appetite. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while +describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the +sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, +passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good +or evil." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) passion is properly to be +found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal +transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is +not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also +natural. Now there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act +of the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised +by means of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion +is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that +of the intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the +definitions of Damascene quoted above. + +Reply Obj. 1: By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well +affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes +place without any alteration in the body. + +Reply Obj. 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of +the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things +that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents. +Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has +greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the +sensitive appetite is more passive. + +Reply Obj. 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or +the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they +signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without +passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy angels +feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery +while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont +to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although +they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance +to ours." +________________________ + +QUESTION 23 + +HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and +under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from +those of the irascible part? + +(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is +based on the contrariety of good and evil? + +(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary? + +(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in +species, but not contrary to one another? +________________________ + +QUESTION 23 + +Whether the Passions of the Concupiscible Part Are Different from +Those of the Irascible Part? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the +irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. +ii, 5) that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are +followed by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the +concupiscible part. Therefore all the passions are in the +concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the +concupiscible part. + +Obj. 2: Further, on the words of Matt. 13:33, "The kingdom of heaven +is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have +prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; +desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the +concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, +as is stated in _Topic._ ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the +concupiscible and irascible faculties. + +Obj. 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically according +to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible +passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same +passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties. + +_On the contrary,_ The acts of the different powers differ in +species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the +concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is +divided, as stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Therefore, since +the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above +(Q. 22, A. 3), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically +distinct from those of the concupiscible part. + +_I answer that,_ The passions of the irascible part differ in species +from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers +have different objects, as stated in the First Part (Q. 77, A. 3), +the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to +different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different +faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object +is required to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify +the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical +order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the potentiality +of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form +in the same matter; so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to +different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while +acts and passions regarding different specific objects, included +under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species +of that genus. + +In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, +and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of +these powers. For we have stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2), +that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, +simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since +the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at +times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in +so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily +acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is +of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible +faculty. Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, +belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, +hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which regard good or +bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to +the irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2), the +irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the +obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards +its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by +making some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible +passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that +even the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by +joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty. + +Reply Obj. 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible +faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible +passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the +irascible power. + +Reply Obj. 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the +concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this +very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: +and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same +applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. +Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different +from the irascible passions. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 2] + +Whether the Contrariety of the Irascible Passions Is Based on the +Contrariety of Good and Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible +passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. +For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible +passions, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). But the contrariety of the +concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, +for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same +applies to the irascible passions. + +Obj. 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as +movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other +contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in +_Phys._ v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, +save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or +evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of +passions other than that of good and evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach and +withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of _Physics._ +Now approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from +the apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what all desire" +(Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions +of the soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and +evil. + +_On the contrary,_ Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as +stated in _Ethic._ iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in +respect of good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. +Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of +good and evil. + +_I answer that,_ Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in _Phys._ +iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of +movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes +and movements, as stated in _Phys._ v, 5. One is according to +approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this +contrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is +a change _to being,_ and to corruption, which is a change _from +being._ The other contrariety is according to opposition of termini, +and belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement +from black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement +from white to black. + +Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the +soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and +evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of +the same term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety +alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: +whereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. +The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, +as stated above (A. 1), is sensible good or evil considered +absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a +term whereto, since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all +things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but +all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term +whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every +concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, +desire and joy; while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, +tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. +Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety +of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object. + +On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible +good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of +difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or +arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us +a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of _hope;_ +whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from +it; and this pertains to the passion of _despair._ In like manner the +arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to +be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of _fear:_ but it also +contains a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, +whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called +_daring._ Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety +in respect of good and evil (as between hope and fear): and also +contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the +same term (as between daring and fear). + +From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 3] + +Whether Any Passion of the Soul Has No Contrary? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a +contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or +in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (A. 1). But both kinds +of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore +every passion of the soul has its contrary. + +Obj. 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil +for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive +part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a +passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a +contrary. + +Obj. 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach +or withdrawal, as stated above (A. 2). But every approach has a +corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every +passion of the soul has a contrary. + +_On the contrary,_ Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is +set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 5. +Therefore not every passion has a contrary. + +_I answer that,_ The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it +cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, +or according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused +by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is +present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not +go beyond the limits of _sadness,_ which is a concupiscible passion; +or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which +movement is that of _anger._ But it cannot have a movement of +withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or +past. Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety +of approach and withdrawal. + +In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good +and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, +which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. +Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other +movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which +repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible +faculty. + +Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement +of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is +contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm +is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of +negation or privation. + +From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 4] + +Whether in the Same Power, There Are Any Passions, Specifically +Different, but Not Contrary to One Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, +specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another. +For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now +the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this +distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no +passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, +differ specifically. + +Obj. 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. +But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as +stated in _Metaph._ x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that +are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically. + +Obj. 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach +or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every +difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the +difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and +withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first +two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as +stated above (A. 2): whereas the third difference does not diversify +the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be +infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power +to differ in species, without being contrary to one another. + +_On the contrary,_ Love and joy differ in species, and are in the +concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; +rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power +there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to +one another. + +_I answer that,_ Passions differ in accordance with their active +causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their +objects. Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in +two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, +as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the +difference in their active power. In the passions of the soul we can +treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of +their motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, +in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from +itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the +patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the patient an +inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, +which is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that it +has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the +generated body be outside its proper place, the mover gives it +movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it +shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are due, +both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same +applies to the cause of repulsion. + +Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it +were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In +the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a +certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: +and this belongs to the passion of _love:_ the corresponding contrary +of which is _hatred_ in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not +yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the +attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of +_desire_ or _concupiscence:_ and contrary to it, in respect of evil, +is the passion of _aversion_ or _dislike._ Thirdly, when the good is +obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good +obtained: and this belongs to the passion of _delight_ or _joy;_ the +contrary of which, in respect of evil, is _sorrow_ or _sadness._ + +On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or +inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising +from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. +And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have _hope_ and _despair._ +In respect of evil not yet present we have _fear_ and _daring._ But in +respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is +no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated +above (A. 3). But evil already present gives rise to the passion +of _anger._ + +Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are +three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, +joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the +irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger +which has no contrary passion. + +Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing +specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the +irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained. + +From this the replies to the objections are evident. +________________________ + +QUESTION 24 + +OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and +under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the +soul? + +(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil? + +(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness or +malice of an act? + +(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 1] + +Whether Moral Good and Evil Can Be Found in the Passions of the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally +good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since +"morals are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. +Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in +common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is +morally good or evil. + +Obj. 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in +accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. +iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the +sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore they +have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are +neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are praised and +blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not +morally good or evil. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking +of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good +if our love is good." + +_I answer that,_ We may consider the passions of the soul in two +ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command +of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in +themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus +there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the +reason, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5). If, however, they be +considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then +moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is +nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the +movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or +evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the +passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or +evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded +by the will, or from not being checked by the will. + +Reply Obj. 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are common to +man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are +proper to man. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, +in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i, 13). + +Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor +blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not +exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they +are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who fears +or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry +in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason." +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 2] + +Whether Every Passion of the Soul Is Evil Morally? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are +morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call +the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Cf. Q. +22, A. 2, footnote]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is +morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally. + +Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement +in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature +is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is +sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii, +4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to +that which is against nature." Therefore these passions are morally +evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But +these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions +of sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all +these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . +For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, +they rejoice in good works." + +_I answer that,_ On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed +from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions +are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions +are good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is +nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider +the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between +sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the +intellectual and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate +the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as +the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the +simple movements of the will are in the intellectual appetite: but +every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while +they called passion, a movement that exceeds the limits of reason. +Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) +calls all passions "diseases of the soul": whence he argues that +"those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are +wanting in sense." Hence we speak of those who are wanting in sense +of being "unsound." + +On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to +all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem +them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are +not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong +in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory +of a mean in the passions, when he says that "every evil, though +moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be +moderately ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or +passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called +"diseases" or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not +controlled by reason. + +Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident. + +Reply Obj. 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease in +the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved +more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it +derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to +deviate always from the order of natural reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are +contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as +they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 3] + +Whether Passion Increases or Decreases the Goodness or Malice of an +Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness +of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, +on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases +the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment +of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel +about matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship +and pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better +it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): "Be ye followers of God, as +most dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no anger when +they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the +unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is +better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to +reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by +passion: for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins +deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without +passion, than he who does with passion. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the +passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without +violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent +forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral +good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good. + +_I answer that,_ As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is +evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens +the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys +good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true +indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate +movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or +ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of +the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's +good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good +is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more +perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining to man. +Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection +of moral good, that the actions of the outward members be controlled +by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey +reason, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 7), it belongs to the perfection +of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be +controlled by reason. + +Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and +do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection +of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in +respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; +according to Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the +living God": where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual +appetite, and by "flesh" the sensitive appetite. + +Reply Obj. 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold +relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, +since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of +the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it +is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of +reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place, +consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: +because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved +to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the +passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a +sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral +goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the +judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order +to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive +appetite. And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an +action. + +Reply Obj. 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, +nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the +right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us. + +Reply Obj. 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment +of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the +ways mentioned above (Reply Obj. 1), it aggravates the sin, or else +it is a sign of its being more grievous. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 4] + +Whether Any Passion Is Good or Evil in Its Species? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or +evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil +depend on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so +that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, +nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no +passion is good or evil according to its species. + +Obj. 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their +object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to +its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which +is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and +that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically +evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. +Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species. + +Obj. 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be +found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no +passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a +kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that +modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good +or evil according to their species. + +_I answer that,_ We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has +been said in regard to acts (Q. 18, AA. 5, 6; Q. 20, A. 1)--viz. that +the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered +from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and +thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an +act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as +it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and +evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object +to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord +with reason: as is clear in the case of _shame_ which is base fear; +and of _envy_ which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions +belong to the same species as the external act. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the passions in their natural +species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself. +But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil +of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, +but essentially. + +Reply Obj. 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves +good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, +if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, +those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to +evil, are themselves evil. + +Reply Obj. 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not +obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of +estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine +reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard +to the soul's passions. +________________________ + +QUESTION 25 + +OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and +under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible +passions; + +(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another; + +(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another; + +(4) The four principal passions. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 1] + +Whether the Irascible Passions Precede the Concupiscible Passions, or +Vice Versa? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the +concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of +their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the +difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the +irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions. + +Obj. 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the +irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that +which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purpose of +removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from +enjoying its object, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1; I, Q. 81, +A. 2). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" +(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the +concupiscible passions. + +Obj. 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy +and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher +says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "retaliation causes anger to cease, because +it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore the +concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions. + +_On the contrary,_ The concupiscible passions regard the absolute +good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the +difficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the +restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede +the irascible. + +_I answer that,_ In the concupiscible passions there is more +diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the +former we find something relating to movement--e.g. desire; and +something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the +irascible passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only +that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we +find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something +difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible +faculty. + +Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of +intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we +compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those +concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that +in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of +such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes +joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): +"Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest +in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: because +it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the +evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since +the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the +movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to +pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this +he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every passion of the irascible +faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. +either in joy or in sadness. + +But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible +passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take +precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add +something to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object +of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the +object of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a +certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the +realization of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion +or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty +in shunning the evil. + +Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those +concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and +those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it +is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and +terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object of the +concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as +the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. +But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good +absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the +common precedes the proper. + +Reply Obj. 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an +accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly +related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the +obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object. +Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those +concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third objection leads +to the same conclusion. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 2] + +Whether Love Is the First of the Concupiscible Passions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the +concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called +from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things +are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). +Therefore desire takes precedence of love. + +Obj. 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting +and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But +concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing +coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love. + +Obj. 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is +sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure +(Ethic. viii, 3, 4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and +consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9) that all +the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved +object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore +love is the first of the concupiscible passions. + +_I answer that,_ Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible +faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of +good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are +naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, +each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is +the reason for shunning the opposite evil. + +Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the +order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently +the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in +the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of +execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in +the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever +tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion +to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, +it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having +attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to +good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards +good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. +Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes +pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because +the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the +enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as +the good itself is, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 3, ad 3). + +Reply Obj. 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are +signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now +in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, +when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not +possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De +Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which +we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, +concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named +after it. + +Reply Obj. 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is +real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This +union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also +an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so +far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for +and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such +a union. This union precedes the movement of desire. + +Reply Obj. 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in +the order of intention. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 3] + +Whether Hope Is the First of the Irascible Passions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the +irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from +anger. Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief +characteristic" (cf. A. 2, Obj. 1), it seems that anger precedes and +surpasses hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something +arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary +evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or +an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive +simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to +overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to +be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And +consequently it seems that hope does not precede them. + +Obj. 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement +of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and despair +imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach +towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring. + +_On the contrary,_ The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it +precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of +the passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the +irascible faculty. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) all irascible passions imply +movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible +faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere +aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or +hatred; [the other is the presence of good or evil itself,] and this +belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good +produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 3, +4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger. + +Since then in the order of generation or execution, proportion or +aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows +that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order +of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, +which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, +those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally +precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that +hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, +which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly; +whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is +consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, +wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like +manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And +that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident +from this--that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding +evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because +daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the +despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one +is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, +as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his _Physics._ Accordingly, +it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions. + +And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of +generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second; +hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth +and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as +stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire +precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and +joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated +above. + +Reply Obj. 1: Because anger arises from the other passions, as an +effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being +more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is the +reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good +more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even +anger regards something more arduous. + +Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially and +directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement +from evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part +is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of +nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a +contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining +the end. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 4] + +Whether These Are the Four Principal Passions: Joy, Sadness, Hope and +Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not +the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3, 7 +sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place. + +Obj. 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the +soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or +generation. The principal passions should therefore be taken, either +in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the +final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of +execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal passion. +Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called +the four principal passions. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused +by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned as +principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from +being akin to one another. + +_On the contrary,_ Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four +principal passions, says: + +"Banish joys: banish fears: +Away with hope: away with tears." + +_I answer that,_ These four are commonly called the principal +passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal +because in them all the other passions have their completion and end; +wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in +_Ethic._ ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because +they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as +regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in +respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and +ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on +to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish +these four passions in relation to the present and the future: for +movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so +that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; +hope regards future good, and fear, future evil. + +As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, +they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that +these four are the principal passions, because they are general +passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we +understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, +in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future +good. + +Reply Obj. 2: These are called principal passions, in the order of +intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last +passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend +towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any +further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be +reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, +which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on +(Reply Obj. 3). + +Reply Obj. 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, +as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; +and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal +passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be +principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, +because it arises from daring. +________________________ + +QUESTION 26 + +OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE +(In Four Articles) + +We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) +the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the +irascible faculty. + +The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall +consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure +and sadness. + +Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; +(2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first +head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power? + +(2) Whether love is a passion? + +(3) Whether love is the same as dilection? + +(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and +love of concupiscence? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 1] + +Whether Love Is in the Concupiscible Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible +power. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I +loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible +power, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, +which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the +concupiscible power. + +Obj. 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the object +beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is +contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is +sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; +indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible +power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the +concupiscible power. + +Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love." +But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, which +belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the +concupiscible power. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is +in the concupiscible power." + +_I answer that,_ Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since +good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the +difference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from +an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in +some other: and this is called the _natural appetite._ Because +natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their +nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the +Author of their nature, as stated in the First Part (Q. 6, A. 1, ad +2; Q. 103, A. 1, ad 1, 3). And there is another appetite arising from +an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity +and not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the +_sensitive appetite,_ which, however, in man, has a certain share of +liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another +appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the +appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is +called the _will._ + +Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the +principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite +the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's +connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called +"natural love": thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the +centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called "natural love." +In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will +to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called +"sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that +sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual +love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the +concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not +under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible +faculty. + +Reply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love. + +Reply Obj. 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and +sadness, not essentially but causally. + +Reply Obj. 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the +vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts +of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says +(Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; since +each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally +suitable to it. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 2] + +Whether Love Is a Passion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power +is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. +iv). Therefore love is not a passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says +(De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but rather +a relation. Therefore love is not a passion. + +Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion +is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite; +for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle. +Therefore love is not a passion. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love +is a passion." + +_I answer that,_ Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. +Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in +the first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the +movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the +generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so +that weight, from being the principle of movement to the place, which +is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be +called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the +appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in +complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards +the appetible object. For "the appetitive movement is circular," as +stated in _De Anima_ iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the +appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while +the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, +so that the movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first +change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called +"love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from +this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and +this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy." +Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the appetite +by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: +properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; +in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, +Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of +movement in the appetite. + +Reply Obj. 2: Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the +complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that +which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence +it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that +union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a +unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, +1) that union is the work of love. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although love does not denote the movement of the +appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that +movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so +as to have complacency therein. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 3] + +Whether Love Is the Same As Dilection? + +Objection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is +to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of +straight lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and +dilection denote the same thing. + +Obj. 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of +their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same. +Therefore these are the same. + +Obj. 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is +chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love to +evil things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De +Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine +says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in +reference to either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection +do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) +that "it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of +dilection." + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men +have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does." + +_I answer that,_ We find four words referring in a way, to the same +thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ, +however, in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" +are expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken +either way. + +Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a +wider signification than the others, since every dilection or charity +is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition +to love, a choice (_electionem_) made beforehand, as the very word +denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, +but only in the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity +denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far +as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word +itself implies [*Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)]. + +Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far +as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same +as dilection. + +Reply Obj. 2: The object of love is more general than the +object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, +as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect of +good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is +the same as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks +of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that +"a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed +love." However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion, +inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference +spoken of. + +Reply Obj. 4: The reason why some held that, even when applied +to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike +than "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so +far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes +the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by +love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can +possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature +of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike +than dilection. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 4] + +Whether Love Is Properly Divided into Love of Friendship and Love of +Concupiscence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into +love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, +while friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. +viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions. +Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and +love of friendship. + +Obj. 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the +same division; for man is not a member of the same division as +"animal." But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, +as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a +division of love. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) +friendship is threefold, that which is founded on _usefulness,_ that +which is founded on _pleasure,_ and that which is founded on +_goodness._ But useful and pleasant friendship are not without +concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with +friendship. + +_On the contrary,_ We are said to love certain things, because we +desire them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its +sweetness which he desires"; as stated in _Topic._ ii, 3. But we have +no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in _Ethic._ +viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of +friendship. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is +to wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold +tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself +or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. +Accordingly, man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he +wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he +wishes good. + +Now the members of this division are related as primary and +secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is +loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the +love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for +something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being +simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, +because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has +goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a +relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, +that it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with +which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative +love. + +Reply Obj. 1: Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, +but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend +is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to +desire, what we wish for ourselves. + +Hence the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a +man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the +character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good +further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of +the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of +concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship. +________________________ + +QUESTION 27 + +OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are +four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether good is the only cause of love? + +(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love? + +(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love? + +(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 1] + +Whether Good Is the Only Cause of Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. +For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it +happens that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: "He that +loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be +good. Therefore good is not the only cause of love. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love +those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil is +the cause of love. + +Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good" +only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all." + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the +good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 26, A. 1), Love belongs to the +appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object +stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. +Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the +proper object of love is the good; because, as stated above (Q. 26, +AA. 1, 2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of +the lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a +good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, +that good is the proper cause of love. + +Reply Obj. 1: Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, +that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is +considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in +so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is in +this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of +iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or +such like. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not +for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good +thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes +insincerity or hypocrisy. + +Reply Obj. 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ +in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good +is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is +that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently +those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most +cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we +speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to +the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression +"beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful +odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation +to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means that which simply +pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant +to apprehend. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 2] + +Whether Knowledge Is a Cause of Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For +it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought +without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have +them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. +35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them. +Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love. + +Obj. 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something +more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they are +known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be +known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love. + +Obj. 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be +no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is +love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not +knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1, 2) that "none can +love what he does not know." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), good is the cause of love, +as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, +except as apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension +of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. +ix, 5, 12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: +and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness +is the beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the +cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only +if known. + +Reply Obj. 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge +thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either +in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard +it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1, 2). But to have it is +not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly. + +Reply Obj. 2: Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, +that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge +belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things +which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, +things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently +the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know distinctly +all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and properties. On +the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a +thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection +of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. +Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is known; +since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. +This is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love +through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, +they know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade +others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to +the love of God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused +by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things +themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above +(Q. 26, A. 1; cf. I, Q. 6, A. 1, ad 2). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 3] + +Whether Likeness Is a Cause of Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For +the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the +cause of hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that "among the +proud there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. +viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with one another." Therefore likeness +is not a cause of love. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves +in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an +actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if +likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would +love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to +possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love. + +Obj. 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have +it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches. +But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. +Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love +those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain +their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore +likeness is not a cause of love. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth +its like." + +_I answer that,_ Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But +it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind +of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: +for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said +to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having +potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has +actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its +proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper +place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its +act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself. + +Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or +well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it +were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus +two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men +are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the +other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to +himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of +concupiscence, or friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: +because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its +act; and it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient +and cognitive being. + +Now it has been stated above (Q. 26, A. 4), that in the love of +concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in +willing the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than +another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with +another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, +if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a +form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes +hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from +gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel among themselves," +because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are +contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in +attaining the position they covet. + +Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in +himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the +latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that +which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good +writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has +that which is becoming to him in respect of his art. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what +he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated +above. + +Reply Obj. 4: According to the same likeness of potentiality to its +act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he +expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the +man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is +inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on +usefulness. We might also say that although not all men have these +virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to +certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which +principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as +being in conformity with his own natural reason. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 4] + +Whether Any Other Passion of the Soul Is a Cause of Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that some other passion can be the cause +of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are +loved for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a +passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. + +Obj. 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we +desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship +based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no +hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at all, +even if we see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a cause of +love. + +_On the contrary,_ All the other emotions of the soul are caused by +love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9). + +_I answer that,_ There is no other passion of the soul that does not +presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion +of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in +something. Now every movement towards something, or rest in +something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in +this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other +passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it +may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular +love: just as one good is the cause of another. + +Reply Obj. 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, +his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is +caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes +pleasure save in that which is loved in some way. + +Reply Obj. 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that +thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's +being loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him +from whom he receives it. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of +pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, +because hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely +that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is +of a good that is loved. +________________________ + +QUESTION 28 + +OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE +(In Six Articles) + +We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there +are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether union is an effect of love? + +(2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love? + +(3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love? + +(4) Whether zeal is an effect of love? + +(5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover? + +(6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 1] + +Whether Union Is an Effect of Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For +absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with +absence; for the Apostle says (Gal. 4:18): "Be zealous for that which +is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a +gloss), "and not only when I am present with you." Therefore union is +not an effect of love. + +Obj. 2: Further, every union is either according to essence, thus +form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the +whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according +to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love does not cause +union of essence; else love could not be between things essentially +distinct. On the other hand, love does not cause union of likeness, +but rather is caused by it, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 3). Therefore +union is not an effect of love. + +Obj. 3: Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the +intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in +act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of +knowledge rather than of love. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a +"unitive love." + +_I answer that,_ The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first +is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the +lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be +considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement +of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. +love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises +from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with +the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it +as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man loves +another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he +wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, +in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a +friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine +says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of +my soul." + +The first of these unions is caused _effectively_ by love; because +love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of +something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused +_formally_ by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In +this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital +principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to +wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to +the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying +that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of real union. That is necessary +to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of +the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or +present. + +Reply Obj. 2: Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union +which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love +with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one +loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (Q. +27, A. 3). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. +This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to +substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his +love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something +belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is +a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the +lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in +keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates +(Polit. ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be +united both into one," but since "this would result in either one or +both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union--to +live together, speak together, and be united together in other like +things. + +Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being +united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is +that the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the +lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love is +closer than that which is caused by knowledge. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 2] + +Whether Mutual Indwelling Is an Effect of Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that love does not cause mutual +indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For +that which is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be +container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual +indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by +means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the +reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that +are really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of +love. + +Obj. 3: Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and +vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, in +the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union +itself is love, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it follows that the +lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently +false. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:16): "He that abideth in +charity abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of +God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to +be in the lover, and vice versa. + +_I answer that,_ This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood +as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. +Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in +the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the +lover, according to Phil. 1:7, "For that I have you in my heart": +while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to +apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a +superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an +intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to +penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy +Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He "searcheth all things, yea the deep +things of God" (1 Cor. 2:10). + +As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, +inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: +causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when +present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to +tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good +that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed +from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of +another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but +because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's +heart. For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of +the bowels of charity." On the other hand, the lover is in the +beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, +but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence is not +satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of +the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by +penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of +friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what +is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his +friend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good +or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper +to friends "to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at +the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). +Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as +affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he +were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he +wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on +his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the +lover. + +In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can +be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends +return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one +another. + +Reply Obj. 1: The beloved is contained in the lover, by being +impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his +complacency. On the other hand, the lover is contained in the +beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the +beloved. For nothing hinders a thing from being both container and +contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its +species, and vice versa. + +Reply Obj. 2: The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of +love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement +of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument is true of the third kind of mutual +indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 3] + +Whether Ecstasy Is an Effect of Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. +For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always +result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at +times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy. + +Obj. 2: Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. +Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes +himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were. + +Obj. 3: Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated +above (A. 1). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in +order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover +always loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. +Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine +love produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy +through love." Since therefore according to the same author (Div. +Nom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, +it seems that every love causes ecstasy. + +_I answer that,_ To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside +oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the +appetitive power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be +placed outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge +proper to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher +knowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is +placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, +when he is raised up so as to comprehend things that surpass sense +and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of +debasement; thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is +overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a +man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards +something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were. + +The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so +far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated +above (A. 2), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from +other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love +of friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a +restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is +carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not +being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy +something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic +good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this +movement remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love +of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because +he wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for +him, for his sake. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, +as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply. + +Reply Obj. 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he +wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will +the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not +follow that he loves another more than himself. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 4] + +Whether Zeal Is an Effect of Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For +zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Cor. +3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and +contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore +zeal is not an effect of love. + +Obj. 2: Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates +itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since it +seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of +his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous of +(_zelare_) their wives, because they will not share them with others. +Therefore zeal is not an effect of love. + +Obj. 3: Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there +without love: for it is written (Ps. 72:3): "I had a zeal on occasion +of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of +love any more than of hatred. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be +a zealot, on account of his great love for all things." + +_I answer that,_ Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the +intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power +tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or +resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object +loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to +remove everything that opposes it. + +But this happens in different ways according to love of +concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence +he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders +his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus +that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association +with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. +In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who +seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. +And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written (Ps. 36:1): "Be +not emulous of evil doers, nor envy (_zelaveris_) them that work +iniquity." + +On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: +wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against +everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is +said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of +repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In +this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he +endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to +the honor or will of God; according to 3 Kings 19:14: "With zeal I +have been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of John +2:17: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a +man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil +he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it." + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of +envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object +of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it. + +Reply Obj. 2: Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the +lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this +communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. +But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods +cannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and +from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not +arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their +entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the +knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except +perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it. + +Reply Obj. 3: The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to +the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down +as an effect of love rather than of hatred. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 5] + +Whether Love Is a Passion That Wounds the Lover? + +Objection 1: It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor +denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor: +for it is written (Cant 2:5): "Stay me up with flowers, compass me +about with apples; because I languish with love." Therefore love is +a wounding passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts +that in which it is: for it is written (Cant 5:6): "My soul melted +when my beloved spoke." Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it +is a corruptive and a wounding passion. + +Obj. 3: Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which +excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius +(Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the +Seraphim's love, includes "hot" and "piercing" and "most fervent." +Moreover it is said of love (Cant 8:6) that "its lamps are fire and +flames." Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "everything +loves itself with a love that holds it together," i.e. that preserves +it. Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that +preserves and perfects. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 26, AA. 1, 2; Q. 27, A. 1), love +denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now +nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to it; +rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be +adapted to that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and made +worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and +betters the lover; but love of a good which is unsuitable to the +lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and +bettered chiefly by the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by +the love of sin, according to Osee 9:10: "They became abominable, as +those things which they loved." + +And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its +formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect of the +material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily +change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of this change +being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act +of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some +bodily organ. + +In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate +effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, languor, +and fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to +freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely bound together, so +as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is +fitted to receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object +loved is in the lover, as stated above (A. 2). Consequently the +freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with +love: while melting denotes a softening of the heart, whereby the +heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If, +then, the beloved is present and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment +ensues. But if the beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. +sadness at its absence, which is denoted by "languor" (hence Cicero +in _De Tusc. Quaest._ iii, 11 applies the term "ailment" chiefly to +sadness); and an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is +signified by "fervor." And these are the effects of love considered +formally, according to the relation of the appetitive power to its +object. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue, +proportionate to the above, in respect of a change in the organ. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 6] + +Whether Love Is Cause of All That the Lover Does? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the lover does not do everything from +love. For love is a passion, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 2). But man +does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from +choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 8. +Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love. + +Obj. 2: Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action +in all animals, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 10. If, therefore, +whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the +appetitive faculty are superfluous. + +Obj. 3: Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by +contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore all +things are not done from love. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, +whatever they do, they do for the love of good." + +_I answer that,_ Every agent acts for an end, as stated above (Q. 1, +A. 2). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. +Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every +action from love of some kind. + +Reply Obj. 1: This objection takes love as a passion existing in the +sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general +sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and +natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love +in chapter iv of _De Divinis Nominibus._ + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 5; Q. 27, A. 4) desire, sadness and +pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result +from love. Wherefore every act that proceeds from any passion, +proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other +passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state +further on (Q. 29, A. 2). +________________________ + +QUESTION 29 + +OF HATRED +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred? + +(2) Whether love is the cause of hatred? + +(3) Whether hatred is stronger than love? + +(4) Whether a man can hate himself? + +(5) Whether a man can hate the truth? + +(6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 1] + +Whether Evil Is the Cause and Object of Hatred? + +Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of +hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore +evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack +of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue. + +Obj. 2: Further, hatred of evil is praiseworthy; hence (2 Macc. 3:1) +some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because of +the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls +[Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil be +the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is commendable: +and this is clearly false. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and +evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different +subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good. + +_On the contrary,_ Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of +love is good, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 1). Therefore +the object of hatred is evil. + +_I answer that,_ Since the natural appetite is the result of +apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as +the natural appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination +of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which +does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above +(Q. 26, A. 1). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is +evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to +that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has +it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and +this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in +the intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite +with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is +dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as +repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, +bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears +the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of +love, so evil is the object of hatred. + +Reply Obj. 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but +only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But +being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of +repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is +hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by +comparison with something else. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is +not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is +not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of +evil nor love of good is good. + +Reply Obj. 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable or +hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the +same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally +unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming +to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and +the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 2] + +Whether Love Is a Cause of Hatred? + +Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For +"the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous" +(Praedic. x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, +since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally +simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. + +Obj. 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the +other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the +cause of hatred. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which +precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a +turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good. +Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9) that all +emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an +emotion of the soul, is caused by love. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), love consists in a certain +agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists +in a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in +each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a +thing disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that +which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; +and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing +which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love. + +Reply Obj. 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes +naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species +of animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous +logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; +e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they +are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance and +accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and +being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, +by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated of accident +except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred +are naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore +nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred. + +Reply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect +of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are +not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it +amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate +its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its +contrary. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from one +term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the +case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the +reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive movement +belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution. +Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appetitive +movement. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 3] + +Whether Hatred Is Stronger Than Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For +Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee +from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain +pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love. +Therefore hatred is stronger than love. + +Obj. 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is +overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into hatred. +Therefore hatred is stronger than love. + +Obj. 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects. +But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on seeking +what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure +for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (QQ. 83, qu. 36). +Therefore hatred is stronger than love. + +_On the contrary,_ Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does +nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). +But hatred and love differ according to the difference of good and +evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred. + +_I answer that,_ It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than +its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as +above stated (A. 2). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be +stronger than love absolutely. + +But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger +than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than +to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to +the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's +movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect +of evil. + +Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two +reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For, +since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain +impression; when once the impression has been received it is not felt +so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a +hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the +heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is +habitual and like a second nature. For this reason, love is felt more +keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De +Trin. x, 12) that "love is felt more keenly when we lack what we +love." And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is +hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is +loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a hatred and a +love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to +different degrees of good there are different degrees of love to +which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that +corresponds to a greater love, moves us more than a lesser love. + +Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love +of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which +corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than +we love pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 2: Hatred would never overcome love, were it not for the +greater love to which that hatred corresponds. Thus man loves +himself, more than he loves his friend: and because he loves himself, +his friend is hateful to him, if he oppose him. + +Reply Obj. 3: The reason why we act with greater insistence in +repelling what is hateful, is because we feel hatred more keenly. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 4] + +Whether a Man Can Hate Himself? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is +written (Ps. 10:6): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul." +But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves. + +Obj. 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But +sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who +kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves. + +Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes a +man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. But +some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that "no man ever +hated his own flesh." + +_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to +hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone +desire anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil +is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). +Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above (Q. 26, A. +4). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is +impossible for a man to hate himself, properly speaking. + +But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two +ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself. +For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some +particular respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man +accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, +in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that +which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what +the king does, as if the king were the whole state. Now it is clear +that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men +account themselves as being principally that which they are in their +material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves +according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that +which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason. And in +both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own +soul," but also himself. + +Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident. + +Reply Obj. 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he +apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill +themselves, apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting +an end to some unhappiness or pain. + +Reply Obj. 3: The miser hates something accidental to himself, but +not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his +sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say +that avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In +fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, +man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 5] + +Whether a Man Can Hate the Truth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For +good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. +Neither, therefore, can he hate the truth. + +Obj. 2: Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as +stated in the beginning of the _Metaphysics_ (i, 1). But knowledge is +only of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But +that which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. Therefore no man +can hate the truth. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love +those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive for +this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore +he cannot hate it. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 4:16): "Am I become your +enemy because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage, +probably from memory, as though it were an assertion: "I am become," +etc.] + +_I answer that,_ Good, true and being are the same in reality, but +differ as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light +of something desirable, while being and true are not so considered: +because good is "what all things seek." Wherefore good, as such, +cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. +Being and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred: because +disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of +love; while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing +hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an +object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and +repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with +the notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good. + +Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is +repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according as truth +is in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates +a particular truth, when he wishes that what is true were not true. +Secondly, according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him +from gaining the object loved: such is the case of those who wish not +to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person +it is said (Job 21:14): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." +Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as +it is in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man +wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should know +the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x, +23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it +reproves." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence +Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, +the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders +one from accomplishing one's desire. + +Reply Obj. 3: The reason why we love those who are straightforward is +that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth, +considered in itself, is a desirable thing. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 6] + +Whether Anything Can Be an Object of Universal Hatred? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of +universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive +appetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the +senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an +object of universal hatred. + +Obj. 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is +disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of +universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be +the object of universal hatred. + +Obj. 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in +things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the +universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the +particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is +directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a +thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter." + +_I answer that,_ There are two ways of speaking of the universal: +first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as +considered in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing +to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as man. +If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive +power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can attain the +universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from +individual matter, on which every sensitive power is based. + +Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of +appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the +object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight +is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is +cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this +particular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred +in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because +this thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an +individual, is hostile to the animal--for instance, a wolf in regard +to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other +hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because it +is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions +proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. +ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something singular, whereas +hatred can be directed to a thing in general." + +But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises +from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the +universal in both ways. + +Reply Obj. 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but +they apprehend something to which the character of universality is +given by abstraction. + +Reply Obj. 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of +hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at +variance with others, so as to be hateful to them. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the universal under the aspect +of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive +apprehension or appetite. +________________________ + +QUESTION 30 + +OF CONCUPISCENCE +(In Four Articles) + +We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are +four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only? + +(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion? + +(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural? + +(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 1] + +Whether Concupiscence Is in the Sensitive Appetite Only? + +Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the +sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according +to Wis. 6:21: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth +to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have no +tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the +sensitive appetite. + +Obj. 2: Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the +sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "There +dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." +But desire for God's commandments is an act of concupiscence, +according to Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted (_concupivit_) to long +for thy justifications." Therefore concupiscence is not only in the +sensitive appetite. + +Obj. 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of +concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul, +and not only in the sensitive appetite. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the +irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided +into the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational +part of the soul, passive and appetitive." Therefore concupiscence is +in the sensitive appetite. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), +"concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure +is twofold, as we shall state later on (Q. 31, AA. 3, 4): one is in +the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in +good perceptible to the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong +to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: +because the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ: wherefore +sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence +seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to +the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word +"concupiscentia." Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in +the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes +its name from it. + +Reply Obj. 1: The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is +sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain +likeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul +being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so that +the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, +following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the +body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according to +Ps. 83:3: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." + +Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower, +but also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply fellowship in +craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing +desired. + +Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper +good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension. +But the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from +apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And to crave a +thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein +concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 2] + +Whether Concupiscence Is a Specific Passion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific +passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by +their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something +delightful to the senses; and this is also the object of +concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore +concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "covetousness +is the love of transitory things": so that it is not distinct from +love. But all specific passions are distinct from one another. +Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the +concupiscible faculty. + +Obj. 3: Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there +is a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above (Q. +23, A. 4). But no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty is +contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) +that "good when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present, it +gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend makes us fear, the +evil that is present makes us sad": from which we gather that as +sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence. But +fear is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible part. +Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the +concupiscible faculty. + +_On the contrary,_ Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to +pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty. +Hence it is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as +a specific passion. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 23, A. 1), the good which +gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the +concupiscible faculty. Hence the various concupiscible passions are +distinguished according to the differences of that good. Now the +diversity of this object can arise from the very nature of the +object, or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity, +derived from the nature of the active object, causes a material +difference of passions: while the difference in regard to its active +power causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect of which the +passions differ specifically. + +Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs +according as it is really present, or absent: because, according as +it is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas, +according as it is absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards +it. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch +as, so to speak, it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it +causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty +to itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it +makes the faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence +is a passion differing _in species_ from both love and pleasure. But +concupiscences of this or that pleasurable object differ _in number._ + +Reply Obj. 1: Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not +absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible, +considered as past, is the object of memory. For these particular +conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers +of the sensitive part, which regards particular things. + +Reply Obj. 2: In the passage quoted we have causal, not essential +predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an effect +of love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness in a +wide sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect of good to +come: so that it includes both love and hope. + +Reply Obj. 3: The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence +has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in +regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil; +sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes +called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though +it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the appetite in +future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and +evil as arduous. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 3] + +Whether Some Concupiscences Are Natural, and Some Not Natural? + +Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into +those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence +belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But the +natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. Therefore no +concupiscence is natural. + +Obj. 2: Further, material differences makes no difference of species, +but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside the +purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and some +not, they differ only in respect of their objects; which amounts to a +material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore +concupiscences should not be divided into those that are natural and +those that are not. + +Obj. 3: Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in +_Phys._ ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is +not natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible: +because, since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the +sensitive appetite, and not to the will, which is the rational +appetite. Therefore there are no concupiscences which are not natural. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11) +distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), concupiscence is the craving +for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, +because it is suitable to the nature of the animal; for example, +food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable +things is said to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable +because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one +apprehends something as good and suitable, and consequently takes +pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said +to be not natural, and is more wont to be called "cupidity." + +Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural +concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to both +is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and +in these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) +calls them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the second +kind are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as +good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the +Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are +"irrational," but the latter, "rational." And because different men +reason differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, +11) "peculiar and acquired," i.e. in addition to those that are +natural. + +Reply Obj. 1: The same thing that is the object of the natural +appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is +apprehended. And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of +food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite. + +Reply Obj. 2: The difference between those concupiscences that are +natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; +it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a +difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite is +the apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows +from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing is apprehended +as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural +concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, +11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence arise +those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very +reason the Philosopher calls "rational" (Rhet. i, 11). + +Reply Obj. 3: Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the +intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the +sensitive faculty, as stated in the First Part (Q. 78, A. 4; Q. 81, +A. 3): so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the +sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by +the universal reason also, through the medium of the particular +imagination. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 4] + +Whether Concupiscence Is Infinite? + +Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For +the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. +But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). +Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. + +Obj. 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it +proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and +therefore unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. + +Obj. 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and +thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject +of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term. +Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would ever +ensue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since +concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), concupiscence is twofold; +one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence +cannot be actually infinite: because it is of that which nature +requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence +man never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in +nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of +concupiscence be infinite successively; so that, for instance, after +getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything +else that nature requires: because these bodily goods, when obtained, +do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of +Samaria (John 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst +again." + +But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as +stated above (A. 3), it follows from the reason, and it belongs to +the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may +desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as +rich as possible. + +Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. +i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another infinite. +Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is +desired for its own sake, e.g. health: and thus greater health is +more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of +itself dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet more. +On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, +because the concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to +the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an +infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on +account of the necessities of life, desire a finite measure of +riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher +says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the concupiscence of any +other things. + +Reply Obj. 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as something +finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once +actually desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it +cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that "from +which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be +taken" (Phys. iii, 6). + +Reply Obj. 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain +sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears in +the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken +in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact the universal +which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it +contains potentially an infinite number of singulars. + +Reply Obj. 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for +him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the +realization of each object of his concupiscence. +________________________ + +QUESTION 31 + +OF DELIGHT [*Or, Pleasure] CONSIDERED IN ITSELF +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four +things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of +delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether delight is a passion? + +(2) Whether delight is subject to time? + +(3) Whether it differs from joy? + +(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite? + +(5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight +of the lower; + +(6) Of sensible delights compared with one another; + +(7) Whether any delight is non-natural? + +(8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 1] + +Whether Delight Is a Passion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For +Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from +passion, and says that "operation is a movement in accord with +nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight +is an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). +Therefore delight is not a passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in _Phys._ +iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having +been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight +is not a passion. + +Obj. 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is +delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in _Ethic._ x, 4, +5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being +altered, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 3 and _De Anima_ ii, 5. Therefore +delight is not a passion. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons +delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul. + +_I answer that,_ The movements of the sensitive appetite, are +properly called passions, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Now every +emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the +sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight, since, +according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain +movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, +in keeping with the nature of the thing." + +In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural +things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does +this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does +not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does +occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and +other natural things, that when these latter are established in the +state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals +do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the +soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. +Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we +designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping +with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we +assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By +saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this +establishing is to be understood not as in the process of +establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the +term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as +Plato [*Phileb. 32, 33] maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated +in _Ethic._ vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is +"sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein +there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a +movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, +it is a passion of the soul. + +Reply Obj. 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second +perfection, as stated in _De Anima_ ii, 1: and therefore when a thing +is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, +delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed +above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we +designate, not its essence, but its cause. + +Reply Obj. 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, +according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the +appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to +the external operation. And so, although in him who has already +gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution +ceases, by which he tends to the end; yet the movement of the +appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired +that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is +possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if +we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the +appetite, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the +appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of +movement. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate to +those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as +bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some +passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (Q. 23, +AA. 1, 4): and in this sense delight is called a passion. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 2] + +Whether Delight Is in Time? + +Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is +a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all +movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time. + +Obj. 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in +respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore +pleasure is in time. + +Obj. 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But +some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one +takes pleasure according to time." + +_I answer that,_ A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by +itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as +it were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those +things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or +something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, +repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are +said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of +themselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are +subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not +essentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the +term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, +because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, +to be a man is in time. + +Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in +time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the +term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, +the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be +altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, +either by reason of itself or accidentally. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _De Anima_ iii, 7, movement is twofold. +One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in +potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. +Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something +existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such +like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is +it of itself in time. + +Reply Obj. 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according +as it is accidentally in time. + +Reply Obj. 3: Other passions have not for their object a good +obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of +the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs +more to delight not to be in time. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 3] + +Whether Delight Differs from Joy? + +Objection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as +joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their +objects. But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good +obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight. + +Obj. 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and +the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. Therefore +delight and joy are altogether the same. + +Obj. 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is +equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and +cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions +of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not +differ from delight. + +_On the contrary,_ We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; +whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same +as delight. + +_I answer that,_ Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of +delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are +natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated +above (Q. 30, A. 3), so also some delights are natural, and some are +not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and +Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some +delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the +same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire +naturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a +result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight +follows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, +but only delight. + +Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned +desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be +the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational +beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since +sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing +thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more +things than does joy. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an +apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to +diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also +called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called +otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to +concupiscences (Q. 30, A. 3, ad 2). + +Reply Obj. 2: A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences +also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy +corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence +of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to +the difference of movement. + +Reply Obj. 3: These other names pertaining to delight are derived +from the effects of delight; for _laetitia_ (gladness) is derived +from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; +"exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, +which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from +its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain special +signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to +joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 4] + +Whether Delight Is in the Intellectual Appetite? + +Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual +appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight is +a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual +power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite. + +Obj. 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the +sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive +appetite. + +Obj. 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational +animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we +have in common with irrational animals. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord." +But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual +appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), a certain delight arises +from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending +something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its +application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual +appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the +intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called +joy, but not bodily delight. + +However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that +delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily +transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is +nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De +Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition +of consent to the things we wish." + +Reply Obj. 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word +"sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For he +says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it +is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." Or we may +say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite. + +Reply Obj. 2: Delight has the character of passion, properly +speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in +the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus +it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. +vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at +the end of _De Coel. Hier.,_ that "the angels are not susceptible to +our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness +of incorruption." + +Reply Obj. 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb +animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De +Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights." +Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appetite, +which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the +intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 5] + +Whether Bodily and Sensible Pleasures Are Greater Than Spiritual and +Intellectual Pleasures? + +Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are +greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek +some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2, 4). But +more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. +Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. + +Obj. 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But +bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the state of +the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore +bodily pleasures are greater. + +Obj. 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by +reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check +spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 118:103): "How sweet are Thy +words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher +says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the +operation of wisdom." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), pleasure arises from union +with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of +the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must +be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are +acts or perfections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to +will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, +are actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for +"movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. +iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and +intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and +are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does +pleasure arise, and not only from their objects. + +If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible +pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for instance +in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt +intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For +man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding +it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense. +Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is +better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than +sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for +there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than +his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as +Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14). + +If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with +sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely +speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the +consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good +which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and +the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more +beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from +even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor +which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is +much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the +conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More +intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a +thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the +object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because +the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement, which +is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived +all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other +part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in +pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible +things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are +realized all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily +pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods +are incorruptible. + +On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more +vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more +known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible +pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are +accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not +occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of +the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures +are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various +griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their +succeeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently +are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary +griefs, as we shall state farther on (Q. 35, A. 5). + +Reply Obj. 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is +because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, +again, because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow +and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, +which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to +seek those of the body. + +Reply Obj. 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily +pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite. + +Reply Obj. 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive +faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be +tempered and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the +mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both +sober and moderate. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 6] + +Whether the Pleasures of Touch Are Greater Than the Pleasures +Afforded by the Other Senses? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not +greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the +greatest pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an +end. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the +words of Tob. 5:12: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in +darkness, and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure +afforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures. + +Obj. 2: Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the +Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is +loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to +be afforded by sight. + +Obj. 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of +the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such +friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by +sight. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the +greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 25, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 27, A. 4, ad +1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as +stated in _Metaph._ i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for +the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. +Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these ways. But because +it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, +it follows that the former pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which +arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the +senses, as loved for their usefulness, are common to all animals. + +If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of +knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than +any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible +pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure +is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is +gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal's nature. +Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this +usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are +vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like. +Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as +being more closely related to the end. For this reason, too, other +animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of +usefulness, derive no pleasure from the other senses except as +subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not +take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor +does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring +it" (Ethic. iii, 10). + +Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect +of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in +respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will +find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than +the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits +of sensible pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that +which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of +the touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, +sexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider +the pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, +then the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual +pleasures are greater than sensible. + +Reply Obj. 1: Joy, as stated above (A. 3), denotes pleasure of the +soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure +belongs principally to the touch. + +Reply Obj. 2: The sight is loved most, "on account of knowledge, +because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is stated in the +same passage (Metaph. i, 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in +another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the +touch, is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of +the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a +movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the +lovable object receives an impression of its image, which entices him +to love it and to seek its delight. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 7] + +Whether Any Pleasure Is Not Natural? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For +pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But +the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural +place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite, +which is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. +Therefore no pleasure is non-natural. + +Obj. 2: Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever is +violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which is +unnatural can give pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, the fact of being established in one's own nature, +if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the +Philosopher's definition quoted above (A. 1). But it is natural to +every thing to be established in its nature; because natural movement +tends to a natural end. Therefore every pleasure is natural. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5, 6) that some +things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease." + +_I answer that,_ We speak of that as being natural, which is in +accord with nature, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 1. Now, in man, nature +can be taken in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is +the principal part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has +his own specific nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be +called natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining to +man in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to +take pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of +virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken as contrasted with +reason, and as denoting that which is common to man and other +animals, especially that part of man which does not obey reason. And +in this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the body, +either as regards the individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the +like, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to +afford man natural pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures, we find +some that are _not natural_ speaking absolutely, and yet _connatural_ +in some respect. For it happens in an individual that some one of the +natural principles of the species is corrupted, so that something +which is contrary to the specific nature, becomes accidentally +natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to +give heat. Consequently it happens that something which is not +natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the +preservation of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, +on account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this +corruption may be either on the part of the body--from some ailment; +thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter, and +vice versa--or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in +eating earth and coals and the like; or on the part of the soul; thus +from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural +intercourse of man and beast, or other such things, which are not in +accord with human nature. + +This suffices for the answers to the objections. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 8] + +Whether One Pleasure Can Be Contrary to Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to +another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and +contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the +good. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but "good is +contrary to evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; +it seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another. + +Obj. 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in +_Metaph._ x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore +pleasure is not contrary to pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only +on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure. But +this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of +form, as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety +between one pleasure and another. + +_On the contrary,_ Things of the same genus that impede one another +are contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some +pleasures impede one another, as stated in _Ethic._ x, 5. Therefore +some pleasures are contrary to one another. + +_I answer that,_ Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to +repose in natural bodies, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Now one +repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary +termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low +place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul +that one pleasure is contrary to another. + +Reply Obj. 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of +good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may +be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to +another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one good from +being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former +is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to water. And in +this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this is +impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that +virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one +thing--i.e. the reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to +natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable +and connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose; +because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as +the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. +Now natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same +body, and to the natural repose of another, as stated in _Phys._ v, +6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to +sadness. + +Reply Obj. 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they are +the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal +difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because +difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in acts +and passions, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 4; Q. 30, A. 2). +________________________ + +QUESTION 32 + +OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head +there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure? + +(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure? + +(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure? + +(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure? + +(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us? + +(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure? + +(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure? + +(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 1] + +Whether Operation Is the Proper Cause of Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first +cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), +"pleasure consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is +requisite for pleasure, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). But the +objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves. +Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure. + +Obj. 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained: since +it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always an +operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore +operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and +they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation is +not the proper cause of pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, 13; x, 4) +that "pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 31, A. 1), two things are +requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good, +and knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a +kind of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the +attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation. +Moreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore +every pleasure must needs be the result of some operation. + +Reply Obj. 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable save +inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when +we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in +some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes pleasure +in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the like; +which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as +possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take +great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the +natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such like things is +nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is +through some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure +is traced to some operation as its cause. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an +operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as +possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are +proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is +finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain +measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer +proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome. +And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to +repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results +from labor. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 2] + +Whether Movement Is a Cause of Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure. +Because, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1), the good which is obtained +and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the +Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with +generation, but with the operation of a thing already in existence. +Now that which is being moved towards something has it not as yet; +but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch as +generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in +_Phys._ viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure. + +Obj. 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in +our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are +not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of +pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the +opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, are +pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement +is not a cause of pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means +this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and +some things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, +that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and +reconciled?" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes +pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to +cause pleasure. + +_I answer that,_ Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. +the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; +and a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect +of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. +vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are +concerned, change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable: +for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not +suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to +man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing +good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued +action of an agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person +remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the +natural mode of being consists in a certain measure; and therefore +when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure +of one's natural mode of being, the removal of that object becomes +pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes +pleasant), because man desires to know something whole and perfect: +when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, +change in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and +another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine +says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay, +but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the whole. And so +whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist +together, all would please collectively more than they do severally, +if all could be perceived collectively." + +If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the +natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of +any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its +delight at once--to such a one change will afford no delight. And the +more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of +being continual. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly +that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have +something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something +of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure; +because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are +unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so +far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes +suitable or ceases to be, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our +natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by +removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude. + +Reply Obj. 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it +becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the +movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom, +but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of +being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the +same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become +pleasant. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 3] + +Whether Hope and Memory Cause Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause +pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene +says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is +absent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future. +Therefore memory and hope do not cause pleasure. + +Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But +hope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: "Hope that is +deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope does not cause pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good, +so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned as +a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope"; +and (Ps. 76:4): "I remembered God, and was delighted." + +_I answer that,_ Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, +in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is +present to us in two ways. First, in knowledge--i.e. according as the +thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in +reality--i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any +kind with another, either actually or potentially. And since real +conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the +conjunction of knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than +potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which +arises from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible +object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein +there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of +apprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of +obtaining the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the +pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of apprehension. + +Reply Obj. 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely +speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion, present, +i.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to +apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment. + +Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, +being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a +present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, +inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction. + +Reply Obj. 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For +everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is +a kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like +manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, +since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as +implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that +is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in +preference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to +memory, which is of that which has already passed away. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 4] + +Whether sadness causes pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For +nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. +Therefore it does not cause it. + +Obj. 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures, +when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when +remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love. But +hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, as stated +above (Q. 29, A. 2). Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 41:4): "My tears have been my +bread day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of +pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give +pleasure. + +_I answer that,_ Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing +actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can +cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes +pleasure, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the +absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives +pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on +account of the deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is +looked upon as something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that +he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so +much reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in _De Civ. Dei_ +xxii, 31 [*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that "oftentimes in joy we call to +mind sad things . . . and in the season of health we recall past +pains without feeling pain . . . and in proportion are the more +filled with joy and gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says +that "the more peril there was in the battle, so much the more joy +will there be in the triumph." + +Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its +contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as stated +in _Phys._ viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause of +pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of something +pleasant. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so +far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far as +man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of +pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love: i.e. +so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating one +and the same thing. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 5] + +Whether the Actions of Others Are a Cause of Pleasure to Us? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause +of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good when +conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us. +Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us. + +Obj. 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If, therefore, +the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the same +reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which is +evidently untrue. + +Obj. 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an innate +habit; hence it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3 that "we must reckon the +pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit +existing in us." But the actions of others do not proceed from habits +existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents. +Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the +agents themselves. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written in the second canonical epistle of +John (verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children +walking in truth." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 31, A. 1), two things are +requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper good, +and the knowledge of having obtained it. Wherefore the action of +another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact +that we obtain some good through the action of another. And in this +way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us: +since it is pleasant to be benefited by another. Secondly, from the +fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own +good: and for this reason men take pleasure in being praised or +honored by others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some +good existing in themselves. And since this appreciation receives +greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men +take greater pleasure in being praised and honored by them. And +because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is pleasing +to some. And as love is for something good, while admiration is for +something great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others, +inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or +greatness, through their giving pleasure to others. Thirdly, from the +fact that another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's +own good, by reason of the power of love, which makes a man to regard +his friend as one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes +one to reckon another's good as being in opposition to oneself, the +evil action of an enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is +written (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth not in iniquity, but +rejoiceth with the truth." + +Reply Obj. 1: Another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its +effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second way; +or by affection, as in the third way. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument avails for the third mode, but not for +the first two. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the actions of another do not proceed from +habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that +gives pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; +or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 6] + +Whether Doing Good to Another Is a Cause of Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause +of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's +proper good, as stated above (AA. 1, 5; Q. 31, A. 1). But doing good +pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper +good. Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of +pleasure. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that +"illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality." Now it is +a mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of +illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone +takes pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, +14 and x, 4, it seems that doing good to others is not a cause of +pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But +man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such as +overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in +punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore +doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is +most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and +strangers." + +_I answer that,_ Doing good to another may give pleasure in three +ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good +conferred on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being +united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own, +we take pleasure in the good we do to others, especially to our +friends, as in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of the end; +as when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for +himself, either from God or from man: for hope is a cause of +pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing +good to another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold +principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard, +doing good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in +man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is +able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their +children, and in their own works, as being things on which they +bestow a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual +inclination to do good, by reason of which doing good becomes +connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in +giving to others. The third principle is the motive: for instance +when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for +whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is +the principal cause of pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 1: Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's good. +But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of +sadness; for instance when it is excessive. + +Reply Obj. 2: Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is +unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature. + +Reply Obj. 3: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give +pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's +own good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is +naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to +appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which +there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility of winning it, +afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, in +so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can +give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be +wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to +reprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding and +reproving, one does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as +stated above. It is pleasant to an angry man to punish, in so far as +he thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to +be due to a previous hurt: for when a man is hurt by another, he +seems to be slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of +this slight by paying back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing +good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to +another is not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect one's +own good. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 7] + +Whether Likeness Is a Cause of Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure. +Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. But +"it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated +in _Rhetor._ i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a +cause of pleasure. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But +those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures, +as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, +rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, those who are satiated with certain delights, derive +not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated with +food. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated (Q. +27, A. 3): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore likeness is a +cause of pleasure. + +_I answer that,_ Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is +like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes +love, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 3). And if that which is like us +does not hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable +simply; for instance one man in respect of another, one youth in +relation to another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus +accidentally it causes disgust or sadness, not as being like and one +with us, but as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us. + +Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own +good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, by a kind of +excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is +conditioned by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous good or any +bodily pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary +to one's own good: thus a potter dislikes other potters, not because +they are potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence +or profits, which he seeks as his own good. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since ruler and subject are in communion with one +another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness +is conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding +pertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they belong to +men who are wise and better than others; the result being that they +give man an idea of his own excellence. Another reason is that by +ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is pleasant. + +Reply Obj. 2: That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man, though +it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is +sorrowful: because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore +the sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so +far as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily +pleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought +than intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we +shall state later on (Q. 35, A. 5). And this explains why all animals +naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense +and movement. For this reason also young people are most inclined to +seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are +subject, while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has +a strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: because +his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 14. + +Reply Obj. 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed +measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, +and consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being +contrary to the proper good of man. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 8] + +Whether Wonder Is a Cause of Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure. +Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of +something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, +is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure. + +Obj. 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were, +the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of +_Metaph._ i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, +than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, +7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and +hindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises from an +operation which is unhindered, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12, 13. +Therefore wonder hinders rather than causes pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to: +wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant. But +"we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in +Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is +the cause of pleasure. + +_I answer that,_ It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated +above (Q. 23, A. 4): and therefore the greater the desire for the +thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the +very increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, +according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is +loved, since it was stated above (A. 3, ad 3) that desire resulting +from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for +knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of +which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge +or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of +pleasure, in so far as it includes a hope of getting the knowledge +which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is +pleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also, representations +of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give +rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with +another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper +and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). +This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered from great +danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in _Rhetor._ i, +11. + +Reply Obj. 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies +ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the +cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that +the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to +another reading:--that he is other than he thought himself to be.] + +Reply Obj. 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good, and +perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is more +perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the unknown, +the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing than +the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second, +it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing accidentally, in +so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for greater desire is +awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man +takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things for the +first time. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do, inasmuch +as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that are of +rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from +the fact that we desire to know something about them, in so far as +they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the +mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are +new," as stated in _Ethic._ x, 4, since more perfect operation +causes more perfect pleasure. +________________________ + +QUESTION 33 + +OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head +there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure? + +(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself? + +(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason? + +(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 33, Art. 1] + +Whether Expansion Is an Effect of Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of +pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to +the Apostle (2 Cor. 6:11): "Our heart is enlarged." Wherefore it is +written (Ps. 118:96) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy +commandment is exceeding broad." But pleasure is a distinct passion +from love. Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure. + +Obj. 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more. +But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not yet +possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than +to pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But +contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that +which we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite +in regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not +pertain to pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ In order to express joy, it is written (Isa. +60:5): "Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be +enlarged." Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" as +being derived from "dilatatio" (expansion), as stated above (Q. 31, +A. 3, ad 3). + +_I answer that,_ Breadth (_latitudo_)is a dimension of bodily +magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save +metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards +breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things +requisite for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the +apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some +suitable good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that +he has attained a certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the +spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to be +magnified or expanded by pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure +is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the +pleasurable object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to +enfold it within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by +pleasure, as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the +object of its pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the +same thing from being attributed to different things according to +different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by +reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the +lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own +interests, but also for what concerns others. On the other hand +expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more +ample in itself so as to become more capacious. + +Reply Obj. 2: Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the +imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the +presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders +itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it, +than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the +end of desire. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by +clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that +he may enjoy it perfectly. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 33, Art. 2] + +Whether Pleasure Causes Thirst or Desire for Itself? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for +itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But +pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, +as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore the movement of +desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not +cause desire. + +Obj. 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure +is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since +desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure +regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause +desire for itself. + +Obj. 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure +often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of +this water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine +(Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes pleasures of the body. + +_I answer that,_ Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as +existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again +thirst, or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as +denoting a craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, +as excluding distaste. + +Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause +thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take +thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed: +because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of +something actually present. But it may happen that what is actually +present is not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of +the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of +the thing possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not +being a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it +successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires +to possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first +part of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine +says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause +thirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because +pleasures of this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in +pleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this happens +when a man possesses a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not +possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little. +Thus in this life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us +delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect +knowledge; in which sense we may understand the words of Ecclus. +24:29: "They that drink me shall yet thirst." + +On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere +intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all +others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves. +Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their +causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are +increased or even when they are protracted; as is evident in the case +of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the +point of perfection in bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and +sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, +do not exceed the natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence +when their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the +greatest delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the +work of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily +powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also +we may understand those words of Ecclus. 24:29: "They that drink me +shall yet thirst": for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly, +and delight in Him, it is written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they "desire to +look at Him." + +Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as +existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to +cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that +disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is +past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that +pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the +memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion. + +Reply Obj. 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete +rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed, +ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what +was not possessed, does not cease altogether. + +Reply Obj. 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in +one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it +may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time. + +Reply Obj. 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another, +as stated above. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 33, Art. 3] + +Whether Pleasure Hinders the Use of Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of +reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason: +wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and +rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; and it is +written (Wis. 8:16): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself +with her," i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore +it helps rather than hinders the use of reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though they +be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the +appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive +power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be +moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power +moves pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of +pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that +"pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence." + +_I answer that,_ As is stated in _Ethic._ x, 5, "appropriate +pleasures increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from +other sources are impediments to activity." Accordingly there is a +certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one +takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure +does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because we are more +attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention +fosters activity. + +On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three +ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we have just +observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the +attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in +respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and +thus if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the +use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or +else it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to +reason. Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, +are contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the +Philosopher says that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of +prudence, but not the speculative estimate," to which they are not +opposed, "for instance that the three angles of a triangle are +together equal to two right angles." In the first sense, however, +they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in so +far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the +body, greater even than in the other passions, in proportion as the +appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards +an absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances hinder the use of +reason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of +reason is fettered or hindered. + +Reply Obj. 1: Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite +in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to +reason; but on the part of the body it always implies alteration. +And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: The powers of the appetite and of apprehension are +indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently +when the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is +hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part. + +Reply Obj. 3: The use of reason requires the due use of the +imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised +through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders +the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination +and of the other sensitive powers. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 33, Art. 4] + +Whether Pleasure Perfects Operation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation. +For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure +hinders the use of reason, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore +pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But +pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its +essence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect +operation. + +Obj. 3: Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so +either as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because +operation is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the +reverse, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 2): nor as agent, because +rather is it the operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, +because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does +not perfect operation, as a habit does." Therefore pleasure does not +perfect operation. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure +perfects operation." + +_I answer that,_ Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an +end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a +thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and +completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher +says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end +added to it": that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is +operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting +the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as +agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) +that "pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man +healthy, but as health does": but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as +the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly +intent on it, and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense +it is said in _Ethic._ x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate +activities, and hinder those that are not appropriate." + +Reply Obj. 1: It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of +reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act +of reason, but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act +is intensified by pleasure. _On the contrary,_ pleasure that arises +from the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated in _Phys._ ii, 3 two things may be causes of +one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And +in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while +pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated above. + +The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said. +________________________ + +QUESTION 34 + +OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under +which head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether every pleasure is evil? + +(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good? + +(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good? + +(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of +moral good and evil? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 1] + +Whether Every Pleasure Is Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that +which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be +evil in itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and +hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is +greater: wherefore "in sexual pleasures," which are the greatest of +all, "it is impossible to understand anything," as stated in _Ethic._ +vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, +Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of conjugal intercourse, the +presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet +that fulfils the conjugal duty." Therefore pleasure is evil in +itself; and consequently every pleasure is evil. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man +lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be +avoided; because, as stated in _Ethic._ x, 5 "the virtuous man is a +kind of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle says (1 +Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But children and +dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the +man who is master of himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil +in themselves and should be avoided. + +Obj. 3: Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult +and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure. +Therefore pleasure is not something good. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord." +Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that +not every pleasure is evil. + +_I answer that,_ As stated in _Ethic._ x, 2, 3, some have maintained +that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they +took account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more +manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did +not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor +between intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all +bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being +prone to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by +abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this +opinion. Because, since none can live without some sensible and +bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are +found in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to +pleasure by following the example of their works instead of listening +to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions, +wherein experience is of great weight, example moves more than words. + +We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are +evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved +good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a +twofold reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the +good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the +moral order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as +stated above (Q. 18, A. 5): just as in the order of nature, a thing +is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if +it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a +certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees +with its nature, for instance, when a heavy body rests down below; +and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which +disagrees with its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, +in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or +lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an +evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant +from reason and the law of God. + +The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of +which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to +actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede +them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions +are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of +good actions good, and those of evil actions evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 33, A. 3), it is not the pleasures +which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy +prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the +body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above (Q. 33, +A. 3), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something +repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad; or by +fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the +pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, +on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the +pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason +is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for +reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times. +We must add, however, that although this fettering of the reason +through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, +since it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a +kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; +because, as stated in the First Part (Q. 98, A. 2) the case was +different in the state of innocence. + +Reply Obj. 2: The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but +those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that +children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all +pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural +appetite, which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them. + +Reply Obj. 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with +the making of external things, as we shall state further on (Q. 57, +A. 3). But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the +concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there is an +art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art of +making arguments," as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 2] + +Whether Every Pleasure Is Good? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as +stated in the First Part (Q. 5, A. 6) there are three kinds of good: +the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous +is good; and in like manner everything useful is good. Therefore also +every pleasure is good. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something +else, is good in itself, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 6, 7. But pleasure +is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to +ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is good in +itself. Now that which is predicated of a thing considered in itself, +is predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure is good. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of +itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in _Ethic._ +i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and +dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently +all pleasure is good. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 2:14): "Who are glad when +they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." + +_I answer that,_ While some of the Stoics maintained that all +pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in +itself, and that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to +have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good +simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual. +That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not +good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two +ways. In one way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a +disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not +natural: thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are +poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament. In +another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable. +And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in some good, if the +appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be +pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a man's appetite repose in +that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular +man, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to +him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an +apparent good. + +Reply Obj. 1: The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with +reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being +good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which +tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. Consequently +not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends +on the order of reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of +something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be +either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far +as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with +regard to pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek +good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just +as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and +verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 3] + +Whether Any Pleasure Is the Greatest Good? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good. +Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation +cannot be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: +for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being +established in its own nature, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). +Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made +better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since +pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue. +Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, +as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is prior +to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is +not universally good, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore pleasure is +not the greatest good. + +_On the contrary,_ Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the +end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is +written (Ps. 15:11): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy +countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end." + +_I answer that,_ Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted +that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained +that all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some +evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good. +But, judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, +because, from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in +a certain movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from +eating and the like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some +"becoming" and movement: and from this, since "becoming" and movement +are the acts of something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is +not of the nature of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be +evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes +pleasure, not only in the "becoming" of knowledge, for instance, when +one learns or wonders, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 8, ad 2); but also +in the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already +acquired. + +Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the +supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, and +unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good; +whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now the +greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated +above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, +and the use of that thing; thus the miser's end is either money or +the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be said to +be either God Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of +God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this +sense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among +human goods. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for some +pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above. +Accordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, +although every pleasure is not such. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by +participation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can +make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally +true that any good becomes better by the addition of another good. +Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous +to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as stated in +_Ethic._ i, 8. + +Reply Obj. 3: That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the +mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect +repose in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every +pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain +science is supremely good, but not every science is. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 4] + +Whether Pleasure Is the Measure or Rule by Which to Judge of Moral +Good or Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule +of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is +the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the +first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and +desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral +matters. + +Obj. 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that +movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all +movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: +since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not +the measure and rule of morals. + +Obj. 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more +certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of +operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because +"those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and +those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in +_Ethic._ x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of +moral goodness and malice. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The searcher of +hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the +pleasure which each one aims at achieving." And the Philosopher says +(Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the +principal, "end [*St. Thomas took _finis_ as being the nominative, +whereas it is the genitive--_tou telous_; and the Greek reads "He" +(i.e. the political philosopher), "is the architect of the end."], in +regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good." + +_I answer that,_ Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the +will, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1); and it is chiefly from the end +that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is +taken to be that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the +will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man +is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of +the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes +pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes +pleasure in evil works. + +On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the +rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally +pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. +But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance +with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed. + +Reply Obj. 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of +generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which +serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is +the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment. + +Reply Obj. 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being +the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect +pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose +will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in +evil. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated +above (Q. 33, A. 4); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless +there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing +depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure +is the cause of goodness in the operation. +________________________ + +QUESTION 35 + +OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF +(In Eight Articles) + +We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must +consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its +effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul? + +(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain? + +(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary [to] pleasure? + +(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure? + +(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of +contemplation? + +(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be +sought? + +(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior? + +(8) Of the species of sorrow. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 1] + +Whether Pain Is a Passion of the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul. +Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the +body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is +a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul, +by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain +is not a passion of the soul. + +Obj. 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive +faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather to +the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that +"bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful body." +Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal +appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather +to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): +"Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in +being punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a passion +of the soul. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among +the passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): + +"hence wild desires and grovelling fears +And human laughter, human tears." +[Translation: Conington.] + +_I answer that,_ Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; +namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so +also two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some +evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and +perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have +not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is +conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that +something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the +pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the +appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to +the appetite. + +Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to +apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: +since the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an +apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension +of another, as stated in the First Part (Q. 103, AA. 1, 3). Since +then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the +same subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the +intellective or sensitive appetite. + +Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, +as stated above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 3): and especially those which tend to +some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive +appetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as +bodily ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence +Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 8 [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain +especially as being a kind of ailment. + +Reply Obj. 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in +the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the +movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel +pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm. 87:4). + +Reply Obj. 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were +an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required +for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the +nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but +because nature desires something as good, the removal of which being +perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive +appetite. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 2] + +Whether Sorrow Is the Same As Pain? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says +(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering." +But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is +not pain. + +Obj. 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow +can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow for +the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite +different from pain. + +Obj. 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of +touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is +not pain, and extends to more objects. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): "I have great sorrow +[Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart," +thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain. + +_I answer that,_ Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold +apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and +from the interior apprehension of the intellect or of the +imagination. Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects +than the exterior apprehension: because whatever things come under +the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not +conversely. Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an +interior apprehension is called joy, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 3): +and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior +apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is +caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; +so too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is +called pain indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of +pain, as joy is a species of pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: +because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, +which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains. + +Reply Obj. 2: External sense perceives only what is present; but the +interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. +Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas +bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can +only regard something present. + +Reply Obj. 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far +as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in +so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the +other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive +power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are +subordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is +a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the +other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no +pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as +stated in _Ethic._ iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects +of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is +contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary +to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is +its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according +to the distinction of interior and exterior apprehension; although, +on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily +pain. But if pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of +sorrow, as stated above. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 3] + +Whether Sorrow or Pain Is Contrary to Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. +For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow +can be the cause of pleasure; for it is written (Matt. 5:5): "Blessed +are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore they are +not contrary to one another. + +Obj. 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to +some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess. +iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and +(Confess. iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it +sometimes pleases us." Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because +contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the matter of +pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent should +ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow." The Philosopher too says +(Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain at +having been pleased." Therefore pleasure and pain are not contrary to +one another. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is +the volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the +volition of dissent from the things we do not wish." But consent and +dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to +one another. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety +is a difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a +passion or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, +since the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present good +and present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain +and pleasure are contrary to one another. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other +accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one +way, in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the +presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something +pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a +drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, in so far +as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink +from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these +ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the comfort of the +future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, +or for the delay of glory, he merits the consolation of eternity. In +like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and +straits in order to obtain it. + +Reply Obj. 2: Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far +as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as it +recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's +love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since +love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, +forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this +reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage: in +so far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a +certain love for those who are there represented. + +Reply Obj. 3: The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, +inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered +under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the +matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: +that is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect +of good or evil. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 4] + +Whether All Sorrow Is Contrary to All Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all +pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary +species of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the +soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally contrary +to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too. + +Obj. 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil). +But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the +Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is +contrary to every sorrow. + +Obj. 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every +sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from _Ethic._ +x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But +joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from +the same habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with +them that rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" (Rom. 12:15). +Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety +is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or +specific. Consequently things may be contraries in respect of a +generic form, as virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form, +as justice and injustice. + +Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms, +e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are specified in +relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which +derive their species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in +those things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that +species contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their +specific nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity +or fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which +are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary to +one another in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no +affinity or fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those +things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic, it +happens that species belonging to contrary genera, are not only not +contrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual +affinity or fittingness. The reason of this is that where there is +one same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to +approach to a white thing, and to approach to a black thing, are +contraries; whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a +certain likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and to +approach to something black. This is most evident in the case of +contradiction, which is the principle of opposition: because +opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g. +"white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness and likeness in +the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the other, as, if +I were to say "black" and "not white." + +Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their +objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary to +one another: since one is a kind of _pursuit,_ the other a kind of +_avoidance,_ which "are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial +are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and +pleasure in respect of the same object, are specifically contrary to +one another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that +are not contrary but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one +another, but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of +a friend, and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse +objects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and sorrow are not +only specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual +fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to +sorrow for evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from +their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow do: +wherefore the comparison does not hold. + +Reply Obj. 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in _Metaph._ +viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now +it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically +contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the subject has +a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: +because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it +possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore on the +part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of +sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: +but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically. + +Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say +that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every +pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their +effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature, +while the other results in a kind of discomfort. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 5] + +Whether There Is Any Sorrow Contrary to the Pleasure of Contemplation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to +the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10): +"The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto +salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act +is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. +xii, 3, 4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of +contemplation. + +Obj. 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore +the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other contrary +will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the +pleasure of contemplation. + +Obj. 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of +sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the +Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of +certain things." Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of +contemplation. + +Obj. 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause +of pleasure, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12, 13; x, 4. But the work of +contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy +it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation +there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure. + +Obj. 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But, +as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) "much study is an affliction of the +flesh." Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its +pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her," i.e. wisdom's, +"conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but +joy and gladness." Now the conversation and company of wisdom are +found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the +pleasure of contemplation. + +_I answer that,_ The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in +two ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the +object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating +but in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate +something harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something +suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation +be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to +the pleasure of contemplation. + +In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that +contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in +the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of +Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow is contrary to +that pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says +the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be +understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because +sorrow is of itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus +pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is +no contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as +apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of +knowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a +sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any +sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like +remedies against certain annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in +drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is +quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the +pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an +annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself: +for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as stated +above (Q. 31, A. 1). + +Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of +contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ, +secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of +an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as +regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a +bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagreeing with the +normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and +the smell of something foul; or from the sensible object, though +agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it +exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above (Q. 33, A. +2), the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant +becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur directly in the +contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no corporeal organ: +wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above that intellectual +contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor "tediousness." Since, +however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of the sensitive +powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental; +therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled with +contemplation. + +Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally +mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because +pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the +pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony +with it, as is evident from what has been said above (A. 4): while +pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the +same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is +evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act +of contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save +accidentally. + +Reply Obj. 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused +by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which +the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as +contrary to the love of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are not +contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are +contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed +rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one +and the same science considers contraries. + +Reply Obj. 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is +nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of +the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far +as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation +of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to +which the appetite is inordinately attached. + +Reply Obj. 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not +contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it, +as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation +accidentally and indirectly, as stated above. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 6] + +Whether Sorrow Is to Be Shunned More Than Pleasure Is to Be Sought? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than +pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There +is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now +that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is +natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is +sought. + +Obj. 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and +intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," as +the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is +due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for +pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the +suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more +eagerly than pleasure is sought. + +Obj. 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists +according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more +virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good" +(Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of +shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists +the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says +(Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised." +Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the +movement of seeking pleasure. + +_On the contrary,_ Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares +(Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good +which is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of +evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the +shunning of sorrow. + +_I answer that,_ The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than +the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of +pleasure is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an +unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable +without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to +be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore +pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. +Therefore desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning +of sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object of +pleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the +object of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and +that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by +reason of something else. Moreover we find a confirmation of this in +natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the +end, when a thing approaches the term that is suitable to its nature, +than at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to +its nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is +suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore the +inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more eager in +tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow. + +But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than +he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of +the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love +is felt more keenly, when we lack that which we love." Now from the +lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the +loss of some loved good, or by the presence of some contrary evil. +But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in +possession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure and +sorrow, the latter is the more shunned, according as love is the more +keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on +the part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant to +a good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure. +For we love the natural well-being of the body more than the pleasure +of eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and +the like, from fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such +causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on +the part of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only +one pleasure, but all. + +Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more +than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And +this is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most +savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of +pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not the same with movement from within and +movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is +suitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we +remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from +without is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing +strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming +at its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, +and slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive +faculty is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object. +Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is +to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty is from +without, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the +more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And then too, +accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and +pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought. + +Reply Obj. 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with +reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, +but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the +dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than +pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which +latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus life is loved +more than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised +for refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning +the pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in _Ethic._ iii, +11. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 7] + +Whether Outward Pain Is Greater Than Interior Sorrow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior +sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause +repugnant to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas +interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, +therefore, life is loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, +according to what has been said above (A. 6), outward pain is greater +than interior sorrow. + +Obj. 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But +outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary; +whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a +contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow. + +Obj. 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has +more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain than of +interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned +more than interior sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): "The sadness of the +heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman +is all evil." Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses +all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart +surpasses every outward wound. + +_I answer that,_ Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and +differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the +appetitive power, as stated above (A. 1). But they differ in respect +of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; +namely, in respect of the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; +and in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is +a conjoined evil repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward +pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward +pain arises from an apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while +inward pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination +or of the reason. + +If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward +pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both +these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite +directly. Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant +to the appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something +being repugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the body. +Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by +reason of another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain +surpasses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of +apprehension: because the apprehension of reason and imagination is +of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch. +Consequently inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than +outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward +pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is +not repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in a manner +pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, +outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then the pain is +increased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, +it is also more universal: since whatever is repugnant to the body, +can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and whatever is +apprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and reason, +but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is said +expressively: "Sadness of the heart is every wound," because even the +pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the +heart. + +Reply Obj. 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are +destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward +pain must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause +pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain +is compared to the appetite. + +Reply Obj. 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness +of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended +likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And +this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its +likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract. +Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a +greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward +apprehension. + +Reply Obj. 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward +pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive +conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of +touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more material than +the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material +than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3; +Q. 31, A. 5), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement +of the sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than +from inward pain. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 8] + +Whether There Are Only Four Species of Sorrow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) +division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor, +distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] +calls "anxiety,"--"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary to +pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it +is incorrect to assign different species of sorrow. + +Obj. 2: Further, _Repentance_ is a species of sorrow; and so are +_indignation_ and _jealousy,_ as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9, +11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this +division is insufficient. + +Obj. 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that are +opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one +another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] +"torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that +weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for +another's wrongs." But it is possible for one to sorrow for another's +wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed +down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this +division is incorrect. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa +[*Nemesius] and of Damascene. + +_I answer that,_ It belongs to the notion of a species that it is +something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in +two ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and +virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal." +Such an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher +says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2, 3). But, secondly, a thing may be +added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed +by that genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to +"animal." Such an addition does not make true species of the genus, +according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. +But sometimes a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus, +through having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which +the notion of that genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame +is said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature +of fire is applied to a foreign matter. In like manner we speak of +astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch +as the principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter. + +In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow +are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something +foreign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the +cause or the object, or of the effect. For the proper object of +sorrow is _one's own evil._ Hence sorrow may be concerned for an +object foreign to it either through one's being sorry for an evil +that is not one's own; and thus we have _pity_ which is sorrow for +another's evil, considered, however, as one's own: or through one's +being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but +another's good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we +have _envy._ The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain +_flight of the appetite._ Wherefore the foreign element in the effect +of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by +excluding flight: and thus we have _anxiety_ which weighs on the +mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also called +_perplexity._ If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that +even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to _torpor,_ then we +have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither +flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason why torpor +especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the +external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward +thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is +stated in _Polit._ i, 1. + +Reply Obj. 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: +and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; for +the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as +Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). + +Reply Obj. 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper +object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species. +Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain +later (II-II, Q. 36, A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: This division is not according to opposite species; but +according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion of +sorrow is applied, as stated above. +________________________ + +QUESTION 36 + +OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are +four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the +presence of an evil? + +(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow? + +(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow? + +(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 36, Art. 1] + +Whether Sorrow Is Caused by the Loss of Good or by the Presence of +Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a +good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De +viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal +goods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss +of some good. + +Obj. 2: Further, it was said above (Q. 35, A. 4) that the sorrow +which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that +pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above (Q. 23, +A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 3). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly +by the loss of good. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), love +is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But the +object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss +of good rather than for an evil that is present. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the +dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of +sorrow." + +_I answer that,_ If privations, as considered by the mind, were what +they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. +For, as stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 10; Q. 48, A. 3), evil is +the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than +the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow +for the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence +of evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of +an apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect +of a being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason." And in this +way evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary." +Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it +makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present +evil or the good which is lost. + +Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place +in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things; +the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural +movements. For if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach +and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable +to nature; while withdrawal is of itself directed to something +contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a +higher place, and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we +consider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then +gravity itself inclines towards the lower place more than it +withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is +the reason for its downward tendency. + +Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a +kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or +approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its +proper object, so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the +other hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards +good rather than evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the +cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of +sorrow or pain, than the good which is lost. + +Reply Obj. 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just +as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense +Augustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods. + +Reply Obj. 2: Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object, +but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular +thing be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is +the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation of the +other, as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4: and consequently sorrow in +respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing +under a contrary aspect. + +Reply Obj. 3: When many movements arise from one cause, it does not +follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards +chiefly, but only the first of them. And each of the others regards +chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 36, Art. 2] + +Whether Desire Is a Cause of Sorrow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or +sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above (A. +1): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now +movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement towards the +other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. + +Obj. 2: Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), +is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is +something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of +pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says +(Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance +of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found +their way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But +ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of +sorrow. + +_I answer that,_ Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, +as stated above (A. 1), the appetitive movement is likened to the +natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold +cause; one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the +principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a +heavy body's downward movement is the lower place; while the +principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting from +gravity. + +Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is +the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above (A. 1) +that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other +hand, the cause, by way of principle, of that movement, is the inward +inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, +the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence +the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is the +first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: +while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination +of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since +concupiscence or desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise +to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 6); hence it is +that Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense +of love, as was also stated (Q. 30, A. 2, ad 2): and in this sense he +says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, +however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. +Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary +to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the movement of the +appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause +of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or +for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: +since we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in which we have +already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which +we desire to have. + +Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of the appetite to the possession of +good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as +stated above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that +regard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that +regard evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: That which is desired, though really future, is, +nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we +may say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the +hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow. + +Reply Obj. 3: Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of +obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through +the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 36, Art. 3] + +Whether the Craving for Unity Is a Cause of Sorrow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause +of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this +opinion," which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and +division [*Aristotle wrote _endeian_, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the +Latin version, read 'incisionem'; should he have read +'indigentiam'?], the cause of sorrow, "seems to have originated in +pains and pleasures connected with food." But not every pleasure or +sorrow is of this kind. Therefore the craving for unity is not the +universal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and +division is the cause of multitude. + +Obj. 2: Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore +sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would be +pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of +whatever is superfluous. + +Obj. 3: Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of +good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, since +it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore +the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving +for separation, as causing sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from +the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls +desire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is +pain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?" + +_I answer that,_ Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is +reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, +be accounted as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing +consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in +itself, the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the +Platonists held that _one_ is a principle, just as _good_ is. Hence +everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and +therefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so +also is the love or craving for unity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but +only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence +neither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as +some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher +from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, +when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in +eating; because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather +than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the +craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the +perfection of nature consists. + +Reply Obj. 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes +something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has some +union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object. + +Reply Obj. 3: Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is +desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore +the desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow, +whereas the craving for unity is. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 36, Art. 4] + +Whether an Irresistible Power Is a Cause of Sorrow? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a greater power should not be +reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the +agent is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. +Therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow. + +Obj. 2: Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can +be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power should +not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. + +Obj. 3: Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes +of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something +external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the +soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in +the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a present evil, is cause of +sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause +of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or +sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of +the appetite to be united with a present evil: and whatever is +contrary to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the +action of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater +power as being the cause of sorrow. + +But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to +transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there +will be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, +by its action on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency, +its consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it. + +Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from +the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, +pain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only +when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence +Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will +"resisting a stronger power": for were it not to resist, but to yield +by consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not +potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the +corruptive evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, +from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to +inflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at +all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow. + +Reply Obj. 3: External agents can be the causes of appetitive +movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it +is thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow. +________________________ + +QUESTION 37 + +OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which +head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn? + +(2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul? + +(3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity? + +(4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other +passions of the soul? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 37, Art. 1] + +Whether Pain Deprives One of the Power to Learn? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the +power to learn. For it is written (Isa. 26:9): "When Thou shalt do +Thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn +justice": and further on (verse 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring +Thy instruction was with them." But the judgments of God and +tribulation cause sorrow in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, +far from destroying, increases the power of learning. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Isa. 28:9): "Whom shall He teach +knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them +that are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts," +i.e. from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of +pleasure; since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in _Ethic._ +vii, 14: and (Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that "the affliction of an +hour maketh one forget great delights." Therefore pain, instead of +taking away, increases the faculty of learning. + +Obj. 3: Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated +above (Q. 35, A. 7). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more, +therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during +those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able +to turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; +and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it +required undivided attention." + +_I answer that,_ Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the +one essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of +the soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it +is withdrawn from the action of another power: because the soul, +being one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one +thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great +portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is +incompatible therewith. + +Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's +attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing to tend +wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even +in natural things. It is likewise evident that in order to learn +anything new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, +as is clearly stated in Prov. 2:4, 5: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as +money, and shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou +understand learning" [Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if +the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from learning +anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man +is unable to give his attention even to that which he knew already. +However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of +love that a man has for learning or for considering: because the +greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind +so as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain. + +Reply Obj. 1: Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to +wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in +regard to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. +And thus, "in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt to be +taught by God. + +Reply Obj. 2: Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon +themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of +consideration, wherefore it is stated in _Ethic._ vii, 11 that "in +the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." +Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure +does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural +body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot +water is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence +freezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can +conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it +takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; +and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether. + +Reply Obj. 3: External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so +that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does: +and yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, +which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater +hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward +sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense, it attracts +the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for the first +time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his +commentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel). +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 37, Art. 2] + +Whether the Effect of Sorrow or Pain Is to Burden the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to +burden the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:11): "Behold this +self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how +great carefulness it worketh in you: yea, defence, yea indignation," +etc. Now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, +which is contrary to being depressed. Therefore depression is not an +effect of sorrow. + +Obj. 2: Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of +pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression but +contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect +of sorrow. + +Obj. 3: Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith, +as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7): "Lest +perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." But that +which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by +something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the +consumer. Therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of +sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] +and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow." + +_I answer that,_ The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes +named metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the +reason that the movements of the animal appetite are like the +inclinations of the natural appetite. And in this way fervor is +ascribed to love, expansion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. +For a man is said to be depressed, through being hindered in his own +movement by some weight. Now it is evident from what has been said +above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 25, A. 4; Q. 36, A. 1) that sorrow is caused +by a present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is +repugnant to the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch +as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if +the evil which is the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive +one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so +far as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for; +yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the +other hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope +of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is +absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or +that. Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, +so that a man becomes completely stupefied. + +Reply Obj. 1: That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which +is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the +forgiveness of sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, +contraction and depression amount to the same: because the soul, +through being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to +outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the +afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus +also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain +things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken +literally, appear to exclude one another. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 37, Art. 3] + +Whether Sorrow or Pain Weakens All Activity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity. +Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage +of the Apostle quoted above (A. 2, Obj. 1). But carefulness conduces +to good work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully +study to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be +ashamed." Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one +to work well. + +Obj. 2: Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in +_Ethic._ vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore +sorrow does too. + +Obj. 3: Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are +others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing +is improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain +actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure +perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it" +(Ethic. x, 5). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), sorrow at times does not +depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal +or external; but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow +itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. +First, as being the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any +action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that +which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is +that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we +do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be +weakened in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to +sorrow, as to its principle and cause: and such action must needs be +improved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain +thing, the more one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a +hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result +from that sorrow. + +From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 37, Art. 4] + +Whether Sorrow Is More Harmful to the Body Than the Other Passions of +the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the +body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those +things which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a +transmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of +colors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. +Therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body. + +Obj. 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to +its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily +transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated +above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the +body than the other passions of the soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and +desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm, +since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair +seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow. +Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other +passions of the soul. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh +age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Prov. +25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the +sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (Ecclus. 38:19): "Of +sadness cometh death." + +_I answer that,_ Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful +to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to +man's life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely +in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other +passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, +which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this +movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed +measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, +it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of +quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if +this movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to +life in respect of its species. + +Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the +bodily transmutation which is their material element, is in +conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which +is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate +to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the +appetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital +movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as +regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; +wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; +though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other +hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of +flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only +as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore +they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all +sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which +makes a stronger impression than future evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual +movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. +Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not +naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally +moved by the soul. + +Reply Obj. 2: Other passions imply a bodily transmutation +which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas +sorrow implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated +above. + +Reply Obj. 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of +reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments +deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life. +Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by +reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the +absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives +man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow +become a prey to melancholy or madness. +________________________ + +QUESTION 38 + +OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head +there are five points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure? + +(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping? + +(3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends? + +(4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth? + +(5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 1] + +Whether Pain or Sorrow Is Assuaged by Every Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every +pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far +as it is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. +ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated +above (Q. 35, A. 4). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every +sorrow. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But +some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in _Ethic._ ix, 4, "the +wicked man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not every +pleasure assuages sorrow. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from +his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, now +dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not +wont to see him." Hence we may gather that those things which united +us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we +mourn their death or absence. But nothing united us more than the +pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures become +burdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages +every sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow +is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any +other, provided it be intense." + +_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been said above (Q. 23, +A. 4), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable +good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite. +Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, +what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to a +non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain +weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore just as all +repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing +from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings relief by +assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to +every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4). +And consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any +sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 2: The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow +while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as +wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This +sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures. + +Reply Obj. 3: When there are two causes inclining to contrary +movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and +more persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made +sorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with a +deceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary +movements. For the thought of the friend's death or absence, inclines +him to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure. +Consequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since the +perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory of the +past, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another; +hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives out the sorrow. +Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that +his "sorrow gave way to his former pleasures." +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 2] + +Whether Pain or Sorrow Is Assuaged by Tears? + +Objection 1: It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because +no effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect of +sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so +laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy. +Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow. + +Obj. 3: Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to +the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases +sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore +it seems that tears do not assuage sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he +mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he +find some little refreshment." + +_I answer that,_ Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this +for two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we +keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it +be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on +outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why +men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sorrow, by +tears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, +because an action, that befits a man according to his actual +disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are +actions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently +they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above (A. 1), +every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that +sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans. + +Reply Obj. 1: This relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the +relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man. +For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant +to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that sorrows. +Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the +same way as the cause of sorrow is. For this reason sorrow is +assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid contrariety. + +Reply Obj. 2: The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of +the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it: because in +each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like thing +increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter and the +other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case, +accidentally, they lessen it. + +Reply Obj. 3: The image of that which saddens us, considered in +itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very +fact that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting +according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure. +For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed +that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it, as having done +something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, +27). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 3] + +Whether Pain or Sorrow Are Assuaged by the Sympathy of Friends? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends +does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary +effects. Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice +together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and +inflamed one by the other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are +sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater. + +Obj. 2: Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine +declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the +sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain +of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further +cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to +increase. + +Obj. 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as +though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other self" +(Ethic. ix, 4, 9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the +sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he +sympathizes. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those +who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them. + +_I answer that,_ When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy +of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher +indicates a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, +since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we +strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened +by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were bearing the burden +with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the +load of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in +the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason is +because when a man's friends condole with him, he sees that he is +loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32, +A. 5). Consequently, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated +above (A. 1), it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing +friend. + +Reply Obj. 1: In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz. +when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the +sorrowful. Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason +of its cause. + +Reply Obj. 2: The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow: +but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to +pleasure. + +And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 4] + +Whether Pain and Sorrow Are Assuaged by the Contemplation of Truth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not +assuage sorrow. For it is written (Eccles. 1:18): "He that addeth +knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulg.: 'labor']. But knowledge +pertains to the contemplation of truth. Therefore the contemplation +of truth does not assuage sorrow. + +Obj. 2: Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the +speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a +principle of movement"; as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 11. Therefore, +since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the +contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow. + +Obj. 3: Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the +part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect. +Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me +that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I +should not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing +to me." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 3, A. 5), the greatest of all +pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure +assuages pain as stated above (A. 1): hence the contemplation of +truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly +one is a lover of wisdom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations +men rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future +Happiness, according to James 1:2: "My brethren, count it all joy, +when you shall fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even +in the midst of bodily tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr +Tiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: +Methinks, I walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ." [*Cf. +Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.] + +Reply Obj. 1: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either on +account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth; +or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are +contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known, +knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of +truth, it causes pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the +part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation +itself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the +higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of +contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to +mitigate even that pain which is in the senses. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 5] + +Whether Pain and Sorrow Are Assuaged by Sleep and Baths? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage +sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the +body. Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow. + +Obj. 2: Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary +causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with the +contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, +as stated above (A. 4). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like. + +Obj. 3: Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, +denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies as +these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to +the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore they do not assuage +sorrow. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard +that the bath had its name [*_Balneum,_ from the Greek _balaneion_] +. . . from the fact of its driving sadness from the mind." And +further on, he says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief +not a little assuaged": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose +[*Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, +Hymn for first Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the +tired limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 37, A. 4), sorrow, by reason of +its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body; +and consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state +of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover +such remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its +normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what +pleasure consists, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). Therefore, since +every pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like +bodily remedies. + +Reply Obj. 1: The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is +felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 31, A. 8), one pleasure hinders +another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently it is +not unreasonable that sorrow should be assuaged by causes which +hinder one another. + +Reply Obj. 3: Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on +the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as +stated in _De Causa Mot. Animal._ xi. +________________________ + +QUESTION 39 + +OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: +under which head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether all sorrow is evil? + +(2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good? + +(3) Whether it can be a useful good? + +(4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 1] + +Whether All Sorrow Is Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of +Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from +its very nature." Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and +everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil. +But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in _Ethic._ +vii, 11, "though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he +aims at avoiding sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of +bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow in +the soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every +spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul. + +_On the contrary,_ Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil. +But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain +men, it is written (Prov. 2:14), that "they were glad when they had +done evil." Therefore sorrow for evil is good. + +_I answer that,_ A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first +considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, +because the mere fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a +present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of +the appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, +on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to be good, +on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, +9. Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or +painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain on +account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or +pain, this could only be either because he feels it not, or because +he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are +manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, +supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. +Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "It is also a good +thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good +remained in his nature, he could not be punished by the loss of +good." Because, however, in the science of Morals, we consider things +individually--for actions are concerned about individuals--that which +is good on some supposition, should be considered as good: just as +that which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged to be +voluntary, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1, and likewise above (Q. 6, A. +6). + +Reply Obj. 1: Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on +the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the +subject that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view, +all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not shun the +perception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily +pain: because the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the +proof of the goodness of nature. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 2] + +Whether Sorrow Can Be a Virtuous Good? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For +that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine +says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he +should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of entering +into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners." +Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. + +Obj. 2: Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious. +But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says (2 Cor. +9:7): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with +sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. + +Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is +concerned about those things which happen against our will." But not +to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a +will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence whatever is +done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine +will is a condition of the rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q. +19, A. 9), it seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the +will, and that consequently it is not virtuous. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is +virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from Matt. 5:5: "Blessed +are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow +is a virtuous good. + +_I answer that,_ In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous +good. For it has been said above (A. 1) that sorrow is a good +inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two +things, as regards bodily pain, are a proof of the goodness of +nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature +shuns, the harmful thing that causes pain. As regards interior +sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right judgment +of reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, +well disposed and detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good +results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the +will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a virtuous good. + +Reply Obj. 1: All the passions of the soul should be regulated +according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous +good; but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps +this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and +reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a +perverse reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such +sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; +for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully. + +Reply Obj. 3: Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, +but because He permits them to happen--such as sins. Consequently a +will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not +discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen actually, even by +God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, +that man should will them in themselves: but only that he should not +revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated above (Q. 19, +A. 10). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 3] + +Whether Sorrow Can Be a Useful Good? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For +it is written (Ecclus. 30:25): "Sadness hath killed many, and there +is no profit in it." + +Obj. 2: Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But +sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow +is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, +2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation," +as stated in _De Coelo_ ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation," as +stated in _Ethic._ x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good. + +_On the contrary,_ The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But +according to Eccles. 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there is +mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore +sorrow is useful. + +_I answer that,_ A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a +present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the +present evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that +which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement arises in +the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening +evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something +which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it +may be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in +itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, sin. +Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: +hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:9): "I am glad: not because you were +made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance." +Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in +itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's +being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being +thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of +temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may +be useful; according to Eccles. 7:3: "It is better to go to the house +of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in +mind of the end of all." + +Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, +since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil +is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for +its own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the +good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good +more earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly. + +Reply Obj. 1: This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive +sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, +and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by +reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to +be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is +useful. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but +sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 4] + +Whether Bodily Pain Is the Greatest Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because +"the worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain +pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore +a certain pain is the greatest evil. + +Obj. 2: Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his +last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever he +will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above (Q. 3, A. 4, Obj. +5; Q. 5, A. 8, Obj. 3). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the +fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening +contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6, 15). +Therefore pain is man's greatest evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are +composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body is +the inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the +better part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil of the +inferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the +worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's greatest good is to +be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain." + +_On the contrary,_ Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was +stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 6). But sorrow or pain belongs to +the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is +an evil of guilt. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is +pain of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it +was wont to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is +called evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin." Therefore sorrow +or pain is not man's greatest evil. + +_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's +greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is +truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in +reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil cannot be +the greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not +to reckon as evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. +Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really +good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be +altogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it is +impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: +namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order +of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear +that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which they +become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the +removal of which the pleasure is better. Consequently, a pleasure can +be man's highest good, in the way above stated (Q. 34, A. 3): whereas +sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a +good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest +evil; because it has an admixture of good. + +Reply Obj. 3: That which harms the better thing is worse than that +which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," +as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil +to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body. +Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as +his own, but as taken from another [*Cornelius Celsus]. +________________________ + +QUESTION 40 + +OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; +(2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there are eight +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity? + +(2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive +faculty? + +(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals? + +(4) Whether despair is contrary to hope? + +(5) Whether experience is a cause of hope? + +(6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards? + +(7) Concerning the order of hope to love; + +(8) Whether love conduces to action? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 1] + +Whether Hope Is the Same As Desire or Cupidity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope is the same as desire or +cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal +passions. But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions +puts cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3, 7). Therefore +hope is the same as cupidity or desire. + +Obj. 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the +object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, viz. +the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire. + +Obj. 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the +possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever +is accidental to the object does not make a different species of +passion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future +good, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. +Therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire or cupidity. + +_On the contrary,_ To different powers belong different species of +passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or +cupidity is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically +from desire or cupidity. + +_I answer that,_ The species of a passion is taken from the object. +Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that +it is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the +good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil. +Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is +present and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy +which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something +arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one +hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any time: in +this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the +future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, +while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this +difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one does not +hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope +differs from despair. It is therefore evident that hope differs from +desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For +this reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible +passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as +stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each +regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is +reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly +to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise. + +Reply Obj. 2: The object of hope is the future good considered, not +absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated +above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope adds not only possibility to the +object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to +another power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult, +as stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Moreover, possibility and +impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the +appetitive power: because the appetite is a principle of movement; +and nothing is moved to anything except under the aspect of being +possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to +get. Consequently hope differs from despair according to the +difference of possible and impossible. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 2] + +Whether Hope Is in the Apprehensive or in the Appetitive Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. +Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says +(Rom. 8:25): "If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it +with patience." But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, +which we exercise by _looking out._ Therefore hope belongs to the +cognitive power. + +Obj. 2: Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence +when a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope and to +be confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems +to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too. + +Obj. 3: Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But +certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the +cognitive power. + +_On the contrary,_ Hope regards good, as stated above (A. 1). Now +good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the +appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but +to the appetitive power. + +_I answer that,_ Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the +appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power; +since movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: +whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the +movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the +things known are in the knower. But since the cognitive power moves +the appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the +appetite various movements according to various aspects of the +apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one +kind of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil +gives rise to another: in like manner various movements arise from +the apprehension of something present and of something future; of +something considered absolutely, and of something considered as +arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible. And +accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive power ensuing from +the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; +namely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man +a twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in two +ways, viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a man +hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is not said to wait +for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said +to await that which he hopes to get by another's help, as though to +await (_exspectare_) implied keeping one's eyes on another (_ex alio +spectare_), in so far as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not +only keeps its eye on the good which man intends to get, but also on +the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to Ecclus. +51:10, "I looked for the succor of men." Wherefore the movement of +hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding +inspection of the cognitive power. + +Reply Obj. 2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get +it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; +and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the +ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because the +movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that +precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the +apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite. + +Reply Obj. 3: Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the +sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone +is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which +the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from +the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 3] + +Whether Hope Is in Dumb Animals? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals. +Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide +Orth. ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency +of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does +not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals. + +Obj. 2: Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of +attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the true +and the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states +(Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals, since +they have no mind. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals +are moved by the things that they see." But hope is of things unseen: +"for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" (Rom. 8:24). Therefore +there is no hope in dumb animals. + +_On the contrary,_ Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible +faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also. + +_I answer that,_ The internal passions of animals can be gathered +from their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in +dumb animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far +off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it: +whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in +hopes of catching it. Because as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2; Q. 26, A. +1; Q. 35, A. 1), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and +likewise the natural appetite of insensible things, result from the +apprehension of an intellect, just as the appetite of the +intellectual nature, which is called the will. But there is a +difference, in that the will is moved by an apprehension of the +intellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural +appetite results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who +is the Author of nature; as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb +animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently, in +the actions of irrational animals and of other natural things, we +observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the +actions of art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet an +animal is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as +though it foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in +them by the Divine Intellect that foresees the future. + +Reply Obj. 2: The object of hope is not the possible as +differentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from the +relation of a predicate to a subject. The object of hope is the +possible as compared to a power. For such is the division of the +possible given in _Metaph._ v, 12, i.e. into the two kinds we have +just mentioned. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the thing which is future does not come under +the object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something present, +an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 4] + +Whether Despair Is Contrary to Hope? + +Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope. +Because "to one thing there is one contrary" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear +is contrary to hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But hope +and despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards the +good, whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of +obtaining good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair. + +Obj. 3: Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is in +opposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair seems to +imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary +to hope, which implies movement of stretching out towards the +hoped-for good. + +_On the contrary,_ The very name of despair (_desperatio_) implies that +it is contrary to hope (_spes_). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 2), there is a twofold +contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary +terms: and this contrariety alone is to be found in the concupiscible +passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is +according to approach and withdrawal with regard to the same term; +and is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above (Q. 23, +A. 2). Now the object of hope, which is the arduous good, has the +character of a principle of attraction, if it be considered in the +light of something attainable; and thus hope tends thereto, for it +denotes a kind of approach. But in so far as it is considered as +unobtainable, it has the character of a principle of repulsion, +because, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3, "when men come to an +impossibility they disperse." And this is how despair stands in +regard to this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal: +and consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e. +good and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the +irascible passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the +concupiscible. But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety +of approach and withdrawal. + +Reply Obj. 2: Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however +it regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible +to obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good. + +Reply Obj. 3: Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a +recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed +impossible to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire; +because we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not +desire to have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good, +which is the object of desire. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 5] + +Whether Experience Is a Cause of Hope? + +Objection 1: It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope. +Because experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the +Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue needs +experience and time." But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in +the appetite, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore experience is not a +cause of hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "the old +are slow to hope, on account of their experience"; whence it seems to +follow that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not +productive of opposites. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that "to have +something to say about everything, without leaving anything out, is +sometimes a proof of folly." But to attempt everything seems to point +to great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. Therefore +inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are +hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many +opponents": which seems to pertain to experience. Therefore +experience is a cause of hope. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the object of hope is a +future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing +may be a cause of hope, either because it makes something possible to +a man: or because it makes him think something possible. In the first +way hope is caused by everything that increases a man's power; e.g. +riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience +man acquires the faculty of doing something easily, and the result of +this is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears +to do that which he is sure of having learned well." + +In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think +that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching and persuasion +may be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, +in so far as it makes him reckon something possible, which before his +experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way, +experience can cause a lack of hope: because just as it makes a man +think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so, +conversely, experience makes a man consider as impossible that which +hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope +in two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say +rather that it causes hope. + +Reply Obj. 1: Experience in matters pertaining to action not only +produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of +custom, which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual +virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it +shows something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope. + +Reply Obj. 2: The old are wanting in hope because of their +experience, in so far as experience makes them think something +impossible. Hence he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have +befallen them." + +Reply Obj. 3: Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope +accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help +one to judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience +is a cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes lack of +hope. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 6] + +Whether Hope Abounds in Young Men and Drunkards? + +Objection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes +of hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so +that it is compared to an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and +drunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily +changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 5), the cause of hope is chiefly +whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness are united +to weakness. Therefore they are not causes of hope. + +Obj. 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above (A. +5). But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken +men are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of +hope." + +_I answer that,_ Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the +Philosopher states in _Rhet._ ii, 12: and these three reasons may be +gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of +hope--namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated +above (A. 1). For youth has much of the future before it, and little +of the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of +the future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope. +Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of +spirit; so that their heart expands: and it is owing to the heart +being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore +youths are spirited and hopeful. Likewise they who have not suffered +defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone +to count a thing possible to them. Wherefore youths, through +inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count +a thing possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these +causes are also in those who are in drink--viz. heat and high +spirits, on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and +shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons +attempt everything and are full of hope. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in +reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think +that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for. + +In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe +that young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality: +but, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not +their shortcomings. + +Reply Obj. 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, +in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A. 5, ad 3). +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 7] + +Whether Hope Is a Cause of Love? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because, +according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), love is the first of +the soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore +love precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love. + +Obj. 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, +as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and +consequently is not its cause. + +Obj. 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 3). +But pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love +precedes hope. + +_On the contrary,_ The gloss commenting on Matt. 1:2, "Abraham begot +Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and +hope begets charity." But charity is love. Therefore love is caused +by hope. + +_I answer that,_ Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its +object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for +is something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens +sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through +ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that +by which something becomes possible to us. + +In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is +caused by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire +and love. But in so far as hope regards one through whom something +becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. +Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us +through someone, we are moved towards him as to our own good; and +thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone +we do not hope in him, except accidentally, that is, in so far as we +think that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by +another makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the +hope we have in him. + +Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 8] + +Whether Hope Is a Help or a Hindrance to Action? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to +action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence +which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action. + +Obj. 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above (Q. 37, A. +3). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written (Prov. +13:12): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope +hinders action. + +Obj. 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above (A. 4). +But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it +is written (2 Kings 2:26), that "it is dangerous to drive people to +despair." Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering +action. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that "he that +plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same +applies to all other actions. + +_I answer that,_ Hope of its very nature is a help to action by +making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of +its object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought +of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that +it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by +reason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of +its effect. Because hope, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 3), causes +pleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 4). +Therefore hope is conducive to action. + +Reply Obj. 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an +evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear +rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget +negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: +whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in +which a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as +difficult. + +Reply Obj. 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that +it causes sorrow, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 3, ad 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a +certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, +strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore +in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove +dangerous to the foe. +________________________ + +QUESTION 41 + +OF FEAR, IN ITSELF +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. +With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in +itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first +head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul? + +(2) Whether fear is a special passion? + +(3) Whether there is a natural fear? + +(4) Of the species of fear. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 1] + +Whether Fear Is a Passion of the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. +For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by +way of _systole_"--i.e. of contraction--"desirous of vindicating +nature." But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in _Ethic._ ii, 5. +Therefore fear is not a passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an +agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something future, +as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a +passion. + +Obj. 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the +sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses. +But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, +fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear +among the other passions of the soul. + +_I answer that,_ Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, +fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated +above (Q. 22), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement +of a passive power--i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as +its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In +this way, both _to feel_ and _to understand_ are passions. Secondly, +more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive +power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive +power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a +bodily transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are +called passions, which imply some deterioration. Now it is evident +that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, +which of itself regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the +sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a certain +transmutation--i.e. contraction--as Damascene says (Cf. Obj. 1). +Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some +particular good. Wherefore it has most properly the character of +passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: +because fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a motive as +present evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so +far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are +principles of external action, they are called virtues. But the +Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the +bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the +agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor +really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really +future, is present in the apprehension of the soul. + +Reply Obj. 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from +apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to +hope for a future good, or to fear a future evil. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 2] + +Whether Fear Is a Special Passion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For +Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught +by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by +sickness"--i.e. sorrow--"nor tossed about in transports of empty +joys." Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other +passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special but a general +passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit +and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial are in +the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as +neither is affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore +neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is +nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a +special passion. + +Obj. 3: Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly +in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: since +the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow"; +and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is "a power of +desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, +as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Therefore fear is not a special +passion, since it belongs to different powers. + +_On the contrary,_ Fear is condivided with the other passions of the +soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12, 15). + +_I answer that,_ The passions of the soul derive their species from +their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special +object. Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the +object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so +the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. +Consequently fear is a special passion of the soul. + +Reply Obj. 1: All the passions of the soul arise from one source, +viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of +this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the +soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general passion. + +Reply Obj. 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but +avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance +be something common, yet fear is a special passion. + +Reply Obj. 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards +evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost +unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions +of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above +(Q. 25, A. 1); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is +ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object +of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the Philosopher says +(Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future +evil which is either corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is +ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the +desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while +avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from +what has been said above (Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 29, A. 2; Q. 36, A. 2). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 3] + +Whether There Is a Natural Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, +through the soul refusing to be severed from the body." + +Obj. 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A. 2, ad 1). +But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). +Therefore there is also a natural fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above (Q. 40, A. +4, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from Rom. +4:18, where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of nature, "he +believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature. + +_On the contrary,_ That which is natural is common to things animate +and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there +is no natural fear. + +_I answer that,_ A movement is said to be natural, because nature +inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is +entirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the +apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to +fire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants. +Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines +thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: +since, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 1), the movements of the cognitive +and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first +principle. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such +as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements +of the animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural. + +And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is +distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of +its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a +fear of "corruptive evil," which nature shrinks from on account of +its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. +Again, there is a fear of "painful evil," which is repugnant not to +nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not +natural. In this sense we have stated above (Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 30, A. +3; Q. 31, A. 7) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into +natural and non-natural. + +But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that +certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as +love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. +The reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance, +imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what +is evil; which inclination is to be found in the natural appetite +also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak +of desire and hope as being even in natural things devoid of +knowledge. On the other hand the other passions of the soul denote +certain movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise +sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or +knowledge is essential to these passions (thus we have said, Q. 31, +AA. 1, 3; Q. 35, A. 1, that apprehension is a necessary condition of +pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be +said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such +like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural +inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some +difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil; both of +which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like +passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings. + +Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 4] + +Whether the Species of Fear Are Suitably Assigned? + +Objection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably +assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, +shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as +the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil." +Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of +sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (Q. 35, +A. 8). Therefore there should only be four species of fear +corresponding to them. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in +our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as +stated above (A. 2). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, +which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of +fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). +But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," as Gregory of +Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore shame is not a +species of fear. + +Obj. 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor +regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore +amazement and stupor are not species of fear. + +Obj. 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the +truth, as stated in the beginning of _Metaph._ But fear leads to +flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of +fear. + +On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of +Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. Obj. 1, 3). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fear regards a future evil +which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is +irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either +in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold +evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature: and +hence arises _laziness,_ as when a man shrinks from work for fear of +too much toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in +the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that +is yet to be done, there is _shamefacedness_; if, however, it be a +deed already done, there is _shame._ + +On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may +surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of +its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil +the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is +_amazement._ Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to +wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is +great in our estimation: and then there is _stupor,_ which is caused +by the representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of +its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of +this kind is called _anxiety._ + +Reply Obj. 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not derived +from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and +for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those +species of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear, which are +derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself. + +Reply Obj. 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in the +power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration +something connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the +doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense +that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of +fear. + +Reply Obj. 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future +reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear. + +Reply Obj. 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but +that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which +arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as +laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement and +stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted +thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and stupor stand in +relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to external +work. + +Reply Obj. 5: He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a +judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the +truth, but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor +fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore +amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor +is a hindrance thereto. +________________________ + +QUESTION 42 + +OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are +six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear? + +(2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear? + +(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear? + +(4) Whether fear itself can be feared? + +(5) Whether sudden things are especially feared? + +(6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no +remedy? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 1] + +Whether the Object of Fear Is Good or Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For +Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose +what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for." +But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good as its +proper object. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and +to be above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good +thing. Therefore good is the object of fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to +fear God, according to Ps. 33:10: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints." +Therefore even the good is an object of fear. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is +of future evil. + +_I answer that,_ Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it +belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in +_Ethic._ vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil. +Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies +pursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies +avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear implies +an avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards +evil as its proper object. + +It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. +This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes +privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is +a privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it +is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the +good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense +Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good +we love. + +In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far +as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so, +just as hope, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 7), regards two things, +namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there +is a hope of obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two +things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, +by its power, can inflict that evil. In this way God is feared by +man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In +this way, too, we fear the power of man; especially when it has been +thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do +us a harm. + +In like manner one fears _to be over another,_ i.e. to lean on +another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears +another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime, lest he reveal it to +others. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 2] + +Whether Evil of Nature Is an Object of Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of +fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take +counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen +naturally, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is +not an object of fear. + +Obj. 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are +always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object +of fear, man would needs be always in fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of +nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such +like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature. +Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems +that it should be. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the +most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is +caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either +corruptive or painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is +contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary +to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of +nature can be the object of fear. + +But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a +natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from +being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an +effect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But +sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as +violent death inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of +nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. +For since fear arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the +Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of +the future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways +that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being +remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is +considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear +it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, +5), "we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that +they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not." +Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on +account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already +present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are +already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the +very point of a death from which there is no escape; "but in order +that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him." + +Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as +future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, be apprehended as +near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be +feared. + +Reply Obj. 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of +nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature, +although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be +possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about +avoiding it. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not +always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always +feared. + +Reply Obj. 3: Death and other defects of nature are the effects of +the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them +as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual +nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear +when threatening in the future. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 3] + +Whether the Evil of Sin Is an Object of Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of +fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. +ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now +nothing but sin severs us from God; according to Isa. 59:2: "Your +iniquities have divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil +of sin can be an object of fear. + +Obj. 2: Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4, 6) that "we fear +when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they +are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on +account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of +sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can +be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4): +and the Apostle says (Gal. 5:10): "I have confidence in you in the +Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can +regard evil of sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q. 41, A. +4). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. +Therefore fear does so likewise. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all +evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2), as the +object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so +the object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily +avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to +our power and will, is not an object of fear; and that nothing gives +rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will is +the proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of sin, +properly speaking, is not an object of fear. + +But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic +cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that +respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from +that extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell in the company of +wicked men, lest he be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a +man thus disposed, fears the being led astray rather than the sin +considered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for +considered in this light it is not an object of fear to him. + +Reply Obj. 1: Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin: +and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards +evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is +about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because +sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely; +wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, +being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a +certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far +as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that +give us pain when they are present, make us fear when they are yet to +come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain +a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be of +an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand, +fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and +consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic +cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic +and from an extrinsic cause. + +Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (Q. 41, A. 4, ad 2, 3), shame is not +fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which +arises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic cause. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 4] + +Whether Fear Itself Can Be Feared? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever +is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus a +man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. +If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear +by being afraid: which seems absurd. + +Obj. 2: Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from +itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him +that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear. + +_On the contrary,_ A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his +own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), nothing can be an object of +fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which +ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic +cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic +cause, in so far as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of +an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the +object of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by +the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. +It is subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys +reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear +cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). +Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove +that fear cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a +solution to the same. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not every fear is identically the same; there are +various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, +then, prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by +fearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him from the +fear which he has not. + +Reply Obj. 2: Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with +the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a +thing flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases. + +Reply Obj. 3: On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded +to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 5] + +Whether Sudden Things Are Especially Feared? + +Objection 1: It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not +especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is +about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in +good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are +feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and +cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more +subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be +feared. + +Obj. 3: Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But +the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence the +Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous +through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that the case is +different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden +things are feared less. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled +at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and +takes forethought for their safety." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 41, A. 2), the object of +fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. +Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, +or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and +suddenness conduce to both of these causes. First, it helps an +imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether +good or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem. +Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in +course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too, +fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand. +Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him +that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which +he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were +it not for the evil taking him by surprise. + +Reply Obj. 1: The object of hope is a good that is possible to +obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature +to increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since +fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, +therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, +as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; +wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be +foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide +their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, +cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the +Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others. + +Reply Obj. 3: Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems +greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious +when seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man +passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his +wealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, +the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty all the more +disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it +seems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident +that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance if the foe +hides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires +greater fear through being much thought about. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 6] + +Whether Those Things Are More Feared, for Which There Is No Remedy? + +Objection 1: It would seem that those things are not more to be +feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of +fear, that there be some hope of safety, as stated above (A. 2). But +an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore +such things are not feared at all. + +Obj. 2: Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in +the natural course of things, there is no return from death to life. +And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the +Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things are not feared +most, for which there is no remedy. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing +which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: nor +is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not +everlasting": and the same applies to evil. But things that cannot be +remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of +their lasting long or for ever. Consequently they are not therefore +any worse or more to be feared. + +_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those +things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put +right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy." + +_I answer that,_ The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever +tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil +is increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of +circumstances, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 3). And of all the +circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to +have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil. Because things +that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration +of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain +length of time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered +for twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same +thing for an infinite length of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to +speak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have +come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, are +considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason +they inspire the greatest fear. + +Reply Obj. 1: Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future +evil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed, there is +an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak +now of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one by which an +already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it +threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above (A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher is speaking there of things that are +good in themselves, i.e., good specifically. And such like good is no +better for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very +nature. +________________________ + +QUESTION 43 + +OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are +two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether love is the cause of fear? + +(2) Whether defect is the cause of fear? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 43, Art. 1] + +Whether Love Is the Cause of Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For +that which leads to a thing is its cause. But "fear leads to the love +of charity" as Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John +(Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the cause of love, and not conversely. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are +feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil." But the +dread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love +him. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than by love. + +Obj. 3: Further, it has been stated above (Q. 42, A. 3) that those +things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which +we do from love, is done from our inmost heart. Therefore fear is not +caused by love. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no +doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, +when we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for." +Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and +consequently love is the cause of fear. + +_I answer that,_ The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation +thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the +passions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the +aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is +a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that +form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is +a cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, +either by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. +Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and +conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the +conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of +that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a +habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which this conjoined +good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such. + +Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is +something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to +avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the +efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear +itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such +an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of +material disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it +is through his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of +that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an +evil. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 42, A. 1), fear, of itself and in +the first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being +contrary to some loved good: and thus fear, of itself, is born of +love. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that +evil ensues: so that sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to +love; in so far as, for instance, through fear of God's punishments, +man keeps His commandments, and thus begins to hope, while hope leads +to love, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 7). + +Reply Obj. 2: He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at +first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him, +we begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is +feared, was loved from the beginning. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument is true of that which is the efficient +cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of +material disposition, as stated above. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 43, Art. 2] + +Whether Defect Is the Cause of Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear. +Because those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is +contrary to power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. + +Obj. 2: Further, the defect of those who are already being executed +is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in _Rhet._ ii, 5. +Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But +"those who contend fear those who contend with them" (Rhet. ii, 5). +Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. + +_On the contrary,_ Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But +"wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" +(Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), fear may be set down to a +twofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part +of him that fears; the other is by way of efficient cause, on the +part of the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of +itself, the cause of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that +one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order +to cause fear, this defect must be according to a measure. For the +defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect +caused by evil present, which is the object of sorrow. And still +greater would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of +the good whose contrary is feared, were entirely absent. + +But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the +cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the cause +apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be +repulsed. It may happen, however, in this respect, that some defect +causes fear accidentally, in so far as owing to some defect someone +wishes to hurt another; for instance, by reason of injustice, either +because that other has already done him a harm, or because he fears +to be harmed by him. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part +of the efficient cause. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who are already being executed, are actually +suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the +measure of fear. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on +account of the power which enables them to contend: but on account of +the lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory. +________________________ + +QUESTION 44 + +OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are +four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether fear causes contraction? + +(2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel? + +(3) Whether it makes one tremble? + +(4) Whether it hinders action? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 1] + +Whether Fear Causes Contraction? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For +when contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are +withdrawn inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the +interior parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of +daring, as may be seen in those who are angered: while the contrary +happens in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not cause +contraction. + +Obj. 2: Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits +and heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out, as may +be seen in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: +on the contrary they lose their speech. Therefore fear does not cause +contraction. + +Obj. 3: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q. 41, A. +4). But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. +iv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But blushing is +an indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore +contraction is not an effect of fear. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear +is a power according to _systole_," i.e. contraction. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 28, A. 5), in the passions of +the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, +while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these +are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation +assumes a resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive +movement. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear +implies a certain contraction: the reason of which is that fear +arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is +difficult to repel, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 2). But that a thing +be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above (Q. +43, A. 2): and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which +it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear +there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe +in one who is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account of the +lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when +seized with fear, leave the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make +for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, +which pertains to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar +contraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes +place in regard to the body. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), +although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to +the inner parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not +the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For in +those who are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital +spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, the inward +movement has an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and +heat concentrate around the heart: the result being that an angry man +is quick and brave in attacking. But in those who are afraid, on +account of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a +downward movement; the said cold being due to the imagined lack of +power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart +instead of concentrating around it: the result being that a man who +is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away. + +Reply Obj. 2: To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it +is natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing +that causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when +in pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns. Now the greatest +help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: +wherefore when they are in pain, their nature stores up the heat and +vital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in repelling +the harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) +when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated together within, +they require to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those who +are in pain can scarcely refrain from crying aloud. On the other +hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits +move from the heart downwards, as stated above (ad 1): wherefore fear +hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in +an upward direction through the mouth: the result being that fear +makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes its +subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1, 6, +7). + +Reply Obj. 3: Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of +the soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there +is contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal +nature: for when an animal is moved by the imagination of death, it +experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the +body, as though it were threatened by a natural death. Hence it is +that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). But +the evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to +the appetite of the soul. Consequently there results a contraction in +this appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as +though contracted in itself, is free to set the vital spirits and +heat in movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the +body: the result being that those who are ashamed blush. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 2] + +Whether Fear Makes One Suitable for Counsel? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for +counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a +hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion +disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of reason. +Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel. + +Obj. 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and +deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all +thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. +Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but +hinders it. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to +avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas +fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be +obtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope +is. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear +makes men of counsel." + +_I answer that,_ A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, +from his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear +makes men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, +3), "we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust +ourselves." Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but +have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel, +and because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above (Q. +42, A. 2). Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are +afraid. + +Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good +counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of +counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to +him greater or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he +loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more +dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every +passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good +counsel. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is +it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is +intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are +so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be +slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely +disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take +good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the +Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he +despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in _Ethic._ +iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope +is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is +of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the +aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of +difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take +counsel, as stated above. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 3] + +Whether Fear Makes One Tremble? + +Objection 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear. +Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold +person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather +to cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are +thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of +those who are being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause +trembling. + +Obj. 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence +laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are +often caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and +consequently does not cause trembling. + +Obj. 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the +inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his outward +parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear +should cause this trembling in all the external members. But such is +not the case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear. + +_On the contrary,_ Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is +followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in fear there takes place a +certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, +the result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this +reason trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack +of power in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to +the want of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves +those members, as stated in _De Anima_ ii, 4. + +Reply Obj. 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner +parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or +nutritive parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst +ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and +urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are +due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philosopher +says (De Problem. xxii, 11). + +This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward +movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially +trembles, as also those members which are connected with the breast +where the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in +their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. +The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw tremble, through their +connection with the heart; which explains the chattering of the +teeth. For the same reason the arms and hands tremble. Or else +because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For which reason the +knees tremble in those who are afraid, according to Isa. 35:3: +"Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.: +'weak'] knees." +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 4] + +Whether Fear Hinders Action? + +Objection 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is +hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs +action. But fear disturbs reason, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore +fear hinders action. + +Obj. 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to +fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls +through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down +below, he would not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear +hinders action. + +Obj. 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness +hinders action. Therefore fear does too. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): "With fear and +trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear +were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a +good action. + +_I answer that,_ Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as +first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may +be hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the +principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, +considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on +account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of their +heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without +much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so +far as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel +and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much +as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the +soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a +disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is +pictured to his imagination. + +Reply Obj. 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and +therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, +it hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other +things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do +that whereby a man escapes from what he fears. +________________________ + +QUESTION 45 + +OF DARING +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether daring is contrary to fear? + +(2) How is daring related to hope? + +(3) Of the cause of daring; + +(4) Of its effect. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 1] + +Whether Daring Is Contrary to Fear? + +Objection 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For +Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice is +contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a +passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear. + +Obj. 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is +contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. + +Obj. 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear +excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes +forethought for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear. +Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is +contrary to fear." + +_I answer that,_ It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest +removed from one another," as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4. Now that +which is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away +from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears +it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own +victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring +is contrary to fear. + +Reply Obj. 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be +taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the +sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus +they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this +movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are +names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: +but we are speaking of it in the first sense. + +Reply Obj. 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not +several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one +thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above +(Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 4) that the irascible passions admit of a +twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and +evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the +opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to +fear, and despair contrary to hope. + +Reply Obj. 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but +merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears +not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while +daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies +privation, so daring implies safety. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 2] + +Whether Daring Ensues from Hope? + +Objection 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. +Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in _Ethic._ +iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1). +Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order. +Therefore daring does not ensue from hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair +contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, +despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). +Therefore daring does not result from hope. + +Obj. 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. +But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. +Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not +result from it. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those +are hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring +ensues from hope. + +_I answer that,_ As we have often stated (Q. 22, A. 2; Q. 35, A. 1; +Q. 41, A. 1), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now +every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of +pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something +either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. By reason +of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of +avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of +pursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the +object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that +which is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason +of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and +avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these four things +belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, +avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to +daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore, +that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming +the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But +despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is +because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope +for. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were not +co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good, +since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; +consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which +pursues good. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, +yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit +of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope +precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not +always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not +always lead to daring, save only when it is strong. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in +the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; +yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In +like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away +from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly +speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as +despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, +daring cannot be a principal passion. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 3] + +Whether Some Defect Is a Cause of Daring? + +Objection 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For +the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine are +strong and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. +Therefore daring is caused by a defect. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who +have no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience is a +defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. + +Obj. 3: Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be +daring; "like the beasts when beaten," as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 5. +But the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is +caused by a defect. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause +of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the +means of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either +non-existent or far off." But anything pertaining to defect implies +either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of +something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a +cause of daring. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2) daring results from hope +and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause +hope or banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and +hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the +appetite, and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be +considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising +hope, or by banishing fear; in one way, in the part of the appetitive +movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation. + +On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, +hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us +reckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, +as bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and +the like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great +number of friends or any other means of help, especially if a man +trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, +with whom it is well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher +says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal of +threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has +no enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of +any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened +by danger, who have harmed others. + +On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the +incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which +raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says +(De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose heart is small in size, +are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; +because the natural heat is unable to give the same degree of +temperature to a large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not +heat a large house as well as it does a small house." He says also +(De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those whose lungs contain much blood, +are more daring, through the heat in the heart that results +therefrom." He says also in the same passage that "lovers of wine are +more daring, on account of the heat of the wine": hence it has been +said above (Q. 40, A. 6) that drunkenness conduces to hope, since the +heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by reason of the +dilatation and enlargement of the heart. + +Reply Obj. 1: Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, +but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think +greatly of himself. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who have no experience of dangers are more +daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far +as through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, +nor the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the +cause of fear gives rise to daring. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have +been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the +assistance of those who suffer unjustly." + +Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally, +i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or +imaginary, either in oneself or in another. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 4] + +Whether the Brave Are More Eager at First Than in the Midst of Danger? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at +first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by +fear, which is contrary to daring, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 44, A. +3). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher +says (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager at +first than in the midst of danger. + +Obj. 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object: +thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. But +the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater +the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger is more arduous +and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is +greatest. + +Obj. 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But +anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that +"anger makes man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger +and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring. + +_On the contrary,_ It is said in _Ethic._ iii, 7 that "the daring are +precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst +of dangers they stand aloof." + +_I answer that,_ Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, +follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive +faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into +circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens +sometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant +of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises +the movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to +experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he +expected, and so gives way. + +On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a +situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to +the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the +danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are +in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but +sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; +wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they +face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding +object of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas men +of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to +hope and banishing fear, as stated above (A. 3). + +Reply Obj. 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of +the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the +body, as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring +the heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it +withdraws to the inferior parts. + +Reply Obj. 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be +increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a +compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil +presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much +difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the +movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of +daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring +considered to be. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some +kind of hope, as we shall see later on (Q. 46, A. 1). Consequently if +the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does +not ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does ensue, there will +be greater daring. +________________________ + +QUESTION 46 + +OF ANGER, IN ITSELF +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of +anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether anger is a special passion? + +(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil? + +(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty? + +(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason? + +(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire? + +(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred? + +(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation +of justice? + +(8) Of the species of anger. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 1] + +Whether Anger Is a Special Passion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For +the irascible power takes its name from anger (_ira_). But there are +several passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not +one special passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary +passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no +passion is contrary to anger, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 3). +Therefore anger is not a special passion. + +Obj. 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But +anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, +pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). +Therefore anger is not a special passion. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a +special passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7). + +_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, +by predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals. +Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all +things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). +Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, +according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains +many effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an +effect is produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since +every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet +a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several +causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are, +in a fashion, actually existing therein. + +Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is +condivided with the other passions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). In +like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause +of the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a general +passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), because love +is the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above (Q. +27, A. 4). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general +passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several +passions. Because the movement of anger does not arise save on +account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope +of revenge: for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry +man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible." +Consequently if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very +much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De +Anima iv, 6). + +Reply Obj. 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" (anger), +not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because +all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these +movements, anger is the most patent. + +Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary +passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of +evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no +contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no +contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are +made. + +Reply Obj. 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus +includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of +cause and effect. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 2] + +Whether the Object of Anger Is Good or Evil? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For +Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is +"the sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails +whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has +the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object. + +Obj. 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each +seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its +object, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 1). Therefore anger does also. + +Obj. 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher +says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil is the +object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves +for revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something +good: since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger +is good. + +Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes +pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of +hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of +anger. + +_I answer that,_ The movement of the appetitive power follows an act +of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a +thing in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we +understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as +when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each +of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by +way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply +follows and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements +are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex +object, as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil +being in, or being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling +from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love +someone, in so far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate +someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same +with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on +someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to +vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a good, +wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks +vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the +character of evil. + +We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, +between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The +first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas +love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is +said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second +difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the +lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: +while both the objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the +man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable +to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, +viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently +it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 3] + +Whether Anger Is in the Concupiscible Faculty? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible +faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a +kind of "desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. +Therefore anger is too. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into +hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is +inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion. +Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty. + +Obj. 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of +Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up of +sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. +Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion. + +_On the contrary,_ The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible +faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the +irascible would not take its name from it. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the passions of the +irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, +in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil +absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions +are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has +been stated (A. 2) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance +that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in +respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the +movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude +about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are +naught or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It +is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in +the irascible faculty. + +Reply Obj. 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving +for a future good, without discriminating between that which is +arduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind +of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense, +however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible +faculties. + +Reply Obj. 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the +same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by +becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it +lasts a long time engenders hatred. + +Reply Obj. 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not +as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and +it has been said above (Q. 25, A. 2) that the concupiscible passions +are the causes of the irascible passions. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 4] + +Whether Anger Requires an Act of Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of +reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive +appetite. But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of +reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not +require an act of reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are +seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is +conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger +listens to reason somewhat." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), anger is a desire for +vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment +to be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says +(Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it +ought to quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately +exasperated." Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of +reason. Therefore anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act +of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in so +far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, +wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another way, it +follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger +follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that +"anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a +result of reason's denouncing the injury." Because the sensitive +appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the +will. + +Reply Obj. 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them +by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with +movements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements, +as stated above (Q. 40, A. 3). + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat +to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but +listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of +reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an +act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the +Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2, 27) that whose who are very +drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: +but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still +able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 5] + +Whether Anger Is More Natural Than Desire? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than +desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. +But "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states +(Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in +fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man. + +Obj. 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things +that act according to reason, are not said to act according to +nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," +as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than +anger. + +Obj. 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a +craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch, +viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these +things are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is +more natural than anger. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger +is more natural than desire." + +_I answer that,_ By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, +as stated in _Phys._ ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a +particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without +reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, +as stated above (Q. 36, A. 2), may be considered in two ways: first, +on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If +then we consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the +object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of +sexual pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these +pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance. + +If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the +subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, +desire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may +be considered either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, +or again as to the particular temperament of the individual. If then +we consider the generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man +considered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger; +because it is from this very generic nature that man is inclined to +desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of +the species and of the individual. If, however, we consider the +specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being; +then anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger +follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher says +(Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more +natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to everything to +rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the +nature of the individual, in respect of his particular temperament, +thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is +prone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, +or any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, +which tendencies result from a man's individual temperament. Because +disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the +humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he +that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with +anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is +inflamed with desire: and for this reason the Philosopher says +(Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be +transmitted from parent to child, than a disposition to desire. + +Reply Obj. 1: We may consider in man both the natural temperament on +the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily +temperament, a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel +others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the +moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as +their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an +extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of +passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in +fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it is natural to +man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat +causes anger, by denouncing the injury which causes anger; and +somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man "does not listen +perfectly to the command of reason," as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). + +Reply Obj. 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore +from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows +that it is, in a manner, natural to man. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the part of +the object. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 6] + +Whether Anger Is More Grievous Than Hatred? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. +For it is written (Prov. 27:4) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury +when it breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore +anger is more grievous than hatred. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, +than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if +the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not +satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved +thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is +more grievous than hatred. + +Obj. 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according +as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the more +settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by +the concurrence of several passions, as stated above (A. 1): whereas +hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than +hatred. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a +beam," but anger to "a mote." + +_I answer that,_ The species and nature of a passion are taken from +its object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the +object of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he +hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. +But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his +enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he +is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that +is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of +vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above (A. 2) that hatred +implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes +application of good to evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil +under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek +evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of +justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in +conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, +that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance. +Consequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than +anger. + +Reply Obj. 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered: +namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the +thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred +desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no +particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for +their own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher +states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence +it is written (Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an +opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other +hand, seeks evil only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. +Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of +justice according to the estimate of the angry man, then he has +mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry +man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never +appeased." + +As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than +hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through +the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can +bear the violence of one provoked?" + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, +in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance is +wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of +punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and +inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, +that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and +know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done +the other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, +since he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, +that an evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and +imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not grieve +those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4). + +Reply Obj. 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more +settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one +cause prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more +lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion +of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a +disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers that which he +hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is +more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting +than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this +disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred +is more incurable than anger." +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 7] + +Whether Anger Is Only Towards Those to Whom One Has an Obligation of +Justice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to +whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice +between man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry +with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his +pen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only +towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is +there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man +is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his +sin; hence it is written (Ps. 4:5): "Be ye angry and sin not." +Therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a +relation of justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an +entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state +injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only +towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). +Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one +is in relation of justice or injustice. + +The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. +ii, 2, 3). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), anger desires evil as being +a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to +whom we are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice, and +wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the +cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the +vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns +those to whom one is just or unjust. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 4, ad 2), anger, though it follows +an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid +of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved +by their imagination to something like rational action. Since then in +man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can +be aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination +denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement +of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement +is like that which occurs in animals against anything that injures +them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, +according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 3), "it is impossible to be +angry with insensible things, or with the dead": both because they +feel no pain, which is, above all, what the angry man seeks in those +with whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance +on them, since they can do us no harm. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically +speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and +himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and +concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to +be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. +But properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, a man is +never angry with himself. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference +between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class, +as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed +only towards an individual." The reason is that hatred arises from +our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and +this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the +other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his action. Now +all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is +always pointed at an individual. When the whole state hurts us, the +whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf. Q. 29, A. 6]. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 8] + +Whether the Species of Anger Are Suitably Assigned? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) +unsuitably assigns three species of anger--"wrath," "ill-will" and +"rancor." For no genus derives its specific differences from +accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: +because "the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath +(_cholos_), if anger continue it is called ill-will (_menis_); while +rancor (_kotos_) is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance." +Therefore these are not different species of anger. + +Obj. 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that +"_excandescentia_ (irascibility) is what the Greeks call _thymosis_, +and is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; +while according to Damascene _thymosis_, is the same as _kotos_ +(rancor). Therefore _kotos_ does not bide its time for taking +vengeance, but in course of time spends itself. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of +anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and +anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees +mentioned by Our Lord (Matt. 5:22): "Whosoever is angry with his +brother" (thus implying "anger without utterance"), and then, +"whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'" (implying anger with +utterance yet without full expression), and lastly, "whosoever shall +say 'Thou fool'" (where we have "perfection of speech"). Therefore +Damascene's division is imperfect, since it takes no account of +utterance. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. +ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.]. + +_I answer that,_ The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory +of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. +This happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement +itself, and he calls this kind of anger _cholos_ (bile) because it +quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes +anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to +_menis_ (ill-will) which is derived from _menein_ (to dwell). +Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz. +vengeance; and this pertains to _kotos_ (rancor) which never rests +until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: "Let all bitterness and anger and +indignation . . . be put away from you."]. Hence the Philosopher +(Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons _akrocholoi_ (choleric), +because they are easily angered; some he calls _pikroi_ (bitter), +because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls +_chalepoi_ (ill-tempered), because they never rest until they have +retaliated [*Cf. II-II, Q. 158, A. 5]. + +Reply Obj. 1: All those things which give anger some kind of +perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently +nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference +thereof. + +Reply Obj. 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain +to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness +of temper, rather than to rancor (_furor_). And there is no reason +why the Greek _thymosis_, which is denoted by the Latin _furor,_ +should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose +in being avenged. + +Reply Obj. 3: These degrees are distinguished according to various +effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the +very movement of anger. +________________________ + +QUESTION 47 + +OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER +(In Four Articles) +[*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text, except +in A. 4]. + +We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. +Under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the +one who is angry? + +(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger? + +(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person; + +(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is +angry. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 1] + +Whether the Motive of Anger Is Always Something Done Against the One +Who Is Angry? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always +something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, +can do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy +iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet +God is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according +to Ps. 105:40: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." +Therefore it is not always on account of something done against him, +that a man is angry. + +Obj. 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire +vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not always +angry on account of something done against us. + +Obj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry +especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest in; +thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise +philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm +the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that +makes us angry. + +Obj. 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, +provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, in +Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. +Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done +against him. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is +always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise +without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because +we think him such." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 46, A. 6), anger is the desire +to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some +injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any +injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the +person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks +its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury +done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be +something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger +is always something done against him. + +Reply Obj. 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the +soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take +vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any +actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against +God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His +commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; +which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an +object of God's providence and protection. + +Reply Obj. 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to +be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in +some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least +because of the nature we have in common. + +Reply Obj. 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look +upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as +though we ourselves were despised and injured. + +Reply Obj. 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks +it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a +slight is an action. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 2] + +Whether the Sole Motive of Anger Is Slight or Contempt? + +Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole +motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we +are angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an +injury." But one may suffer an injury without being despised or +slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger. + +Obj. 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to +the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore +they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to +anger, when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). +Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other +causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that +others should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known +our evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore being +slighted is not the only motive for being angry. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is +"a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight +done unbecomingly." + +_I answer that,_ All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For +slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," + "despiteful treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, +and "insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. +Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks +another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks +vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken +only for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger +is always something considered in the light of an injustice. +Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not +angry,--if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering +justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just." +Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through +ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a +man does an injustice, when he does an injury from choice, on +purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 8. +Wherefore we are most of all angry with those who, in our opinion, +have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an +injury through ignorance or through passion, either we are not angry +with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through +ignorance or through passion takes away from the notion of injury, +and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on +the other hand, who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from +contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the +Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at all, +or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because +they do not seem to have acted slightingly." + +The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's +excellence: because "men think little of things that are not worth +much ado" (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from +all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so +far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight. + +Reply Obj. 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man +suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt or +slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of +itself the cause of anger. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as +such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with +anything derogatory thereto. + +Reply Obj. 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of +slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the +more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if +a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this +seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show +signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little +about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying +out his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems +not to care much for his friendship. Consequently all those things, in +so far as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 3] + +Whether a Man's Excellence Is the Cause of His Being Angry? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause +of his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, +2) that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for +instance, the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed." But +these things seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than +excellence makes one prone to anger. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are +very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some +failing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for +suspicion; but if they think they excel in those points, they do not +trouble." But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. +Therefore defect rather than excellence is a cause of a man being +angry. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable +and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not +angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when +they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and +well-founded hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence +makes men prone to anger. + +_I answer that,_ The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be +taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus +excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the +motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above (A. 2). Now it +is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a +slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently +those who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be +slighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, +or an orator in his eloquence, and so forth. + +Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be +considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the +motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger +except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is +above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are +more easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to +some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more +easily grieved. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently +excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and +therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But +in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly despised, he +has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is +envied or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or +some other like cause. + +Reply Obj. 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder +sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke +anger, because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 4] + +Whether a Person's Defect Is a Reason for Being More Easily Angry +with Him? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for +being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, +3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and +humble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. +Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down." But these things savor +of littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a +reason for being less angry with him. + +Obj. 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger +ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not +provoke anger against him. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being +friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they +offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): "If +my enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it." Therefore +a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with +him. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich +man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in +like manner the prince is angry with his subject." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3) unmerited contempt more +than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency +or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase +our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being +despised. For just as the higher a man's position is, the more +undeservedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he +has for despising. Thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a +peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant. + +If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited +contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way +those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done +wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, +according to Prov. 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to +wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those +before whom they humble themselves. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of +death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; +and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are +angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have attained to +the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are +grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of just +retaliation. + +Reply Obj. 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater +indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing +to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are +angry with those who are beneath us. +________________________ + +QUESTION 48 + +OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are +four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether anger causes pleasure? + +(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart? + +(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason? + +(4) Whether it causes taciturnity? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 48, Art. 1] + +Whether Anger Causes Pleasure? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. +Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, +since, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, +acts with pain." Therefore anger does not cause pleasure. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "vengeance +makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain": +whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from +vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the +advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an +effect united with pleasure. + +Obj. 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed +to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in _Rhet._ ii, 3. +Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying +that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, +xviii, 109, trl. Pope). + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, +chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: +and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible +are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of +thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from +what has been said (Q. 47, AA. 1, 3), that the movement of anger +arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow +vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is +present, pleasure ensues, and so much the greater according as the +sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect +pleasure ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of +anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes +present to the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope; because +none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above (Q. 46, +A. 1); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone +that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what +he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. +Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about +vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish +sorrow and consequently anger. + +Reply Obj. 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same +thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the +thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its +beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the +real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether. + +Reply Obj. 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and +consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking +vengeance follows from anger. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 48, Art. 2] + +Whether Anger Above All Causes Fervor in the Heart? + +Objection 1: It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of +anger. For fervor, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 5; Q. 37, A. 2), +belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and +cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more powerful than +its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor. + +Obj. 2: Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor, +increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer it +lasts. But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher +says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger." Therefore fervor +is not the proper effect of anger. + +Obj. 3: Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But +"the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger," as +the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause +fervor. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that "anger +is fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation +of the bile." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 44, A. 1), the bodily +transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is +proportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now it is evident that +every appetite, even the natural appetite, tends with greater force +to repel that which is contrary to it, if it be present: hence we see +that hot water freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater +force on the hot object. Since then the appetitive movement of anger +is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; +it follows that the appetite tends with great force to repel the +injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence +and impetuosity in the movement of anger. And because the movement of +anger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, +but one of prosecution, which corresponds to the action of heat, the +result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and +vital spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's +passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being so +disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof +in their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) "the +heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, +the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, +the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. +With the mouth indeed he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows +not what it says." + +Reply Obj. 1: "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of +the beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently +when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, +he feels his love thereof the more: the result being that his heart +is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of +his love; so that anger increases the fervor of love and makes it to +be felt more. + +Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is +to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor of love has a +certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one +loves: whence it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the +blood. For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to +love; and hence the saying that "love springs from the liver," +because of the blood being formed there. On the other hand, the +fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, +for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened +to the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene +says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from an exhalation of +the bile whence it takes its name _chole_." + +Reply Obj. 2: Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the +causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory +is weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip +from our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done. +Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time +goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. Moreover a wrong +seems greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is +gradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes +into the past. The same applies to love, so long as the cause of love +is in the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, +5) that "if a friend's absence lasts long, it seems to make men +forget their friendship." But in the presence of a friend, the cause +of friendship is continually being multiplied by time: wherefore the +friendship increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its +cause continually multiplied. + +Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the +strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent having +burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon +dies away. + +Reply Obj. 3: Every power that is divided in itself is weakened. +Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry +with another, by this very fact his anger with the former is +weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be +greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, +in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem +to be of little or no account. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 48, Art. 3] + +Whether Anger Above All Hinders the Use of Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of +reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not +seem to hinder the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as +stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man +show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "an +angry man is not cunning but is open." Therefore anger does not seem +to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning, +as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.). + +Obj. 3: Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by +juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more +clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases +anger: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are more +angry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable +men, if they be dishonored": and so forth. Therefore the same cause +increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore +anger does not hinder the judgment of reason. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws +the light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind." + +_I answer that,_ Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily +organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers +for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered +when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any +disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is +clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated (A. +2) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in the region +of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members. +Consequently, of all the passions, anger is the most manifest +obstacle to the judgment of reason, according to Ps. 30:10: "My eye +is troubled with wrath." + +Reply Obj. 1: The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the +appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the +passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though +it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion of +the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material +element of anger. In this respect it hinders the judgment of reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because it is +clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without +thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being +hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what done +openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the +dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an +effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous +man (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his +friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly." Desire, on the other +hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, +the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame and +voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those +things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of +vengeance, man seeks to be in the open. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in +the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another +facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it +increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or wealth, +suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on +account of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. Consequently +it causes greater grief: just as a great good, through being received +unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the +increase of the grief that precedes, anger is increased also. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 48, Art. 4] + +Whether Anger Above All Causes Taciturnity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity. +Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger +conduces to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down +by Our Lord (Matt. 5:22): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his +brother"; and " . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; +and " . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool.'" +Therefore anger does not cause taciturnity. + +Obj. 2: Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks +out into unbecoming words: hence it is written (Prov. 25:28): "As a +city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man +that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking." But anger, above +all, hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above (A. 3). +Consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words. +Therefore it does not cause taciturnity. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 12:34): "Out of the abundance +of the heart the mouth speaketh." But anger, above all, causes a +disturbance in the heart, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore above all +it conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does +not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more +fiercely." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 46, A. 4), anger both +follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both +respects it may cause taciturnity. On the part of the reason, when +the judgment of reason prevails so far, that although it does not +curb the appetite in its inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it +curbs the tongue from unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says +(Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes when the mind is disturbed, anger, as if +in judgment, commands silence." On the part of the impediment to +reason because, as stated above (A. 2), the disturbance of anger +reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those members which +reflect more distinctly the emotions of the heart, such as the eyes, +face and tongue; wherefore, as observed above (A. 2), "the tongue +stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce." +Consequently anger may cause such a disturbance, that the tongue is +altogether deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result. + +Reply Obj. 1: Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason +from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to +paralyze the tongue and other outward members. + +And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound +to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered +by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and +immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even death. If, +however, the disturbance be not so great, then "out of the abundance +of the heart" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds to speak. +________________________ + +TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ. 49-54) +________________________ + +QUESTION 49 + +OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE +(In Four Articles) + +After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the +consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of +intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic +principle is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the +First Part (Q. 77, seqq.), it remains for us to consider them in general: +in the second place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like +habits, which are the principles of human acts. + +Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, +the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of +their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are +distinguished from one another. + +Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether habit is a quality? + +(2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality? + +(3) Whether habit implies an order to an act? + +(4) Of the necessity of habit. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 49, Art. 1] + +Whether Habit Is a Quality? + +Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine +says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the +verb 'to have.'" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also +to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as "having" +quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a +quality. + +Obj. 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may +be clearly seen in the _Book on the Predicaments_ (Categor. vi). But +one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is +not a quality. + +Obj. 3: Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in the +_Book of the Predicaments_ (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the +order of that which has parts," as stated in _Metaph._ v, text. 24. +But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not +a quality. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments +(Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change." + +_I answer that,_ This word _habitus_ (habit) is derived from _habere_ +(to have). Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, +inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in +another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation (_se +habet_) either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. + +Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in +regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various +predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the +"post-predicaments," so called because they result from the various +predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and +such like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this +distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between +the "haver" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no +medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are +some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for +instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, +further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an +action or passion, but something after the manner of action or +passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and +something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says +(Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an +action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the +case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore +these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under +the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, +text. 25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is +clothed." + +But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in +regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a +quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and +of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a +disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, +and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus +health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. +Wherefore we must say that habit is a quality. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes "to have" in the general sense: for +thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in which we +understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is +had: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said. + +Reply Obj. 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that +which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher +goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to +place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as +Simplicius observes in his _Commentary on the Predicaments,_ "he +includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to +place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is the +order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes +all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet +arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: +"and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, +which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 49, Art. 2] + +Whether Habit Is a Distinct Species of Quality? + +Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of +quality. Because, as we have said (A. 1), habit, in so far as it is a +quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed +well or ill." But this happens in regard to any quality: for a thing +happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in +like manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such +things. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the _Book of the +Predicaments_ (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or +habits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition +is not distinct from the other species of quality. + +Obj. 3: Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference belonging +to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion. +Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of +another genus; but "differences should be proper to a genus," as the +Philosopher says in _Metaph._ vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit +is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not to be a distinct +species of quality. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says in the _Book of the +Predicaments_ (Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit +and disposition." + +_I answer that,_ The Philosopher in the _Book of Predicaments_ +(Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of +quality. Now Simplicius, in his _Commentary on the Predicaments,_ +explains the difference of these species as follows. He says "that +some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its +nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, being caused +from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter," i.e. those +which are adventitious, "are habits and dispositions, differing in +the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural +qualities, some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state +of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality: +while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply +rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, we have the +third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth +species of quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an +animated being." But this distinction of the species of quality seems +unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like qualities, +which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many +dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health, +beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the +species, since that which is the more natural is always first. + +Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions +and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, +implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says +(Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore +it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. +Therefore, just as that in accordance with which the material +potentiality (_potentia materiae_) is determined to its substantial +being, is called quality, which is a difference affecting the +substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the +subject is determined to its accidental being, is called an +accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear +from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19). + +Now the mode o[r] determination of the subject to accidental being +may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in +regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, +which are matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take +the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we +shall then have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, +considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the +notion of good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of +quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or +slowly transitory. + +But the mode o[r] determination of the subject, in regard to action +or passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality. +And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done +with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in +them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or +evil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, +whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end. + +On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in +regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of +quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says +(Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the +body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by +perfect I mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature." +And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and +the cause why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the +first species we consider both evil and good, and also +changeableness, whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain +nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher +(Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone +is disposed, well or ill"; and in _Ethic._ ii, 4, he says that by +"habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." +For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has the +aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. +And since nature is the first object of consideration in anything, +for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality. + +Reply Obj. 1: Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above +(A. 1, ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some +quality except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or +ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must +consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So +in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said to be well or +ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a +thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently +even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as they are +considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, +belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and color, according to +their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat +and cold, according to their suitability to the nature of a thing, +concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the +Philosopher, in the first species of quality. + +Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some +give another solution, as Simplicius says in his _Commentary on the +Predicaments._ + +Reply Obj. 3: This difference, "difficult to change," does not +distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from +disposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as +the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition of +habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is +divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can be +divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect +within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining +the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be easily +lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not +to be lost easily. And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a +boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse +species of the one subaltern genus: so that we call dispositions, +those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very +nature are easily lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g. +sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by +reason of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they +have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this +sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation +seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for in order +to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, +according to which, when a quality is, by reason of its nature, +easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly +changeable, then it is called a habit: while the contrary happens in +regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly +changeable: for supposing a man to have a science imperfectly, so as +to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that +science, rather than that he has the science. From this it is clear +that the word "habit" implies a certain lastingness: while the word +"disposition" does not. + +Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are +specific differences (of a quality), although they belong to passion +and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, +though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless designate +differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same +way, in the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of +substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential +principles are designated. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 49, Art. 3] + +Whether Habit Implies Order to an Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. +For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher +says (De Anima iii, text 8), that "when one is become knowing by +habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise than +before learning." Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a +principle to an act. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, +belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put in +the definition of power, as we read in _Metaph._ v, text. 17. +Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. +Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, +habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to +power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of +quality. + +Obj. 3: Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and +beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore it is +not essential to habit to be a principle of act. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "habit +is that whereby something is done when necessary." And the +Commentator says (De Anima iii) that "habit is that whereby we act +when we will." + +_I answer that,_ To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both +in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in +which the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to +every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential to habit +to imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is +suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature, which is the +end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is +either an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one +attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not +only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to +operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the +end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition +of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is +well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its +nature, or in regard to something else, that is to the end. + +But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in +which they are, imply primarily and principally relation to an act. +For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a +relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the nature of a thing, +in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it +follows that the habit principally implies relation to an act. Now it +is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be +a principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, +implies principally relation to an act. + +Reply Obj. 1: Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in +this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a +state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is +called first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in +_De Anima_ ii, text. 5. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, +but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which +power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of +quality. + +Reply Obj. 3: Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual +disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as +nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to +act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), that +man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform +the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies to other habits. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 49, Art. 4] + +Whether Habits Are Necessary? + +Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by +habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated +above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in +respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. Therefore +there is no necessity for habits. + +Obj. 2: Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies +sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, without +any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity +for habits. + +Obj. 3: Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is +habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. +Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous. + +_On the contrary,_ Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But +perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in +the nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be +habits. + +_I answer that,_ As we have said above (AA. 2, 3), habit implies a +disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or +end, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed +thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, +three conditions are necessary. The first condition is that which is +disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and +so, that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act. +Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of +potentiality and act, and whose substance is its own operation, which +itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and +disposition, as is clearly the case in God. + +The second condition is, that that which is in a state of +potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination +in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a +state of potentiality in regard to something else, but in regard to +that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such +a subject from its own nature has the due relation to such an act. +Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since +that matter is not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we +said in the First Part (Q. 56, A. 2) there is no need for disposition +or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, +since the nature of the heavenly body is not in a state of +potentiality to more than one fixed movement. + +The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those +things to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur, +capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the +subject well or ill to its form or to its operation. Wherefore the +simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the +elements in one single fixed way, are not called dispositions or +habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, +such things as health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the +adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative +adjustability. For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. +24, 25) that "habit is a disposition": and disposition is "the order +of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or +as to species," as we have said above (A. 1, ad 3). Wherefore, since +there are many things for whose natures and operations several things +must concur which may vary in their relative adjustability, it +follows that habit is necessary. + +Reply Obj. 1: By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the +subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some +disposition. But the form itself is further ordained to operation, +which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is +limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the +form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form be such +that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be +disposed to its operations by means of habits. + +Reply Obj. 2: Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then +it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not a +relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as +we have said. For this reason the natural forces do not perform their +operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves +determined to one mode of operation. + +Reply Obj. 3: The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as +will be made clear further on (Q. 54, A. 3): whereas the same power +has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary +that the powers be determined to good. +________________________ + +QUESTION 50 + +OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS +(In Six Articles) + +We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are +six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there is a habit in the body? + +(2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence +or in respect of its power? + +(3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit? + +(4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect? + +(5) Whether there is a habit in the will? + +(6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 1] + +Whether There Is a Habit in the Body? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. +For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), "a habit is that whereby +we act when we will." But bodily actions are not subject to the will, +since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body. + +Obj. 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But +habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily +disposition can be a habit. + +Obj. 3: Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But +change can only be in the third species of quality, which is divided +against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says in the _Book of Predicaments_ +(De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are +called habits. + +_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 49, AA. 2 seqq.), habit is +a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either +to form or to operation. Therefore in so far as habit implies +disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its +subject. For every operation of the body proceeds either from a +natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. +Consequently, as to those operations which proceed from its nature, +the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are +determined to one mode of operation; and we have already said (Q. 49, +A. 4) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things +that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations which +proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to +the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion +to their operations: whence "by like acts like habits are formed" +(Ethic. ii, 1, 2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations +are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body: +to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with +promptitude to help in the operations of the soul. + +If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus +a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the +soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty +and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the +nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, +are easily changeable. + +On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his _Commentary on the +Predicaments,_ Alexander denied absolutely that habits or +dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the +first species of quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that +Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the _Book on the +Predicaments_ not as though they belonged to the first species of +quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as +health and sickness may be easy or difficult to change, so also are +all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and +dispositions. But this is clearly contrary to the intention of +Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and +sickness as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in +_Phys._ vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among +habits. + +Reply Obj. 1: This objection runs in the sense of habit as a +disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are +from nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from +the soul, and the principle of which is the will. + +Reply Obj. 2: Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change +on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they may +be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to +wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; or +because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other +dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply difficult to +change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And +therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is +a habit simply: but that it is "as a habit," as we read in the Greek +[*_isos hexin_ (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of +the soul are called habits simply. + +Reply Obj. 3: Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of +quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third +species, in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in +some "becoming" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called +passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to +perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed +into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his _Commentary_ +disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third +species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas Aristotle +puts heat in the third. + +Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that +passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ in +bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives +heat in this only that it is being heated, and not so as to be able +to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or +passion-like quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought +to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a +disposition; and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to +become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that +disposition would be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like +quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius +disapproves of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply +diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the +diverse participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be +no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore we must say +otherwise that, as was explained above (Q. 49, A. 2, ad 1), the +adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to +their suitability to nature, implies the notion of disposition: and +so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, +which are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change +as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to +like habits and dispositions, primarily and of themselves. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, art. 2] + +Whether the Soul Is the Subject of Habit in Respect of Its Essence or +in Respect of Its Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of +its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of +dispositions and habits in relation to nature, as stated above (Q. +49, A. 2). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the +powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul is the +nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in +the soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers. + +Obj. 2: Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit +is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of +accident, as we have said in the First Part (Q. 77, A. 1, ad 5). +Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers. + +Obj. 3: Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the +subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it +is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore +habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits +in the various powers of the soul. + +_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 49, AA. 2, 3), habit +implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. +If therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot +be in the soul--that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul +itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in +this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by +reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its +relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which +man may become a partaker, according to 2 Pet. 1, "that we may be +partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, +namely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence, as +we shall state later on (Q. 110, A. 4). + +On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it +is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in so far as the +soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, +which is a condition for a habit, as we have said above (Q. 49, A. +4). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its +powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in +respect of its powers. + +Reply Obj. 1: The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as +a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a +form and nature to which someone is disposed. + +Reply Obj. 2: Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But +since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the +subject, according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the +subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident +is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in +which sense power is the subject of habit. + +Reply Obj. 3: Habit takes precedence of power, according as it +implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a +relation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the +principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does +not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is +posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence of +power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act +takes precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to +potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation and +time, as stated in _Metaph._ vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 3] + +Whether There Can Be Any Habits in the Powers of the Sensitive Part? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the +powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an +irrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no +habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to +put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part. + +Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. +But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is no will, +which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above (Q. +49, A. 3). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers. + +Obj. 3: Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and +just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it virtue +related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there +are no sciences: since science is of universals, which the sensitive +powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of +virtue in the sensitive part. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "some +virtues," namely, temperance and fortitude, "belong to the irrational +part." + +_I answer that,_ The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: +first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, +according as they act at the command of reason. According as they act +from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature +is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be +ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by +which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something. + +Reply Obj. 1: The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn +aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no +habits in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to +obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for +in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be +rational, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. + +Reply Obj. 2: The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the +command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals +act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits +ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain +dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas +by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things +in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can +admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine +says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): "We find the most untamed beasts, +deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest +pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we say that they +are tame and gentle." But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of +the will, for they have not that power of using or of refraining, +which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly +speaking, there can be no habits in them. + +Reply Obj. 3: The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be +moved by the rational appetite, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. +57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude +to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more +suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite +than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of +sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act +at the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of +sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man +has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the +Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom conduces much +to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are +moved to act at the command of the reason. + +On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing +and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to +their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just +as the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but +rather in the powers which command their movements. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 4] + +Whether There Is Any Habit in the Intellect? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. +For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above (A. 1). +But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in +_De Anima_ i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the intellect +is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the +intellect is not the subject of a habit. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the +mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, +is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has +potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same +time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only +in that which is composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is +form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the +same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be +in the intellect; but only in the _conjunction,_ which is composed of +soul and body. + +Obj. 3: Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill +disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. 25). +But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the +intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it +is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft +flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are not +in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the +act of some part of the body. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2, 3, 10) puts +science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first +principles, in the intellective part of the soul. + +_I answer that,_ concerning intellective habits there have been +various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one _possible_ +[*See First Part, Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2] intellect for all men, were +bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect +itself, but in the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest that +men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of +knowledge directly in that, which, being only one, would be common to +all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect +of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ from one +another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, +but would be in the interior sensitive powers, which differ in +various men. + +Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of +Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational, +not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now +the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, +science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. +Wherefore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect +itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8, 18) that +when the "possible" intellect "is thus identified with each thing," +that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the +intelligible species, "then it is said to be in act, as the knower is +said to be in act; and this happens when the intellect can act of +itself," i.e. by considering: "and even then it is in potentiality in +a sense; but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." +Therefore the "possible" intellect itself is the subject of the habit +of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually +considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this +supposition is contrary to the truth. For as to whom belongs the +operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. +But to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. +Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the +intellect itself. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his +_Commentary on the Predicaments,_ that, since every operation of man is +to a certain extent an operation of the _conjunctum,_ as the +Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the +soul only, but in the _conjunctum._ And from this it follows that no +habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the +argument, given above. But the argument is not cogent. For habit is not +a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of +the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to be in that power +which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to +the power as its object. + +Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and +body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in _De Anima_, +text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to +the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3, 39). Whence it follows +that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect +itself; and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul +and body. And therefore we must say that the "possible" intellect is +the subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this +belongs, above all, to the "possible" intellect. Wherefore the +"possible" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits. + +Reply Obj. 2: As potentiality to sensible being belongs to +corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the +"possible" intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the +"possible" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and +perfect act. + +Reply Obj. 3: Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare +their proper objects for the _possible intellect,_ therefore it is by +the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of +the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in +a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But +principally it is in the "possible" intellect. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 5] + +Whether Any Habit Is in the Will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For +the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by +means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does +not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of +habit. + +Obj. 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as +there is to the "possible" intellect, because the former is an active +power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves +all the powers to their acts, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore +there is no habit in the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by +reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the +will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which +reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will. + +_On the contrary,_ Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; +for it is "a habit whereby men will and do that which is just" +(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit. + +_I answer that,_ Every power which may be variously directed to act, +needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the +will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And +therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby +it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of +habit, it is clear that it is principally related to the will; +inasmuch as habit "is that which one uses when one wills," as stated +above (A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: Even as in the intellect there is a species which is +the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive +power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its +object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain +inclination, as we have said above (Q. 6, A. 4; Q. 22, A. 2). And +therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined +sufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power needs no +quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of +human life, that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, +to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has a +relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, +in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain +qualities to incline them, and these are called habits. + +Reply Obj. 2: The active intellect is active only, and in no way +passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and +moved (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between +them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that +which is somehow in potentiality. + +Reply Obj. 3: The will from the very nature of the power is inclined +to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many +ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some +fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more +promptly. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 6] + +Whether There Are Habits in the Angels? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. +For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: "It is +not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) +powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the +manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in +a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to them." But every +habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels. + +Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The holy +dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other +things, in God's goodness." But that which is of itself (_per se_) is +prior to and more powerful than that which is by another (_per +aliud_). Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves +unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And +this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same +passage adds: "For if this were the case, surely their essence would +not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible +deified of itself." + +Obj. 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But +disposition, as is said in the same book, is "the order of that which +has parts." Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems +that there are no dispositions and habits in them. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels +of the first hierarchy are called: "Fire-bearers and Thrones and +Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of +their habits." + +_I answer that,_ Some have thought that there are no habits in the +angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. +Whence Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: "Their +dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, +through the absence of matter in them." And Simplicius says the same +in his _Commentary on the Predicaments:_ "Wisdom which is in the soul +is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. +For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself." + +Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is +manifest from what we have said (Q. 49, A. 4) that only a being in +potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned +commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and +that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, +excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though +there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some +potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), +therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may +habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and +the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind. +Whence, Simplicius says in his _Commentary on the Predicaments_ that: +"The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits +here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images +which it contains in itself." + +However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with +regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in +the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all +intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all +sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it +needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is not as a pure +potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not +indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an +admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less +potentiality it has. And therefore, as we said in the First Part (Q. +55, A. 1), so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of +habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its +proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence +it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things +according to the mode of its substance, as stated in _De Causis:_ and +the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand. + +But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are +infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to +God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, +being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. +Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are +"godlike," that is to say, that by them they are made like to God. + +But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not +in angels, since they are immaterial. + +Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of material +habits and accidents. + +Reply Obj. 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, +they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of +themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, +therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, +so far do they need to have habits. + +Reply Obj. 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but +there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected +by several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to +several things. +________________________ + +QUESTION 51 + +OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION +(In Four Articles) + +We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their +formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their +diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether any habit is from nature? + +(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts? + +(3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act? + +(4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 51, Art. 1] + +Whether Any Habit Is from Nature? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use +of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. +But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator +says on _De Anima_ iii. Therefore habit is not from nature. + +Obj. 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. +But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the habits +of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one. + +Obj. 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are +necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above (Q. 49, A. +4). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature +would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is clearly +false. Therefore habits are not from nature. + +_On the contrary,_ In _Ethic._ vi, 6, among other habits, place is +given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from +nature: wherefore also first principles are said to be known +naturally. + +_I answer that,_ One thing can be natural to another in two ways. +First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing +is natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward +tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is +natural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to +health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in +respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: +first, because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it +is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For +instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely +from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, health +is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle. + +Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in +relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the +foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded +by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this +disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since +such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different +grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect +of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely +from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic +principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art. + +But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject +is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 2), may be natural +whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the +individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of +the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the +specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the +part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way +does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be +entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since +they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which +cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in the First Part +(Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 3). + +There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their +existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: +in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in +the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a +natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific +nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with +regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus +the understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For +it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, +having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at +once perceive that every whole is larger than its part: and in like +manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and +what is a part--this he cannot know except through the intelligible +species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, +the Philosopher at the end of the _Posterior Analytics_ shows that +knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses. + +But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is +natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the +disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to +understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for the operation +of the intellect. + +In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its +beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the +habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, +the principles of common law are called the "nurseries of virtue." +The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, +which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the +habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers. + +But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, +there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For +some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or +meekness or such like. + +Reply Obj. 1: This objection takes nature as divided against reason +and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man. + +Reply Obj. 2: Something may be added even naturally to the nature of +a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, +with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power +itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would have to be +the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by +which something is known, must needs be the actual likeness of the +thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew +all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. +Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' intellective +power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things +understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not +by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those +things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything +belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power. + +Reply Obj. 3: Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various +kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, as +we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some +habits are natural, therefore all are natural. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 51, Art. 2] + +Whether Any Habit Is Caused by Acts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit +is a quality, as we have said above (Q. 49, A. 1). Now every quality +is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since +then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather +gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by +its own acts. + +Obj. 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to +that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or +cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, +moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore +habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that +the same would be mover and moved, active and passive: which is +impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8. + +Obj. 3: Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But +habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is +clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. +Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1, 2) teaches that +habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts. + +_I answer that,_ In the agent there is sometimes only the active +principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active +principle of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused +by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become +accustomed or unaccustomed, as is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1. But a +certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and +the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the +acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according +as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and +further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about +conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident +proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their +agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but +with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover +moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is +disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be +multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive +and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of +moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they +are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in +the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions. + +Reply Obj. 1: The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But +in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives +something from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused. + +Reply Obj. 2: The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be +mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by +itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. +28, 29. + +Reply Obj. 3: The act which precedes the habit, in so far as +it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent +principle than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a +more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in +the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of +first principles is a more excellent principle than the science of +conclusions. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 51, Art. 3] + +Whether a Habit Can Be Caused by One Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For +demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of +one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can +be caused by one act. + +Obj. 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do +they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by +multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it +can be the generating cause of a habit. + +Obj. 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that +a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can +cause a habit. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does +one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a +short time make a man blessed and happy." But "happiness is an +operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue" (Ethic. i, 7, 10, +13). Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other +habits, is not caused by one act. + +_I answer that,_ As we have said already (A. 2), habit is caused by +act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in +order that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active +principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that +because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not +enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so +that by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. +Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot +entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the +appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the +reason judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard to +various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is +not thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to +the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs +to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused +by one act, but only by many. + +But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two +passive principles: one is the _possible_ (See First Part, Q. 79, A. +2, ad 2) intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle +(De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular +reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. +With regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for +a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the +power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition +convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the +conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a +habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even +on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science +can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the _possible_ +intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive +powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to +be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De +Memor. et Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily +habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is +of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine +restores health at once. + +Hence the solutions to the objections are clear. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 51, Art. 4] + +Whether Any Habits Are Infused in Man by God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. +For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, +He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue. + +Obj. 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode which +is suitable to their nature: for "it belongs to Divine providence to +preserve nature," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are +naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above (A. 2). +Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts. + +Obj. 3: Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by +that habit perform many acts. But "from those acts a like habit is +caused" (Ethic. ii, 1, 2). Consequently there will be two habits of +the same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. +Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species +cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into +man by God. + +_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): "God filled him with +the spirit of wisdom and understanding." Now wisdom and understanding +are habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God. + +_I answer that,_ Some habits are infused by God into man, for two +reasons. + +The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is +disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, +namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above +(Q. 5, A. 5). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to +which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those +habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human +nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine +infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues. + +The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second +causes, without these second causes, as we have said in the First +Part (Q. 105, A. 6). Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show +His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which +nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of +His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused +by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the +Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by +custom, but not so perfectly. + +Reply Obj. 1: God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but +in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives +certain things to some, which He does not give to others. + +Reply Obj. 2: That God works in all according to their mode, does not +hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from this +that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature. + +Reply Obj. 3: Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a +habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the +remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not +cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had +before. +________________________ + +QUESTION 52 + +OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS +(In Three Articles) + +We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head +there are three points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether habits increase? + +(2) Whether they increase by addition? + +(3) Whether each act increases the habit? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 52, Art. 1] + +Whether Habits Increase? + +Objection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase +concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the +genus [of] quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be +no increase of habits. + +Obj. 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But +since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it +cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase. + +Obj. 3: Further, those things which can be more or less are subject +to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more hot, +is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is +proved in _Phys._ vii, text. 15, 17. Therefore habits cannot increase. + +_On the contrary,_ Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore +the disciples said to our Lord (Luke 17:5): "Lord, increase our +faith." Therefore habits increase. + +_I answer that,_ Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, +is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual +things, on account of the natural connection of the intellect with +corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal +quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the +perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is +reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And +so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And +since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things which +are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be +better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8). + +Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in +respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation +of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections +of a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be +"little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. +But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of +the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or +"less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this +distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a +being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to +consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to +consider it in respect of its participation by a subject. + +In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers +concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius +relates in his _Commentary on the Predicaments._ For Plotinus and the +other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were +susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material +and so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity +of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of +themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things +affected by them (_qualia_) are said to be more or less, in respect +of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is +not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this +opinion in the _Predicaments_ (Categor. vi). The third opinion was +that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For +they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and +less, for instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. +The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and +immaterial forms are not susceptible of more or less, but that +material forms are. + +In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe +that [that], in respect of which a thing receives its species, must +be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for +whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and +whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, +more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, +text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition +or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or +anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, +or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, +considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can +be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like +qualities which are not denominated from a relation to something +else: and much more so, substance, which is _per se_ being. But those +things which receive their species from something to which they are +related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to +more or less: and nonetheless they remain in the same species, on +account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from +which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself +more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, +on account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We +may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to the +nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an +animal's nature, to which various dispositions may be suitable; which +disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal +the nature of health remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, +2, 3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the +same in all, nor is it always the same in one individual; but down to +a certain point it may decrease and still remain health." + +Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of +excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the +most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater +or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may +increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot. + +But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation +by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are +susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the +cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot +be susceptible of more or less, because it is _per se_ being. And +therefore every form which is participated substantially by its +subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the +genus of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because +quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, +therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as +more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that +when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, +but to be made. But other qualities which are further removed from +quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are +susceptible of more or less, in respect of their participation by the +subject. + +Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this +diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its +species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something +indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot +be participated more or less. First because the participator has its +species in respect of that form. And for this reason no substantial +form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says +(Metaph. viii, text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, +so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, +in respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far +as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material +dispositions, "more or less are found in substance." + +Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially +indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must +needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this +reason we do not speak of the species of number as varying in respect +of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an +indivisible unity. The same is to be said of the species of +continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as +two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as +double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and +tetragon. + +This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the _Predicaments_ +(Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of +more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a +triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, +because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore +whatever participates their nature must participate it in its +indivisibility. + +It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in +respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two +ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and +dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for +instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less +science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect +of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health +is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse +aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and +disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they +essentially imply indivisibility. + +We shall say further on (Q. 66, A. 1) how it is with the virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities +and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the +word "growth," the term of which is something great. + +Reply Obj. 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection +which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the +subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit +include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore +there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less. + +Reply Obj. 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the +third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the +first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there +follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like +manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive +appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration +follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20). +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 52, Art. 2] + +Whether Habit Increases by Addition? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of +addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to +forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there +is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it +is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already +existing." Therefore in habits also there is no increase without +addition. + +Obj. 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some +agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for +instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. +Therefore there is no increase without addition. + +Obj. 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be +white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more +white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the +addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not +made more white, except by an added whiteness. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That +which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something +hot, that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in +like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they +increase. + +_I answer that,_ The solution of this question depends on what we +have said above (A. 1). For we said that increase and decrease in +forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one +way not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through +the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such +increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of +form to form; but by the subject participating more or less +perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is +in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to +participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is +proved in _Metaph._ vii, text. 32, so, by an intense action of the +agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form +more perfectly, not as though something were added to the form. + +For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of +addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in the +subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been +stated (A. 1) that such an addition or subtraction would change the +species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from +being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be +understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either +because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not +previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, after being +cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because +some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot +thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in +either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot +thing, but a greater white or hot thing. + +Since, however, as stated above (A. 1), certain accidents are of +themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find +increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to +the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species +remains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement +increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. in +so far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or +readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; +thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same +specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science +increases, as to the subject's participation thereof, in intensity, +in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in +considering the same conclusions. + +As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive +increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply +healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it +be brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change +in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save +in intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them. + +How this question affects virtues we shall state further on (Q. 66, +A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by +addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living +things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; +such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in +_Phys._ iv, text. 63. + +Reply Obj. 2: The cause that increases a habit, always effects +something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the +subject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes +the form to extend further. + +Reply Obj. 3: What is not already white, is potentially white, as not +yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new +form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in +potentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but +it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it +receives through the agent's action. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 52, Art. 3] + +Whether Every Act Increases Its Habit? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every act increases its habit. For +when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are +causes of habits, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 2). Therefore a habit +increases when its acts are multiplied. + +Obj. 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But +all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike (Ethic. +ii, 1, 2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should +increase it. + +Obj. 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the +habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit. + +_On the contrary,_ Opposite effects do not result from the same +cause. But according to _Ethic._ ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit +whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. +Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit. + +_I answer that,_ "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1, 2). Now +things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities +being the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a +different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is +unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there +is movement from less white to more white, even as from one opposite +to another, as stated in _Phys._ v, text. 52. + +But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (Q. +50, A. 5); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act +contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an +act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. +Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to +the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either +increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may +speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an +animal. For not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's +size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but +the multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the +body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the +act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not +dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening +thereof. + +From this it is clear how to solve the objections. +________________________ + +QUESTION 53 + +HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED +(In Three Articles) + +We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this +head there are three points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted? + +(2) Whether it can be diminished? + +(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 53, Art. 1] + +Whether a Habit Can Be Corrupted? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For +habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is +pleasant to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is +not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as +its subject remains. + +Obj. 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to +corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases +through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. +Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of +its subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a +substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like +manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary: +since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. +vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost. + +Obj. 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the +habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a +direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved +directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of +the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the +intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect +independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for +which reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old +age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the +same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they +also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares +(Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than learning." + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) +that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." +Moreover, by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, +virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2). + +_I answer that,_ A form is said to be corrupted directly by its +contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When +therefore a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a +contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with +bodily habits--for instance, health and sickness. But those habits +that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. +There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an +incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a +corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly +indeed in the "possible" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive +powers of apprehension, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 3, ad 3). +Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on +the part of the "possible" intellect, but only on the part of the +lower sensitive powers. + +We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be +corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, +either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be +corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted +directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in +the "possible" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active +intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. +Wherefore if in the "possible" intellect there be a habit caused +immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible +both directly and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first +principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted +by any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher +says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that "it cannot be lost by being +forgotten." There is, however, in the "possible" intellect a habit +caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is +called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in +two ways. First, on the part of those very propositions which are the +starting point of the reason: for the assertion "Good is not good" is +contrary to the assertion "Good is good" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, +on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical +syllogism is contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. +Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a +true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated +above, says that "deception is the corruption of science." As to +virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as +stated in _Ethic._ vi, 1: and to these applies what we have said of +science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in +the appetitive part of the soul; and the same may be said of the +contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused +therein because it is natural to it to be moved by the reason. +Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a +judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or +virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Ethic._ vii, 10, a habit is like a second +nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the +nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a +habit is removed, though with difficulty. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, +yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of +reason, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if +we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an +obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its +act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal +transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can +corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the +habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. +Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than +learning," this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or +cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through +the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 53, Art. 2] + +Whether a Habit Can Diminish? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a +habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed +either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost +it cannot diminish. + +Obj. 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by +reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not +become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow +that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. +And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its +subject, it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, +proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now +whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that +form can be separate, as stated in _De Anima_ i, text. 13. Hence it +follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible. + +Obj. 3: Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any +accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is +defined with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not +become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its +inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less +intense. + +_On the contrary,_ It is natural for contraries to be applicable to +the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since +therefore a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish. + +_I answer that,_ Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, +as we have already explained (Q. 52, A. 1). And since they increase +through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they +diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them: since the +diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, +even as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a +foundation of its increase. + +Reply Obj. 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is +not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the +different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due +to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through +its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to +a greater or a smaller number of things. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a +habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that a +certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the +habit, but in its subject. + +Reply Obj. 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very notion +implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we +take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, +which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject: +for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in +defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as +though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but +we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we +say that _simitas_ is "a curvature of the nose." But if we take +accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and +terminates in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and +terminates at the accident: for "a white thing" is "something that +has whiteness." Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we +place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a +definition; for we say that a _simum_ is a "snub-nose." Accordingly +whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is +not of the very essence of the accident, is ascribed to that +accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase +and decrease in certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white +is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies +to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other +qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish by a kind of +addition, as we have already clearly explained (Q. 52, A. 2). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 53, Art. 3] + +Whether a Habit Is Corrupted or Diminished Through Mere Cessation +from Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or +diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more +lasting than passion-like qualities, as we have explained above (Q. +49, A. 2, ad 3; Q. 50, A. 1). But passion-like qualities are neither +corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not +lessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to +make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or +corrupted through cessation from act. + +Obj. 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing +is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation from act +does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be +diminished or corrupted through cessation from act. + +Obj. 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the +intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are +above time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. +Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through +length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) +that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption +of science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of +intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other +habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from +act. + +_I answer that,_ As stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 27, a thing is a +cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing +causes movement by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. +Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. +It is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a +habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we +cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed +or weakened that habit. For it has been stated (A. 1) that habits are +destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. +Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary +agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those +habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation +from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of +virtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man +ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails +to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own +passions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and +deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the +inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. +Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from act. +The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready +to judge aright of those things that are pictured by his imagination. +Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange +fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; +so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by +frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to +judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, +and thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly +destroyed by cessation from act. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give +heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat +were to increase. + +Reply Obj. 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of +corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles thereto, as +explained above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The intellectual part of the soul, considered in +itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and +therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of +the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence +the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget. +________________________ + +QUESTION 54 + +OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS +(In Four Articles) + +We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this +head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether many habits can be in one power? + +(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects? + +(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad? + +(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 54, Art. 1] + +Whether Many Habits Can Be in One Power? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one +power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the +same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now +habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing, +viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like +manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power. + +Obj. 2: Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject +there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the cause +of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can +proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits +in one power. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a +power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the +same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be +informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several habits +cannot be at the same time in one power. + +_On the contrary,_ The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, +are the habits of various sciences. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 49, A. 4), habits are +dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either +to nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature. As to those +habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can +be in one same subject: since in one subject we may take parts in +various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts +there are various habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts +of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human +nature, we have the habit or disposition of health: while, if we take +like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of +these in respect of nature is strength or weakness; whereas, if we +take the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of +these in proportion to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several +habits or dispositions in the same subject. + +If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to +operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may +be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the +subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 2): +for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, +as was clearly shown above (Q. 51, A. 2). Now a passive power is +compared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to form: +because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, +too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object +to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can +move one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of +several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are +qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to +acts of a determinate species. Consequently several habits, even as +several specifically different acts, can belong to one power. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even as in natural things, diversity of species is +according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, +as stated in _Metaph._ v, text. 33 (since things that differ in +matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of +objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher +says in _Ethic._ vi, 1, that "those objects that differ generically +belong to different departments of the soul"); while specific +difference of objects entails a specific difference of acts, and +consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ +in species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of +different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that +different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one +power. And even as several genera may be included in one genus, and +several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that +there are several species of habits and powers. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is +multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically +different acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many +superficially different habits from being in one power. + +Reply Obj. 3: A body is informed by its shape as by its own +terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a +power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate +term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same +time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; +just as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one +shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure. +For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time +_actually;_ and yet it can know several things at the same time +_habitually._ +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 54, Art. 2] + +Whether Habits Are Distinguished by Their Objects? + +Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their +objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of +science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the +unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects +specifically distinct. + +Obj. 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the +same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the +physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated +in _Phys._ ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by +their objects. + +Obj. 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the +same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if +it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it +be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in +order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same +object can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of +habits does not follow diversity of objects. + +_On the contrary,_ Acts differ in species according to the diversity +of their objects, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5). But habits are +dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished +according to the diversity of objects. + +_I answer that,_ A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the +specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in +which forms differ specifically; or according to that mode of +distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are +distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their +active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. +Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply +order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of +the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition +implying a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation +consequent to nature. + +Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three +things. First, in respect of the active principles of such +dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of +specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows. + +Reply Obj. 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must +consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, +which may differ in species or even in genus. And though the +distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet +they are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the +other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of +cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit. + +Reply Obj. 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one +means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means +of mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the +sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the +movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the +whole force of a demonstration, which is "a syllogism producing +science," as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And +consequently various means are as so many active principles, in +respect of which the habits of science are distinguished. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. +vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in +speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a +diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. +Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above +all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said +(Q. 18, A. 6; Q. 19, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 34, A. 4). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 54, Art. 3] + +Whether Habits Are Divided into Good and Bad? + +Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and +bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards +contraries, as was stated above (A. 2, Obj. 1). Therefore habits are +not divided into good and bad. + +Obj. 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is +common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the +Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a +privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore +habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same +object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of +concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; +for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the +Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not +divided into good and bad. + +_On the contrary,_ A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue +to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad +habits. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), habits are specifically +distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, +but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. +First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. +In this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: +since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the +agent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act +unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human +nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are +discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it +is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference +of good and bad. + +Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the +fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower +nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher +nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting +human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which +disposes to an act befitting some higher nature. + +Reply Obj. 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far as +contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen +that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits +follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided into +good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; +but not by reason of one habit being [about] something good, and +another about something bad. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not the good which is common to every being, that +is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some +determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. +the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a +difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something +determinate repugnant to a determinate nature. + +Reply Obj. 3: Several good habits about one same specific thing are +distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as +stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are +distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in +keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are +contrary to one virtue. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 54, Art. 4] + +Whether One Habit Is Made Up of Many Habits? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. +For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems +to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at +once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated above +(Q. 51, A. 3). Therefore one habit is made up of several. + +Obj. 2: Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are +assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude, +temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many. + +Obj. 3: Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a +habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one +science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one +habit is made up of many. + +_On the contrary,_ A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. +But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not +made up of many. + +_I answer that,_ A habit directed to operation, such as we are +chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now +every perfection should be in proportion with that which it perfects. +Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in +so far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective +aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they are +related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or +to one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above (AA. +2, 3). + +If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall +find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this multiplicity is +directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it +is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed to several habits, +even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to +many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity. + +Reply Obj. 1: That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, +not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that +the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly +changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins by being +imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same +applies to other qualities. + +Reply Obj. 2: The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, +are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective +or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q. 57, A. 6, ad +4; II-II, Q. 48). + +Reply Obj. 3: In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, +scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet +imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific +knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in +him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, +forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and +demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from +another. +________________________ + +TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ. 55-89): +GOOD HABITS, i.e., VIRTUES (QQ. 55-70) +________________________ + +QUESTION 55 + +OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE +(In Four Articles) + +We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since +habits, as we have said (Q. 54, A. 3), are divided into good and bad, +we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, +and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts, +Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of +vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues: +(1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of +virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue. + +Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether human virtue is a habit? + +(2) Whether it is an operative habit? + +(3) Whether it is a good habit? + +(4) Of the definition of virtue. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 55, Art. 1] + +Whether Human Virtue Is a Habit? + +Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For +virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit +of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the +limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue +is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. +De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." But use +of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. + +Obj. 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: +otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do +merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts. + +Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is +the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering +which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, +and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, denominates +either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but +an action or a relation. + +Obj. 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there +natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. +Neither therefore are human virtues habits. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science +and virtue are habits. + +_I answer that,_ Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now +a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But +the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, +according as it is determinate to its act. + +Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to +their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore +these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the +rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one +particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they +are determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we +have said above (Q. 49, A. 4). Therefore human virtues are habits. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which +the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: +for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to +the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When +therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken +for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can +reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a +hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say +'strength,' which is the original signification of the Latin +'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to +indicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. +But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of +power. + +Reply Obj. 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the +same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to +which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue +is nothing else than the good use of free-will. + +Reply Obj. 3: We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, +as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus +we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by +the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive +power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits. + +Reply Obj. 4: When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of +love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us +love is set in order by virtue. + +Reply Obj. 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one +act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we +have said. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 55, Art. 2] + +Whether Human Virtue Is an Operative Habit? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue +to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health +and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But +health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is +virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in +reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from +the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, +while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some definite time. +Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in +rational beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to +act, but also to being. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that +virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best." +Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God +Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3, 6, 14) to Whom the +soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that +virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as +it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, +therefore, an operative habit. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue +of a thing is that which makes its work good." + +_I answer that,_ Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies +some perfection of power, as we have said above (A. 1). Wherefore, +since power [*The one Latin word _potentia_ is rendered +'potentiality' in the first case, and 'power' in the second] is of +two kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in +reference to act; the perfection of each of these is called virtue. +But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is +potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of +the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts in +so far as it is in act. + +Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, +the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other +animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to +the soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the +soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And +therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong +to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. +Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather +to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an +operative habit. + +Reply Obj. 1: Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: +for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue +is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs +pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding +disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue +itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, +the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to +that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable +disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are +suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue +from being a principle of operation. + +Reply Obj. 2: Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; +but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are +proper to man. + +Reply Obj. 3: As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of +man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have +said above (Q. 3, A. 2), happiness or bliss by which man is made most +perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, +consists in an operation. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 55, Art. 3] + +Whether Human Virtue Is a Good Habit? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it +should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But +there is a virtue even of sin; according to 1 Cor. 15:56: "The virtue +[Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not +always a good habit. + +Obj. 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only +referred to good, but also to evil: according to Isa. 5: "Woe to you +that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness." +Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue +[Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an +evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can +doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher +says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, +and his work good likewise." + +_I answer that,_ As we have said above (A. 1), virtue implies a +perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the +limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must +needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says +(Div. Hom. ii) that every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the +virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore +human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive +of good works. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be +perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief +or robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains +(Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to +evil things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far +as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as to attain to +the limit of its possibility. + +Reply Obj. 2: The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists +in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, +together with this falling away from reason, some lower power is +perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in +direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But +the perfection of that power, since it is compatible with a falling +away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, +according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the +weakness of the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human +virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect +in infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the +lower powers. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 55, Art. 4] + +Whether Virtue Is Suitably Defined? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the definition, usually given, of +virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the +mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, +which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, +since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not +seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore +unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality." + +Obj. 2: Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since +it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than +quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should +not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality. + +Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come +across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, +it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even +of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10). +Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind." + +Obj. 4: Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the +righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is +therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, +when we say that virtue is that "by which we live righteously." + +Obj. 5: Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. +But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that +"pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is +untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of virtue." + +Obj. 6: Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting +on John 15:11: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract. +xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11]: "He who created thee +without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore +unsuitable to say that "God works virtue in us, without us." + +_On the contrary,_ We have the authority of Augustine from whose +words this definition is gathered, and principally in _De Libero +Arbitrio_ ii, 19. + +_I answer that,_ This definition comprises perfectly the whole +essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of +anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition +comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, +as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it +is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, +and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable +if for "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus. + +Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has +any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, +and matter "in which" it exists, namely, the subject. The matter +about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be +included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue +to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue +in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is +mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind." + +The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But +it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to +evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, +sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true +and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred +to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are +always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live +righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are +sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of +which no one makes bad use." + +Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this +definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God +works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the +definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or +infused. + +Reply Obj. 1: That which is first seized by the intellect is being: +wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and +consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being. +Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and +that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. +But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and +health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the +notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as +accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they +themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are +they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, +but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue +called good, because by it something is good. + +Reply Obj. 2: Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not +good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends +further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to +which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to +be in accord with reason." + +Reply Obj. 3: Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, +except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). +And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 4: Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts +those outward things right which come into human use, and are the +proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q. 60, A. 2; +II-II, Q. 58, A. 8). But the righteousness which denotes order to a +due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, +as stated above (Q. 19, A. 4), is common to all virtues. + +Reply Obj. 5: One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for +instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, +or by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as +principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil. + +Reply Obj. 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any +action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of +the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things +which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action +on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. +________________________ + +QUESTION 56 + +OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE +(In Six Articles) + +We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are +six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? + +(2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers? + +(3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue? + +(4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the +subject of virtue? + +(5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of +virtue? + +(6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 1] + +Whether the Subject of Virtue Is a Power of the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power +of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue is +that by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the +soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a +power, but in the essence of the soul. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue is +that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." But +as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the +essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, +any more than to the essence of the soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, power is in the second species of quality. But +virtue is a quality, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 4): and quality +is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not +the subject of virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But +the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in +a power of the soul. + +_I answer that,_ It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs +to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of +virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in +that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an +operative habit, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 2): for all +operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the +fact that virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the +end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an +operation proceeding from the thing's power. Therefore a power of the +soul is the subject of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is +taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it +belongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of +existence in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for +the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live +righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions. + +Reply Obj. 2: Good is either the end, or something referred to the +end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the +work, this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred +to the work, and consequently, to the power. + +Reply Obj. 3: One accident is said to be the subject of another, not +as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident +inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by +means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of +color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of +virtue. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 2] + +Whether One Virtue Can Be in Several Powers? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. +For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various +way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as +directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive power as +executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three +things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to +work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to +will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right +reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in the +will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, +12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers. + +_On the contrary,_ The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But +the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue +cannot be in several powers of the soul. + +_I answer that,_ It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected +in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way +it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity +of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while +diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so +wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits; +but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two +or more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus +one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in one +chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way +of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved by another, and one +power receives from another. + +Reply Obj. 1: One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in +the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in +various degrees. + +Reply Obj. 2: "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, +inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral +virtue is essentially in the appetite. + +Reply Obj. 3: Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it +presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall +see further on (A. 3; Q. 57, A. 4). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 3] + +Whether the Intellect Can Be the Subject of Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of +virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is +love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the +appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what +has been said above (Q. 55, A. 3). Now good is not the object of the +intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of +virtue is not the intellect, but the appetitive power. + +Obj. 3: Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good," as +the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects the +intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said +to be a good man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the +intellect is not the subject of virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the +subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above +given, of virtue (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore the intellect is the +subject of virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 55, A. 3), a virtue is a +habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good +act in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an +aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has +the aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man +always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism +or make a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and +arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also +the right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives +man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly. + +And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing +simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is +actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is +said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, because he is +just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. +And since virtue is that "which makes its possessor good, and his +work good likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: +because they make the work to be actually good, and the subject good +simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: +because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain +aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. For through +being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, +but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian or a good smith. And +for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; +while at other times they are called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2). + +Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative +sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect, +but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus +the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that science, wisdom and +understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the +subject of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the +will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the +reason of this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other +powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q. 9, A. +1; Q. 17, AA. 1, 5; I, Q. 82, A. 4): and therefore if man do well +actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue +which makes a man to do well actually, and not merely to have the +aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some +power as moved by the will. + +Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are +the other powers: for a man considers something actually, because he +wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is +subordinate to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so +called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is +the subject of Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command of +the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless +he will" [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical +intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right +reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be +rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason of things +to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly +disposed by the rectitude of the will, just as to the principles of +speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the +active intellect. And therefore as the subject of science, which is +the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect +in its relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence +is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will. + +Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue +simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it +depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, +whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above (Q. 25, +AA. 1, 2, 3; Q. 27, A. 4; I, Q. 20, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as +truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act +of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in +regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical, +is a virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers virtue simply so called. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 4] + +Whether the Irascible and Concupiscible Powers Are the Subject of +Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible +powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common +to us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper +to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. It is +therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and +concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as we +have said in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). + +Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of +a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's body: +for the Apostle says (Rom. 7): "I know that good does not dwell in my +flesh." Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of +virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is +not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is +ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a +man make good use of his body: "For instance, if my coachman, through +obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; +this is all due to me." But just as the soul rules the body, so also +does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the +irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due +to the rational powers. Now "virtue is that by which we live +rightly," as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore virtue is +not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the +rational powers. + +Obj. 4: Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice" +(Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and +concupiscible powers, but of the rational power, as we have said +above (Q. 13, A. 2). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible +and concupiscible powers, but in the reason. + +_On the contrary,_ Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and +temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. +iii, 10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of +the soul." + +_I answer that,_ The irascible and concupiscible powers can be +considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are +parts of the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not +competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be +considered as participating in the reason, from the fact that they +have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or +concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so +far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human +act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues. + +For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and +concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from one power +according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless +both powers be well disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a +craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his +instrument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter of the +operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as +they are moved by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting +in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the +irascible and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of +the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity +with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the +irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain +habitual conformity of these powers to reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in +themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and +dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, +and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this +way they can be the subject of human virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of +virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as +being moved by reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so +also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, +have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the _fomes:_ +whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, the good of +reason is begotten in them. + +Reply Obj. 3: The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and +concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the +body obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those +things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: +whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the +body with a despotic command" as the master rules his slave: +wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. +For this reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the +irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; on +the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at +times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, +3) that the "reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a +political command" such as that by which free men are ruled, who have +in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must +there be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by +which these powers are well disposed to act. + +Reply Obj. 4: In choice there are two things, namely, the intention +of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the +preferential choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs +to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2, 5). But that the irascible and +concupiscible powers have a right intention of the end in regard to +the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these +powers. And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with +the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but +prudence is in the reason. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 5] + +Whether the Sensitive Powers of Apprehension Are the Subject of +Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in +the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive +appetite can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. +But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: for +the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. I, Q. +78, A. 4] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers +there can be virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be +hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so also can +the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned +above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of +appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of +apprehension. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. +Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the power +of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other +interior sensitive powers of apprehension. + +_On the contrary,_ All virtues are either intellectual or moral +(Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while +the intellectual virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear +from _Ethic._ vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior +sensitive powers of apprehension. + +_I answer that,_ In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension +there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what +the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing +after another, we become used to it; and use is a second nature." Now +a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is +like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue in his _Rhetoric_ +that "it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet, +in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other +sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so called, +but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as +we have said above (Q. 50, A. 4, ad 3). + +Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be +virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens +that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that +power which consummates the good act. But the knowledge of truth is +not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such +powers prepare the way to the intellective knowledge. And therefore +in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know +truth: these are rather in the intellect or reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is +the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the +act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: +and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. +Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the +intellect rather through moving it; for the reason that the phantasms +are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight (De Anima +iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in +the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive virtues are in +the intellect itself, or the reason. + +And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a +genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of +the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a +fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 6] + +Whether the Will Can Be the Subject of Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of +virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a +power by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the +reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the +Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, +according to reason. And to this good every virtue is ordered, since +everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as +Tully says in his Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in +accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. +i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect +and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in +the irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by +participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are +voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of +some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in +respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue +in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same +act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be the +subject of virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Greater perfection is required in the mover than +in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible +powers. Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than +in the irascible and concupiscible powers. + +_I answer that,_ Since the habit perfects the power in reference to +act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, +which habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not +suffice for the purpose. + +Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its +object. Since, therefore, as we have said above (Q. 19, A. 3), the +object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, +in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it. But +if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, +whether as regards the whole human species, such as Divine good, +which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the +individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will +need virtue. And therefore such virtues as those which direct man's +affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as +charity, justice, and such like. + +Reply Obj. 1: This objection is true of those virtues which are +ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, +which are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is +clear from what we have said (Q. 35, A. 6). + +Reply Obj. 2: Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are +rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e. +in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the +appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must +be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on +(Q. 62, A. 3). + +Reply Obj. 3: Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated +passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these +cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the +power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need exists +only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good. +________________________ + +QUESTION 57 + +OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES +(In Six Articles) + +We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the +intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological +virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues? + +(2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding? + +(3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue? + +(4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art? + +(5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man? + +(6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to +prudence? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 1] + +Whether the Habits of the Speculative Intellect Are Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the habits of the speculative +intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we +have said above (Q. 55, A. 2). But speculative habits are not +operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. +operative matter. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect +are not virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made +happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic. i, +9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human +goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining +to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called +virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and +virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not +subalternate, as the Philosopher proves in _Topic._ iv. Therefore +speculative habits are not virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ The speculative habits alone consider necessary +things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher +(Ethic. vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of +the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise +than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are +virtues. + +_I answer that,_ Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as +stated above (Q. 55, A. 3), a habit, as we have already observed (Q. +56, A. 3), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it +confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it +confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated +(Q. 55, A. 3), belongs to those habits alone which affect the +appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power +that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses. + +Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect +the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the +intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as +they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth +(since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not +called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right +use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative +science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, +but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which +he has scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which +he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue which +perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of +these speculative habits. And in this way too there can be merit in +the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus +Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the "contemplative life has greater +merit than the active life." + +Reply Obj. 1: Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. +Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with +the speculative faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which +the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the +interior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in +this way it is an operative habit. + +Reply Obj. 2: Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the +first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative +virtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except +perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient +cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme +object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its +acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those +things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these +virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they are a +kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the +contemplation of truth, as we have already stated (Q. 3, A. 7). + +Reply Obj. 3: Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second +sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 2] + +Whether There Are Only Three Habits of the Speculative Intellect, Viz. +Wisdom, Science and Understanding? + +Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of +the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. +Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7. +Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the +intellectual virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in +respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of +these objects, as we have already explained (I, Q. 77, A. 3). +Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material +objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now the +principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the +conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of principles should +not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of +conclusions. + +Obj. 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the +essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason employs +the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs +the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the +result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual +virtue, so also should opinion be. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three +alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and +understanding. + +_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 1), the virtues of the +speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative +intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work. +Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration--as known in +itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as +a _principle,_ and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore +the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such +truth is called _understanding,_ which is the habit of principles. + +On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is +understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the +reason's inquiry, and is as a _term._ This may happen in two ways: +first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so +that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since +"things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable +first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that +which is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is +knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is +_wisdom,_ which considers the highest causes, as stated in _Metaph._ +i, 1, 2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in +order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is +not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in +this or that genus of knowable matter, it is _science_ which perfects +the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable +matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas +there is but one wisdom. + +Reply Obj. 1: Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that +which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions +from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above +the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to +their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore +it is a more perfect virtue than science. + +Reply Obj. 2: When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a +power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or +power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: +thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, and +light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is +seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles +of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion +being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with +the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them. +Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs +to science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider +the principles in themselves belongs to understanding. + +Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues +are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a +certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, +wherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the +rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the +sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on +understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these +depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing +beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the +conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4), a virtuous habit has +a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the +good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore +those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell +the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can +be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, +3, they are not intellectual virtues. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 3] + +Whether the Intellectual Habit, Art, Is a Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. +For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19) that "no one makes bad +use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can +work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is +not a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a +virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). +Therefore art is not a virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just +as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are +speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would +have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3, 4) says that art is +a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative +virtues, which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of +the soul. + +_I answer that,_ Art is nothing else but "the right reason about +certain works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, +not on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, +but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is +commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the +quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an +operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the +speculative habits: since the quality of the object considered by the +latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human +appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the +geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his +appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: +even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. +And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the +speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor speculative +habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the +property of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards +the aptness to work well. + +Reply Obj. 1: When anyone endowed with an art produces bad +workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary +to the art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his +words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. +Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated +above (A. 2, ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that +it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect +virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for +which purpose something further is requisite: although there cannot +be a good use without the art. + +Reply Obj. 2: In order that man may make good use of the art he has, +he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for +this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; +namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a +moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by +justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even in speculative matters there is something by way +of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or +the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained +to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of +comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to +distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by +the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body +is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, +is free (_liber_). On the other hand, those sciences which are not +ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not +arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that +the notion of art is more applicable to them. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 4] + +Whether Prudence Is a Distinct Virtue from Art? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue +from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But +diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since +there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore +prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too +should be reckoned a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, prudence has more in common with art than the +speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters +that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4, 5). Now some +speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should +prudence be called an art. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" +(Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as +stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of +seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from +art. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art +(Ethic. vi, 5). + +_I answer that,_ Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a +different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above (A. 1; Q. 56, +A. 3) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely +conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits are virtues, +not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through +conferring the use. But art confers the mere aptness for good work; +since it does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not +only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the +appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof. + +The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of +things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason of things +to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in _Metaph._ +ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing into outward +matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is +an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to see," "to will," and the +like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like +human actions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art +does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the +things with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of +reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which +reason argues; just as we have said above (A. 2, ad 2) that science +depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the habit of +principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in +speculative matters, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 8. Consequently, it +is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be +done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this +depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence +there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. On the +other hand the good of things made by art is not the good of man's +appetite, but the good of those things themselves: wherefore art does +not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that +more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than +to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to +sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is +essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is evident that +prudence is a virtue distinct from art. + +Reply Obj. 1: The various kinds of things made by art are all +external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. +But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is +a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative +habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are both +in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be +otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art +has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what +has been said. + +Reply Obj. 3: Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding +man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there +is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. +Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of +warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, +but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good +counsel about all the concerns of life. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 5] + +Whether Prudence Is a Virtue Necessary to Man? + +Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to +lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it +is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in +respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right +reason about these things, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 5. Now art is +not necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be +made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is +prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has +become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become +virtuous. + +Obj. 2: Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as +stated in _Ethic._ vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, but +also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need +prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he +follow the counsels of prudent men. + +Obj. 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always +tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem to be +the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking +counsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about +things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis. +9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels +uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned +an intellectual virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for +human life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: "She +teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which +are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." + +_I answer that,_ Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. +For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good +deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; +to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse +or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the +end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end, +and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably +directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the +appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to +that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be +rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and +choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the +reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, +to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things +ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently +prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life. + +Reply Obj. 1: The good of an art is to be found, not in the +craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason +about things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into +external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the +thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art +is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good +of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its +perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as +stated above (A. 4). Consequently art does not require of the +craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. +Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. +that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it +were proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, +because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the +craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may +produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas +prudence is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not +merely that he may be a good man. + +Reply Obj. 2: When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, +but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as +regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. +Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet +this is required in order that he may lead a good life. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2, truth is not the same for +the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of +the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect +and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in +conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary +matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an +intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. On +the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on +conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in +necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only +in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be +matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence +it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is +assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to +be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 6] + +Whether "Eubulia," "Synesis," and "Gnome" Are Virtues Annexed to +Prudence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that "_eubulia, synesis_, and _gnome_" are +unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For _eubulia_ is +"a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it +"belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic. vi, 9). +Therefore _eubulia_ is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather +is prudence itself. + +Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The +highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is +judgment. Now _synesis_ enables us to judge well. Therefore _synesis_ +is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment +on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. +But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. +Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no +need, besides _synesis,_ of the virtue of _gnome_. + +Obj. 4: Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other +parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of the +present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super +Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," and the +like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues +annexed to prudence. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. +vi, 9, 10, 11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to +prudence. + +_I answer that,_ Wherever several powers are subordinate to one +another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest +act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done +by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the +third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the +speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is +a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical +intellect, in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason +does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is +evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, +to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue +which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest +place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. _eustochia_, +which perfects counsel; and _synesis_ and _gnome_, which are parts of +prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall +speak further on (ad 3). + +Reply Obj. 1: Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its +immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it +perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. +_euboulia_. + +Reply Obj. 2: Judgment about what is to be done is directed to +something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a +man's judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter +does not attain to its final complement until the reason has +commanded aright in the point of what has to be done. + +Reply Obj. 3: Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's +proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper +principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should +need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence +only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there +are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on +common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative +matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all +matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, +differ according to their different objects. _Synesis_ and _gnome_ +differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: +for _synesis_ judges of actions according to the common law; while +_gnome_ bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where +the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II, +Q. 51, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 4: Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution +and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: +but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are +all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective +parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, +and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential +parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary +virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later +(II-II, Q. 48, seqq.). +________________________ + +QUESTION 58 + +OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the +difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their +distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; +(3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and +the others. + +Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue? + +(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue? + +(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual +virtue? + +(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue? + +(5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without +moral virtue? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 1] + +Whether Every Virtue Is a Moral Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. +Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin _mos,_ i.e. custom. +Now, we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. +Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral +virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue +is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done +from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the +rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on (Q. 64, +AA. 1, 2, 3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a +habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since every +human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with +reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees with his +reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue +is a moral virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher [says] (Ethic. i, 13): "When we +speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or +intelligent, but that he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, +wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are +virtues, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2). Therefore not every virtue +is a moral virtue. + +_I answer that,_ In order to answer this question clearly, we must +consider the meaning of the Latin word _mos;_ for thus we shall be +able to discover what a _moral_ virtue is. Now _mos_ has a twofold +meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts +15:1): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (_morem_) of +Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or +quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which +sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2) +that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, +i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": and the +word is used in the same sense in Ps. 67:7, where we read: "Who +maketh men of one manner (_moris_) to dwell in a house." For both +these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek +there is a distinct word for each, for the word _ethos_is written +sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short _e._ + +Now _moral_ virtue is so called from _mos_ in the sense of a natural +or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the +other meaning of _mos,_ i.e. _custom,_ is akin to this: because +custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar +to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action +belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to +move all the powers to their acts, as explained above (Q. 9, A. 1). +Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are +in the appetitive faculty. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes _mos_ in the sense of _custom._ + +Reply Obj. 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no +virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive +part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act +of the appetitive faculty (Q. 13, A. 1). Wherefore a habit of +choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is +that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although the +acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice. + +Reply Obj. 3: "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text. +3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the +appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by +consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the +appetitive faculty. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 2] + +Whether Moral Virtue Differs from Intellectual Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from +intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that +virtue is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual +virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ. + +Obj. 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of +virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit +regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and +holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his +duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral +virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the +rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the +intellectual virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore moral +virtue does not differ from intellectual. + +Obj. 4: Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included +in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the +definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) +that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by +reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that +fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as +stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ +from intellectual. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ i, 13 that "there are two +kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral." + +_I answer that,_ Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and +whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey +reason somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly +and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the +body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason +commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the +Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a +despot," i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. +Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are +subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act +well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since +virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, +it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be +none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who +said "every virtue is a kind of prudence," as stated in _Ethic._ vi, +13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of +knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so +through ignorance. + +Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive +faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of +opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason +commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power," whereby a man +rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of +opposition. Hence Augustine says on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that "sometimes +we understand (what is right) while desire is slow, or follows not at +all," in so far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty +cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And +in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so +long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: +provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of +reason in this individual act of choice. + +Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only +that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual +virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a +habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, +even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the +appetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of +reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as +they are in conformity with reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of +right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right +reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about +things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue is the art +of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other +virtues, by participation, for as much as they are directed by +prudence. + +Reply Obj. 2: All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based +on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we +have said about art (ad 1). + +The same applies to the Third Objection. + +Reply Obj. 4: Right reason which is in accord with prudence is +included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its +essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all +the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of +prudence. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 3] + +Whether Virtue Is Adequately Divided into Moral and Intellectual? + +Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into +moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral +and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual +virtues (Ethic. vi, 3, 5); and again is placed by all among the four +cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further +on (Q. 61, A. 1). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into +intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them. + +Obj. 2: Further, continency, perseverance, and patience are not +reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral +virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are +consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not +adequately divided into intellectual and moral. + +Obj. 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are +not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. +science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above +(Q. 57, AA. 2, 3, 5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are +not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. +Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and +moral. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue +is twofold, intellectual and moral." + +_I answer that,_ Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of +his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of +human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for +these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in _De +Anima_ iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a +perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects +man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may +be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects +his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that +every human virtue is either intellectual or moral. + +Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But +considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with +the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as +stated above (Q. 57, A. 4). It is in this sense that it is reckoned +with the moral virtues. + +Reply Obj. 2: Continency and perseverance are not perfections of the +sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound +in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if +his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it +conformable to reason. Continency and perseverance are, however, +perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest +reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since +intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in +respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so +that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the +ends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the +continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding +from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by +the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be +the principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce an +imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence +if the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is +not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the +resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of +that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, continency, +desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are +not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher +maintains (Ethic. vii, 1, 9). + +Reply Obj. 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for +they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 4] + +Whether There Can Be Moral Without Intellectual Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual +virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is +"a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though +nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, +there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same +subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. +Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, +inclining him to consent to his reason, without his reason being +perfected by an intellectual virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect +use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous and +acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. +Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual. + +Obj. 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But +some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural +inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without +intellectual virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other +virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real +virtues." But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Q. +57, A. 5). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual +virtues. + +_I answer that,_ Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual +virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding +and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is +a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a +choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be +directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which +inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with +reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those +things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless +his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function +of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above (Q. 57, +AA. 5, 6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: +and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it +is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident +principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently +just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds +from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of +those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason +about things to be done. + +Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is +without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity +require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: +and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that +reason be perfected by intellectual virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason +as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things +which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have +full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack +of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Matt. +10:16: "Be ye therefore prudent (Douay: 'wise') as serpents, and +simple as doves." + +Reply Obj. 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind +of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger +this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it +be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting +means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the +faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously +will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be not right +reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right +reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according to +right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; +but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle +declares (Ethic. vi, 13). +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 5] + +Whether There Can Be Intellectual Without Moral Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there can be intellectual without +moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on +the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the +sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a +perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a +perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it. + +Obj. 2: Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things +makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper +matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without +the moral virtues, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems +most akin to the moral virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good +counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having +the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral +virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without +moral virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" +(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue. + +_I answer that,_ Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, +be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the +right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in +general, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now +right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. +And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only +universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles +of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of +principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or +again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that +man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens +sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of +understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a +passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is +overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is +opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by +the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be +rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, +in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular +principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by +certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to +judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the +virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man +is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the +right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to +have moral virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite +for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing +about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even +so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the +foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based. + +Reply Obj. 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite +whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, +when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in +the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does +not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does. + +Reply Obj. 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but +also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the +impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of +prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue. +________________________ + +QUESTION 59 + +OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. +And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ +accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the +relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral +virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are +five points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion? + +(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion? + +(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue? + +(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion? + +(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 1] + +Whether Moral Virtue Is a Passion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because +the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a +mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are +in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such +as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's +ills, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 8). Now "Cicero the renowned orator +did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in _De +Civ. Dei_ ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5 that "passions are +neither virtues nor vices." + +_I answer that,_ Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for +three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive +appetite, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3): whereas moral virtue is not +a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, +being a kind of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in +themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in +reference to reason: wherefore the passions, considered in +themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they +may accord or disaccord with reason. Now nothing of this sort can be +a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above +(Q. 55, A. 3). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in +some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the +movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in +the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On +the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins +in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is +moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) +states that it is "a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason +as a prudent man would appoint it." + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its +essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it +establishes the mean between passions. + +Reply Obj. 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, +it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean +sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a +vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in +so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with +reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in +so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason"; viz. +"when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are +relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei +ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that +he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from +being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 2] + +Whether There Can Be Moral Virtue with Passion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. +For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who is +not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does +not give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore +all moral virtues are without passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health +is to the body, as stated _Phys._ vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue is +a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But +the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as he says in the same +book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is +passion compatible with virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in +particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for the +Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the judgment +of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that "when they," i.e. the +soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the +truth." Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will +is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: +but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even +praiseworthy." But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral +virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is +consistent with them. + +_I answer that,_ The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, +as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that +the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the +Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De +Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with +moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean. + +This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one +of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not +discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and +the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and +concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the +passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of +their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other +emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the +intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions +being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. +These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose +deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise +man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius +[*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it +is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its +fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs +disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by +fear, or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these passions +forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or +consenting thereto." + +Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they +cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately; +as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any +movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, +in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says +(Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom +from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the +assertion should be qualified": they should have said virtue is +freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to +manner and time." + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other +examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own +mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the +passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the +Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that +virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that +when he says "a gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand +this of inordinate passion. + +Reply Obj. 2: This and all similar arguments which Tully brings +forward in _De Tusc. Quaest._ iv take the passions in the execution +of reason's command. + +Reply Obj. 3: When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as +to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and +the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through +being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's +command. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 3] + +Whether Sorrow Is Compatible with Moral Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. +Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7: +"She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and +justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom "hath no +bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is +incompatible with virtue also. + +Obj. 2: Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher +states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is +incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with +virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. +Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, +which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to +virtue and is incompatible with it. + +_On the contrary,_ Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow +in Him, for He said (Matt. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even unto +death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics +held that in the mind of the wise man there are three _eupatheiai_, +i.e. "three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. +instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; instead +of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to +sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons. + +First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now +they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought +that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good +to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous +man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and +body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some +good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. +Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise +man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous +man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live +without committing slight sins, according to 1 John 1:8: "If we say +that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because +a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been +so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, +according to 2 Cor. 7:10: "The sorrow that is according to God +worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may +praiseworthily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is +compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions +are when moderated by reason. + +Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about +evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is +about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the +enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one +possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the +mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary +to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is +unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the +virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by +reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection +by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason +dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be +conformed to reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Wherefore +moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a +mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6, 7). +Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good +is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more +undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow. + +Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue +is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the +other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no +matter how. + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made +sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. +Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom +there can be no hindrance to wisdom. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it +helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow. + +Reply Obj. 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but +moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to +the present state of life. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 4] + +Whether All the Moral Virtues Are About the Passions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the +passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue +is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are +passions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, AA. 1, +2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. + +Obj. 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which +is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, +13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above +(Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions. + +Obj. 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: +and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some are +about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in +_Ethic._ iii, 6, 10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the +passions. + +_On the contrary,_ Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the +passions; as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1, seqq. + +_I answer that,_ Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the +soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as +defined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. +Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are +subject to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not +only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations +of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject +of a passion, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore not all the +moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some +about operations. + +Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and +sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something +resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in +acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, +after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and +passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure or +sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," +viz. as about something that results from virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of +the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where +there are no passions, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but +some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 5] + +Whether There Can Be Moral Virtue Without Passion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. +For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the +passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is +altogether without passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its +contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the passions +incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom. 7:5) they +are called "passions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether +without passion. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as +Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all +things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is +without any passion. + +_On the contrary,_ "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as +stated in _Ethic._ i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice +cannot be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be. + +_I answer that,_ If we take the passions as being inordinate +emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect +virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any +movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, +which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be +without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would +follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether +idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers +subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them +execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. +Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due +external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper +regulated movements. + +Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but +about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice: +because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a +passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least +in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be +increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into +the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the +movement of the higher, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 7; Q. 24, A. 3). +Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a +virtue is, the more does it cause passion. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces +ordinate passion. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to +sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of its +nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as +there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is +altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good +operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the +body's help. +________________________ + +QUESTION 60 + +HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES) + +We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: +under which head there are five points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue? + +(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are +distinct from those which are about passions? + +(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations? + +(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different +passions? + +(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects +of the passions? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 1] + +Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. +Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason +which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their +inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral +virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all +moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral +virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations. + +Obj. 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material +objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the +formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one +thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there +is but one moral virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their +end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3). Now there is but one common end of +all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate +ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not +infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one. + +_On the contrary,_ One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated +above (Q. 56, A. 2). But the subject of the moral virtues is the +appetitive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as +stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2; Q. 81, A. 2). Therefore there +cannot be only one moral virtue. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 1, 2, 3), the moral +virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ +specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, +as stated above (Q. 54, A. 2). Again, the species of the object of +appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it +receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the +passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes +it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as +the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that +if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity +receive a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is +of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, +the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind +specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of +generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the +forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according +to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: +for instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals +of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the +various adaptability of matter. + +Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of +commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and +moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason +univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by +participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by +the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their +various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues +are of various species and are not one only. + +Reply Obj. 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral +matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one +kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all +such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the +appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind +according to its various relations to reason, the directing power. + +Reply Obj. 2: This formal element is one generically, on account of +the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the +various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from the +last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be +infinite in number, are not infinite in species. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 2] + +Whether Moral Virtues About Operations Are Different from Those That +Are About Passions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into +those which are about operations and those which are about passions. +For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an +operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or +sorrow." Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (Q. +31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1). Therefore the same virtue which is about +passions is also about operations, since it is an operative habit. + +Obj. 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action. If +therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a +consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral +virtues are about both passions and operations. + +Obj. 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards +every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite are +passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are +also about passions. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons justice to be about +operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions +(Ethic. ii, 3, 7; v, 1, seqq.). + +_I answer that,_ Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to +virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has +some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow +which are passions, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4, ad 1). + +Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter +about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral +virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which +are about passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in +certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those +operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in +so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate +with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some +power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and +selling, and all such operations in which there is an element of +something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its +parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the +other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on +commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these +operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And +for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly +about internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as +is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like. + +It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, +that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate +passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as +the due measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other +virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their +due measure. Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, +justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed +by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other +virtues. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first +considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two +consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But +in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about +passions, for the reason given above. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 3] + +Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue About Operations? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about +operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to +belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is +but one virtue about operations. + +Obj. 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are +directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the +other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause +diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. +v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common +good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs +a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations +does not cause a diversity of moral virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various +operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity +of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of +justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and +again in distributions, as is set down in _Ethic._ v, 2. Therefore +there are not different virtues about different operations. + +_On the contrary,_ Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, +both of which are about operations. + +_I answer that,_ All the moral virtues that are about operations +agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of +something due to another: but they differ in respect of various +special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, +the order of reason is established, as we have stated (A. 2), not +according as how man is affected towards such operations, but +according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which +becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the +formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that +a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about +operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. But the +thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something +is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an +inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according +as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already +conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are +various virtues: e.g. _Religion_ whereby we pay our debt to God; +_Piety,_ whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; +_Gratitude,_ whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth. + +Reply Obj. 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose +object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But +the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something +due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: That justice which seeks the common good is +another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an +individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and +Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs +man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to +the common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since +it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common +good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that +justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, +save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical +difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue +that is active through the command of another virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is the same kind of due in all the +operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the +same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it +may be that distributive justice is of another species from +commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on +(II-II, Q. 61, A. 1). +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 4] + +Whether There Are Different Moral Virtues About Different Passions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues +about different passions. For there is but one habit about things +that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the +case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. +love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as +we stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 2, 4; Q. 27, A. 4). Therefore there is +but one moral virtue about all the passions. + +Obj. 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about +different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral +virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is +one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about +fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore +there is no need for different moral virtues about different passions. + +Obj. 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different +species, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Now there is but one virtue +about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not +different moral virtues about different passions. + +_On the contrary,_ Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance +about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 6, 10; +iv, 5. + +_I answer that,_ It cannot be said that there is only one moral +virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the +same power as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, +others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). + +On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions +necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because +some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy +and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About such passions as are +thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same +virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the +mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as +in the natural order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. +between black and white. Secondly, because there are different +passions contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling +to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that +which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of +the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues, +because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as +being directed to the one same thing, viz. the attainment of some +good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, +and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the +opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this +leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions are not +all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring +and fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some +difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary +which has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues +about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible +passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope +and despair; meekness, about anger. + +Reply Obj. 1: All the passions concur in one common principle and +end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not +suffice for the unity of moral virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle causes +movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in +the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too +between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like +a second nature, consents to reason's dictates. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those three passions are directed to the same object in +a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same +virtue. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 5] + +Whether the Moral Virtues Differ in Point of the Various Objects of +the Passions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ +according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are +objects of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those +moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to +the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of +a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. +Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions +differ according to the objects of those passions. + +Obj. 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive +appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits +than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species +of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that +there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the +same applies to the other passions. + +Obj. 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various +objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less +pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species +of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the +same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified +according to the objects of the passions. + +Obj. 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But +there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus +temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and +_eutrapelia_ about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be +different virtues about fears of evils. + +_On the contrary,_ Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence +about pleasures of the table, and _eutrapelia_ about pleasures in +games. + +_I answer that,_ The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; +whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive +appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according +to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their +relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, +according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, +cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are +related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues. Now +the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive +appetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from +causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, +as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above (A. 4); +and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, +without causing a difference of passions, since several virtues are +directed about one passion, e.g. pleasure. + +And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always +belong to diverse virtues, as stated above (A. 4); therefore a +difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers +always causes a specific difference of virtues--for instance the +difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that +which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason +rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to +outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according +as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again, +according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has +various relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause +a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object +of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a +bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same +good may be directed to man's good in himself, either in his body or +in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every +such difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates +virtues. + +Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the +sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life +either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of +the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of +_temperance._ As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are +not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: +hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like +art, is about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3). + +On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner +power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the +former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the +body, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. +These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way +they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to +obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which +distinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; +since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far +as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in +reference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of +desire, pleasure, or love, there is _liberality_: but if we consider +this good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our hope, +there is _magnificence_ [*_megaloprepeia_]. With regard to that good +which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the object of love, we have +a virtue called _philotimia,_ i.e. _love of honor_: while if we +consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have +_magnanimity._ Wherefore liberality and _philotimia_ seem to be in +the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the +irascible. + +As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard +to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the +concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his +behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, +to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful +actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand +in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves +towards another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being +pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this +belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" +[*_philia_], and may be rendered "affability." Secondly, one man +behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: +this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls +"truthfulness" [*_aletheia_]. For frankness is more akin to the +reason than pleasure, and serious matters than play. Hence there is +another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher +calls _eutrapelia_ (Ethic. iv, 8). + +It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten +moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, +liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, _philotimia,_ gentleness, +friendship, truthfulness, and _eutrapelia,_ all of which differ in +respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we +add _justice,_ which is about operations, there will be eleven in all. + +Reply Obj. 1: All objects of the same specific operation have the +same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific +passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do. + +Reply Obj. 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as +virtues are, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: More and less do not cause a difference of species, +unless they bear different relations to reason. + +Reply Obj. 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil +does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states +(Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, +so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, +seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence +there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and, +again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the +other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if +it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion. +Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated +above. +________________________ + +QUESTION 61 + +OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are +five points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal +virtues? + +(2) Of their number; + +(3) Which are they? + +(4) Whether they differ from one another? + +(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, +perfect, and exemplar virtues? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 1] + +Whether the Moral Virtues Should Be Called Cardinal or Principal +Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called +cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a +division are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not +principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite +members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of them +should be called principal. + +Obj. 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But +the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues +are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than +the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in +comparison with that which is so by participation. But the +intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: +whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by +participation, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 3). Therefore the +intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the +poor in spirit" (Luke 6:20) says: "We know that there are four +cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." +But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal +virtues. + +_I answer that,_ When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to +speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above (Q. 56, A. +3), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires +rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the +faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the +other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers +imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of +the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well +without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the +perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those +virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal +virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the +intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as +was clearly shown above (Q. 57, A. 4). Consequently, those virtues +which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the +moral virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the +members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic +idea; although considered in their nature as things, one species may +surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other +animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to +several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing +hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the +generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance +principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue +into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not +found in the same way in all things. + +Reply Obj. 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated above +(Q. 58, A. 3, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, +but "super-human" or godlike virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, +rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do +not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, +which is the object of the appetite. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 5] + +Whether There Are Four Cardinal Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. +For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, +as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 58, A. 4). But that +which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence +alone is a principal virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. +Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and +by a right appetite, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2. Therefore there are +only two cardinal virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than +another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to +rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that +there are many more principal virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of +good works is built on four virtues." + +_I answer that,_ Things may be numbered either in respect of their +formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: +and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues. + +For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good +as defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as +existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal +virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according as the reason puts its +order into something else; either into operations, and then we have +"Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the +need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their +thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions +inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a +curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions +withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through +fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for +that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there +is "Fortitude." + +In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects +of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: +viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is +perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, +and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible +faculty, subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject +of "Fortitude." + +Reply Obj. 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. +The others are principal, each in its own genus. + +Reply Obj. 2: That part of the soul which is rational by +participation is threefold, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks before +another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and +as to the formal principle. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 3] + +Whether Any Other Virtues Should Be Called Principal Rather Than These? + +Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called +principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the +principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all +the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than +any be called a principal virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should +above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for +Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues +without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind." +Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. +But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: "Patience hath +a perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal +virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De +Invent. Rhet. ii). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), these four are reckoned as +cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue +as we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in +certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of +reason, is found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel +or its judgment, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 6). Again, good as +defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and +due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of +another person, and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the +passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult +to curb, viz. in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in +holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of +passion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are most +difficult to withstand. + +Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. +First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they +are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with +all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good +in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every +virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called +justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be +called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against +any passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, +as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in +this way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all +the objections fail. + +Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, +each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and +thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they +are called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account +of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue +which commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions +between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for +the pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens +against dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because +the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are +called principal by reason of their matter, as stated above. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 4] + +Whether the Four Cardinal Virtues Differ from One Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not +diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, +1): "There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and +brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no +sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real +justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance." But this would +not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since +the different species of one genus do not qualify one another. +Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another. + +Obj. 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the function +of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance +is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): +"Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, and is +not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says +(De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in +all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that +these virtues are not distinct from one another. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the +necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should +have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a +particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act +with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to +belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; +the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, +holding his passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from +choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end, +implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; +while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs to +fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison +to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from one another. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there +are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and +he applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the +same four virtues are distinct from one another. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), these four virtues are +understood differently by various writers. For some take them as +signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found +in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain +rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, +a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in +any matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any +passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and +fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that +which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, +or the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these four +virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and +fortitude are distinct virtuous habits: because it is fitting that +every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a _habit,_ should be +accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its +contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, +inasmuch as it is a _virtue,_ it is directed to good which involves +the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to +justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a _moral virtue_ +partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, +and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to +temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, which we +ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the +other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to reason; +whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a +kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations. According +to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the +other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one +another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both +habit, and virtue, and moral virtue. + +Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, +according as they have their special determinate matter; each of its +own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general +condition from which the virtue's name is taken as stated above (A. +3). In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct +habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects. + +Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first +sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues +qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of +prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are +directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the +rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what +is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the +pleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very +hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his +daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much +easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate. Again, +temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing +into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened +by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very +great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught +of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be +inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by +cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing +himself to be unconquered by toil." + +From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance +observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent +by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues +are taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the +sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above. + +Reply Obj. 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down by the +Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, +however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 5] + +Whether the Cardinal Virtues Are Fittingly Divided into Social +Virtues, Perfecting, Perfect, and Exemplar Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly +divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, +and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the +"exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." Now the +Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, +fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." Therefore these virtues +cannot be exemplar. + +Obj. 2: Further, the _perfect_ virtues are those which are without +any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul +that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it +has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the +passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above +(Q. 59, A. 5) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. +Therefore there is no such thing as _perfect_ virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the +"perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human +affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it +seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that +it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that +he despises what most men admire, viz. power and office." Therefore +there are no "perfecting" virtues. + +Obj. 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the +"social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of +their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal +justice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states +(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social." + +_On the contrary,_ Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, +together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The +four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are +social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes +purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there +are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean +soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf. +Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The +gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his +good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and +peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives +for the common weal."] + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul +needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this +something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." +Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in +God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly +virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we +speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself +may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze +on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to +reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the +observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. +Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1). + +Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on +Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him +according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" +virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well +in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have +been speaking of these virtues until now. + +But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to +Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in _Ethic._ x, 7, and +as Scripture often admonishes us--for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, +as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48), we must needs place +some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar +virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a +difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who +are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these +are called "perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the +things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs +all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as +nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the +soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly +things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted +consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the +virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: +these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought +else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; +fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the +Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as +the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who +are at the summit of perfection. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according +as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying +and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in +this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God. + +Reply Obj. 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living +together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of +those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence +Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social +virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative +mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; +"the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is +impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth +kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is +speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions. + +Reply Obj. 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is +wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: +"Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their +exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to +those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, +or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to +others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with what +Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a +hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays +this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and +contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be +taken up under the pressure of charity." + +Reply Obj. 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: +but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the +service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, +1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we +understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but +also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, +or even towards one individual. +________________________ + +QUESTION 62 + +OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there +are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there are any theological virtues? + +(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual +and moral virtues? + +(3) How many, and which are they? + +(4) Of their order. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 1] + +Whether There Are Any Theological Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological +virtues. For according to _Phys._ vii, text. 17, "virtue is the +disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, +I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which is +Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are +not virtues of a man. + +Obj. 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But +the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 5), +which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are +not virtues of man. + +Obj. 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because they +direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all +things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is +directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no +need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and +will to God. + +_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. +Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, +and charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): "Ye that fear +the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love +Him." Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to +God. Therefore they are theological virtues. + +_I answer that,_ Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions +whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Q. 5, A. +7). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Q. 5, +A. 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, +which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is +a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the +power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about +which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made +"partakers of the Divine nature." And because such happiness +surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles +which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not +suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary +for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he +may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to +his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not +without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called +"theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch +as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused +in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known +to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ. + +Reply Obj. 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in +two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues +surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled +wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man +becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that +these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of +which he is made a partaker. + +Reply Obj. 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were +virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us +virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but +exemplate virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to +God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in +proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their +nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the +object of supernatural happiness. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 2] + +Whether the Theological Virtues Are Distinct from the Intellectual +and Moral Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not +distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological +virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as +to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues +which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the +virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. +Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral +and intellectual virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to +God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs +us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it +considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are +not distinct from the intellectual virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four +cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, which +is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct +from the theological. + +_On the contrary,_ That which is above man's nature is distinct from +that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues +are above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are +in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (Q. 58, A. 3). +Therefore they are distinct from one another. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), habits are +specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal +difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological +virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the +knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the +intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human +reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct +from the moral and intellectual virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's +intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the +theological virtues, supernaturally. + +Reply Obj. 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3, 7) +reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as +they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on +the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass +human reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. +When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this +can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love +of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then +each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each +cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and +cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4; Q. 28, A. 6, ad +2; Q. 41, A. 2, ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of +charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity +essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some +way, as we shall show further on (Q. 65, AA. 2, 5; II-II, Q. 23, A. +7). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 3] + +Whether Faith, Hope, and Charity Are Fittingly Reckoned As +Theological Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not +fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological +virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural +inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the +virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural +virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore there should +be but one theological virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the +intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the +intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it +is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral +virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. +Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. +Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the +intellective part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore +there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the +intellect, the other, the will. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain +faith, hope, charity, these three." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the theological virtues +direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the +natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the +latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the +reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal +principles which are known to us by the natural light of the +intellect, and which are reason's starting-point, both in speculative +and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will +which tends naturally to good as defined by reason. + +But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, +according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, +neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath +prepared for them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the +above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural +to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, +man receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means +of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is +faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that +end as something attainable--and this pertains to hope--and as to a +certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, +transformed into that end--and this belongs to charity. For the +appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end +naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the +thing with its end. + +Reply Obj. 1: The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to +understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition +to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be +directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end +and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is +insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be directed +to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was need for +an additional supernatural habit in both respects. + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since +faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence +faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short +of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above +the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion +to man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of God is stronger +than men." + +Reply Obj. 3: Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to +the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there +must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, +hope and charity. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 4] + +Whether Faith Precedes Hope, and Hope Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the order of the theological virtues +is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root +precedes that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the +virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: "Being rooted and founded in +charity." Therefore charity precedes the others. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man cannot +love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, +by doing good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that faith +precedes charity, and charity hope. + +Obj. 3: Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated +above (A. 2, ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a +passion, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore charity, which is +love, precedes hope. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle enumerates them thus (1 Cor. 13:13): +"Now there remain faith, hope, charity." + +_I answer that,_ Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of +perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter +precedes form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same +subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: +because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the +appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless +that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is +by faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. +Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. In +like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. +Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some +good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good +of his own. Hence for the very reason that a man hopes in someone, he +proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope +precedes charity as regards their respective acts. + +But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: +because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive +from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is +the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the +form of them all, as we shall state further on (II-II, Q. 23, A. 8). + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes +to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs +to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a +man before having charity, to hope through merits not already +possessed, but which he hopes to possess. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 40, A. 7), in treating of the +passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. +the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes hope: +for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also +regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some +good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though +afterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a +man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to +love him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the +more in him. +________________________ + +QUESTION 63 + +OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there +are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether virtue is in us by nature? + +(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation? + +(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion? + +(4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species +as infused virtue? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 1] + +Whether Virtue Is in Us by Nature? + +Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us +and are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the +monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow +nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on Matt. 4:23, "Jesus went +about," etc., says: "He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, +justice, humility, which man possesses naturally." + +Obj. 2: Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as +was clearly shown above (Q. 55, A. 4, ad 2). But that which accords +with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. +Therefore virtue is in man by nature. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural +to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written (Job +31:18): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with +me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, +and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts +remain, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all +men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature. + +_I answer that,_ With regard to corporeal forms, it has been +maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for +instance, who upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. +I, Q. 45, A. 8; Q. 65, A. 4]. Others held that forms are entirely +from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms +originated from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that +they are partly from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially +in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought +into act by the agent. + +In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that +they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would +pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science +and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body, +are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by +being polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said +that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the +active intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences +and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted to +them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the +Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth. + +To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in +which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to +his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. +And, since each thing derives its species from its form, and its +individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his +rational soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him +in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his +specific nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the +particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of +his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of +his body, considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a +way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to +this particular soul. + +In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so +in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are +to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of +both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual +and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural +appetite for good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in +respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a +disposition in the body, some are disposed either well or ill to +certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts +of certain parts of the body, according to the disposition of which +these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts, +and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid +sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural aptitude +for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in +these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a +natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is +determined to one, while the perfection of these virtues does not +depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in +respect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of +virtue's action, and according to various circumstances. + +It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, +according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to +perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from +without. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two +argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, +inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken +in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body +has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living +temperately, another for some other virtue. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 2] + +Whether Any Virtue Is Caused in Us by Habituation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by +habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. +Prosperi cvi.] commenting on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is +sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is +no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is +lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now +faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by +God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith." +Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation. + +Obj. 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are +incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, +according to Wis. 8:21: "I knew that I could not otherwise be +continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be +caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God. + +Obj. 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the +perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its +cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more +efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. +Much more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts. + +_I answer that,_ We have spoken above (Q. 51, AA. 2, 3) in a general +way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a +special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note +that, as stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4), man's virtue perfects him in +relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, +species, and order," as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in +"number, weight, and measure," as expressed in Wis. 11:21, man's good +must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is +twofold, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 3, 4), viz. human reason and +Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to +more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by +the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold. + +It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined +according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts: +inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule +the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which +directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human +reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is +reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence +Augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the +words, "which God works in us without us" (Super Ps. 118, Serm. +xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds +good. + +Reply Obj. 2: Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused +virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But +actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; +because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated +above (Q. 49, A. 3): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of +acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly +contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin +without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered +from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in +the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. +There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without +grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological +virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, +will be more fully explained later (Q. 109, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1; Q. 51, A. 1), certain seeds or +principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These +principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them: +thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent +than the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the +reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which +results through the appetite partaking of reason, which rectification +belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they +proceed from higher principles, can cause acquired human virtues. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 3] + +Whether Any Moral Virtues Are in Us by Infusion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no virtues besides the theological +virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, +save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by +second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), "it is God's +rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and +moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above (A. +2). Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us +by infusion. + +Obj. 2: Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than +in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct +us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural +virtues needing to be caused in us by God. + +Obj. 3: Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: +much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, +according to a gloss on Heb. 1 [*Cf. Jerome on Gal. 1: 15, 16]. +Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by +means of infusion. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 8:7): "She teacheth temperance +and prudence and justice and fortitude." + +_I answer that,_ Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes +and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are +acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles +pre-existing in us, as above stated (A. 1; Q. 51, A. 1): instead of +which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, +whereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated (Q. 62, A. +1). Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, +in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to +the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are +to the natural principles of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be +caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the +theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, +from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues. + +Reply Obj. 2: The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our +supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But +the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard +to other things, yet in relation to God. + +Reply Obj. 3: The power of those naturally instilled principles does +not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in +addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his +supernatural end. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 4] + +Whether Virtue by Habituation Belongs to the Same Species As Infused +Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in +species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, +according to what has been said (A. 3), do not differ seemingly, save +in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, +not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused +moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of +infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires +of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species. + +Obj. 3: Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is +wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature. +But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten +naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one +produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired +and infused virtue belong to the same species. + +_On the contrary,_ Any change introduced into the difference +expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the +definition of infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in +us without us," as stated above (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore acquired +virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species +as infused virtue. + +_I answer that,_ There is a twofold specific difference among habits. +The first, as stated above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1), +is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now +the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's +proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of +the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal +aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these +concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part +of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is +appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human +reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed +according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, +the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the +health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according +to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring +it into subjection" (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and +the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired +temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other +virtues. + +The other specific difference among habits is taken from the things +to which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not +of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures +to which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, +the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse +virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of +government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, +whereby men behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens +with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God" +(Eph. 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves +well in respect of human affairs. + +Reply Obj. 1: Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation +to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as +stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires +for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: +wherefore their respective acts are not identical. + +Reply Obj. 3: God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as +the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it +was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a +man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts. +But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated. +________________________ + +QUESTION 64 + +OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of +virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues, +(4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean? + +(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational +mean? + +(3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean? + +(4) Whether the theological virtues do? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 1] + +Whether Moral Virtues Observe the Mean? + +Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the +mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is +extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it +is stated in _De Coelo_ i that "virtue is the limit of power." +Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean. + +Obj. 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues +tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, +and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, +2, 3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean. + +Obj. 3: Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the +mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the +contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some +moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus +virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the +extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the +poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that +it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral +virtue is a habit of choosing the mean." + +_I answer that,_ As already explained (Q. 55, A. 3), the nature of +virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is +properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to +some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive +movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good +of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with +its rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the +rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in +discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by +their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is +clearly the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident +that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of +reason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean +is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue +observes the mean. + +Reply Obj. 1: Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, +while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore we +compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which it has +of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity; +while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. +deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter, +then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes the passion +conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, +6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state," in so far as +the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an +extreme in reference to the 'best' and the 'excellent, '" viz. as to +its conformity with reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: In actions and passions the mean and the extremes +depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from +being extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while +the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through +being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity +and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the +respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and +a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other +circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since these +virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, +i.e. _where_ it is right, _when_ it is right, and for an _end_ that +is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum _when_ +it is not right, or _where_ it is not right, or for an undue _end;_ +and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto _where_ one +ought, and _when_ one ought. This agrees with the saying of the +Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the +extreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his action." + +Reply Obj. 3: The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of +magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and +poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. +according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if +this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, +or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done +when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by +deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity +or poverty. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 2] + +Whether the Mean of Moral Virtue Is the Real Mean, or the Rational +Mean? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the +rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue +consists in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in _Metaph._ +ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral +virtue is a real mean. + +Obj. 2: Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral +virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a +mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral +virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. + +Obj. 3: Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or +geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of +justice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral +virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral +virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." + +_I answer that,_ The rational mean can be understood in two ways. +First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, +as though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in +this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but +the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the +rational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that +which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense +every mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated +(A. 1), moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity +with right reason. + +But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real +mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, for +instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean +is not the real mean, but is considered in relation to us: and such +is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is +that justice is about operations, which deal with external things, +wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as +stated above (Q. 60, A. 2): wherefore the rational mean in justice is +the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each +one his due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal +with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established in the +same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their +passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the +passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the +passions. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two +arguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason, +while the third argues from the mean of justice. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 3] + +Whether the Intellectual Virtues Observe the Mean? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not +observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by +conforming to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in +reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore +the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. + +Obj. 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual +virtue: for it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, that "virtue observes the +mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it." If +therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, this mean will +have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would +be an indefinite series of virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as +the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22, 23). But there seems +to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, +as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition to one another, +but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. +Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a +mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue +observes the mean. + +_I answer that,_ The good of anything consists in its observing the +mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may +happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above (A. 1). Now +intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as +stated above (Q. 56, A. 3). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue +consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a +measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true; in the case +of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, +2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity +with a right appetite. + +Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, +is measured by things; since things are the measure of our intellect, +as stated in _Metaph._ x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we +think or say, according as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the +good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, +by way of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the +intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what +they are not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. +There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though +something were, which in reality it is not: and there will be +deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, +whereas in reality it is. + +The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in +relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; so that both +in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean +consists in conformity with things. But if we consider it in relation +to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. +Consequently the rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and +also the mean of prudence--of prudence as ruling and measuring, of +moral virtue, as ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the +difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both +cases. + +Reply Obj. 1: Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as +stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that +measure. + +Reply Obj. 2: There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: +because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another +kind of virtue, but things themselves. + +Reply Obj. 3: The things themselves that are contrary have no +contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the +other: nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of +affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end +of _Peri Hermen[e]ias._ For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in +contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another, so long as +we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one +hand we have "being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet +if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something positive +in both cases. Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but +the opinion stating that "good is good" is contrary to the opinion +stating that "good is not good": and between two such contraries +intellectual virtue observes the mean. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 4] + +Whether the Theological Virtues Observe the Mean? + +Objection 1: It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. +For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. +Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore +much more does theological virtue observe the mean. + +Obj. 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite +being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists +in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue +perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 3). +Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean. + +Obj. 3: Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean +between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course +between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): +thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe +the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the +existence of two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches, +who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue +observes the mean. + +_On the contrary,_ Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible +to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by +excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it +is written (Ecclus. 43:33): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as +you can: for He is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue +does not observe the mean. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the mean of virtue depends +on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may +exceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological +virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, +and thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: +because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, +according to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His +omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human +power: so that never can we love God as much as He ought to be loved, +nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore +can there be excess in such things. Accordingly the good of such +virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we +approach to the summit. + +The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with +us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought, +yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, +according to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is +possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, +accidentally and in reference to us. + +Reply Obj. 1: The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in +a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: +whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered +in itself, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect +and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the +theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and +measure. Wherefore the comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 3: Hope observes the mean between presumption and +despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be +presumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of +his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which +according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no +excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. In +like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not +by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe +too much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle +position between contrary opinions, as was explained above. +________________________ + +QUESTION 65 + +OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head +there are five points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another? + +(2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity? + +(3) Whether charity can be without them? + +(4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity? + +(5) Whether charity can be without them? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 1] + +Whether the Moral Virtues Are Connected with One Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected +with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the +exercise of acts, as is proved in _Ethic._ ii, 1, 2. But man can +exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising +himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to +have one moral virtue without another. + +Obj. 2: Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now +a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or +magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2, 3) that "a poor +man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other virtues; and +(Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts +his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous." Therefore the moral +virtues are not connected with one another. + +Obj. 3: Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of +the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective +part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since +we may have one science, without having another. Neither, therefore, +are the moral virtues connected with one another. + +Obj. 4: Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this +can only be because they are united together in prudence. But this +does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, +seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in relation to +one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another +virtue: even as one may have the art of making certain things, +without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right +reason about things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not +necessarily connected with one another. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says on Luke 6:20: "The virtues are +connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to +have several": and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues +that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one +another": and Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "one virtue without +the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect": and +Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. ii): "If you confess to not having one +particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all." + +_I answer that,_ Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or +as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or +fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of +good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by +habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not +connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being +accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not +prompt in doing deeds of chastity. + +But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good +deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that +they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this +two reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of +assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated +above (Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), some distinguish them according to certain +general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that +discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to +temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we +consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the +connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as +virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and +so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by +Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" +as a virtue, "if isolated from the others: for there can be no true +prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues +to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. Q. 61, A. 4, Obj. +1). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4). + +Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their +matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for +their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above (Q. 58, A. +4), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to +moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now +right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which +inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct +choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by +prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that +are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence +unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is "right reason +about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end +of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by +moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science +unless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither can we +have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows +clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general +state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be +done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself +at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he +exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire +the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by +good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for +instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of +concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining +his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the +absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In +the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete +character of virtue, if prudence be lacking. + +But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to +some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since +it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of +such virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral +virtues, without actually having the habits of these +virtues--provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when +once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in +proximate potentiality. Because when, by practice, a man has acquired +liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for +a large sum of money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with +but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, +acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never +been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having a thing +when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the +Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which is scarcely lacking is +not lacking at all." + +This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: The intellectual virtues are about divers matters +having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the +various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the +connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are +about passions and operations, that are clearly related to one +another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial +passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. +pleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the +matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the +passions. Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one +rule of prudence. + +Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first +principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on +the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the +moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles +which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do +not depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other +intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, +because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason +the appetite, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1; Q. 58, A. 5, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 4: Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as +the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the +principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though +reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, +yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in +any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, +"A whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the science of +geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his +conclusion. Moreover, things _done_ are related to one another, but +not things _made,_ as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of +prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a +deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not +occur in things to be made. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 2] + +Whether Moral Virtues Can Be Without Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. +For it is stated in the _Liber Sentent. Prosperi_ vii, that "every +virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity +can be in none except the good," as stated in the same book. +Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human +acts, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1, 2, whereas charity cannot be had +otherwise than by infusion, according to Rom. 5:5: "The charity of +God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to +us." Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without +charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through +depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; +indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity +of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral +virtues are not connected with charity, and can be without it. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 3:14): "He that loveth not, +abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the +virtues, since it is "by them" that "we lead a good life," as +Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17, 19). Therefore they cannot be +without the love of charity. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 63, A. 2), it is possible by +means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they +produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the +natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be +without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so +far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last +end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and +cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like +moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above +(A. 1; Q. 58, AA. 4, 5) that the other moral virtues cannot be +without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral +virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, +which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now for +prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be +well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of +charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, +which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters +right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, +that "contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is +therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without +charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they +cannot be without prudence. + +It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused +virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since +they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, +those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, +but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end +in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last +end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi +cvi.] on the words, "All that is not of faith is sin" (Rom. 14:23), +says: "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, +even if his conduct be good." + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. +Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its +possessor good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of +acquired virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet +prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all +the infused moral virtues. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 3] + +Whether Charity Can Be Without Moral Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem possible to have charity without the moral +virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is +superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the +fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor. 13:4, +seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if +one has charity, other virtues are superfluous. + +Obj. 2: Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the +works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their +own sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. +ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet +they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works +pleasing to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of +charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there +are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says (on +Luke 17:10) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not +having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. +Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that +he has all the moral virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it +is written (Rom. 13:8): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled +the Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without +having all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about +all acts of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1, 2. Therefore he that +has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a +letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp.] that +charity contains all the cardinal virtues. + +_I answer that,_ All the moral virtues are infused together with +charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly +in works of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of +nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain +works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus +animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that +their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, +inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all +the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the +moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it +is through them that man performs each different kind of good work. + +It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, +not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, +again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all +the infused moral virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not +only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower +power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action +would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed. +Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the +end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but +also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to +the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving +principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end. +Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with +charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds +it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently +feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some +impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of +science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or +unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue +experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary +dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not +occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts +by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions. + +Reply Obj. 3: Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in +so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, +for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the +virtues. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 4] + +Whether Faith and Hope Can Be Without Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith and hope are never without +charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be +more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused +moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith +and hope be without charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says +(Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection +thereof, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore faith cannot be +without charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be +no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this love +that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Matt. 1:2 says that "faith begets hope, +and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can +be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without +charity. + +_I answer that,_ Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be +considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as +complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good +works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a +perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is +good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but +not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will +the habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect +character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he +does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless +he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of +prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without +prudence. + +Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without +charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without +charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since +to believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to will +not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one +ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every +right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine +says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but +not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be +without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope +consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if +it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without +charity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not +yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be +an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently, +faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are +not virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires +that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we +should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6). + +Reply Obj. 1: Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused +prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this +involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the +ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not +depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without +charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect +virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look +to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this +is not without charity. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 5] + +Whether Charity Can Be Without Faith and Hope? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity can be without faith and +hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to +love God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future +bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. + +Obj. 2: Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to +Eph. 3:17: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is sometimes +without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith +and hope, and the other virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had +neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we +shall explain further on (III, Q. 7, AA. 3, 4). Therefore charity can +be without faith and hope. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is +impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to +charity, according to Prov. 8:17: "I love them that love me." Again, +it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above (Q. 62, +A. 4). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and +hope. + +_I answer that,_ Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also +a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain +mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in +_Ethic._ viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 John +4:16: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," +and from 1 Cor. 1:9, where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom +you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship +of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with +Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in +the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and +hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, +if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their +fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which +is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this +fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this +fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and +hope. + +Reply Obj. 1: Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love +of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object +we are directed by faith and hope. + +Reply Obj. 2: Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it +gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are +the precursors of charity, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 4), and so +charity is impossible without them. + +Reply Obj. 3: In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account +of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had +manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above, +Q. 4, A. 3]: so that in Him was perfect charity. +________________________ + +QUESTION 66 + +OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head +there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another? + +(2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are +equal? + +(3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue; + +(4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another; + +(5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another; + +(6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 1] + +Whether One Virtue Can Be Greater or Less Than Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less +than another. For it is written (Apoc. 21:16) that the sides of the +city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote +the virtues. Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one +cannot be greater than another. + +Obj. 2: Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, +cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a +maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher +states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, +19) that "virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to +evil purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater +or less than another. + +Obj. 3: Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power +of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God Whose +power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue +cannot be greater than another. + +_On the contrary,_ Wherever there can be increase and greater +abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater +abundance and increase: for it is written (Matt. 5:20): "Unless your +justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall +not enter into the kingdom of heaven": and (Prov. 15:5): "In abundant +justice there is the greatest strength (_virtus_)." Therefore it +seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another. + +_I answer that,_ When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater +than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as +applying to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear +that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always more +excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the +cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said +(Q. 18, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 2) that the cause and root of human good is +the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in +goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, +in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better +than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. +Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining +moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands +before temperance, which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller +share of reason, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6. + +The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of +the same species. In this way, according to what was said above (Q. +52, A. 1), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue +may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; +secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we +consider it in itself, we shall call it great or little, according to +the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue, e.g. +temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But +this does not apply to science and art: for every grammarian does not +know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics +said rightly, as Simplicius states in his _Commentary on the +Predicaments,_ that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art +can; because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum. + +If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may +then be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in +different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to +attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and +this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural +disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a +greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the +measure of the giving of Christ," as stated in Eph. 4:9. And here the +Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, +unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because +the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean +of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics +thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated +in _Ethic._ ii, 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached +more nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen +when several archers aim at a fixed target. + +Reply Obj. 1: This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of +proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we +shall see further on (A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 2: This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the +character of something _more_ or _less_ good, in the ways explained +above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit. + +Reply Obj. 3: God does not work by necessity of nature, but according +to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various +measures of virtue, according to Eph. 4:7: "To every one of you +[Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving +of Christ." +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 2] + +Whether All the Virtues That Are Together in One Man, Are Equal? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not +all equally intense. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:7): "Everyone +hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another +after that." Now one gift would not be more proper than another to a +man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore +it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. + +Obj. 2: Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and +the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another in one +virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not +the case: since various saints are specially praised for different +virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith (Rom. 4), Moses for his meekness +(Num. 7:3), Job for his patience (Tob. 2:12). This is why of each +Confessor the Church sings: "There was not found his like in keeping +the law of the most High," [*See _Lesson_ in the Mass _Statuit_ +(Dominican Missal)], since each one was remarkable for some virtue or +other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same +man. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's +pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows that +a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of +another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same +man. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who +are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so +on. Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were +equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man. + +_I answer that,_ As explained above (A. 1), the comparative greatness +of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to +their specific nature: and in this way there is no doubt that in a +man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than +faith and hope. Secondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree +of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes +intense or remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues in +one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their +growth in man is equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size, but +equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another. + +Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as +the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their +connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above (Q. 65, A. +1) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is +according to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues +to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found +together with the other in any matter. In this way virtues cannot be +said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties +equal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) +when he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that +one is more prudent than the other; it follows that the fortitude of +the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in +fortitude, since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will +find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all +in the same way." + +The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of +those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective +matters (Q. 65, AA. 1, 2). In this way the connection among moral +virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from +charity, and not from the inclination, which is on the part of the +subject, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 1). Accordingly the nature of the +equality among virtues can also be considered on the part of +prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: +for in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same +degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined +according to right reason in each matter of virtue. + +But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. +the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform +the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this +either from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God. + +Reply Obj. 1: This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the +gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all +of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it +refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one +man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on +account of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in +which all the infused virtues are connected. + +Reply Obj. 2: One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another +saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness +for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue. + +This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 3] + +Whether the Moral Virtues Are Better Than the Intellectual Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the +intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, +is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the +sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover, +they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable +to the intellectual virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor +good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art +in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of +prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But +according to _Ethic._ vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of +the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore +moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the +intellectual virtue that regards moral matters. + +_On the contrary,_ Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is +rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the +essentially rational part, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. Now rational +by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. +Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue. + +_I answer that,_ A thing may be said to be greater or less in two +ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders +something from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and +yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle, +_Topic._ iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in +its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species +from its object, as explained above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1). +Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the +more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the +reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the +reason apprehends things in the universal, while the appetite tends +to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. +Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which +perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which +perfect the appetite. + +But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, +which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other +powers to act, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1), is more excellent. And +since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for +it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of +virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though +the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking. + +Reply Obj. 1: The moral virtues are more lasting than the +intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters +pertaining to the life of the community. Yet it is evident that the +objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more +lasting than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain +particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more +necessary for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not +simply, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, +from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a +useful thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason +for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that +happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above +(Q. 3, A. 6). + +Reply Obj. 2: The reason why man is said to be good simply, in +respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, +is because the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as +stated above (Q. 56, A. 3). Wherefore this argument, too, proves +merely that moral virtue is better relatively. + +Reply Obj. 3: Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the +choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of +each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that +virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of +prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6; vi, 13. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 4] + +Whether Justice Is the Chief of the Moral Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral +virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is +due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. +Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in +which it is most perfect. Now, according to Jam. 1:4, "Patience hath +a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater +than justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue," +as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice. +Therefore it is greater than justice. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice +is the most excellent of the virtues." + +_I answer that,_ A virtue considered in its species may be greater or +less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater +simply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above +(A. 1). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral +virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by +considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is +the will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above (Q. +8, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 1): its object or matter, because it is about +operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also +in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of +virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are +about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the +appetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the +rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the +chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently +fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters +of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues +that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the +Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest +which receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good. +Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; +because the former," i.e. fortitude, "is useful in war, and the +latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude +comes temperance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters +directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one +species, viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three +virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in +excellence also. + +A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping +or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is more excellent +simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is +more excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in +some accidental mode of being. + +Reply Obj. 1: The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of +justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his +own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from +justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas justice +can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than +liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation: +while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an +addition to justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring +evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also +excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by +charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also +inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it +is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this +matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues +simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being +disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is +brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a +part of fortitude. + +Reply Obj. 3: There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, +as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their +ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but +not simply. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 5] + +Whether Wisdom Is the Greatest of the Intellectual Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the +intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one +commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in +_Ethic._ i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence +(Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, +and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to +what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems +that prudence is greater than wisdom. + +Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to +happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing to +that which is best," as stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 17. Now prudence +is "right reason about things to be done," whereby man is brought to +happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man +attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems +to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which +are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the +object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De +Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according +to Job 26:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." +Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom. + +Obj. 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than +knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from +indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of +understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is +a greater virtue than wisdom. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is +"the head" among "the intellectual virtues." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue, +as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom +surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom +considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning +of the _Metaphysics._ And since it is by the cause that we judge of +an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower +effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the +other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of +them all. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about +the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater +virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7, "man were +the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, as stated in +the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but +vice versa: because "the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he +himself is judged by no man" (1 Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no +business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its +command covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain +wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, +the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for +her, as the doorkeeper for the king. + +Reply Obj. 2: Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, +but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme +Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect +in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act +of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in +respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the +act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so +that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one +knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a +higher object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects +be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which +possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain +about a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more +certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher +says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to +know something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and +probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is +better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean +things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, +is beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his +possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet +this little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is +preferable to all other knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 4: The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles +depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a +whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is +greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and +non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to +being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are +constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the +proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes +use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of +understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other +sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by +vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that +wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 6] + +Whether Charity Is the Greatest of the Theological Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the +theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while +hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is +compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now +intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident +above (Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity. + +Obj. 2: Further, when two things are added together, the result is +greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to +charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion +viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the +beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and +hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Matt. 1:3 says that +"faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are +greater than charity. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): "Now there remain +faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is +charity." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue, +as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three +theological virtues look at God as their proper object, it cannot be +said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its +having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches +nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is +greater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, +imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is +not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of +charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, +in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire +to union with the beloved; hence it is written (1 John 4:16): "He +that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." + +Reply Obj. 1: Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same +way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because +the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: +whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man. +Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than +to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in +the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the +beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than +in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the +container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. +Secondly, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements +pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the +appetitive movement tending to God, which movement belongs to the +theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive +movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to +Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge." + +Reply Obj. 2: Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to +obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who +desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other +hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by +hope, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 3: An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but +not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more +noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in +this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to +wit, that one is a disposition to the other. +________________________ + +QUESTION 67 + +OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under +which head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life? + +(2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain? + +(3) Whether faith remains? + +(4) Whether hope remains? + +(5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope? + +(6) Whether charity remains? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 1] + +Whether the Moral Virtues Remain After This Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not remain after +this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, +according to Matt. 22:30. But it is absurd to put moral virtues in +the angels [*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy +of the gods" (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in _Ethic._ x, 8. Therefore +neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life. + +Obj. 2: Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But +the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says +(Moral. iv, 18): "The works of the active life pass away from the +body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this life. + +Obj. 3: Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, +are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states +(Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, +when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily organs. +Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this +life. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 1:15) that "justice is +perpetual and immortal." + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held +that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as +Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made +happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is +better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all +others." Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in +the future life, but after a different manner. + +In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues +there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The material +element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive +part to the passions and operations according to a certain mode: and +since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely +this order of reason. + +Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the +future life, as regards their material element. For in the future +life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food +and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor +distributions and commutations of things employed in this present +life. But, as regards the formal element, they will remain most +perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's +reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things +concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive +power will be moved entirely according to the order of reason, in +things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. +xiv, 9) that "prudence will be there without any danger of error; +fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, +without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither +prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most +steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no +imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident what will be its +act in that life, viz. "to be subject to God": because even in this +life subjection to a superior is part of justice. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral +virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as +regards "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to +"matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd +desires." + +The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that +concern the active life, belong to the material element of the +virtues. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold state after this life; one before +the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the +body; the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be +reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the +irrational powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. +Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and +temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be +perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the +resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the soul actually, +but only radically in its essence, as stated in the First Part (Q. +77, A. 8). Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only +in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain +nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q. 63, A. 1). Justice, +however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence of justice it +is specially said that it is "perpetual and immortal"; both by reason +of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because its act +will not change, as stated. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 2] + +Whether the Intellectual Virtues Remain After This Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not +remain after this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8, 9) that +"knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be +because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge of science is in +part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other +intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the +intellectual virtues will cease after this life. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since +science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is +not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. +But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore science +and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death. + +Obj. 3: Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so +that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be no act +of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing +without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life, +the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of +the body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this +life. + +_On the contrary,_ The knowledge of what is universal and necessary +is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now +the knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this +life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, +according to Luke 16:25: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good +things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much +more, therefore, does the knowledge of universal and necessary things +remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues. + +_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 6) some have +held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive +intellect except when it actually understands; and that so long as +actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in +the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs, viz. in the +powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the +body is corrupted: and consequently, according to this opinion, +neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after +this life when once the body is corrupted. + +But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De +Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is in act when it is +identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is +in potentiality to consider it actually." It is also contrary to +reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" +intellect immovably, according to the mode of their container. Hence +the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De +Anima iii) because it preserves the intelligible species. + +And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this +life, by applying the intelligible species to them as stated in the +First Part (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1, ad 5), cease as soon as the +body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, +which are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues, +these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the +intelligible species, which are in the "possible" intellect, the +intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal +element of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these remain after +this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated +concerning the moral virtues (A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as +referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of +understanding; because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when +the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the +phantasms. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its +material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible +species, which are in the "possible" intellect. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 89, A. 1), the +separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to +the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet not as to the same +mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues +(A. 1). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 3] + +Whether Faith Remains After This Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that faith remains after this life. +Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains +after this life, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore faith remains also. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 3:11): "Other foundation no +man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. +faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the foundation is removed, that which +is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not +after this life, no other virtue remains. + +Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory +differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is +compatible with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be +"evening" and "morning" knowledge [*Cf. I, Q. 58, A. 6]; and a man +can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with +opinion through a probable syllogism, about one same conclusion. +Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with the knowledge +of glory. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6, 7): "While we are in +the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not +by sight." But those who are in glory are not absent from the Lord, +but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain +in the life of glory. + +_I answer that,_ Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one +thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two +things are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation +and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect of +contrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we +find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: wherefore +in alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as +when a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. +19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, it +is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same +thing at the same time. + +Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a +thing's very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack of +reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And +since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, cannot +pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an +imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is changed: even +as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. +Sometimes, however, the imperfection does not belong to the specific +nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something +else; even as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, +because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like +reason; and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, +the thing remains substantially. + +Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature +of faith: for it is included in its definition; faith being defined +as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things +that appear not" (Heb. 11:1). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in +Joan.): "What is faith? Believing without seeing." But it is an +imperfect knowledge that is of things unapparent or unseen. +Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: +therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect +and remain identically the same. + +But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect +knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect +knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we +must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways: first, on +the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; +thirdly, on the part of the subject. The difference of perfect and +imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the +"morning" and "evening" knowledge of the angels: for the "morning" +knowledge is about things according to the being which they have in +the Word, while the "evening" knowledge is about things according as +they have being in their own natures, which being is imperfect in +comparison with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect +and imperfect knowledge are exemplified in the knowledge of a +conclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable +medium. On the part of the subject the difference of perfect and +imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is +essential to opinion that we assent to one of two opposite assertions +with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science +it is essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for +science possesses certitude which results from the understanding of +principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses +opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls short of science +in so far as it lacks vision. + +Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the +same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect and imperfect +can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. +Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect on the part of the object is +quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; +but they are compatible with one another in respect of the same +medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at +one and the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and +imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other +imperfect, e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil. In like +manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is +incompatible with imperfect knowledge through one and the same +medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in +the same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a +probable and through a demonstrative medium. Again, knowledge that is +perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect +knowledge in the same subject. Now faith, of its very nature, +contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the +believer sees not what he believes: whereas bliss, of its very +nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the +Blessed see that which makes them happy, as stated above (Q. 3, A. +8). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are incompatible in one +and the same subject. + +Reply Obj. 1: Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of +the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a +more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible +with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of +faith is incompatible. + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: +consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will be +perfected also. + +The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 4] + +Whether Hope Remains After Death, in the State of Glory? + +Objection 1: It would seem that hope remains after death, in the +state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more +excellent manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain +after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much +more then does hope remain. + +Obj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this +life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever--in the +lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can +remain. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in +the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of +the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine +declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the soul, +according to Ecclus. 24:29: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and +they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and 1 Pet. 1:12: "On Whom the +angels desire to look." Therefore it seems that there can be hope in +the Blessed after this life is past. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "What a man seeth, +why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object +of hope, viz. God. Therefore they do not hope. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), that which, in its very +nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the +opposite perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that movement +of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is +"the act of that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so +that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement +ceases; for a thing does not continue to become white, when once it +is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not +possessed, as is clear from what we have said above about the passion +of hope (Q. 40, AA. 1, 2). Therefore when we possess that which we +hope for, viz. the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to +have hope. + +Reply Obj. 1: Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, +which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible +with the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except +perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not +remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect +of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is +in our actual possession. + +Reply Obj. 2: Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state +further on (II-II, Q. 19, A. 2). Servile fear regards punishment, and +will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer +be possibility of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an +act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the +other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards +this act, it does not remain. Because separation from God is in the +nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to +Prov. 1:33: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." +Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated +above (Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 1), and therefore the fear which will +remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there can be fear +of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in +the lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that the +notion of something future remains there, which is the object of +fear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its +being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither +past nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking, +neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q. 42, A. +2), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no +such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except +speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future +evil is called fear. + +Reply Obj. 3: As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in +the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the +reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in +them because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is said +to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can +be desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly +speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is +God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. +Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated above +(Q. 40, A. 1): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, +is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money +is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. +In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly +speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire +it. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 5] + +Whether Anything of Faith or Hope Remains in Glory? + +Objection 1: It would seem that something of faith and hope remains +in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there +remains what is common; thus it is stated in _De Causis_ that "if you +take away rational, there remains living, and when you remove living, +there remains being." Now in faith there is something that it has in +common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is something proper +to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. +Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith +still remains. + +Obj. 2: Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to +Eph. 1:17, 18: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the +knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the +light of glory, of which it is written (Ps. 35:10): "In Thy light we +shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light +supervenes: for a candle is not extinguished when the sun's rays +appear. Therefore it seems that the light of faith itself remains +with the light of glory. + +Obj. 3: Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the +withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of +liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the +act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore +when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still +remain. + +_On the contrary,_ Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is +either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith +does not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above (A. 3), +it seems that it is withdrawn entirely. + +_I answer that,_ Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but +that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and +remains in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if +this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically +but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same +genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand, +hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is +compared to the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the +term of movement. + +But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith +remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. Because +when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus +does not remain identically the same: thus if you remove the +difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not +remain identically the same, as though the identical color were at +one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that +genus is not related to difference as matter to form, so that the +substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the +difference is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically +the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are not +the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the +species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e. the compound +of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and +likewise the genus; the genus denotes the whole by signifying that +which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is +formal; the species, by signifying both. Thus, in man, the sensitive +nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is +predicated of that which has a sensitive nature, rational of that +which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So +that the one same whole is denoted by these three, but not under the +same aspect. + +It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the +difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, the +substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal +nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute the +animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was +previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is therefore evident +that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or +specifically the same, but only generically. + +Reply Obj. 1: If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining "living" +thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the +perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject: +whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are +opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently they +are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the +air. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that loses his money does not therefore lose the +possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the +habit of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is +the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even +its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: +and so such a habit would remain to no purpose. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 6] + +Whether Charity Remains After This Life, in Glory? + +Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not remain after this +life, in glory. Because according to 1 Cor. 13:10, "when that which +is perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is +imperfect, "shall be done away." Now the charity of the wayfarer is +imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of +glory is attained. + +Obj. 2: Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. +But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore the +apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the +life to come, it seems that charity is not the same in both cases. + +Obj. 3: Further, things of the same kind can advance from +imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of +the wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, +however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of +the wayfarer does not remain in heaven. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8): "Charity never +falleth away." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), when the imperfection of a +thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to +hinder the identical thing passing from imperfection to perfection, +even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now +charity is love, the nature of which does not include imperfection, +since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, +either seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not done away by the +perfection of glory, but remains identically the same. + +Reply Obj. 1: The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; +because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now +although that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the +substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away, +charity itself is not done away. + +Reply Obj. 2: The object of charity is not knowledge itself; +if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the +charity of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the +same, viz. God Himself. + +Reply Obj. 3: The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot +attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on +the part of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in +_Ethic._ ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly +we love Him. +________________________ + +QUESTION 68 + +OF THE GIFTS +(In Eight Articles) + +We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues? + +(2) Of the necessity of the Gifts? + +(3) Whether the Gifts are habits? + +(4) Which, and how many are they? + +(5) Whether the Gifts are connected? + +(6) Whether they remain in heaven? + +(7) Of their comparison with one another; + +(8) Of their comparison with the virtues. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 1] + +Whether the Gifts Differ from the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the +virtues. For Gregory commenting on Job 1:2, "There were born to him +seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when +through the conception of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the +Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of Isa. 11:2, +3: "And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," +etc. where the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated. +Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine commenting on Matt. 12:45, "Then he goeth +and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. +Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues +of the Holy Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are +opposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts +do not differ from the virtues commonly so called. + +Obj. 3: Further, things whose definitions are the same, are +themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the +gifts; for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead +a good life," etc. [*Cf. Q. 55, A. 4]. Likewise the definition of a +gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable +giving," according to the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the +virtues and gifts do not differ from one another. + +Obj. 4: Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: +for, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2), wisdom, understanding, and +knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, +piety to a kind of justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue. +Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, +which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the +three theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's +three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven +gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by +the four corners of the house. + +_I answer that,_ If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the +notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition +between them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it +perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers +to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that +which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect another in +well-doing: especially as we have already stated (Q. 63, A. 3) that +some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we +cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held +that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But +there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve; for they must +explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among +the gifts there are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned +virtues. + +Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as +being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a +suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would +apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice +versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the +reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three +to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the +gifts perfect the free-will according as it is a faculty of the +reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since +they observed only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith +and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the +affections. If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have +to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason. + +Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of +the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence, +temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens +it against every kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift," said that +the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, +that we may resist temptation. But neither is this distinction +sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which +lead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything +naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard +to charity, of which it is written (Cant. 8:7): "Many waters cannot +quench charity." + +Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as +having been in Christ, according to Isa. 11:2, 3, said that the +virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in +order to conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, +for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. +Yet neither does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction. +Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly in +humility and meekness, according to Matt. 11:29: "Learn of Me, +because I am meek and humble of heart," and in charity, according to +John 15:12: "Love one another, as I have loved you." Moreover, these +virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion. + +Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we +must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we +find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For +thus it is written (Isa. 11:2, 3): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of +understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we +are clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down +as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion +from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold +principle of movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other +extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above (Q. 9, AA. 4, 6): +moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune +(Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8). + +Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its +mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a +disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. +Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the +disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: +thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order +to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that +human virtues perfect man according as it is natural for him to be +moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. +Consequently man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed +to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only +because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is +disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according to +Isa. 50:5: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I +have not gone back." Even the Philosopher says in the chapter On Good +Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by +Divine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according to human +reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are +moved by a principle higher than human reason. This then is what some +say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than +acts of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad +sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above +the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are +Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher +(Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of +"heroic" or "divine virtue [*_arete heroike kai theia_]," in respect +of which some men are called "divine." + +Reply Obj. 2: The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they +are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed +to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. +For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose light +flows from God. + +Reply Obj. 3: This definition applies to virtue taken in its general +sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as +distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we +lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is +measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from +infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation +to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the +promptings of God. + +Reply Obj. 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it +proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, +according as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same +applies to the other virtues. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 2] + +Whether the Gifts Are Necessary to Man for Salvation? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man +for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection +surpassing the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary +for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing +the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not +under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not +necessary to man for salvation. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave +well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's +behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; +and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts +are not necessary to man for salvation. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost +gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel +against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against +ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against +pride." But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found +in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for +salvation. + +_On the contrary,_ Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, +and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: +since of wisdom it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him +that dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is +without fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are +placed between these are also necessary for salvation. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the gifts are perfections of +man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of +God. Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not +sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, +there is, in consequence, need for a gift. + +Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its +natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, +with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as +stated above (Q. 62, A. 1). And, though this latter perfection is +greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more +perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his +full possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since +we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything +that has a nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work +according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who +works inwardly in every nature and in every will. On the other hand, +that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of +itself work, unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which +possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon +which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed +light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can +work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, +cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions from him. + +Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to +man's connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his +reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the +shape of special promptings from God, this will be out of God's +superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not +every one that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or +divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to +which man's reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and +imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of +reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting +or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. 8:14, 17: "Whosoever +are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, +heirs also": and Ps. 142:10: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the +right land," because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of +that land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the +Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it is +necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 1: The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the +virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass +the commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect +of man being moved by a higher principle. + +Reply Obj. 2: By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so +perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual +need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, +for the reason already given. + +Reply Obj. 3: Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its +natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it +does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is +unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the +objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are +subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, +dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently +the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His +promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 3] + +Whether the Gifts of the Holy Ghost Are Habits? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not +habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as +"a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the _Predicaments_ +(Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy +Ghost rest in Him, as stated in Isa. 11:2, 3: "He upon Whom thou +shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that +baptizeth"; on which words Gregory comments as follows (Moral. ii, +27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular +way, He dwells always in the Mediator." Therefore the gifts of the +Holy Ghost are not habits. + +Obj. 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as +he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). But in +so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an +instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is +befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the +gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. + +Obj. 3: Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine +inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit: +for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," +as Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the +gifts of the Holy Ghost. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His +disciples (John 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in +you." Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore +His gifts abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or +passions but abiding habits. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the gifts are perfections of +man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. +Now it is evident from what has been already said (Q. 56, A. 4; Q. +58, A. 2), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power +according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, +as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. +Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy +Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in +comparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now +the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are +disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy +Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy +Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 1: Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying +that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy +Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now +the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above (A. 2). +Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy +men. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which +has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is +not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy +Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will. +Therefore he needs a habit. + +Reply Obj. 3: Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the +manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: +hence the comparison fails. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 4] + +Whether the Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost Are Suitably Enumerated? + +Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are +unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down +corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, +understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; +whereas nothing is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth +intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to +justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. +the gift of fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to +temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently. + +Obj. 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude +is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore +justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down. + +Obj. 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to +God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by +God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological +virtues, should have been included. + +Obj. 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, +of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided +with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the +other three. + +Obj. 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; +counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, +some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. +Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Holy Writ (Isa. 11:2, 3). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the gifts are habits +perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the +Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers +so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the +appetitive powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is +natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, +as by a superior power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the +principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even +as they are virtues; and such powers are the reason and appetite. + +Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the +apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and +judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of +truth, the speculative reason is perfected by _understanding;_ the +practical reason, by _counsel._ In order to judge aright, the +speculative reason is perfected by _wisdom_; the practical reason by +_knowledge._ The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's +relations to another, is perfected by _piety;_ in matters touching +himself, it is perfected by _fortitude_ against the fear of dangers; +and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by _fear,_ according to +Prov. 15:27: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil," +and Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid +of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all +those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, +extend. + +Reply Obj. 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters +concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, +but to external things that can be made, since art is the right +reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made +(Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of +the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the +principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when +He moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to +temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, +to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good +appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to +withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, +and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name +of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our +country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is +also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore +the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all, +is fittingly called piety. + +Reply Obj. 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless +in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved +by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union +between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith, hope +and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the +gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to +these three virtues, as being derived therefrom. + +Reply Obj. 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God +is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are +transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the +other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to +God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from +certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its +name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from +evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does. + +Reply Obj. 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of +man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their +directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of +understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. +Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a +consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 5] + +Whether the Gifts of the Holy Ghost Are Connected? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the +Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the +word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to +the same Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the +gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are +given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the +faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some of the +gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems +that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and the +same man. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small +account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless +if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the +strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very +weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if +it hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it +lack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has +these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good +action": from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift +without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not +connected. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with +the following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's +sons, that by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of +whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore +the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening +one another. + +_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question is easily gathered +from what has been already set down. For it has been stated (A. 3) +that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues +as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul +are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. +Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. 5:5: +"The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, +Who is given to us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. +Wherefore, just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, +so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so +that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of +which can one possess without charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as +gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the +knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to +instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this +sense that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and +knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the +"word" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts +of the Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but +perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the +promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and +human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in all who are +possessed of charity. + +Reply Obj. 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while +expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (Obj. 1): hence he +is referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a +gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For +it is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain +the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, +to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against +the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the +proper name of knowledge." + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues +is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected +by another, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 1); so Gregory wishes to +prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that +one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed +that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless +one virtue lend its support to another." We are therefore not to +understand that one gift can be without another; but that if +understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as +temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 6] + +Whether the Gifts of the Holy Ghost Remain in Heaven? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not +remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of +His sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all +temptations." Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according +to Isa. 11:9: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My +holy mountain." Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in +heaven. + +Obj. 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated +above (A. 3). But habits are of no use, where their acts are +impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; +for Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates +the truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . +. fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the +inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of which are incompatible with +the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the +state of glory. + +Obj. 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative +life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, +e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as +Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy +Ghost will be in the state of glory. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city +of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an +earthly river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but +taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more +abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of +sevenfold heavenly virtue." + +_I answer that,_ We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to +their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may +be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for +this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind +amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially +realized in heaven, where God will be "all in all" (1 Cor. 15:28), +and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered +as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in +the present life they have an operation about a matter, in respect of +which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered +in this way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as we +have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues (Q. +67, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as +they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they +afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of +glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good +by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that +passes away with the present state, and something that remains in the +future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the +hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, hope passes, and +certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the +truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness," of +which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach no more every man +. . . his brother" (Jer. 31:3, 4); but the enlightening of the mind +remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being +impetuous," which is necessary in the present life; and also that "it +makes the mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future +state. Of fortitude he says that it "fears not adversity," which is +necessary in the present life; and further, that it "sets before us +the viands of confidence," which remains also in the future life. +With regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she +overcomes the void of ignorance," which refers to the present state. +When, however, he adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer +figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future +state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with +deeds of mercy." These words taken literally refer only to the +present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by +"the inmost heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will +achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he says +that "it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," +which refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens it with +the meat of hope for the future," which also belongs to the present +state, as regards hope, but may also refer to the future state, as +regards being "strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain +there. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. +For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life; +but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things +pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly +bliss. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 7] + +Whether the Gifts Are Set Down by Isaias in Their Order of Dignity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias +in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that +which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of +man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written (Deut. 10:12): +"And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but +that thou fear the Lord thy God?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a +master, where is My fear?" Therefore it seems that fear, which is +mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts. + +Obj. 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the +Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable +to all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. +Therefore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be +the most excellent gift. + +Obj. 3: Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel +pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry. +Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it +is set down as being below it. + +Obj. 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while +science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than +the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than +fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the +gifts are not set down in their order of dignity. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It +seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which +Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these" (of which +we read in Matt. 5:3): "but there is a difference of order, for +there" (viz. in Isaias) "the enumeration begins with the more +excellent gifts, here, with the lower gifts." + +_I answer that,_ The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two +ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as +proceeding from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by +comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the +gifts simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their +comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for all +the acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated +above (A. 4). Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence +of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the +contemplative are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, +understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom +stands before understanding, and understanding before science, and +prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, +wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than +piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels +fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, +and fortitude temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude +and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and +counsel are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and +knowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the +gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so +far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference to the +others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as +counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and piety, it is +considered with regard to their matter. + +Reply Obj. 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to +speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the +Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not +as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the +order of generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov. +16:16), before doing good works, and which result from the other +gifts. + +Reply Obj. 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not +compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of +which he had said it "is profitable to little." + +Reply Obj. 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of +its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: +for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, +3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters. + +Reply Obj. 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are +more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in +relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because +reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. +But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the +directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to +piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of +difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary +matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason of their +matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 8] + +Whether the Virtues Are More Excellent Than the Gifts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than +the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of +charity: "No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this +alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the +children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy +Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing." But charity is a +virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the +Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more +excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for +Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the +mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, +temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven +virtues" (viz. the gifts), so "as against folly to bestow wisdom; +against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against +fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of +heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues are more +excellent than the gifts. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the +virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make +evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up +the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or +understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or +counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that +fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest +knowledge, while it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest +piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; +and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit +of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts +of the Holy Ghost. + +_On the contrary,_ The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and +to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (Obj. +2), so that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. +Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues. + +_I answer that,_ As was shown above (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 62, A. 1), there +are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some +intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those +whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are +those whereby reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are +those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the +reason. On the other hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the +powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion. + +Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, +by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way +as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which +perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues. +Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the +moral virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more +excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence +Gregory says (Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven +gifts, "never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all +they do be done in faith, hope, and charity." + +But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and +moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the +gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their +Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the +other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more +exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the +thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more +perfect than the virtues. + +Reply Obj. 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to +be more perfect than the gifts. + +Reply Obj. 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. +One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes +love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the +intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. +The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of +one's neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this +way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, +through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be +rightly subordinate to God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the +Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which +"dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and +understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far +as they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the +perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory +means to say. +________________________ + +QUESTION 69 + +OF THE BEATITUDES +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues? + +(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life? + +(3) Of the number of the beatitudes; + +(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 69, Art. 1] + +Whether the Beatitudes Differ from the Virtues and Gifts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the +virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) +assigns the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts +of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq., +ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal +virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and +gifts. + +Obj. 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the +reason and the eternal law, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; Q. 21, A. +1). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the +gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, +as is clear from what has been said (Q. 68, AA. 1, 3, seqq.). +Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude +of the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the +beatitudes do not differ from them. + +Obj. 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, +and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do +not differ from the virtues and gifts. + +_On the contrary,_ Certain things are included among the beatitudes, +that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and +peace. Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 2, A. 7; Q. 3, A. 1), happiness +is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end +already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher says +(Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are +full of hope"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "We are saved by +hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved +towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. +And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of +virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of +eternal happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we +need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His +gifts that we may obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes +differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit from habit, but as +act from habit. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the +gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are +more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above (Q. 68, A. +8). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the +throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, who +is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the +mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them to the +gifts of the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument proves that no other habits, besides the +virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct. + +Reply Obj. 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of +meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these +might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, +because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues +perfect him, as stated above (Q. 68, A. 2). +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 69, Art. 2] + +Whether the Rewards Assigned to the Beatitudes Refer to This Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the +beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be +happy because they hope for a reward, as stated above (A. 1). Now the +object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to +the life to come. + +Obj. 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to +the beatitudes, Luke 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are +filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you +shall mourn and weep." Now these punishments do not refer to this +life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according +to Job 21:13: "They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do +the rewards of the beatitudes refer to this life. + +Obj. 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the +reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De +Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant +fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps. +16:15: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall +appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God, +and that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 +John 3:2: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared +what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be +like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these +rewards refer to the future life. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): +"These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to +have been fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that +complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised +to us after this life." + +_I answer that,_ Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking +of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that +all these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De +Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; +and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to +the future, and some to the present life. + +In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of +future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of +our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; +and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect +inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it +is one thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves +begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the +fruit. + +Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the +beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to +happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned +as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the +future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in +those who have attained perfection, in which case they refer to the +present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts +of the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at +perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly +kingdom. + +Reply Obj. 1: Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it +may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that +end, according to Ps. 27:7: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have +been helped." + +Reply Obj. 2: Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal +punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence +Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so, +Lord--that the disordered mind should be its own punishment." The +Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul +is divided against itself . . . one part pulls this way, another +that"; and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a +man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In +like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes do not +receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual +rewards, even in this life, according to Matt. 19:29, and Mk. 10:30: +"Ye shall receive a hundred times as much" even "in this time." + +Reply Obj. 3: All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life +to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this +life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (loc. cit.), +can denote the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" +begins to reign in men. The "possession" of the land denotes the +well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the +solid foundation of the eternal inheritance, signified by "the land." +They are "comforted" in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who +is called the "Paraclete," i.e. the Comforter. They "have their +fill," even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said (John +4:34): "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me." Again, in +this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again, the eye being cleansed +by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, "see God." +Likewise, in this life, those who are the "peacemakers" of their own +movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called "the children +of God." Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly fulfilled +in heaven. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 69, Art. 3] + +Whether the Beatitudes Are Suitably Enumerated? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably +enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated +above (A. 1, ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and +understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is +assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters +connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are +insufficiently enumerated. + +Obj. 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active +life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge and +counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected +with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are +insufficiently indicated. + +Obj. 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active +life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety seems to +correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included +directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are +insufficiently enumerated. + +Obj. 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. +Thus, it is written (Job 5:17): "Blessed is the man whom God +correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked +in the counsel of the ungodly"; and (Prov. 3:13): "Blessed is the man +that findeth wisdom." Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently +enumerated. + +Obj. 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For +there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes are +indicated. + +Obj. 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth +chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5 +are too many. + +_I answer that,_ These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To +make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to +consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a +sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative +life [*See Q. 3]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in +different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are +said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary +to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the +active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative +happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, +if imperfect, is a beginning thereof. + +And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as +removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure +consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, +whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn--by a virtue so +that he uses them in moderation--and by a gift, in a more excellent +way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude +is: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the +contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from +humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent +of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following +the irascible passions man is withdrawn--by a virtue, so that they +are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason--and by +a gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's +will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude +is: "Blessed are the meek." From following the concupiscible +passions, man is withdrawn--by a virtue, so that man uses these +passions in moderation--and by a gift, so that, if necessary, he +casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes +a deliberate choice of sorrow [*Cf. Q. 35, A. 3]; hence the third +beatitude is: "Blessed are they that mourn." + +Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor, +either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the +former we are disposed--by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do +our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice--and by a gift, +so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of +justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats +and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: +"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice." With regard +to spontaneous favors we are perfected--by a virtue, so that we give +where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others +united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and by a +gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs +of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: hence it is written +(Luke 14:12, 13): "When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy +friends, nor thy brethren," etc . . . "but . . . call the poor, the +maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth +beatitude is: "Blessed are the merciful." + +Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final +beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are +included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the +effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative +life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active +life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in +himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled +by the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean +of heart." But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is +perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life +is peace, according to Isa. 32:17: "The work of justice shall be +peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers." + +Reply Obj. 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life +are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to +the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason +given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift of +understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of +God," corresponds to the gift of wisdom. + +Reply Obj. 2: In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is +not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even +the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude +implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include the acts of +those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, +as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to counsel is the act of +counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the other hand, +they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the +direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and mercy in +respect of counsel. + +Reply Obj. 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider +two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first five +beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their +directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the +executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and +mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations +to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Luke 6:22: "It +is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb +indignation," fortitude being about the irascible passions: +poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from +the lusts and pleasures of the world. + +Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this +way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the +principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to +piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows +his failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18: +"He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The +principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is +fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is +God's counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable +to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with +alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor." It is thus +that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4). + +Reply Obj. 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be +reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: +because they must all belong either to the active or to the +contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man +whom the Lord correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of +mourning: when we read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked in +the counsel of the ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: +and when we read, "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must +be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies +to all others that can be adduced. + +Reply Obj. 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration +of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is +confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows +that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the +eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven. + +Reply Obj. 6: Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the +multitude (Luke 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to +the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than +pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes +Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. +The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets +aside by saying: "Blessed are ye poor." The second is that man be +well off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he +excludes by saying in the second place: "Blessed are ye that hunger." +The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of +heart, and this he puts aside by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep +now." The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes, +saying, fourthly: "Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you." +And as Ambrose says on Luke 6:20, "poverty corresponds to temperance, +which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers +is compassionate and, through compassion gives; mourning, to +prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred +belongs to fortitude." +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 69, Art. 4] + +Whether the Rewards of the Beatitudes Are Suitably Enumerated? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are +unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is +eternal life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the +kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned. + +Obj. 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, +both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same +ground it should have been assigned to all. + +Obj. 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, +as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the +rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess +the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of heaven." Therefore +these rewards are unsuitably enumerated. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded +these rewards. + +_I answer that,_ These rewards are most suitably assigned, +considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three +kinds of happiness indicated above (A. 3). For the first three +beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which +sensual happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking +the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. +in God, but in temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards +of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some +men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men seek in external +things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, +both of which are implied in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man +attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our +Lord promised the kingdom of heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, +cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy +their enemies so as to gain security for themselves. Hence Our Lord +promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the +living, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, +men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts +and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those +that mourn. + +Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which +are the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his +neighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate +love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes +rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from +them. For there are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead +of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they +may abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who +hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, +recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's +misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain +mercy, and be delivered from all misery. + +The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or +beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the +dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes +one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they +shall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among +others, shows a man to be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity +and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine +sonship, consisting in perfect union with God through consummate +wisdom. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these +rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human +intellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by +means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion to +the merits to which those rewards are assigned. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all +the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. +Hence it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other +rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to +Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor +in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer +persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of +the body. + +Reply Obj. 3: The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For +it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to +have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and +peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to +have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of +which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill +than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies abundance of +comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more +than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God, +even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also +sees the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal +palace belongs to the king's son. +________________________ + +QUESTION 70 + +OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head +there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts? + +(2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes? + +(3) Of their number? + +(4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 70, Art. 1] + +Whether the Fruits of the Holy Ghost Which the Apostle Enumerates +(Gal. 5) Are Acts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, +enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22, 23), are not acts. For that +which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we +should go on indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is +written (Wis. 3:15): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and (John +4:36): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto +life everlasting." Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits. + +Obj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy +[*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the +English 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing +in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their own +sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits. + +Obj. 3: Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle +numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. +Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above (Q. 55, A. +1). Therefore the fruits are not actions. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 12:33): "By the fruit the +tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy +men explain the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits. + +_I answer that,_ The word "fruit" has been transferred from the +material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is +the product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain +sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that +produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. +Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word "fruit" in +two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the +tree, is that which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is +what he gathers. + +Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last +and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet +these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, +that which man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In +this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his +enjoyment. + +If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then +human actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act +of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then +man's operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said +to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect +of a higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's +operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine +seed, for it is written (1 John 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God, +committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him." + +Reply Obj. 1: Since fruit is something last and final, nothing +hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is +subordinate to another. And so our works, in so far as they are +produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far +as they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should +rather be called flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): "My +flowers are the fruits of honor and riches." + +Reply Obj. 2: When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own +sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the +expression "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; +and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the +last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in +this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason +of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for +its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but +as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own +sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must +say that man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his last +end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of +their inherent goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence +Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits +because "they refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine +delight." + +Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their +actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to +believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): +"Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor." +It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the +fruits. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 70, Art. 2] + +Whether the Fruits Differ from the Beatitudes? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the +beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated +above (Q. 69, A. 1, ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he +is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are +fruits of the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude +which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the present +life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. +Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future beatitude. +Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes. + +Obj. 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and +delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above +(Q. 3, A. 1; Q. 4, A. 1). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same +nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another. + +_On the contrary,_ Things divided into different species, differ from +one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different +parts, as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. +Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes. + +_I answer that,_ More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. +Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and +delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and +excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not +vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one +delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and +which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts +rather than to the virtues, as already stated (Q. 69, A. 1, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but +not that all the fruits are beatitudes. + +Reply Obj. 2: The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect +simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other +hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and +perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes. + +Reply Obj. 3: More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as +stated. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 70, Art. 3] + +Whether the Fruits Are Suitably Enumerated by the Apostle? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated +by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22, 23). Because, elsewhere, he says that +there is only one fruit of the present life; according to Rom. 6:22: +"You have your fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written +(Isa. 27:9): "This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken +away." Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits. + +Obj. 2: Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated +(A. 1). But Our Lord mentions (Matt. 13:23) a threefold fruit as +growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold, +sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold." Therefore one should not reckon twelve +fruits. + +Obj. 3: Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate +and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned +by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a +painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather +something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are +enumerated. + +Obj. 4: On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated +insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated (A. 2) that +all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned +here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and +of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are +insufficiently enumerated. + +_I answer that,_ The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the +Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the +twelve fruits of which it is written (Apoc. 22:2): "On both sides of +the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a +fruit is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or +root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the +various ways in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process +consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, +in regard to itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; +thirdly, in regard to things that are below it. + +Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it +has a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. +Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is +effected by love, which is the first of our emotions and the root of +them all, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4). Wherefore among the fruits +of the Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is +given in a special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself +is love. Hence it is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is +poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." +The necessary result of the love of charity is joy: because every +lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always +actual presence in God Whom it loves, according to 1 John 4:16: "He +that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore +the sequel of charity is "joy." Now the perfection of joy is peace in +two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for +it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is +disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is +perfectly set at peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any +other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written +(Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them +there is no stumbling-block," because, to wit, external things do not +disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm +of the restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not +satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two +things, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that +our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity +and joy, "peace" is given the third place. In evil things the mind +has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being +disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience"; +secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed; +which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of +evil" (Ethic. v, 3). + +Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his +neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs +_goodness._ Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this +belongs _benignity,_ for the benign are those in whom the salutary +flame (_bonus ignis_) of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to +their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the +evils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs _meekness,_ which +curbs anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm +to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or +deceit. To this pertains _faith,_ if we take it as denoting fidelity. +But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man +is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject +his intellect and, consequently, all that is his, to God. + +Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as +regards external action, by _modesty,_ whereby we observe the _mode_ +in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by +_continency_ and _chastity:_ whether these two differ because +chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, continency also from +lawful desires: or because the continent man is subject to +concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither +subject to, nor led away from them. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which +also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in +the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided +into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits. + +Reply Obj. 2: The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do +not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various +degrees of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus continency of +the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; +the continency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal +continency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways +in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to +the three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because +the perfection of anything is considered with respect to its +beginning, its middle, and its end. + +Reply Obj. 3: The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is +something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the +foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as +much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith, +which is certainly about the unseen." + +Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says on Gal. 5:22, 23, "the Apostle had no +intention of teaching us how many (either works of the flesh, or +fruits of the Spirit) there are; but to show how the former should be +avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer +fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the +gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of +fittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct +the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of +wisdom and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, +joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, +is that these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from +evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 70, Art. 4] + +Whether the Fruits of the Holy Ghost Are Contrary to the Works of the +Flesh? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not +contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates +(Gal. 5:19, seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the +works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the +Spirit are not contrary to them. + +Obj. 2: Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions +more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore the +fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to +one another. + +Obj. 3: Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is +given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness, +and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh, are not +opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the +works of the flesh. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh +lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." + +_I answer that,_ The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit +may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the +fruits of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the +works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to +that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which +surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite +draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since +upward and downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so +in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of +the Spirit. + +Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be +considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this +they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated +above (A. 3, ad 4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the +works, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, +Augustine, commenting on Gal. 5:22, 23, contrasts the fruits with the +carnal works, each to each. Thus "to fornication, which is the love +of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, +whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By +uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from +fornication: and to these the joy of tranquillity is opposed. +Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, +is opposed to peace. Against witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, +emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps +us to bear the evils inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; +while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive +them. In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to +drunkenness and revellings, contingency." + +Reply Obj. 1: That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's +nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since +works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are +contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue are called +fruits, but not so works of vice. + +Reply Obj. 2: "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," +as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices +are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of +the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit. + +The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said. +________________________ + +EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ. 71-89) +________________________ + +QUESTION 71 + +OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES +(In Six Articles) + +We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six +points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in +themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one +another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect +of sin. + +Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue? + +(2) Whether vice is contrary to nature? + +(3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act? + +(4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue? + +(5) Whether every sin includes action? + +(6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. +xxii): "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law." +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 1] + +Whether Vice Is Contrary to Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For +one thing has one contrary, as proved in _Metaph._ x, text. 17. Now +sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary +to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members +or of any things whatever. + +Obj. 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But +vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is +not contrary to virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is +the soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is +opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice +is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a +quality which makes its subject good," as was shown above (Q. 55, AA. +3, 4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue. + +_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in virtue--the essence +of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of +virtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider +something consequently. Virtue implies _directly_ a disposition +whereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its +nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that +"virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; +and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its +nature." That which virtue implies _consequently_ is that it is a +kind of goodness: because the goodness of a thing consists in its +being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to +which virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown above (Q. 56, +A. 3). + +Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of +these is _sin,_ which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to +which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an +inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: +in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is +a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is _malice_: while in +respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its +contrary is _vice_: because the vice of a thing seems to consist in +its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine +says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural +perfection may be called a vice." + +Reply Obj. 1: These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in +the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the +latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a +kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such. + +Reply Obj. 2: Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the +principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The +reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in +act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a +good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease and +sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body he calls +it disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with +fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease is attended +with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well +compacted together." And although at times there may be disease in +the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden +complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted +occupations; "yet, in the soul," as he says, "these two things are +indistinguishable, except in thought." For whenever a man is +ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is +rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since "a tree is +known by its fruit," i.e. man by his works, according to Matt. 12:33. +But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a +habit or affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with +itself through life": and this is to be found even without disease +and sickness, e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. +Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even +as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is +reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is +reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or +disease. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 2] + +Whether Vice Is Contrary to Nature? + +Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. +Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now +virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as +stated above (Q. 63, AA. 1, 2, 3). Therefore vice is not contrary to +nature. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which +is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated to +upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to +vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. + +Obj. 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the +greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is +found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Matt. 7:13): +"Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who +go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. + +Obj. 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated +above (A. 1). Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or desire, +contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, +27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that +vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every +vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), vice is contrary to virtue. +Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a +manner befitting its nature, as stated above (A. 1). Hence the vice +of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting +its nature, and for this reason is that thing "vituperated," which +word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, +14). + +But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the +form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his +species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary +to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature +of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord +with the nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord +with reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius +states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man +good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as much +as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's +nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature as +regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which +accords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says +(De Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, +like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to +be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary +to nature. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being +against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to +"being from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is +contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense +virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they +incline us to that which is suitable to nature. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and +the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his +senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who +follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow the +order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than +achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is +owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive +nature against the order of his reason. + +Reply Obj. 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to +the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to +the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it +amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human +reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence +Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every nature, as such, is +from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the +Divine art whereby it was made." +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 3] + +Whether Vice Is Worse Than a Vicious Act? + +Objection 1: It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than +a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better +it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious +habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. +Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. + +Obj. 2: Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a +bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a +vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. + +Obj. 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit +produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their +badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in +goodness and in badness. + +_On the contrary,_ A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but +not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a +vicious action is worse than a vicious habit. + +_I answer that,_ A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it +is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as +stated in _Metaph._ ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be +able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do +evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in +goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between power and act, +so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the +corresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below +the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that a +habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a +good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or bad by reason of +the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its +habit in goodness or badness, since "the cause of a thing being such, +is yet more so." + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another +simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above +another simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; +while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it +in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from +the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in +goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more lasting +than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are +both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and +whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act +simply excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain +respect. + +Reply Obj. 2: A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain +respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit +precedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness. + +Reply Obj. 3: Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act +causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we +consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses +habit both in goodness and in badness. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 4] + +Whether Sin Is Compatible with Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is +incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the +same subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated +above (A. 1). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil +habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, +therefore, can sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary +matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural +things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus +monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the seed, +as stated in _Phys._ ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary +matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: so +that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2, 3) that +"virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes." Now one +virtuous act does not cause a virtue, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 3): +and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore +they can be together in the same subject. + +_I answer that,_ Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. +Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a +form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of +necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is +incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is +incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward +movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): +whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, +produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently +man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or +produce a contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an +act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot +corrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit: +since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it +destroyed by one act as stated above (Q. 63, A. 2, ad 2). But if +we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is +possible for some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every +mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the +infused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, charity being banished +by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are +expelled _as virtues._ And I say [this] on account of faith and hope, whose +habits remain unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer +virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to +charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the +other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by +one act of any kind of sin. + +Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but +is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible +with virtues, whether infused or acquired. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of +itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the +act, but not with the habit, of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin +to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes +acts of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 3: The natural powers act of necessity, and hence +so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On +the other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of +necessity; hence the comparison fails. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 5] + +Whether Every Sin Includes an Action? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as +merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now +there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can +there be sin without action. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera +Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, +unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be +voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin +implies an act. + +Obj. 3: Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a +man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never +does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he +ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this +is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who +knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to +do" does not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act. + +_I answer that,_ The reason for urging this question has reference to +the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. +For some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either +interior or exterior--interior, as when a man wills _not to go to +church,_ when he is bound to go--exterior, as when a man, at the very +hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), occupies +himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in +a way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one +thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, to +go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, +that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he is +bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. +On the other hand, others say, that a sin of omission does not +necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one +is bound to do is a sin. + +Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of +omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin +consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, +as when a man wills _not to go to church:_ while sometimes it will be +without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, +at the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going +or not going to church. + +If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or +occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity +include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit +what we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what +we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, +either united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be +not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone +omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or +occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such +cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some +act, at least the interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears +directly on the omission, as when a man wills _not to go to church,_ +because it is too much trouble; and in this case this act, of its +very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin +whatever, pertains, of itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is +essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears +directly on something else which hinders man from doing what he +ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as +when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church--or, +precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, +the result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In +this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to the +omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that +which is outside the intention is said to be accidental (Phys. ii, +text. 49, 50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission +has indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but that +this act is accidental to the sin of omission. + +Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is +proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently +it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the +circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential to other actual +sins. + +Reply Obj. 1: More things are required for good than for evil, since +"good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results +from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that +sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing +what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly +what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act, +whereas there can be sin without act. + +Reply Obj. 2: The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that on +which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which +we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 5. +Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has +it in his power to will, and not to will. + +Reply Obj. 3: The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative +precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to +act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept +binds him to act. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 6] + +Whether Sin Is Fittingly Defined As a Word, Deed, or Desire Contrary +to the Eternal Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: +"Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." +Because "word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every +sin implies an act, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore this definition +does not include every sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the +will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised +under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. +Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary to the +eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed." + +Obj. 3: Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from +the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to +the end as explained above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6; Q. 20, AA. +2, 3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference +to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to neglect +eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he says +(Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using +what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use." Now the +definition in question contains no mention of aversion from our due +end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is +contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being +forbidden, but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore +sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God. + +Obj. 5: Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained +above (A. 1). Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius +states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say +that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the +eternal law. + +_On the contrary,_ the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. +xxii, 27). + +_I answer that,_ As was shown above (A. 1), sin is nothing else than +a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being +voluntary, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), whether it be voluntary, as +being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being +commanded by the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or +operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with +its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a +rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now +there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and +homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. +the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly +Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the +definition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act, +and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says "word, +deed, or desire"; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and +which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, "contrary to the +eternal law." + +Reply Obj. 1: Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: +e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the +genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6, 7): and so +"word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is not said, +what is done and what is not done. + +Reply Obj. 2: The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands +all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it +is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will +alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin, +through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in +defining sin to include something referring to external action. + +Reply Obj. 3: The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his +end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to +things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary +to the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end and all other +forms of inordinateness. + +Reply Obj. 4: When it is said that not every sin is evil through +being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive +law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, +which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in +the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through +being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely +because it is inordinate. + +Reply Obj. 5: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense +against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to +reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being +"contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference to +its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs +us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith. +________________________ + +QUESTION 72 + +OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS +(In Nine Articles) + +We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which +head there are nine points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects? + +(2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins; + +(3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes? + +(4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against? + +(5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment? + +(6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission? + +(7) Whether they differ according to their various stages? + +(8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency? + +(9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 1] + +Whether Sins Differ in Species According to Their Objects? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species, +according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in +relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, +AA. 4, 6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as +stated above (Q. 71, A. 1), it seems that sins should differ +specifically according to their ends rather than according to their +objects. + +Obj. 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically +according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil +in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically +according to their opposites rather than according to their objects. + +Obj. 3: Further, if sins differed specifically according to their +objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with +diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is +about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, +18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins +do not differ in species according to their objects. + +_On the contrary,_ "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's +law." Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to +their various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated +above (Q. 18, A. 2). Therefore sins, also differ in species according +to their objects. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 71, A. 6), two things concur in +the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, +which consists in departing from God's law. Of these two, one is +referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act +in such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of +the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for +"no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). +Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is +essential and not from that which is accidental: because what is +accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ +specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the +inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species +according to their objects, as was proved above (Q. 18, A. 2). +Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species +by their objects. + +Reply Obj. 1: The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and +therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the +will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to +the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its +due order: hence sins differ specifically according to the objects of +their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even +if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite virtues, it +would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according +to their objects, as stated above (Q. 60, A. 5). + +Reply Obj. 3: In various things, differing in species or genus, +nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from +which aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks +excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks +abundance of things adapted to human use. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 2] + +Whether Spiritual Sins Are Fittingly Distinguished from Carnal Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly +distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): +"The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, +uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. from +which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now +carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins +should not be distinguished from spiritual sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as +stated in Rom. 8:13: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall +die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you +shall live." Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to +pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not +be distinguished from spiritual sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or +reason, is called the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in +the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according +to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the +flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a +sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on +(Q. 74, A. 7). Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, +and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another. + +Obj. 4: Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, +seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins +against his own body. But, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), +"every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that +committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body." Therefore +fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (Eph. +5:3) reckons covetousness with the carnal sins. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven +capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), sins take their species from +their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable +good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the possession of +which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q. 31, +A. 3), pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is +consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in +accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual pleasure, +e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other +pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and +this can also be called carnal pleasure. + +Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are +called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure, +are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the +pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. +Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse ourselves from +all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit." + +Reply Obj. 1: As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are +called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal +pleasure; but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according +to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says +(De Civ. Dei xiv, 2, 3). The reason of this is because every failing +in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense. + +This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. +the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are +named, is carnal pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 4: As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the soul +is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of +sinning it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of +gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It +may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body +also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is +man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, +which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, +which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, it may be +said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is +something bodily, and in this respect covetousness is numbered with +the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, +but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it +is a spiritual sin. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 3] + +Whether Sins Differ Specifically in Reference to Their Causes? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference +to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it +derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. +Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they +differ specifically in reference to their causes. + +Obj. 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have +least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like its +material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according +to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in reference +to their other causes. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set on +fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear +inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor." +For it is written (1 John 2:16) that "all that is in the world, is +the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence +of the eyes, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is +said to be in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world +denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in +Joan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins +according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer +to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically +according to the diversity of their causes. + +_On the contrary,_ If this were the case all sins would belong to one +species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus. +10:15) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and (1 Tim. 6:10) +that "the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is +evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not +differ specifically according to their different causes. + +_I answer that,_ Since there are four kinds of causes, they are +attributed to various things in various ways. Because the _formal_ +and the _material_ cause regard properly the substance of a thing; +and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and +form, both in species and in genus. The _agent_ and the _end_ regard +directly movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations +differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, +however, because the natural active principles are always determined +to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts are +taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those +acts, but also from their active principles: thus heating and cooling +are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the +other hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts +of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and +consequently from one active or motive principle, diverse species of +sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may +proceed to theft, or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his +care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue +ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically +according to their various active or motive causes, but only in +respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object +of the will. For it has been shown above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, +6) that human acts take their species from the end. + +Reply Obj. 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not being +determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human +acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the +end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15, 16), and +consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end. + +Reply Obj. 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have the +character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior +act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to +this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even +considered as the matter "about which," they have the character of +term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; +_Ethic._ x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so +far as term has the character of end. + +Reply Obj. 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct +species of sins, but to show their various causes. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 4] + +Whether Sin Is Fittingly Divided into Sin Against God, Against +Oneself, and Against One's Neighbor? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin +against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that +which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the +division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for +it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," +as stated above (Q. 66, A. 6). Therefore sin against God should not +be reckoned a part of the division of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, every division should consist of things in +opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not +opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins +against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly +divided into these three. + +Obj. 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external. But +God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not +distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin +is unfittingly divided according to these three. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of +sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and +against his neighbor." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 71, AA. 1, 6), sin is an +inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in +relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and +passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another +order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man +should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a +solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is +naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in _Polit._ i, 2, +hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation +to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second +contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever things are +comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of +God Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of God, +which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things +due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance, +by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In +like manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it, +because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our +neighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason. +Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation +to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man +sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen +in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in +matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his +neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things +whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are +diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their +objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and +consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different +species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, +differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from +what has been said (Q. 62, AA. 1, 2, 3) that by the theological +virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to +himself; and by justice to his neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 1: To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as +the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order +to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special +kind of sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: When several things, of which one includes another, are +distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, +not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes +beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and +figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not +in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in +which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers +three and four. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although God and our neighbor are external to the +sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are +related to it as to its object. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 5] + +Whether the Division of Sins According to Their Debt of Punishment +Diversifies Their Species? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to +their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, +when sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are +infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the +same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since +temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to +mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the +gravity of the fault, according to Deut. 25:2: "According to the +measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be." +Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can +they be said to belong to the same species. + +Obj. 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species +[*_Ex genere,_ genus in this case denoting the species], as murder +and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in +an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal +sins differ specifically. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its +reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward +is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of +sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as +stated above (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically +distinct according to the debt of punishment. + +_On the contrary,_ Those things that constitute a species are prior +to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin +as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically +according to the debt of punishment. + +_I answer that,_ In things that differ specifically we find a twofold +difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to +be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational," +"animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is consequent to +specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may [follow from +the diversity of species], yet, in others, it may be found within the +same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific +diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within +the one species of man. + +We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal +sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment, +cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is +accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the +agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is +evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, +wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the +sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, +viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments +according to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference +derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the +specific diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it. + +Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the +diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin. +For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of +order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order, +implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: +thus, in an animal's body, the frame may be so out of order that the +vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; +while, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be +disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the +principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in +the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable +principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore +when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last +end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; +but when it is disordered without turning away from God, there is +venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which +results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable +according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired +by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters +concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is +impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one +who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the +truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he +who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the +nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin +mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins +without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his +disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not +destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he +does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally. + +Reply Obj. 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards +what they _turn away from,_ not as regards what they _turn to,_ viz. +the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same +species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the +species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle +word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its +species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that +this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not +that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even +in things of the same species, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or acts +virtu[ous]ly; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, +but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 6] + +Whether Sins of Commission and Omission Differ Specifically? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sins of commission and omission +differ specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one +another (Eph. 2:1), where it is written: "When you were dead in your +offenses and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: +"'Offenses,' by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by +doing what was forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here +denotes sins of omission; while "sin" denotes sins of commission. +Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with +one another as different species. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for +this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said +(Q. 71, A. 6). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against +which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative +precepts, against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of +omission and commission differ specifically. + +Obj. 3: Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and +negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, +since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor +difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text. +67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same +species. + +_On the contrary,_ Omission and commission are found in the same +species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to +others, which is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to +whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission +and commission do not differ specifically. + +_I answer that,_ There is a twofold difference in sins; a material +difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be +observed in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal +difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which +is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing +from one another in the material specific difference, which are +nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are +directed to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing +come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves +differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if +we refer to the material species in sins of omission and commission, +they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far +as negation and privation may have a species. But if we refer to the +formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ +specifically, because they are directed to the same end, and proceed +from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, +both robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the +glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the +prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, +negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, is its +cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that +fire gives forth heat, and that it does not give forth cold. + +Reply Obj. 1: This division in respect of commission and omission, is +not according to different formal species, but only according to +material species, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and +negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, +first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative +precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by +the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative +precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees +of virtue; and consequently they are not, of necessity, opposed to +sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from +which it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or +privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. +Consequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various +precepts of the Law. + +Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers the material diversity of +sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, +negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by +reduction to the affirmation on which it is based. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 7] + +Whether Sins Are Fittingly Divided into Sins of Thought, Word, and +Deed? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into +sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) +describes three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal +sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second stage +is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; +and the third stage, "when consent is given to the deed." Now these +three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to +reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; +the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second, +"when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a +habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume on God's +mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made +between sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin +are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting. + +Obj. 3: Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there +precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ +specifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one +another. + +_On the contrary,_ Jerome in commenting on Ezech. 43:23, says: "The +human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is +either by thought, or word, or deed." + +_I answer that,_ Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when +each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ +specifically: secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from +diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is +the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the +foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, +as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to +the generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these +three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various +complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, +wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first +beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of +thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is +ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third +degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these +three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless +it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of +sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, +through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then +he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful +deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in +respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided +into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for +this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: +whereas Jerome (in commenting on Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between +them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation +which is intended principally; while in sins of deed, it is the +consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and +the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are +stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and +youth follow the complete generation of a man. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from +the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each +is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct +from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only +when there is a break in the movement. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 8] + +Whether Excess and Deficiency Diversify the Species of Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that excess and deficiency do not +diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in +respect of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a +species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species +of sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to +straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative +matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the +species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than +the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by +straying more or less from the rectitude of reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry +declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. _Metaph._ i]. Now excess and +deficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and +wasteful--illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, by +excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species +of sins. + +_On the contrary,_ Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety +is a difference of form," as stated in _Metaph._ x, text. 13, 14. Now +vices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to +one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ +specifically. + +_I answer that,_ While there are two things in sin, viz. the act +itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from +the order of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is +gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's +intention, as stated above (A. 1), but one the contrary, from the act +itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention +is directed. Consequently wherever we find a different motive +inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of +sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by +excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of +deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just as the +motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while +the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same. +Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary +to one another. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although _more_ and _less_ do not cause diversity of +species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in +so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say +that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. +viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no different species of +friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by +insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short +thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they +result from different motives. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; +and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind +through departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other +hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, +wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or +less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the +intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes +to tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds +of falsehood, as is evident of the _boaster,_ who exceeds in telling +untruths for the sake of fame, and the _cheat,_ who tells less than +the truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also +explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another. + +Reply Obj. 3: One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to +different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. II-II, Q. +119, A. 1, ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders +contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects. +________________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 9] + +Whether Sins Differ Specifically in Respect of Different Circumstances? + +Objection 1: It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of +different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil +results from each single defect." Now individual defects are +corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the +corruption of each circumstance there results a corresponding species +of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take +their species from circumstances, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 10). +Therefore sins differ specifically according as different +circumstances are corrupted. + +Obj. 3: Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according +to the words contained in the following verse: + +"Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily." + +Now these pertain to various circumstances, for "hastily" means +sooner than is right; "too much," more than is right, and so on with +the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according to +the various circumstances. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that +"every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought +not"; and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the +species of sins are not diversified in this respect. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 8), wherever there is a special +motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the +motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens +sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there +is but one motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes +when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so +on with the circumstances, since he does this through an inordinate +desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of +different circumstances does not diversify the species of sins, but +belongs to one and the same species. + +Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises +from different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be +due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on +account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he +desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; +that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in +taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different +circumstances entails different species of sins. + +Reply Obj. 1: Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different +species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even +as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the +privation or aversion, as stated above (A. 1), but from turning to +the object of the act. + +Reply Obj. 2: A circumstance never transfers an act from one species +to another, save when there is another motive. + +Reply Obj. 3: In the various species of gluttony there are various +motives, as stated. +________________________ + +QUESTION 73 + +OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER +(In Ten Articles) + +We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under +which head there are ten points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another? + +(2) Whether all are equal? + +(3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object? + +(4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is +opposed? + +(5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins? + +(6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes? + +(7) Whether it depends on their circumstances? + +(8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues? + +(9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against? + +(10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the +person sinning? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 1] + +Whether All Sins Are Connected with One Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is +written (James 2:10): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend +in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of +transgressing all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all +sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a +transgression of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly +commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all. + +Obj. 2: Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever +lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above (Q. 65, A. 1). +Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. +Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a +principle in common, as stated above (Q. 65, AA. 1, 2). Now as the +virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love +of God, which builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of +all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is +the root of all sins, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). +Therefore all vices and sins are also connected so that whoever has +one, has them all. + +_On the contrary,_ Some vices are contrary to one another, as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together +in the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and +vices to be connected with one another. + +_I answer that,_ The intention of the man who acts according to +virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of +the sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of +every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, +wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same +end, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right +reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above (Q. 65, +A. 1). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point +of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to +some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, +to which the sinner's intention is directed when departing from +reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact +they are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore, vices +and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is +evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, +sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not consist in +passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which +are connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many. + +Reply Obj. 1: James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to +which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated +above (Q. 72, A. 1), but as regards that from which sin turns away, +in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. +Now all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he +also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised in +every sin; and in this sense he says that whoever "offends in one +point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing one +sin, he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of God, +which is the origin of all sins. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 71, A. 4), the opposite virtue is +not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy +virtue; while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning man away +from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit +of acquired virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as to engender +a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the +destruction of which entails the loss of prudence, since when man +acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without +which no moral virtue is possible, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4; Q. +65, A. 1). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the +perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far as they +partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous +acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues. Nevertheless it +does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of +sins--first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, so that +a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being +present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to virtue, as +regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above (Q. 71, A. +1). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot +be said that man has the opposite vices or sins. + +Reply Obj. 3: The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws +man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which +flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love +disunites man's affections among different things, in so far as man +loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are +various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, which arise from +self-love, are not connected together. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 2] + +Whether All Sins Are Equal? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to +do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one +and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and +the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another. + +Obj. 2: Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, +which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things. +Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over +a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way +from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or +less. Therefore all sins are equal. + +Obj. 3: Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are +equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said to Pilate (John 19:11): "He that +hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is +evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is +greater than another. + +_I answer that,_ The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in +the book on _Paradoxes_ (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: +from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only +hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of +hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero +the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the +side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure +from reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of +more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider +the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of +privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists, +so to speak, in _being_ corrupted; thus death is privation of life, +and darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not admit +of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence +a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the +third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already +dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be +covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single +shade shutting out all the light. There is, however, another +privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite +habit; it consists in _becoming_ corrupted rather than in _being_ +corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due +commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that +commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and the same +applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or +less on the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it +matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or +less from the due commensuration of humors or members. The same +applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due +commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of +reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in +_Ethic._ iv, 5. For the substance of the act, or the affection of the +agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of +reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one +departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we +must say that sins are not all equal. + +Reply Obj. 1: To commit sin is unlawful on account of some +inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater +inordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure +privation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same +subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to +its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the +same species of virtue, as stated above (Q. 66, AA. 1, 2). Moreover, +even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, +since virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 3] + +Whether the Gravity of Sins Varies According to Their Objects? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary +according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to +its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. +Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their +various objects. + +Obj. 2: Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. +Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to which it +turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which +it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary +according to their various objects. + +Obj. 3: Further, sins that have different objects are of different +kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one +another, as is proved in _Phys._ vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one +sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects. + +_On the contrary,_ Sins take their species from their objects, as was +shown above (Q. 72, A. 1). But some sins are graver than others in +respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore +the gravity of sins varies according to their objects. + +_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said (Q. 71, A. 5), +the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver +than another: for just as the good of health consists in a certain +commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so +the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human +act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the +higher the principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the +humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on +the human body from the heart, which is the principle of life, or +from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must +needs be so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle +which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the +reason directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher +the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. Now +the object of an act is its end, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 3, ad 2); +and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their +objects. Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man as +their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore +a sin which is about the very substance of man, e.g. murder, is +graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and +graver still is a sin committed directly against God, e.g. unbelief, +blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin +will be graver than another according as it is about a higher or +lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their +objects, the difference of gravity which is derived from the objects +is first and foremost, as resulting from the species. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the object is the matter about which an act is +concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the +intention of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 3, +ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown +above (Q. 72, A. 6; Q. 18, A. 6). + +Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that man turns unduly to some +mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, +which aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various +degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those +things to which man turns. + +Reply Obj. 3: All the objects of human acts are related to one +another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far +as they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all +sins from being compared with one another. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 4] + +Whether the Gravity of Sins Depends on the Excellence of the Virtues +to Which They Are Opposed? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary +according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, +so that, to wit, the graver sin is opposed to the greater virtue. +For, according to Prov. 15:5, "In abundant justice there is the +greatest strength." Now, as Our Lord says (Matt. 5:20, seqq.) +abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than +murder, which less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least +grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3 that "virtue is about +the difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the +greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less +grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what is less +difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater +virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope (1 +Cor. 13:13). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less +grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and +hope. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater +virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst +is opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest +virtue; and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most +grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. + +_I answer that,_ A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, +principally and directly; that sin, to wit, which is about the same +object: because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the +more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: +because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the +object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and +virtue take their species from the object, as shown above (Q. 60, A. +5; Q. 72, A. 1). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly +opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in +the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be +considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue in +checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man +from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not only from that +sin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it is evident that +the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less +grievous sins: even as the more perfect health is, the more does it +ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin +is opposed to the greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the opposition which consists +in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor +sins. + +Reply Obj. 2: The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good +is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. +For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is +shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not being overcome +by the difficulty. + +Reply Obj. 3: Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: +hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the +hatred of God, which is the most grievous of all sins. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 5] + +Whether Carnal Sins Are of Less Guilt Than Spiritual Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt +than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than +theft: for it is written (Prov. 6:30, 32): "The fault is not so great +when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the +folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul." Now theft belongs to +covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to +lust, which is a carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater +guilt than spiritual sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The +quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil +rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the +greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the +carnal sins are of most guilt. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is +more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger is +a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust +pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than +spiritual sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins +are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins. + +_I answer that,_ Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal +sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater +guilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference +between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than +carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned +for this. The first is on the part of the subject: because spiritual +sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and +to turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the +carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs to turn +to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a +_turning to_ something, and for that reason, implies a closer +cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a _turning from_ +something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for this reason it +involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of +the person against whom sin is committed: because carnal sin, as +such, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, +in the order of charity, than God and his neighbor, against whom he +commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are +of greater guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since +the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we +shall state further on (A. 6). Now carnal sins have a stronger +impulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore +spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. + +Reply Obj. 1: Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also +to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under the +head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on Eph. 5:5. "No +fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery +is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more +than his chattels. + +Reply Obj. 2: The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of +lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with +difficulty be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is +insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the +reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in +anger, is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he +says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy of +reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to +us and irrational animals": hence, by these sins man is, so to speak, +brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that +they are more shameful. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 6] + +Whether the Gravity of a Sin Depends on Its Cause? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend +on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly it +moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is +lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes +weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin +that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does +not derive its gravity from its cause. + +Obj. 2: Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore +a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known concupiscence," says: +"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all +evils." Now the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, +the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is +diminished by the greatness of its cause. + +Obj. 3: Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a +virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. +Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: +so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused +from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. +Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of +its cause. + +_On the contrary,_ If the cause be increased, the effect is +increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous +the sin. + +_I answer that,_ In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two +causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of +sin, and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as +a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on Matt. 7:18, "A good tree +cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the +more grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the +more grievously does man sin. + +The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being +those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must +make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord +with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the +proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more +grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced +to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the +will to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural +inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the +judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment +of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the +will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the +gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much +so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, +which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause +diminishes the sin, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: If concupiscence be understood to include the movement +of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is a +greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which +is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater +concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement +of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, being +stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous +temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if +concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason, +and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the +graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is +redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the cause which renders the act +involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as +stated. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 7] + +Whether a Circumstance Aggravates a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a +sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a +circumstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. +Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance. + +Obj. 2: Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, +it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, it +cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates +a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away +(from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the object to +which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice. + +_On the contrary,_ Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he +who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven +(Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance +aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of +virtue (Ethic. ii, 1, 2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased +by that which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a +defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs from +the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances +in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin +to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in +three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one +kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with +one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance +that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another +kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's +property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than +fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by +drawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio of +sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom +he ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways +than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that +very reason his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the +graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says +(Paradox. iii) that "in taking his father's life a man commits many +sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated +him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the +republic." Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by adding to the +deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, +taking another's property constitutes the sin of theft; but if to +this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's +property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself, to take +more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act. + +Reply Obj. 1: Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated +above (Q. 18, A. 10). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give +the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a +thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in +reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, not +only according to the species of that act, but also according to a +circumstance. + +Reply Obj. 2: A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if +it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species; +because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as +stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in +relation to the malice of another circumstance. + +Reply Obj. 3: Reason should direct the action not only as regards the +object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may +turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single +circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought not or +where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason +suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of +reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought +to be united by right reason. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 8] + +Whether Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of Its Causing More Harm? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of +its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent +to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its +goodness or malice, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 5). Therefore a sin is +not aggravated on account of its causing more harm. + +Obj. 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. +Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God, +according to Job 35:6, 8: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what +shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that +is like thee." If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing +more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more +grievous than sins against God or oneself. + +Obj. 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him +of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because +the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man +ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace. +Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit +fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into +mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its +causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely +speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently +untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its +causing a greater harm. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice +is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it +diminishes the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the +integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as +it does more harm. + +_I answer that,_ Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because +sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as +when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a +murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the +sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. +Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when +a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he +knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to +do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the +quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in +so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to +sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to +another, a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however, +the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is +connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin +directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that +might ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his +action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow +directly from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor +intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is +directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very +species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious +fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although +such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet +it aggravates his sin directly. + +But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner +himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the +sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate +a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for +instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, +on the other hand, this harm is directly consequent to the sinful +act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then +greater harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a +graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an +unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of hell, would +suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of +theft: but his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither +intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a +believer, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that +he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to +sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of +sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: As we have already stated (Q. 20, A. 5), in treating of +the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action +if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not +follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is +inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm +itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the +act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be +inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are +the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found +in sins which man commits against God, and in some which he commits +against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do +God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things +concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things, +which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and +freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though +this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery +from some anxiety. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, +because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors; +whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not harm but +pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause +of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient +cause of another's spiritual death, because no man dies spiritually +except by sinning of his own will. +________________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 9] + +Whether a Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of the Condition of the Person +Against Whom It Is Committed? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of +the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this +were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed +against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin: +because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less +harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through being +scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the +person against whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, +this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, +because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave +sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many times." But the +kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a +sin, because every man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less +grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than +another's horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). +Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate +the sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a +sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to +Wis. 6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and Luke 12:47: +"The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . +shall be beaten with many stripes." Therefore, in like manner, on the +part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by +reason of his position and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a +more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person +than on a poor man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" +(Col. 3:25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is +measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does +not aggravate the sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are +committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (3 Kings +19:14): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets +with the sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed +by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Micah 7:6: +"the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against +her mother." Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are +expressly condemned: thus it is written (Job 34:18): "Who saith to +the king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly." +Therefore the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the +sin. + +_I answer that,_ The person sinned against is, in a manner, the +object of the sin. Now it has been stated above (A. 3) that the +primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is +deemed to be so much the more grave, as its object is a more +principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man +himself, and his neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of +one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate to +the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in +respect of the person sinned against, may be considered on the part +of these three. + +First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as +he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that an injury +inflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to Zech. 2:8: +"He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin +is the more grievous, according as it is committed against a person +more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or +official station. On the part of man himself, it is evident that he +sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he +sins, is more united to him, either through natural affinity or +kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against +himself rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all +the more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5: "He that is evil to +himself, to whom will he be good?" On the part of his neighbor, a man +sins the more grievously, according as his sin affects more persons: +so that a sin committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign +prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous +than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly +prohibited (Ex. 22:28): "The prince of thy people thou shalt not +curse." In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person +of prominence, is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and +the disturbance it would cause among many people. + +Reply Obj. 1: He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far +as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that +the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which +does not extenuate the sin of the injurer. + +Reply Obj. 2: The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those +things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance +his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, +because he does it of his own will; but in those things that are not +subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual +goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself: for it is +more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, however, +things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of +our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of injuries done to +such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, +unless indeed our neighbor be willing, or give his approval. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is no respect for persons if God punishes more +severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is +done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many. +________________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 10] + +Whether the Excellence of the Person Sinning Aggravates the Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning +does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving +to God, according to Ecclus. 25:13: "How great is he that findeth +wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the +Lord." Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed +to him: for it is written (2 Paral. 30: 18, 19): "The Lord Who is +good will show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the +Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that +they are not sanctified." Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the +excellence of the person sinning. + +Obj. 2: Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" (Rom. +2:11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for +one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the +excellence of the person sinning. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he +would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his +goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the +excellence of the person sinning. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is +deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more +excellent person." + +_I answer that,_ Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us +unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like +sins are less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is +less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human +weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other +sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins are all the more +imputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be +assigned for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one +who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence +Our Lord said (Luke 12:47) that the "servant who knew the will of his +lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." +Secondly, on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a +man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: +and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, +aggravates a sin, according to Wis. 6:7: "The mighty shall be +mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being +specially inconsistent with the excellence of the person sinning: for +instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up +as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to be a fornicator, +whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the +example or scandal; because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): "Sin +becomes much more scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his +position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men +are wont to bear them with more indignation. + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted alludes to those things which are +done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness. + +Reply Obj. 2: God does not respect persons in punishing the great +more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of +their sin, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 3: The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not +from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof. +________________________ + +QUESTION 74 + +OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN +(In Ten Articles) + +We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head +there are ten points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin? + +(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin? + +(3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin? + +(4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin? + +(5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin? + +(6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected +in the higher reason? + +(7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the +higher reason? + +(8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin? + +(9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin? + +(10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed +to its proper object? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 1] + +Whether the Will Is a Subject of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. +For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will and +the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin +cannot be in the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what +seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does not +sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points +to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will. +Therefore sin is nowise in the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient +cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause do not +coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of +sin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine +states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10, 11). Therefore it is not the subject +of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the +will that we sin, and live righteously." + +_I answer that,_ Sin is an act, as stated above (Q. 71, AA. 1, 6). +Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. _to cut_ and _to burn_: +and such acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which +the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) +that "movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover." On +the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external +matter, but remain in the agent, e.g. _to desire_ and _to know_: and +such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the +proper subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle +of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are +voluntary, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1; Q. 18, A. 6), it follows that +the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good +acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore +it follows that sin is in the will as its subject. + +Reply Obj. 1: Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will +does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is +an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this +sense is in the will. + +Reply Obj. 2: If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise +subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in +the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is +invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the +apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect +also is deemed a sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument applies to those efficient causes whose +actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, +but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the +will; hence the argument does not prove. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 2] + +Whether the Will Alone Is the Subject of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. +For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except +by the will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. +Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil +pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore the +will alone is the subject of sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine +states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so true is +it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no +sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary, +except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this +suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the +external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a +subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is +the subject of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are +about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the +will, are the subject of virtues, as stated above (Q. 56). Therefore +the will is not the only subject of sin. + +_I answer that,_ As was shown above (A. 1), whatever is the a +principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts +are not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those +which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q. 6, A. 4) in +treating of voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a +subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their +acts, or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same +powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act +and habit belong to the same subject. + +Reply Obj. 1: We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we +sin by the other powers as moved by the will. + +Reply Obj. 2: Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper +objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and +evils, by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, +and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: The members of the body are not principles but merely +organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves +them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, +the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, +because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in +_Polit._i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions +that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is +inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 3] + +Whether There Can Be Sin in the Sensuality? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the +sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his +actions. Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. +Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality. + +Obj. 2: Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine +states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement of +the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality ever +remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; wherefore +it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, +12, 13). Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a +sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to +him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we do +with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, +8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the +deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 7:19): "The good which I will +I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words +Augustine explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2, +3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a +movement of the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the +sensuality. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3), sin may be found in any +power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the +nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or +sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. +Wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are +common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have a +certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we +surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have +the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the First +Part (Q. 78, A. 4). In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses +that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in +its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can +be the principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the +subject of sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be +understood as referring to the _fomes,_ which is never completely +destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin +passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the _fomes_ +does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual +inordinate movements, if he be presentient of them, for instance by +turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his +thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about +this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements of +concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the +considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement of +vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such +movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, +for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each +single one. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without +the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does +nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and +consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is +something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the +sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is +something imperfect in the genus of sin. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 4] + +Whether Mortal Sin Can Be in the Sensuality? + +Objection 1: It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. +Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to +commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about +carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal +sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality. + +Obj. 2: Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be +in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the +irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). +Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about the same +subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now +disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial +sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A. 3, ad 3), mortal +sin can be there also. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate +movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can +even be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, +mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of +the sensuality is not a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of +the body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which +destroys the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes +spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5). +Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to +order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can +only belong to the power whose function it is to order others to the +end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in +the reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal +sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being +an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom +the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, +not to the sensuality, but to reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an +act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act +of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of +moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act +of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always +accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power; +and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: A disposition may be related in three ways to that to +which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the +same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect +science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same +thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it +is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those +things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can +arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is +a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In this way the +venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal +sin, which is in the reason. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 5] + +Whether Sin Can Be in the Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the +sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is +not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from +sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated +above (A. 1). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. +Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, there can be no sin except about things which are +under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among +those things which are under our control: since by nature some are +mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in +the reason. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in +the lower and in the higher reason. + +_I answer that,_ The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we +have clearly shown (AA. 1, 2, 3). Now reason has a twofold act: one +is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the +act of knowing the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing +the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the +reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which +error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or +error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it +either commands the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or +deliberately fails to check them. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the defect in the proper act of +the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the +case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is +unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and +excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. +If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is +able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and +the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only +to the act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason +as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its +proper act. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), when we were treating of +the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the +reason, in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in +another: so that both the movement of the will can be called +rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is +found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the +reason, or through the reason being the principle of the will's act. + +The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said +(ad 1). +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 6] + +Whether the Sin of Morose Delectation Is in the Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not +in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive +power, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). But the appetitive power is +distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore +morose delectation is not in the reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, +since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. +Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not +about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose +delectation is not in the reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin +_mora_--delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is +no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore +morose delectation does not belong to the reason. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the +consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere +thought of the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman +alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes +the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). +Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason. + +_I answer that,_ As stated (A. 5), sin may be in the reason, not only +in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its +directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not +only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the +reason fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in +the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now +it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it +commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately +provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when +it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, +when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of +passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell +(_immoratur_) upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense +the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its +proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in +accordance with what has been stated above (A. 1), viz. that actions +which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their +principles. + +Reply Obj. 2: Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper +object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those +lower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly +delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of +reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of +time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells (_immoratur_) +thereon, and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and +turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched +the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 7] + +Whether the Sin of Consent to the Act Is in the Higher Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not +in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, +as stated above (Q. 15, A. 1): whereas the reason is an apprehensive +power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher +reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and +consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7). +[*_Rationes aeternae,_ cf. I, Q. 15, AA. 2, 3, where as in similar +passages _ratio_ has been rendered by the English _type,_ because St. +Thomas was speaking of the Divine _idea_ as the archetype of the +creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is +identified with the eternal law, (cf. A. 8, Obj. 1; A. 9)]. But +sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal +law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he +consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not +always in the higher reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions +according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal +pleasures or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without +deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as +Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful +act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason. + +Obj. 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does +the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act +through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any +deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves +his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may +consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent +to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, +so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its +consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered +the forbidden fruit to her husband." + +_I answer that,_ Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which +consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and +delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical +reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we +must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final +sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in +speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is +delivered by referring it to the first principles; since, so long as +there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be +submitted to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the +final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that +human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule +is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and +further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above (Q. +19, A. 4). Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the +higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the +judgment is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is +intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced +on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes +last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, and the +delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble +thereto. Therefore the consent to an action belongs properly to the +higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the +delectation belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a +lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the +delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower +court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not +conversely. + +Reply Obj. 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not +absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and +judging, as stated above (Q. 15, A. 3). Because the fact that the +consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will +tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment. +Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: The higher reason is said to consent, from the very +fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine +law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of +God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it +by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always +proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin. +xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a +sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of +moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it +become the servant or slave of the evil deed." + +Reply Obj. 3: The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can +direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or +restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of +the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating +the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of +this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to +the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man +persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to +the higher reason. + +Reply Obj. 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden +and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or +lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower +reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher +reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it +does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly be imputed to it. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 8] + +Whether Consent to Delectation Is a Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that consent to delectation is not a +mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, +which does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and +consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin +consists in turning away from the Divine law, as is evident from +Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above (Q. 71, +A. 6). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to +which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being such +is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to +which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But +delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. +Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, +according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states +(Ethic. x, 3, 5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the +outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation +consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and +malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward +thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a +like difference of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is +not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore +neither is the consent to the delectation. + +Obj. 4: Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a +mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found +also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the +act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for +this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he +seems not to sin mortally. + +Obj. 5: Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple +fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation +resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a +mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought +of fornication. + +Obj. 6: Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the +remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii). +Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away +by means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that +"this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by +deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we +should strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our trespasses.'" +Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be +altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be +forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since +without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them." +But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to +delectation is a mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions on this point, for +some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but +only a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and +this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must take note +that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in +_Ethic._ x, 4, and again, that since every delectation may be +compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, +and to the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens +that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because +the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which +the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action itself, +which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far +as the appetitive power, to which it belongs to take delight in +anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for +instance, when a man thinks and delights in his thought, in so far as +his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent +to an action, e.g. a thought, has for its object another action, as +being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from +the inclination of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to +the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of +fornication, may delight in either of two things: first, in the +thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the +delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the +appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not in itself a +mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man +thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at +all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he +may wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently such affection +or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a +mortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and +sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to +consent to such a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true. + +But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act +thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this act. +Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts +to nothing less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to +fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in +conformity with his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man +deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in +itself a mortal sin. Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a +mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains. + +Reply Obj. 1: Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower +reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above (A. 7). +Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, +for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating according to +them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on +them, as being regulated according to them: and by turning from them +in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even the acts of the lower +powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as +the direction of the higher reason fails in directing them according +to the eternal types. + +Reply Obj. 2: Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself +a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to +take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial +sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, in its +genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent +is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the +act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent has been +given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal +sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the delectation which has the +thought for its object. + +Reply Obj. 4: The delectation which has an external act for its +object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, +even though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the +prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is +inordinate, and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also. + +Reply Obj. 5: The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency +in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the +consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of +murder. + +Reply Obj. 6: The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may +be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin. +________________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 9] + +Whether There Can Be Venial Sin in the Higher Reason As Directing +the Lower Powers? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the +higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a +sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the "higher +reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal law." But +mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore +it seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the higher +reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual +life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of the +heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal. + +Obj. 3: Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out +of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial +sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the +higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of +the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on +account of the contempt of the Divine law. + +_On the contrary,_ Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher +reason, as stated above (A. 7). But consent to an act of venial sin +is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher +reason. + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher +reason "is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law"; it +contemplates it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging +and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the +fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to +an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinateness +of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, +in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion +from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act of venial sin +is. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial +sin, it does not turn away from the eternal law: wherefore it sins, +not mortally, but venially. + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the +very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and +such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart +consisting in some disorder either of the movement or of the parts +surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In +like manner there is mortal sin in the higher reason whenever the +order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is the +eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this +untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial. + +Reply Obj. 3: Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to +contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the +Divine law. +________________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 10] + +Whether Venial Sin Can Be in the Higher Reason As Such? + +Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher +reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a +power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed +with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the +eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without +mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason +as such. + +Obj. 2: Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can +be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate +movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal +sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such. + +Obj. 3: Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us +unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, +through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher +good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when +the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, +considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more +grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is +contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse +to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement +that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the +subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. +Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such. + +_On the contrary,_ A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But +it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a +venial sin in the higher reason as such. + +_I answer that,_ The higher reason regards its own object otherwise +than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher +reason. For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, +except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it +does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate +consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; +and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts +of the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins. + +With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple +_intuition,_ and _deliberation,_ in respect of which it again +consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of +simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine +things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And +although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden +movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin +unless it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one +of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly +under some other aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, +is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, +when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as +impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus +apprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider +that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine +law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this +deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, the +higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even +if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin mortally in giving +a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, +it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal sins in their +genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus. + +Reply Obj. 1: A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be +mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the +incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: In matters of action, the simple intuition of the +principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, +as well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it +belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: +consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement. + +Reply Obj. 3: One and the same thing may be the subject of different +considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the +existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by +the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which +is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the +higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is +reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that +which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal +sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of +a higher consideration, as was explained above. +________________________ + +QUESTION 75 + +OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in +particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether sin has a cause? + +(2) Whether it has an internal cause? + +(3) Whether it has an external cause? + +(4) Whether one sin is the cause of another? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 75, Art. 1] + +Whether Sin Has a Cause? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the +nature of evil, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 6). But evil has no cause, +as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause. + +Obj. 2: Further, a cause is that from which something follows of +necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for +every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause. + +Obj. 3: Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or +evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for +"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Matt. 7:18). Likewise +neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment +is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. +Therefore sin has no cause. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to +Job 5:6, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is +something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law +of God." Therefore sin has a cause. + +_I answer that,_ A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as +it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, +so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a +negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be +assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of +affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of +the negation in itself; since the result of removing the cause is the +removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of +darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which +a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting +negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of its principal +tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these +suffices to cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of +sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of +that which something ought naturally to have, such an inordinateness +must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which +naturally is and ought to be in a thing, is never lacking except on +account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say +that evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient +cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause +is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its +inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and on the part of +the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness +of sin is a result of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the +will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine +law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, +and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the +intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of +direction in the will. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which +privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the +subject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this +evil has a cause, has been explained. + +Reply Obj. 2: If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it +must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not +impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of +something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on +account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all +things happen of necessity, as is proved in _Metaph._ vi, text. 5. +Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is +a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule +of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact of +not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in +itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before +it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the +cause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 75, Art. 2] + +Whether Sin Has an Internal Cause? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that +which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an +internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, +the effect follows. + +Obj. 2: Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal +movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever is within man is either natural or +voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for +sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; +iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is +already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the +first sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10, 11; +Retract. i, 9) that "the will is the cause of sin." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the direct cause of sin must +be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a +twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other +proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the +reason and will, in respect of which man has a free-will; while the +remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the +sensitive appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, +that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is +due to an apprehension of the senses that the sensitive appetite is +inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the +will and reason, as we shall explain further on (Q. 77, A. 1). +Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one +proximate, on the part of the reason and will; and the other remote, +on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite. + +But since we have said above (A. 1, ad 3) that the cause of sin is +some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the +rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent +good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the +appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, +whose nature it is to consider this rule; and the completeness of the +voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the +will, given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: That which is within a thing as its natural power, is +always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the +appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power +of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the +preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, +and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is proposed +as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is inclined, +that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the +will produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements that +precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually +sinning. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the +substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the +will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself. + +Reply Obj. 3: That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is +natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which +sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins +through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from +the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with +his nature, ought to observe. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 75, Art. 3] + +Whether Sin Has an External Cause? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is +a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are +within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no +external cause. + +Obj. 2: Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. +Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal +cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption +of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can +arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no +external cause. + +Obj. 3: Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is +multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external +inducements to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed +to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 21:16): "Are not these they, +that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and +made you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore +something external can be a cause of sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the internal cause of sin is +both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as +lacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin. +Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, +either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the +reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q. +9, A. 6; Q. 10, A. 4), none can move the will inwardly save God +alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q. +79, A. 1). Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of +sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to +sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external +sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the +reason, of necessity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed +externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps +it be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive +appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore +something external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be +a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient +completive cause of sin being accomplished. + +Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that the external motive causes of +sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that +it remains in our power to sin or not to sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: The fact that sin has an internal cause does not +prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause +of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 3: If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, +the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful +act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the +character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being +voluntary and in our power. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 75, Art. 4] + +Whether One Sin Is a Cause of Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of +another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in +with one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of +good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil. +In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is +not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless," as Dionysius +declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have +no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and +form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause. + +Obj. 2: Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect +thing," as stated in _Meteor._ iv, 2 [*Cf. _De Anima_ ii.]. But sin is +essentially something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause +of another. + +Obj. 3: Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the +same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we +go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the +cause of another. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin that is +not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of +sin." + +_I answer that,_ Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the +act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in +the same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it +happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of the +four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or +moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which +removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for +when man, by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or +anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into +another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the +second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed to +commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions +and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after the manner of a +material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its +matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for strife, which is +often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the +manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man +commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a +man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for +the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral +matters, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), it follows +that one sin is also the formal cause of another: because in the act +of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is +material while the latter is formal. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character +of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least +apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being +inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another +sin. A sin has matter, not _of which_ but _about which_ it is: and it +has its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of +another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral +imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an +act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of +another sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is +no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is +not caused by another sin. +________________________ + +QUESTION 76 + +OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The +internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which +are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above (A. +2), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first +place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the +part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause +of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice, +which is the cause of sin on the part of the will. + +Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin? + +(2) Whether ignorance is a sin? + +(3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether? + +(4) Whether it diminishes sin? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 76, Art. 1] + +Whether Ignorance Can Be a Cause of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: +because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a +non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance +is not a cause of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin +being a _turning to_ something, as was stated above (Q. 75, A. 1). +Now ignorance seems to savor of _turning away_ from something. +Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does +not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the good +apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some +sin through ignorance." + +_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a +moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one +that moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of +heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes +an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in +this way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; because it +is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the +act of sin, in so far as it directs human acts. + +Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance +with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in +conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the +conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an +operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion +of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular +proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except +through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is +restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is +wrong to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence +ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the +universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular +circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that +not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone +which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. +Consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be +restrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his +father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his +committing the sin, but is concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a +man sins, not "through ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1). + +Reply Obj. 1: Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but +it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment. + +Reply Obj. 2: As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards +sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect +of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment. + +Reply Obj. 3: The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely +unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in +another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause +of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a +man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a +certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 76, Art. 2] + +Whether Ignorance Is a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a +word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above (Q. 71, +A. 5). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or +external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to +knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment +resulting from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of +knowledge is not a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as +it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, +it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, +rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a +sin, but rather a result of sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any +sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act. +Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all +its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a +sin, unless perchance it be original sin. + +Obj. 5: Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, +as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual in the +one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be +continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be +a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance +deserves punishment, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: "If any man know not, +he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin. + +_I answer that,_ Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience +denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge +about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense +Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the +other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of +knowledge of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. +Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, +without the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act +rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of +faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is +bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there +are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet +he is not bound to know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and +contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is +evident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or +do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, +ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not +imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to +know. Consequently ignorance of such like things is called +"invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason +such like ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our +power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no +invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance +is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it +be about things one is not bound to know. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 71, A. 6, ad 1), when we say that +sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, +by reason of which omissions have the character of sin; so that +negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the +above definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one +ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order +to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet +by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have +the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there +is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by his acts, whereas +grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not +only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is +commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of +the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in some +way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of +consideration is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 4: Although when the guilt has passed away through +repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of +knowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of +which the ignorance is said to be a sin. + +Reply Obj. 5: Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually +only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is +it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually +indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the +knowledge that he ought to have. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 76, Art. 3] + +Whether Ignorance Excuses from Sin Altogether? + +Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin +altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is +voluntary. Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (Q. +6, A. 8). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done +accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown. +Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human +acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore +nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be +deemed sinful or virtuous. + +Obj. 3: Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he +is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which +perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some +things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things +alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done +through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether +excuse from sin. + +_I answer that,_ Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which +it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated (AA. 1, 2) that +ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would +have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be +contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. +If, however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not +have prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will +thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, +but not willing, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1: and such like +ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already +stated, since it does not make the act to be involuntary, does not +excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not +cause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act. + +On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it +makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin, +because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse +altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of +the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, +in so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen +that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of +which circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong +to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge +is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for +instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which +suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it +is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting another species +of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend +himself and strike him back, and that if he had known this, he would +not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the +act). Wherefore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is +not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge +of the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance +itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either +directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of +certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as +when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to +acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such +like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, +provided it be about matters one is bound and able to know. +Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, +however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary, either +through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not +bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated +above (Q. 6, A. 8). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin +altogether. + +Reply Obj. 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, +the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his +sin is not accidental. + +Reply Obj. 3: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of +reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with +madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that +causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 76, Art. 4] + +Whether Ignorance Diminishes a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. +For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now +ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. +iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does +not diminish sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But +ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore it does +not diminish a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish +sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on Rom. +2:4, "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to +penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not." +Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this +would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which +removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does +not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. +iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore +ignorance does not diminish sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, +diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Tim. 1:13: +"I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore +ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin. + +_I answer that,_ Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish +sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not +render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is +evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through +making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does +away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not +the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, +neither diminishes nor increases the sin. + +Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such +as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse +from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like +ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is +purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this +kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, +since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to +bear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. +Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being +committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, +as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result +being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much +wine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this +ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the +sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be +said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; +wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less +sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is +not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from +that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: One sin added to another makes more sins, but it does +not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do not +coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes +the second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of +them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if +committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk, +although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness +diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own +gravity implies. + +Reply Obj. 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to +simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of +the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even +ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an +allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the +foundation of the spiritual edifice. + +Reply Obj. 4: The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the +two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which +results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the +ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and +more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated +above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an +ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to +be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, +not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to +expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, +as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii). +________________________ + +QUESTION 77 + +OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive +appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin: +and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline +the will? + +(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge? + +(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness? + +(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin? + +(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 John 2:16: "Concupiscence of the +eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life." + +(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it? + +(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether? + +(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 1] + +Whether the Will Is Moved by a Passion of the Sensitive Appetite? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of +the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its +object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as +it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive +power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object +of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good +defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive +appetite does not move the will. + +Obj. 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the +soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational +appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to +a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that "the +rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the +heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." Therefore the will cannot +be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. + +Obj. 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is +material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not +use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in _De +Anima_ iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material +force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a +passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective +appetite. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dan. 13:56): "Lust hath perverted +thy heart." + +_I answer that,_ A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or +move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two +ways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's +powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of +necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power +becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both +because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the +contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be +directed to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a +certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one +thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of +distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced +in respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the +rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or +altogether impeded. + +Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is +good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of +reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate +apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, +as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that +the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the +estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even +as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: +for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of +passion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of +their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often +follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the +will's movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination +always to follow the judgment of the reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not +the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in +the judgment about the object of the will, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; +but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated. + +The Third Objection is solved in like manner. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 2] + +Whether the Reason Can Be Overcome by a Passion, Against Its +Knowledge? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a +passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by +the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the +strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, +which is weak and soon passes away. + +Obj. 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the +apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is +really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; +and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not +really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But +what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. +Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge. + +Obj. 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its +knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about +a particular matter--on the contrary, if a universal and a particular +proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g. +"Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one +another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in _Peri Herm._ +ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to +pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have +two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible. + +Obj. 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the +particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who +knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal +is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from +_Poster._ i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. +that "no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to +contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of +fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the +particular. + +Obj. 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words +express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that man, +while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an +evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even +in particular. + +Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against +its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have +universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law +in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating +me in the law of sin." Now the law that is in the members is +concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then +concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason +counter to its knowledge. + +_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the +opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by +passion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, +and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, +because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, +it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear +good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend +to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it +is written (Prov. 14:22): "They err that work evil." + +Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge +that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according +to the words of Luke 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of +his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," +and of James 4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it +not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, +and it is necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a +distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a +twofold knowledge, viz. universal and particular, a defect in either +of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, +as stated above (Q. 76, A. 1). It may happen, then, that a man has +some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and +yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is +fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not to +follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be +observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from +not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to +have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular, +and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it +does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not +actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in +particular what he knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of +attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to +the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to +consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually what +he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. +some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way, +a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular +what he knows in general, in so far as the passions hinder him from +considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of +distraction, as explained above (A. 1). Secondly, by way of +opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to +what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation, +the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not +to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on account +of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That +this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that +sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of +reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through +excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the +reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in +general. + +Reply Obj. 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not +hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, +since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing +that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal +knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking. + +Reply Obj. 2: The fact that something appears good in particular to +the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this +particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the +reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge +or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the +same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or +vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual +knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a +false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is directly +opposed, not to a habit, but to an act. + +Reply Obj. 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on +account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to +draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal +proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws +his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, +3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, +two particular and two universal, of which one is of the son, e.g. No +fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to +be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from +arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the +passion lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second. + +Reply Obj. 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to +words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to +judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state +of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and +so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in +_Ethic._ vii, 3. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 3] + +Whether a Sin Committed Through Passion, Should Be Called a Sin of +Weakness? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a sin committed through passion +should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement +movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (A. 1). Now +vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of +weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should not be +called a sin of weakness. + +Obj. 2: Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile +in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (Ps. 77:39): "He +remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be +those which result from bodily defects, rather than those which are +due to a passion. + +Obj. 3: Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things +which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, +whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, +according to Gen. 4:7: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: +'The lust thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion +over it." Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of +weakness. + +_On the contrary,_ Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions +diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. +Therefore a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of +weakness. + +_I answer that,_ The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in +which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul +by way of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body +is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution +of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so +that the humors and members of the human body cease to be subject to +its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, +when it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for +instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De +Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul +is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a +disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be +out of order, when they fail to comply with the order of nature, so +too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are +not subject to the order of reason, for the reason is the ruling +power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or +irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to the order of +reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid +manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. +Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to +an epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as in the body the stronger the movement against +the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the +stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the +greater the weakness of the soul. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is +not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may +have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as +stated above (A. 1). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we +refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness +of soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to +a condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us +through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent +to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our +appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of +the will is hindered in the way already explained (A. 1). +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 4] + +Whether Self-love Is the Source of Every Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that self-love is not the source of every +sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper +cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: +wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev. +19:18). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8): "Sin taking occasion by +the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which +words a gloss says that "the law is good, since by forbidding +concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that +concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a +distinct passion from love, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 2; Q. 23, A. +4). Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine in commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set on +fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love +arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility." +Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of +self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. +Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that +"self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of +Babylon." Now every sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore +self-love is the cause of every sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 75, A. 1), the proper and direct +cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a +mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from +inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone +desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he +loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love +him. Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the +cause of every sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting +good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate +self-love, leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei +xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, +is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man is said to love both the good he desires for +himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is +directed to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or +money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of +evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some +good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is +reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man +either desires good things, or avoids evil things. + +Reply Obj. 4: A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore +the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be +committed through self-love. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 5] + +Whether Concupiscence of the Flesh, Concupiscence of the Eyes, and +Pride of Life Are Fittingly Described As Causes of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, +concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly +described as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. +6:10), "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of +all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. +Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by +what is seen by the eyes, according to Dan. 13:56: "Beauty hath +deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be +condivided with concupiscence of the flesh. + +Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated +above (Q. 30, A. 2). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only +by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence +of the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been +mentioned. + +Obj. 4: Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate +desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of +evil things, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). But nothing is mentioned +here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are +insufficiently described. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 2:16): "All that is in the +world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of +life." Now a thing is said to be "in the world" by reason of sin: +wherefore it is written (1 John 5:19): "The whole world is seated in +wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), inordinate self-love is the +cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: +for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that +inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in +two ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the +passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as +it is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the +aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible +part, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Again, concupiscence is twofold, +as stated above (Q. 30, A. 3). One is natural, and is directed to +those things which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards +the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the +like, or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual +matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called +"concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, +and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation or +pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in +respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar mode of +perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual +concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the eyes," whether this be +taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the +organ, so as to denote curiosity according to Augustine's exposition +(Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed +outwardly to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the +explanation of others. + +The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of +life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we +shall state further on (Q. 84, A. 2; II-II, Q. 162, A. 1). + +It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can +be reduced to these three: since all the passions of the +concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the +irascible passions to the third, which is not divided into two +because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence. + +Reply Obj. 1: "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according +as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How +covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," +is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on (Q. 84, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the +concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only +for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, +but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power. + +Reply Obj. 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the +senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in _Metaph._ i: and so +its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the +inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. +xxxiii). + +Reply Obj. 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, +as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 39, A. 2); and so those passions +alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of +those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 6] + +Whether Sin Is Alleviated on Account of a Passion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of +passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot +thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now +passion is a cause of sin, as stated (A. 5). Therefore the more +intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not +diminish sin, but increases it. + +Obj. 2: Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, +as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit: +for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a +greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also +increases rather than diminishes a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as +he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the +will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. +Therefore passion aggravates a sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The passion of concupiscence is called a +temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that +overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De +Civ. Dei iv, 12). + +_I answer that,_ Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, +which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a +movement of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be +related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: +antecedently, according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws +or inclines the reason or will, as stated above (AA. 1, 2; Q. 10, A. +3); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers +redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be +moved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused in the +sensitive appetite. + +Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must +needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is +voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our +control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the +reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the +impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. +In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes +its voluntariness. + +On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but +increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to +wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; +and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence +with which anyone sins, the greater the sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to +which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the +part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his +turning to something else--accidentally, i.e. beside his intention. +Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental +cause, but of its direct cause. + +Reply Obj. 2: A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason +increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do +well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such +a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the movement of the will incited by the +passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own +movement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 7] + +Whether Passion Excuses from Sin Altogether? + +Objection 1: It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. +For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin +altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes +an act to be involuntary, according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth +against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you +would." Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether. + +Obj. 2: Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular +matter, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 76, A. 3). But ignorance of a +particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q. 6, +A. 8). Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether. + +Obj. 3: Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the +body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case +of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease +of the soul. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (Rom. 7:5) speaks of the passions as +"passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: +which would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. +Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether. + +_I answer that,_ An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be +excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether +involuntary. Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the +subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; +otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points +apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary +either _in itself,_ as when the will tends towards it directly; or +_in its cause,_ when the will tends towards that cause and not +towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, +for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does +through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said +to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will +tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, +but did not. + +Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion +is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, +as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then +if such a passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is +reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have +stated with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not +voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or +some such cause fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use +of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely +excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to +take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive the +passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from +having its full effect; since the members are not put to work, except +by the consent of reason, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 9): wherefore +such a passion does not excuse from sin altogether. + +Reply Obj. 1: The words, "So that you do not the things that you +would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner +movement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, +in which sense we are to understand the words of Rom. 7:19: "The evil +which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the +will as preceding the passion, as is the case with the incontinent, +who act counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence. + +Reply Obj. 2: The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is +ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after +taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a +particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being applied +to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, +as stated. + +Reply Obj. 3: Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a +comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about +drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 8] + +Whether a Sin Committed Through Passion Can Be Mortal? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot +be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin +committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive +for pardon (_venia_). Since therefore sin committed through passion +is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal. + +Obj. 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But +passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the +sensuality, as stated above (Q. 74, A. 4). Therefore a sin committed +through passion cannot be mortal. + +Obj. 3: Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above +(AA. 1, 2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn +away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin +committed through passion cannot be mortal. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5) that "the passions of +the sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth +fruit unto death." Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth +fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be +mortal. + +_I answer that,_ Mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5), consists +in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion +pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to +direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last +end can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating +reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden +movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or +to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the +deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive +the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as +stated above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a +mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and +adulteries are committed through passion. + +Reply Obj. 1: A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its +cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens +the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance +is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin, +through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon (_veniam_). +Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of +venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection +regards the first kind. + +Reply Obj. 2: Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to +something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which +follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A. 6, ad +1): hence the argument does not prove. + +Reply Obj. 3: Passion does not always hinder the act of reason +altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its +free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, +the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer +either mortal or venial. +________________________ + +QUESTION 78 + +OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. +malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, +i.e. purposely? + +(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain +malice? + +(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through +habit? + +(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than +through passion? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 1] + +Whether Anyone Sins Through Certain Malice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through +certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain +malice. Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the +Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): "They +err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice. + +Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works +intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the +intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of _malitia_ +(malice) from _malum_ (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not +denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. +Therefore no one sins through malice. + +Obj. 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a +cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, +which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 34:27): "[Who] as it were on +purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not +understand all His ways." Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore +some sin purposely or through certain malice. + +_I answer that,_ Man like any other being has naturally an appetite +for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is +due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: +for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now +the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, +both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin +occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as +when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in +the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too +does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. +Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. +Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to +suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one +loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a +limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when +an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, +more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or +some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of +some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some +temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so +a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, +whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a +temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or +on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly. + +Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that +a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through +ignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular +action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through +passion: and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular +evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular +good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus +that a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice. + +Reply Obj. 2: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but +it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or +obtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone +would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without +suffering loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to +enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before +him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's +anger, to being deprived of the pleasure. + +Reply Obj. 3: The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to +denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. +v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit +is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through +malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also +denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of +evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he +sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean +some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when +anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this +imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the +cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not +indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous +sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above +(Q. 75, A. 4, ad 3). +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 2] + +Whether Everyone That Sins Through Habit, Sins Through Certain +Malice? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, +sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain +malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a +man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle +word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed +through certain malice. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by +which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1, 2). But the acts which +precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. +Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through +certain malice. + +Obj. 3: Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he +is glad after having done it, according to Prov. 2:14: "Who are glad +when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and +this, because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do +those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But +those who sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin: +because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious habit, "are full of +remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not +committed through certain malice. + +_On the contrary,_ A sin committed through certain malice is one that +is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to +which we are inclined by habit, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2 with +regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is +committed through certain malice. + +_I answer that,_ There is a difference between a sin committed by one +who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not +necessary to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the +person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something +we use when we will," as stated above (Q. 50, A. 1). And thus, even +as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth +into a virtuous act, because a bad habit does not corrupt reason +altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being +that a sinner does some works which are generically good; so too it +may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from +that habit, but through the uprising of a passion, or again through +ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin +through certain malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever +is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of +something lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to +him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the very +thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something +that excludes a spiritual good: the result being that a man chooses a +spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in +respect of that habit: and this is to sin through certain malice. +Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through +certain malice. + +Reply Obj. 1: Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting +in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, +but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not +a simple but a relative evil. + +Reply Obj. 2: Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the +acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them +as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin +committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that sins through habit is always glad for what he +does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is +able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means +of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that +while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through +the habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his +sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account +of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 3] + +Whether One Who Sins Through Certain Malice, Sins Through Habit? + +Objection 1: It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, +sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an +unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i.e. through +choice, "unless it be done through habit." Now to sin through certain +malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above (A. +1). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the +habit of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not +suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little." +But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through +certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice, +not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a +habit. + +Obj. 3: Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will +must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by the +nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. +Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something +supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through +passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as +stated (Q. 77, A. 3). Therefore whenever anyone sins through certain +malice, he sins through habit. + +_On the contrary,_ The good habit stands in the same relation to the +choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something +evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit +of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. +Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, +may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice. + +_I answer that,_ The will is related differently to good and to evil. +Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the +rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to +be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, +to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, +in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as +when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through +the impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through +passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain +malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when +his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may happen in two +ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him +to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, some evil is, as it +were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of +its suitableness, the will tends, as to something good, because +everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. +Moreover this corrupt disposition is either a habit acquired by +custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case +of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some +natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord, +may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for +instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not through sin being +in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or +fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption, +he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the +bridle, as it were. + +It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, +always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not +always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man +sins through certain malice, that he sins through habit. + +Reply Obj. 1: To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only +to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with +pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, +and this occurs only in one who has a habit. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin +from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this +something is not always a habit, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a +habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there +is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because +evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be +perfect without the evil of fault. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is More Grievous to Sin Through Certain Malice Than +Through Passion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin +through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance +excuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is +greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins +through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers +from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the Philosopher +(Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false +estimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action. +Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain +malice, than for one who sins through passion. + +Obj. 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous +his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into +sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain +malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than +that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than +to sin through passion. + +Obj. 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through +choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil. +Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain +malice. + +_On the contrary,_ A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very +reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: "He hath +struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on +purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment is not increased +except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through +being done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice. + +_I answer that,_ A sin committed through malice is more grievous than +a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, +as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other +things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the +movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is +committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the +will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin +is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by +something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the +very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much +the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being +committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is +stronger. Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to +sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon +returns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a +man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, +abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. +vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a +sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the +incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers +intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice +is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle +in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the +case of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a +good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the +passion, for the time being. Now the worst of all defects is defect +of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through +malice is more grievous than one committed through passion. + +Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, +neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 4). +Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to +be less grave. + +Reply Obj. 2: The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a +defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is +inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to +sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while +choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for +him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the +passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the +passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice, +chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained (AA. 2, +3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the +principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin "through" +choosing. +________________________ + +QUESTION 79 + +OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part +of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether God is a cause of sin? + +(2) Whether the act of sin is from God? + +(3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of +heart? + +(4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who +are blinded or hardened? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 1] + +Whether God Is a Cause of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the +Apostle says of certain ones (Rom. 1:28): "God delivered them up to a +reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: +'convenient']," and a gloss comments on this by saying that "God works +in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, +whether to good or to evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not +right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man +a cause of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): "The creatures of God +are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men." +But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since +therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the +First Part (Q. 44, A. 1), it seems that God is a cause of sin, by +provoking man to sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. +Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause of +sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin. + +Obj. 4: Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not +contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of +punishment; since of this evil it is written (Isa. 45:7) that God +creates evil, and (Amos 3:6): "Shall there be evil in the city which +God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not done?" Therefore it is not +incompatible with God's goodness that He should cause the evil of +fault. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 11:25): "Thou . . . hatest +none of the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates sin, +according to Wis. 14:9: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are +hateful." Therefore God is not a cause of sin. + +_I answer that,_ Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of +another's sin. First, directly, namely by inclining his or another's +will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely by not preventing someone +from sinning. Hence (Ezech. 3:18) it is said to the watchman: "If +thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, +when I say to the wicked, 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it +not to him."] . . . I will require his blood at thy hand." Now God +cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, +since every sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the +end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their +last end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible +that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of +departing from the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be +directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin +indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the +assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to +give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order +of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so +that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the +cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking +of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer +while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident that God is +nowise a cause of sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear +from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it +follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was +not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate +sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that +reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a person to danger if +we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. +xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "God +inclines men's wills to good and evil," is to be understood as +meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in +so far as He does not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even this +is due as being deserved through a previous sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: When it is said the "creatures of God are turned 'to' +an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the +preposition "to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made +clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem" +admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which +might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures that they +might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, +wherefore the text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the +unwise," who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for a purpose +other than that for which they were made. + +Reply Obj. 3: The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, +according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that +first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it +goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that +first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's +orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause +thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits against the +commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause. + +Reply Obj. 4: Punishment is opposed to the good of the person +punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is +opposed to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly +opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison +between fault and punishment. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 2] + +Whether the Act of Sin Is from God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For +Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not a +thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin +is not from God. + +Obj. 2: Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except +because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, +intending evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a +cause of sin, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore God is not the cause +of the act of sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, +as was shown above (Q. 18, AA. 2, 8). Now whatever is the cause of a +thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If +therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, +which is false, as was proved above (A. 1). Therefore God is not the +cause of the act of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now +"the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine +declares (De Trin. iii, 4, 9). Therefore God's will is the cause of +the act of sin. + +_I answer that,_ The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in +both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode +of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius +declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something +existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as +it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, +viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God +is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin +denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from +the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order +of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced +to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of +limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the +motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement +in the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and +yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to +have a defect. + +Reply Obj. 1: In this passage Augustine calls by the name of "thing," +that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the +act of sin is not a thing. + +Reply Obj. 2: Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to +man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to +Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. +Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the +act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect +accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 72, A. 1), acts and habits do not +take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the +nature of evil, but from some object, to which that privation is +united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, +belongs to the species of the act consequently, and not as a specific +difference. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 3] + +Whether God Is the Cause of Spiritual Blindness and Hardness of +Heart? + +Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual +blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. +3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man +is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore +God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + +Obj. 2: Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God +does not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened heart, +according to Ecclus. 3:27: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the +last." Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart. + +Obj. 3: Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. +But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice of man, +according to Wis. 2:21: "For their own malice blinded them," and +again, according to 2 Cor. 4:4: "The god of this world hath blinded +the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God. +Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of +heart. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 6:10): "Blind the heart of +this people, and make their ears heavy," and Rom. 9:18: "He hath +mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth." + +_I answer that,_ Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two +things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, +and turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is +not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as +He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of +grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God +to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as +regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of +heart. + +Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the +enlightening of souls, according to John 1:9: "That was the true +light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even +as the sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies, +though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of +nature, whereas God works freely, through the order of His wisdom. +Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all +bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves +it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters are +closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being +darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in failing to light +up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who +closed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His own accord, +withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that +the cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an +obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His +grace. In this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness +of ear, and hardness of heart. + +These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, +which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens +the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses +excel in rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, +of which the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," +hence it is that spiritual "blindness" corresponds to sight, +"heaviness of the ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the +affections. + +Reply Obj. 1: Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the +withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this +respect, they make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened +by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it +is a sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as +sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is +said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 4] + +Whether Blindness and Hardness of Heart Are Directed to the Salvation +of Those Who Are Blinded and Hardened? + +Objection 1: It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are +always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and +hardened. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is +supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He +could draw some good from every evil." Much more, therefore, does He +direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause. Now +God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above +(A. 3). Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are +blinded and hardened. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 1:13) that "God hath no pleasure +in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death, +neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living.']." Now He +would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn +their blindness to their profit: just as a physician would seem to +take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal +the invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore +God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded. + +Obj. 3: Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" (Acts 10:34). +Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the +case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in +Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were +seized with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine (De +Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the +spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. + +Obj. 4: On the other hand, according to Rom. 3:8, evil should not be +done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God +does not blind some for the sake of their welfare. + +_I answer that,_ Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has +a twofold relation--to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's +damnation--to another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz. +that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall +into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and +converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). Therefore +blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those +who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of +reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is +directed medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are +blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are +blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work +together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). Therefore as regards some, blindness +is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their +damnation; as Augustine says (De Quaest. Evang. iii). + +Reply Obj. 1: Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is +directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom +the evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole +universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the +martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as +regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good +that ensues from the loss. + +Reply Obj. 3: That God directs the blindness of some to their +spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of +others is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He +vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God a +respecter of persons, as explained in the First Part (Q. 23, A. 5, ad +3). + +Reply Obj. 4: Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; +but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good. +________________________ + +QUESTION 80 + +OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and +under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin? + +(2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly? + +(3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity? + +(4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 1] + +Whether the Devil Is Directly the Cause of Man's Sinning? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of +man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. +Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his +friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says +that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De +Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills men's hearts with +secret lusts." Therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is +the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil." But +God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is +directly the cause of our sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the _Eudeme[a]n +Ethics_ (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle of +human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but +also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good +counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take +evil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that +"nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his +desire." Now man does not become a slave to his desires, except +through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but +man's own will alone. + +_I answer that,_ Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly +the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of +an action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper +principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the +will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be +directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act. + +Now the will, as stated above (Q. 9, AA. 3, 4, 6), can be moved by +two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended +appetible is said to move the appetite: secondly by that agent which +moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will +itself, or God, as was shown above (Q. 9, AA. 3, 4, 6). Now God +cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above (Q. 79, A. 1). Therefore +it follows that in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the +cause of his sin. + +As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will +in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the +will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he +that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the +will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, +in a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or +apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible +things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the +second and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, +either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by +persuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything +be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, +moved by any object except the last end, as stated above (Q. 10, AA. +1, 2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he +that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of +sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither +directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing +the object of appetite. + +Reply Obj. 1: All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with +them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man to +affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him +objects of appetite. + +Reply Obj. 2: This comparison is true in so far as the devil is +somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the +cause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of +causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will +inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way. + +Reply Obj. 3: God is the universal principle of all inward movements +of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, is +directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or +offering the object of appetite. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 2] + +Whether the Devil Can Induce Man to Sin, by Internal Instigations? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, +by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul +are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except +by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which +are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot +instigate man to evil through his internal movements. + +Obj. 2: Further, all the internal movements arise from the external +senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God alone +to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the First +Part (Q. 110, A. 4). Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in +man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are +perceived by the external senses. + +Obj. 3: Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and +to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of +these, because, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, AA. 2, 3, ad 2), +the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it +seem possible for him to produce imaginary species, since imaginary +forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are +in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to +produce, as is clear from what we have said in the First Part (Q. +110, A. 2; Q. 111, AA. 2, 3, ad 2). Therefore the devil cannot +through man's internal movements induce him to sin. + +_On the contrary,_ In that case, the devil would never tempt man, +unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false. + +_I answer that,_ The interior part of the soul is intellective and +sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the +will. As regards the will, we have already stated (A. 1; I, Q. 111, +A. 1) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its +very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of +truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; +rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, +which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. +Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the +imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can +induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain +forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive +appetite to some passion or other. + +The reason of this is, that as stated in the First Part (Q. 110, A. +3), the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally +by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those +effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here +below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the +representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to +local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.) [*De +Insomn. iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in +abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with +it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, +which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and +continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just +as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the +time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can +be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it +happens that man's imagination is brought into play. + +In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions +according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital +spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through +certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result +is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image +which is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive +principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: +De Insomn. iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to +an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing +of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as +being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a +passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this +way the devil induces man inwardly to sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic +principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as +external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that +food may be more easily digested. + +Reply Obj. 2: This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether +outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but +according to local movement, as explained above. + +Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these +forms are received originally from the senses. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q, 80, Art. 3] + +Whether the Devil Can Induce Man to Sin of Necessity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of +necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said +of the devil (Job 41:24) that "there is no power on earth that can +compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he +dwells on the earth. + +Obj. 2: Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of +things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented +to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the +senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, +text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated +above (A. 2); and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. +lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which, to wit, the devil is the +cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, +it adapts itself to shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, +seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin +of necessity. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is +some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the devil +can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the +way explained above (A. 2). Therefore he can induce man to sin of +necessity. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 5:8): "Your adversary the +devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." +Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man +were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he +cannot induce man to sin of necessity. + +Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): "Be subject . . . to God, +but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said +neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in +any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to +resist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not +compel to sin. + +_I answer that,_ The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained +by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; +but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident +from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, +except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede +altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as +is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being +thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a +sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so +far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above (Q. 77, A. 7). +It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to +sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Not every power that is greater than man, can move +man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 6). + +Reply Obj. 2: That which is apprehended by the senses or the +imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has +the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the +reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the +reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the +exercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the +devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of +sinning. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 4] + +Whether All the Sins of Men Are Due to the Devil's Suggestion? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the +devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd +of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to +others." + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the +devil, according to John 8:34: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave +[Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the +same also he is the slave" (2 Pet. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a +sin, has been overcome by the devil. + +Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is +irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, +if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion +from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly +false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's +suggestion. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all +our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to +a movement of the free-will." + +_I answer that,_ the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of +all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason +of whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to +sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who +dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, +however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were +the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) +from the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still +have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which desire +might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter +that is subject to the free-will. + +Reply Obj. 1: The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as +regards their original cause, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man becomes another's slave not only by being +overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: +it is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of +the devil. + +Reply Obj. 3: The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he +sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not +already prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be +said of no sin of man. +________________________ + +QUESTION 81 + +OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while +man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, by outward +suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of +origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration +of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its +essence; (3) of its subject. + +Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his +descendants? + +(2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other +parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin? + +(3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten +of Adam by way of seminal generation? + +(4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from +some part of the human body? + +(5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and +not the man, had sinned? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 1] + +Whether the First Sin of Our First Parent Is Contracted by His +Descendants, by Way of Origin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is +not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezech. +18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he +would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no +one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin. + +Obj. 2: Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, +unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass +from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the +subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in +the First Part (Q. 118, A. 2). Therefore neither can any sin be +transmitted by way of origin. + +Obj. 3: Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is +caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because it lacks +the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. +Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin. + +Obj. 4: Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more +powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united +to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long +as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen +infect the soul. + +Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds +fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are so +through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are +said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their origin. Therefore +nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin +entered into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be +understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written +(Wis. 2:24): "By the envy of the devil, death came into this world." +It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin +entered into the world. + +_I answer that,_ According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold +that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his +descendants, by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to +be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be +washed from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian +heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For +instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra +Julian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi, xii.] + +In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be +transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have +gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject +of sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is +transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem +to produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous, +endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be +transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, +from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to +child--thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the +father of a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, +although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body +is proportionate to the soul, and since the soul's defects redound +into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable +defect of the soul is passed on to the child, through the +transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject +of the guilt. + +But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that +some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to +child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted +in consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the +case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a +defect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, +which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the +rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on +the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty +stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says +(Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather +takes pity on him." + +Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men +born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one +common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as +in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as +one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says +(Praedic., De Specie) that "by sharing the same species, many men are +one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so +many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, +of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, +but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. +Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a +sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is +imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man's first +moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this +man born of Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of +his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who +originate from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to +their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first +parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which +flows from the soul into the bodily members is called "actual." And +just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is +not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part +of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original +sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person +receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is +called the "sin of nature," according to Eph. 2:3: "We . . . were by +nature children of wrath." + +Reply Obj. 1: The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, +because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share in +his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is +transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual +sin is transmitted through being imitated. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power +in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless the +motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the +rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits the human +nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which +infects it: for he that is born is associated with his first parent +in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature from him +by a kind of movement which is that of generation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet +human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt. + +Reply Obj. 4: The semen is the principle of generation, which is an +act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the +soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is +already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person. + +Reply Obj. 5: A man is not blamed for that which he has from his +origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider +him as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: +thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account +of a crime committed by one of his forbears. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 2] + +Whether Also Other Sins of the First Parent or of Nearer Ancestors +Are Transmitted to Their Descendants? + +Objection 1: It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first +parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. +For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished +by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate parents, +according to Ex. 20:5: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the +iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth +generation." Furthermore, according to human law, the children of +those who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the +guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he +has of himself, than that which he has received from another: thus +fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his +children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has from Adam. Much +more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of +himself. + +Obj. 3: Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our +first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our +nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer +ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it be +corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to Apoc. 22:11: +"He that is filthy, let him be filthier still." Therefore children +contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer ancestors, +even as they contract the sin of their first parent. + +_On the contrary,_ Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the +merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their +descendants. Much less therefore are their sins. + +_I answer that,_ Augustine puts this question in the _Enchiridion_ +xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter +carefully we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the +nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first +parent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man +begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently those +things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal +actions and matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to +their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the +knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the +other hand, those things that concern the nature of the species, are +transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of +nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes, unless nature +fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the +individual pertaining to natural disposition, are transmitted to the +children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so +forth; but nowise those that are purely personal, as stated above. + +Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also +something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the +nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, +and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original +justice, as stated in the First Part (Q. 100, A. 1), was a gift of +grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This +gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original +justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his +posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however, +whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature +as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of +the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted. + +Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad +Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment +on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either +in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul is God's +immediate property, as stated in Ezech. 18:4. Sometimes, however, by +Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their +parents' account, inasmuch as the child, as to its body, is part of +its father. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man can more easily transmit that which he has of +himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our +nearer ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely +personal, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The first sin infects nature with a human corruption +pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption +pertaining only to the person. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 3] + +Whether the Sin of the First Parent Is Transmitted, by the Way of +Origin, to All Men? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not +transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a +punishment consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are +born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still +living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may +be gathered from 1 Thess. 4:14: "We who are alive . . . unto the +coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept." Therefore +they do not contract original sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a +man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he does not +transmit it to his children. + +Obj. 3: Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, +as the Apostle declares (Rom. 5:15, seqq). But the gift of Christ is +not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "Death passed upon +all men in whom all have sinned." + +_I answer that,_ According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly +believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam +contract original sin from him; else all would not need redemption +[*Cf. Translator's note inserted before III, Q. 27] which is through +Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered +from what has been stated (A. 1), viz. that original sin, in virtue +of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his posterity, just +as, from the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of +the body, through their being moved by the will. Now it is evident +that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an +inborn aptitude to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin is +transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of +generation. + +Reply Obj. 1: It is held with greater probability and more commonly +that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die, +and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the Third +Part (Suppl., Q. 78, A. 1, Obj. 1). If, however, it be true, as +others hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome +mentions among others in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of +the Body--Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the objection, that +although they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in +them, and that the punishment of death will be remitted by God, since +He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins. + +Reply Obj. 1: Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, +in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. +Nevertheless original sin remains in its effect as regards the +_fomes,_ which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of +the body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man +exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are +baptized transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being +renewed in Baptism, but as still retaining something of the oldness +of the first sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born +of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that +are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not +only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but also unto the +removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 4] + +Whether Original Sin Would Be Contracted by a Person Formed +Miraculously from Human Flesh? + +Objection 1: It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a +person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on Gen. 4:1 +says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, +because they were not severed from him in the place of life, before +he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned." But if a +man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be +severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would contract original +sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being +infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted. +Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, +from whatever part of the flesh it was formed. + +Obj. 3: Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, +in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who might +be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they +would contract original sin. + +_On the contrary,_ They would not have been in Adam _according to +seminal virtue,_ which alone is the cause of the transmission of +original sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), original sin is +transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they +are moved by him through generation, even as the members are moved by +the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except +by the active power of generation: so that those alone contract +original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of +generation originally derived from Adam, i.e. who are descended from +him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than +the active power of generation. But if anyone were to be formed by +God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not +be derived from Adam. Consequently he would not contract original +sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were +moved, not by the man's will, but by some external power. + +Reply Obj. 1: Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. +Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on +account of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom +his active generation extends. + +Reply Obj. 2: The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far +as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated. + +Reply Obj. 3: If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would +have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression is +St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica, III, Q. 31, +A. 6, Reply to First Objection.], but not according to seminal +virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 5] + +Whether If Eve, and Not Adam, Had Sinned, Their Children Would Have +Contracted Original Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, +their children would have contracted original sin. Because we +contract original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in +them, according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): "In whom all +have sinned." Now a man pre-exists in his mother as well as in his +father. Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his +mother's sin as well as from his father's. + +Obj. 2: Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children +would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is "the +mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher +states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1, 4), when death and liability to +suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to +suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin. +Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would +contract original sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the Holy +Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born without +original sin) "purifying her." But this purification would not have +been necessary, if the infection of original sin were not contracted +from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is +contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children +would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin +entered into this world." Now if the woman would have transmitted +original sin to her children, he should have said that it entered by +two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, +since she sinned first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the +children, not by the mother, but by the father. + +_I answer that,_ The solution of this question is made clear by what +has been said. For it has been stated (A. 1) that original sin is +transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the +begetting of his children: wherefore it has been said (A. 4) that if +anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not +contract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of +philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father, +while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin is +contracted, not from the mother, but from the father: so that, +accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would +not contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, +they would contract it. + +Reply Obj. 1: The child pre-exists in its father as in its active +principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive +principle. Consequently the comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 2: Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their +children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject to +the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a +necessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother, not +as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems +unreasonable. Because, as stated in the First Part (Q. 97, AA. 1, 2, +ad 4), immortality and impassibility, in the original state, were a +result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, +whereby the body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul +remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is +original sin. If, therefore, supposing Adam had not sinned, original +sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's +sin; it is evident that the children would not have been deprived of +original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to +suffer and subject to the necessity of dying. + +Reply Obj. 3: This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was +not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because it +behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest purity" [*Cf. +Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy to receive +God unless it be pure, according to Ps. 92:5: "Holiness becometh Thy +House, O Lord." +________________________ + +QUESTION 82 + +OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE +(Question 82) + +We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this +head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether original sin is a habit? + +(2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man? + +(3) Whether original sin is concupiscence? + +(4) Whether original sin is equally in all? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 82, Art. 1] + +Whether Original Sin Is a Habit? + +Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For +original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De +Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. +But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a +habit. + +Obj. 2: Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than +original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of +actual sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a +man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit +has the nature of a fault. + +Obj. 3: Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because +evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not +preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of +infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of +original sin little children have the aptitude of concupiscence +though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of +habit. Therefore original sin is a habit. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 49, A. 4; Q. 50, A. 1), habit is +twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: +thus science and virtue are called habits. In this way original sin +is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a +complex nature, whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to +something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second +nature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original +sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the +destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice, +even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by +reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to +health. Hence it is that original sin is called the "languor of +nature" [*Cf. Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii]. + +Reply Obj. 1: As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as +it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly +something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately +disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original +justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of +the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt +habit. + +Reply Obj. 2: Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas +original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition +of nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted +from our first parent, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Now this +inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the +inordinate disposition of an act is not: and for this reason original +sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot. + +Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers the habit which inclines a +power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. +Nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow +from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal +of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate +movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements +results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to say +that original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except +by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a +habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 82, Art. 2] + +Whether There Are Several Original Sins in One Man? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one +man. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in +iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in +which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several +original sins in man. + +Obj. 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject +to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of nature +which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines +to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not one +habit; but several. + +Obj. 3: Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the +different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown +above (Q. 74). Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it +seems that original sin is not one but several. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:29): "Behold the Lamb of +God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason +for the employment of the singular is that the "sin of the world" is +original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage. + +_I answer that,_ In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons +may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of +original sin. For it has been stated (Q. 81, A. 2), that the first +sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. +Wherefore in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, +it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The +second reason may be taken from the very essence of original sin. +Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on +the cause, while the unity of number is derived from the subject. For +example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed +from different causes, e.g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a +lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man +will be one in number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that +is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original +justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently +original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in +number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in +proportion, but is numerically many. + +Reply Obj. 1: The employment of the plural--"in sins"--may be +explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use +of the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the +life of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually +pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually +many; or by the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of +our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; +or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit +cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason why +it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal +of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed, +the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the +harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers of the +soul have various opposite tendencies. + +Reply Obj. 3: Original sin infects the different parts of the +soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original +justice held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there +is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man, +although the various parts of the body are affected. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 82, Art. 3] + +Whether Original Sin Is Concupiscence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. +For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide +Orth. ii, 4, 30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, +since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a +natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are in +us, according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:5). Now there are several other +passions besides concupiscence, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). +Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another +passion. + +Obj. 3: Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are +disordered, as stated above (A. 2, Obj. 3). But the intellect is the +highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). +Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is +the guilt of original sin." + +_I answer that,_ Everything takes its species from its form: and it +has been stated (A. 2) that the species of original sin is taken from +its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be +considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries +have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be +considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is +opposed to it. Now the whole order of original justice consists in +man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, +was in the will, whose function it is to move all the other parts to +the end, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1), so that the will being turned +away from God, all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. +Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was +made subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while +every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material +element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the +other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning +inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by +the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin is +concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, +formally. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally +governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to +man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as +it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary +to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), all the irascible +passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the +princip[al] place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous +in moving, and is felt most, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2, ad 1). +Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the +chief passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion. + +Reply Obj. 3: As, in good things, the intellect and reason +stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul +is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as +stated above (Q. 77, AA. 1, 2;Q. 80, A. 2). Hence original +sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance +is comprised among the material defects of original sin. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 82, Art. 4] + +Whether Original Sin Is Equally in All? + +Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. +Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above +(A. 3). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. +Therefore original sin is not equally in all. + +Obj. 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the +soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But +sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to +degrees. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust +transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation may +be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be +greater in one than in another. + +_On the contrary,_ Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above +(Q. 81, A. 1). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin +is too. + +_I answer that,_ There are two things in original sin: one is the +privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this +privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted +to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has +no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away +entirely; and privations that remove something entirely, such as +death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above (Q. 73, +A. 2). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: +since all are related equally to the first principle of our corrupt +origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; +for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that +original sin cannot be more in one than in another. + +Reply Obj. 1: Through the bond of original justice being broken, +which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, +each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more +impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the +soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of +the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more +prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to +original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken +in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to +themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the +powers, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same +species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be +caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or +less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause +of original sin is equal to all, so that there is no comparison. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: +for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust +in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we +must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive +appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original +justice. This lust is equally in all. +________________________ + +QUESTION 83 + +OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head +there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the +soul? + +(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or +through its powers? + +(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of +original sin? + +(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. +the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 83, Art. 1] + +Whether Original Sin Is More in the Flesh Than in the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh +than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind +arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this +rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): +"I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my +mind." Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh. + +Obj. 2: Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: +thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the +soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal +semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in +so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls +were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is +not in the soul, but in the flesh. + +Obj. 4: Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the +body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it would +follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God +would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's +creation and fusion. + +Obj. 5: Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, +knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational +soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by +being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of +original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul +into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by +the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh. + +_On the contrary,_ The same is the subject of a virtue and of the +vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the +subject of virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): "I know that +there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is +good." Therefore the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but +only the soul. + +_I answer that,_ One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as +in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its +subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, +as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle +(Rom. 5:12): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily +semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power +of the semen that original sin together with human nature is +transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh +as its subject, but only in the soul. + +The reason for this is that, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1), original +sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this +posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as +actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now +in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from +the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can +in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its +instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting +to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible +faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, +which, in so far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the +instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the +nutritive power and the internal members, which have no natural +aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of +guilt. + +Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the +flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to +the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of +guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of +guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject +of original sin, and not the flesh. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, +qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already +redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to +punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh." +Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, +but of punishment. + +Reply Obj. 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental +cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the +instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal +cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since +in him it had the nature of actual sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect +of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but +as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is +transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational +soul, but disposes the matter for it. + +Reply Obj. 4: The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, +but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. +And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, +it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being created. On +the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to +the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with regard to God +infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained through being +infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused. + +Reply Obj. 5: The common good takes precedence of private good. +Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general +order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a +body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more +that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to +its infusion into the body, as stated in the First Part (Q. 90, A. +4; Q. 118, A. 3). And it is better for the soul to be thus, +according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it +can avoid damnation, by means of grace. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 83, Art. 2] + +Whether Original Sin Is in the Essence of the Soul Rather Than in the +Powers? + +Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of +the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to +be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved +by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence +but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not +according to its essence, but only according to the powers. + +Obj. 2: Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now +original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the +subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the +soul, rather than in its essence. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as +from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But +original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is +more in the powers than in the essence of the soul. + +Obj. 4: Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated +(Q. 82, A. 3). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. +Therefore original sin is also. + +_On the contrary,_ Original sin is called the sin of nature, as +stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Now the soul is the form and nature of +the body, in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, +as stated in the First Part (Q. 76, A. 6). Therefore the soul is the +subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence. + +_I answer that,_ The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the +soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus +if the motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the +concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that +the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is +evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently +that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the +primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as +the term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and +this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in +the First Part (Q. 76, A. 6). Therefore the soul, in respect of its +essence, is the primary subject of original sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to +the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will +of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches +first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: Even original justice pertained radically to the +essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to +which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the +powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the +principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of +actual sins, which are the sins of the person. + +Reply Obj. 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to form, +which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless +comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of +the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper +accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation +and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 4: Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the +position of matter and effect, as stated above (Q. 82, A. 3). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 83, Art. 3] + +Whether Original Sin Infects the Will Before the Other Powers? + +Objection 1: It would seem that original sin does not infect the will +before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power +by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of +the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative +power more than to the others. + +Obj. 2: Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal +semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh +than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive +powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them +more than in the will. + +Obj. 3: Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of +the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin +infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of +all infect the intellect, as preceding the others. + +_On the contrary,_ Original justice has a prior relation to the will, +because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. +Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has +a prior relation to the will. + +_I answer that,_ Two things must be considered in the infection of +original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this +respect it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above (A. +2). In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and +in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore +regard first of all that power in which is seated the first +inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above +(Q. 74, AA. 1, 2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the +will. + +Reply Obj. 1: Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative +power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. +Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is +the subject of original sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the +soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former +follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of +perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers, +are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher +power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of +original sin reaches it first. + +Reply Obj. 3: The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by +proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the +intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to +sin. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 83, Art. 4] + +Whether the Aforesaid Powers Are More Infected Than the Others? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more +infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to +pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject +of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. +Therefore that power is most infected by original sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in +so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey +reason, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. Therefore the generative power +is not the most infected by original sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual +and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of +things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of +all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) +that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements +of the members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now +those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, +wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful +incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin +regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the +concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch. + +_I answer that,_ Those corruptions especially are said to be +infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one +subject to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and +murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption +of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated +above (Q. 81, A. 1). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, +are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves the generative +power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes +delectation of the touch, which is the most powerful object of the +concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul +are said to be corrupted by original sin, these three are said +specially to be corrupted and infected. + +Reply Obj. 1: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, +belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above (A. 3). But in so far as +it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid +powers proximately, and to the will, remotely. + +Reply Obj. 2: The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers +which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of +original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but +through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative +power. Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sight is not related to the act of generation except in +respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species +is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the +touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch +rather than to the sight. +________________________ + +QUESTION 84 + +OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be +the cause of another. Under this head there are four points of +inquiry: + +(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins? + +(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin? + +(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, +besides pride and covetousness? + +(4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 84, Art. 1] + +Whether Covetousness Is the Root of All Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all +sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is +opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root +of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for +the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are +not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in +_Ethic._ i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins, +but proceeds from some deeper root. + +Obj. 3: Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name +for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires money +through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is +not the root of all sins. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): "The desire of +money is the root of all evil." + +_I answer that,_ According to some, covetousness may be understood in +different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and +thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for +any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, +because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, +as stated above (Q. 72, A. 2). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of +a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods inordinately: and they +say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, +comparing it to the root of a tree, which draws its sustenance from +earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things. + +Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of +the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins. +For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they +"will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the +devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils." Hence it is +evident that he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the +inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that +covetousness, as denoting a special sin, is called the root of all +sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to +the whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of +committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for any sin +whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal +goods, according to Eccles. 10:19: "All things obey money": so that +in this desire for riches is the root of all sins. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For +sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the +desire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is +called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for +the immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of +God, is called the root of the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: +"Rooted and founded in charity." + +Reply Obj. 2: The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not +as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last +end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any +temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than a +particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual +goods, which along with many others can be procured by means of money. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as in natural things we do not ask what +always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that +the nature of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to +act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what +happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the +reason that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say that +covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no other +evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise +therefrom, for the reason given. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 84, Art. 2] + +Whether Pride Is the Beginning of Every Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every +sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning of +a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is +the root of every sin, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is also +the beginning of every sin, and not pride. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): "The beginning of the +pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God." But +apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of +pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that +which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which, +according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of +Babylon." Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning of +every sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the +beginning of all sin." + +_I answer that,_ Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, +as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin. +Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not +being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic +sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to +the corruption of nature; and in this sense they say that it is the +beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, +because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good +by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, for which reason +covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as +turning away from God, to Whose commandment man refuses to be +subject, for which reason it is called the "beginning," because the +beginning of evil consists in turning away from God. + +Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the +mind of the wise man who said (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the +beginning of all sin." For it is evident that he is speaking of pride +as denoting inordinate desire to excel, as is clear from what follows +(verse 17): "God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; +indeed this is the point of nearly the whole chapter. We must +therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the +beginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary +actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, and of +execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have +stated many times before (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 1; Q. 18, A. 7, ad 2; Q. 15, +A. 1, ad 2; Q. 25, A. 2). Now man's end in acquiring all temporal +goods is that, through their means, he may have some perfection and +excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the +desire to excel, is said to be the "beginning" of every sin. On the +other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to +that which by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of +sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, from +this point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all +evils, as stated above (A. 1). + +This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + +Reply Obj. 2: Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of +pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from +the fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he +desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. +Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote +the special sin, but rather that general condition of every sin, +consisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that +apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is +the first species of pride. For it is characteristic of pride to be +unwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the +result being that a man is unduly lifted up, in respect of the other +species of pride. + +Reply Obj. 3: In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love +oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently +it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the +beginning of every evil. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 84, Art. 3] + +Whether Any Other Special Sins, Besides Pride and Avarice, Should Be +Called Capital? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride +and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to be +to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in _De Anima_ +ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore +covetousness is called the "root of all evils," it seems that it +alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice. + +Obj. 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the +other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the +head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the +character of head: so that no sins should be called capital. + +Obj. 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital +punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished +thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain +special vices under the name of capital. + +_I answer that,_ The word capital is derived from _caput_ (a head). +Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, +which is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, +metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even +men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a +capital vice is so called, in the first place, from "head" taken in +the proper sense, and thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for +which capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that +we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in which +the term "capital" is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a +principle or director of others. In this way a capital vice is one +from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, +which origin is formal, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 6). Wherefore a +capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their +director and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to +which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander in +matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) +compares these capital vices to the "leaders of an army." + +Reply Obj. 1: The term "capital" is taken from _caput_ and applied to +something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some +property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And +therefore the capital vices are not only those which have the +character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the +"root," and pride which is called the beginning, but also those which +have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins. + +Reply Obj. 2: Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, +for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine +(De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and order." +But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it regards some +good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers capital sin as so called from +the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 84, Art. 4] + +Whether the Seven Capital Vices Are Suitably Reckoned? + +Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital +vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, +lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal +virtues, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 2). Therefore there are only four +principal or capital vices. + +Obj. 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as +stated above (Q. 77). But there are four principal passions of the +soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the +above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and +sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and +sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are +unfittingly enumerated. + +Obj. 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it +should not be placed among the principal vices. + +Obj. 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, +so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above (A. 2). But avarice +is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also +should be placed among the capital vices. + +Obj. 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused +through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through +ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. +steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are +insufficiently enumerated. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates +them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the capital vices are those +which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this +kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the +condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong +inclination for one particular end, the result being that he +frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does +not come under the consideration of art, because man's particular +dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a +natural relationship of the ends to one another: and it is in this +way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this +kind of origin can come under the consideration of art. + +Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends +have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is +in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are +differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First, +directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek +it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it. +Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: +thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a +good on account of some attendant evil. + +Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a +certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility, +merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and +praise, and this good is sought inordinately by _vainglory._ +Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the +preservation of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is +pursued inordinately by _gluttony,_ or the preservation of the +species, e.g. sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately +by _lust._ Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which +_covetousness_ is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately +the contrary evils. + +Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some +property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first +place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect +good, to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by +_pride_ or _vainglory._ Secondly, it implies satiety, which +_covetousness_ seeks in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it +implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in +_Ethic._ i, 7; x, 6, 7, 8 and this _gluttony_ and _lust_ pursue. + +On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil +occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own +good, and thus we have _sloth,_ which is sadness about one's +spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it +happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without +recrimination, belongs to _envy,_ which is sadness about another's +good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be +with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is _anger._ Again, +these same vices seek the contrary evils. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since +virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or +to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the +appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the +principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues. + +Reply Obj. 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the +passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the +concupiscible part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure +or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the +capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated +above (Q. 25, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a +distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special +kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against +another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the right +to vengeance. + +Reply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the +order of the end, as stated above (A. 2): and it is in the same order +that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore +pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, +but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral. +xxxi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another point +of view, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). + +Reply Obj. 5: These vices are called capital because others, most +frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from +arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the +sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which +pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual +goods on account of the attendant labor; for the ignorance that can +cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2). That +a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to +ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should not be done +that good may come of it. +________________________ + +QUESTION 85 + +OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF +NATURE +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of +the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of +punishment. + +Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin? + +(2) Whether it can be taken away altogether? + +(3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is +stricken in consequence of sin. + +(4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin? + +(5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin? + +(6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 1] + +Whether Sin Diminishes the Good of Nature? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of +nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good +remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. +Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human +nature. + +Obj. 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which +precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its +accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. +Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature +is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be +diminished. + +Obj. 3: Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now +no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it is +possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards +another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the +good of his nature. + +Obj. 4: Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which +is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an +accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But +sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore +sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act. + +_On the contrary,_ "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to +Jericho (Luke 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of +his gifts, and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is +from the _Glossa Ordinaria_ of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore +sin diminishes the good of nature. + +_I answer that,_ The good of human nature is threefold. First, there +are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties +that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. +Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as +stated above (Q. 60, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1), this inclination to virtue +is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred +on the whole of human nature in the person of the first man, may be +called a good of nature. + +Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed +nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely +destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of +nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. +Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated +above (Q. 50, A. 1). Now from the very fact that thing becomes +inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other +contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to +virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there results a +diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of +nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as +anyone may see who reads the context. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has +an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not +changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is +the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its +term. + +Reply Obj. 3: A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active +and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something +is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when +treating of the production of habits (Q. 51, A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 4: An accident does not act effectively on its subject, +but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that +whiteness makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder +sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is +itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an +inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness of the +agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the +fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive +element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive appetite, and +the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above +(Q. 77, AA. 1, 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as +though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the +object acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it +out of order. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 2] + +Whether the Entire Good of Human Nature Can Be Destroyed by Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can +be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since +human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken +away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of +nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end +it can be entirely taken away. + +Obj. 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts +are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all +bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. +Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems +that the whole can also be taken away by sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is +aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some +on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any +more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the +good of nature entirely. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does +not exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the +good of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. +Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does +not destroy it entirely. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the good of nature, that is +diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is +befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for +it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, +which is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from +man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer +be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of +nature to be destroyed entirely. + +Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually +diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use +of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, +without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, +text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be +made in the same quantity, it will at last be entirely destroyed, for +instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length +of a span. If, however, the subtraction be made each time in the same +proportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely, +as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished +by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided +that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted +before. But this does not apply to the question at issue, since a +subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a +previous sin, but perhaps more, if it be a more grievous sin. + +We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the +aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between +two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, +and tends to the good of virtue, as to its term and end. Consequently +its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of +its root, secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is +not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as +stated above (A. 1). But it is diminished in the second way, in so +far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if +it were diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely +destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. +Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is +placed against its attaining its term, it is evident that it can be +diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed +indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to +sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of +this inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a +transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the +very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is +diminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always +remains rooted in the nature of the body. + +Reply Obj. 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by +subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, +and this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, +as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: +nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its +term, in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on +the one hand, and not on the other. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue +remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is +not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by +Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains +in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally +endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the +lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ +requisite for sight. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 3] + +Whether Weakness, Ignorance, Malice and Concupiscence Are Suitably +Reckoned As the Wounds of Nature Consequent Upon Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and +concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature +consequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause +of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as +appears from what has been said above (Q. 76, A. 1; Q. 77, AA. 3, 5; +Q. 78, A. 1). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should +have no place among the effects of sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an +act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not +be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be +reckoned a wound of nature. + +Obj. 4: Further, it has been stated (Q. 77, A. 3) that to sin from +weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a +passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness. + +Obj. 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two +things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz. +ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," +which four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it +seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete. + +_On the contrary,_ The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not +known]. + +_I answer that,_ As a result of original justice, the reason had +perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself +was perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original +justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already +stated (Q. 81, A. 2); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as +it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally +directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature. + +Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of +virtue, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 2), viz. the reason, where +prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the +subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of +temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its +order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the +will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; +in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, +there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is +deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there +is the wound of concupiscence. + +Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human +nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the +inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on +account of actual sin, as was explained above (AA. 1, 2), these four +wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, +the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will +hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and +concupiscence more impetuous. + +Reply Obj. 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not +be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is +more easily inclined to sin again. + +Reply Obj. 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a +certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gen. +8:21: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The +imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his +youth.']. + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 82, A. 3, ad 1), concupiscence is +natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so +far as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man. + +Reply Obj. 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called +a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the +reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary +to fortitude which pertains to the irascible. + +Reply Obj. 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of +Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, +viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to +these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. +"Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed +through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 4] + +Whether Privation of Mode, Species and Order Is the Effect of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order +is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) +that "where these three abound, the good is great; where they are +less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at +all." But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does +not destroy mode, species and order. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the +"privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De +Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is +not the effect of sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now +since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding +privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the +result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species and +order is not the effect of each sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, +according to Ps. 6:3, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now +weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order. + +_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part, Q. 5, A. 5, mode, +species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, +and also upon every being. Because every being and every good as such +depends on its form from which it derives its species. Again, any +kind of form, whether substantial or accidental, of anything +whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in +_Metaph._ viii, that "the forms of things are like numbers," so that +a form has a certain _mode_ corresponding to its measure. Lastly +owing to its form, each thing has a relation of _order_ to something +else. + +Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, +corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good +belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, +species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. +There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has +its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated +above (AA. 1, 2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the +good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, +and is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting +in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and +order, the privation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear +both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it +destroys or diminishes mode, species and order. + +This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections. + +Reply Obj. 3: Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as +explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 5] + +Whether Death and Other Bodily Defects Are the Result of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that death and other bodily defects are +not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now +these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in +others, whereas original sin, from which especially these defects +seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above (Q. 82, A. 4). +Therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But +these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism or +Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than +original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the +body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does +original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the +result of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12), "By one man sin +entered into this world, and by sin death." + +_I answer that,_ One thing causes another in two ways: first, by +reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one +thing is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of +the power of its nature or form, the result being that the effect is +directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like +defects are beside the intention of the sinner, it is evident that +sin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one +thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an +obstacle: thus it is stated in _Phys._ viii, text. 32, that "by +displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting +thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause of +death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the +sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, whereby not +only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the +control of reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole +body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, +as stated in the First Part (Q. 97, A. 1). Wherefore, original +justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as +human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the +powers, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 82, A. 3), so also it became +subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body. + +Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of +punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death +and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. +And although the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless +they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as +punishments. + +Reply Obj. 1: Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if +equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or +diminished, the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes +of an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For +supposing a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it +does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will +be equal; but that one will move with greater velocity, which has the +greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it +is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, +when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is +left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments, +some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, +although original sin is equal in all. + +Reply Obj. 2: Both original and actual sin are removed by the same +cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rom. +8:11): "He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of +His Spirit that dwelleth in you": but each is done according to the +order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that +we should first of all be conformed to Christ's sufferings, before +attaining to the immortality and impassibility of glory, which was +begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our +bodies should remain, for a time, subject to suffering, in order that +we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ. + +Reply Obj. 3: Two things may be considered in actual sin, the +substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the +substance of the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some +sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, it +deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the +acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body, +as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those +defects, as original sin does. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 6] + +Whether Death and Other Defects Are Natural to Man? + +Objection 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are +natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ +generically" (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as +other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is +naturally corruptible. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally +corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But +such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible. + +Obj. 3: Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human +life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the +vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as +stated in _De Anima_ ii, text. 50, it seems that death and such like +defects are natural to man. + +_On the contrary,_ (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. +Now "God made not death" (Wis. 1:13). Therefore death is not natural +to man. + +(2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a +punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable +to it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original +sin, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore they are not natural to man. + +(3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its +end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above (Q. 2, +A. 7; Q. 5, AA. 3, 4): and the form of the human body is the rational +soul, as was proved in the First Part (Q. 75, A. 6). Therefore the +human body is naturally incorruptible. + +_I answer that,_ We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; +first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its +particular nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of +action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every +corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in _De Coelo_ +ii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation of +the thing to which it belongs. + +On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some +universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or +again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is +said by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." This force intends +the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate +generation and corruption in things are requisite: and in this +respect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as +regards the inclination of the form which is the principle of being +and perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is +allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the +discretion of the universal agent. And although every form intends +perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being +can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational soul; for the +reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other +forms are; indeed it has an immaterial operation of its own, as +stated in the First Part (Q. 75, A. 2). Consequently as regards his +form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible +things. But since that very form has a matter composed of contraries, +from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in +the whole. In this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards +the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the +nature of his form. + +The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the +other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to +solve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the +rational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its +end, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is +corruptible, considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, +adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note +a twofold condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and +another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition +of matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter +both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for +cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted +for a knife: but that iron be breakable and inclined to rust, results +from the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose +this in the iron, indeed he would do without it if he could: +wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's +intention, nor to the purpose of his art. In like manner the human +body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a +mixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable as an organ +of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the +fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is +not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an incorruptible +matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in +forming man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift of +original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was +stated in the First Part (Q. 97, A. 1). It is in this sense that it +is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment +of sin. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +________________________ + +QUESTION 86 + +OF THE STAIN OF SIN +(In Two Articles) + +We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul? + +(2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 86, Art. 1] + +Whether Sin Causes a Stain on the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For +a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: +hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as +Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of +a much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by +sinning. Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning. + +Obj. 2: Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above (Q. 74, +AA. 1, 2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in _De _Anima +iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by +considering anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. +Therefore neither is the will stained by sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either +something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, +it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that +nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither disposition +nor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal +of a disposition or habit; for instance, in a man who after +committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into +a sin of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote +anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation. +Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of +grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain caused by +all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It was said to Solomon (Ecclus. 47:22): "Thou hast +stained thy glory": and it is written (Eph. 5:27): "That He might +present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": +and in each case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a +stain is the effect of sin. + +_I answer that,_ A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, +when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another +body, e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a +stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's soul +has a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural +light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; the other, +from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, +whereby man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and +fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there +is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to +certain things, against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as +shown above (Q. 71, A. 6). Wherefore the loss of comeliness +occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the +soul. + +Reply Obj. 1: The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their +own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the +soul, by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them +inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law. + +Reply Obj. 2: The action of the intellect is accomplished by the +intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of +the intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, +by them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in a +movement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to +the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves +inordinately, according to Osee 9:10: "They . . . became abominable +as those things were which they loved." + +Reply Obj. 3: The stain is neither something positive in the soul, +nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the +soul's brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore +diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is +the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which +varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 86, Art. 2] + +Whether the Stain Remains in the Soul After the Act of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul +after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the +soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or +disposition, as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3). Therefore the stain does +not remain in the soul after the act of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the +body, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But the shadow does not remain +when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in +the soul when the act of sin is past. + +Obj. 3: Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of +the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is no +longer there, neither is the stain in the soul. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jos. 22:17): "Is it a small thing +to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime +remaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us'] to this day?" + +_I answer that,_ The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the +act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated +above (A. 1), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on +account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the Divine +law. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the +stain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved by grace, he +returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is +removed. For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew +from the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once +return to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that +his will should have a movement contrary to the previous movement. +Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of +movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement ceases, +but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of +sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something +privative, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light. + +Reply Obj. 2: After the interposed body has passed by, the +transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards +the illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the +sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: +and so there is no comparison. + +Reply Obj. 3: The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes +the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local +parting. Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is +not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain +removed. +________________________ + +QUESTION 87 + +OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT +(In Eight Articles) + +We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) +the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect +of the punishment due to them. + +Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin? + +(2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another? + +(3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment? + +(4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in +quantity? + +(5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite +punishment? + +(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin? + +(7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin? + +(8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 1] + +Whether the Debt of Punishment Is an Effect of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an +effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, +does not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is +accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention of the +sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is +good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an +effect of sin, which is evil. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate +affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur a +further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. +Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 2:9): "Tribulation and anguish +upon every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to +sin. Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the +words "tribulation and anguish." + +_I answer that,_ It has passed from natural things to human affairs +that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some +detriment therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one +contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which +reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as stated in _Meteor._ i, +12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to +repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all +things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to +the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against +an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And +because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, +commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in +consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment. + +Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment +corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. +In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his +own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who +governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member +either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to +the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these +orders is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, +and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold +punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; +another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God. + +Reply Obj. 1: Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by +reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental +to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt +of punishment. + +Reply Obj. 2: Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by +God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, +not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of +punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) +that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." +Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the +effect of sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: This punishment of the _inordinate affection_ is due to +sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a +further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or +human law. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 2] + +Whether Sin Can Be the Punishment of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. +For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of +virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not +bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite +direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says +(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. +Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against +the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above (Q. 74, +AA. 1, 2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins +are punishments of others. + +_I answer that,_ We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its +essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. +Sin as such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin +considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for +it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas +punishment is essentially something against the will, as stated in +the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5). Consequently it is evident that sin +regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin. + +On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in +three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing +an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and +the like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine +grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the +withdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above +(Q. 79, A. 3), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is +also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle +speaks (Rom. 1:24) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the +desires of their heart," i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, +when men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome +by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the +punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance +of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior +act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, +as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in +order to achieve a sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: "We wearied +ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the +effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its +effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in +respect of a preceding sin, but also with regard to itself. + +Reply Obj. 1: Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall +into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it +is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise +from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the +amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are +the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is +evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment, +since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of +a nature to withdraw man from sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: This objection considers sin essentially as such: and +the same answer applies to the Third Objection. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 3] + +Whether Any Sin Incurs a Debt of Eternal Punishment? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal +punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since +justice is equality: wherefore it is written (Isa. 27:8): "In measure +against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now +sin is temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal +punishment. + +Obj. 2: Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). +But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end, +and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher +states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it +for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction of +men" [Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal +punishment on man. + +Obj. 4: Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is +accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. +Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 25:46): "These shall go into +everlasting punishment"; and (Mk. 3:29): "He that shall blaspheme +against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be +guilty of an everlasting sin." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), sin incurs a debt of +punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so +long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of +the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now +disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes +irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is +irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be +repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle +of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine +power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there +arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied +by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby +one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the +principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the +disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, +although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the +principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by +charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to +destroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal +punishment. + +Reply Obj. 1: Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of +severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, +however, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for +punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that +adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a +momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes by +imprisonment or banishment for life--sometimes even by death; wherein +account is not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of +the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the +living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the +eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to Gregory +(Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his +own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. A man is said to +have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual +sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very +fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, +everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked +would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins +for ever." + +Reply Obj. 2: Even the punishment that is inflicted according to +human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is +punished, but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, +this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that +at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the +punishment, according to Prov. 19:25: "The wicked man being scourged, +the fool shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments +inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for +those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments, +according to Ps. 59:6: "Thou hast given a warning to them that fear +Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be +delivered." + +Reply Obj. 3: God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; +but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. + +Reply Obj. 4: Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, +nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the +order, and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance +lasts, the punishment endures. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 4] + +Whether Sin Incurs a Debt of Punishment Infinite in Quantity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment +infinite in quantity. For it is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O +Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me +to nothing." Now God's anger or fury signifies metaphorically the +vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an +infinite punishment, even as to make a thing out of nothing denotes +infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance, sin is +awarded a punishment infinite in quantity. + +Obj. 2: Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of +fault, according to Deut. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin +shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is +committed against God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin +increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against +(thus it is a more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a +private individual), and God's greatness is infinite. Therefore an +infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God. + +Obj. 3: Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, +and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. +Therefore it is infinite in quantity also. + +_On the contrary,_ If this were the case, the punishments of all +mortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than +another. + +_I answer that,_ Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin +comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the +immutable good, which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is +infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. +In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself +is finite, and because the movement of turning towards it is finite, +since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so +far as sin consists in turning away from something, its corresponding +punishment is the _pain of loss,_ which also is infinite, because it +is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin +turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment is the +_pain of sense,_ which is also finite. + +Reply Obj. 1: It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the +sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be +incompatible with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice +requires, as stated above (A. 3). The expression "to be brought to +nothing" is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, +according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing." + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers sin as turning away from +something, for it is thus that man sins against God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of +fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, +for as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But +punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And a fault +which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; +wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite +as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does +not incur punishment of infinite quantity. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 5] + +Whether Every Sin Incurs a Debt of Eternal Punishment? + +Objection 1: It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal +punishment. Because punishment, as stated above (A. 4), is +proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely +from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs +infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot +be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of everlasting +punishment, as stated above (A. 4), it seems that no sin incurs a +debt of mere temporal punishment. + +Obj. 2: Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore +Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment is +incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But +original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children who have +died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the +kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words (John 3:3): "Unless a +man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Much more, +therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting. + +Obj. 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through +being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its +punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment +if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there +is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves +eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any +sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter +sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not +punished eternally. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), a sin incurs a debt of +eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in +the order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very +principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in +some sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve +contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things +referable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little +intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for +instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would +not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. +Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal +punishment. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in +respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the +substance of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect +of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist in +turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting +things referable to the end: and the last end differs infinitely from +the things that are referred to it. + +Reply Obj. 2: Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on +account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the +subject, viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is +no remission of sin. + +The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. +Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of +the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above (A. 3). +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 6] + +Whether the Debt of Punishment Remains After Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment +after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin +is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is +removed, the debt of punishment ceases also. + +Obj. 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a +virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when +sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains. + +Obj. 3: Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). +But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. +Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Kings xii. 13, 14): "David said +to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: +The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die. +Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the +Lord to blaspheme . . . the child that is born to thee shall die." +Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: +and so the debt of punishment remains, when the sin has been removed. + +_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, +and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, +when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of +sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses +the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay +some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality +of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who +has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's +commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something +contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of +justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done +to one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful +or injurious act has ceased there still remains the debt of +punishment. + +But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident +that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the +soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from +Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain +consists, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). Now man is united to God by +his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, +unless his will accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, +unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment +of his past sin, or bear patiently the punishment which God inflicts +on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when +punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of +punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; +and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against +the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this +particular purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary +simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained +when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary (Q. 6, A. 6). We +must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, +there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punishment +simply, but of satisfactory punishment. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain +remains, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 2), so the debt of punishment +also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of +punishment does not remain in the same way, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, +but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue +demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God +or man. + +Reply Obj. 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed +as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that +the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered +by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied +by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is +requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove +the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at +the sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the +example of David quoted above. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 7] + +Whether Every Punishment Is Inflicted for a Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for +a sin. For it is written (John 9:3, 2) about the man born blind: +"Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should +be born blind." In like manner we see that many children, those also +who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for +instance, diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no +sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover before they are +baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who +do not suffer such things. Therefore not every punishment is +inflicted for a sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent +should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of +these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written +about the wicked (Ps. 72:5): "They are not in the labor of men: +neither shall they be scourged like other men"; and (Job 21:7): "[Why +then do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with +riches" (?)[*The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; +and (Hab. 1:13): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: +'them that do unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked +man oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than +himself?" Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet. 2:22) that "He did +no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said (1 Pet. +2:21) that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always +inflicted by God for sin. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): "Who ever perished +innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? _On the contrary,_ I have +seen those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God"; +and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and +is inflicted for a sin." + +_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 6), punishment can be +considered in two ways--simply, and as being satisfactory. A +satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who +differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union +of love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the +punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take +the debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of +punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has +always a relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a +relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a +sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and +this, either principally or consequently--principally, the punishment +of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived +of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result +from this defect in human nature. + +Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and +yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as +stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5). Now evil is privation of +good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good +of the body, and external goods, it happens sometimes that man +suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater +good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health, +or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the +glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, not simply +but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of +punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man +prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them +to health. And since such like are not punishments properly speaking, +they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted +sense: because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of +penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself +the punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state +of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in +virtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is +reduced to original sin as its cause. + +Reply Obj. 1: Such like defects of those who are born with them, or +which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of +original sin, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 5); and they remain even +after baptism, for the cause stated above (Q. 85, A. 5, ad 2): and +that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, +which is left to itself, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 5, ad 1). +Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the +salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others who are +admonished by their means--and also to the glory of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but +they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief +goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual +goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal goods or +evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. +viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the +virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive +temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the +psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath held them +fast." + +Reply Obj. 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but +for our sins. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 8] + +Whether Anyone Is Punished for Another's Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's +sin. For it is written (Ex. 20:5): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, +visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the +third and fourth generation of them that hate Me"; and (Matt. 23:35): +"That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon +the earth." + +Obj. 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, +according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their +parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to +Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for +the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his +father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather +than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose +crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, +not for their own sins, but for those of their parents. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not +bear the iniquity of the father." + +_I answer that,_ If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which +one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's +punishment, in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above +(A. 7). If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of +sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for his own +sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we +speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this way it does happen +that one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated (A. 7) +that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are +medicinal punishments intended for the health of the soul. Wherefore +there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments +inflicted on one for another's sin, either by God or by man; e.g. on +children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, +inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such a way, +however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, +this penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the +one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take +part in the sin, it has the character of punishment in regard to the +one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who +is punished, it is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if he +consent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his +soul, if he bears it patiently. + +With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, +because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good. +Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without +some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. +ad Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one +for another's sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the +father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by +saying (Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine." + +Reply Obj. 1: Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred +to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the +property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, +if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood +in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words +are added, "Of them that hate Me," and in the chapter quoted from +Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure of your +fathers." The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their +children, because the latter are the more prone to sin through being +brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to +them, and by imitating their parents' example, conforming to their +authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, +seeing the punishment of their parents, they fail to mend their ways. +The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are +wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so +that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to +imitate them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so +as to grieve for them. + +Reply Obj. 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for +another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or +medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are +punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, +rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the +punishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as +stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and +because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own +household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought up amid +the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he +is not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more +obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment. +________________________ + +QUESTION 88 + +OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN +(In Six Articles) + +In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of +the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall +consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall +consider venial sin in itself. + +Under the first head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin? + +(2) Whether they differ generically? + +(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin? + +(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal? + +(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an +aggravating circumstance? + +(6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 1] + +Whether Venial Sin Is Fittingly Condivided with Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided +with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin is +a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of +being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently +every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with +mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Whether you eat or +drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now +whoever sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for +God's glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit +a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. + +Obj. 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either +as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr. +Christ. i, 3, 4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable +good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good which +gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to +Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3, 4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys +a mutable good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human +perverseness," as Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). +Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to +overthrow, to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal +sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. + +Obj. 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact +turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable +good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that +he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with +mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a +crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does +not." But a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is +fittingly condivided with mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, +if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken +metaphorically: thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if +we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and +fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if +mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it +does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. +But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is +opposed to that which is venial. + +For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 1, +ad 3; Q. 72, A. 5; Q. 74, A. 9, ad 2), is said to be mortal by +comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through +causing an irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a +principle, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5). Now the principle of the +spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order +to the last end, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5; Q. 87, A. 3): and if +this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic +principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated above (Q. 87, A. +3), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired +through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be repaired +through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the +last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher +principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such +sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins +which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to +the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called +venial: because a sin receives its acquittal (_veniam_) when the debt +of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as +explained above (Q. 87, A. 6). + +Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and +irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic +principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all +diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is +fittingly condivided with mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a +division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the +generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its +parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other +afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine +gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called +a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to +mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to +substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is +not _against_ the law, since he who sins venially neither does what +the law forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he +acts _beside_ the law, through not observing the mode of reason, +which the law intends. + +Reply Obj. 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it +does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not +actually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not +therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid +mortal sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to +God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has to +God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the +human act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does +not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it +does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally. + +Reply Obj. 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as +enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using it, +by referring it to God, not actually but habitually. + +Reply Obj. 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in +contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed +therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of +finality. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 2] + +Whether Mortal and Venial Sin Differ Generically? + +Objection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ +generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some +generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be +generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as +stated above (Q. 18, A. 2). Now either mortal or venial sin may be +committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any +mutable good, either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or +more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin +do not differ generically. + +Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 72, A. 5; Q. 87, A. 3), a +sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be +repaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice, +which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability +belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are +remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed +through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or +ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in +cause, as stated above (Q. 77, A. 8, ad 1). Therefore venial and +mortal sin do not differ generically. + +Obj. 3: Further, it was stated above (Q. 74, A. 3, ad 3; A. 10) that +sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial +sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no +sins are generically venial. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, +serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain +generic mortal sins. + +_I answer that,_ Venial sin is so called from _venia_ (pardon). +Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has +been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin +venial": and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, a sin +is called venial because it does not contain anything either +partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as +when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin +committed through weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial +"from the cause": totally, through not destroying the order to the +last end, wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting +punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now. + +For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no +determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can +have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, +and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of +an act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to +a thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is +directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. +Consequently it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary +to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against +the love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: +wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes, +however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a +certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God +and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so +forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus. + +Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and +malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition +of the agent, as stated above (Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), it happens sometimes +that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, +becomes mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his +last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a +mortal sin in its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle +word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on +the part of the agent, that a sin generically mortal because venial, +by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, +which is the proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above +in reference to sudden movements of unbelief. + +Reply Obj. 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that is +contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of +God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence +it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves +contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that +they are mortal by reason of their genus. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers those sins which are venial +from their cause. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers those sins which are venial by +reason of the imperfection of the act. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 3] + +Whether Venial Sin Is a Disposition to Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to +mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial +and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated +above (A. 1). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species, +wherefore it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1, 2, that "from like acts +like dispositions and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial +sin differ in genus or species, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore +venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to +mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a +venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore +Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for +good works that it may destroy them." Therefore even good works would +be venial sins, which is absurd. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): "He that contemneth +small things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins +venially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and +little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin. + +_I answer that,_ A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there +is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of +disposition. For there is a cause which moves directly to the +production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause +which moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces +a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly +an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and +thus it disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin +generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to +a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, +in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to +a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the +disposition or habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial +sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end +in that venial sin: since the end for one who has a habit, as such, +is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, +by sinning often venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. +Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle +thereto. In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin +generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, +turns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his +will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is +disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, +by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus. + +Reply Obj. 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety +to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated +above (A. 1, ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. +Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so +can a venial sin dispose to mortal. + +Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is +in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit +in different ways, as stated (AA. 1, 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal +sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; +whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as +stated. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 4] + +Whether a Venial Sin Can Become Mortal? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. +For Augustine in explaining the words of John 3:36: "He that +believeth not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in +Joan.): "The slightest," i.e. venial, "sins kill if we make little of +them." Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death +of the soul. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. + +Obj. 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of +reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as +stated above (Q. 74, A. 8, ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become +mortal. + +Obj. 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and +incurable disease, as stated above (A. 1). But a curable disease may +become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal. + +Obj. 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is +a disposition to mortal, as stated (A. 3). Therefore a venial sin can +become mortal. + +_I answer that,_ The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may +be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be +at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because +a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so +that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the +act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, +it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal. + +Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, +becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end +in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated +above (A. 2). + +Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins +constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many +venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because +all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment +equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the +duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal +punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as +stated above (Q. 87, AA. 3, 5). It is also evident as regards the +pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the +privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, +as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as +regards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although +as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be +improportionate to one another. + +If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one +mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above (A. 3) with +regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial +sin disposes to mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins +making one mortal sin dispositively. + +Reply Obj. 2: The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the +consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement of +the reason in consenting is a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding +disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may +undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, +which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the +comparison fails. + +Reply Obj. 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an +imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being +perfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a +disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident +which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 5] + +Whether a Circumstance Can Make a Venial Sin to Be Mortal? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin +mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, +serm. xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness +be frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and drunkenness are +not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be +mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Master says (Sentent. ii, D, 24) that +delectation, if morose [*See Q. 74, A. 6], is a mortal sin, but that +if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a +circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be +mortal. + +Obj. 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal +sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a +good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much +more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal. + +_On the contrary,_ Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity +cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, +because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act +be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason +of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the +quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (Q. 72, +A. 5, ad 1; Q. 87, A. 5, ad 1). + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 7, A. 1; Q. 18, A. 5, ad 4; AA. +10, 11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as +such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may +happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and +then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species +of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the +deformity of another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another +woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; +but if this other be another man's wife, there is an additional +deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs +to another; and accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new +species of sin known as adultery. + +It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin +become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For +it has been stated above (A. 1) that the deformity of a venial sin +consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, +whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about +the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot +make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, +but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, +as it were, the specific difference of the moral act. + +Reply Obj. 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin +to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by +something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a +new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance +something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its +species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like. + +We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger +is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if +the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, +such as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin +generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the +imperfection of the act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the +sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its +generic nature, through the consent of reason. If, on the other hand, +the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically +venial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish +to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the +anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps +accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to great scandal +or something of the kind. + +With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason +of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the +mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he +is directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly +contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of +ignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of +the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of +getting drunk, for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him +as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk +frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his +will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to +refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its +specific nature. + +Reply Obj. 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those +matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the +delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection +of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because +anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account +of the approval of the deliberating reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, +unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above +(Q. 18, A. 5, ad 4). +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 6] + +Whether a Mortal Sin Can Become Venial? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. +Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is +from venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above (A. +5). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial. + +Obj. 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, +that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he +who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen +that a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a +creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that +simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, +commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love +of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he +was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial +sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial. + +Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 5, Obj. 3), good is more distant +from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in +itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, +as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a +mortal sin become venial. + +_On the contrary,_ An eternal thing can never become temporal. But +mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves +temporal punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial. + +_I answer that,_ Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in +the genus of sin, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). Now the imperfect can +become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial +sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining +to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the +purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become +imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by +the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, +for the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to +utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional +deformity. + +Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by +reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not +completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a +deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said +above (A. 2). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of +deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from +deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the +species of the act is destroyed. + +Reply Obj. 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from +perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man +and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove. + +Reply Obj. 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin +altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that +commits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin +either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then +the ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of +the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things +whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those +things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good +end." Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise +be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4, 5), the +judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the +enemy of the common weal, are not murderers. +________________________ + +QUESTION 89 + +OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there +are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul? + +(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," +"hay," "stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12); + +(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence? + +(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially? + +(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins? + +(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 1] + +Whether Venial Sin Causes a Stain on the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the +soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that +if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so +as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the +stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. +Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul. + +Obj. 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of +the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But, in +venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the +affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a +temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). +But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing +through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the +soul. + +_On the contrary,_ it is written, (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present +it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on +which the gloss says: "i.e., some grievous sin." Therefore it seems +proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul. + +I answer that as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1), a stain denotes a loss +of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in +corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the +soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a +twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the +members and colors, the other resulting from outward refulgence +supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one +habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an +outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual +comeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because it neither +destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other +virtues, as we shall show further on (II-II, Q. 24, A. 10; Q. 133, A. +1, ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain +denotes something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems +in the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness. +Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in +the soul. If, however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce +a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the +comeliness that results from acts of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial +sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would +not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse. + +Reply Obj. 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys +the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a +temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of +grace, which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their +last end, is entirely cut off. _On the contrary,_ in venial sin, man +does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no +comparison. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 2] + +Whether Venial Sins Are Suitably Designated As "Wood, Hay, and +Stubble"? + +Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated +as "wood, hay, and stubble." Because wood, hay, and stubble are said +(1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins +are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions +are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not +suitably designated as wood, hay, and stubble. + +Obj. 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay, and stubble, "shall be +saved yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who +commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a +man dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, +venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who +build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our +neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay, +and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do +good works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 John 1:8): "If +we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial +sins are not suitably designated by these three. + +Obj. 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and +degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under +these three. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who +builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," +so that he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt +of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated +above (Q. 87, A. 5). Therefore these three signify venial sins. + +_I answer that,_ Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead +faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, +and precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according +to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine +disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as +the Apostle says (Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, +"shall not obtain the kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; +whereas the Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble +"shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble +cannot be understood to denote mortal sins. + +Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are +indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial +sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a +good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his +possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so +that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to +do anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be +reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the +love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are designated by +"gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by +"wood," "hay," and "stubble." + +We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate +themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are +designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in +a house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be +burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied +in a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man +suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory +after this life, and yet he is saved for ever. + +Reply Obj. 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual +foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because +they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written (Ps. +136:1): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": +because venial sins do not destroy the edifice. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and +stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon" +the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have +esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17: +"Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal +sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not +built upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be +saved so as by fire. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of +temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight +venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of +charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do +not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy +about earthly things remain longer, because they are unable to have +such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove +them. + +Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all +things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the +end." Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, +viz. to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," which is +burnt up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because +venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man +is more or less attached to them. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 3] + +Whether Man Could Commit a Venial Sin in the State of Innocence? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the +state of innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, "Adam was not seduced," a +gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was +possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done +was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless he could +have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin +without sinning mortally. + +Obj. 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not +suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all +there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should +have been checked." Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat, +which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be +nothing more than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen. +ad lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of making +the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had +taken the forbidden fruit." Again there seems to have been a certain +movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had +said, as appears from her saying (Gen. 3:3): "Lest perhaps we die." +Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a +venial sin before he committed a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the +original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally +notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he +could also sin venially. + +_On the contrary,_ Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing +penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares +(De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could not commit a sin that would +not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not +change man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially. + +_I answer that,_ It is generally admitted that man could not commit a +venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be +understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the +sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had +committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that +aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, +unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or +vow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. +Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into +mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must +therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin venially, +because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in +itself, before losing the integrity of the original state by sinning +mortally. + +The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either +through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden +movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in +respect of things referred to the end, the due order of the end being +safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of +order, by reason of the lower powers not being checked by the higher. +Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is +due to the sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the +sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the +fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the +act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, as stated +above (Q. 74, A. 10); and that the human mind be out of order as +regards things directed to the end, the due order of the end being +safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end +are not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest +place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the +appetite, as stated above (Q. 10, AA. 1, 2, ad 3; Q. 72, A. 5). Now, +in the state of innocence, as stated in the First Part (Q. 95, A. 1), +there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers +were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject +to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be +no inordinateness in man, unless first of all the highest part of man +were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it +is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a +venial sin, before committing a mortal sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same +sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is +easily forgiven. + +Reply Obj. 2: This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his +first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into +the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by +the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for +she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention +the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept. + +Reply Obj. 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the +original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial +sin cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is +incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the +first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 4] + +Whether a Good or a Wicked Angel Can Sin Venially? + +Objection 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. +Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul +which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix +in Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels." But man +can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an +angel can commit a venial sin also. + +Obj. 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could +love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. +Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, +by sinning venially. + +Obj. 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial +sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like +frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a +mortal sin to be venial as stated above (A. 3), unless there is a +special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an +angel can sin venially. + +_On the contrary,_ The perfection of an angel is greater than that of +man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the +primitive state, and much less, therefore, can an angel. + +_I answer that,_ An angel's intellect, as stated above in the First +Part (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, A. 8), is not discursive, i.e. it does not +proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both +separately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect +considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its +principles. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q. +8, A. 2; Q. 10, A. 1; Q. 72, A. 5), ends are like principles, while +the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not +directed to the means, except as they stand under the order to the +end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no +inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the same time they +have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal +sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in +subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts +are acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the +other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in +subordination to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they +sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does +not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we +have stated to be in them (I, Q. 63, A. 4; Q. 64, A. 2, ad 5). + +Reply Obj. 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or +intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated +above. + +Reply Obj. 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God, +without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last +end, or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The demons incite man to all such things which seem +venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to +mortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on +account of the end they have in view. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 5] + +Whether the First Movements of the Sensuality in Unbelievers Are +Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality +in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:1) that +"there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who +walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking there of the +concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rom. +7). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of +condemnation to those who walk not according to the flesh, i.e. by +consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But +unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is +a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of +unbelievers are mortal sins. + +Obj. 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who +are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow the +road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But +damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels +the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, +it seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are +mortal sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was +so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this +liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which +the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an +unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he +acts against his duty. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated in Acts 10:34 that "God is not a +respecter of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto +condemnation, what He does not impute to another. But he does not +impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither +therefore does He impute them to unbelievers. + +_I answer that,_ It is unreasonable to say that the first movements +of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. +This is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself +could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 79, A. +4). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in +believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the +sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. + +Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the +person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, increases it, as +stated above (Q. 73, A. 10). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in +a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of +an unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their +ignorance, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I obtained the mercy of God, +because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief": whereas the sins of +believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, +according to Heb. 10:29: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth +worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament +unclean, by which he was sanctified?" + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to +original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus +Christ, although the _fomes_ of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the +fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a +sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers. + +In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore +the Reply to the Second Objection is evident. + +Reply Obj. 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a +result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such +liability pertains, not to actual but to original sin. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 6] + +Whether Venial Sin Can Be in Anyone with Original Sin Alone? + +Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with +original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is +a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 88, A. 3). Therefore +in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin +exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have venial +together with original sin, and without mortal sins. + +Obj. 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection +with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an +unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin +without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin +without committing a mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is +first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that +time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal +sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible +for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however +short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original +sin alone and without mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Man is punished for original sin in the children's +limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on +(II-II, Q. 69, A. 6): whereas men are punished in hell for no other +than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be +punished for venial sin with no other than original sin. + +_I answer that,_ It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with +original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is +because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of +years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, +wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does +anything which is such generically. But when he begins to have the +use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or +mortal sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about +then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself +to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of +original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due +end, as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he +will sin mortally, through not doing that which is in his power to +do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him +without mortal, until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to +him through grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a +necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes +disposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire. + +Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin +alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on +account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: The child that is beginning to have the use of reason +can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free +from the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as +possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has +discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to +himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the +intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's +affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zech. 1:3): +"Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." +________________________ + +TREATISE ON LAW (QQ. 90-108) +________________________ + +QUESTION 90 + +OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW +(In Four Articles) + +We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the +extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose +temptations we have spoken in the First Part (Q. 114). But the +extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by +means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: wherefore in the first +place we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace. + +Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its +parts. Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for +our consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; +(3) The effects of law. + +Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason? + +(2) Concerning the end of law; + +(3) Its cause; + +(4) The promulgation of law. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 1] + +Whether Law Is Something Pertaining to Reason? + +Objection 1: It would seem that law is not something pertaining to +reason. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my +members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; +since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law +is not something pertaining to reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, +habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like +manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason +are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above (Q. 57). +Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when +the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. +Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act +aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is +evident from what has been said above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore law +pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words +of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever +pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law." + +_On the contrary,_ It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. +But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1). +Therefore law is something pertaining to reason. + +_I answer that,_ Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is +induced to act or is restrained from acting: for _lex_ (law) is +derived from _ligare_ (to bind), because it binds one to act. Now the +rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first +principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated +above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to +the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, +according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the +principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for +instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in +the genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something +pertaining to reason. + +Reply Obj. 1: Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in +something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: +and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law +is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and +ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to +something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from +a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as +it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is +called "the law of the members." + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as, in external action, we may consider the work +and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house +built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of +reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by +this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all +the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or +argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a +syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above (Q. 13, +A. 3; Q. 76, A. 1) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, +3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the +same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative +intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like +universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed +to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are +sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are +retained in the reason by means of a habit. + +Reply Obj. 3: Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated +above (Q. 17, A. 1): for it is due to the fact that one wills the +end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained +to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may +have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of +reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the +will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's +will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 2] + +Whether the Law Is Always Something Directed to the Common Good? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to the +common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to +forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. +Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good. + +Obj. 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human +actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is +directed to some particular good. + +Obj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on +reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason is the +foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also +of that which is directed to private good. Therefore the law is not +only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an +individual. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted +for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the law belongs to that +which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and +measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason +itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all +the rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must +needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, +which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and +the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q. +2, A. 7; Q. 3, A. 1). Consequently the law must needs regard +principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part +is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man +is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard +properly the relationship to universal happiness. Wherefore the +Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both +happiness and the body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we +call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce and +preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic": since the +state is a perfect community, as he says in _Polit._ i, 1. + +Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle +of the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination +to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the +cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far +as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly +ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some +individual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in +so far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained +to the common good. + +Reply Obj. 1: A command denotes an application of a law to matters +regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the +law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands +are given even concerning particular matters. + +Reply Obj. 2: Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: +but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as +to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, +according as the common good is said to be the common end. + +Reply Obj. 3: Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the +speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first +indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the +practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the +common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the +nature of a law. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 3] + +Whether the Reason of Any Man Is Competent to Make Laws? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to +make laws. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "when the Gentiles, +who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law . +. . they are a law to themselves." Now he says this of all in +general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself. + +Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the +intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man +can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is +competent to make laws. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, +so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign +of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a +family can make laws for his household. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance +of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together +with the Commonalty." + +_I answer that,_ A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost +the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common +good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the +viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law +belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has +care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of +anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), a law is in a person not +only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that +is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far +as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him. +Hence the same text goes on: "Who show the work of the law written in +their hearts." + +Reply Obj. 2: A private person cannot lead another to virtue +efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not +taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in +order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the +Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in +the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to +inflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Q. 92, A. 2, ad 3; +II-II, Q. 64, A. 3). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him +alone. + +Reply Obj. 3: As one man is a part of the household, so a household +is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, +according to _Polit._ i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is +not the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the good +of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is +a perfect community. Consequently he that governs a family, can +indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have +properly the force of law. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 4] + +Whether Promulgation Is Essential to a Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a +law. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the +natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a +law that it be promulgated. + +Obj. 2: Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or +not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches +not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. +Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the +future, since "laws are binding in matters of the future," as the +jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But +promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not +essential to a law. + +_On the contrary,_ It is laid down in the _Decretals,_ dist. 4, that +"laws are established when they are promulgated." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a law is imposed on others +by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by +being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. +Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is +proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be +ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them +by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to +obtain its force. + +Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be +gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the +common good, made by him who has care of the community, and +promulgated. + +Reply Obj. 1: The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that +God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally. + +Reply Obj. 2: Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, +are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be +notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated. + +Reply Obj. 3: The promulgation that takes place now, extends to +future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by +which means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. +v, 3; ii, 10) that "_lex_ (law) is derived from _legere_ (to read) +because it is written." +________________________ + +QUESTION 91 + +OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there +are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there is an eternal law? + +(2) Whether there is a natural law? + +(3) Whether there is a human law? + +(4) Whether there is a Divine law? + +(5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several? + +(6) Whether there is a law of sin? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 1] + +Whether There Is an Eternal Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because +every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from +eternity on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from +eternity. Therefore no law is eternal. + +Obj. 2: Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation +could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom it could +be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal. + +Obj. 3: Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained +to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no +law is eternal. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "That Law +which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than +unchangeable and eternal." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2; AA. 3, 4), a law +is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the +ruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted +that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the +First Part (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2), that the whole community of the +universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the +government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature +of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not +subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it +is that this kind of law must be called eternal. + +Reply Obj. 1: Those things that are not in themselves, exist with +God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according +to Rom. 4:17: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that +are." Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the +character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to +the government of things foreknown by Him. + +Reply Obj. 2: Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; +and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the +Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the +promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that +hears or reads. + +Reply Obj. 3: The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as +it directs certain things to the end; but not passively--that is to +say, the law itself is not ordained to the end--except accidentally, +in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law +must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God +Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the +eternal law is not ordained to another end. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 2] + +Whether There Is in Us a Natural Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural law in us. +Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for +Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by +which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But nature +does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in +necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man. + +Obj. 2: Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, +as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). But the directing of human acts to +their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational +creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; +whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law +is natural to man. + +Obj. 3: Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the +law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his +free-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since +therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is +man subject to a natural law. + +_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 2:14: "When the Gentiles, who have +not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," comments +as follows: "Although they have no written law, yet they have the +natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is +good and what is evil." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 1), law, being a +rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in +him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is +ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as +it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things +subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal +law, as was stated above (A. 1); it is evident that all things +partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its +being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to +their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational +creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, +in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident +both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the +Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper +act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the +rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after +saying (Ps. 4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though +someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who +showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The +light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying +that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and +what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing +else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore +evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational +creature's participation of the eternal law. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if the natural law were +something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a +participation thereof, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Every act of reason and will in us is based on that +which is according to nature, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 1): for +every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known +naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is +derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. +Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs +be in virtue of the natural law. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the +Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the +rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational +manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the +rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something +pertaining to reason, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 1). Irrational +creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, +wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, +except by way of similitude. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 3] + +Whether There Is a Human Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a human law. For the +natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above +(A. 2). Now through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as +Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural law +suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is +no need for a human law. + +Obj. 2: Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated +above (Q. 90, A. 1). But human reason is not a measure of things, but +vice versa, as stated in _Metaph._ x, text. 5. Therefore no law can +emanate from human reason. + +Obj. 3: Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in +_Metaph._ x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of +conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. 9:14: "The thoughts of +mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law +can emanate from human reason. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two +kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls +human. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2), a law is a +dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the +same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative +reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated +above (ibid.). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the +speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, +we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of +which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of +reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from +general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to +proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. +These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called +human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be +observed, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 2, 3, 4). Wherefore Tully says +in his _Rhetoric_ (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source +in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their +utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were +approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the +law." + +Reply Obj. 1: The human reason cannot have a full participation of +the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and +imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, +by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the +knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of +each single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so +too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural +participation of the eternal law, according to certain general +principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of +individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. +Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them +by law. + +Reply Obj. 2: Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but +the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and +measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural +reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of +things that are from nature. + +Reply Obj. 3: The practical reason is concerned with practical +matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary +things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore +human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the +demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every +measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it +is possible in its own particular genus. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 4] + +Whether There Was Any Need for a Divine Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. +Because, as stated above (A. 2), the natural law is a participation +in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as +stated above (A. 1). Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in +addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:14) that "God left man in +the hand of his own counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as +stated above (Q. 14, A. 1). Therefore man was left to the direction +of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated +above (A. 3). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also +by a Divine law. + +Obj. 3: Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational +creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides the +natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should +the rational creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural +law. + +_On the contrary,_ David prayed God to set His law before him, saying +(Ps. 118:33): "Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, +O Lord." + +_I answer that,_ Besides the natural and the human law it was +necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. +And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is +directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And +indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is +proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man +to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the +natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is +ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is improportionate to +man's natural faculty, as stated above (Q. 5, A. 5), therefore it was +necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be +directed to his end by a law given by God. + +Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, +especially on contingent and particular matters, different people +form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and +contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without +any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was +necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by +God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err. + +Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is +competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior +movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: +and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to +conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law +could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was +necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene. + +Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5, 6), human +law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at +doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, +and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary +for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain +unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to +supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden. + +And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is +said: "The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness +of sin; "converting souls," because it directs not only exterior, but +also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because +of the certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little +ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine. + +Reply Obj. 1: By the natural law the eternal law is participated +proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his +supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence +the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in +the eternal law. + +Reply Obj. 2: Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed +from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from +principles imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural +law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain +additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law. + +Reply Obj. 3: Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher +than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: +consequently the comparison fails. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 5] + +Whether There Is but One Divine Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, +where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the +whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. +46:8: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one +Divine law. + +Obj. 2: Further, every law is directed to the end which the +lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends +one and the same thing for all men; since according to 1 Tim. 2:4: "He +will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the +truth." Therefore there is but one Divine law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the +eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the +revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. +Therefore much more is the Divine law but one. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): "The priesthood being +translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the +law." But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage, +viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore +the Divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law. + +_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 30, A. 3), +distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished +in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically +different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect +in the same species, e.g. a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine +law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24, 25) +compares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child "under +a pedagogue"; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full +grown man, who is "no longer under a pedagogue." + +Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken +in connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated +above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to +the common good as to its end, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). This +good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to +this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the +very outset of the law, the people were invited to the earthly +kingdom of the Chananaeans (Ex. 3:8, 17). Again it may be an +intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the +New Law. Wherefore, at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ +invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying (Matt. 4:17): "Do +penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence Augustine says +(Contra Faust. iv) that "promises of temporal goods are contained in +the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise +of eternal life belongs to the New Testament." + +Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the +order of righteousness (A. 4): wherein also the New Law surpasses the +Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Matt. 5:20: +"Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and +Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence the +saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls +the mind" ( Sentent. iii, D, xl). + +Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its +commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the +New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of +Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence +Augustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is +little difference [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words +'timor' and 'amor'--'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the +Gospel--fear and love." + +Reply Obj. 1: As the father of a family issues different commands to +the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one +kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and +another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been +led to a greater capacity for Divine things. + +Reply Obj. 2: The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise +than through Christ, according to Acts 4:12: "There is no other name +. . . given to men, whereby we must be saved." Consequently the law +that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the +coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to +the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain +rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them +to receive Him. + +Reply Obj. 3: The natural law directs man by way of certain general +precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it +is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in +certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not +stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to +be twofold, as already explained. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 6] + +Whether There Is a Law in the Fomes of Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there is no law of the _fomes_ of +sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." +But the _fomes_ of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. +Therefore the _fomes_ has not the nature of a law. + +Obj. 2: Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey +it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor, +from not following the instigations of the _fomes;_ but rather from +his following them. Therefore the _fomes_ has not the nature of a law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated +above (Q. 90, A. 2). But the _fomes_ inclines us, not to the common, +but to our own private good. Therefore the _fomes_ has not the nature +of sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law +in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2; Q. 90, A. 1, ad 1), the law, +as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by +way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that +every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject +to the law, is called a law by participation, as stated above (A. 2; +Q. 90, A. 1, ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a +twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he +directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed +different subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that +there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; +thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some +dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be under +another law, as it were: thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, +he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile legislation. + +Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various +natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is +against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in +a way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another +meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, +is allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is +that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so +effective in the primitive state, that nothing either beside or +against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back +on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact +this happens to each one individually, the more he deviates from the +path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts +that are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. 48:21: +"Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared +to senseless beasts, and made like to them." + +So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the +_fomes,_ in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in +so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a +direct inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this +way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by +the just sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and +his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby +he is led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law +depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the _fomes_ in itself, as an +incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as +stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the +Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows a +nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument considers law in the light of a rule or +measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law +become transgressors. But the _fomes_ is not a law in this respect, +but by a kind of participation, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the _fomes_ as to its proper +inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of +sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is +ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in +the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far +as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called _fomes_ in so +far as it strays from the order of reason. +________________________ + +QUESTION 92 + +OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW +(In Two articles) + +We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are +two points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good? + +(2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, +and to punish, as the Jurist states? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 92, Art. 1] + +Whether an Effect of Law Is to Make Men Good? + +Objection 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men +good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in +_Ethic._ ii, 6 is "that which makes its subject good." But virtue is +in man from God alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without +us," as we stated above (Q. 55, A. 4) in giving the definition of +virtue. Therefore the law does not make men good. + +Obj. 2: Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But +the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. +Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the +law does not make men good. + +Obj. 3: Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above +(Q. 90, A. 2). But some behave well in things regarding the +community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore +it is not the business of the law to make men good. + +Obj. 4: Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says +(Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his +subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not +make men good. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the +"intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens." + +_I answer that,_ as stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2; AA. 3, 4), a law +is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his +subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing +consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is +regulated: thus we see that the virtue of the irascible and +concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason; +and accordingly "the virtue of every subject consists in his being +well subjected to his ruler," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But +every law aims at being obeyed by those who are subject to it. +Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead +its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue is "that which +makes its subject good," it follows that the proper effect of law is +to make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in some +particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on +true good, which is the common good regulated according to Divine +justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good +simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that +which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in +opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good +simply, but in respect to that particular government. In this way +good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man +is called a good robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to +his end. + +Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is twofold, as explained above (Q. 63, A. 2), +viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an +action contributes to both, but in different ways; for it causes the +acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves +and fosters it when it already exists. And since law is given for the +purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to +virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore the Philosopher says +in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make +men good by habituating them to good works." + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue +that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of +punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is +a beginning of virtue, as stated above (Q. 63, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: The goodness of any part is considered in comparison +with the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is +the part that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then every man is +a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good, unless he +be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well +consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the +common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be +virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is +enough for the good of the community, that the other citizens be so +far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the +Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "the virtue of a sovereign is +the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen +is not the same as that of a good man." + +Reply Obj. 4: A tyrannical law, through not being according to +reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of +law; and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it +aims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature of a +law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his +subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make them +good, not simply, but with respect to that particular government. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 92, Art. 2] + +Whether the Acts of Law Are Suitably Assigned? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably +assigned as consisting in "command, prohibition, permission, and +punishment." For "every law is a general precept," as the Jurist +states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore the other +three are superfluous. + +Obj. 2: Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be +good, as stated above (A. 1). But counsel aims at a higher good than +a command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to +command. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so +does reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, so +also is to reward. + +Obj. 4: Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as +stated above (A. 1). But he that obeys the law, merely through fear +of being punished, is not good: because "although a good deed may be +done through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done +well," as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore +punishment is not a proper effect of law. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either +permits something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'": or +forbids something, as: "No man may ask a consecrated virgin in +marriage": or punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put to +death." + +_I answer that,_ Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason +asserting something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding +something. Now it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to +another. Wherefore just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason +leads us from certain principles to assent to the conclusion, so it +induces us by some means to assent to the precept of the law. + +Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the +law directs, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2; Q. 91, A. 4). Again +there are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above (Q. 18, A. +8), some acts are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in +respect of these the act of the law is a precept or command, for "the +law commands all acts of virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil +generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these the law +forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect of +these the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly +good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent. And it is the +fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure +obedience: in which respect punishment is an effect of law. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a +prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in +a wide sense, every law is a kind of precept. + +Reply Obj. 2: To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within +the competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law. +Wherefore too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Cor. +7:12) says: "I speak, not the Lord." Consequently it is not reckoned +as an effect of law. + +Reply Obj. 3: To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish +pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the +pain is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of +law, but only to punish. + +Reply Obj. 4: From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what +is good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so +likewise, with delight and of one's own accord. Accordingly, law, +even by punishing, leads men on to being good. +________________________ + +QUESTION 93 + +OF THE ETERNAL LAW +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2) +The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; (5) The new law, +which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of +the _fomes,_ suffice what we have said when treating of original sin. + +Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) What is the eternal law? + +(2) Whether it is known to all? + +(3) Whether every law is derived from it? + +(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law? + +(5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law? + +(6) Whether all human things are subject to it? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 1] + +Whether the Eternal Law Is a Sovereign Type [*Ratio] Existing in God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign +type existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there +are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. +lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God "made each thing according to its type." +Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the +Divine mind. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by +word, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 4). But Word is a Personal name in +God, as stated in the First Part (Q. 34, A. 1): whereas type refers +to the Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine +type. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law +above our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is above +our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But +the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore +the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the +eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform." + +_I answer that,_ Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type +of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor +there must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are +to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just as +the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or +exemplar of the products of that art, so too the type in him who +governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, +provided the other conditions be present which we have mentioned +above (Q. 90). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things +in relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of +his art, as stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 8). Moreover He +governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each +single creature, as was also stated in the First Part (Q. 103, A. 5). +Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all +things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so +the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, +bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing +else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and +movements. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal +types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and +consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, +according to their different relations to things, as stated in the +First Part (Q. 15, A. 2). But law is said to direct human acts by +ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). And +things, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one, +according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the +eternal law is one since it is the type of this order. + +Reply Obj. 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may be +considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the +word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, +and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same +applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else than +something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts +mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the +Father is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the +Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to the +Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as +Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other things +expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. +Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God: +yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between +type and word. + +Reply Obj. 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the +same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the +human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not +true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with +things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to +the reality." But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: +since each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine +intellect, as was stated in the First Part (Q. 16, A. 1). +Consequently the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is +truth itself. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 2] + +Whether the Eternal Law Is Known to All? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. +Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), "the things that are of +God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a +type existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save +God alone. + +Obj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal +law is that by which it is right that all things should be most +orderly." But all do not know how all things are most orderly. +Therefore all do not know the eternal law. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the +eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according to +_Ethic._ i, "any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the +eternal law is not known to us. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge +of the eternal law is imprinted on us." + +_I answer that,_ A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; +secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is +found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it +by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in +itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every +rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For +every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of +the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says +(De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain +extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and +as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, +some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the +eternal law. + +Reply Obj. 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are +in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, +according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God . . . are +clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." + +Reply Obj. 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according to +his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend +it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore +it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way +aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are +most orderly. + +Reply Obj. 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, +as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to +Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him +that eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the +Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what +he knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. +In another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a +kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such +or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 3] + +Whether Every Law Is Derived from the Eternal Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the +eternal law. For there is a law of the _fomes,_ as stated above (Q. +91, A. 6), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the +eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh," of +which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the +law of God." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, +because, as stated above (A. 2, Obj. 2), "the eternal law is that, +according to which it is right that all things should be most +orderly." But some laws are unjust, according to Isa. 10:1: "Woe to +them that make wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from +the eternal law. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law +which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things +which are punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine +providence is the eternal law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore not +even every good law is derived from the eternal law. + +_On the contrary,_ Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings +reign, and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine +Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore all laws +proceed from the eternal law. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2), the law denotes a +kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are +movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must +needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second +mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. +Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the +plan of government is derived by secondary governors from the +governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state +flows from the king's command to his inferior administrators: and +again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art +flows from the chief craftsman to the under-craftsmen, who work with +their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in +the Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior +governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of +inferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal law. +Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are +derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, +6) that "in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what +man has drawn from the eternal law." + +Reply Obj. 1: The _fomes_ has the nature of law in man, in so far as +it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect +it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far +as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, +and has not the nature of law, as stated above (Q. 91, A. 6). + +Reply Obj. 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it +partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it +is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from +reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law +but of violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it +retains some appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in +power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the +Lord God, according to Rom. 13:1. + +Reply Obj. 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not as +approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things +are directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, +because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. +Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it +cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It +would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law +condemns. Consequently it does not follow that human law is not +derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect +equality with it. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 4] + +Whether Necessary and Eternal Things Are Subject to the Eternal Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are +subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to +reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore +it is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the +Divine reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal law. +But God's will is eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are +subject to the eternal law. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the +King's law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28, 24, "shall be +subject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have +delivered up the Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, +is subject to the eternal law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But +many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for instance, +the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. +Therefore even necessary things are subject to the eternal law. + +_On the contrary,_ Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and +consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in +order to restrain them from evil, as explained above (Q. 92, A. 2). +Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the eternal law is the type +of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the +Divine government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything +is not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the +eternal law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by +looking around us. For those things are subject to human government, +which can be done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is +not subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a +soul, hands, or feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by +God, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal +law: while things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not +subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself. + +Reply Obj. 1: We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to +the will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it +is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, +but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of +God's will, as to the things themselves that God wills about +creatures; which things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as +they are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things God's +will is said to be reasonable (_rationalis_): though regarded in +itself it should rather be called their type (_ratio_). + +Reply Obj. 2: God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born +of God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to the +eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of +appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). But He is +said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in +respect of which also the Father is said to be greater than He. + +The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary +things that are created. + +Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some +necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they +derive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. +And this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is +restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do +otherwise than it is allowed to. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 5] + +Whether Natural Contingents Are Subject to the Eternal Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject +to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as +stated above (Q. 90, A. 4). But a law cannot be promulgated except to +rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. +Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; +and consequently natural contingents are not. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," +as stated in _Ethic._ i. But the eternal law is the supreme type, as +stated above (A. 1). Since then natural contingents do not partake of +reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that +they are not subject to the eternal law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural +contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the +eternal law. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 8:29): "When He compassed the +sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should +not pass their limits." + +_I answer that,_ We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of +the eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends +only to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is +because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the +government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a +law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of +irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself +moving those things, for these irrational creatures do not move +themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2). +Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however +much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational +beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement +of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle +of action. + +Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward +principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God +imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. +And so, in this way, God is said to command the whole of nature, +according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass +away." And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are +subject to the eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are +subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; +but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine +commandment. + +Reply Obj. 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to +natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, +by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human +actions, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are +obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine +Reason by obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over +more things than human reason does. And as the members of the human +body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of +reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so too +irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, +being rational. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the defects which occur in natural things are +outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the +order of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, +from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the First Part +(Q. 22, A. 2). And since the eternal law is the type of Divine +providence, as stated above (A. 1), hence the defects of natural +things are subject to the eternal law. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 6] + +Whether All Human Affairs Are Subject to the Eternal Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to +the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): "If you are led by +the spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the +sons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to +Rom. 8:14: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons +of God." Therefore not all men are under the eternal law. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7): "The prudence [Vulg.: +'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to +the law of God." But many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh +dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which +is the law of God. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal +law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a life of +blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who are +already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not +under the eternal law. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing +evades the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the +peace of the universe is administered." + +_I answer that,_ There are two ways in which a thing is subject to +the eternal law, as explained above (A. 5): first, by partaking of +the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and +passion, i.e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward +motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are +subject to the eternal law, as stated above (A. 5). But since the +rational nature, together with that which it has in common with all +creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, +consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because +while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, +as stated above (A. 2), it also has a natural inclination to that +which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally +adapted to the recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1). + +Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, +in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is +corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of +good is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both +ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural +knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; +and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the +added motive of grace and virtue. + +Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as +always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the +eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both +their knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are +imperfect; but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on +the part of passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law +decrees concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony +with that law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem +that the righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. +Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, +God knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with most +suitable laws." + +Reply Obj. 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two +ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being +pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the +same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains +from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, +and not from love of virtue." In this way the spiritual man is not +under the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity +which is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be +understood as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy +Ghost, are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. +Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is +the Son, as stated above (A. 4, ad 2); it follows that such works, in +so far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The +Apostle witnesses to this when he says (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the +Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." + +Reply Obj. 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law +of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to +the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards +passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law +of Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the +flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and +consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in +accordance with the eternal law. For we have seen above (Q. 85, A. 2) +that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature. + +Reply Obj. 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the +end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body +rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. +We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law that +some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal +law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy +state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under the +eternal law. +________________________ + +QUESTION 94 + +OF THE NATURAL LAW +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six +points of inquiry: + +(1) What is the natural law? + +(2) What are the precepts of the natural law? + +(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law? + +(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all? + +(5) Whether it is changeable? + +(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 1] + +Whether the Natural Law Is a Habit? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, +as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in +the soul: power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one +of the soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by +going through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit. + +Obj. 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that +the conscience or _synderesis_ "is the law of our mind"; which can +only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as +was shown in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 12). Therefore the natural law +is a habit. + +Obj. 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be +shown further on (A. 6). But man's reason, which the law regards, +does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural +law is not an act, but a habit. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit +is that whereby something is done when necessary." But such is not +the natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot +act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit. + +_I answer that,_ A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, +properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. +For it has been stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2) that the natural law +is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of +reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he +does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. +Since then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit +properly and essentially. + +Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a +habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And +accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes +considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason +only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. +Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not +the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the +principles the habit of which we possess. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of +virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, +he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, +viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the +soul besides these three: there are acts; thus _to will_ is in the +one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its +own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the +like. + +Reply Obj. 2: _Synderesis_ is said to be the law of our mind, because +it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are +the first principles of human actions. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held +habitually; and this is granted. + +To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that +sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him +habitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, +a man is unable to use the habit of science. In like manner, through +the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of +understanding of principles, or the natural law, which is in him +habitually. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 2] + +Whether the Natural Law Contains Several Precepts, or Only One? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several +precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above +(Q. 92, A. 2). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural +law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws. + +Obj. 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But +human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is +manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of +nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are +many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result +would be that even things relating to the inclination of the +concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law. + +Obj. 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated +above (Q. 90, A. 1). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is +only one precept of the natural law. + +_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the natural law in man stand in +relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of +demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles. +Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 91, A. 3), the precepts of the +natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of +demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are +self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in +two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any +proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is +contained in the notion of the subject: although, to one who knows +not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition +is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, "Man is a +rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says +"man," says "a rational being": and yet to one who knows not what a +man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as +Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are +universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions +whose terms are known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its +part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one +another." But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, +who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to +one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident +that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not +evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it. + +Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are +apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls +under apprehension, is _being_, the notion of which is included in +all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first +indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed +and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion of _being_ +and _not-being:_ and on this principle all others are based, as is +stated in _Metaph._ iv, text. 9. Now as _being_ is the first thing +that falls under the apprehension simply, so _good_ is the first +thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, +which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under +the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical +reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that +which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, +that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All +other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that +whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or +evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be +done or avoided. + +Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature +of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a +natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being +good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as +evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of +natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural +law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in +accordance with the nature which he has in common with all +substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its +own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this +inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of +warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, +there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more +specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other +animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to +belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" +[*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of +offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to +good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper +to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about +God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains +to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun +ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and +other such things regarding the above inclination. + +Reply Obj. 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the +character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first +precept. + +Reply Obj. 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human +nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as +they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced +to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the +natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common +foundation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all +things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is +contained under the law of reason. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 3] + +Whether All Acts of Virtue Are Prescribed by the Natural Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed +by the natural law. Because, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2) it is +essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some +acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual, as +is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not +all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law. + +Obj. 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If +therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it +seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this +applies to certain special sins. + +Obj. 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are +common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a +thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all +acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. + +_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that +"virtues are natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of +the natural law. + +_I answer that,_ We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, +under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts +considered in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of +virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the +natural law. For it has been stated (A. 2) that to the natural law +belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his +nature. Now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is +suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give +heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, +there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to +reason: and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently, +considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural +law: since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act +virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in +themselves, i.e. in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts +are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done +virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which, +through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive +to well-living. + +Reply Obj. 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, +drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural +common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral +common good. + +Reply Obj. 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is proper +to man--and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also +against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may +mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and in +this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus +contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is +unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural +crime. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is +owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are +virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while +they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 4] + +Whether the Natural Law Is the Same in All Men? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in +all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural +law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this +is not common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), +"all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the +same in all men. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to +be just," as stated in _Ethic._ v. But it is stated in the same book +that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in +regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in +all men. + +Obj. 3: Further, as stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural law +belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his +nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things; +some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and +other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for +all. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is +common to all nations." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural law +belong those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among +these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. +Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated +in _Phys._ i. The speculative reason, however, is differently +situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the +speculative reason is busied chiefly with necessary things, which +cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the +universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical +reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about +which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there +is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to +matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. +Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, +both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is +not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the +principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, +truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters +of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is +the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to +all. + +It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles +whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is +the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper +conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, +but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the +three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, +although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of +the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for +all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it +is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this +principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to +another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the +majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it +would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held +in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of +fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to +fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if +one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such +and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater +the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in +which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or +not to restore. + +Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general +principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to +knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are +conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same +for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to +knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to +rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to +generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some +obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted +by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus +formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural +law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar +relates (De Bello Gall. vi). + +Reply Obj. 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever +is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, +since they contain many things that are above nature; but that +whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. +Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is +contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way of +example, "by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would +be done by." + +Reply Obj. 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of +things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as +conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of +cases, but failing in a few. + +Reply Obj. 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, +so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must +needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally +right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed +according to reason. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 5] + +Whether the Natural Law Can Be Changed? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. +Because on Ecclus. 17:9, "He gave them instructions, and the law of +life," the gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be +written, in order to correct the law of nature." But that which is +corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed. + +Obj. 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are +against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as +when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. 22:2); and +when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the +Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself +"a wife of fornications" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be +changed. + +Obj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the possession of all +things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law." +But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it +seems that the natural law is subject to change. + +_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The +natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does +not vary according to time, but remains unchangeable." + +_I answer that,_ A change in the natural law may be understood in two +ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the +natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of +human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by +the Divine law and by human laws. + +Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of +subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural +law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether +unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary +principles, which, as we have said (A. 4), are certain detailed +proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural +law is not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most +cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare +occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance of +such precepts, as stated above (A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 1: The written law is said to be given for the correction +of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to +the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the +hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed +those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in +need of correction. + +Reply Obj. 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death +of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God on +account of original sin, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord killeth +and maketh alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be +inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice +whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; +who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently +intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither +adultery nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the +taking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of +God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its +owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in +human things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in +natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as +stated in the First Part, Q. 105, A. 6, ad 1. + +Reply Obj. 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two +ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should +not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the +contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the +natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art +invented them. In this sense, "the possession of all things in common +and universal freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to +wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in +by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. +Accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except +by addition. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 6] + +Whether the Law of Nature Can Be Abolished from the Heart of Man? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from +the heart of man. Because on Rom. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have +not the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which +sin had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is +restored by grace." But the law of righteousness is the law of +nature. Therefore the law of nature can be blotted out. + +Obj. 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of +nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more +therefore can the law of nature be blotted out. + +Obj. 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just. But +many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of +nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart +of man. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written +in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law +which is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the +natural law cannot be blotted out. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 4, 5), there belong to the +natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to +all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, +which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first +principles. As to those general principles, the natural law, in the +abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is +blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as reason +is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point +of practice, on account of concupiscence or some other passion, as +stated above (Q. 77, A. 2). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary +precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, +either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors +occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and +corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, +as the Apostle states (Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful. + +Reply Obj. 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, +not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts +of the natural law, in the way stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet +nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the +natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain +enactments which are unjust. +________________________ + +QUESTION 95 + +OF HUMAN LAW +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in +itself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head +there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Its utility. + +(2) Its origin. + +(3) Its quality. + +(4) Its division. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 1] + +Whether It Was Useful for Laws to Be Framed by Men? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be +framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made +good thereby, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 1). But men are more to be +induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against +their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame +laws. + +Obj. 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have +recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice is +better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it +would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted +to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition. + +Obj. 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human +actions, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, +2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite +in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot +be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who +looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for +human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the +framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws. + +_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that +in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence +might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread +of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But these +things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that +human laws should be made. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 63, A. 1; Q. 94, A. 3), man has +a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be +acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe +that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in +food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, +viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as +other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing +and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for +himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of +virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to +which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are +more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive +this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of +virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of +virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by +the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. +But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not +easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained +from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might +desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they +themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do +willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. +Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, +is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have +peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the +Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals +if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be +severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason +to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which +other animals are unable to do. + +Reply Obj. 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue +by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly +disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better +that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by +judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to +find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the +many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. +Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what +laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be +pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what +is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by +considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in +the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment +judge of things present, towards which they are affected by love, +hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is +perverted. + +Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every +man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, +whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for +very few matters to be left to the decision of men. + +Reply Obj. 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the +law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher +says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that +has happened or not happened," and the like. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 2] + +Whether Every Human Law Is Derived from the Natural Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from +the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the +legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference." +But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of +indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived +from the natural law. + +Obj. 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as +stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But +those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of +the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (Q. 94, A. +4). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong +to the natural law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the +Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which +is equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived +from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for +all: which is clearly false. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are +derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the +reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist +says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.]. +Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law. + +_On the contrary,_ Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from +nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and +reverence for the laws." + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is +not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law +depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is +said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. +But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from +what has been stated above (Q. 91, A. 2, ad 2). Consequently every +human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived +from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law +of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law. + +But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural +law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by +way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like +to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn +from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that +whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: +thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to +some particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the +general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. +that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the +principle that "one should do harm to no man": while some are derived +therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that +the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or +that way, is a determination of the law of nature. + +Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But +those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in +human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force +from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the +second way, have no other force than that of human law. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which +are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the +natural law. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument avails for those things that are derived +from the natural law, by way of conclusions. + +Reply Obj. 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot be +applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of +human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among +various people. + +Reply Obj. 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as +referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of +the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and +prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they +see at once what is the best thing to decide. + +Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we +ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and +opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, +as to their demonstrations." +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 3] + +Whether Isidore's Description of the Quality of Positive Law Is +Appropriate? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality +of positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law +shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom +of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; +clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; +framed for no private benefit, but for the common good." Because he +had previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, +saying that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it +foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common +weal." Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to +these. + +Obj. 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De +Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous to +add "just." + +Obj. 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to +Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the +definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country." + +Obj. 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be +necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is +necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore +human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing +may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as +usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and +"useful." + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Isidore. + +_I answer that,_ Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be +determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such +as to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything +that is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule +and measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: +since it is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or +measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher +measure is twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law, as +explained above (A. 2; Q. 93, A. 3). Now the end of human law is to +be useful to man, as the Jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, +ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining +the nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that +it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine +law; that it be "helpful to discipline," inasmuch as it is +proportionate to the nature law; and that it "further the common +weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind. + +All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. +For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he +goes on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according +to the customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies +that it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends +first on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying "just": +secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline +should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also +into account the ability of nature (for the same burdens should not +be laid on children as adults); and should be according to human +customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to +others: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of +which he says, "adapted to place and time." The remaining words, +"necessary, useful," etc. mean that law should further the common +weal: so that "necessity" refers to the removal of evils; +"usefulness" to the attainment of good; "clearness of expression," to +the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And +since, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2), law is ordained to the common +good, this is expressed in the last part of the description. + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 4] + +Whether Isidore's Division of Human Laws Is Appropriate? + +Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human +statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he +includes the "law of nations," so called, because, as he says, +"nearly all nations use it." But as he says, "natural law is that +which is common to all nations." Therefore the law of nations is not +contained under positive human law, but rather under natural law. + +Obj. 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ +not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of the +commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions +(Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they do not differ, +except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: +since it may go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human laws +is not appropriate. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests +and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems +that, as this division includes _military law,_ and _public law,_ +referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should include other +laws pertaining to other offices of the state. + +Obj. 4: Further, those things that are accidental should be passed +over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that +man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the +names of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian" law, +another the "Falcidian" law, etc. + +_On the contrary,_ The authority of Isidore (Obj. 1) suffices. + +_I answer that,_ A thing can of itself be divided in respect of +something contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either +rational or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and +therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its +being rational or irrational; but not in the point of its being white +or black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the +notion of human law, many things are contained, in respect of any of +which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the +first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be derived from +the law of nature, as explained above (A. 2). In this respect +positive law is divided into the _law of nations_ and _civil law,_ +according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the +law of nature, as stated above (A. 2). Because, to the law of nations +belong those things which are derived from the law of nature, as +conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings and sellings, and the +like, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of the +law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved +in _Polit._ i, 2. But those things which are derived from the law of +nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, +according as each state decides on what is best for itself. + +Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to +the common good of the state. In this respect human law may be +divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special +way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the +people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for +the safety of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are +adapted to these men. + +Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that +one who governs the community of the state, as shown above (Q. 90, A. +3). In this respect, there are various human laws according to the +various forms of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher +(Polit. iii, 10) one is _monarchy,_ i.e. when the state is governed +by one; and then we have _Royal Ordinances._ Another form is +_aristocracy,_ i.e. government by the best men or men of highest +rank; and then we have the _Authoritative legal opinions_ (_Responsa +Prudentum_) and _Decrees of the Senate_ (_Senatus consulta_). Another +form is _oligarchy,_ i.e. government by a few rich and powerful men; +and then we have _Praetorian,_ also called _Honorary,_ law. Another +form of government is that of the people, which is called +_democracy,_ and there we have _Decrees of the commonalty_ +(_Plebiscita_). There is also tyrannical government, which is +altogether corrupt, which, therefore, has no corresponding law. +Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and +which is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the +_Lords and Commons,_ as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). + +Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human +actions. In this respect, according to the various matters of which +the law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes +named after their authors: thus we have the _Lex Julia_ about +adultery, the _Lex Cornelia_ concerning assassins, and so on, +differentiated in this way, not on account of the authors, but on +account of the matters to which they refer. + +Reply Obj. 1: The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to +man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived +from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote +from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless +it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from +the natural law which is common to all animals. + +The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been +said. +________________________ + +QUESTION 96 + +OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there +are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether human law should be framed for the community? + +(2) Whether human law should repress all vices? + +(3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue? + +(4) Whether it binds man in conscience? + +(5) Whether all men are subject to human law? + +(6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter +of the law? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 1] + +Whether Human Law Should Be Framed for the Community Rather Than for +the Individual? + +Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for +the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher +says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular +acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject +of decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are +framed about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for +the community, but also for the individual. + +Obj. 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above +(Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). But human acts are about individual matters. +Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community, but +rather for the individual. + +Obj. 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated +above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). But a measure should be most certain, as +stated in _Metaph._ x. Since therefore in human acts no general +proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual +cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for +individual cases. + +_On the contrary,_ The Jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. +iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made to suit the +majority of instances; and they are not framed according to what may +possibly happen in an individual case." + +_I answer that,_ Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to +that end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore +says (Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private +benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence human +laws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good +comprises many things. Wherefore law should take account of many +things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the +community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is +procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for only a +short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one +another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6). + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal just, +i.e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down +simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he +says that "the legal is that which originally was a matter of +indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer": as the +fixing of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the community +in one respect, and individuals in another. These are called +"privileges," i.e. "private laws," as it were, because they regard +private persons, although their power extends to many matters; and in +regard to these, he adds, "and further, all particular acts of +legislation." Other matters are legal, not through being laws, but +through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such +are decrees which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he +adds "all matters subject to decrees." + +Reply Obj. 2: A principle of direction should be applicable to many; +wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things +belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle +in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as there +are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since +their use consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law +would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single +act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of +directing individual actions; whereas law is a general precept, as +stated above (Q. 92, A. 2, Obj. 2). + +Reply Obj. 3: "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all +things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as +natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as +being true in the greater number of instances, though at times and +less frequently it fail. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 2] + +Whether It Belongs to the Human Law to Repress All Vices? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress +all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in +order that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check." +But it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were +repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils. + +Obj. 2: Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the +citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear +from all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress +all vices. + +Obj. 3: Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated +above (Q. 95, A. 2). But all vices are contrary to the law of nature. +Therefore human law should repress all vices. + +_On the contrary,_ We read in _De Lib. Arb._ i, 5: "It seems to me +that the law which is written for the governing of the people rightly +permits these things, and that Divine providence punishes them." But +Divine providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law +rightly allows some vices, by not repressing them. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2), law is framed as +a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous +with that which it measures, as stated in _Metaph._ x, text. 3, 4, +since different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore +laws imposed on men should also be in keeping with their condition, +for, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both +according to nature, and according to the customs of the country." +Now possibility or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or +disposition: since the same thing is not possible to one who has not +a virtuous habit, as is possible to one who has. Thus the same is not +possible to a child as to a full-grown man: for which reason the law +for children is not the same as for adults, since many things are +permitted to children, which in an adult are punished by law or at +any rate are open to blame. In like manner many things are +permissible to men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable +in a virtuous man. + +Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of +whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid +all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more +grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to +abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without +the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus +human law prohibits murder, theft and such like. + +Reply Obj. 1: Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others. +Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's neighbor +is injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as stated. + +Reply Obj. 2: The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not +suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude +of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. +that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect +ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet +greater evils: thus it is written (Ps. 30:33): "He that violently +bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood"; and (Matt. 9:17) that if "new +wine," i.e. precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old bottles," +i.e. into imperfect men, "the bottles break, and the wine runneth +out," i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, +break into evils worse still. + +Reply Obj. 3: The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal +law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine +says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "The law which is framed for the government +of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are punished +by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do +everything, is this a reason why it should be blamed for what it +does." Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything that is +forbidden by the natural law. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 3] + +Whether Human Law Prescribes Acts of All the Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of +all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. But +human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above (A. 2). +Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is +the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come under +a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of +virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above +(Q. 90, A. 2). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the +common good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not +prescribe all acts of virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law +"prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the +acts of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in +like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing the +former, forbidding the latter." + +_I answer that,_ The species of virtues are distinguished by their +objects, as explained above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1; Q. 62, A. 2). +Now all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private +good of an individual, or to the common good of the multitude: thus +matters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the +state, or for upholding the rights of a friend, and in like manner +with the other virtues. But law, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2) is +ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts +cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless human law does not +prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue: but only in regard +to those that are ordainable to the common good--either immediately, +as when certain things are done directly for the common good--or +mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things pertaining to +good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the +common good of justice and peace. + +Reply Obj. 1: Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the +obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of +virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it +prescribes some acts of each virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways. +First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act +of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do +brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue. +Secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a +way in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds from +virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is the end +at which every lawgiver aims. + +Reply Obj. 3: There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the +common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 4] + +Whether Human Law Binds a Man in Conscience? + +Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not bind man in +conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of +higher power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is +beneath the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its +precept in a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience. + +Obj. 2: Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the +commandments of God. But sometimes God's commandments are made void +by human laws, according to Matt. 15:6: "You have made void the +commandment of God for your tradition." Therefore human law does not +bind a man in conscience. + +Obj. 3: Further, human laws often bring loss of character and injury +on man, according to Isa. 10:1 et seqq.: "Woe to them that make +wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the +poor in judgment, and do violence to the cause of the humble of My +people." But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and +violence. Therefore human laws do not bind man in conscience. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 2:19): "This is thankworthy, +if for conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully." + +_I answer that,_ Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If +they be just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the +eternal law whence they are derived, according to Prov. 8:15: "By Me +kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Now laws are said to +be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the +common good--and from their author, that is to say, when the law that +is made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver--and from their +form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an +equality of proportion and with a view to the common good. For, since +one man is a part of the community, each man in all that he is and +has, belongs to the community; just as a part, in all that it is, +belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, +in order to save the whole: so that on this account, such laws as +these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and binding in +conscience, and are legal laws. + +On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being +contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things mentioned +above--either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on +his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but +rather to his own cupidity or vainglory--or in respect of the author, +as when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to +him--or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally +on the community, although with a view to the common good. The like +are acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine says (De +Lib. Arb. i, 5), "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all." +Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in +order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should +even yield his right, according to Matt. 5:40, 41: "If a man . . . +take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever +will force thee one mile, go with him other two." + +Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine +good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to +anything else contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must +nowise be observed, because, as stated in Acts 5:29, "we ought to +obey God rather than man." + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1, 2), all human power is +from God . . . "therefore he that resisteth the power," in matters +that are within its scope, "resisteth the ordinance of God"; so that +he becomes guilty according to his conscience. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the +commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power. +Wherefore in such matters human law should not be obeyed. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust +hurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not +extend to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to +obey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more +grievous hurt. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 5] + +Whether All Are Subject to the Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For +those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the +Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:9): "The law is not made for the just man." +Therefore the just are not subject to the law. + +Obj. 2: Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]: "He +that is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound by +the public law." Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of +the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of whom it is said +(Rom. 8:14): "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the +sons of God." Therefore not all men are subject to human law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3, +De Leg. et Senat.] that "the sovereign is exempt from the laws." But +he that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not +all are subject to the law. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "Let every soul be +subject to the higher powers." But subjection to a power seems to +imply subjection to the laws framed by that power. Therefore all men +should be subject to human law. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2; A. 3, ad 2), the +notion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human +acts; secondly, that it has coercive power. Wherefore a man may be +subject to law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the +regulator: and, in this way, whoever is subject to a power, is +subject to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two +ways that one is not subject to a power. In one way, by being +altogether free from its authority: hence the subjects of one city or +kingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign of another city or +kingdom, since they are not subject to his authority. In another way, +by being under a yet higher law; thus the subject of a proconsul +should be ruled by his command, but not in those matters in which the +subject receives his orders from the emperor: for in these matters, +he is not bound by the mandate of the lower authority, since he is +directed by that of a higher. In this way, one who is simply subject +to a law, may not be subject thereto in certain matters, in respect +of which he is ruled by a higher law. + +Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is +subject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous are +not subject to the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and +violence are contrary to the will: but the will of the good is in +harmony with the law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant +from it. Wherefore in this sense the good are not subject to the law, +but only the wicked. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of subjection by way of coercion: +for, in this way, "the law is not made for the just men": because +"they are a law to themselves," since they "show the work of the law +written in their hearts," as the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14, 15). +Consequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it does on +the wicked. + +Reply Obj. 2: The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed by +man: and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the +law of the Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters +that are inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. +Nevertheless the very fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is +due to the leading of the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Pet. 2:13: "Be +ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake." + +Reply Obj. 3: The sovereign is said to be "exempt from the law," as +to its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no man is coerced by +himself, and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the +sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be exempt from the law, +because none is competent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against +the law. Wherefore on Ps. 50:6: "To Thee only have I sinned," a gloss +says that "there is no man who can judge the deeds of a king." But as +to the directive force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by +his own will, according to the statement (Extra, De Constit. cap. Cum +omnes) that "whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep +himself. And a wise authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus] +says: 'Obey the law that thou makest thyself.'" Moreover the Lord +reproaches those who "say and do not"; and who "bind heavy burdens +and lay them on men's shoulders, but with a finger of their own they +will not move them" (Matt. 23:3, 4). Hence, in the judgment of God, +the sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to its directive force; +but he should fulfil it to his own free-will and not of constraint. +Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is +expedient, he can change the law, and dispense in it according to +time and place. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 6] + +Whether He Who Is Under a Law May Act Beside the Letter of the Law? + +Objection 1: It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act +beside the letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31): +"Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when +once they are made they must pass judgment not on them, but according +to them." But if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that +he observes the intention of the lawgiver, he seems to pass judgment +on the law. Therefore it is not right for one who is under the law to +disregard the letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of +the lawgiver. + +Obj. 2: Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can +make the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make the +law. Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the +lawgiver, but should always act according to the letter of the law. + +Obj. 3: Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by +words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise: for +Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree +just things." Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the +lawgiver otherwise than by the words of the law. + +_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The meaning of what is +said is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not +subject to speech, but speech to things." Therefore we should take +account of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), every law is directed to the +common weal of men, and derives the force and nature of law +accordingly. Hence the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., +tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, +is it allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, +those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of +man." Now it happens often that the observance of some point of law +conduces to the common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in +some cases, is very hurtful. Since then the lawgiver cannot have in +view every single case, he shapes the law according to what happens +most frequently, by directing his attention to the common good. +Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be +hurtful to the general welfare, it should not be observed. For +instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law +that the gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for +public welfare as a general rule: but, it were to happen that the +enemy are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the +city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were not +opened to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, +contrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain the common +weal, which the lawgiver had in view. + +Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law +according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk needing +instant remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is +useful and what is not useful to the state: those alone can do this +who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have +the power to dispense from the laws. If, however, the peril be so +sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter +to authority, the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since +necessity knows no law. + +Reply Obj. 1: He who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of +the law, does not judge the law; but of a particular case in which he +sees that the letter of the law is not to be observed. + +Reply Obj. 2: He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not +interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by +reason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. +For if it be a matter of doubt, he must either act according to the +letter of the law, or consult those in power. + +Reply Obj. 3: No man is so wise as to be able to take account of +every single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express +in words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in +view. And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into +consideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid +confusion: but should frame the law according to that which is of +most common occurrence. +________________________ + +QUESTION 97 + +OF CHANGE IN LAWS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four +points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether human law is changeable? + +(2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better +occurs? + +(3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the +force of law? + +(4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by +dispensation of those in authority? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 97, Art. 1] + +Whether Human Law Should Be Changed in Any Way? + +Objection 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in +any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as +stated above (Q. 95, A. 2). But the natural law endures unchangeably. +Therefore human law should also remain without any change. + +Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure +should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human +acts, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it should remain +without change. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as +stated above (Q. 95, A. 2). But that which is right once is right +always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A temporal +law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 91, A. 3), human law is a +dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be +two causes for the just change of human law: one on the part of +reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law. +The cause on the part of reason is that it seems natural to human +reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, +in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early +philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by +those who succeeded them. So also in practical matters: for those who +first endeavored to discover something useful for the human +community, not being able by themselves to take everything into +consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in +many ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made +institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of +the common weal. + +On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be +rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom +different things are expedient according to the difference of his +condition. An example is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): +"If the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are +most careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law +allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the +government of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same +people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the +government to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing +their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and the +choice devolves to a few good men." + +Reply Obj. 1: The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, +as stated above (Q. 91, A. 2), and therefore endures without change, +owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, +the Author of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and +imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the +natural law contains certain universal precepts, which are +everlasting: whereas human law contains certain particular precepts, +according to various emergencies. + +Reply Obj. 2: A measure should be as enduring as possible. But +nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to +change. And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable. + +Reply Obj. 3: In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and +therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But +right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to +which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated above: +wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 97, Art. 2] + +Whether Human Law Should Always Be Changed, Whenever Something Better +Occurs? + +Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever +something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human +reason, like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former +times give place to others, if something better occurs. Therefore the +same should apply to human laws. + +Obj. 2: Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the +future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found +possible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have +ensued; because the laws of old were crude in many points. Therefore +it seems that laws should be changed, whenever anything better occurs +to be enacted. + +Obj. 3: Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But +we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except by +experience, which "requires time," as stated in _Ethic._ ii. +Therefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for something +better to occur for legislation. + +_On the contrary,_ It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, 5): "It +is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those +traditions to be changed which we have received from the fathers of +old." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), human law is rightly +changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal. +But, to a certain extent, the mere change of law is of itself +prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the +observance of laws, seeing that what is done contrary to general +custom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as grave. +Consequently, when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is +diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law +should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the common +weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this +respect. Such compensation may arise either from some very great and +every evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the +extreme urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the existing +law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore +the Jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit. +Princip.] that "in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of +the benefit to be derived, before departing from a law which has long +been considered just." + +Reply Obj. 1: Rules of art derive their force from reason alone: and +therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed +hitherto should be changed. But "laws derive very great force from +custom," as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently they +should not be quickly changed. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument proves that laws ought to be changed: not +in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or in +a case of great urgency, as stated above. This answer applies also to +the Third Objection. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 97, Art. 3] + +Whether Custom Can Obtain Force of Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, +nor abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law +and from the Divine law, as stated above (Q. 93, A. 3; Q. 95, A. 2). +But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine +law. Therefore neither can it change human law. + +Obj. 2: Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first +acted against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such acts, +nothing good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is +a rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so +that the mere custom should obtain force of law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men +whose business it is to govern the community; wherefore private +individuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private +individuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to +abolish the law. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): "The +customs of God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to +be considered as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of +the Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God." + +_I answer that,_ All law proceeds from the reason and will of the +lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of +God; the human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now +just as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made +manifest by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since +seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution. +But it is evident that by human speech, law can be both changed and +expounded, in so far as it manifests the interior movement and +thought of human reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if +they be repeated, so as to make a custom, law can be changed and +expounded; and also something can be established which obtains force +of law, in so far as by repeated external actions, the inward +movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually +declared; for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to +proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has +the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law. + +Reply Obj. 1: The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine +will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom +proceeding from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence +it is that no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: for +Isidore says (Synon. ii, 16): "Let custom yield to authority: evil +customs should be eradicated by law and reason." + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 96, A. 6), human laws fail in some +cases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; +namely, in a case where the law fails; yet the act will not be evil. +And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, +then custom shows that the law is no longer useful: just as it might +be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, +however, the same reason remains, for which the law was useful +hitherto, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law, +but the law that overcomes the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason +for the law seeming useless, be that it is not "possible according to +the custom of the country" [*Q. 95, A. 3], which has been stated to +be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set aside the +custom of a whole people. + +Reply Obj. 3: The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of +two conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own +laws, the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts +far more in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority +of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as +representing the people. Wherefore although each individual cannot +make laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people have not +the free power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a +higher authority; nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom +obtains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom +it belongs to make laws for that people: because by the very fact +that they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is +introduced by custom. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 97, Art. 4] + +Whether the Rulers of the People Can Dispense from Human Laws? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot +dispense from human laws. For the law is established for the "common +weal," as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not +be set aside for the private convenience of an individual: because, +as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), "the good of the nation is +more godlike than the good of one man." Therefore it seems that a man +should not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the general +law. + +Obj. 2: Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as +follows (Deut. 1:17): "You shall hear the little as well as the +great; neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the +judgment of God." But to allow one man to do that which is equally +forbidden to all, seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the +rulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is +against a precept of the Divine law. + +Obj. 3: Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with +the natural and Divine laws: else it would not "foster religion," nor +be "helpful to discipline," which is requisite to the nature of law, +as laid down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man can dispense from +the Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from +the human law. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:17): "A dispensation is +committed to me." + +_I answer that,_ Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring +out to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household +is called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he +distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure. +Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the +very fact that he directs how some general precept is to be fulfilled +by each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is +conducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a +particular individual, or in some particular case, either because it +would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion +of some evil, as explained above (Q. 96, A. 6). But it would be +dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except +perhaps by reason of an evident and sudden emergency, as stated above +(Q. 96, A. 6). Consequently he who is placed over a community is +empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority, +so that, when the law fails in its application to persons or +circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be +observed. If however he grant this permission without any such +reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an +imprudent dispenser: unfaithful, if he has not the common good in +view; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting +dispensations. Hence Our Lord says (Luke 12:42): "Who, thinkest thou, +is the faithful and wise dispenser [Douay: steward], whom his lord +setteth over his family?" + +Reply Obj. 1: When a person is dispensed from observing the general +law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the +intention of benefiting, the common good. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are +served out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the +condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive +special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object +of special favor. + +Reply Obj. 3: Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts, +which never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts, +however, which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man +sometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan should not +be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar. +But to the Divine law each man stands as a private person to the +public law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none can +dispense from public human law, except the man from whom the law +derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the precepts of the +Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man +to whom He may give special power for that purpose. +________________________ + +QUESTION 98 + +OF THE OLD LAW +(In Six Articles) + +In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law +itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are six points +of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the Old Law was good? + +(2) Whether it was from God? + +(3) Whether it came from Him through the angels? + +(4) Whether it was given to all? + +(5) Whether it was binding on all? + +(6) Whether it was given at a suitable time? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 98, Art. 1] + +Whether the Old Law Was Good? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is +written (Ezech. 20:25): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and +judgments in which they shall not live." But a law is not said to be +good except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it +contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good. + +Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce +to the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the Old Law +was not salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle +says (Rom. 7:8, seqq.): "Without the law sin was dead. And I lived +some time without the law. But when the commandment came sin revived; +and I died." Again he says (Rom. 5:20): "Law entered in that sin +might abound." Therefore the Old Law was not good. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should +be possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according to +human custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said (Acts +15:10): "Why tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the +disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" +Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:12): "Wherefore the law +indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good." + +_I answer that,_ Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as +a doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right +reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now +the Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it repressed +concupiscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the +commandment, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods" (Ex. 20:17). +Moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin; and these too are +contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good +law. The Apostle argues in the same way (Rom. 7): "I am delighted," +says he (verse 22), "with the law of God, according to the inward +man": and again (verse 16): "I consent to the law, that is good." + +But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius +states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, and an imperfect +good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a +thing is such that it is sufficient in itself to conduce to the end: +while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance +in attaining the end, but is not sufficient for the realization +thereof. Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a +man; but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able +to bring him back to health. Again it must be observed that the end +of human law is different from the end of Divine law. For the end of +human law is the temporal tranquillity of the state, which end law +effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which +might disturb the peaceful condition of the state. On the other hand, +the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end which is +everlasting happiness; which end is hindered by any sin, not only of +external, but also of internal action. Consequently that which +suffices for the perfection of human law, viz. the prohibition and +punishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine +law: but it is requisite that it should make man altogether fit to +partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save by the +grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby "charity" which fulfilleth the law +. . . "is spread abroad in our hearts" (Rom. 5:5): since "the grace of +God is life everlasting" (Rom. 6:23). But the Old Law could not +confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is +written (John 1:17), the law was given "by Moses, grace and truth +came by Jesus Christ." Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but +imperfect, according to Heb. 7:19: "The law brought nothing to +perfection." + +Reply Obj. 1: The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which +are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the +remission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man +confessed himself a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, "and +judgments in which they shall not live"; i.e. whereby they are unable +to obtain life; and so the text goes on: "And I polluted them," i.e. +showed them to be polluted, "in their own gifts, when they offered +all that opened the womb, for their offenses." + +Reply Obj. 2: The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the +cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: in +so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is +prescribed, and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not +given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. +5:11): "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by +it killed me." In the same sense when it is said that "the law +entered in that sin might abound," the conjunction "that" must be +taken as consecutive and not final: in so far as men, taking occasion +from the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more +grievous after law had forbidden it, and because concupiscence +increased, since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden. + +Reply Obj. 3: The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help +of grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written (Rom. +9:16): "It is not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth," viz. +that he wills and runs in the commandments of God, "but of God that +showeth mercy." Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:32): "I have run the +way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart," i.e. by +giving me grace and charity. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 98, Art. 2] + +Whether the Old Law Was from God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it +is written (Deut. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." But the Law +was imperfect, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the Old Law was not +from God. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that +all the works which God hath made continue for ever." But the Old Law +does not continue for ever: since the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18): +"There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because +of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Therefore the Old Law +was not from God. + +Obj. 3: Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but +also the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of sin, +as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law does +not pertain to God, to Whom "none is like among the lawgivers" (Job +36:22). + +Obj. 4: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that God "will have all +men to be saved." But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as +stated above (A. 1). Therefore the giving of such a law did not +appertain to God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 15:6) while speaking to the +Jews, to whom the Law was given: "You have made void the commandment +of God for your tradition." And shortly before (verse 4) He had said: +"Honor thy father and mother," which is contained expressly in the +Old Law (Ex. 20:12; Deut. 5:16). Therefore the Old Law was from God. + +_I answer that,_ The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the +Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to +Christ in two ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He +Himself says (Luke 24:44): "All things must needs be fulfilled, which +are written in the law . . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms, +concerning Me": and (John 5:46): "If you did believe Moses, you would +perhaps believe Me also; for he wrote of Me." Secondly, as a kind of +disposition, since by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it +enclosed (_concludebat_) them in the worship of one God, by Whom the +human race was to be saved through Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says +(Gal. 3:23): "Before the faith came, we were kept under the law shut +up (_conclusi_), unto that faith which was to be revealed." Now it is +evident that the same thing it is, which gives a disposition to the +end, and which brings to the end; and when I say "the same," I mean +that it does so either by itself or through its subjects. For the +devil would not make a law whereby men would be led to Christ, Who +was to cast him out, according to Matt. 12:26: "If Satan cast out +Satan, his kingdom is divided" [Vulg.: 'he is divided against +himself']. Therefore the Old Law was given by the same God, from Whom +came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ. + +Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect simply, and +yet perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is said to be perfect, not +simply, but with regard to the condition of time. So, too, precepts +that are given to children are perfect in comparison with the +condition of those to whom they are given, although they are not +perfect simply. Hence the Apostle says (Gal. 3:24): "The law was our +pedagogue in Christ." + +Reply Obj. 2: Those works of God endure for ever which God so made +that they would endure for ever; and these are His perfect works. But +the Old Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace; +not as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless for this +time; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, "the law brought +nothing to perfection": hence he says (Gal. 3:25): "After the faith +is come, we are no longer under a pedagogue." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 79, A. 4), God sometimes permits +certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So +also did He wish to give such a law as men by their own forces could +not fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might +find themselves to be sinners, and being humbled might have recourse +to the help of grace. + +Reply Obj. 4: Although the Old Law did not suffice to save man, yet +another help from God besides the Law was available for man, viz. +faith in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified +even as we were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him +insufficient aids to salvation. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 98, Art. 3] + +Whether the Old Law Was Given Through the Angels? + +Objection 1: It seems that the Old Law was not given through the +angels, but immediately by God. For an angel means a "messenger"; so +that the word "angel" denotes ministry, not lordship, according to +Ps. 102:20, 21: "Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you +ministers of His." But the Old Law is related to have been given by +the Lord: for it is written (Ex. 20:1): "And the Lord spoke . . . +these words," and further on: "I am the Lord Thy God." Moreover the +same expression is often repeated in Exodus, and the later books of +the Law. Therefore the Law was given by God immediately. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to John 1:17, "the Law was given by +Moses." But Moses received it from God immediately: for it is written +(Ex. 33:11): "The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont +to speak to his friend." Therefore the Old Law was given by God +immediately. + +Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law, as +stated above (Q. 90, A. 3). But God alone is Sovereign as regards the +salvation of souls: while the angels are the "ministering spirits," +as stated in Heb. 1:14. Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be +given through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of +souls. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle said (Gal. 3:19) that the Law was +"given [Vulg.: 'ordained'] by angels in the hand of a Mediator." And +Stephen said (Acts 7:53): "(Who) have received the Law by the +disposition of angels." + +_I answer that,_ The Law was given by God through the angels. And +besides the general reason given by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. +that "the gifts of God should be brought to men by means of the +angels," there is a special reason why the Old Law should have been +given through them. For it has been stated (AA. 1, 2) that the Old +Law was imperfect, and yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of +the human race, which was to come through Christ. Now it is to be +observed that wherever there is an order of powers or arts, he that +holds the highest place, himself exercises the principal and perfect +acts; while those things which dispose to the ultimate perfection are +effected by him through his subordinates: thus the ship-builder +himself rivets the planks together, but prepares the material by +means of the workmen who assist him under his direction. Consequently +it was fitting that the perfect law of the New Testament should be +given by the incarnate God immediately; but that the Old Law should +be given to men by the ministers of God, i.e. by the angels. It is +thus that the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews +(1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the Old; because in +the New Testament "God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son," whereas +in the Old Testament "the word was spoken by angels" (Heb. 2:2). + +Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals (Praef. +chap. i), "the angel who is described to have appeared to Moses, is +sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in +truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the external +delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director within, Who +supported the effectual power of speaking." Hence also it is that the +angel spoke as personating the Lord. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is stated +in Exodus that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face"; and shortly +afterwards we read, "'Show me Thy glory.' Therefore He perceived what +he saw and he desired what he saw not." Hence he did not see the very +Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him +immediately. Accordingly when Scripture states that "He spoke to him +face to face," this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of +the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to +mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means of a subordinate +creature, i.e. an angel and a cloud. Again we may say that this +vision "face to face" means some kind of sublime and familiar +contemplation, inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence. + +Reply Obj. 3: It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own +authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it +through others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He +promulgated it through the angels. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q, 98, Art. 4] + +Whether the Old Law Should Have Been Given to the Jews Alone? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have been +given to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the +salvation which was to come through Christ, as stated above (AA. 2, +3). But that salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all +nations, according to Isa. 49:6: "It is a small thing that thou +shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to +convert the dregs of Israel. Behold I have given thee to be the light +of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to the +farthest part of the earth." Therefore the Old Law should have been +given to all nations, and not to one people only. + +Obj. 2: Further, according to Acts 10:34, 35, "God is not a respecter +of persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and worketh +justice, is acceptable to Him." Therefore the way of salvation should +not have been opened to one people more than to another. + +Obj. 3: Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated +above (A. 3). But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the +angels not to the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written +(Ecclus. 17:14): "Over every nation He set a ruler." Also on all +nations He bestows temporal goods, which are of less account with God +than spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to +all peoples. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 3:1, 2): "What advantage then +hath the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words +of God were committed to them": and (Ps. 147:9): "He hath not done in +like manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made +manifest unto them." + +_I answer that,_ It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being +given to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish +people alone remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the +others turned away to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy to +receive the Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs. + +But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to +idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was more grievous, +as is clear from Ex. 32 and from Amos 5:25, 26: "Did you offer +victims and sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house +of Israel? But you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the +image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made to +yourselves." Moreover it is stated expressly (Deut. 9:6): "Know +therefore that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this excellent land +in possession for thy justices, for thou art a very stiff-necked +people": but the real reason is given in the preceding verse: "That +the Lord might accomplish His word, which He promised by oath to thy +fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob." + +What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says (Gal. 3:16) +that "to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith +not, 'And to his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And to thy +seed,' which is Christ." And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other +special boons to that people, on account of the promised made to +their fathers that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting +that the people, of whom Christ was to be born, should be signalized +by a special sanctification, according to the words of Lev. 19:2: "Be +ye holy, because I . . . am holy." Nor again was it on account of the +merit of Abraham himself that this promise was made to him, viz. that +Christ should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and +vocation. Hence it is written (Isa. 41:2): "Who hath raised up the +just one form the east, hath called him to follow him?" + +It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election +that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the people sprung +from them received the law; according to Deut. 4:36, 37: "Ye did +[Vulg.: 'Thou didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, +because He loved thy fathers, and chose their seed after them." And +if again it asked why He chose this people, and not another, that +Christ might be born thereof; a fitting answer is given by Augustine +(Tract. super Joan. xxvi): "Why He draweth one and draweth not +another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish not to err." + +Reply Obj. 1: Although the salvation, which was to come through +Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that +Christ should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was +privileged above other peoples; according to Rom. 9:4: "To whom," +namely the Jews, "belongeth the adoption as of children (of God) +. . . and the testament, and the giving of the Law . . . whose are +the fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the flesh." + +Reply Obj. 2: Respect of persons takes place in those things which +are given according to due; but it has no place in those things which +are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives +of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter of persons: +but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to +distribute them according to personal merits, he would be a respecter +of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on the human +race gratuitously: wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if He +gives them to some rather than to others. Hence Augustine says (De +Praedest. Sanct. viii): "All whom God teaches, he teaches out of +pity; but whom He teaches not, out of justice He teaches not": for +this is due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the +first parent. + +Reply Obj. 3: The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account +of sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are the +ministries of the angels, which the very order of various natures +demands, viz. that the lowest beings be governed through the +intermediate beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not +only to men, but also to beasts, according to Ps. 35:7: "Men and +beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord." +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 98, Art. 5] + +Whether All Men Were Bound to Observe the Old Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old +Law. Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject to +his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the +earth" (Ps. 46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were +bound to observe the Law. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the +Old Law: for it is written (Deut. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth +not in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work." If +therefore other men could be saved without the observance of the Old +Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual and +to the observances of the Law: for it is written (Ex. 12:48): "If any +stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the +Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he +celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is +born in the land." But it would have been useless to admit strangers +to the legal observances according to Divine ordinance, if they could +have been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none +could be saved without observing the Law. + +_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the +Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that +the Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved +without observing the Law. + +_I answer that,_ The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural +law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those +precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound +to observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but +because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts +which were added by the Old Law, they were not binding on any save +the Jewish people alone. + +The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above (A. 4), +was given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a prerogative +of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born of that +people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification +of certain ones, are binding on them alone: thus clerics who are set +aside for the service of God are bound to certain obligations to +which the laity are not bound; likewise religious are bound by their +profession to certain works of perfection, to which people living in +the world are not bound. In like manner this people was bound to +certain special observances, to which other peoples were not bound. +Wherefore it is written (Deut. 18:13): "Thou shalt be perfect and +without spot before the Lord thy God": and for this reason they used +a kind of form of profession, as appears from Deut. 26:3: "I profess +this day before the Lord thy God," etc. + +Reply Obj. 1: Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to observe his +law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain +things to be observed by the servants of his household, others are +not bound thereto. + +Reply Obj. 2: The more a man is united to God, the better his state +becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the +worship of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. +Hence it is written (Deut. 4:8): "What other nation is there so +renowned that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?" +In like manner, from this point of view, the state of clerics is +better than that of the laity, and the state of religious than that +of folk living in the world. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more +securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere natural +law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity +are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons to +those of the religious, although they can be saved without this. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 98, Art. 6] + +Whether the Old Law Was Suitably Given at the Time of Moses? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at +the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation +which was to come through Christ, as stated above (AA. 2, 3). But man +needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. +Therefore the Law should have been given immediately after sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of +those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the +"seed, which is Christ" (Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as +related in Gen. 12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at +once at the time of Abraham. + +Obj. 3: Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from +Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He born of +no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise +was renewed, according to 2 Kings 23:1: "The man to whom it was +appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said." +Therefore the Old Law should have been given after David, just as it +was given after Abraham. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set +because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He +made the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a +Mediator": ordained, i.e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss +explains. Therefore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given +in this order of time. + +_I answer that,_ It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the +time of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in +respect of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it +is imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law +restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through +being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil what they desire to +do. Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time +as would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man +was proud of two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He was proud +of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for +salvation: and accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome +in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason without +the help of a written law: and man was able to learn from experience +that his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man +had fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices. +Wherefore, after those times, it was necessary for a written law to +be given as a remedy for human ignorance: because "by the Law is the +knowledge of sin" (Rom. 3:20). But, after man had been instructed by +the Law, his pride was convinced of his weakness, through his being +unable to fulfil what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (Rom. +8:3, 4), "what the Law could not do in that it was weak through the +flesh, God sent [Vulg.: 'sending'] His own Son . . . that the +justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." + +With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which +was most needed by the people, at the time when the natural law began +to be obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was +fitting that this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly +manner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection; +wherefore it was becoming that the Old Law should be given between +the law of nature and the law of grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once +after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident in +his own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law; +because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by +habitual sinning. + +Reply Obj. 2: A law should not be given save to the people, since it +is a general precept, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 2, 3); wherefore at +the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as it were, +household precepts: but when Abraham's descendants had multiplied, so +as to form a people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it +was fitting that they should be given a law; for "slaves are not that +part of the people or state to which it is fitting for the law to be +directed," as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2, 4, 5). + +Reply Obj. 3: Since the Law had to be given to the people, not only +those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole +people, who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the +sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed, +according to Rom. 4:11: hence even before David, the Law had to be +given to that people as soon as they were collected together. +________________________ + +QUESTION 99 + +OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they +are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. Under +the first head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one? + +(2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts? + +(3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral +precepts? + +(4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts? + +(5) Whether it contains any others besides these? + +(6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 1] + +Whether the Old Law Contains Only One Precept? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. +Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above (Q. 90, +AA. 2, 3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but +one precept. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:9): "If there be any other +commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy +neighbor as thyself." But this is only one commandment. Therefore the +Old Law contained but one commandment. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:12): "All things . . . +whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. +For this is the Law and the prophets." But the whole of the Old Law +is comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the +Old Law contains but one commandment. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 2:15): "Making void the Law +of commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the +Old Law, as the gloss comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law +comprises many commandments. + +_I answer that,_ Since a precept of law is binding, it is about +something which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises +from the necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept +implies, in its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing +is commanded as being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many +things may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end; and, +accordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being +ordained to one end. Consequently we must say that all the precepts +of the Old Law are one in respect of their relation to one end: and +yet they are many in respect of the diversity of those things that +are ordained to that end. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one +end: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity of +the things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art of building +is one according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the +building of a house: and yet it contains various rules, according to +the variety of acts ordained thereto. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the +commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing +friendship, either between man and man, or between man and God. +Wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou +shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," as expressing the end of all +commandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, +when we love our neighbor for God's sake. Hence the Apostle put this +commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and +of one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): "On +these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets." + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Ethic._ ix, 8, "friendship towards +another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man +looks on another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things +whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them," +this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained +implicitly in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself": +so that it is an explanation of this commandment. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 2] + +Whether the Old Law Contains Moral Precepts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral +precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as +stated above (Q. 91, AA. 4, 5; Q. 98, A. 5). But the moral precepts +belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old +Law. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance +where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things that +are of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason seems to +suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not +belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that killeth" +(2 Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, +according to Ps. 118:93: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for +by them Thou hast given me life." Therefore the moral precepts do not +belong to the Old Law. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover, He gave +them discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an +inheritance." Now discipline belongs to morals; for this gloss on +Heb. 12:11: "Now all chastisement (_disciplina_)," etc., says: +"Discipline is an exercise in morals by means of difficulties." +Therefore the Law which was given by God comprised moral precepts. + +_I answer that,_ The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is +evident from Ex. 20:13, 15: "Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not +steal." This was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention +of human law is to create friendship between man and man; so the +chief intention of the Divine law is to establish man in friendship +with God. Now since likeness is the reason of love, according to +Ecclus. 13:19: "Every beast loveth its like"; there cannot possibly +be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless man +become good: wherefore it is written (Lev. 19:2; 11:45): "You shall +be holy, for I am holy." But the goodness of man is virtue, which +"makes its possessor good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore it was necessary +for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue: and these +are the moral precepts of the Law. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as +being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto. +For just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law +presuppose the natural law. + +Reply Obj. 2: It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's +assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, +but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be +impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as to +the universal principles of the natural law; but through being +habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of things to be +done in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which +are like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the +natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the extend of +judging to be lawful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there +was need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue man from both +these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those +things set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of +the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, such as +the Unity of the Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to +which reason is liable. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv), even +the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the +moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good, +without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 3] + +Whether the Old Law Comprises Ceremonial, Besides Moral, Precepts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise +ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to +man is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions +are called moral, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3). Therefore it seems +that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral +precepts. + +Obj. 2: Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to +refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of a +virtue, viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers +worship and ceremony to the Godhead." Since, then, the moral precepts +are about acts of virtue, as stated above (A. 2), it seems that the +ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral. + +Obj. 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which +signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. +Christ. ii, 3, 4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first +place." Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial +precepts about certain figurative actions. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:13, 14): "Ten words . . . +He wrote in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time +that I should teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall +do." But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts. +Therefore besides the moral precepts there are others which are +ceremonial. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the Divine law is instituted +chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted +chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another. Hence +human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of +anything relating to Divine worship except as affecting the common +good of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many +institutions relating to Divine matters, according as it seemed +expedient for the formation of human morals; as may be seen in the +rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand the Divine law directed men +to one another according to the demands of that order whereby man is +directed to God, which order was the chief aim of that law. Now man +is directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which +are faith, hope, and love, but also by certain external works, +whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God: and it is +these works that are said to belong to the Divine worship. This +worship is called "ceremony,"--the _munia,_ i.e. gifts, of Ceres (who +was the goddess of fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings +were made to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus +states [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word "ceremony" was +introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being +derived from a town near Rome called "Caere": since, when Rome was +taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were taken +thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those precepts of +the Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially called +ceremonial. + +Reply Obj. 1: Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and +therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these +matters also. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 91, A. 3), the precepts of the +natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are +determined both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these +very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not +of natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the +precepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct +from the moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Wherefore to +worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral +precept; but the determination of this precept, namely that He is to +be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and such and such +offerings, belongs to the ceremonial precepts. Consequently the +ceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God +cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes. +Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only +expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the +things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes +expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions; but +also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains to +the ceremonial precepts. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 4] + +Whether, Besides the Moral and Ceremonial Precepts, There Are Also +Judicial Precepts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in +addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For +Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are +"precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding +the life that is foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have +to lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that is +foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of +precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law. + +Obj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, "I have not declined from +Thy judgments," says, i.e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for +me." But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the +judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral +precepts. + +Obj. 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to +Ps. 93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment." But acts of +justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral +precepts. Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, +and consequently should not be held as distinct from them. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:1): "These are the precepts +and ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral +precepts" antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts +besides moral and ceremonial precepts. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3), it belongs to the Divine +law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these +belongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which +dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has +to be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known +principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical +matters. Accordingly just as the determination of the universal +principle about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial +precepts, so the determination of the general precepts of that +justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial +precepts. + +We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; +viz. _moral_ precepts, which are dictated by the natural law; +_ceremonial_ precepts, which are determinations of the Divine +worship; and _judicial_ precepts, which are determinations of the +justice to be maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. 7:12) +after saying that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is +just, and holy, and good": "just," in respect of the judicial +precepts; "holy," with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the +word "sanctus"--"holy"--is applied to that which is consecrated to +God); and "good," i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts. + +Reply Obj. 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the +ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised +under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the +precepts of the life we have to lead. + +Reply Obj. 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an +application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. +Hence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral +precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in +common with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations +of general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments" comprise +both judicial and moral precepts, as in Deut. 5:1: "Hear, O Israel, +the ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial +precepts, as in Lev. 18:4: "You shall do My judgments, and shall +observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while +"judgments" refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts. + +Reply Obj. 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral +precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs +to the judicial precepts. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 5] + +Whether the Old Law Contains Any Others Besides the Moral, Judicial, +and Ceremonial Precepts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides +the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial +precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; +while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby +God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, +viz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated +above (Q. 60, A. 5). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the +Old Law should comprise others. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Deut. 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God, +and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and +commandments." Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above +(A. 4). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial +precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments." +[*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this +article are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in +the ordinary acceptance of the word.] + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Deut. 6:17): "Keep the precepts of +the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have +[Vulg.: 'He hath'] commanded thee." Therefore in addition to the +above, the Law comprises "testimonies." + +Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): "Thy justifications +(i.e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget." +Therefore in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and +judicial precepts, but also others, called "justifications." + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:1): "These are the precepts +and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . +you." And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. +Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them. + +_I answer that,_ Some things are included in the Law by way of +precept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the +precepts. Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and +to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the +authority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the +fulfilment, which benefit consists in the attainment of some good, +useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary +evil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law certain things +should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: +e.g. Deut. 6:4: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and +Gen. 1:1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": and these +are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the Law +certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, +and punishments for those who transgress; as it may be seen in Deut. +28: "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will +make thee higher than all the nations," etc.: and these are called +"justifications," according as God punishes or rewards certain ones +justly. + +The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except +in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is +twofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to +the rule of a law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher +distinguishes a twofold just--moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7). + +Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be +done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of +virtue would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better +maintaining of the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the +moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or +prohibition, as "Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not steal": and +these are properly called "precepts." Other things are prescribed or +forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as something better to be +done. These may be called "commandments"; because they are expressed +by way of inducement and persuasion: an example whereof is seen in +Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou +shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like cases. +Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that +"justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty as +fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human +affairs; to the ceremonial precepts, as regards Divine matters. + +Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and +rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the +Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled +"justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore +the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that +those things be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and +those things "commandments" which He enjoined (_mandavit_) through +others, as the very word seems to denote. + +From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either +moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not +the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the +precepts, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion +of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far +as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as +Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be +anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts. + +The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 6] + +Whether the Old Law Should Have Induced Men to the Observance of Its +Precepts, by Means of Temporal Promises and Threats? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced +men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises +and threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to +God by fear and love: hence it is written (Deut. 10:12): "And now, +Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou +fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him?" But the +desire for temporal goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says +(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity." +Therefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the +intention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as +the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii, 6). + +Obj. 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law. +Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher +the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law +employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, +the Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means. + +Obj. 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of +guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. +But as stated in Eccles. 9:2, "all" temporal "things equally happen +to the just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean +and to the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that +despiseth sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods or evils are not +suitably set forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of +the Divine law. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 1:19, 20): "If you be willing, +and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. +But if you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall +devour you." + +_I answer that,_ As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to +assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too +in every law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of +punishments and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in +speculative sciences, the means of persuasion are adapted to the +conditions of the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in +sciences should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is +based on principles more generally known. And thus also he who would +persuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs to move him +at first by things for which he has an affection; just as children +are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now +it has been said above (Q. 98, AA. 1, 2, 3) that the Old Law disposed +men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison +disposes to the perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet +imperfect in comparison to the perfection which was to result from +Christ's coming: and for this reason, that people is compared to a +child that is still under a pedagogue (Gal. 3:24). But the perfection +of man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to +things spiritual, as is clear from the words of the Apostle (Phil. +3:13, 15): "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch [Vulg.: +'and stretching'] forth myself to those that are before . . . Let us +therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded." Those who are yet +imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God: +whereas the perverse place their end in temporalities. It was +therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by means +of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection. + +Reply Obj. 1: Covetousness whereby man places his end in +temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal +goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the +imperfect to the love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: "He will praise +Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him." + +Reply Obj. 2: Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or +punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades +men by means of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In +this respect it employs higher means. + +Reply Obj. 3: As any one can see, who reads carefully the story of +the Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the +Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the +precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But +certain individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law, +met with misfortunes--either because they had already become +spiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from +attachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be +tried)--or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, +their heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed +from God, according to Isa. 29:13 (Matt. 15:8): "This people honoreth +Me with their lips; but their hearts is far from Me." +________________________ + +QUESTION 100 + +OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW +(In Twelve Articles) + +We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the +moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial +precepts. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law +of nature? + +(2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of +all the virtues? + +(3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to +the ten precepts of the decalogue? + +(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one +another? + +(5) Their number; + +(6) Their order; + +(7) The manner in which they were given; + +(8) Whether they are dispensable? + +(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept +of the Law? + +(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept? + +(11) The distinction of other moral precepts; + +(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 1] + +Whether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Belong to the Law of +Nature? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to +the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): "Moreover He +gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But +instruction is in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the +law of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. +Therefore not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But +human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that +belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the +natural law is the same in all men, while these moral institutions +are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there +why the Divine law should add to the law of nature, ordinances +pertaining to good morals. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in +certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that +faith "worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of +nature; since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not +all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles, +who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": +which must be understood of things pertaining to good morals. +Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of +nature. + +_I answer that,_ The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and +judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature +to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to +reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are +called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which +are discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative +reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so +every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known +naturally, as stated above (Q. 94, AA. 2, 4): from which principles +one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some +matters connected with human actions are so evident, that after very +little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of +them by means of these general first principles: while some matters +cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of the +various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, +but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible for all to +consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those +who are versed in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of +which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; +such as the articles of faith. + +It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about +matters which concern good morals; and since good morals are those +which are in accord with reason; and since also every judgment of +human reason must needs by derived in some way from natural reason; +it follows, of necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the +law of nature; but not all in the same way. For there are certain +things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and +at once, judges to be done or not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father +and thy mother," and "Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not steal": +and these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are +certain things which, after a more careful consideration, wise men +deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they +need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: e.g. "Rise +up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man," and +the like. And there are some things, to judge of which, human reason +needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of +God: e.g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the +likeness of anything"; "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy +God in vain." + +This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 2] + +Whether the Moral Precepts of the Law Are About All the Acts of +Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not +about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the +Old Law is called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: "I will keep +Thy justifications." But justification is the execution of justice. +Therefore the moral precepts are only about acts of justice. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the character +of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone and to +none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in +rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts of the moral +law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the +acts of justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore +says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards the +common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the +moral precepts are only about the acts of justice. + +_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a +transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the +commandments of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts +of virtue. Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts +of virtue. + +_I answer that,_ Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the +common good, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2), the precepts of the Law +must needs be diversified according to the various kinds of +community: hence the Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws +which are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be different +from the laws of a state which is ruled by the people, or by a few +powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained for one kind of +community, and the Divine law for another kind. Because human law is +ordained for the civil community, implying mutual duties of man and +his fellows: and men are ordained to one another by outward acts, +whereby men live in communion with one another. This life in common +of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists +in directing the human community. Wherefore human law makes precepts +only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, +this is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the +Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1). + +But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of +men in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come. +And therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those +matters whereby men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now +man is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. +Wherefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters +whereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the +acts of all the virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good +order the acts of the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues +set in good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior +passions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that the +Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the +virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which the order of +virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under +an obligation of precept; while other matters, which pertain to the +well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel. + +Reply Obj. 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of +those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the +character of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should +obey God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to +man should be subject to reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man +to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower +powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the +Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice. + +The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said +about the different kinds of community. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 3] + +Whether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Are Reducible to the +Ten Precepts of the Decalogue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old +Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first +and principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy +God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated in Matt. 22:37, +39. But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. +Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of +the decalogue. + +Obj. 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the +ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of +the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy +the Sabbath-day." Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to +all the precepts of the decalogue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue. +But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard acts +of justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the +precepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts. + +_On the contrary,_ The gloss on Matt. 5:11: "Blessed are ye when they +shall revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten +precepts, set them out in detail." Therefore all the precepts of the +Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue. + +_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other +precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have +given the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other +precepts to the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue +includes those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately +from God. Such are those which with but slight reflection can be +gathered at once from the first general principles: and those also +which become known to man immediately through divinely infused faith. +Consequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the +precepts of the decalogue: viz. first general principles, for they +need no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the +natural reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that +one should do evil to no man, and other similar principles: and again +those which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord +with reason; since the people receive these principles from God, +through being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts +are contained in the precepts of the decalogue; yet in different +ways. For the first general principles are contained in them, as +principles in their proximate conclusions; while those which are +known through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in +their principles. + +Reply Obj. 1: Those two principles are the first general principles +of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either +through nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the +decalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general principles. + +Reply Obj. 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one +respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things +of God, according to Ps. 45:11: "Be still and see that I am God." In +this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but +not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial +precept. + +Reply Obj. 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other +virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the +other virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts +about acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come +under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements +of the Law. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 4] + +Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Distinguished from +One Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are +unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue +distinct from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But +that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt not +have strange gods before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is +added, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," etc. belongs to +worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts +(Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two. + +Obj. 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct +from the negative precepts; e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," +and, "Thou shalt not kill." But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is +affirmative: and that which follows, "Thou shalt not have strange +gods before Me," is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and +do not, as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:7): "I had not known +concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Hence +it seems that this precept, "Thou shalt not covet," is one precept; +and, therefore, should not be divided into two. + +_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Augustine who, in +commenting on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three +precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. + +_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are differently +divided by different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Lev. +26:26, "Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the +precept of the Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, +because its observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. +But he distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first +being, "I am the Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt not have +strange gods before Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two +precepts, in his commentary on Osee 10:10, "On thy" [Vulg.: "their"] +"two iniquities"); the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt +not make to thyself any graven thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt +not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." He states that there +are six precepts pertaining to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy +father and thy mother"; the second, "Thou shalt not kill"; the third, +"Thou shalt not commit adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; +the fifth, "Thou shalt not bear false witness"; the sixth, "Thou +shalt not covet." + +But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the +Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue, +if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it +is written (Matt. 6:24), "No man can serve two masters," the two +statements, "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have +strange gods before Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one +precept. Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod.) who also distinguishes +four precepts as referring to God, unites these two under one +precept; and reckons in the second place, "Thou shalt not make . . . +any graven thing"; as third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the +Lord thy God in vain"; and as fourth, "Remember that thou keep holy +the Sabbath-day." The other six he reckons in the same way as +Hesychius. + +Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of +anything is not forbidden except as to the point of their being +worshipped as gods--for God commanded an image of the Seraphim +[Vulg.: Cherubim] to be made and placed in the tabernacle, as related +in Ex. 25:18--Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt +not have strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . . any +graven thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's wife, +for the purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of +the flesh; whereas, to covet other things, which are desired for the +purpose of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; +wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct precepts, that which forbids +the coveting of another's goods, and that which prohibits the +coveting of another's wife. Thus he distinguishes three precepts as +referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is +better. + +Reply Obj. 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith: wherefore the +precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those +about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship +rather than about faith, because the precept about faith is +presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept +of charity. For just as the first general principles of the natural +law are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no +promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident +principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that cometh to +God, must believe that He is" (Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other +promulgation that the infusion of faith. + +Reply Obj. 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the +negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man +should honor his parents does not include that he should not kill +another man; nor does the latter include the former. But when an +affirmative precept is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do +not find that two distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one +precept saying that "Thou shalt not steal," and another binding one +to keep another's property intact, or to give it back to its owner. +In the same way there are not different precepts about believing in +God, and about not believing in strange gods. + +Reply Obj. 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and therefore +the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it +were one. But because there are various special kinds of +covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different +prohibitions against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically +in respect of the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the +Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 5). +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 5] + +Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Set Forth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are +unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso +viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to +the commandments of heaven." But sins are distinguished according as +man sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the +decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his +relations to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to +God and himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are +insufficiently enumerated. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the +worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, and +the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept +about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others +also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial +rite. + +Obj. 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so +also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the +teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou +shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Therefore there +should be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and +false doctrine. + +Obj. 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents, +so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of charity +extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are +ordained unto charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: "The end of the +commandment is charity." Therefore as there is a precept referring to +parents, so should there have been some precepts referring to +children and other neighbors. + +Obj. 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in +thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and +adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou +shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct from +the prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt +not covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou shalt not covet thy +neighbor's wife." Therefore the same should have been done in regard +to the sins of homicide and false witness. + +Obj. 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the +concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the +irascible part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, +when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet." Therefore the decalogue +should have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the +irascible faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the +decalogue are unfittingly enumerated. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:13): "He shewed you His +covenant, which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He +wrote in two tablets of stone." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), just as the precepts of +human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the +precepts of the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community +or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell +aright in a community, two things are required: the first is that he +behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he behave +well to those who are his fellows and partners in the community. It +is therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the +first place precepts ordering man in his relations to God; and in the +second place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other +men who are his neighbors and live with him under God. + +Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, +fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his +master consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and +this is the sense of the first commandment, in the words "Thou shalt +not have strange gods." Reverence to his master requires that he +should do nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the +second commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God +in vain." Service is due to the master in return for the benefits +which his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third +commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the +creation of all things. + +To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in +general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying +his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about +honoring one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to +none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is +done to one's neighbor--sometimes in his person, i.e. as to his +personal existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt +not kill": sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation +of offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt not +commit adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to +both the aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said, "Thou +shalt not steal." Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, +"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor": harm done +by thought is forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet." + +The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may +also be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to +deeds; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven +thing": the second, to words; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not +take the name of the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; +because the sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral +precept, requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to +Augustine (In Ps. 32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence +the unity of the First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by +the third, His goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we +rest as in our last end. + +Reply Obj. 1: This objection may be answered in two ways. First, +because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts +of charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept about +loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural law +had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of +loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its +vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of +God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing +oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those +precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God. + +Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are +those which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is +written (Deut. 10:4): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had +written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Hence +the precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can +understand at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it +is easy for a man, especially for a believer, to understand that, of +necessity, he owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But +that, in matters which regard himself and not another, man has, of +necessity, certain duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the +first glance, it seems that everyone is free in matters that concern +himself. And therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man +with regard to himself, reach the people through the instruction of +men who are versed in such matters; and, consequently, they are not +contained in the decalogue. + +Reply Obj. 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in +celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of past favors, or +in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were +offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine favors to be +commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to +mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the reason for +this precept is given in Ex. 20:11: "In six days the Lord made heaven +and earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was +the repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, +or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed +in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written (Isa. 58:13): +"If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will +in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the holy of the +Lord glorious." Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in +mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities were +celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and +transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory of the +past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future +Passion of Christ, which though temporal and transitory, brought us +to the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath +alone, and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned +in the precepts of the decalogue. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), "men swear by one +greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of +all their controversy." Hence, since oaths are common to all, +inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a +precept of the decalogue. According to one interpretation, however, +the words, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in +vain," are a prohibition of false doctrine, for one gloss expounds +them thus: "Thou shalt not say that Christ is a creature." + +Reply Obj. 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate +dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts that forbid +the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate +dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in return +for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son's +debt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it by +denying it: since the father is the principle of generation and +being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue +does not prescribe deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone +except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be +indebted to their children for any favors received, but rather the +reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and +"parents love their children as being a part of themselves," as the +Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue +contains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for +the same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children. + +Reply Obj. 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, +in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, +are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they +needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. +But murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion +(since it is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and +are desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently with +regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to +proscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins of deed. + +Reply Obj. 6: As stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), all the passions of the +irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part. +Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it were, the first +elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible +passions, but only of the concupiscible passions. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 6] + +Whether the Ten Precepts of the Decalogue Are Set in Proper Order? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are +not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly +previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us +than God is; according to 1 John 4:20: "He that loveth not his +brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" But +the first three precepts belong to the love of God, while the other +seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of +the decalogue are not set in proper order. + +Obj. 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative +precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts. +But according to Boethius in his commentary on the _Categories_ +[*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before virtues +are sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the +negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative. + +Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions. But +actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore +the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are +unsuitably placed last in order. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): "The things that are +of God, are well ordered" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of +God']. But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by +God, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore they are arranged in becoming +order. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 3, 5, ad 1), the precepts of +the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. +Now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by +the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. +Moreover, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, +that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is +supremely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and society +is God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the +decalogue, first of all, to direct man to God; since the contrary to +this is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to +the commander as to its end, it is requisite first that the soldier +should be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is most +grievous; and secondly it is requisite that he should be in +coordination with the other soldiers. + +Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is +that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in +common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him +reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an +army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make +a compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his commander: and +this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point +of service to him. + +As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his +neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a +more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those +persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those +precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first +place is given to that one which regards his parents. Among the other +precepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of +sin. For it is more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by +deed than by word; and by word than by thought. And among sins of +deed, murder which destroys life in one already living is more +grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child; +and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods. + +Reply Obj. 1: Although our neighbor is better known than God by the +way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for the +love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on (II-II, Q. 25, A. +1; Q. 26, A. 2). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded +precedence of the others. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as God is the universal principle of being in +respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect +of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly +placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds in +respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of +deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. For although in +the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are +sown, according to Ps. 33:15: "Turn away from evil, and do good," and +Isa. 1:16, 17: "Cease to do perversely; learn to do well"; yet, in +the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because "the crooked +line is known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by the law is the +knowledge of sin" (Rom. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmative precept +demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the +order, but that which is given above. Because in the precepts +regarding God, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative +precept is placed last, since its transgression implies a less +grievous sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order of +execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of +reason. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 7] + +Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Formulated? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are +unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to +acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of +vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one +another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a +precept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a +negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative +precepts should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in +others. + +Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based +on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Divine +law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each +precept, and not only in the first and third. + +Obj. 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be +rewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the +precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each +precept, and not only in the second and fourth. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so far +as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat of +punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old +Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in +each, and not only in the first and second. + +Obj. 5: Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in +the memory: for it is written (Prov. 3:3): "Write them in the tables +of thy heart." Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the +memory should be made in the third commandment only. Consequently it +seems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 11:21) that "God made all +things, in measure, number and weight." Much more therefore did He +observe a suitable manner in formulating His Law. + +_I answer that,_ The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of +the Divine law: wherefore it is written (Deut. 4:6): "This is your +wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Now it belongs to +wisdom to arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it +must be evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth. + +Reply Obj. 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of +its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead to +the affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is +white, it is not black: but it does not follow that if it is not +black, it is white: because negation extends further than +affirmation. And hence too, that one ought not to do harm to another, +which pertains to the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as +a primary dictate of reason, than that one ought to do someone a +service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a primary dictate of reason +that man is a debtor in the point of rendering a service or kindness +to those from whom he has received kindness, if he has not yet repaid +the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently +repay, viz. God and man's father, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 14. +Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one +about the honor due to parents, the other about the celebration of +the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor. + +Reply Obj. 2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest; +hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the precepts +include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general moral +precept; thus the first precept includes the determination, "Thou +shalt not make a graven thing"; and in the third precept the +Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state the reason +in each case. + +Reply Obj. 3: Generally speaking, men direct their actions to some +point of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed +that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be +hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. And since +parents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is +expected from them: wherefore a promise of reward is added to the +precept about honoring one's parents. The same applies to the precept +forbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that men were hindered +from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they can get by +entering into a compact with the demons. + +Reply Obj. 4: Punishments are necessary against those who are prone +to evil, as stated in _Ethic._ x, 9. Wherefore a threat of punishment +is only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to +which men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the +general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury on +account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that a threat is +affixed to the first two precepts. + +Reply Obj. 5: The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of +a past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is made +therein. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a +determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural law, +wherefore this precept needed a special admonition. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 8] + +Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Dispensable? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are +dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural +law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like +human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure +of law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for +dispensation, as stated above (Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4). Therefore a +dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the decalogue. + +Obj. 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God +does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law +made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are +ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our +superiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2 +Cor. 2:10): "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, +for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ." Therefore +superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue. + +Obj. 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one +forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men +in this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of +human law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. +Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. + +Obj. 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a +precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this +precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4): "And they determined in +that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the +Sabbath-day, we will fight against him." Therefore the precepts of +the decalogue are dispensable. + +_On the contrary,_ are the words of Isa. 24:5, where some are +reproved for that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken +the everlasting covenant"; which, seemingly, apply principally to the +precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue +cannot be changed by dispensation. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), precepts +admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, +if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver +is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first +and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and +virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If +therefore there be any precepts which contain the very preservation +of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such +precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are +indispensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, +such as this--that no man should work for the destruction of the +commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man +should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of +dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the +above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these +latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the +omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial +to the former precepts which contain the intention of the lawgiver. +For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were +enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch +as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on +account of some greater utility. + +Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the +lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which +direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final +good, which is God; while the precepts of the second table contain +the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be +done to anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this +sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently +the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law +which contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing +principle that "justice should be preserved." But he is speaking in +reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to +apply in certain cases. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), "God continueth +faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself if He +were to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is +justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be +lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to +His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one +another. + +Reply Obj. 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in +so far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this +sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law +cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not +undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence +this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a +killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine +observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's property is +taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, this is not +theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue. + +Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away +the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to +them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay +his son, he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be +slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it +is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and +ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be +the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no +murderer any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking unto +himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not +guilty either of adultery or of fornication: because he took unto +himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the +institution of marriage. + +Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the +essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to +any determination by application to individual actions--for instance, +that this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not--in this point +they admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in +such matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage +and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such +matters as are subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men +stand in the place of God: and yet not in all respects. + +Reply Obj. 4: This determination was an interpretation rather than a +dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does +something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Matt. +12:3, seqq.). +________________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 9] + +Whether the Mode of Virtue Falls Under the Precept of the Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the +precept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice +should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done +bravely, and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it is +commanded (Deut. 26:20) that "thou shalt follow justly after that +which is just." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept. + +Obj. 2: Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver +comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver is +directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in _Ethic._ ii: and +it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the mode of +virtue falls under the precept. + +Obj. 3: Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in +working willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept +of the Divine law, for it is written (Ps. 99:2): "Serve ye the Lord +with gladness"; and (2 Cor. 9:7): "Not with sadness or necessity: for +God loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye +do, do gladly; and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it +sorrowfully, it is done in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of +virtue falls under the precept of the law. + +_On the contrary,_ No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he +has the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; +v, 8). Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be +punished. Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of +virtue, would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is +contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at leading man to +virtue, by habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of +virtue does not fall under the precept. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 3, ad 2), a precept of +law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the +law is brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. +Now the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in _Ethic._ +x, 9, because that properly falls under the precept of the law, for +which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human +law are differently situated as to the appointment of penalties; +since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which +come under the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in +accordance with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, +is competent to judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those +things that appear," according to 1 Kings 16:7: while God alone, the +framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward +movements of wills, according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of hearts +and reins is God." + +Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in +some sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect +it is regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in +another way, it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine +law. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as the +Philosopher states in _Ethic._ ii. The first is that man should act +"knowingly": and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine and +human law; because what a man does in ignorance, he does +accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain +things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable or +pardonable. + +The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from +choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a +twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, +about which we have spoken above (QQ. 8, 12): and concerning these +two, Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For +human law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not: +whereas the Divine law does, according to Matt. 5:22: "Whosoever is +angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment." + +The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable +principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies +that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the +mode of virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of +human law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking +the law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit +of filial piety. + +Reply Obj. 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under +the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not +that they be done from the habit of justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in +the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the +law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear +on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something leading or +disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the +precept and the matter of the precept are not the same: just as +neither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces to +the end. + +Reply Obj. 3: That works of virtue should be done without sadness, +falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with +sadness works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully +or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in so far +as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor (which +love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: and in +another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as +pleasure ensues from a habit; for "pleasure taken in a work proves +the existence of a habit," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3. For an act +may give pleasure either on account of its end, or through its +proceeding from a becoming habit. +________________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 10] + +Whether the Mode of Charity Falls Under the Precept of the Divine Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the +precept of the Divine law. For it is written (Matt. 19:17): "If thou +wilt enter into life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to +follow that the observance of the commandments suffices for entrance +into life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, +except they be done from charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): +"If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I +should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it +profiteth me nothing." Therefore the mode of charity is included in +the commandment. + +Obj. 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in +doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the +Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): "Do all to the glory of God." Therefore +the mode of charity falls under the precept. + +Obj. 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the +precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law +without having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be +done without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore one +can fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the +error of Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). +Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment. + +_On the contrary,_ Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If +therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows +that whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But +whoever has not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore +it follows that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he +does, however good this may be in itself: which is absurd. + +_I answer that,_ Opinions have been contrary on this question. For +some have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the +precept; and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to +fulfil this precept: because he can dispose himself to receive +charity from God. Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having +charity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its kind: +because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from +charity, and is binding not for all time, but only for such time as +one is in a state of charity. On the other hand, some have said that +the mode of charity is altogether outside the precept. + +Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act +of charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself: +and thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially +prescribes it, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou +shalt love thy neighbor." In this sense, the first opinion is true. +Because it is not impossible to observe this precept which regards +the act of charity; since man can dispose himself to possess charity, +and when he possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity +can be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, +i.e. inasmuch as the acts of the other virtues are ordained to +charity, which is "the end of the commandment," as stated in 1 Tim. +i, 5: for it has been said above (Q. 12, A. 4) that the intention of +the end is a formal mode of the act ordained to that end. In this +sense the second opinion is true in saying that the mode of charity +does not fall under the precept, that is to say that this +commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean that a man must honor +his father from charity, but merely that he must honor him. Wherefore +he that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not break this +precept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of +charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into life, +keep one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among which +is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our +neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction that God +should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all things +would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept +of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore he that +honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from charity, +not in virtue of the precept, "Honor thy father and mother," but in +virtue of the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy +whole heart." And since these are two affirmative precepts, not +binding for all times, they can be binding, each one at a different +time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of +honoring his father and mother, without at the same time breaking the +precept concerning the omission of the mode of charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law, unless +he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without +charity. Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for +man to fulfil the law without grace. +________________________ + +ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 11] + +Whether It Is Right to Distinguish Other Moral Precepts of the Law +Besides the Decalogue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other +moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord +declared (Matt. 22:40), "on these two commandments" of charity +"dependeth the whole law and the prophets." But these two +commandments are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue. +Therefore there is no need for other moral precepts. + +Obj. 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial +and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q. 99, AA. 3, 4). But the +determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial +and ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained +in the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated +above (A. 3). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral +precepts besides the decalogue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the +virtues, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore, as the Law contains, +besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion, +liberality, mercy, and chastity; so there should have been added some +precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, +sobriety, and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore +unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides +those of the decalogue. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:8): "The law of the Lord is +unspotted, converting souls." But man is preserved from the stain of +sin, and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides +those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include +other moral precepts. + +_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been stated (Q. 99, AA. +3, 4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from +their institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed +of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But +the moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of +natural reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of +these there are three grades: for some are most certain, and so +evident as to need no promulgation; such as the commandments of the +love of God and our neighbor, and others like these, as stated above +(A. 3), which are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; +wherefore no man can have an erroneous judgment about them. Some +precepts are more detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated +man can easily grasp; and yet they need to be promulgated, because +human judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led astray +concerning them: these are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, +there are some precepts the reason of which is not so evident to +everyone, but only the wise; these are moral precepts added to the +decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron. + +But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we +know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to +the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so +many corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids +the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts +forbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written +(Deut. 18:10, 11): "Neither let there be found among you anyone that +shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the +fire: . . . neither let there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone +that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh +the truth from the dead." The second commandment forbids perjury. To +this is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the +prohibition of false doctrine (Deut. 13). To the third commandment +are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment +prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about +honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: "Rise up before the hoary +head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and likewise all the +precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our +betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth +commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred +and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according to +Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor": +likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother (Lev. 19:17): +"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." To the sixth +commandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about +whoredom, according to Deut. 23:17: "There shall be no whore among +the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; +and the prohibition against unnatural sins, according to Lev. 28:22, +23: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate +with any beast." To the seventh commandment which prohibits theft, is +added the precept forbidding usury, according to Deut. 23:19: "Thou +shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury"; and the prohibition +against fraud, according to Deut. 25:13: "Thou shalt not have divers +weights in thy bag"; and universally all prohibitions relating to +peculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false +testimony, is added the prohibition against false judgment, according +to Ex. 23:2: "Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of +the most part, to stray from the truth"; and the prohibition against +lying (Ex. 23:7): "Thou shalt fly lying," and the prohibition against +detraction, according to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not be a detractor, +nor a whisperer among the people." To the other two commandments no +further precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all kinds +of evil desires. + +Reply Obj. 1: The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love +of God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards +them; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto +less evidently. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is in virtue of their institution that the +ceremonial and judicial precepts are determinations of the precepts +of the decalogue, not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case +of the superadded moral precepts. + +Reply Obj. 3: The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good, +as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). And since those virtues which direct +our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as +also does the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative act +conduces to the common good of the species; hence precepts bearing +directly on these virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in +addition thereto. As to the act of fortitude there are the order to +be given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the +common good: as is clear from Deut. 20:3, where the priest is +commanded (to speak thus): "Be not afraid, do not give back." In like +manner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to paternal +admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the household; hence +it is said (Deut. 21:20) in the person of parents: "He slighteth +hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling, and to +debauchery and banquetings." +________________________ + +TWELFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 12] + +Whether the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Justified Man? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law +justified man. Because the Apostle says (Rom. 2:13): "For not the +hearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law +shall be justified." But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil +the precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of +the Law was a cause of justification. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): "Keep My laws and My +judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." But the +spiritual life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of +the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human law. +But human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice +consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts +of the Law justified man. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): "The letter +killeth": which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), +refers even to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did +not cause justice. + +_I answer that,_ Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that +which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign +or a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly +the causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, as it were, +it may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice +be taken in the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by +the precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed men to +the justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified, because as +Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 24), "even the life of that +people foretold and foreshadowed Christ." + +But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must +notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as in the act: so +that accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First, +according as man is made just, by becoming possessed of the habit of +justice: secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in +this sense justification is nothing else than the execution of +justice. Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the +acquired or the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated +(Q. 63, A. 4). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the +infused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter +is true justice, of which we are speaking now, and in this respect of +which a man is said to be just before God, according to Rom. 4:2: "If +Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not +before God." Hence this justice could not be caused by moral +precepts, which are about human actions: wherefore the moral precepts +could not justify man by causing justice. + +If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution +of justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified man, but in +various ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole +contained something just in itself, in so far as they aimed at +offering worship to God; whereas taken individually they contained +that which is just, not in itself, but by being a determination of +the Divine law. Hence it is said of these precepts that they did not +justify man save through the devotion and obedience of those who +complied with them. On the other hand the moral and judicial +precepts, either in general or also in particular, contained that +which is just in itself: but the moral precepts contained that which +is just in itself according to that "general justice" which is "every +virtue" according to _Ethic._ v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts +belonged to "special justice," which is about contracts connected +with the human mode of life, between one man and another. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle takes justification for the execution of +justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is said +to live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death, which +the Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle +quotes this passage (Gal. 3:12). + +Reply Obj. 3: The precepts of human law justify man by acquired +justice: it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only +about that justice which is before God. +________________________ + +QUESTION 101 + +OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must +consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, their +duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts; + +(2) Whether they are figurative? + +(3) Whether there should have been many of them? + +(4) Of their various kinds. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 101, Art. 1] + +Whether the Nature of the Ceremonial Precepts Consists in Their +Pertaining to the Worship of God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts +does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because, +in the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence +from food (Lev. 11); and about refraining from certain kinds of +clothes, e.g. (Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is +woven of two sorts"; and again (Num. 15:38): "To make to themselves +fringes in the corners of their garments." But these are not moral +precepts; since they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they +judicial precepts; since they do not pertain to the pronouncing of +judgment between man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. +Yet they seem in no way to pertain to the worship of God. Therefore +the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their +pertaining to Divine worship. + +Obj. 2: Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those +which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from the +_cerei_ (candles) which are lit up on those occasions. But many other +things besides solemnities pertain to the worship of God. Therefore +it does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from +their pertaining to the Divine worship. + +Obj. 3: Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns, +i.e. rules, of salvation: because the Greek _chaire_ is the same as +the Latin "salve." But all the precepts of the Law are rules of +salvation, and not only those that pertain to the worship of God. +Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are +called ceremonial. + +Obj. 4: Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the +ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason. +But there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship +of God; such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the +Passover and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason +for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts +are not those which pertain to the worship of God. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 18:19, 20): "Be thou to the +people in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the +people the ceremonies and the manner of worshipping." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 99, A. 4), the ceremonial +precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is +directed to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of +the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is +directed to God by the worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts +are properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. +The reason for their being so called was given above (Q. 99, A. 3), +when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the +other precepts. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the +like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also those +things whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus +too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes under +the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of +the Law which regard the clothing and food of God's worshippers, and +other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the +ministers, with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship: just +as those who administer to a king make use of certain special +observances. Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial +precepts. + +Reply Obj. 2: The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very +probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of +the lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the +Candlestick were furnished with "oil of olives," as stated in Lev. +24:2. Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the +Divine worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: so +that all ceremonial precepts may be included under the observance of +solemnities. + +Reply Obj. 3: Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be +very much to the point, since the word "ceremony" is not Greek but +Latin. We may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from God, +those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, which direct +man to God: and accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are +called ceremonial precepts. + +Reply Obj. 4: This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a +certain amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial +precisely because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind +of consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine +worship must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on (A. +2), the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very +evident. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 101, Art. 2] + +Whether the Ceremonial Precepts Are Figurative? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not +figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in +such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. +Christ. iv, 4, 10) and this seems very necessary in the framing of a +law: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which +reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore declares (Etym. v, 21). +If therefore the precepts of the Law were given as figures of +something, it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these +precepts without explaining what they signified. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be +entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in +representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the +drama: because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done +to represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such +things should not be done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial +precepts are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above (A. 1). +Therefore they should not be figurative. + +Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that "God is +worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity." But the precepts of +faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial +precepts should not be figurative. + +Obj. 4: Further, Our Lord said (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and +they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But a +figure is not the very truth: in fact one is condivided with the +other. Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine +worship, should not be figurative. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Col. 2:16, 17): "Let no man . . +. judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or +of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to +come." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 99, AA. 3, 4), the +ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now +the Divine worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since man +is composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the +worship of God; the soul by an interior worship; the body by an +outward worship: hence it is written (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my +flesh have rejoiced in the living God." And as the body is ordained +to God through the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the +internal worship. Now interior worship consists in the soul being +united to God by the intellect and affections. Wherefore according to +the various ways in which the intellect and affections of the man who +worships God are rightly united to God, his external actions are +applied in various ways to the Divine worship. + +For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on +the Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship will not +consist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, +proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection, according to Isa. +51:3: "Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the +voice of praise." + +But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine +Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us +under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states +(Coel. Hier. i); in various ways, however, according to the various +states of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the +Divine Truth manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that +manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:8). +Hence the external worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not +only of the future truth to be manifested in our heavenly country, +but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly +manifestation. But under the New Law this way is already revealed: +and therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something +future, but to be brought to our minds as something past or present: +and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone +needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1): +"The Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the good things to come, +not the very image of the things": for a shadow is less than an +image; so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to +the Old. + +Reply Obj. 1: The things of God are not to be revealed to man except +in proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of +downfall, were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more +beneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured +people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at +least implicitly by using those figures to the honor of God. + +Reply Obj. 2: Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical +expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it +fail to grasp Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of +the truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need of +signs by means of sensible figures. + +Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking there of internal worship; to +which, however, external worship should be ordained, as stated above. + +The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were +taught by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual worship of +God. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 101, Art. 3] + +Whether There Should Have Been Many Ceremonial Precepts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been many +ceremonial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should +be proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated +above (AA. 1, 2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the +foreshadowing of Christ. Now "there is but one God, of Whom are all +things . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things" (1 +Cor. 8:6). Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial +precepts. + +Obj. 2: Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an +occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (Acts +15:10): "Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the +disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?" +Now the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's +salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce to man's +salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it seems that the ceremonial +precepts should not have been given in great number. + +Obj. 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and +bodily worship of God, as stated above (A. 2). But the Law should +have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to Christ, +Who taught them to worship God "in spirit and in truth," as stated in +John 4:23. Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial +precepts. + +_On the contrary,_ (Osee 8:12): "I shall write to them [Vulg.: 'him'] +My manifold laws"; and (Job 11:6): "That He might show thee the +secrets of His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 96, A. 1), every law is given to +a people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to +evil, who have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as stated +above (Q. 95, A. 1); some, inclined to good, either from nature or +from custom, or rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and +improved by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with +regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old Law should +contain many ceremonial precepts. For in that people there were many +prone to idolatry; wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means +of ceremonial precepts from the worship of idols to the worship of +God. And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the +other hand to devise many means of repressing every single one: and +again, to lay many obligations on such like men, in order that being +burdened, as it were, by their duties to the Divine worship, they +might have no time for the service of idols. As to those who were +inclined to good, it was again necessary that there should be many +ceremonial precepts; both because thus their mind turned to God in +many ways, and more continually; and because the mystery of Christ, +which was foreshadowed by these ceremonial precepts, brought many +boons to the world, and afforded men many considerations, which +needed to be signified by various ceremonies. + +Reply Obj. 1: When that which conduces to an end is sufficient to +conduce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one +remedy, if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to +health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that +which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be +multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick man, when one is +not enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak +and imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, on +account of its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's minds +to God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18, 19): "There is a setting +aside of the former commandment because of the weakness and +unprofitableness thereof, for the law brought nothing to perfection." +Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number. + +Reply Obj. 2: A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions, +that the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in order to avoid the +sin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the +Jews, were they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, the fact that +they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not +prevent God from giving them many ceremonial precepts. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus +it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person. +Many such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily +worship; as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. iii). +Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God +so much as to allow men to fall away into the worship of idols. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 101, Art. 4] + +Whether the Ceremonies of the Old Law Are Suitably Divided into +Sacrifices, Sacred Things, Sacraments, and Observances? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are +unsuitably divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and +observances." For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. +But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the +sacrifice in which Christ "delivered Himself an oblation and a +sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5:2). Therefore none but the sacrifices were +ceremonies. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the New +Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the Old +Law there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and +"sacraments." + +Obj. 3: Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God: in +which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be +consecrated. But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the +worship of God, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore all ceremonies were +sacred things. Therefore "sacred things" should not be taken as a +part of the ceremonies. + +Obj. 4: Further, "observances" are so called from having to be +observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for it +is written (Deut. 8:11): "Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware +lest at any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His +commandments and judgments and ceremonies." Therefore the +"observances" should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies. + +Obj. 5: Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the +ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come (Col. 2:16, +17): and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears +from the words of the Apostle (Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem +to be inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above +division of ceremonies is unsuitable. + +_On the contrary,_ In the Old Law each of the above is called a +ceremony. For the sacrifices are called ceremonies (Num. 15:24): +"They shall offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations +thereof, as the ceremonies require." Of the sacrament of Order it is +written (Lev. 7:35): "This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in +the ceremonies." Of sacred things also it is written (Ex. 38:21): +"These are the instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . . +in the ceremonies of the Levites." And again of the observances it is +written (3 Kings 9:6): "If you . . . shall turn away from following +Me, and will not observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . . . ceremonies which I +have set before you." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the ceremonial precepts +are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may +consider the worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of +worship. The worship consists specially in _sacrifices,_ which are +offered up in honor of God. The instruments of worship refer to the +_sacred things,_ such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. +With regard to the worshippers two points may be considered. The +first point is their preparation for Divine worship, which is +effected by a sort of consecration either of the people or of the +ministers; and to this the _sacraments_ refer. The second point is +their particular mode of life, whereby they are distinguished from +those who do not worship God: and to this pertain the _observances,_ +for instance, in matters of food, clothing, and so forth. + +Reply Obj. 1: It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both +in some certain place and by some certain men: and all this pertained +to the worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified +Christ the victim, so too their sacraments and sacred things +foreshadowed the sacraments and sacred things of the New Law; while +their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under +the New Law: all of which things pertain to Christ. + +Reply Obj. 2: The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist, +contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He +sanctified "the people by His own blood" (Heb. 13:12). Hence this +Sacrifice is also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did +not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; hence they are not called +sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments +apart from the sacrifices of the Old Law, which sacraments were +figures of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain +consecrations certain sacrifices were united. + +Reply Obj. 3: The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred +things. But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated to +the Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments: +wherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things. + +Reply Obj. 4: Those things which pertained to the mode of life of the +people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of +observances, in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were +not called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection +with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. +But by a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony, in so far +as they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped God. + +Reply Obj. 5: Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, +so were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn +festivals seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations +and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle +says (Heb. 5:1): "Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained +for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts +and sacrifices." +________________________ + +QUESTION 102 + +OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS +(In Six Articles) + +We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under +which head there are six points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts? + +(2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or +figurative? + +(3) The causes of the sacrifices; + +(4) The causes of the sacrifices; + +(5) The causes of the sacred things; + +(6) The causes of the observances. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 1] + +Whether There Was Any Cause for the Ceremonial Precepts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial +precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, "Making void the law of the +commandments," the gloss says, (i.e.) "making void the Old Law as to +the carnal observances, by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical +precepts, which are based on reason." But if the observances of the +Old Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them +by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no +reason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the +law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save +that man's obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. +viii, 6, 13), concerning the prohibition about the tree of life. +Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the +purpose of testing man's obedience, having no reason in themselves. + +Obj. 3: Further, man's works are called moral according as they +proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the +ceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. +It seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial +precepts: for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:9): "The commandment of the +Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." But the ceremonial +precepts are commandments of God. Therefore they are lightsome: and +yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore +the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause. + +_I answer that,_ Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), +it is the function of a "wise man to do everything in order," those +things which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well +ordered, as the Apostle states (Rom. 13:1). Now there are two +conditions required for things to be well ordered. First, that they +be ordained to their due end, which is the principle of the whole +order in matters of action: since those things that happen by chance +outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but +for fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly, that which is done in +view of the end should be proportionate to the end. From this it +follows that the reason for whatever conduces to the end is taken +from the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken +from cutting, which is its end, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 9. Now it is +evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of +the Law, were institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is written +(Deut. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of +nations." Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts +were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can +be gathered. + +Reply Obj. 1: It may be said there was no reason for the observances +of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very +nature of the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be +made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in +relation to something else: namely, in so far as something was +signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the decrees of the +New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are +reasonable from the very nature of the act. + +Reply Obj. 2: The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of +knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil: +and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something +else, in as much as it signified something. And so also the +ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account of +their relation to something else. + +Reply Obj. 3: The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable +causes: as for instance, "Thou shalt not kill," "Thou shalt not +steal." But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their +relation to something else, as stated above. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 2] + +Whether the Ceremonial Precepts Have a Literal Cause or Merely a +Figurative Cause? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a +literal, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial +precepts, the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal +lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because +each was given as a sign. For it is written (Gen. 17:11): "You shall +circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the +covenant between Me and you": and of the celebration of the Passover +it is written (Ex. 13:9): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as +a memorial before thy eyes." Therefore much more did the other +ceremonial precepts have none but a figurative reason. + +Obj. 2: Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the +ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 2). +Therefore they have no other than a figurative cause. + +Obj. 3: Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain +thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or not, it +seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points +in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be a matter of +indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: +for instance, the number of animals to be offered, and other such +particular circumstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the +precepts of the Old Law. + +_On the contrary,_ Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed +Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written (1 +Cor. 10:11) that "all (these things) happened to them in figure." Now +in the stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or +figurative, there is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial +precepts had also literal, besides their figurative causes. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the reason for whatever +conduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the +ceremonial precepts was twofold: for they were ordained to the Divine +worship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of +Christ; just as the words of the prophets regarded the time being in +such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as +Jerome says on Osee 1:3. Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial +precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect +of the Divine worship which was to be observed for that particular +time: and these reasons are literal: whether they refer to the +shunning of idolatry; or recall certain Divine benefits; or remind +men of the Divine excellence; or point out the disposition of mind +which was then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly, their +reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their being +ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are figurative +and mystical: whether they be taken from Christ Himself and the +Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of +the Christian people, which pertains to the moral sense; or to the +state of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by +Christ, which refers to the anagogical sense. + +Reply Obj. 1: Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in +Scripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are +employed in order to convey that particular meaning; so also the +meaning of those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine +benefits, on account of which they were instituted, and of others +similar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order of +literal causes. Consequently when we assert that the cause of the +celebration of the Passover was its signification of the delivery +from Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign of God's covenant with +Abraham, we assign the literal cause. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts +had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the +purpose of worshipping God then and there. + +Reply Obj. 3: As we have stated when speaking of human laws (Q. 96, +AA. 1, 6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but not in +regard to particular conditions, which depend on the judgment of +those who frame them; so also many particular determinations in the +ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but only a +figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 3] + +Whether a Suitable Cause Can Be Assigned for the Ceremonies Which +Pertained to Sacrifices? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for +the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which were +offered in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining +human life: such as certain animals and certain loaves. But God needs +no such sustenance; according to Ps. 49:13: "Shall I eat the flesh of +bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?" Therefore such +sacrifices were unfittingly offered to God. + +Obj. 2: Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in +sacrifice to God, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally the +turtledove and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper, +an offering was made of sparrows. Now many other animals are more +noble than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be offered +to God, it seems that not only of these three should sacrifices have +been offered to Him. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as man has received from God the dominion over +birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes. +Consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the +divine sacrifices. + +Obj. 4: Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to +be offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded to be +offered, so also should the young of the turtledove. + +Obj. 5: Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but also +of animals, as is clear from Gen. 1:20, seqq. Now death is opposed to +life. Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain +animals should be offered to God, especially as the Apostle +admonishes us (Rom. 12:1), to present our bodies "a living sacrifice, +holy, pleasing unto God." + +Obj. 6: Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice +to God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore +it was unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined, +especially as regards birds (Lev. 1:15, seqq.). + +Obj. 7: Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards +corruption and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God, +it was unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, +e.g. a lame, or a blind, or otherwise defective animal. + +Obj. 8: Further, those who offer victims to God should partake +thereof, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:18): "Are +not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" It was +therefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied certain parts of +the victims, namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right +shoulder. + +Objection 9: Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of +God, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no +female animals was offered up to God as a holocaust, although +holocausts were offered of both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it +was inconsistent that female animals should be offered up in +peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds should +not be offered up in peace-offerings. + +Objection 10: Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one +kind. Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so +that it was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on +the following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other +peace-offerings, as laid down in Lev. 7:15, seqq. + +Objection 11: Further, all sins agree in turning us from God. +Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice +should have been offered up for all sins. + +Objection 12: Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice, +were offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem to +be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various +ways; for sometimes an offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes +of flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven, +sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a gridiron. + +Objection 13: Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should +be recognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that +besides animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt +should be offered to God. + +Objection 14: Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice +of the heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward +sacrifice, the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the +pungency which salt represents; for it is written (Ecclus. 24:27): +"My spirit is sweet above honey." Therefore it was unbecoming that +the use of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory, should be +forbidden in a sacrifice; while the use was prescribed, of salt which +is pungent, and of incense which has a bitter taste. Consequently it +seems that things pertaining to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have +no reasonable cause. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 1:13): "The priest shall offer +it all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most +sweet savor to the Lord." Now according to Wis. 7:28, "God loveth +none but him that dwelleth with wisdom": whence it seems to follow +that whatever is acceptable to God is wisely done. Therefore these +ceremonies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable +causes. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the ceremonies of the Old +Law had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were +intended for Divine worship; and a figurative or mystical cause, +according as they were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either +hand the ceremonies pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a +fitting cause. + +For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for +the divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can be taken in two +ways. First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of +the mind to God, to which the offerer of the sacrifice was +stimulated. Now in order to direct his mind to God aright, man must +recognize that whatever he has is from God as from its first +principle, and direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in +the offerings and sacrifices, by the fact that man offered some of +his own belongings in honor of God, as though in recognition of his +having received them from God, according to the saying of David (1 +Paral. xxix, 14): "All things are Thine: and we have given Thee what +we received of Thy hand." Wherefore in offering up sacrifices man +made protestation that God is the first principle of the creation of +all things, and their last end, to which all things must be directed. +And since, for the human mind to be directed to God aright, it must +recognize no first author of things other than God, nor place its end +in any other; for this reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer +sacrifice to any other but God, according to Ex. 22:20: "He that +sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord." +Wherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned to the ceremonies +of the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from +offering sacrifices to idols. Hence too it is that the precepts about +the sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they +had fallen into idolatry, by worshipping the molten calf: as though +those sacrifices were instituted, that the people, being ready to +offer sacrifices, might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to +idols. Thus it is written (Jer. 7:22): "I spake not to your fathers +and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the +land of Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and +sacrifices." + +Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had +fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son; wherefore it +is written (John 3:16): "God so loved the world, as to give His +only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, +but may have life everlasting." Consequently the chief sacrifice is +that whereby Christ Himself "delivered Himself . . . to God for an +odor of sweetness" (Eph. 5:2). And for this reason all the other +sacrifices of the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow this +one individual and paramount sacrifice--the imperfect forecasting the +perfect. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 10:11) that the priest of the +Old Law "often" offered "the same sacrifices, which can never take +away sins: but" Christ offered "one sacrifice for sins, for ever." +And since the reason of the figure is taken from that which the +figure represents, therefore the reasons of the figurative sacrifices +of the Old Law should be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ. + +Reply Obj. 1: God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to Him +on account of the things themselves that were offered, as though He +stood in need of them: wherefore it is written (Isa. 1:11): "I desire +not holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and +lambs and buckgoats." But, as stated above, He wished them to be +offered to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in order to signify the +right ordering of man's mind to God; and in order to represent the +mystery of the Redemption of man by Christ. + +Reply Obj. 2: In all the respects mentioned above (ad 1), there was a +suitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being offered +in sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because +idolaters offered all other animals to their gods, or made use of +them in their sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people +had been dwelling) considered it abominable to slay these animals, +wherefore they used not to offer them in sacrifice to their gods. +Hence it is written (Ex. 8:26): "We shall sacrifice the abominations +of the Egyptians to the Lord our God." For they worshipped the sheep; +they reverenced the ram (because demons appeared under the form +thereof); while they employed oxen for agriculture, which was +reckoned by them as something sacred. + +Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man's +mind to God: and in two ways. First, because it is chiefly by means +of these animals that human life is sustained: and moreover they are +most clean, and partake of a most clean food: whereas other animals +are either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if +they be tame, they have unclean food, as pigs and geese: and nothing +but what is clean should be offered to God. These birds especially +were offered in sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the +land of promise. Secondly, because the sacrificing of these animals +represented purity of heart. Because as the gloss says on Lev. 1, "We +offer a calf, when we overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when +we restrain our unreasonable motions; a goat, when we conquer +wantonness; a turtledove, when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when +we feast on the unleavened bread of sincerity." And it is evident +that the dove denotes charity and simplicity of heart. + +Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that +they might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the gloss observes, "Christ +is offered in the calf, to denote the strength of the cross; in the +lamb, to signify His innocence; in the ram, to foreshadow His +headship; and in the goat, to signify the likeness of 'sinful flesh' +[*An allusion to Col. 2:11 (Textus Receptus)]. The turtledove and +dove denoted the union of the two natures"; or else the turtledove +signified chastity; while the dove was a figure of charity. "The +wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of believers with the water +of Baptism." + +Reply Obj. 3: Fish through living in water are further removed from +man than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again, fish +die as soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not be +offered in the temple like other animals. + +Reply Obj. 4: Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the +young; while with doves the case is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi +Moses observes (Doct. Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are +commanded to be offered, because nothing should be offered to God but +what is best. + +Reply Obj. 5: The animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain, +because it is by being killed that they become useful to man, +forasmuch as God gave them to man for food. Wherefore also they were +burnt with fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made fit +for human consumption. Moreover the slaying of the animals signified +the destruction of sins: and also that man deserved death on account +of his sins; as though those animals were slain in man's stead, in +order to betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these +animals signified the slaying of Christ. + +Reply Obj. 6: The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the +sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, +whereby idolaters sacrificed animals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi +Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), "the Law chose that manner of +slaying which was least painful to the slain animal." This excluded +cruelty on the part of the offerers, and any mangling of the animals +slain. + +Reply Obj. 7: It is because unclean animals are wont to be held in +contempt among men, that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice +to God: and for this reason too they were forbidden (Deut. 23:18) to +offer "the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of +. . . God." For the same reason they did not offer animals before the +seventh day, because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being +not yet firm on account of its exceeding softness. + +Reply Obj. 8: There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was one in +which the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called "a +holocaust, i.e. all burnt." For this kind of sacrifice was offered to +God specially to show reverence to His majesty, and love of His +goodness: and typified the state of perfection as regards the +fulfilment of the counsels. Wherefore the whole was burnt up: so that +as the whole animal by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft, so it +might denote that the whole man, and whatever belongs to him, are +subject to the authority of God, and should be offered to Him. + +Another sacrifice was the "sin-offering," which was offered to God on +account of man's need for the forgiveness of sin: and this typifies +the state of penitents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into +two parts: for one part was burnt; while the other was granted to the +use of the priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by +God through the ministry of His priests. When, however, this +sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or specially +for the sin of the priest, the whole victim was burnt up. For it was +not fitting that the priests should have the use of that which was +offered for their own sins, to signify that nothing sinful should +remain in them. Moreover, this would not be satisfaction for sin: for +if the offering were granted to the use of those for whose sins it +was offered, it would seem to be the same as if it had not been +offered. + +The third kind of sacrifice was called the "peace-offering," which +was offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the welfare and +prosperity of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already +received or yet to be received: and this typifies the state of those +who are proficient in the observance of the commandments. These +sacrifices were divided into three parts: for one part was burnt in +honor of God; another part was allotted to the use of the priests; +and the third part to the use of the offerers; in order to signify +that man's salvation is from God, by the direction of God's +ministers, and through the cooperation of those who are saved. + +But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not +allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offerers: the +blood being poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God, +while the fat was burnt upon the altar (Lev. 9:9, 10). The reason for +this was, first, in order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used +to drink the blood and eat the fat of the victims, according to Deut. +32:38: "Of whose victims they eat the fat, and drank the wine of +their drink-offerings." Secondly, in order to form them to a right +way of living. For they were forbidden the use of the blood that they +might abhor the shedding of human blood; wherefore it is written +(Gen. 9:4, 5): "Flesh with blood you shall not eat: for I will +require the blood of your lives": and they were forbidden to eat the +fat, in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is +written (Ezech. 34:3): "You have killed that which was fat." Thirdly, +on account of the reverence due to God: because blood is most +necessary for life, for which reason "life" is said to be "in the +blood" (Lev. 17:11, 14): while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. +Wherefore, in order to show that to God we owe both life and a +sufficiency of all good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat +burnt up in His honor. Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the shedding +of Christ's blood, and the abundance of His charity, whereby He +offered Himself to God for us. + +In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were +allotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent a certain kind +of divination which is known as "spatulamantia," so called because it +was customary in divining to use the shoulder-blade (_spatula_), and +the breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these +things were taken away from the offerers. This is also denoted the +priest's need of wisdom in the heart, to instruct the people--this +was signified by the breast-bone, which covers the heart; and his +need of fortitude, in order to bear with human frailty--and this was +signified by the right shoulder. + +Reply Obj. 9: Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of +sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust: +because the female is an imperfect animal. The offering of +turtledoves and doves was on account of the poverty of the offerers, +who were unable to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were +offered freely, and no one was bound to offer them against his will, +hence these birds were offered not among the peace-victims, but among +the holocausts and victims for sin, which man was obliged to offer at +times. Moreover these birds, on account of their lofty flight, were +befitting the perfection of the holocausts: and were suitable for +sin-offerings because their song is doleful. + +Reply Obj. 10: The holocaust was the chief of all the sacrifices: +because all was burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it was eaten. +The second place in holiness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins, +which was eaten in the court only, and on the very day of the +sacrifice (Lev. 7:6, 15). The third place must be given to the +peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, +but anywhere in Jerusalem. Fourth in order were the "ex-voto" +peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten even on the +morrow. The reason for this order is that man is bound to God, +chiefly on account of His majesty; secondly, on account of the sins +he has committed; thirdly, because of the benefits he has already +received from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to +receive from Him. + +Reply Obj. 11: Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the +sinner, as stated above (Q. 73, A. 10): wherefore different victims +are commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, +or of some other private individual. "But," as Rabbi Moses says +(Doct. Perplex. iii), "we must take note that the more grievous the +sin, the lower the species of animals offered for it. Wherefore the +goat, which is a very base animal, was offered for idolatry; while a +calf was offered for a priest's ignorance, and a ram for the +negligence of a prince." + +Reply Obj. 12: In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in view the +poverty of the offerers; so that those who could not have a +four-footed animal at their disposal, might at least offer a bird; +and that he who could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and +that if a man had not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn. + +The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the +"living bread" (John 6:41, 51). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it +were, during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the +patriarchs; He was like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the +prophets; and He was like perfect bread after He had taken human +nature; baked in the fire, i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven +of the virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He +suffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross as on a +gridiron. + +Reply Obj. 13: The products of the soil are useful to man, either as +food, and of these bread was offered; or as drink, and of these wine +was offered; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were offered; +or as healing, and of these they offered incense, which both smells +sweetly and binds easily together. + +Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His +blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace of Christ; +salt, His knowledge; incense, His prayer. + +Reply Obj. 14: Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God, both +because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols; and in +order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from +those who intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not offered, to +denote the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be +offered in the sacrifices to idols. + +Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of +putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God should be incorrupt. +Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again, +mortification of the flesh. + +Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is +necessary in the offerer; and again, to signify the odor of a good +name: for incense is composed of matter, both rich and fragrant. And +since the sacrifice "of jealousy" did not proceed from devotion, but +rather from suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein +(Num. 5:15). +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 4] + +Whether Sufficient Reason Can Be Assigned for the Ceremonies +Pertaining to Holy Things? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned +for the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For +Paul said (Acts 17:24): "God Who made the world and all things +therein; He being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples +made by hands." It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a +tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of God. + +Obj. 2: Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except by +Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law. +Therefore it should not have been changed by the building of a temple. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Divine Law, more than any other indeed, should +lead man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine worship +requires multiplication of altars and temples; as is evident in +regard to the New Law. Therefore it seems that also under the Old Law +there should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many. + +Obj. 4: Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship +of God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and +simplicity. Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or +temple to be divided by means of veils. + +Obj. 5: Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e. God, appears +first of all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first +movement begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of +God. Therefore it should have been built so as to point to the east +rather than the west. + +Obj. 6: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:4) that they should "not +make . . . a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything." It was +therefore unfitting for graven images of the cherubim to be set up in +the tabernacle or temple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory, +the candlestick, the table, the two altars, seem to have been placed +there without reasonable cause. + +Obj. 7: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:24): "You shall make an +altar of earth unto Me": and again (Ex. 20:26): "Thou shalt not go up +by steps unto My altar." It was therefore unfitting that subsequently +they should be commanded to make an altar of wood laid over with gold +or brass; and of such a height that it was impossible to go up to it +except by steps. For it is written (Ex. 27:1, 2): "Thou shalt make +also an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits long, and as +many broad . . . and three cubits high . . . and thou shalt cover it +with brass": and (Ex. 30:1, 3): "Thou shalt make . . . an altar to +burn incense, of setim wood . . . and thou shalt overlay it with the +purest gold." + +Obj. 8: Further, in God's works nothing should be superfluous; for +not even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be found. +But one cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was +unbecoming to furnish the tabernacle with many coverings, viz. +curtains, curtains of goats' hair, rams' skins dyed red, and +violet-colored skins (Ex. 26). + +Objection 9: Further, exterior consecration signifies interior +holiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was therefore +unsuitable for the tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated, +since they were inanimate things. + +Objection 10: Further, it is written (Ps. 33:2): "I will bless the +Lord at all times, His praise shall always be in my mouth." But the +solemn festivals were instituted for the praise of God. Therefore it +was not fitting that certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn +festivals; so that it seems that there was no suitable cause for the +ceremonies relating to holy things. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 8:4) that those who "offer +gifts according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of +heavenly things. As it was answered to Moses, when he was to finish +the tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to +the pattern which was shown thee on the mount." But that is most +reasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore +the ceremonies relating to holy things had a reasonable cause. + +_I answer that,_ The chief purpose of the whole external worship is +that man may give worship to God. Now man's tendency is to reverence +less those things which are common, and indistinct from other things; +whereas he admires and reveres those things which are distinct from +others in some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among +men for kings and princes, who ought to be reverenced by their +subjects, to be clothed in more precious garments, and to possess +vaster and more beautiful abodes. And for this reason it behooved +special times, a special abode, special vessels, and special +ministers to be appointed for the divine worship, so that thereby the +soul of man might be brought to greater reverence for God. + +In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed above (A. 2; Q. +100, A. 12; Q. 101, A. 2), was instituted that it might foreshadow +the mystery of Christ. Now that which foreshadows something should be +determinate, so that it may present some likeness thereto. +Consequently, certain special points had to be observed in matters +pertaining to the worship of God. + +Reply Obj. 1: The divine worship regards two things: namely, God Who +is worshipped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is +worshipped, is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no +need, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men, +who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake there was +need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for the worship +of God, for two reasons. First, that through coming together with the +thought that the place was set aside for the worship of God, they +might approach thither with greater reverence. Secondly, that certain +things relating to the excellence of Christ's Divine or human nature +might be signified by the arrangement of various details in such +temple or tabernacle. + +To this Solomon refers (3 Kings 8:27) when he says: "If heaven and +the heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house +which I have built" for Thee? And further on (3 Kings 8:29, 20) he +adds: "That Thy eyes may be open upon this house . . . of which Thou +hast said: My name shall be there; . . . that Thou mayest hearken to +the supplication of Thy servant and of Thy people Israel." From this +it is evident that the house of the sanctuary was set up, not in +order to contain God, as abiding therein locally, but that God might +be made known there by means of things done and said there; and that +those who prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray +more devoutly, so as to be heard more readily. + +Reply Obj. 2: Before the coming of Christ, the state of the Old Law +was not changed as regards the fulfilment of the Law, which was +effected in Christ alone: but it was changed as regards the condition +of the people that were under the Law. Because, at first, the people +were in the desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they were +engaged in various wars with the neighboring nations; and lastly, at +the time of David and Solomon, the state of that people was one of +great peace. And then for the first time the temple was built in the +place which Abraham, instructed by God, had chosen for the purpose of +sacrifice. For it is written (Gen. 22:2) that the Lord commanded +Abraham to "offer" his son "for a holocaust upon one of the mountains +which I will show thee": and it is related further on (Gen. 22:14) +that "he calleth the name of that place, The Lord seeth," as though, +according to the Divine prevision, that place were chosen for the +worship of God. Hence it is written (Deut. 12:5, 6): "You shall come +to the place which the Lord your God shall choose . . . and you shall +offer . . . your holocausts and victims." + +Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building +of the temple before the aforesaid time; for three reasons assigned +by Rabbi Moses. First, lest the Gentiles might seize hold of that +place. Secondly, lest the Gentiles might destroy it. The third reason +is lest each tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and +strifes and quarrels be the result. Hence the temple was not built +until they had a king who would be able to quell such quarrels. Until +that time a portable tabernacle was employed for divine worship, no +place being as yet fixed for the worship of God. This is the literal +reason for the distinction between the tabernacle and the temple. + +The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a +twofold state. For the tabernacle, which was changeable, signifies +the state of the present changeable life: whereas the temple, which +was fixed and stable, signifies the state of future life which is +altogether unchangeable. For this reason it is said that in the +building of the temple no sound was heard of hammer or saw, to +signify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from +the future state. Or else the tabernacle signifies the state of the +Old Law; while the temple built by Solomon betokens the state of the +New Law. Hence the Jews alone worked at the building of the +tabernacle; whereas the temple was built with the cooperation of the +Gentiles, viz. the Tyrians and Sidonians. + +Reply Obj. 3: The reason for the unity of the temple or tabernacle +may be either literal or figurative. The literal reason was the +exclusion of idolatry. For the Gentiles put up various temples to +various gods: and so, to strengthen in the minds of men their belief +in the unity of the Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to +Him in one place only. Another reason was in order to show that +bodily worship is not acceptable of itself: and so they restrained +from offering sacrifices anywhere and everywhere. But the worship of +the New Law, in the sacrifice whereof spiritual grace is contained, +is of itself acceptable to God; and consequently the multiplication +of altars and temples is permitted in the New Law. + +As to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of God, +consisting in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets, there were, +even under the Old Law, various places, called synagogues, appointed +for the people to gather together for the praise of God; just as now +there are places called churches in which the Christian people gather +together for the divine worship. Thus our church takes the place of +both temple and synagogue: since the very sacrifice of the Church is +spiritual; wherefore with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct +from the place of teaching. The figurative reason may be that hereby +is signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or triumphant. + +Reply Obj. 4: Just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle betokened +the unity of God, or the unity of the Church, so also the division of +the tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those things +that are subject to God, and from which we arise to the worship of +God. Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was called +the "Holy of Holies," and was placed to the west; the other was +called the "Holy Place" [*Or 'Sanctuary'. The Douay version uses both +expressions], which was situated to the east. Moreover there was a +court facing the tabernacle. Accordingly there are two reasons for +this distinction. One is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained +to the worship of God. Because the different parts of the world are +thus betokened by the division of the tabernacle. For that part which +was called the Holy of Holies signified the higher world, which is +that of spiritual substances: while that part which is called the +Holy Place signified the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was +separated from the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four +different colors (denoting the four elements), viz. of linen, +signifying earth, because linen, i.e. flax, grows out of the earth; +purple, signifying water, because the purple tint was made from +certain shells found in the sea; violet, signifying air, because it +has the color of the air; and scarlet twice dyed, signifying fire: +and this because matter composed of the four elements is a veil +between us and incorporeal substances. Hence the high-priest alone, +and that once a year, entered into the inner tabernacle, i.e. the +Holy of Holies: whereby we are taught that man's final perfection +consists in his entering into that (higher) world: whereas into the +outward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy Place, the priests entered every +day: whereas the people were only admitted to the court; because the +people were able to perceived material things, the inner nature of +which only wise men by dint of study are able to discover. + +But with regard to the figurative reason, the outward tabernacle, +which was called the Holy Place, betokened the state of the Old Law, +as the Apostle says (Heb. 9:6, seqq.): because into that tabernacle +"the priests always entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices." +But the inner tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, +signified either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the +New Law to come. To the latter state Christ brought us; and this was +signified by the high-priest entering alone, once a year, into the +Holy of Holies. The veil betokened the concealing of the spiritual +sacrifices under the sacrifices of old. This veil was adorned with +four colors: viz. that of linen, to designate purity of the flesh; +purple, to denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for God; +scarlet twice dyed, signifying the twofold love of God and our +neighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contemplation. With regard +to the state of the Old Law the people and the priests were situated +differently from one another. For the people saw the mere corporeal +sacrifices which were offered in the court: whereas the priests were +intent on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith in +the mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they entered into +the outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle was divided from the +court by a veil; because some matters relating to the mystery of +Christ were hidden from the people, while they were known to the +priests: though they were not fully revealed to them, as they were +subsequently in the New Testament (cf. Eph. 3:5). + +Reply Obj. 5: Worship towards the west was introduced in the Law to +the exclusion of idolatry: because all the Gentiles, in reverence to +the sun, worshipped towards the east; hence it is written (Ezech. +8:16) that certain men "had their backs towards the temple of the +Lord, and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the rising +of the sun." Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle +had the Holy of Holies to westward, that they might adore toward the +west. A figurative reason may also be found in the fact that the +whole state of the first tabernacle was ordained to foreshadow the +death of Christ, which is signified by the west, according to Ps. +67:5: "Who ascendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name." + +Reply Obj. 6: Both literal and figurative reasons may be assigned for +the things contained in the tabernacle. The literal reason is in +connection with the divine worship. And because, as already observed +(ad 4), the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, signified +the higher world of spiritual substances, hence that tabernacle +contained three things, viz. "the ark of the testament in which was a +golden pot that had manna, and the rod of Aaron that had blossomed, +and the tables" (Heb. 9:4) on which were written the ten commandments +of the Law. Now the ark stood between two "cherubim" that looked one +towards the other: and over the ark was a table, called the +"propitiatory," raised above the wings of the cherubim, as though it +were held up by them; and appearing, to the imagination, to be the +very seat of God. For this reason it was called the "propitiatory," +as though the people received propitiation thence at the prayers of +the high-priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by the cherubim, +in obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of the testament was +like the foot-stool to Him that sat on the propitiatory. These three +things denote three things in that higher world: namely, God Who is +above all, and incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness of +Him was set up; to denote His invisibility. But there was something +to represent his seat; since, to wit, the creature, which is beneath +God, as the seat under the sitter, is comprehensible. Again in that +higher world there are spiritual substances called angels. These are +signified by the two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show +that they are at peace with one another, according to Job 25:2: "Who +maketh peace in . . . high places." For this reason, too, there was +more than one cherub, to betoken the multitude of heavenly spirits, +and to prevent their receiving worship from those who had been +commanded to worship but one God. Moreover there are, enclosed as it +were in that spiritual world, the intelligible types of whatsoever +takes place in this world, just as in every cause are enclosed the +types of its effects, and in the craftsman the types of the works of +his craft. This was betokened by the ark, which represented, by means +of the three things it contained, the three things of greatest import +in human affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the +testament; the power of governing, betokened by the rod of Aaron; and +life, betokened by the manna which was the means of sustenance. Or +else these three things signified the three Divine attributes, viz. +wisdom, in the tables; power, in the rod; goodness, in the +manna--both by reason of its sweetness, and because it was through +the goodness of God that it was granted to man, wherefore it was +preserved as a memorial of the Divine mercy. Again, these three +things were represented in Isaias' vision. For he "saw the Lord +sitting upon a throne high and elevated"; and the seraphim standing +by; and that the house was filled with the glory of the Lord; +wherefrom the seraphim cried out: "All the earth is full of His +glory" (Isa. 6:1, 3). And so the images of the seraphim were set up, +not to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first +commandment; but as a sign of their function, as stated above. + +The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world, also contained +three things, viz. the "altar of incense," which was directly opposite +the ark; the "table of proposition," with the twelve loaves of +proposition on it, which stood on the northern side; and the +"candlestick," which was placed towards the south. These three things +seem to correspond to the three which were enclosed in the ark; and +they represented the same things as the latter, but more clearly: +because, in order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering the +temple, might grasp the meaning of these types, it was necessary to +express them more manifestly than they are in the Divine or angelic +mind. Accordingly the candlestick betokened, as a sensible sign +thereof, the wisdom which was expressed on the tables (of the Law) in +intelligible words. The altar of incense signified the office of the +priest, whose duty it was to bring the people to God: and this was +signified also by the rod: because on that altar the sweet-smelling +incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people acceptable to +God: for it is written (Apoc. 8:3) that the smoke of the +sweet-smelling spices signifies the "justifications of the saints" +(cf. Apoc. 19:8). Moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the +priesthood should be denoted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the +outer tabernacle, by the altar of incense: because the priest is the +mediator between God and the people, governing the people by Divine +power, denoted by the rod; and offering to God the fruit of His +government, i.e. the holiness of the people, on the altar of incense, +so to speak. The table signified the sustenance of life, just as the +manna did: but the former, a more general and a coarser kind of +nourishment; the latter, a sweeter and more delicate. Again, the +candlestick was fittingly placed on the southern side, while the table +was placed to the north: because the south is the right-hand side of +the world, while the north is the left-hand side, as stated in _De +Coelo et Mundo_ ii; and wisdom, like other spiritual goods, belongs to +the right hand, while temporal nourishment belongs on the left, +according to Prov. 3:16: "In her left hand (are) riches and glory." +And the priestly power is midway between temporal goods and spiritual +wisdom; because thereby both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are +dispensed. + +Another literal signification may be assigned. For the ark contained +the tables of the Law, in order to prevent forgetfulness of the Law, +wherefore it is written (Ex. 24:12): "I will give thee two tables of +stone, and the Law, and the commandments which I have written: that +thou mayest teach them" to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron +was placed there to restrain the people from insubordination to the +priesthood of Aaron; wherefore it is written (Num. 17:10): "Carry +back the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it +may be kept there for a token of the rebellious children of Israel." +The manna was kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred +by God on the children of Israel in the desert; wherefore it is +written (Ex. 16:32): "Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept unto +generations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread wherewith +I fed you in the wilderness." The candlestick was set up to enhance +the beauty of the temple, for the magnificence of a house depends on +its being well lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as +Josephus observes (Antiquit. iii, 7, 8), to signify the seven +planets, wherewith the whole world is illuminated. Hence the +candlestick was placed towards the south; because for us the course +of the planets is from that quarter. The altar of incense was +instituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a +sweet-smelling smoke; both through respect for the tabernacle, and as +a remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding of blood and the +slaying of animals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being +vile, whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated. The table +was placed there to signify that the priests who served the temple +should take their food in the temple: wherefore, as stated in Matt. +12:4, it was lawful for none but the priests to eat the twelve loaves +which were put on the table in memory of the twelve tribes. And the +table was not placed in the middle directly in front of the +propitiatory, in order to exclude an idolatrous rite: for the +Gentiles, on the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the +idol of the moon, wherefore it is written (Jer. 7:18): "The women +knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven." + +In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts, on +which sacrifices of those things which the people possessed were +offered to God: and consequently the people who offered these +sacrifices to God by the hands of the priest could be present in the +court. But the priests alone, whose function it was to offer the +people to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon the very +devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. And this +altar was put up outside the tabernacle and in the court, to the +exclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles placed altars +inside the temples to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols. + +The figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the +relation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was foreshadowed therein. +Now it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures +of the Law, various figures were instituted in the temple to betoken +Christ. For He was foreshadowed by the "propitiatory," since He is "a +propitiation for our sins" (1 John 2:2). This propitiatory was +fittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written (Heb. 1:6): +"Let all the angels of God adore Him." He is also signified by the +ark: because just as the ark was made of setim-wood, so was Christ's +body composed of most pure members. More over it was gilded: for +Christ was full of wisdom and charity, which are betokened by gold. +And in the ark was a golden pot, i.e. His holy soul, having manna, +i.e. "all the fulness of the Godhead" (Col. 2:9). Also there was a +rod in the ark, i.e. His priestly power: for "He was made a . . . +priest for ever" (Heb. 6:20). And therein were the tables of the +Testament, to denote that Christ Himself is a lawgiver. Again, Christ +was signified by the candlestick, for He said Himself (John 8:12): "I +am the Light of the world"; while the seven lamps denoted the seven +gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in the table, because +He is our spiritual food, according to John 6:41, 51: "I am the +living bread": and the twelve loaves signified the twelve apostles, +or their teaching. Or again, the candlestick and table may signify +the Church's teaching, and faith, which also enlightens and +refreshes. Again, Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts +and incense. Because all works of virtue must be offered to us to God +through Him; both those whereby we afflict the body, which are +offered, as it were, on the altar of holocausts; and those which, +with greater perfection of mind, are offered to God in Christ, by the +spiritual desires of the perfect, on the altar of incense, as it +were, according to Heb. 13:15: "By Him therefore let us offer the +sacrifice of praise always to God." + +Reply Obj. 7: The Lord commanded an altar to be made for the offering +of sacrifices and gifts, in honor of God, and for the upkeep of the +ministers who served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction +of the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was at the +beginning of the Law (Ex. 20:24, seqq.) when the Lord commanded them +to make "an altar of earth," or at least "not of hewn stones"; and +again, not to make the altar high, so as to make it necessary to "go +up" to it "by steps." This was in detestation of idolatrous worship: +for the Gentiles made their altars ornate and high, thinking that +there was something holy and divine in such things. For this reason, +too, the Lord commanded (Deut. 16:21): "Thou shalt plant no grove, +nor any tree near the altar of the Lord thy God": since idolaters +were wont to offer sacrifices beneath trees, on account of the +pleasantness and shade afforded by them. There was also a figurative +reason for these precepts. Because we must confess that in Christ, +Who is our altar, there is the true nature of flesh, as regards His +humanity--and this is to make an altar of earth; and again, in regard +to His Godhead, we must confess His equality with the Father--and +this is "not to go up" to the altar by steps. Moreover we should not +couple the doctrine of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which provokes +men to lewdness. + +But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of +God, there was no longer reason to fear these occasions of idolatry. +Wherefore the Lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of +brass, and to be conspicuous to all the people; and the altar of +incense, which was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so +precious as to give the people an occasion for idolatry. + +Since, however, the reason for the precept, "Thou shalt not go up by +steps unto My altar" (Ex. 20:26) is stated to have been "lest thy +nakedness be discovered," it should be observed that this too was +instituted with the purpose of preventing idolatry, for in the feasts +of Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people. +But later on the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for +the sake of decency: so that without any danger the altar could be +placed so high that the priests when offering sacrifices would go up +by steps of wood, not fixed but movable. + +Reply Obj. 8: The body of the tabernacle consisted of boards placed +on end, and covered on the inside with curtains of four different +colors, viz. twisted linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice dyed. +These curtains, however, covered the sides only of the tabernacle; +and the roof of the tabernacle was covered with violet-colored skins; +and over this there was another covering of rams' skins dyed red; and +over this there was a third curtain made of goats' hair, which +covered not only the roof of the tabernacle, but also reached to the +ground and covered the boards of the tabernacle on the outside. The +literal reason of these coverings taken altogether was the adornment +and protection of the tabernacle, that it might be an object of +respect. Taken singly, according to some, the curtains denoted the +starry heaven, which is adorned with various stars; the curtain (of +goats' skin) signified the waters which are above the firmament; the +skins dyed red denoted the empyrean heaven, where the angels are; the +violet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity. + +The figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which +the tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of Christ, who +compose the Church. The boards were covered on the inner side by +curtains of four colors: because the faithful are inwardly adorned +with the four virtues: for "the twisted linen," as the gloss +observes, "signifies the flesh refulgent with purity; violet +signifies the mind desirous of heavenly things; purple denotes the +flesh subject to passions; the twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind +in the midst of the passions enlightened by the love of God and our +neighbor." The coverings of the building designate prelates and +doctors, who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly manner of +life, signified by the violet colored skins: and who should also be +ready to suffer martyrdom, denoted by the skins dyed red; and austere +of life and patient in adversity, betokened by the curtains of goats' +hair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as the gloss observes. + +Reply Obj. 9: The literal reason for the sanctification of the +tabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated with greater +reverence, being deputed, as it were, to the divine worship by this +consecration. The figurative reason is that this sanctification +signified the sanctification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the +faithful of whom the Church of Christ is composed. + +Reply Obj. 10: Under the Old Law there were seven temporal +solemnities, and one continual solemnity, as may be gathered from +Num. 28, 29. There was a continual feast, since the lamb was +sacrificed every day, morning and evening: and this continual feast +of an abiding sacrifice signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of +the temporal feasts the first was that which was repeated every week. +This was the solemnity of the "Sabbath," celebrated in memory of the +work of the creation of the universe. Another solemnity, viz. the +"New Moon," was repeated every month, and was observed in memory of +the work of the Divine government. For the things of this lower world +owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the moon; wherefore this +feast was kept at the new moon: and not at the full moon, to avoid +the worship of idolaters who used to offer sacrifices to the moon at +that particular time. And these two blessings are bestowed in common +on the whole human race; and hence they were repeated more frequently. + +The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and they +commemorated the benefits which had been conferred especially on that +people. For there was the feast of the "Passover" in the first month +to commemorate the blessing of being delivered out of Egypt. The +feast of "Pentecost" was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the +blessing of the giving of the Law. The other three feasts were kept +in the seventh month, nearly the whole of which was solemnized by +them, just as the seventh day. For on the first of the seventh month +was the feast of "Trumpets," in memory of the delivery of Isaac, when +Abraham found the ram caught by its horns, which they represented by +the horns which they blew. The feast of Trumpets was a kind of +invitation whereby they prepared themselves to keep the following +feast which was kept on the tenth day. This was the feast of +"Expiation," in memory of the blessing whereby, at the prayer of +Moses, God forgave the people's sin of worshipping the calf. After +this was the feast of "Scenopegia" or of "Tents," which was kept for +seven days, to commemorate the blessing of being protected and led by +God through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence during this +feast they had to take "the fruits of the fairest tree," i.e. the +citron, "and the trees of dense foliage" [*Douay and A. V. and R. V. +read: 'Boughs of thick trees'], i.e. the myrtle, which is fragrant, +"and the branches of palm-trees, and willows of the brook," which +retain their greenness a long time; and these are to be found in the +Land of promise; to signify that God had brought them through the +arid land of the wilderness to a land of delights. On the eighth day +another feast was observed, of "Assembly and Congregation," on which +the people collected the expenses necessary for the divine worship: +and it signified the uniting of the people and the peace granted to +them in the Land of promise. + +The figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual +sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of Christ, Who is +the "Lamb of God," according to Heb. 13:8: "Jesus Christ yesterday +and today, and the same for ever." The Sabbath signified the +spiritual rest bestowed by Christ, as stated in Heb. 4. The Neomenia, +which is the beginning of the new moon, signified the enlightening of +the primitive Church by Christ's preaching and miracles. The feast of +Pentecost signified the Descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles. +The feast of Trumpets signified the preaching of the apostles. The +feast of Expiation signified the cleansing of the Christian people +from sins: and the feast of Tabernacles signified their pilgrimage in +this world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue. The feast of +Assembly or Congregation foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in +the kingdom of heaven: wherefore this feast is described as "most +holy" (Lev. 23:36). These three feasts followed immediately on one +another, because those who expiate their vices should advance in +virtue, until they come to see God, as stated in Ps. 83:8. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 5] + +Whether There Can Be Any Suitable Cause for the Sacraments of the Old +Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for +the sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things that are done for +the purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of +idolaters: since it is written (Deut. 12:31): "Thou shalt not do in +like manner to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all +the abominations which the Lord abhorreth." Now worshippers of idols +used to knive themselves to the shedding of blood: for it is related +(3 Kings 18:28) that they "cut themselves after their manner with +knives and lancets, till they were all covered with blood." For this +reason the Lord commanded (Deut. 14:1): "You shall not cut yourselves +nor make any baldness for the dead." Therefore it was unfitting for +circumcision to be prescribed by the Law (Lev. 12:3). + +Obj. 2: Further, those things which are done for the worship of God +should be marked with decorum and gravity; according to Ps. 34:18: "I +will praise Thee in a grave [Douay: 'strong'] people." But it seems +to savor of levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore it was +unfittingly commanded (Ex. 12:11) that they should eat the Paschal +lamb "in haste." Other things too relative to the eating of the lamb +were prescribed, which seem altogether unreasonable. + +Obj. 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the +sacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal lamb signified the +sacrament of the Eucharist, according to 1 Cor. 5:7: "Christ our +Pasch is sacrificed." Therefore there should also have been some +sacraments of the Old Law to foreshadow the other sacraments of the +New Law, such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, and so +forth. + +Obj. 4: Further, purification can scarcely be done except by removing +something impure. But as far as God is concerned, no bodily thing is +reputed impure, because all bodies are God's creatures; and "every +creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received +with thanksgiving" (1 Tim. 4:4). It was therefore unfitting for them +to be purified after contact with a corpse, or any similar corporeal +infection. + +Obj. 5: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 34:4): "What can be made +clean by the unclean?" But the ashes of the red heifer [*Cf. Heb. +9:13] which was burnt, were unclean, since they made a man unclean: +for it is stated (Num. 19:7, seqq.) that the priest who immolated her +was rendered unclean "until the evening"; likewise he that burnt her; +and he that gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly +prescribed there that the unclean should be purified by being +sprinkled with those cinders. + +Obj. 6: Further, sins are not something corporeal that can be carried +from one place to another: nor can man be cleansed from sin by means +of something unclean. It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of +expiating the sins of the people that the priest should confess the +sins of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it +might carry them away into the wilderness: while they were rendered +unclean by the other, which they used for the purpose of +purification, by burning it together with the calf outside the camp; +so that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies with water +(Lev. 16). + +Obj. 7: Further, what is already cleansed should not be cleansed +again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification to a +man cleansed from leprosy, or to a house; as laid down in Lev. 14. + +Obj. 8: Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by material +water or by shaving the hair. Therefore it seems unreasonable that +the Lord ordered (Ex. 30:18, seqq.) the making of a brazen laver with +its foot, that the priests might wash their hands and feet before +entering the temple; and that He commanded (Num. 8:7) the Levites to +be sprinkled with the water of purification, and to shave all the +hairs of their flesh. + +Objection 9: Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed by +that which is less. Therefore it was unfitting that, in the Law, the +higher and lower priests, as stated in Lev. 8 [*Cf. Ex. 29], and the +Levites, according to Num. 8, should be consecrated with any bodily +anointing, bodily sacrifices, and bodily oblations. + +Objection 10: Further, as stated in 1 Kings 16:7, "Man seeth those +things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." But those +things that appear outwardly in man are the dispositions of his body +and his clothes. Therefore it was unfitting for certain special +garments to be appointed to the higher and lower priests, as related +in Ex. 28 [*Cf. Lev. 8:7, seqq.]. It seems, moreover, unreasonable +that anyone should be debarred from the priesthood on account of +defects in the body, as stated in Lev. 21:17, seqq.: "Whosoever of +thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, he shall not +offer bread to his God . . . if he be blind, if he be lame," etc. It +seems, therefore, that the sacraments of the Old Law were +unreasonable. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 20:8): "I am the Lord that +sanctify you." But nothing unreasonable is done by God, for it is +written (Ps. 103:24): "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." +Therefore there was nothing without a reasonable cause in the +sacraments of the Old Law, which were ordained to the sanctification +of man. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 101, A. 4), the sacraments are, +properly speaking, things applied to the worshippers of God for their +consecration so as, in some way, to depute them to the worship of +God. Now the worship of God belonged in a general way to the whole +people; but in a special way, it belonged to the priests and Levites, +who were the ministers of divine worship. Consequently, in these +sacraments of the Old Law, certain things concerned the whole people +in general; while others belonged to the ministers. + +In regard to both, three things were necessary. The first was to be +established in the state of worshipping God: and this institution was +brought about--for all in general, by circumcision, without which no +one was admitted to any of the legal observances--and for the +priests, by their consecration. The second thing required was the use +of those things that pertain to divine worship. And thus, as to the +people, there was the partaking of the paschal banquet, to which no +uncircumcised man was admitted, as is clear from Ex. 12:43, seqq.: +and, as to the priests, the offering of the victims, and the eating +of the loaves of proposition and of other things that were allotted +to the use of the priests. The third thing required was the removal +of all impediments to divine worship, viz. of uncleannesses. And +then, as to the people, certain purifications were instituted for the +removal of certain external uncleannesses; and also expiations from +sins; while, as to the priests and Levites, the washing of hands and +feet and the shaving of the hair were instituted. + +And all these things had reasonable causes, both literal, in so far +as they were ordained to the worship of God for the time being, and +figurative, in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow Christ: as +we shall see by taking them one by one. + +Reply Obj. 1: The chief literal reason for circumcision was in order +that man might profess his belief in one God. And because Abraham was +the first to sever himself from the infidels, by going out from his +house and kindred, for this reason he was the first to receive +circumcision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle (Rom. 4:9, +seqq.) thus: "He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the +justice of the faith which he had, being uncircumcised"; because, to +wit, we are told that "unto Abraham faith was reputed to justice," +for the reason that "against hope he believed in hope," i.e. against +the hope that is of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace, +"that he might be made the father of many nations," when he was an +old man, and his wife an old and barren woman. And in order that this +declaration, and imitation of Abraham's faith, might be fixed firmly +in the hearts of the Jews, they received in their flesh such a sign +as they could not forget, wherefore it is written (Gen. 17:13): "My +covenant shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant." This was +done on the eighth day, because until then a child is very tender, +and so might be seriously injured; and is considered as something not +yet consolidated: wherefore neither are animals offered before the +eighth day. And it was not delayed after that time, lest some might +refuse the sign of circumcision on account of the pain: and also lest +the parents, whose love for their children increases as they become +used to their presence and as they grow older, should withdraw their +children from circumcision. A second reason may have been the +weakening of concupiscence in that member. A third motive may have +been to revile the worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to +that part of the body. The Lord's prohibition extended only to the +cutting of oneself in honor of idols: and such was not the +circumcision of which we have been speaking. + +The figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the +removal of corruption, which was to be brought about by Christ, and +will be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age, which is the age of +those who rise from the dead. And since all corruption of guilt and +punishment comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of our +first parent, therefore circumcision was applied to the generative +member. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:11): "You are circumcised" in +Christ "with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body +of the flesh, but in the circumcision of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ." + +Reply Obj. 2: The literal reason of the paschal banquet was to +commemorate the blessing of being led by God out of Egypt. Hence by +celebrating this banquet they declared that they belonged to that +people which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they +were delivered from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's +blood on the transoms of their house doors, as though declaring that +they were averse to the rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the +ram. Wherefore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of +the blood of the lamb on the door-posts, from the danger of +extermination which threatened the Egyptians. + +Now two things are to be observed in their departure from Egypt: +namely, their haste in going, for the Egyptians pressed them to go +forth speedily, as related in Ex. 12:33; and there was danger that +anyone who did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the +Egyptians. Their haste was shown in two ways. First by what they ate. +For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a sign "that it +could not be leavened, the Egyptians pressing them to depart"; and to +eat roast meat, for this took less time to prepare; and that they +should not break a bone thereof, because in their haste there was no +time to break bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is +written: "You shall gird your reins, and you shall have shoes on your +feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall eat in haste": +which clearly designates men at the point of starting on a journey. +To this also is to be referred the command: "In one house shall it be +eaten, neither shall you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the +house": because, to wit, on account of their haste, they could not +send any gifts of it. + +The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by the wild +lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, because the sacrifice of +the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ according to 1 +Cor. 5:7: "Christ our pasch is sacrificed." The blood of the lamb, +which ensured deliverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled on +the ransoms, signified faith in Christ's Passion, in the hearts and +on the lips of the faithful, by which same Passion we are delivered +from sin and death, according to 1 Pet. 1:18: "You were . . . +redeemed . . . with the precious blood . . . of a lamb unspotted." +The partaking of its flesh signified the eating of Christ's body in +the Sacrament; and the flesh was roasted at the fire to signify +Christ's Passion or charity. And it was eaten with unleavened bread +to signify the blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ's +body, according to 1 Cor. 5:8: "Let us feast . . . with the +unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." The wild lettuces were +added to denote repentance for sins, which is required of those who +receive the body of Christ. Their loins were girt in sign of +chastity: and the shoes of their feet are the examples of our dead +ancestors. The staves they were to hold in their hands denoted +pastoral authority: and it was commanded that the paschal lamb should +be eaten in one house, i.e. in a catholic church, and not in the +conventicles of heretics. + +Reply Obj. 3: Some of the sacraments of the New Law had corresponding +figurative sacraments in the Old Law. For Baptism, which is the +sacrament of Faith, corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written +(Col. 2:11, 12): "You are circumcised . . . in the circumcision of" +Our Lord Jesus "Christ: buried with Him in Baptism." In the New Law +the sacrament of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the +paschal lamb. The sacrament of Penance in the New Law corresponds to +all the purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders +corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the priests. To +the sacrament of Confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fulness +of grace, there would be no corresponding sacrament of the Old Law, +because the time of fulness had not yet come, since "the Law brought +no man [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to perfection" (Heb. 7:19). The same +applies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an immediate +preparation for entrance into glory, to which the way was not yet +opened out in the Old Law, since the price had not yet been paid. +Matrimony did indeed exist under the Old Law, as a function of +nature, but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ with the +Church, for that union was not as yet brought about. Hence under the +Old Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce, which is contrary +to the nature of the sacrament. + +Reply Obj. 4: As already stated, the purifications of the Old Law +were ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship: +which worship is twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of +the mind to God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations, +and so forth. Now men are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins, +whereby men were said to be polluted, for instance, by idolatry, +murder, adultery, or incest. From such pollutions men were purified +by certain sacrifices, offered either for the whole community in +general, or also for the sins of individuals; not that those carnal +sacrifices had of themselves the power of expiating sin; but that +they signified that expiation of sins which was to be effected by +Christ, and of which those of old became partakers by protesting +their faith in the Redeemer, while taking part in the figurative +sacrifices. + +The impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily +uncleannesses; which were considered in the first place as existing +in man, and consequently in other animals also, and in man's clothes, +dwelling-place, and vessels. In man himself uncleanness was +considered as arising partly from himself and partly from contact +with unclean things. Anything proceeding from man was reputed unclean +that was already subject to corruption, or exposed thereto: and +consequently since death is a kind of corruption, the human corpse +was considered unclean. In like manner, since leprosy arises from +corruption of the humors, which break out externally and infect other +persons, therefore were lepers also considered unclean; and, again, +women suffering from a flow of blood, whether from weakness, or from +nature (either at the monthly course or at the time of conception); +and, for the same reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered +from a flow of seed, whether due to weakness, to nocturnal pollution, +or to sexual intercourse. Because every humor issuing from man in the +aforesaid ways involves some unclean infection. Again, man contracted +uncleanness by touching any unclean thing whatever. + +Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these +uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from the reverence due to +those things that belong to the divine worship: both because men are +not wont, when unclean, to touch precious things: and in order that +by rarely approaching sacred things they might have greater respect +for them. For since man could seldom avoid all the aforesaid +uncleannesses, the result was that men could seldom approach to touch +things belonging to the worship of God, so that when they did +approach, they did so with greater reverence and humility. Moreover, +in some of these the literal reason was that men should not be kept +away from worshipping God through fear of coming in contact with +lepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and contagious +diseases. In others, again, the reason was to avoid idolatrous +worship: because in their sacrificial rites the Gentiles sometimes +employed human blood and seed. All these bodily uncleannesses were +purified either by the mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of +those which were more grievous, by some sacrifice of expiation for +the sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question. + +The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were +figures of various sins. For the uncleanness of any corpse signifies +the uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The +uncleanness of leprosy betokened the uncleanness of heretical +doctrine: both because heretical doctrine is contagious just as +leprosy is, and because no doctrine is so false as not to have some +truth mingled with error, just as on the surface of a leprous body +one may distinguish the healthy parts from those that are infected. +The uncleanness of a woman suffering from a flow of blood denotes the +uncleanness of idolatry, on account of the blood which is offered up. +The uncleanness of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies +the uncleanness of empty words, for "the seed is the word of God." +The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the woman in child-birth +signifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness of the +woman in her periods signifies the uncleanness of a mind that is +sensualized by pleasure. Speaking generally, the uncleanness +contracted by touching an unclean thing denotes the uncleanness +arising from consent in another's sin, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: "Go +out from among them, and be ye separate . . . and touch not the +unclean thing." + +Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even +by inanimate objects; for whatever was touched in any way by an +unclean man, became itself unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the +superstition of the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness was +contracted not only by touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi +Moses states (Doct. Perplex. iii) of a woman in her periods. The +mystical sense of this was that "to God the wicked and his wickedness +are hateful alike" (Wis. 14:9). + +There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in +themselves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house or in +clothes. For just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor +causing putrefaction and corruption in the flesh; so, too, through +some corruption and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises +sometimes a kind of corruption in the stones with which a house is +built, or in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the +name of leprosy, whereby a house or a garment was deemed to be +unclean: both because all corruption savored of uncleanness, as +stated above, and because the Gentiles worshipped their household +gods as a preservative against this corruption. Hence the Law +prescribed such houses, where this kind of corruption was of a +lasting nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to be burnt, in +order to avoid all occasion of idolatry. There was also an +uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written (Num. 19:15): "The +vessel that hath no cover, and binding over it, shall be unclean." +The cause of this uncleanness was that anything unclean might easily +drop into such vessels, so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this +command aimed at the prevention of idolatry. For idolaters believed +that if mice, lizards, or the like, which they used to sacrifice to +the idols, fell into the vessels or into the water, these became more +pleasing to the gods. Even now some women let down uncovered vessels +in honor of the nocturnal deities which they call "Janae." + +The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a +house signified the uncleanness of the assembly of heretics; the +leprosy of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from +bitterness of mind; the leprosy of a woolen garment denoted the +wickedness of flatterers; leprosy in the warp signified the vices of +the soul; leprosy on the woof denoted sins of the flesh, for as the +warp is in the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has +neither cover nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the veil of +taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity of discipline. + +Reply Obj. 5: As stated above (ad 4), there was a twofold uncleanness +in the Law; one by way of corruption in the mind or in the body; and +this was the graver uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with +an unclean thing, and this was less grave, and was more easily +expiated. Because the former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices +for sins, since all corruption is due to sin, and signifies sin: +whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling of +a certain water, of which water we read in Num. 19. For there God +commanded them to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had +committed in worshipping a calf. And a cow is mentioned rather than a +calf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to designate the +synagogue, according to Osee 4:16: "Israel hath gone astray like a +wanton heifer": and this was, perhaps, because they worshipped +heifers after the custom of Egypt, according to Osee 10:5: "(They) +have worshipped the kine of Bethaven." And in detestation of the sin +of idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact, whenever +sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude of sins, it +was all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show that this +sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, "the priest" +dipped "his finger in her blood," and sprinkled "it over against the +door of the tabernacle seven times"; for the number seven signified +universality. Further, the very sprinkling of blood pertained to the +detestation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered up was +not poured out, but was collected together, and men gathered round it +to eat in honor of the idols. Likewise it was burnt by fire, either +because God appeared to Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from +the midst of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together with all that +was connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether; just as the +cow was burnt "with her skin and her flesh, her blood and dung being +delivered to the flames." To this burning were added "cedar-wood, and +hyssop, and scarlet twice dyed," to signify that just as cedar-wood +is not liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not easily +lose its color, and hyssop retains its odor after it has been dried; +so also was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole people, +and for their good behavior and devotion. Hence it is said of the +ashes of the cow: "That they may be reserved for the multitude of the +children of Israel." Or, according to Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8, 9, +10), the four elements are indicated here: for "cedar-wood" was added +to the fire, to signify the earth, on account of its earthiness; +"hyssop," to signify the air, on account of its smell; "scarlet twice +dyed," to signify water, for the same reason as purple, on account of +the dyes which are taken out of the water: thus denoting the fact +that this sacrifice was offered to the Creator of the four elements. +And since this sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both +"he that burned her," and "he that gathered up the ashes," and "he +that sprinkled the water" in which the ashes were placed, were deemed +unclean in detestation of that sin, in order to show that whatever +was in any way connected with idolatry should be cast aside as being +unclean. From this uncleanness they were purified by the mere washing +of their clothes; nor did they need to be sprinkled with the water on +account of this kind of uncleanness, because otherwise the process +would have been unending, since he that sprinkled the water became +unclean, so that if he were to sprinkle himself he would remain +unclean; and if another were to sprinkle him, that one would have +become unclean, and in like manner, whoever might sprinkle him, and +so on indefinitely. + +The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red cow +signified Christ in respect of his assumed weakness, denoted by the +female sex; while the color of the cow designated the blood of His +Passion. And the "red cow was of full age," because all Christ's +works are perfect, "in which there" was "no blemish"; "and which" had +"not carried the yoke," because Christ was innocent, nor did He carry +the yoke of sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses, because they +blamed Him for transgressing the law of Moses by breaking the +Sabbath. And it was commanded to be delivered "to Eleazar the +priest," because Christ was delivered into the hands of the priests +to be slain. It was immolated "without the camp," because Christ +"suffered outside the gate" (Heb. 13:12). And the priest dipped "his +finger in her blood," because the mystery of Christ's Passion should +be considered and imitated. + +It was sprinkled "over against . . . the tabernacle," which denotes +the synagogue, to signify either the condemnation of the unbelieving +Jews, or the purification of believers; and this "seven times," in +token either of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, or of the seven +days wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that pertain to +the Incarnation of Christ should be burnt with fire, i.e. they should +be understood spiritually; for the "skin" and "flesh" signified +Christ's outward works; the "blood" denoted the subtle inward force +which quickened His external deeds; the "dung" betokened His +weariness, His thirst, and all such like things pertaining to His +weakness. Three things were added, viz. "cedar-wood," which denotes +the height of hope or contemplation; "hyssop," in token of humility +or faith; "scarlet twice dyed," which denotes twofold charity; for it +is by these three that we should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes +of this burning were gathered by "a man that is clean," because the +relics of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, who +were not guilty of Christ's death. The ashes were put into water for +the purpose of expiation, because Baptism receives from Christ's +Passion the power of washing away sins. The priest who immolated and +burned the cow, and he who burned, and he who gathered together the +ashes, were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water: either +because the Jews became unclean through putting Christ to death, +whereby our sins are expiated; and this, until the evening, i.e. +until the end of the world, when the remnants of Israel will be +converted; or else because they who handle sacred things with a view +to the cleansing of others contract certain uncleannesses, as Gregory +says (Pastor. ii, 5); and this until the evening, i.e. until the end +of this life. + +Reply Obj. 6: As stated above (ad 5), an uncleanness which was caused +by corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by +sin-offerings. Now special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the +sins of individuals: but since some were neglectful about expiating +such sins and uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to offer +this expiation; it was laid down that once a year, on the tenth day +of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for +the whole people. And because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28), "the +Law maketh men priests, who have infirmity," it behooved the priest +first of all to offer a calf for his own sins, in memory of Aaron's +sin in fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer a ram for a +holocaust, which signified that the priestly sovereignty denoted by +the ram, who is the head of the flock, was to be ordained to the +glory of God. Then he offered two he-goats for the people: one of +which was offered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the +he-goat is an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin clothes are +made having a pungent odor; to signify the stench, uncleanness and +the sting of sin. After this he-goat had been immolated, its blood +was taken, together with the blood of the calf, into the Holy of +Holies, and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled with it; to signify +that the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleanness of the children +of Israel. But the corpses of the he-goat and calf which had been +offered up for sin had to be burnt, to denote the destruction of +sins. They were not, however, burnt on the altar: since none but +holocausts were burnt thereon; but it was prescribed that they should +be burnt without the camp, in detestation of sin: for this was done +whenever sacrifice was offered for a grievous sin, or for the +multitude of sins. The other goat was let loose into the wilderness: +not indeed to offer it to the demons, whom the Gentiles worshipped in +desert places, because it was unlawful to offer aught to them; but in +order to point out the effect of the sacrifice which had been offered +up. Hence the priest put his hand on its head, while confessing the +sins of the children of Israel: as though that goat were to carry +them away into the wilderness, where it would be devoured by wild +beasts, because it bore the punishment of the people's sins. And it +was said to bear the sins of the people, either because the +forgiveness of the people's sins was signified by its being let +loose, or because on its head written lists of sins were fastened. + +The figurative reason of these things was that Christ was +foreshadowed both by the calf, on account of His power; and by the +ram, because He is the Head of the faithful; and by the he-goat, on +account of "the likeness of sinful flesh" (Rom. 8:3). Moreover, +Christ was sacrificed for the sins of both priests and people: since +both those of high and those of low degree are cleansed from sin by +His Passion. The blood of the calf and of the goat was brought into +the Holies by the priest, because the entrance to the kingdom of +heaven was opened to us by the blood of Christ's Passion. Their +bodies were burnt without the camp, because "Christ suffered without +the gate," as the Apostle declares (Heb. 13:12). The scape-goat may +denote either Christ's Godhead Which went away into solitude when the +Man Christ suffered, not by going to another place, but by +restraining His power: or it may signify the base concupiscence which +we ought to cast away from ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord +acts of virtue. + +With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these +sacrifices, the reason is the same as that which we assigned (ad 5) +to the sacrifice of the red heifer. + +Reply Obj. 7: The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his +deformity, but declared him to be cleansed. This is shown by the +words of Lev. 14:3, seqq., where it was said that the priest, "when +he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed," shall command "him that +is to be purified": consequently, the leper was already healed: but +he was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest +restored him to the society of men and to the worship of God. It +happened sometimes, however, that bodily leprosy was miraculously +cured by the legal rite, when the priest erred in his judgment. + +Now this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in the first +place, he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, he was restored, +as clean, to the society of men and to the worship of God, to wit, +after seven days. At the first purification the leper who sought to +be cleansed offered for himself "two living sparrows . . . +cedar-wood, and scarlet, and hyssop," in such wise that a sparrow and +the hyssop should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so +that the cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory: while the +hyssop and sparrow were that part of the aspersory which was dipped +into the blood of the other sparrow which was "immolated . . . over +living waters." These things he offered as an antidote to the four +defects of leprosy: for cedar-wood, which is not subject to +putrefaction, was offered against the putrefaction; hyssop, which is +a sweet-smelling herb, was offered up against the stench; a living +sparrow was offered up against numbness; and scarlet, which has a +vivid color, was offered up against the repulsive color of leprosy. +The living sparrow was let loose to fly away into the plain, because +the leper was restored to his former liberty. + +On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, and was restored +to the society of men; but only after having shaved all the hair of +his body, and washed his clothes, because leprosy rots the hair, +infects the clothes, and gives them an evil smell. Afterwards a +sacrifice was offered for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a +result of sin: and some of the blood of the sacrifice was put on the +tip of the ear of the man that was to be cleansed, "and on the thumb +of his right hand, and the great toe of his right foot"; because it +is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. In this +rite, moreover, three liquids were employed: viz. blood, against the +corruption of the blood; oil, to denote the healing of the disease; +and living waters, to wash away the filth. + +The figurative reason was that the Divine and human natures in Christ +were denoted by the two sparrows, one of which, in likeness of His +human nature, was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters, +because the waters of Baptism are sanctified by Christ's Passion. The +other sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, remained living, +because the Godhead cannot die: hence it flew away, for the Godhead +could not be encompassed by the Passion. Now this living sparrow, +together with the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, +i.e. faith, hope and charity, as stated above (ad 5), was put into +the water for the purpose of sprinkling, because we are baptized in +the faith of the God-Man. By the waters of Baptism or of his tears +man washes his clothes, i.e. his works, and all his hair, i.e. his +thoughts. The tip of the right ear of the man to be cleansed is +moistened with some the blood and oil, in order to strengthen his +hearing against harmful words; and the thumb and toe of his right +hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy. Other matters +pertaining to this purification, or to that also of any other +uncleannesses, call for no special remark, beyond what applies to +other sacrifices, whether for sins or for trespasses. + +Reply Obj. 8 and 9: Just as the people were initiated by circumcision +to the divine worship, so were the ministers by some special +purification or consecration: wherefore they are commanded to be +separated from other men, as being specially deputed, rather than +others, to the ministry of the divine worship. And all that was done +touching them in their consecration or institution, was with a view +to show that they were in possession of a prerogative of purity, +power and dignity. Hence three things were done in the institution of +ministers: for first, they were purified; secondly, they were adorned +[*'Ornabantur.' Some editions have 'ordinabantur'--'were ordained': +the former reading is a reference to Lev. 8:7-9] and consecrated; +thirdly, they were employed in the ministry. All in general used to +be purified by washing in water, and by certain sacrifices; but the +Levites in particular shaved all the hair of their bodies, as stated +in Lev. 8 (cf. Num. 8). + +With regard to the high-priests and priests the consecration was +performed as follows. First, when they had been washed, they were +clothed with certain special garments in designation of their +dignity. In particular, the high-priest was anointed on the head with +the oil of unction: to denote that the power of consecration was +poured forth by him on to others, just as oil flows from the head on +to the lower parts of the body; according to Ps. 132:2: "Like the +precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard, the beard +of Aaron." But the Levites received no other consecration besides +being offered to the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands +of the high-priest, who prayed for them. The lesser priests were +consecrated on the hands only, which were to be employed in the +sacrifices. The tip of their right ear and the thumb of their right +hand, and the great toe of their right foot were tinged with the +blood of the sacrificial animal, to denote that they should be +obedient to God's law in offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by +touching their right ear); and that they should be careful and ready +in performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moistening of +the right foot and hand). They themselves and their garments were +sprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been sacrificed, in +memory of the blood of the lamb by which they had been delivered in +Egypt. At their consecration the following sacrifices were offered: a +calf, for sin, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten +calf; a ram, for a holocaust, in memory of the sacrifice of Abraham, +whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate; again, a ram +of consecration, which was a peace-offering, in memory of the +delivery from Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and a basket of +bread, in memory of the manna vouchsafed to the people. + +In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the fat of the +ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were placed on their +hands, to show that they received the power of offering these things +to the Lord: while the Levites were initiated to the ministry by +being brought into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined +to the ministry touching the vessels of the sanctuary. + +The figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be +consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ, should be first of +all purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the waters of tears, in +their faith in Christ's Passion, which is a sacrifice both of +expiation and of purification. They have also to shave all the hair +of their body, i.e. all evil thoughts. They should, moreover, be +decked with virtues, and be consecrated with the oil of the Holy +Ghost, and with the sprinkling of Christ's blood. And thus they +should be intent on the fulfilment of their spiritual ministry. + +Reply Obj. 10: As already stated (A. 4), the purpose of the Law was +to induce men to have reverence for the divine worship: and this in +two ways; first, by excluding from the worship of God whatever might +be an object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the divine +worship all that seemed to savor of reverence. And, indeed, if this +was observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the +animals to be sacrificed, much more was it to be observed in the very +ministers. Wherefore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers, +it was prescribed that they should have no bodily stain or defect: +since men so deformed are wont to be despised by others. For the same +reason it was also commanded that the choice of those who were to be +destined to the service of God was not to be made in a broadcast +manner from any family, but according to their descent from one +particular stock, thus giving them distinction and nobility. + +In order that they might be revered, special ornate vestments were +appointed for their use, and a special form of consecration. This +indeed is the general reason of ornate garments. But the high-priest +in particular had eight vestments. First, he had a linen tunic. +Secondly, he had a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were +placed "little bells" and "pomegranates of violet, and purple, and +scarlet twice dyed." Thirdly, he had the ephod, which covered his +shoulders and his breast down to the girdle; and it was made of gold, +and violet and purple, and scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen: and +on his shoulders he bore two onyx stones, on which were graven the +names of the children of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational, made +of the same material; it was square in shape, and was worn on the +breast, and was fastened to the ephod. On this rational there were +twelve precious stones set in four rows, on which also were graven +the names of the children of Israel, in token that the priest bore +the burden of the whole people, since he bore their names on his +shoulders; and that it was his duty ever to think of their welfare, +since he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart, so to +speak. And the Lord commanded the "Doctrine and Truth" to be put in +the rational: for certain matters regarding moral and dogmatic truth +were written on it. The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was +placed a stone which changed color according to the various things +which were about to happen to the children of Israel: and this they +call the "Truth and Doctrine." Fifthly, he wore a belt or girdle made +of the four colors mentioned above. Sixthly, there was the tiara or +mitre which was made of linen. Seventhly, there was the golden plate +which hung over his forehead; on it was inscribed the Lord's name. +Eighthly, there were "the linen breeches to cover the flesh of their +nakedness," when they went up to the sanctuary or altar. Of these +eight vestments the lesser priests had four, viz. the linen tunic and +breeches, the belt and the tiara. + +According to some, the literal reason for these vestments was that +they denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe; as though the +high-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the Creator of +the world, wherefore it is written (Wis. 18:24): "In the robe" of +Aaron "was the whole world" described. For the linen breeches +signified the earth out of which the flax grows. The surrounding belt +signified the ocean which surrounds the earth. The violet tunic +denoted the air by its color: its little bells betoken the thunder; +the pomegranates, the lightning. The ephod, by its many colors, +signified the starry heaven; the two onyx stones denoted the two +hemispheres, or the sun and moon. The twelve precious stones on the +breast are the twelve signs of the zodiac: and they are said to have +been placed on the rational because in heaven are the types +(_rationes_) of earthly things, according to Job 38:33: "Dost thou +know the order of heaven, and canst thou set down the reason +(_rationem_) thereof on the earth?" The turban or tiara signified the +empyrean: the golden plate was a token of God, the governor of the +universe. + +The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains or defects +wherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify the various vices and +sins from which they should be free. Thus it is forbidden that he +should be blind, i.e. he ought not to be ignorant: he must not be +lame, i.e. vacillating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have "a +little, or a great, or a crooked nose," i.e. that he should not, from +lack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in another, or even +exercise some base occupation: for the nose signifies discretion, +because it discerns odors. It is forbidden that he should have "a +broken foot" or "hand," i.e. he should not lose the power of doing +good works or of advancing in virtue. He is rejected, too, if he have +a swelling either in front or behind [Vulg.: 'if he be +crook-backed']: by which is signified too much love of earthly +things: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if his mind is darkened by carnal +affections: for running of the eyes is caused by a flow of matter. He +is also rejected if he had "a pearl in his eye," i.e. if he presumes +in his own estimation that he is clothed in the white robe of +righteousness. Again, he is rejected "if he have a continued scab," +i.e. lustfulness of the flesh: also, if he have "a dry scurf," which +covers the body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the +comeliness of the members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is +rejected "if he have a rupture" or hernia; through baseness rending +his heart, though it appear not in his deeds. + +The vestments denote the virtues of God's ministers. Now there are +four things that are necessary to all His ministers, viz. chastity +denoted by the breeches; a pure life, signified by the linen tunic; +the moderation of discretion, betokened by the girdle; and rectitude +of purpose, denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the +high-priests needed four other things in addition to these. First, a +continual recollection of God in their thoughts; and this was +signified by the golden plate worn over the forehead, with the name +of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they had to bear with the +shortcomings of the people: this was denoted by the ephod which they +bore on their shoulders. Thirdly, they had to carry the people in +their mind and heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which +they wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a godly life by +performing works of perfection; and this was signified by the violet +tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed to the bottom of the +violet tunic, which bells signified the teaching of divine things +united in the high-priest to his godly mode of life. In addition to +these were the pomegranates, signifying unity of faith and concord in +good morals: because his doctrine should hold together in such a way +that it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 6] + +Whether There Was Any Reasonable Cause for the Ceremonial Observances? + +Objection 1: It would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the +ceremonial observances. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:4), +"every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is +received with thanksgiving." It was therefore unfitting that they +should be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean according +to Lev. 11 [*Cf. Deut. 14]. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as animals are given to man for food, so also +are herbs: wherefore it is written (Gen. 9:3): "As the green herbs +have I delivered all" flesh "to you." But the Law did not distinguish +any herbs from the rest as being unclean, although some are most +harmful, for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems +that neither should any animals have been prohibited as being unclean. + +Obj. 3: Further, if the matter from which a thing is generated be +unclean, it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is +unclean. But flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh +was not prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like manner neither +should blood have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which is +engendered from blood. + +Obj. 4: Further, Our Lord said (Matt. 10:28; cf. Luke 12:4), that +those should not be feared "that kill the body," since after death +they "have no more that they can do": which would not be true if +after death harm might come to man through anything done with his +body. Much less therefore does it matter to an animal already dead +how its flesh be cooked. Consequently there seems to be no reason in +what is said, Ex. 23:19: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of +its dam." + +Obj. 5: Further, all that is first brought forth of man and beast, as +being most perfect, is commanded to be offered to the Lord (Ex. 13). +Therefore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in Lev. 19:23: +"when you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in it +fruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision [*'Praeputia,' +which Douay version renders 'first fruits'] of them," i.e. the first +crops, and they "shall be unclean to you, neither shall you eat of +them." + +Obj. 6: Further, clothing is something extraneous to man's body. +Therefore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden to +the Jews: for instance (Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not wear a garment +that is woven of two sorts": and (Deut. 22:5): "A woman shall not be +clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel": +and further on (Deut. 22:11): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is +woven of woolen and linen together." + +Obj. 7: Further, to be mindful of God's commandments concerns not the +body but the heart. Therefore it is unsuitably prescribed (Deut. 6:8, +seqq.) that they should "bind" the commandments of God "as a sign" on +their hands; and that they should "write them in the entry"; and +(Num. 15:38, seqq.) that they should "make to themselves fringes in +the corners of their garments, putting in them ribands of blue . . . +they may remember . . . the commandments of the Lord." + +Obj. 8: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9) that God does not +"take care for oxen," and, therefore, neither of other irrational +animals. Therefore without reason is it commanded (Deut. 22:6): "If +thou find, as thou walkest by the way, a bird's nest in a tree . . . +thou shalt not take the dam with her young"; and (Deut. 25:4): "Thou +shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn"; and (Lev. +19:19): "Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any +other kind." + +Objection 9: Further, no distinction was made between clean and +unclean plants. Much less therefore should any distinction have been +made about the cultivation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly +prescribed (Lev. 19:19): "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different +seeds"; and (Deut. 22:9, seqq.): "Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with +divers seeds"; and: "Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass +together." + +Objection 10: Further, it is apparent that inanimate things are most +of all subject to the power of man. Therefore it was unfitting to +debar man from taking silver and gold of which idols were made, or +anything they found in the houses of idols, as expressed in the +commandment of the Law (Deut. 7:25, seqq.). It also seems an absurd +commandment set forth in Deut. 23:13, that they should "dig round +about and . . . cover with earth that which they were eased of." + +Objection 11: Further, piety is required especially in priests. But +it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one's +friends: wherefore Tobias is commended for so doing (Tob. 1:20, +seqq.). In like manner it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a +loose woman, because she is thereby delivered from sin and infamy. +Therefore it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to +priests (Lev. 21). + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:14): "But thou art +otherwise instructed by the Lord thy God": from which words we may +gather that these observances were instituted by God to be a special +prerogative of that people. Therefore they are not without reason or +cause. + +_I answer that,_ The Jewish people, as stated above (A. 5), were +specially chosen for the worship of God, and among them the priests +themselves were specially set apart for that purpose. And just as +other things that are applied to the divine worship, need to be +marked in some particular way so that they be worthy of the worship +of God; so too in that people's, and especially the priests', mode of +life, there needed to be certain special things befitting the divine +worship, whether spiritual or corporal. Now the worship prescribed by +the Law foreshadowed the mystery of Christ: so that whatever they did +was a figure of things pertaining to Christ, according to 1 Cor. +10:11: "All these things happened to them in figures." Consequently +the reasons for these observances may be taken in two ways, first +according to their fittingness to the worship of God; secondly, +according as they foreshadow something touching the Christian mode of +life. + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 5, ad 4, 5), the Law distinguished +a twofold pollution or uncleanness; one, that of sin, whereby the +soul was defiled; and another consisting in some kind of corruption, +whereby the body was in some way infected. Speaking then of the +first-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can +defile a man, by reason of its nature; wherefore we read (Matt. +15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but what +cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man": which words are +explained (Matt. 15:17) as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can +defile the soul accidentally; in so far as man partakes of them +against obedience or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or +through their being an incentive to lust, for which reason some +refrain from wine and flesh-meat. + +If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in some kind +of corruption, the flesh of certain animals is unclean, either +because like the pig they feed on unclean things; or because their +life is among unclean surroundings: thus certain animals, like moles +and mice and such like, live underground, whence they contract a +certain unpleasant smell; or because their flesh, through being too +moist or too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human body. Hence +they were forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-footed animals, i.e. +animals having an uncloven hoof, on account of their earthiness; and +in like manner they were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that +have many clefts in their feet, because such are very fierce and +their flesh is very dry, such as the flesh of lions and the like. For +the same reason they were forbidden to eat certain birds of prey the +flesh of which is very dry, and certain water-fowl on account of +their exceeding humidity. In like manner certain fish lacking fins +and scales were prohibited on account of their excessive moisture; +such as eels and the like. They were, however, allowed to eat +ruminants and animals with a divided hoof, because in such animals +the humors are well absorbed, and their nature well balanced: for +neither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof; nor are they +too earthy, which is shown by their having not a flat but a cloven +hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to partake of the drier kinds, of +which the fins and scales are an indication, because thereby the +moist nature of the fish is tempered. Of birds they were allowed to +eat the tamer kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the like. Another +reason was detestation of idolatry: because the Gentiles, and +especially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown up, offered up +these forbidden animals to their idols, or employed them for the +purpose of sorcery: whereas they did not eat those animals which the +Jews were allowed to eat, but worshipped them as gods, or abstained, +for some other motive, from eating them, as stated above (A. 3, ad +2). The third reason was to prevent excessive care about food: +wherefore they were allowed to eat those animals which could be +procured easily and promptly. + +With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to partake of those +of any animals whatever without exception. Blood was forbidden, both +in order to avoid cruelty, that they might abhor the shedding of +human blood, as stated above (A. 3, ad 8); and in order to shun +idolatrous rites whereby it was customary for men to collect the +blood and to gather together around it for a banquet in honor of the +idols, to whom they held the blood to be most acceptable. Hence the +Lord commanded the blood to be poured out and to be covered with +earth (Lev. 17:13). For the same reason they were forbidden to eat +animals that had been suffocated or strangled: because the blood of +these animals would not be separated from the body: or because this +form of death is very painful to the victim; and the Lord wished to +withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational animals, so +as to be less inclined to be cruel to other men, through being used +to be kind to beasts. They were forbidden to eat the fat: both +because idolaters ate it in honor of their gods; and because it used +to be burnt in honor of God; and, again, because blood and fat are +not nutritious, which is the cause assigned by Rabbi Moses (Doct. +Perplex. iii). The reason why they were forbidden to eat the sinews +is given in Gen. 32:32, where it is stated that "the children of +Israel . . . eat not the sinew . . . because he touched the sinew of" +Jacob's "thigh and it shrank." + +The figurative reason for these things is that all these animals +signified certain sins, in token of which those animals were +prohibited. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faustum iv, 7): "If the +swine and lamb be called in question, both are clean by nature, +because all God's creatures are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the +pig is unclean in a certain signification. Thus if you speak of a +foolish, and of a wise man, each of these expressions is clean +considered in the nature of the sound, letters and syllables of which +it is composed: but in signification, the one is clean, the other +unclean." The animal that chews the cud and has a divided hoof, is +clean in signification. Because division of the hoof is a figure of +the two Testaments: or of the Father and Son: or of the two natures +in Christ: of the distinction of good and evil. While chewing the cud +signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound understanding +thereof; and whoever lacks either of these is spiritually unclean. In +like manner those fish that have scales and fins are clean in +signification. Because fins signify the heavenly or contemplative +life; while scales signify a life of trials, each of which is +required for spiritual cleanness. Of birds certain kinds were +forbidden. In the eagle which flies at a great height, pride is +forbidden: in the griffon which is hostile to horses and men, cruelty +of powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds on very small +birds, signifies those who oppress the poor. The kite, which is full +of cunning, denotes those who are fraudulent in their dealings. The +vulture, which follows an army, expecting to feed on the carcases of +the slain, signifies those who like others to die or to fight among +themselves that they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven kind +signify those who are blackened by their lusts; or those who lack +kindly feelings, for the raven did not return when once it had been +let loose from the ark. The ostrich which, though a bird, cannot fly, +and is always on the ground, signifies those who fight for God's +cause, and at the same time are taken up with worldly business. The +owl, which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in the daytime, +denotes those who are clever in temporal affairs, but dull in +spiritual matters. The gull, which both flies in the air and swims in +the water, signifies those who are partial both to Circumcision and +to Baptism: or else it denotes those who would fly by contemplation, +yet dwell in the waters of sensual delights. The hawk, which helps +men to seize the prey, is a figure of those who assist the strong to +prey on the poor. The screech-owl, which seeks its food by night but +hides by day, signifies the lustful man who seeks to lie hidden in +his deeds of darkness. The cormorant, so constituted that it can stay +a long time under water, denotes the glutton who plunges into the +waters of pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long beak, and +feeds on snakes; and perhaps it is the same as the stork: it +signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the ills of +others, as with snakes. The swan is bright in color, and by the aid +of its long neck extracts its food from deep places on land or water: +it may denote those who seek earthly profit though an external +brightness of virtue. The bittern is a bird of the East: it has a +long beak, and its jaws are furnished with follicules, wherein it +stores its food at first, after a time proceeding to digest it: it is +a figure of the miser, who is excessively careful in hoarding up the +necessaries of life. The coot [*Douay: _porphyrion._ St. Thomas' +description tallies with the coot or moorhen: though of course he is +mistaken about the feet differing from one another.] has this +peculiarity apart from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for +swimming, and a cloven foot for walking: for it swims like a duck in +the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks only when it +bites, since it dips all its food in water: it is a figure of a man +who will not take advice, and does nothing but what is soaked in the +water of his own will. The heron [*Vulg.: _herodionem_], commonly +called a falcon, signifies those whose "feet are swift to shed blood" +(Ps. 13:3). The plover [*Here, again, the Douay translators +transcribed from the Vulgate: _charadrion;_ _charadrius_ is the +generic name for all plovers.], which is a garrulous bird, signifies +the gossip. The hoopoe, which builds its nest on dung, feeds on +foetid ordure, and whose song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief +which works death in those who are unclean. The bat, which flies near +the ground, signifies those who being gifted with worldly knowledge, +seek none but earthly things. Of fowls and quadrupeds those alone +were permitted which have the hind-legs longer than the forelegs, so +that they can leap: whereas those were forbidden which cling rather +to the earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of the four +Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are reputed +unclean. By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we are to +understand the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and bravery in committing +sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Men were wont to eat plants and other products of the +soil even before the deluge: but the eating of flesh seems to have +been introduced after the deluge; for it is written (Gen. 9:3): "Even +as the green herbs have I delivered . . . all" flesh "to you." The +reason for this was that the eating of the products of the soil +savors rather of a simple life; whereas the eating of flesh savors of +delicate and over-careful living. For the soil gives birth to the +herb of its own accord; and such like products of the earth may be +had in great quantities with very little effort: whereas no small +trouble is necessary either to rear or to catch an animal. +Consequently God being wishful to bring His people back to a more +simple way of living, forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but +not those things that are produced by the soil. Another reason may be +that animals were offered to idols, while the products of the soil +were not. + +The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said (ad +1). + +Reply Obj. 4: Although the kid that is slain has no perception of the +manner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would seem to savor of +heartlessness if the dam's milk, which was intended for the +nourishment of her offspring, were served up on the same dish. It +might also be said that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of +their idols prepared the flesh of kids in this manner, for the +purpose of sacrifice or banquet: hence (Ex. 23) after the solemnities +to be celebrated under the Law had been foretold, it is added: "Thou +shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam." The figurative reason +for this prohibition is this: the kid, signifying Christ, on account +of "the likeness of sinful flesh" (Rom. 8:3), was not to be seethed, +i.e. slain, by the Jews, "in the milk of its dam," i.e. during His +infancy. Or else it signifies that the kid, i.e. the sinner, should +not be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e. should not be cajoled by +flattery. + +Reply Obj. 5: The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits, which +they held to bring them good luck: or they burnt them for the purpose +of secrecy. Consequently (the Israelites) were commanded to look upon +the fruits of the first three years as unclean: for in that country +nearly all the trees bear fruit in three years' time; those trees, to +wit, that are cultivated either from seed, or from a graft, or from a +cutting: but it seldom happens that the fruit-stones or seeds encased +in a pod are sown: since it would take a longer time for these to +bear fruit: and the Law considered what happened most frequently. The +fruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings of clean +fruits, were offered to God: and from the fifth year onward they were +eaten. + +The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that after +the three states of the Law (the first lasting from Abraham to David, +the second, until they were carried away to Babylon, the third until +the time of Christ), the Fruit of the Law, i.e. Christ, was to be +offered to God. Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on +account of their imperfection. + +Reply Obj. 6: It is said of a man in Ecclus. 19:27, that "the attire +of the body . . . " shows "what he is." Hence the Lord wished His +people to be distinguished from other nations, not only by the sign +of the circumcision, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain +difference of attire. Wherefore they were forbidden to wear garments +woven of woolen and linen together, and for a woman to be clothed +with man's apparel, or vice versa, for two reasons. First, to avoid +idolatrous worship. Because the Gentiles, in their religious rites, +used garments of this sort, made of various materials. Moreover in +the worship of Mars, women put on men's armor; while, conversely, in +the worship of Venus men donned women's attire. The second reason was +to preserve them from lust: because the employment of various +materials in the making of garments signified inordinate union of +sexes, while the use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an +incentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust. The +figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment woven +of woolen and linen signified that it was forbidden to unite the +simplicity of innocence, denoted by wool, with the duplicity of +malice, betokened by linen. It also signifies that woman is forbidden +to presume to teach, or perform other duties of men: or that man +should not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman. + +Reply Obj. 7: As Jerome says on Matt. 23:6, "the Lord commanded them +to make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their garments, +so that the Israelites might be distinguished from other nations." +Hence, in this way, they professed to be Jews: and consequently the +very sight of this sign reminded them of their law. + +When we read: "Thou shalt bind them on thy hand, and they shall be +ever before thy eyes [Vulg.: 'they shall be and shall move between +thy eyes'], the Pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words, +and wrote the decalogue of Moses on a parchment, and tied it on their +foreheads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes": +whereas the intention of the Lord in giving this commandment was that +they should be bound in their hands, i.e. in their works; and that +they should be before their eyes, i.e. in their thoughts. The +violet-colored fillets which were inserted in their cloaks signify +the godly intention which should accompany our every deed. It may, +however, be said that, because they were a carnal-minded and +stiff-necked people, it was necessary for them to be stirred by these +sensible things to the observance of the Law. + +Reply Obj. 8: Affection in man is twofold: it may be an affection of +reason, or it may be an affection of passion. If a man's affection be +one of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God +has subjected all things to man's power, according to Ps. 8:8: "Thou +hast subjected all things under his feet": and it is in this sense +that the Apostle says that "God has no care for oxen"; because God +does not ask of man what he does with oxen or other animals. + +But if man's affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in +regard to other animals: for since the passion of pity is caused by +the afflictions of others; and since it happens that even irrational +animals are sensible to pain, it is possible for the affection of +pity to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now +it is evident that if a man practice a pitiful affection for animals, +he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: wherefore +it is written (Prov. 11:10): "The just regardeth the lives of his +beasts: but the bowels of the wicked are cruel." Consequently the +Lord, in order to inculcate pity to the Jewish people, who were prone +to cruelty, wished them to practice pity even with regard to dumb +animals, and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty to +animals. Hence He prohibited them to "boil a kid in the milk of its +dam"; and to "muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn"; and to slay +"the dam with her young." It may, nevertheless, be also said that +these prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians +held it to be wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while +threshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare +the mother bird with her young during incubation, and to employ them +for the purpose of securing fruitfulness and good luck in bringing up +children: also because it was held to be a good omen to find the +mother sitting on her young. + +As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the literal reason +may have been threefold. The first was to show detestation for the +idolatry of the Egyptians, who employed various mixtures in +worshipping the planets, which produce various effects, and on +various kinds of things according to their various conjunctions. The +second reason was in condemnation of unnatural sins. The third reason +was the entire removal of all occasions of concupiscence. Because +animals of different species do not easily breed, unless this be +brought about by man; and movements of lust are aroused by seeing +such things. Wherefore in the Jewish traditions we find it prescribed +as stated by Rabbi Moses that men shall turn away their eyes from +such sights. + +The figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of +life should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth the corn, i.e. +from the preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle +states (1 Cor. 9:4, seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with +her young: because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual +senses, i.e. the offspring, and set aside the observance of the +letter, i.e. the mother, for instance, in all the ceremonies of the +Law. It is also forbidden that a beast of burden, i.e. any of the +common people, should be allowed to engender, i.e. to have any +connection, with animals of another kind, i.e. with Gentiles or Jews. + +Reply Obj. 9: All these minglings were forbidden in agriculture; +literally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyptians in +worshipping the stars employed various combinations of seeds, animals +and garments, in order to represent the various connections of the +stars. Or else all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of +the unnatural vice. + +They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohibition: "Thou +shalt not sow thy field with different seeds," is to be understood, +in the spiritual sense, of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in +the Church, which is a spiritual vineyard. Likewise "the field," i.e. +the Church, must not be sown "with different seeds," i.e. with +Catholic and heretical doctrines. Neither is it allowed to plough +"with an ox and an ass together"; thus a fool should not accompany a +wise man in preaching, for one would hinder the other. + +Reply Obj. 10: [*The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the +codices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was +supplied by Nicolai.] Silver and gold were reasonably forbidden +(Deut. 7) not as though they were not subject to the power of man, +but because, like the idols themselves, all materials out of which +idols were made, were anathematized as hateful in God's sight. This +is clear from the same chapter, where we read further on (Deut. +7:26): "Neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into thy house, +lest thou become an anathema like it." Another reason was lest, by +taking silver and gold, they should be led by avarice into idolatry +to which the Jews were inclined. The other precept (Deut. 23) about +covering up excretions, was just and becoming, both for the sake of +bodily cleanliness; and in order to keep the air wholesome; and by +reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the covenant which +stood in the midst of the camp, wherein the Lord was said to dwell; +as is clearly set forth in the same passage, where after expressing +the command, the reason thereof is at once added, to wit: "For the +Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver thee, and +to give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be holy (i.e. clean), +and let no uncleanness appear therein." The figurative reason for +this precept, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), is that sins which +are the fetid excretions of the mind should be covered over by +repentance, that we may become acceptable to God, according to Ps. +31:1: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins +are covered." Or else according to a gloss, that we should recognize +the unhappy condition of human nature, and humbly cover and purify +the stains of a puffed-up and proud spirit in the deep furrow of +self-examination. + +Reply Obj. 11: Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in their +rites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. Wherefore, in order to +extirpate the customs of idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that +the priests of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the +temple, should not "incur an uncleanness at the death" of anyone +except of those who were closely related to them, viz. their father +or mother, and others thus near of kin to them. But the high-priest +had always to be ready for the service of the sanctuary; wherefore he +was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, however nearly related +to him. They were also forbidden to marry a "harlot" or "one that has +been put away," or any other than a virgin: both on account of the +reverence due to the priesthood, the honor of which would seem to be +tarnished by such a marriage: and for the sake of the children who +would be disgraced by the mother's shame: which was most of all to be +avoided when the priestly dignity was passed on from father to son. +Again, they were commanded to shave neither head nor beard, and not +to make incisions in their flesh, in order to exclude the rites of +idolatry. For the priests of the Gentiles shaved both head and beard, +wherefore it is written (Bar 6:30): "Priests sit in their temples +having their garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven." +Moreover, in worshipping their idols "they cut themselves with knives +and lancets" (3 Kings 18:28). For this reason the priests of the Old +Law were commanded to do the contrary. + +The spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be +entirely free from dead works, i.e. sins. And they should not shave +their heads, i.e. set wisdom aside; nor should they shave their +beards, i.e. set aside the perfection of wisdom; nor rend their +garments or cut their flesh, i.e. they should not incur the sin of +schism. +________________________ + +QUESTION 103 + +OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under +which head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law? + +(2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had +any power of justification? + +(3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ? + +(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of +Christ? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 1] + +Whether the Ceremonies of the Law Were in Existence Before the Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in +existence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were +ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 4). But +sacrifices and holocausts preceded the Law: for it is written (Gen. +4:3, 4) that "Cain offered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the +Lord," and that "Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, and of +their fat." Noe also "offered holocausts" to the Lord (Gen. 18:20), +and Abraham did in like manner (Gen. 22:13). Therefore the ceremonies +of the Old Law preceded the Law. + +Obj. 2: Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part +of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded the +Law. For we read (Gen. 13:18) that "Abraham . . . built . . . an +altar the Lord"; and (Gen. 28:18) that "Jacob . . . took the stone +. . . and set it up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it." +Therefore the legal ceremonies preceded the Law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been +circumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears from Gen. +17. In like manner the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written +(Gen. 14:18) that "Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most high +God." Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law. + +Obj. 4: Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals +belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (Q. 100, 2, +A. 6, ad 1). But this distinction preceded the Law; for it is written +(Gen. 7:2, 3): "Of all clean beasts take seven and seven . . . but of +the beasts that are unclean, two and two." Therefore the legal +ceremonies preceded the Law. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:1): "These are the precepts +and ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should +teach you." But they would not have needed to be taught about these +things, if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence. +Therefore the legal ceremonies did not precede the Law. + +_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said (Q. 101, A. 2; +Q. 102, A. 2), the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double +purpose; the worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ. Now +whoever worships God must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed +things pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the divine +worship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the determining of our +relations with our neighbor is a matter determined by the judicial +precepts, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 4). Consequently, as among men +in general there were certain judicial precepts, not indeed +established by Divine authority, but ordained by human reason; so +also there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any +law, but according to the will and devotion of those that worship +God. Since, however, even before the Law some of the leading men were +gifted with the spirit of prophecy, it is to be believed that a +heavenly instinct, like a private law, prompted them to worship God +in a certain definite way, which would be both in keeping with the +interior worship, and a suitable token of Christ's mysteries, which +were foreshadowed also by other things that they did, according to 1 +Cor. 10:11: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." Therefore +there were some ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal +ceremonies, because they were not as yet established by legislation. + +Reply Obj. 1: The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices +and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of +their own will, according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in +honor of God those things which they had received from Him, and thus +to testify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of +all. + +Reply Obj. 2: They also established certain sacred things, because +they thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain places +should be set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship. + +Reply Obj. 3: The sacrament of circumcision was established by +command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament +of the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as +an observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said (John 7:20) +that circumcision was "not of Moses, but of his fathers." Again, +among those who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence +before the Law by human appointment, for the Law allotted the +priestly dignity to the firstborn. + +Reply Obj. 4: The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in +vogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is +written (Gen. 9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat +for you": but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used +only certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they did make any +distinction in regard to eating; it was not that it was considered +illegal to eat such animals, since this was not forbidden by any law, +but from dislike or custom: thus even now we see that certain foods +are looked upon with disgust in some countries, while people partake +of them in others. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 2] + +Whether, at the Time of the Law, the Ceremonies of the Old Law Had +Any Power of Justification? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the +power of justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation from +sin and consecration pertains to justification. But it is written +(Ex. 39:21) that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by +the sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil; and (Lev. 16:16) +that, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated "the +sanctuary from the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from +their transgressions and . . . their sins." Therefore the ceremonies +of the Old Law had the power of justification. + +Obj. 2: Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to +justification, according to Ps. 10:8: "The Lord is just and hath +loved justice." But some pleased God by means of ceremonies, +according to Lev. 10:19: "How could I . . . please the Lord in the +ceremonies, having a sorrowful heart?" Therefore the ceremonies of +the Old Law had the power of justification. + +Obj. 3: Further, things relating to the divine worship regard the +soul rather than the body, according to Ps. 18:8: "The Law of the +Lord is unspotted, converting souls." But the leper was cleansed by +means of the ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated in Lev. 14. Much +more therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul +by justifying it. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 2) [*The first words of the +quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory, +substituted them for 2:21, which runs thus: 'If justice be by the +Law, then Christ died in vain.']: "If there had been a law given +which could justify [Vulg.: 'give life'], Christ died in vain," i.e. +without cause. But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of +the Old Law did not confer justice. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 102, A. 5, ad 4), a twofold +uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One was spiritual and +is the uncleanness of sin. The other was corporal, which rendered a +man unfit for divine worship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched +carrion, was said to be unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but +a kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies +of the Old Law had the power to cleanse: because they were ordered by +the Law to be employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid +uncleannesses which were contracted in consequence of the +prescription of the Law. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 9:13) that "the +blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being +sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleansing of the +flesh." And just as this uncleanness which was washed away by such +like ceremonies, affected the flesh rather than the soul, so also the +ceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly before (Heb. +9:10) justices of the flesh: "justices of the flesh," says he, "being +laid on them until the time of correction." + +On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of +the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason of this was +that at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through +Christ, "Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world" (John +1:29). And since the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion had +not yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law could not +really contain in themselves a power flowing from Christ already +incarnate and crucified, such as the sacraments of the New Law +contain. Consequently they could not cleanse from sin: thus the +Apostle says (Heb. 10:4) that "it is impossible that with the blood +of oxen and goats sin should be taken away"; and for this reason he +calls them (Gal. 4:9) "weak and needy elements": weak indeed, because +they cannot take away sin; but this weakness results from their being +needy, i.e. from the fact that they do not contain grace within +themselves. + +However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the minds of the +faithful, to be united by faith to Christ incarnate and crucified; so +that they were justified by faith in Christ: of which faith the +observance of these ceremonies was a sort of profession, inasmuch as +they foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices +were offered up for sins, not as though the sacrifices themselves +washed sins away, but because they were professions of faith which +cleansed from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms +employed: for it is written (Lev. 4:26; 5:16) that in offering the +sacrifice for sin "the priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall +be forgiven him," as though the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of +the sacrifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who +offered them. It must be observed, however, that the very fact that +the ceremonies of the Old Law washed away uncleanness of the body, +was a figure of that expiation from sins which was effected by Christ. + +It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the +ceremonies had no power of justification. + +Reply Obj. 1: That sanctification of priests and their sons, and of +their apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by sprinkling +them with blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to the +divine worship, and to remove impediments from them, "to the +cleansing of the flesh," as the Apostle states (Heb. 9:13) in token +of that sanctification whereby "Jesus" sanctified "the people by His +own blood" (Heb. 13:12). Moreover, the expiation must be understood +as referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the +forgiveness of sin. Hence even the sanctuary which could not be the +subject of sin is stated to be expiated. + +Reply Obj. 2: The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by their +obedience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality +foreshadowed; not by reason of the things considered in themselves. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those ceremonies which were prescribed in the cleansing +of a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the +defilement of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these +ceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed: +hence it is written (Lev. 14:3, 4) that the priest, "going out of the +camp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command +him that is to be purified to offer," etc.; whence it is evident that +the priest was appointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after +cleansing. But these ceremonies were employed for the purpose of +taking away the uncleanness of irregularity. They do say, however, +that if a priest were to err in his judgment, the leper would be +cleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in virtue of the +sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle that the thigh of the +adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk the water "on which" the +priest had "heaped curses," as stated in Num. 5:19-27. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 3] + +Whether the Ceremonies of the Old Law Ceased at the Coming of Christ? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not +cease at the coming of Christ. For it is written (Bar. 4:1): "This is +the book of the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever." +But the legal ceremonies were part of the Law. Therefore the legal +ceremonies were to last for ever. + +Obj. 2: Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed +was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, who has +been cleansed, to make this offering (Matt. 8:4). Therefore the +ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ's coming. + +Obj. 3: Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. +But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes, +inasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of God, besides the +fact that they were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore the +ceremonies of the Old Law should not have ceased. + +Obj. 4: Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham's +faith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing of +creation: and other solemnities, in memory of other Divine favors, as +stated above (Q. 102, A. 4, ad 10; A. 5, ad 1). But Abraham's faith +is ever to be imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and +other Divine favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least +circumcision and the other legal solemnities should not have ceased. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Col. 2:16, 17): "Let no man . . +. judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or +of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to +come": and (Heb. 8:13): "In saying a new (testament), he hath made +the former old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its +end." + +_I answer that,_ All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were +ordained to the worship of God as stated above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 2). +Now external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, +which consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently exterior +worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations +in the internal worship, in which a threefold state may be +distinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, both in +heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them--in both of these +considered as things to come. Such was the state of faith and hope in +the Old Law. Another state of interior worship is that in which we +have faith and hope in heavenly goods as things to come; but in the +means of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. Such +is the state of the New Law. The third state is that in which both +are possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, +nothing hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the +Blessed. + +In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of +God will be figurative; there will be naught but "thanksgiving and +voice of praise" (Isa. 51:3). Hence it is written concerning the city +of the Blessed (Apoc. 21:22): "I saw no temple therein: for the Lord +God Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb." Proportionately, +therefore, the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which +foreshadowed the second and third states, had need to cease at the +advent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced +which would be in keeping with the state of divine worship for that +particular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, +but the Divine favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a +thing of the present. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Old Law is said to be "for ever" simply and +absolutely, as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the +ceremonial precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which +those ceremonies foreshadowed. + +Reply Obj. 2: The mystery of the redemption of the human race was +fulfilled in Christ's Passion: hence Our Lord said then: "It is +consummated" (John 19:30). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law +must have ceased then altogether through their reality being +fulfilled. As a sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ +"the veil of the temple was rent" (Matt. 27:51). Hence, before +Christ's Passion, while Christ was preaching and working miracles, +the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ +had already begun, but was not as yet consummated. And for this +reason Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded the leper to observe +the legal ceremonies. + +Reply Obj. 3: The literal reasons already given (Q. 102) for the +ceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was founded on faith in +that which was to come. Hence, at the advent of Him Who was to come, +both that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto. + +Reply Obj. 4: The faith of Abraham was commended in that he believed +in God's promise concerning his seed to come, in which all nations +were to blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, it +was necessary to make profession of Abraham's faith by means of +circumcision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs to +be declared by means of another sign, viz. Baptism, which, in this +respect, took the place of circumcision, according to the saying of +the Apostle (Col. 2:11, 12): "You are circumcised with circumcision +not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the +circumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism." + +As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its +place is taken by the "Lord's Day," which recalls the beginning of +the new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other +solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted by new solemnities: because +the blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors +granted us by Christ. Hence the feast of the Passover gave place to +the feast of Christ's Passion and Resurrection: the feast of +Pentecost when the Old Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on +which was given the Law of the living spirit: the feast of the New +Moon, to Lady Day, when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e. +Christ, by the fulness of grace: the feast of Trumpets, to the feasts +of the Apostles: the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and +Confessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to the feast of the Church +Dedication: the feast of the Assembly and Collection, to feast of the +Angels, or else to the feast of All Hallows. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 4] + +Whether Since Christ's Passion the Legal Ceremonies Can Be Observed +Without Committing Mortal Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that since Christ's Passion the legal +ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must +not believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving +the Holy Ghost: since by His fulness they were "endued with power +from on high" (Luke 24:49). But the apostles observed the legal +ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated (Acts +16:3) that Paul circumcised Timothy: and (Acts 21:26) that Paul, at +the advice of James, "took the men, and . . . being purified with +them, entered into the temple, giving notice of the accomplishment of +the days of purification, until an oblation should be offered for +every one of them." Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed +since the Passion of Christ without mortal sin. + +Obj. 2: Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning +the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church +complied with this observance; for it is stated (Gal. 2:12) that, +"when" certain men "had come" to Antioch, Peter "withdrew and +separated himself" from the Gentiles. Therefore the legal ceremonies +can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin. + +Obj. 3: Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men into +sin. But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles +should observe certain ceremonies of the Law: for it is written (Acts +15:28, 29): "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay +no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you +abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from +things strangled, and from fornication." Therefore the legal +ceremonies can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing +mortal sin. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): "If you be +circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." But nothing save +mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ's fruit. Therefore since +Christ's Passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe +the other legal ceremonies. + +_I answer that,_ All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which +the interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of +his inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either +profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, +though our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; +yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the +same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them. For by +them was it said: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son," +where the verbs are in the future tense: whereas we express the same +by means of verbs in the past tense, and say that she "conceived and +bore." In like manner the ceremonies of the Old Law betokened Christ +as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments +signify Him as already born and having suffered. Consequently, just +as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of +faith, to say that Christ is yet to be born, which the fathers of old +said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to +observe those ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with +devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching of Augustine (Contra +Faust. xix, 16), who says: "It is no longer promised that He shall be +born, shall suffer and rise again, truths of which their sacraments +were a kind of image: but it is declared that He is already born, has +suffered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in which +Christians share, are the actual representation." + +Reply Obj. 1: On this point there seems to have been a difference of +opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii, +11, seqq.) distinguished two periods of time. One was the time +previous to Christ's Passion, during which the legal ceremonies were +neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their +own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful to observe them. +But immediately after Christ's Passion they began to be not only +dead, so as no longer to be either effectual or binding; but also +deadly, so that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal sin. Hence +he maintained that after the Passion the apostles never observed the +legal ceremonies in real earnest; but only by a kind of pious +pretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize the Jews and hinder +their conversion. This pretense, however, is to be understood, not as +though they did not in reality perform those actions, but in the +sense that they performed them without the mind to observe the +ceremonies of the Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for +health's sake, not with the intention of observing legal circumcision. + +But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid +scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth of life +and doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in +things pertaining to the salvation of the faithful; therefore +Augustine (Epist. lxxxii) more fittingly distinguished three periods +of time. One was the time that preceded the Passion of Christ, during +which the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another +period was after the publication of the Gospel, during which the +legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The third is a middle +period, viz. from the Passion of Christ until the publication of the +Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because +they had neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, +because it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity to +observe them, provided they did not put their trust in them so as to +hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though faith in Christ +could not justify without the legal observances. On the other hand, +there was no reason why those who were converted from heathendom to +Christianity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who +was born of a Jewish mother; but was unwilling to circumcise Titus, +who was of heathen nationality. + +The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be +debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, while converted +heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in +order to show that there is a difference between these rites. For +heathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as +prohibited by God for all time; whereas the legal ceremonial ceased +as being fulfilled through Christ's Passion, being instituted by God +as a figure of Christ. + +Reply Obj. 2: According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the +Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews, +of whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting +thus. On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense of +blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose +Apostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this solution: because +in the canonical Scripture (viz. Gal. 2:11), wherein we must not hold +anything to be false, Paul says that Peter "was to be blamed." +Consequently it is true that Peter was at fault: and Paul blamed him +in very truth and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by +observing the legal ceremonial for the time being; because this was +lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive +minuteness in the observance of the legal rites lest he should +scandalize the Jews, the result being that he gave scandal to the +Gentiles. + +Reply Obj. 3: Some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is +not to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that the +prohibition of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the +prohibition of things strangled, that of violence and rapine; the +prohibition of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while +fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself: which opinion they +gathered from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in a +mystical sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be +unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give +this special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from +heathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods were forbidden +literally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in +order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says on Ezech. 44:31 ("The +priest shall not eat of anything that is dead"): "He condemns those +priests who from gluttony did not keep these precepts." + +But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more +conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should have +been forbidden more than the others. + +We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods +were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing +compliance with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the +union of Gentiles and Jews living side by side. Because blood and +things strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while +the Jews might have suspected the Gentiles of relapse into idolatry +if the latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these +things were prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles +and Jews were to become united together. But as time went on, with +the lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the +Gospel teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught that "not that +which entereth into the mouth defileth a man" (Matt. 15:11); and that +"nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving" (1 +Tim. 4:4). With regard to fornication a special prohibition was made, +because the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful. +________________________ + +QUESTION 104 + +OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall +consider them in general; in the second place we shall consider their +reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) What is meant by the judicial precepts? + +(2) Whether they are figurative? + +(3) Their duration; + +(4) Their division. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 1] + +Whether the Judicial Precepts Were Those Which Directed Man in +Relation to His Neighbor? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those +which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial +precepts take their name from _judgment._ But there are many things +that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to +judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which +directed man in his relations to his neighbor. + +Obj. 2: Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral +precepts, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 4). But there are many moral +precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the +case with the seven precepts of the second table. Therefore the +judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his +neighbor. + +Obj. 3: Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the +judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above (Q. 99, +A. 4; Q. 101, A. 1). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some +which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and +apparel, of which we have already spoken (Q. 102, A. 6, ad 1, 6). +Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man +as to his neighbor. + +_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among other works of +a good and just man, that "he hath executed true judgment between man +and man." But judicial precepts are so called from "judgment." +Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which +directed the relations between man and man. + +_I answer that,_ As is evident from what we have stated above (Q. 95, +A. 2; Q. 99, A. 4), in every law, some precepts derive their binding +force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason +dictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are +called "moral" precepts: since human morals are based on reason. At +the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding +force, not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered in +themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or +undue); but from some institution, Divine or human: and such are +certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the +moral precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to +man's subordination to God, they are called "ceremonial" precepts: +but when they refer to man's relations to other men, they are called +"judicial" precepts. Hence there are two conditions attached to the +judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man's relations to +other men; secondly, that they derive their binding force not from +reason alone, but in virtue of their institution. + +Reply Obj. 1: Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of +certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial +power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of +affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary +contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever +matters concern the community at large and the government thereof. +Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern +actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering +of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject to the +direction of the sovereign as supreme judge. + +Reply Obj. 2: This argument holds in respect of those precepts which +direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding +force from the mere dictate of reason. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are +moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened +by faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are +also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except in +virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only +with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but also with whatever +relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and +worship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end; +wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of +ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine +worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as to +his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his +neighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave to his master, +since a slave "is his master's in all that he is," as the Philosopher +says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no judicial precepts ordaining +man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason, +which is the princip[le] in moral matters, holds the same position, +in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge +holds in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the +relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the +relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is +directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he is +directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial +than judicial precepts in the Law. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 2] + +Whether the Judicial Precepts Were Figurative? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not +figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be +instituted as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial +precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the +judicial and ceremonial precepts. + +Obj. 2: Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the +Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. But +the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but +stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the +judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything. + +Obj. 3: Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had +to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God are +above our reason, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 2, ad 2). But things +concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the +judicial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor should +not have been figurative. + +_On the contrary,_ The judicial precepts are expounded both in the +allegorical and in the moral sense (Ex. 21). + +_I answer that,_ A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, +primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted +principally that it may be the figure of something. In this way the +ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for +the very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the +worship of God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are +figurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In +this way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For +they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in +order that they might regulate the state of that people according to +justice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow something +consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who +were directed by these precepts, was figurative, according to 1 Cor. +10:11: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." + +Reply Obj. 1: The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same +way as the judicial precepts, as explained above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might +be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had to +be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, +24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that were given to +this people were more figurative that those which were given to other +nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds of this people are expounded +in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the Assyrians or +Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men. + +Reply Obj. 3: In this people the direction of man in regard to his +neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far +as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in +this respect it was figurative. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 3] + +Whether the Judicial Precepts of the Old Law Bind for Ever? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law +bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of +justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. +Now "justice is perpetual and immortal" (Wis. 1:15). Therefore the +judicial precepts bind for ever. + +Obj. 2: Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human +institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever. +Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18) that "there is a +setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and +unprofitableness thereof." Now this is true of the ceremonial +precept, which "could [Vulg.: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make +him perfect that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers +washings and justices of the flesh," as the Apostle declares (Heb. +9:9, 10). On the other hand, the judicial precepts were useful and +efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted, +viz. to establish justice and equity among men. Therefore the +judicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain +their efficacy. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12) that "the priesthood +being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of +the Law." But the priesthood was transferred from Aaron to Christ. +Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial +precepts are no longer in force. + +_I answer that,_ The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but +were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the +ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far +as to be not only "dead," but also deadly to those who observe them +since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the +Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, +because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a +sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his +kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or +ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force +through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly +sin to intend to observe them thus. + +The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been +said above (A. 2). For it has been stated that the ceremonial +precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being +instituted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of +Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not +instituted that they might be figures, but that they might shape the +state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when +the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the +judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law was a +pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in Gal. 3:24. Since, +however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose +of being figures, but for the performance of certain deeds, the +observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the +intention of observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, is +prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the +former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has not yet +come. + +Reply Obj. 1: The obligation of observing justice is indeed +perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, +according to human or Divine institution, must needs be different, +according to the different states of mankind. + +Reply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts established by men retain their +binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains +the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of +government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is +government by the people, demands different laws from those of +oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows +(Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, +the judicial precepts had to be changed also. + +Reply Obj. 3: Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice +and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the +coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that +people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile +and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial +precepts needed to be changed also. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 4] + +Whether It Is Possible to Assign a Distinct Division of the Judicial +Precepts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct +division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts +direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which +need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man +and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to +division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not +possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. + +Obj. 2: Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral +matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, +except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the +decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial +precepts. + +Obj. 3: Further, because there is a distinct division of the +ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing +some as "sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law contains +no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it +seems that they have no distinct division. + +_On the contrary,_ Wherever there is order there must needs be +division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the +judicial precepts, since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore +it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division. + +_I answer that,_ Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or +ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct +division in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a +distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless +by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the +Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one another, +are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is +directed. + +Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the +people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among +themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of +members of the same household, such as the order of the father to his +son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and +according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of +judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down +concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his +office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the +judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a +man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling, +judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial +precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard to +foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and +about the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third +part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given +relating to home life: for instance, about servants, wives and +children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts. + +Reply Obj. 1: Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between +one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are +reducible to certain distinct heads, according to the different +relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in +the moral order, as stated above (Q. 100, A. 3): and consequently it +is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in +relation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a +different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from +their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct reason for +distinguishing them. + +Reply Obj. 3: The Law alludes to the division of the judicial +precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the +judicial precepts of the Law. +________________________ + +QUESTION 105 + +OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under +which head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the +rulers; + +(2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another; + +(3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners; + +(4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 1] + +Whether the Old Law Enjoined Fitting Precepts Concerning Rulers? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts +concerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4), +"the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler." But +the Law contains no precept relating to the institution of the chief +ruler; and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior +rulers: firstly (Ex. 18:21): "Provide out of all the people wise +[Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; again (Num. 11:16): "Gather unto Me +seventy men of the ancients of Israel"; and again (Deut. 1:13): "Let +Me have from among you wise and understanding men," etc. Therefore +the Law provided insufficiently in regard to the rulers of the people. + +Obj. 2: Further, "The best gives of the best," as Plato states (Tim. +ii). Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to be ruled +by a king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in +resemblance to the Divine government, whereby God rules the world +from the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king over the +people, and they should not have been allowed a choice in the matter, +as indeed they were allowed (Deut. 17:14, 15): "When thou . . . shalt +say: I will set a king over me . . . thou shalt set him," etc. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to Matt. 12:25: "Every kingdom divided +against itself shall be made desolate": a saying which was verified +in the Jewish people, whose destruction was brought about by the +division of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things +pertaining to the general well-being of the people. Therefore it +should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings: nor +should this have been introduced even by Divine authority; as we read +of its being introduced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the +Silonite (3 Kings 11:29, seqq.). + +Obj. 4: Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of +the people in things concerning God, as stated in Heb. 5:1; so are +rulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But +certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood for the priests +and Levites of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many +like things. Therefore in like manner certain things should have been +determined for the livelihood of the rulers of the people: the more +that they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in +Ex. 23:8: "You shall not [Vulg.: 'Neither shalt thou'] take bribes, +which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just." + +Obj. 5: Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is +tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, He +established a tyrannical law; for it is written (1 Kings 8:11): "This +will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will +take your sons," etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting provision with +regard to the institution of rulers. + +_On the contrary,_ The people of Israel is commended for the beauty +of its order (Num. 24:5): "How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O +Jacob, and thy tents." But the beautiful ordering of a people depends +on the right establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made +right provision for the people with regard to its rulers. + +_I answer that,_ Two points are to be observed concerning the right +ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take +some share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures +peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring, +as stated in _Polit._ ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in +respect of the kinds of government, or the different ways in which +the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, +as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first +place is held by the _kingdom,_ where the power of government is +vested in one; and _aristocracy,_ which signifies government by the +best, where the power of government is vested in a few. Accordingly, +the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is +given the power to preside over all; while under him are others +having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared +by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the +rules are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being +partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly +aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; +partly democracy, i.e. government by the people, in so far as the +rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right +to choose their rulers. + +Such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For +Moses and his successors governed the people in such a way that each +of them was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom. +Moreover, seventy-two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue: for +it is written (Deut. 1:15): "I took out of your tribes wise and +honorable, and appointed them rulers": so that there was an element +of aristocracy. But it was a democratical government in so far as the +rulers were chosen from all the people; for it is written (Ex. +18:21): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," +etc.; and, again, in so far as they were chosen by the people; +wherefore it is written (Deut. 1:13): "Let me have from among you +wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc. Consequently it is evident that the +ordering of the rulers was well provided for by the Law. + +Reply Obj. 1: This people was governed under the special care of God: +wherefore it is written (Deut. 7:6): "The Lord thy God hath chosen +thee to be His peculiar people": and this is why the Lord reserved to +Himself the institution of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses +pray (Num. 27:16): "May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the +flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude." Thus by God's +orders Josue was set at the head in place of Moses; and we read about +each of the judges who succeeded Josue that God "raised . . . up a +saviour" for the people, and that "the spirit of the Lord was" in +them (Judges 3:9, 10, 15). Hence the Lord did not leave the choice of +a king to the people; but reserved this to Himself, as appears from +Deut. 17:15: "Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose." + +Reply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, +so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king +is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom +this power is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only the +virtuous man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, +as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect virtue is to +be found in few: and especially were the Jews inclined to cruelty and +avarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the +very first the Lord did not set up the kingly authority with full +power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. But +afterwards when the people asked Him to do so, being indignant with +them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear from His words +to Samuel (1 Kings 8:7): "They have not rejected thee, but Me, that I +should not reign over them." + +Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish +the manner of election from the very beginning (Deut. 17:14, seqq.): +and then He determined two points: first, that in choosing a king +they should wait for the Lord's decision; and that they should not +make a man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to +take little interest in the people they are set over, and +consequently to have no care for their welfare: secondly, He +prescribed how the king after his appointment should behave, in +regard to himself; namely, that he should not accumulate chariots and +horses, nor wives, nor immense wealth: because through craving for +such things princes become tyrants and forsake justice. He also +appointed the manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards +God: namely, that they should continually read and ponder on God's +Law, and should ever fear and obey God. Moreover, He decided how they +should behave towards their subjects: namely, that they should not +proudly despise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not +depart from the paths of justice. + +Reply Obj. 3: The division of the kingdom, and a number of kings, was +rather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many +dissensions, specially against the just rule of David, than a benefit +conferred on them for their profit. Hence it is written (Osee 13:11): +"I will give thee a king in My wrath"; and (Osee 8:4): "They have +reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and I knew not." + +Reply Obj. 4: The priestly office was bequeathed by succession from +father to son: and this, in order that it might be held in greater +respect, if not any man from the people could become a priest: since +honor was given to them out of reverence for the divine worship. +Hence it was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as +to tithes and as to first-fruits, and, again, as to oblations and +sacrifices, that they might be afforded a means of livelihood. On the +other hand, the rulers, as stated above, were chosen from the whole +people; wherefore they had their own possessions, from which to +derive a living: and so much the more, since the Lord forbade even a +king to have superabundant wealth to make too much show of +magnificence: both because he could scarcely avoid the excesses of +pride and tyranny, arising from such things, and because, if the +rulers were not very rich, and if their office involved much work and +anxiety, it would not tempt the ambition of the common people; and +would not become an occasion of sedition. + +Reply Obj. 5: That right was not given to the king by Divine +institution: rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that +right, by framing unjust laws, and by degenerating into tyrants who +preyed on their subjects. This is clear from the context that +follows: "And you shall be his slaves [Douay: 'servants']": which is +significative of tyranny, since a tyrant rules is subjects as though +they were his slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter them +from asking for a king; since the narrative continues: "But the +people would not hear the voice of Samuel." It may happen, however, +that even a good king, without being a tyrant, may take away the +sons, and make them tribunes and centurions; and may take many things +from his subjects in order to secure the common weal. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 2] + +Whether the Judicial Precepts Were Suitably Framed As to the +Relations of One Man with Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not +suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another. +Because men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what +belongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law: +since it is written (Deut. 23:24): "Going into thy neighbor's +vineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest." Therefore +the Old Law did not make suitable provisions for man's peace. + +Obj. 2: Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states +has been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher says +(Polit. ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law; for it is +written (Num. 27:8): "When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance +shall pass to his daughter." Therefore the Law made unsuitable +provision for the welfare of the people. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human +society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying +and selling, as stated in _Polit._ i. But the Old Law took away the +force of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year of the +jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor (Lev. 25:28). +Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfitting command. + +Obj. 4: Further, man's needs require that men should be ready to +lend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the +pledges: hence it is written (Ecclus. 29:10): "Many have refused to +lend, not out of wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded +without cause." And yet this was encouraged by the Law. First, +because it prescribed (Deut. 15:2): "He to whom any thing is owing +from his friend or neighbor or brother, cannot demand it again, +because it is the year of remission of the Lord"; and (Ex. 22:15) it +is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is +present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution. Secondly, +because the security acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is +written (Deut. 24:10): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any +thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take +away a pledge"; and again (Deut. 24:12, 13): "The pledge shall not +lodge with thee that night, but thou shalt restore it to him +presently." Therefore the Law made insufficient provision in the +matter of loans. + +Obj. 5: Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a +fraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be observed in +such matters: hence it is stated in 2 Mac. 3:15 that "the priests . . +. called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things +given to be kept, that He would preserve them safe, for them that had +deposited them." But the precepts of the Old Law observed little +caution in regard to deposits: since it is prescribed (Ex. 22:10, 11) +that when goods deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath +of the depositary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision in +this matter. + +Obj. 6: Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do +men let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant to +pay his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an +unnecessarily hard prescription (Lev. 19:13) that "the wages of him +that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning." + +Obj. 7: Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge, it +should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting that +the Law (Deut. 17:8, 9) should command them to go to a fixed place to +ask for judgment on doubtful matters. + +Obj. 8: Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more, +should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated +(Deut. 19:15) that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word +shall stand." + +Objection 9: Further, punishment should be fixed according to the +gravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written (Deut. +25:2): "According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also +of the stripes be." Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments for certain +faults: for it is written (Ex. 22:1) that the thief "shall restore +five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Moreover, +certain slight offenses are severely punished: thus (Num. 15:32, +seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day: and +(Deut. 21:18, seqq.) the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on +account of certain small transgressions, viz. because "he gave +himself to revelling . . . and banquetings." Therefore the Law +prescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner. + +Objection 10: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), +"Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment, +indemnity, prison, stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile, +death, slavery." Now some of these were prescribed by the Law. +"Indemnity," as when a thief was condemned to make restitution +fivefold or fourfold. "Prison," as when (Num. 15:34) a certain man is +ordered to be imprisoned. "Stripes"; thus (Deut. 25:2), "if they see +that the offender be worthy of stripes; they shall lay him down, and +shall cause him to be beaten before them." "Public disgrace" was +brought on to him who refused to take to himself the wife of his +deceased brother, for she took "off his shoe from his foot, and" did +"spit in his face" (Deut. 25:9). It prescribed the "death" penalty, +as is clear from (Lev. 20:9): "He that curseth his father, or mother, +dying let him die." The Law also recognized the "lex talionis," by +prescribing (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Therefore it +seems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two +other punishments, viz. "exile" and "slavery." + +Objection 11: Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But +dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable +in punishing them (Ex. 21:29): "If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a +woman," it "shall be stoned": and (Lev. 20:16): "The woman that shall +lie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same." +Therefore it seems that matters pertaining to the relations of one +man with another were unsuitably regulated by the Law. + +Objection 12: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 21:12) a murderer to +be punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of +much less account than the slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be +sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it +is unfittingly prescribed (Deut. 21:1, 4) that "when there shall be +found . . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is +guilty of the murder . . . the ancients" of the nearest city "shall +take a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor +ploughed the ground, and they shall bring her into a rough and stony +valley, that never was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall +strike off the head of the heifer." + +_On the contrary,_ It is recalled as a special blessing (Ps. 147:20) +that "He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His +judgments He hath not made manifest to them." + +_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting +Tully, "a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the +law and by community of welfare." Consequently it is of the essence +of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by +just laws. Now the relations of one man with another are twofold: +some are effected under the guidance of those in authority: others +are effected by the will of private individuals. And since whatever +is subject to the power of an individual can be disposed of according +to his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between one man +and another, and the punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction +of those in authority, to whom men are subject. On the other hand, +the power of private persons is exercised over the things they +possess: and consequently their dealings with one another, as regards +such things, depend on their own will, for instance in buying, +selling, giving, and so forth. Now the Law provided sufficiently in +respect of each of these relations between one man and another. For +it established judges, as is clearly indicated in Deut. 16:18: "Thou +shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: 'thy'] gates +. . . that they may judge the people with just judgment." It is also +directed the manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to Deut. +1:16, 17: "Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own +country or a stranger: there shall be no difference of persons." It +also removed an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by +forbidding judges to accept bribes (Ex. 23:8; Deut. 16:19). It +prescribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and it +appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we shall state +farther on (ad 10). + +But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the +Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should be +distinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly +granted to others by the will of the possessors. These three points +were provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the +possessions themselves were divided among individuals: for it is +written (Num. 33:53, 54): "I have given you" the land "for a +possession: and you shall divide it among you by lot." And since many +states have been ruined through want of regulations in the matter of +possessions, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 6); therefore +the Law provided a threefold remedy against the irregularity of +possessions. The first was that they should be divided equally, +wherefore it is written (Num. 33:54): "To the more you shall give a +larger part, and to the fewer, a lesser." A second remedy was that +possessions could not be alienated for ever, but after a certain +lapse of time should return to their former owner, so as to avoid +confusion of possessions (cf. ad 3). The third remedy aimed at the +removal of this confusion, and provided that the dead should be +succeeded by their next of kin: in the first place, the son; +secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father's +brother; fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to +preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that heiresses +should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in Num. 36:6. + +Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things +should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards the care of them; +for it was prescribed (Deut. 22:1-4): "Thou shalt not pass by, if +thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt +bring them back to thy brother," and in like manner as to other +things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on +entering a friend's vineyard to eat of the fruit, but not to take any +away. And, specially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed +that the forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of grapes and fruit, +should be left behind for them (Lev. 19:9; Deut. 24:19). Moreover, +whatever grew in the seventh year was common property, as stated in +Ex. 23:11 and Lev. 25:4. + +Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner. +There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written (Deut. +14:28, 29): "The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . . +and the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the +widow . . . shall come and shall eat and be filled." And there was a +transfer for a consideration, for instance, by selling and buying, by +letting out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all +of which we find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it +is clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual +relations of one man with another. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8), "he that loveth his +neighbor hath fulfilled the Law": because, to wit, all the precepts +of the Law, chiefly those concerning our neighbor, seem to aim at the +end that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love +that men give their own goods to others: because, as stated in 1 John +3:17: "He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up +his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?" Hence +the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to +others readily: thus the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich "to +give easily and to communicate to others." Now a man does not give +easily to others if he will not suffer another man to take some +little thing from him without any great injury to him. And so the Law +laid down that it should be lawful for a man, on entering his +neighbor's vineyard, to eat of the fruit there: but not to carry any +away, lest this should lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and +cause a disturbance of the peace: for among well-behaved people, the +taking of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it rather +strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give things to one +another. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to +their father's estate except in default of male issue: failing which +it was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line +in order to comfort the father, who would have been sad to think that +his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law observed due +caution in the matter, by providing that those women who succeeded to +their father's estate, should marry within their own tribe, in order +to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in Num. 36:7, 8. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the regulation +of possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state or +nation. Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by the +law in some of the heathen states, "that anyone should sell his +possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss." For if possessions +were to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen to come into the +hands of a few: so that it might become necessary for a state or +country to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to +remove this danger, ordered things in such a way that while provision +was made for men's needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to +avail for a certain period, at the same time the said danger was +removed, by prescribing the return of those possessions after that +period had elapsed. The reason for this law was to prevent confusion +of possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite +distinction among the tribes. + +But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates, +therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like movable +goods. Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas +there was a fixed limit to the amount of estates, which could not be +exceeded, while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On +the other hand, houses situated not in a town, but "in a village that +hath no walls," could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses +are built merely with a view to the cultivation and care of +possessions; wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription in +regard to both (Lev. 25). + +Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law was to +accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one +another's assistance: because this is a very great incentive to +friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in +the matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of +mutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more frequent +and benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this +purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be +ready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined to do so as +the year of remission drew nigh, as stated in Deut. 15:7, seqq. +Secondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant +a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting necessities of life +in security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they +should be restored at once. For it is written (Deut. 23:19): "Thou +shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury": and (Deut. 24:6): +"Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; +for he hath pledged his life to thee": and (Ex. 22:26): "If thou take +of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again +before sunset." Thirdly, by forbidding them to be importunate in +exacting payment. Hence it is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend +money to any of my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou +shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner." For this reason, too, +it is enacted (Deut. 24:10, 11): "When thou shalt demand of thy +neighbor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his +house to take away a pledge, but thou shalt stand without, and he +shall bring out to thee what he hath": both because a man's house is +his surest refuge, wherefore it is offensive to a man to be set upon +in his own house; and because the Law does not allow the creditor to +take away whatever he likes in security, but rather permits the +debtor to give what he needs least. Fourthly, the Law prescribed that +debts should cease together after the lapse of seven years. For it +was probable that those who could conveniently pay their debts, would +do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud the lender +without cause. But if they were altogether insolvent, there was the +same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there was +for renewing the loan on account of their need. + +As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through +the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they perished or +deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if +they perished or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper +care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if +they were hired for a consideration: because they might have died or +deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of +the lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent, +the lender would have gained something by the loan which would no +longer have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed +when animals were hired for a consideration: because then the owner +received a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had +no right to any profit, by receiving indemnity for the animal, unless +the person who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, +of animals not hired for a consideration, equity demanded that he +should receive something by way of restitution at least to the value +of the hire of the animal that had perished or deteriorated. + +Reply Obj. 5: The difference between a loan and a deposit is that a +loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to +whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of +the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter obligation +of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. Because +the latter might be lost in two ways. First, unavoidably: i.e. either +through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held in deposit +were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic cause, +for instance, if it were taken by an enemy, or devoured by a beast +(in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner what +was left of the animal thus slain): whereas in the other cases +mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to +take an oath in order to clear himself of suspicion. Secondly, the +goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for +instance by theft: and then the depositary was bound to restitution +on account of his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held +an animal on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent +when it depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for less +negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case +of theft. + +Reply Obj. 6: Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor men +who toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded +wisely that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food. +But they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be rich: +nor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a +livelihood: and consequently the comparison does not hold. + +Reply Obj. 7: The purpose for which judges are appointed among men, +is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now a +matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded +people: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was prescribed +(Deut. 16:18) that "judges and magistrates" should be appointed in +each tribe, "to judge the people with just judgment." Secondly, a +matter may be doubtful even among experts: and therefore, in order to +remove doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should +foregather in some chief place chosen by God, where there would be +both the high-priest, who would decide doubtful matters relating to +the ceremonies of divine worship; and the chief judge of the people, +who would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just as +even now cases are taken from a lower to a higher court either by +appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written (Deut. 17:8, 9): "If +thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in +judgment . . . and thou see that the words of the judges within thy +gates do vary; arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God +shall choose; and thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical +race, and to the judge that shall be at that time." But such like +doubtful matters did not often occur for judgment: wherefore the +people were not burdened on this account. + +Reply Obj. 8: In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing +as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with a +certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs +to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible for two or +three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor +probable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore their testimony is +taken as being true, especially if they do not waver in giving it, or +are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might +not easily depart from the truth, the Law commanded that they should +be most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful +should be severely punished, as stated in Deut. 19:16, seqq. + +There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in +token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, Who are sometimes +mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two +Persons; and sometimes as three: as Augustine observes on John 8:17: +"In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true." + +Reply Obj. 9: A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of +the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, on account +of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things +being equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on account of a +habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except +by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account of a great desire for or a +great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily deterred from such +sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the +facility of committing a sin and of concealing it: for such like +sins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to +deter others from committing them. + +Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be +observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first is when a sin +is committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether +involuntary, man is altogether excused from punishment; for it is +written (Deut. 22:25, seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a +field is not guilty of death, because "she cried, and there was no +man to help her." But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, and yet +through weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion, the +sin is diminished: and the punishment, according to true judgment, +should be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal requires +that the sin be severely punished in order to deter others from +committing such sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a +man sins through ignorance: and then he was held to be guilty to a +certain extent, on account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge: +yet he was not punished by the judges but expiated his sin by +sacrifices. Hence it is written (Lev. 4:2): "The soul that sinneth +through ignorance," etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying to +ignorance of fact; and not to ignorance of the Divine precept, which +all were bound to know. The third degree was when a man sinned from +pride, i.e. through deliberate choice or malice: and then he was +punished according to the greatness of the sin [*Cf. Deut. 25:2]. The +fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy: +and then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a destroyer of +the commandment of the Law [*Cf. Num. 15:30, 31]. + +Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft, +the Law considered what would be likely to happen most frequently +(Ex. 22:1-9): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can +easily be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice +their value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, +because they graze in the fields: wherefore it happened more +frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law +inflicted a heavier penalty, by ordering four sheep to be restored +for the theft of one. As to cattle, they were yet more difficult to +safeguard, because they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in +flocks as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty was inflicted +in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox. +And this I say, unless perchance the animal itself were discovered in +the thief's possession: because in that case he had to restore only +twice the number, as in the case of other thefts: for there was +reason to presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he +kept it alive. Again, we might say, according to a gloss, that "a cow +is useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing, +for food, for milk, and its hide is employed for various purposes": +and therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep was +useful in four ways: "for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its +wool." The unruly son was slain, not because he ate and drank: but on +account of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was always punished +by death, as stated above. As to the man who gathered sticks on the +sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, which commanded the +sabbath to be observed, to testify the belief in the newness of the +world, as stated above (Q. 100, A. 5): wherefore he was slain as an +unbeliever. + +Reply Obj. 10: The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the more +grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God, and +for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents, +adultery and incest. In the case of thief of other things it +inflicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case of blows +and mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; and likewise +for the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less degree +it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace. + +The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases. +First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail himself of +the privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in +the seventh year of remission: wherefore he was punished by remaining +a slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not +wherewith to make restitution, as stated in Ex. 22:3. + +The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law: +because God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas all other +nations were given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from +that people absolutely, he would be in danger of falling into +idolatry. For this reason it is related (1 Kings 26:19) that David +said to Saul: "They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have +cast me out this day, that I should not dwell in the inheritance of +the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods." There was, however, a +restricted sort of exile: for it is written in Deut. 19:4 [*Cf. Num. +35:25] that "he that striketh [Vulg.: 'killeth'] his neighbor +ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred against him, shall +flee to one of the cities" of refuge and "abide there until the death +of the high-priest." For then it became lawful for him to return +home, because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they forgot +their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not +so eager to kill the slayer. + +Reply Obj. 11: Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on account +of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners, who had +not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was +more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone "yesterday or the +day before" (in which case steps might have been taken to avoid the +danger) than if it had taken to butting suddenly.--Or again, the +animal was slain in detestation of the sin; and lest men should be +horrified at the sight thereof. + +Reply Obj. 12: The literal reason for this commandment, as Rabbi +Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was +frequently from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf +was a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was brought +about in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore +that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the roads. +Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of +his beast, and if the murder was previously discovered, the beast was +not slain. Thirdly, the place, where the heifer was slain, remained +uncultivated. Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men +of the city would readily make known the murderer, if they knew who +he was: and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign would +escape about the matter. Or again, this was done in order to frighten +people, in detestation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer, +which is a useful animal and full of strength, especially before it +has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder, +however useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his life; and +that, by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking off of its +head; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off +from the fellowship of men, which was betokened by the fact that the +heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated +place. + +Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of +Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no sin; nor did +it plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The +fact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated valley signified +the despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and +the devil is shown to be the arch-murderer. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 3] + +Whether the Judicial Precepts Regarding Foreigners Were Framed in a +Suitable Manner? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding +foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said (Acts 10:34, 35): +"In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but +in every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice is +acceptable to Him." But those who are acceptable to God should not be +excluded from the Church of God. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded +(Deut. 23:3) that "the Ammonite and the Moabite, even after the tenth +generation, shall not enter into the church of the Lord for ever": +whereas, on the other hand, it is prescribed (Deut. 23:7) to be +observed with regard to certain other nations: "Thou shalt not abhor +the Edomite, because he is thy brother; nor the Egyptian because thou +wast a stranger in his land." + +Obj. 2: Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things +which are not in our power. But it is not in man's power to be an +eunuch, or born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded +(Deut. 23:1, 2) that "an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt +not enter into the church of the Lord." + +Obj. 3: Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be +molested: for it is written (Ex. 22:21): "Thou shalt not molest a +stranger, nor afflict him; for yourselves also were strangers in the +land of Egypt": and (Ex. 23:9): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, +for you know the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in +the land of Egypt." But it is an affliction to be burdened with +usury. Therefore the Law unsuitably permitted them (Deut. 23:19, 20) +to lend money to the stranger for usury. + +Obj. 4: Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we +should show greater care and love for those things that are nearest +to us, according to Ecclus. 13:19: "Every beast loveth its like: so +also every man him that is nearest to himself." Therefore the Lord +unsuitably commanded (Deut. 20:13-19) that all the inhabitants of a +captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees +should not be cut down. + +Obj. 5: Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue to +the good of the individual. But the common good is sought in a war +which men fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably +commanded (Deut. 20:5-7) that certain men should be sent home, for +instance a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a +vineyard, or who had married a wife. + +Obj. 6: Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is a +man's fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: since this is contrary +to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are +unfittingly excused from the toil of battle (Deut. 20:8). + +_On the contrary,_ Divine Wisdom declares (Prov. 8:8): "All my words +are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them." + +_I answer that,_ Man's relations with foreigners are twofold: +peaceful, and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the +Law contained suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three +opportunities of peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when +foreigners passed through their land as travelers. Secondly, when +they came to dwell in their land as newcomers. And in both these +respects the Law made kind provision in its precepts: for it is +written (Ex. 22:21): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger (_advenam_)"; +and again (Ex. 22:9): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger +(_peregrino_)." Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be admitted +entirely to their fellowship and mode of worship. With regard to +these a certain order was observed. For they were not at once +admitted to citizenship: just as it was law with some nations that no +one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as +the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 1). The reason for this was that if +foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as +soon as they settled down in its midst, many dangers might occur, +since the foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart +might attempt something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the +Law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close relations +with the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom they were born and +educated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau, Jacob's brother), +that they should be admitted to the fellowship of the people after +the third generation; whereas others (with whom their relations had +been hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be +admitted to citizenship; while the Amalekites, who were yet more +hostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred with them, were to +be held as foes in perpetuity: for it is written (Ex. 17:16): "The war +of the Lord shall be against Amalec from generation to generation." + +In like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the +Law contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place, it +commanded that war should be declared for a just cause: thus it is +commanded (Deut. 20:10) that when they advanced to besiege a city, +they should at first make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined +that when once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly +persevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order that they +might be the more heedful of this command, it ordered that on the +approach of battle the priest should hearten them by promising them +God's aid. Thirdly, it prescribed the removal of whatever might prove +an obstacle to the fight, and that certain men, who might be in the +way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it enjoined that they should use +moderation in pursuing the advantage of victory, by sparing women and +children, and by not cutting down fruit-trees of that country. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Law excluded the men of no nation from the worship +of God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul: for it +is written (Ex. 12:48): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among +you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first be +circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner, +and he shall be as that which is born in the land." But in temporal +matters concerning the public life of the people, admission was not +granted to everyone at once, for the reason given above: but to some, +i.e. the Egyptians and Idumeans, in the third generation; while +others were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation of their past +offense, i.e. the peoples of Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one +man is punished for a sin committed by him, in order that others +seeing this may be deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one +nation or city be punished for a crime, that others may refrain from +similar crimes. + +Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted +to citizenship on account of some act of virtue: thus it is related +(Judith 14:6) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, "was +joined to the people of Israel, with all the succession of his +kindred." The same applies to Ruth the Moabite who was "a virtuous +woman" (Ruth 3:11): although it may be said that this prohibition +regarded men and not women, who are not competent to be citizens +absolutely speaking. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3), a man is said +to be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in a restricted +sense. A man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of +citizenship, for instance, the right of debating or voting in the +popular assembly. On the other hand, any man may be called citizen, +only in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the state, even +common people or children or old men, who are not fit to enjoy power +in matters pertaining to the common weal. For this reason bastards, +by reason of their base origin, were excluded from the _ecclesia,_ +i.e. from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The +same applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive the honor +due to a father, especially among the Jews, where the divine worship +was continued through carnal generation: for even among the heathens, +those who had many children were marked with special honor, as the +Philosopher remarks (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters +pertaining to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from +others, as neither were strangers, as already stated: for it is +written (Isa. 56:3): "Let not the son of the stranger that adhereth +to the Lord speak, saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from +His people. And let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree." + +Reply Obj. 3: It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the +acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on +account of the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to +promote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a +profit. + +Reply Obj. 4: A distinction was observed with regard to hostile +cities. For some of them were far distant, and were not among those +which had been promised to them. When they had taken these cities, +they killed all the men who had fought against God's people; whereas +the women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities +which had been promised to them, all were ordered to be slain, on +account of their former crimes, to punish which God sent the +Israelites as executor of Divine justice: for it is written (Deut. +9:5) "because they have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy +coming in." The fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched, for +the use of the people themselves, to whom the city with its territory +was destined to be subjected. + +Reply Obj. 5: The builder of a new house, the planter of a vineyard, +the newly married husband, were excluded from fighting, for two +reasons. First, because man is wont to give all his affection to +those things which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of +having, and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above +other things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on account of this +affection they would fear death all the more, and be so much the less +brave in battle. Secondly, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. +ii, 5), "it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented from +obtaining something good when it is within his grasp." And so lest +the surviving relations should be the more grieved at the death of +these men who had not entered into the possession of the good things +prepared for them; and also lest the people should be horror-stricken +at the sight of their misfortune: these men were taken away from the +danger of death by being removed from the battle. + +Reply Obj. 6: The timid were sent back home, not that they might be +the gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers by their +presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others to be +afraid and run away. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 4] + +Whether the Old Law Set Forth Suitable Precepts About the Members of +the Household? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable +precepts about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every +respect his master's property," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, +2). But that which is a man's property should be his always. +Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to command (Ex. 21:2) that +slaves should "go out free" in the seventh year. + +Obj. 2: Further, a slave is his master's property, just as an animal, +e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded (Deut. 22:1-3) with regard +to animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if they be +found going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Deut. +23:15): "Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is +fled to thee." + +Obj. 3: Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more even than +the human law. But according to human laws those who ill-treat their +servants and maidservants are severely punished: and the worse +treatment of all seems to be that which results in death. Therefore +it is unfittingly commanded (Ex. 21:20, 21) that "he that striketh +his bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die under his hands +. . . if the party remain alive a day . . . he shall not be subject +to the punishment, because it is his money." + +Obj. 4: Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs from +that of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But the dominion of +master over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or +maidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to allow a man to +sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Ex. 21:7). + +Obj. 5: Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has +power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses. +Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Deut. 21:18, seqq.) that a +father should bring his son to the ancients of the city for +punishment. + +Obj. 6: Further, the Lord forbade them (Deut. 7:3, seqq.) to make +marriages with strange nations; and commanded the dissolution of such +as had been contracted (1 Esdras 10). Therefore it was unfitting to +allow them to marry captive women from strange nations (Deut. 21:10, +seqq.). + +Obj. 7: Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain +degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to Lev. 18. +Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Deut. 25:5) that if any man +died without issue, his brother should marry his wife. + +Obj. 8: Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man and +wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this is +impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was +unfitting for the Lord to allow (Deut. 24:1-4) a man to put his wife +away, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not +take her again to wife. + +Objection 9: Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband, +so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the Law +did not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate +the injury done by a servant to his master, or by a son to his +father. Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to +prescribe the "sacrifice of jealousy" in order to investigate a +wife's adultery (Num. 5:12, seqq.). Consequently it seems that the +Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the +household. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The judgments of the +Lord are true, justified in themselves." + +_I answer that,_ The mutual relations of the members of a household +regard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the +Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of man's life +may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of +view of the individual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his +individuality: and for the purpose of the preservation of life, +considered from this standpoint, man has at his service external +goods, by means of which he provides himself with food and clothing +and other such necessaries of life: in the handling of which he has +need of servants. Secondly man's life is preserved from the point of +view of the species, by means of generation, for which purpose man +needs a wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual +relations of the members of a household admit of a threefold +combination: viz. those of master and servant, those of husband and +wife, and those of father and son: and in respect of all these +relationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts. Thus, with +regard to servants, it commanded them to be treated with +moderation--both as to their work, lest, to wit, they should be +burdened with excessive labor, wherefore the Lord commanded (Deut. +5:14) that on the Sabbath day "thy manservant and thy maidservant" +should "rest even as thyself"--and also as to the infliction of +punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their servants, to set +them free (Ex. 21:26, 27). Similar provision was made in favor of a +maidservant when married to anyone (Ex. 21:7, seqq.). Moreover, with +regard to those servants in particular who were taken from among the +people, the Law prescribed that they should go out free in the +seventh year taking whatever they brought with them, even their +clothes (Ex. 21:2, seqq.): and furthermore it was commanded (Deut. +15:13) that they should be given provision for the journey. + +With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those +who were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that they should +marry a wife from their own tribe (Num. 36:6): and this lest +confusion should ensue in the property of various tribes. Also that a +man should marry the wife of his deceased brother when the latter +died without issue, as prescribed in Deut. 25:5, 6: and this in order +that he who could not have successors according to carnal origin, +might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and that thus the +deceased might not be entirely forgotten. It also forbade them to +marry certain women; to wit, women of strange nations, through fear +of their losing their faith; and those of their near kindred, on +account of the natural respect due to them. Furthermore it prescribed +in what way wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that +they should not be slandered without grave reason: wherefore it +ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his +wife of a crime (Deut. 22:13, seqq.). Also that a man's hatred of his +wife should not be detrimental to his son (Deut. 21:15, seqq.). +Again, that a man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, +but rather that he should write a bill of divorce and send her away +(Deut. 24:1). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love from the +very outset, it was prescribed that no public duties should be laid +on a recently married man, so that he might be free to rejoice with +his wife. + +With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by +instructing them in the faith: hence it is written (Ex. 12:26, +seqq.): "When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of +this service? You shall say to them: It is the victim of the passage +of the Lord." Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of +right conduct: wherefore it is written (Deut. 21:20) that the parents +had to say: "He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself +to revelling and to debauchery." + +Reply Obj. 1: As the children of Israel had been delivered by the +Lord from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the service of +God, He did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is +written (Lev. 25:39, seqq.): "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, +sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of +bondservants: but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner . . . for +they are My servants, and I brought them out of the land of Egypt: +let them not be sold as bondmen": and consequently, since they were +slaves, not absolutely but in a restricted sense, after a lapse of +time they were set free. + +Reply Obj. 2: This commandment is to be understood as referring to a +servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in committing +some sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: With regard to the ill-treatment of servants, the Law +seems to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or not: +since if it were certain, the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the +penalty was forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered to be given +his liberty: while for slaying, the punishment was that of a +murderer, when the slave died under the blow of his master. If, +however, the hurt was not certain, but only probable, the Law did not +impose any penalty as regards a man's own servant: for instance if +the servant did not die at once after being struck, but after some +days: for it would be uncertain whether he died as a result of the +blows he received. For when a man struck a free man, yet so that he +did not die at once, but "walked abroad again upon his staff," he +that struck him was quit of murder, even though afterwards he died. +Nevertheless he was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred by the +victim of his assault. But this was not the case if a man killed his +own servant: because whatever the servant had, even his very person, +was the property of his master. Hence the reason for his not being +subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being "because it is +his money." + +Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (ad 1), no Jew could own a Jew as a +slave absolutely: but only in a restricted sense, as a hireling for a +fixed time. And in this way the Law permitted that through stress of +poverty a man might sell his son or daughter. This is shown by the +very words of the Law, where we read: "If any man sell his daughter +to be a servant, she shall not go out as bondwomen are wont to go +out." Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only his son, but +even himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave, according to Lev. +25:39, 40: "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to +thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: +but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner." + +Reply Obj. 5: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9), the paternal +authority has the power only of admonition; but not that of coercion, +whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in +this case the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished by the +rulers of the city. + +Reply Obj. 6: The Lord forbade them to marry strange women on account +of the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray into +idolatry. And specially did this prohibition apply with respect to +those nations who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that +they would adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman +was willing to renounce idolatry, and become an adherent of the Law, +it was lawful to take her in marriage: as was the case with Ruth whom +Booz married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law (Ruth 1:16): +"Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God." Accordingly it +was not permitted to marry a captive woman unless she first shaved +her hair, and pared her nails, and put off the raiment wherein she +was taken, and mourned for her father and mother, in token that she +renounced idolatry for ever. + +Reply Obj. 7: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii super Matth.), "because +death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who did everything with a +view to the present life, it was ordained that children should be +born to the dead man through his brother: thus affording a certain +mitigation to his death. It was not, however, ordained that any other +than his brother or one next of kin should marry the wife of the +deceased, because" the offspring of this union "would not be looked +upon as that of the deceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be +under the obligation to support the household of the deceased, as his +brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on account of +his relationship." Hence it is evident that in marrying the wife of +his dead brother, he took his dead brother's place. + +Reply Obj. 8: The Law permitted a wife to be divorced, not as though +it were just absolutely speaking, but on account of the Jews' +hardness of heart, as Our Lord declared (Matt. 19:8). Of this, +however, we must speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony +(Supp., Q. 67). + +Reply Obj. 9: Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery, both +easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since "the eye of the +adulterer observeth darkness" (Job 24:15). But this does not apply to +a son in respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his +master: because the latter infidelity is not the result of the lust +of pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden like the +infidelity of an adulterous woman. +________________________ + +QUESTION 106 + +OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF +(In Four Articles) + +In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel +which is called the New Law: and in the first place we must consider +it in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we +shall treat of those things that are contained in the New Law. Under +the first head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it +instilled in the heart? + +(2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify? + +(3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of +the world? + +(4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will +another law take its place? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 1] + +Whether the New Law Is a Written Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is a written law. For the +New Law is just the same as the Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth +in writing, according to John 20:31: "But these are written that you +may believe." Therefore the New Law is a written law. + +Obj. 2: Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is the +natural law, according to Rom. 2:14, 15: "(The Gentiles) do by nature +those things that are of the law . . . who have [Vulg.: 'show'] the +work of the law written in their hearts." If therefore the law of the +Gospel were instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from +the law of nature. + +Obj. 3: Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those who are in +the state of the New Testament. But the law that is instilled in the +heart is common to those who are in the New Testament and to those +who are in the Old Testament: for it is written (Wis. 7:27) that +Divine Wisdom "through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she +maketh the friends of God and prophets." Therefore the New Law is not +instilled in our hearts. + +_On the contrary,_ The New Law is the law of the New Testament. But +the law of the New Testament is instilled in our hearts. For the +Apostle, quoting the authority of Jeremiah 31:31, 33: "Behold the +days shall come, saith the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of +Israel, and unto the house of Judah, a new testament," says, +explaining what this statement is (Heb. 8:8, 10): "For this is the +testament which I will make to the house of Israel . . . by giving +[Vulg.: 'I will give'] My laws into their mind, and in their heart +will I write them." Therefore the New Law is instilled in our hearts. + +_I answer that,_ "Each thing appears to be that which preponderates +in it," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 8). Now that which is +preponderant in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its +efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given +through faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the +grace itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe +in Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says (Rom. +3:27): "Where is . . . thy boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of +works? No, but by the law of faith": for he calls the grace itself of +faith "a law." And still more clearly it is written (Rom. 8:2): "The +law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from +the law of sin and of death." Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. +xxiv) that "as the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is +the law of faith inscribed on the hearts of the faithful": and +elsewhere, in the same book (xxi): "What else are the Divine laws +written by God Himself on our hearts, but the very presence of His +Holy Spirit?" + +Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to +receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to the use of +that grace: such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in +the New Law; and the faithful need to be instructed concerning them, +both by word and writing, both as to what they should believe and as +to what they should do. Consequently we must say that the New Law is +in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that +secondarily it is a written law. + +Reply Obj. 1: The Gospel writings contain only such things as pertain +to the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto, or by +directing us to the use thereof. Thus with regard to the intellect, +the Gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the manifestation +of Christ's Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith +through which we receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: and with regard +to the affections, it contains matters touching the contempt of the +world, whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy +Ghost: for "the world," i.e. worldly men, "cannot receive" the Holy +Ghost (John 14:17). As to the use of spiritual grace, this consists +in works of virtue to which the writings of the New Testament exhort +men in divers ways. + +Reply Obj. 2: There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled +into man. First, through being part of his nature, and thus the +natural law is instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled +into man by being, as it were, added on to his nature by a gift of +grace. In this way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by +indicating to him what he should do, but also by helping him to +accomplish it. + +Reply Obj. 3: No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost except +through faith in Christ either explicit or implicit: and by faith in +Christ man belongs to the New Testament. Consequently whoever had the +law of grace instilled into them belonged to the New Testament. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 2] + +Whether the New Law Justifies? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law does not justify. For no +man is justified unless he obeys God's law, according to Heb. 5:9: +"He," i.e. Christ, "became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal +salvation." But the Gospel does not always cause men to believe in +it: for it is written (Rom. 10:16): "All do not obey the Gospel." +Therefore the New Law does not justify. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the Romans that +the Old Law did not justify, because transgression increased at its +advent: for it is stated (Rom. 4:15): "The Law worketh wrath: for +where there is no law, neither is there transgression." But much more +did the New Law increase transgression: since he who sins after the +giving of the New Law deserves greater punishment, according to Heb. +10:28, 29: "A man making void the Law of Moses dieth without any +mercy under two or three witnesses. How much more, do you think, he +deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden underfoot the Son of +God," etc.? Therefore the New Law, like the Old Law, does not justify. + +Obj. 3: Further, justification is an effect proper to God, according +to Rom. 8:33: "God that justifieth." But the Old Law was from God +just as the New Law. Therefore the New Law does not justify any more +than the Old Law. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 1:16): "I am not ashamed of +the Gospel: for it is the power of God unto salvation to everyone +that believeth." But there is no salvation but to those who are +justified. Therefore the Law of the Gospel justifies. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), there is a twofold element +in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz. the grace +of the Holy Ghost bestowed inwardly. And as to this, the New Law +justifies. Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): "There," +i.e. in the Old Testament, "the Law was set forth in an outward +fashion, that the ungodly might be afraid"; "here," i.e. in the New +Testament, "it is given in an inward manner, that they may be +justified." The other element of the Evangelical Law is secondary: +namely, the teachings of faith, and those commandments which direct +human affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does +not justify. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6) "The letter killeth, +but the spirit quickeneth": and Augustine explains this (De Spir. et +Lit. xiv, xvii) by saying that the letter denotes any writing +external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are +contained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel +would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the healing +grace of faith. + +Reply Obj. 1: This argument holds true of the New Law, not as to its +principal, but as to its secondary element: i.e. as to the dogmas and +precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing. + +Reply Obj. 2: Although the grace of the New Testament helps man to +avoid sin, yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot sin: +for this belongs to the state of glory. Hence if a man sin after +receiving the grace of the New Testament, he deserves greater +punishment, as being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not +using the help given to him. And this is why the New Law is not said +to "work wrath": because as far as it is concerned it gives man +sufficient help to avoid sin. + +Reply Obj. 3: The same God gave both the New and the Old Law, but in +different ways. For He gave the Old Law written on tables of stone: +whereas He gave the New Law written "in the fleshly tables of the +heart," as the Apostle expresses it (2 Cor. 3:3). Wherefore, as +Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xviii), "the Apostle calls this +letter which is written outside man, a ministration of death and a +ministration of condemnation: whereas he calls the other letter, i.e. +the Law of the New Testament, the ministration of the spirit and the +ministration of justice: because through the gift of the Spirit we +work justice, and are delivered from the condemnation due to +transgression." +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 3] + +Whether the New Law Should Have Been Given from the Beginning of the +World? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law should have been given +from the beginning of the world. "For there is no respect of persons +with God" (Rom. 2:11). But "all" men "have sinned and do need the +glory of God" (Rom. 3:23). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should +have been given from the beginning of the world, in order that it +might bring succor to all. + +Obj. 2: Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they live in +various times. But God, "Who will have all men to be saved" (1 Tim. +2:4), commanded the Gospel to be preached in all places, as may be +seen in the last chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the Law of +the Gospel should have been at hand for all times, so as to be given +from the beginning of the world. + +Obj. 3: Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for all +eternity, more than to save his body, which is a temporal matter. But +God provided man from the beginning of the world with things that are +necessary for the health of his body, by subjecting to his power +whatever was created for the sake of man (Gen. 1:26-29). Therefore +the New Law also, which is very necessary for the health of the soul, +should have been given to man from the beginning of the world. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not +first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But the New Law +is highly spiritual. Therefore it was not fitting for it to be given +from the beginning of the world. + +_I answer that,_ Three reasons may be assigned why it was not fitting +for the New Law to be given from the beginning of the world. The +first is because the New Law, as stated above (A. 1), consists +chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be +given abundantly until sin, which is an obstacle to grace, had been +cast out of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by +Christ: wherefore it is written (John 7:39): "As yet the Spirit was +not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." This reason the +Apostle states clearly (Rom. 8:2, seqq.) where, after speaking of +"the Law of the Spirit of life," he adds: "God sending His own Son, +in the likeness of sinful flesh, of sin* hath condemned sin in the +flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." +[*St. Thomas, quoting perhaps from memory, omits the "et" (and), +after "sinful flesh." The text quoted should read thus: "in the +likeness of sinful flesh, and a sin offering (_peri hamartias_), +hath," etc.] + +A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law. +Because a thing is not brought to perfection at once from the outset, +but through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a +boy, and then a man. And this reason is stated by the Apostle (Gal. +3:24, 25): "The Law was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be +justified by faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer +under a pedagogue." + +The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law is the law of +grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all to be left to himself +under the state of the Old Law, so that through falling into sin, he +might realize his weakness, and acknowledge his need of grace. This +reason is set down by the Apostle (Rom. 5:20): "The Law entered in, +that sin might abound: and when sin abounded grace did more abound." + +Reply Obj. 1: Mankind on account of the sin of our first parents +deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace: and so "from whom it is +withheld it is justly withheld, and to whom it is given, it is +mercifully given," as Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv) [*Cf. +Ep. ccvii; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii, 19]. Consequently it does not +follow that there is respect of persons with God, from the fact that +He did not offer the Law of grace to all from the beginning of the +world, which Law was to be published in due course of time, as stated +above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The state of mankind does not vary according to +diversity of place, but according to succession of time. Hence the +New Law avails for all places, but not for all times: although at all +times there have been some persons belonging to the New Testament, as +stated above (A. 1, ad 3). + +Reply Obj. 3: Things pertaining to the health of the body are of +service to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy: +whereas things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to +grace, which is forfeit through sin. Consequently the comparison will +not hold. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 4] + +Whether the New Law Will Last Till the End of the World? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law will not last until the +end of the world. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10), "when +that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done +away." But the New Law is "in part," since the Apostle says (1 Cor. +13:9): "We know in part and we prophesy in part." Therefore the New +Law is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a more perfect state. + +Obj. 2: Further, Our Lord (John 16:13) promised His disciples the +knowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, should +come. But the Church knows not yet all truth in the state of the New +Testament. Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein +all truth will be revealed by the Holy Ghost. + +Obj. 3: Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son and the +Son from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct from the Father +and the Son. But there was a state corresponding with the Person of +the Father, viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein men were intent on +begetting children: and likewise there is a state corresponding to +the Person of the Son: viz. the state of the New Law, wherein the +clergy who are intent on wisdom (which is appropriated to the Son) +hold a prominent place. Therefore there will be a third state +corresponding to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men will hold the +first place. + +Obj. 4: Further, Our Lord said (Matt. 24:14): "This Gospel of the +kingdom shall be preached in the whole world . . . and then shall the +consummation come." But the Gospel of Christ is already preached +throughout the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet +come. Therefore the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the +kingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet, +like unto another Law. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 24:34): "I say to you that +this generation shall not pass till all (these) things be done": +which passage Chrysostom (Hom. lxxvii) explains as referring to "the +generation of those that believe in Christ." Therefore the state of +those who believe in Christ will last until the consummation of the +world. + +_I answer that,_ The state of the world may change in two ways. In +one way, according to a change of law: and thus no other state will +succeed this state of the New Law. Because the state of the New Law +succeeded the state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less +perfect one. Now no state of the present life can be more perfect +that the state of the New Law: since nothing can approach nearer to +the last end than that which is the immediate cause of our being +brought to the last end. But the New Law does this: wherefore the +Apostle says (Heb. 10:19-22): "Having therefore, brethren, a +confidence in the entering into the Holies by the blood of Christ, a +new . . . way which He hath dedicated for us . . . let us draw near." +Therefore no state of the present life can be more perfect than that +of the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end the more +perfect it is. + +In another way the state of mankind may change according as man +stands in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly. +And thus the state of the Old Law underwent frequent changes, since +at times the laws were very well kept, and at other times were +altogether unheeded. Thus, too, the state of the New Law is subject +to change with regard to various places, times, and persons, +according as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man more or less +perfectly. Nevertheless we are not to look forward to a state wherein +man is to possess the grace of the Holy Ghost more perfectly than he +has possessed it hitherto, especially the apostles who "received the +firstfruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and more abundantly than +others," as a gloss expounds on Rom. 8:23. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), there is a threefold +state of mankind; the first was under the Old Law; the second is that +of the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but in +heaven. But as the first state is figurative and imperfect in +comparison with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state +figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state, with +the advent of which the present state will be done away as expressed +in that very passage (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a +dark manner; but then face to face." + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 31), Montanus and +Priscilla pretended that Our Lord's promise to give the Holy Ghost +was fulfilled, not in the apostles, but in themselves. In like manner +the Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes whom they +held to be the Paraclete. Hence none of the above received the Acts +of the Apostles, where it is clearly shown that the aforesaid promise +was fulfilled in the apostles: just as Our Lord promised them a +second time (Acts 1:5): "You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, +not many days hence": which we read as having been fulfilled in Acts +2. However, these foolish notions are refuted by the statement (John +7:39) that "as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not +yet glorified"; from which we gather that the Holy Ghost was given as +soon as Christ was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension. +Moreover, this puts out of court the senseless idea that the Holy +Ghost is to be expected to come at some other time. + +Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of +matters necessary for salvation; those things, to wit, that we are +bound to believe and to do. But He did not teach them about all +future events: for this did not regard them according to Acts 1:7: +"It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath +put in His own power." + +Reply Obj. 3: The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father, but +also to the Son: because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law. +Hence Our Lord said (John 5:46): "If you did believe Moses, you would +perhaps believe me also; for he wrote of Me." In like manner the New +Law corresponds not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost; +according to Rom. 8:2: "The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ +Jesus," etc. Hence we are not to look forward to another law +corresponding to the Holy Ghost. + +Reply Obj. 4: Since Christ said at the very outset of the preaching +of the Gospel: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand" (Matt. 4:17), it is +most absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the +kingdom. But the preaching of the Gospel of Christ may be understood +in two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge +of Christ: and thus the Gospel was preached throughout the world even +at the time of the apostles, as Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv in +Matth.). And in this sense the words that follow--"and then shall the +consummation come," refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of which +He was speaking literally. Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may +be understood as extending throughout the world and producing its +full effect, so that, to wit, the Church would be founded in every +nation. And in these sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius (Epist. +cxcix), the Gospel is not preached to the whole world yet, but, when +it is, the consummation of the world will come. +________________________ + +QUESTION 107 + +OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under +which head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law? + +(2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old? + +(3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old? + +(4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 1] + +Whether the New Law Is Distinct from the Old Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the +Old. Because both these laws were given to those who believe in God: +since "without faith it is impossible to please God," according to +Heb. 11:6. But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, +as the gloss says on Matt. 21:9. Therefore the law is the same also. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Adamant. Manich. discip. +xvii) that "there is little difference between the Law and Gospel" +[*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and +'amor']--"fear and love." But the New and Old Laws cannot be +differentiated in respect of these two things: since even the Old Law +comprised precepts of charity: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor" (Lev. +19:18), and: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" (Deut. 6:5). In like +manner neither can they differ according to the other difference +which Augustine assigns (Contra Faust. iv, 2), viz. that "the Old +Testament contained temporal promises, whereas the New Testament +contains spiritual and eternal promises": since even the New +Testament contains temporal promises, according to Mk. 10:30: He +shall receive "a hundred times as much . . . in this time, houses and +brethren," etc.: while in the Old Testament they hoped in promises +spiritual and eternal, according to Heb. 11:16: "But now they desire +a better, that is to say, a heavenly country," which is said of the +patriarchs. Therefore it seems that the New Law is not distinct from +the Old. + +Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both laws by +calling the Old Law "a law of works," and the New Law "a law of +faith" (Rom. 3:27). But the Old Law was also a law of faith, +according to Heb. 11:39: "All were [Vulg.: 'All these being'] +approved by the testimony of faith," which he says of the fathers of +the Old Testament. In like manner the New Law is a law of works: +since it is written (Matt. 5:44): "Do good to them that hate you"; +and (Luke 22:19): "Do this for a commemoration of Me." Therefore the +New Law is not distinct from the Old. + +_On the contrary,_ the Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): "The priesthood +being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of +the Law." But the priesthood of the New Testament is distinct from +that of the Old, as the Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore +the Law is also distinct. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 91, A. 4), every +law ordains human conduct to some end. Now things ordained to an end +may be divided in two ways, considered from the point of view of the +end. First, through being ordained to different ends: and this +difference will be specific, especially if such ends are proximate. +Secondly, by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the +end. Thus it is clear that movements differ in species through being +directed to different terms: while according as one part of a +movement is nearer to the term than another part, the difference of +perfect and imperfect movement is assessed. + +Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in +two ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from the fact that +they are ordained to diverse ends: thus a state-law ordained to +democratic government, would differ specifically from a law ordained +to government by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be +distinguished from one another, through one of them being more +closely connected with the end, and the other more remotely: thus in +one and the same state there is one law enjoined on men of mature +age, who can forthwith accomplish that which pertains to the common +good; and another law regulating the education of children who need +to be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on. + +We must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law +is not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have the same +end, namely, man's subjection to God; and there is but one God of the +New and of the Old Testament, according to Rom. 3:30: "It is one God +that justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through +faith." According to the second way, the New Law is distinct from the +Old Law: because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of children, as the +Apostle says (Gal. 3:24), whereas the New Law is the law of +perfection, since it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says +(Col. 3:14) that it is "the bond of perfection." + +Reply Obj. 1: The unity of faith under both Testaments witnesses to +the unity of end: for it has been stated above (Q. 62, A. 2) that the +object of the theological virtues, among which is faith, is the last +end. Yet faith had a different state in the Old and in the New Law: +since what they believed as future, we believe as fact. + +Reply Obj. 2: All the differences assigned between the Old and New +Laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection. +For the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the +imperfect, who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are +directed in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those who are +perfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed in +another way. For those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous +habits, are directed to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of +some outward cause: for instance, by the threat of punishment, or the +promise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the +like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who were imperfect, +that is, who had not yet received spiritual grace, was called the +"law of fear," inasmuch as it induced men to observe its commandments +by threatening them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing +temporal promises. On the other hand, those who are possessed of +virtue, are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not +on account of some extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law +which derives its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled +into our hearts, is called the "Law of love": and it is described as +containing spiritual and eternal promises, which are objects of the +virtues, chiefly of charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined of +themselves to those objects, not as to something foreign but as to +something of their own. For this reason, too, the Old Law is +described as "restraining the hand, not the will" [*Peter Lombard, +Sent. iii, D, 40]; since when a man refrains from some sins through +fear of being punished, his will does not shrink simply from sin, as +does the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of +righteousness: and hence the New Law, which is the Law of love, is +said to restrain the will. + +Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old Testament who, +having charity and the grace of the Holy Ghost, looked chiefly to +spiritual and eternal promises: and in this respect they belonged to +the New Law. In like manner in the New Testament there are some +carnal men who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New +Law; and these it was necessary, even under the New Testament, to +lead to virtuous action by the fear of punishment and by temporal +promises. + +But although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless +it did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom "charity . . . is spread +abroad in our hearts" (Rom. 5:5). + +Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 106, AA. 1, 2), the New Law is +called the law of faith, in so far as its pre-eminence is derived +from that very grace which is given inwardly to believers, and for +this reason is called the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists +secondarily in certain deeds, moral and sacramental: but the New Law +does not consist chiefly in these latter things, as did the Old Law. +As to those under the Old Testament who through faith were acceptable +to God, in this respect they belonged to the New Testament: for they +were not justified except through faith in Christ, Who is the Author +of the New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle says (Heb. 11:26) +that he esteemed "the reproach of Christ greater riches than the +treasure of the Egyptians." +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 2] + +Whether the New Law Fulfils the Old? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law does not fulfil the Old. +Because to fulfil and to void are contrary. But the New Law voids or +excludes the observances of the Old Law: for the Apostle says (Gal. +5:2): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." +Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old. + +Obj. 2: Further, one contrary is not the fulfilment of another. But +Our Lord propounded in the New Law precepts that were contrary to +precepts of the Old Law. For we read (Matt. 5:27-32): "You have heard +that it was said to them of old: . . . 'Whosoever shall put away his +wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. But I say to you that +whosoever shall put away his wife . . . maketh her to commit +adultery.'" Furthermore, the same evidently applies to the +prohibition against swearing, against retaliation, and against hating +one's enemies. In like manner Our Lord seems to have done away with +the precepts of the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods +(Matt. 15:11): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man: +but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man." Therefore the +New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old. + +Obj. 3: Further, whoever acts against a law does not fulfil the law. +But Christ in certain cases acted against the Law. For He touched the +leper (Matt. 8:3), which was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems +to have frequently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of +Him (John 9:16): "This man is not of God, who keepeth not the +sabbath." Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law: and so the New Law +given by Christ is not a fulfilment of the Old. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral, ceremonial, +and judicial, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 4). But Our Lord (Matt. 5) +fulfilled the Law in some respects, but without mentioning the +judicial and ceremonial precepts. Therefore it seems that the New Law +is not a complete fulfilment of the Old. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 5:17): "I am not come to +destroy, but to fulfil": and went on to say (Matt. 5:18): "One jot or +one tittle shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the New Law is compared to +the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect +fulfils that which is lacking in the imperfect. And accordingly the +New Law fulfils the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the +Old Law. + +Now two things in the Old Law offer themselves to our consideration: +viz., the end, and the precepts contained in the Law. + +Now the end of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, as +was stated above (Q. 92, A. 1): and consequently the end of the Old +Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not +accomplish this: but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, +and promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils +the Old by justifying men through the power of Christ's Passion. This +is what the Apostle says (Rom. 8:3, 4): "What the Law could not do +. . . God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh . . . +hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law +might be fulfilled in us." And in this respect, the New Law gives +what the Old Law promised, according to 2 Cor. 1:20: "Whatever are +the promises of God, in Him," i.e. in Christ, "they are 'Yea'." [*The +Douay version reads thus: "All the promises of God are in Him, 'It +is'."] Again, in this respect, it also fulfils what the Old Law +foreshadowed. Hence it is written (Col. 2:17) concerning the +ceremonial precepts that they were "a shadow of things to come, but +the body is of Christ"; in other words, the reality is found in +Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas +the Old Law is called the law of shadow or of figure. + +Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works +and in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing to be +circumcised and to fulfil the other legal observances, which were +binding for the time being; according to Gal. 4:4: "Made under the +Law." In His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three +ways. First, by explaining the true sense of the Law. This is clear +in the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition of which the +Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior act: +wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by showing that the prohibition +extended also to the interior acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord +fulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing the safest way of +complying with the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade +perjury: and this is more safely avoided, by abstaining altogether +from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled +the precepts of the Law, by adding some counsels of perfection: this +is clearly seen in Matt. 19:21, where Our Lord said to the man who +affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: "One thing +is wanting to thee: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou +hast," etc. [*St. Thomas combines Matt. 19:21 with Mk. 10:21]. + +Reply Obj. 1: The New Law does not void observance of the Old Law +except in the point of ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q. 103, +AA. 3, 4). Now the latter were figurative of something to come. +Wherefore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were +fulfilled when those things were accomplished which they +foreshadowed, it follows that they are no longer to be observed: for +if they were to be observed, this would mean that something is still +to be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled. Thus the promise of a +future gift holds no longer when it has been fulfilled by the +presentation of the gift. In this way the legal ceremonies are +abolished by being fulfilled. + +Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), those +precepts of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Old Law. +For what Our Lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is +not contrary to what the Law prescribed. "For the Law did not say: +'Let him that wills, put his wife away': the contrary of which would +be not to put her away. _On the contrary,_ the Law was unwilling that +a man should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay, so that +excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened +during the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord, in order to impress +the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no +exception save in the case of fornication." The same applies to the +prohibition about swearing, as stated above. The same is also clear +with respect to the prohibition of retaliation. For the Law fixed a +limit to revenge, by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably: +whereas Our Lord deprived them of vengeance more completely by +commanding them to abstain from it altogether. With regard to the +hatred of one's enemies, He dispelled the false interpretation of the +Pharisees, by admonishing us to hate, not the person, but his sin. As +to discriminating between various foods, which was a ceremonial +matter, Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed: but He showed +that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of something +else, as stated above (Q. 102, A. 6, ad 1). + +Reply Obj. 3: It was forbidden by the Law to touch a leper; because +by doing so, man incurred a certain uncleanness of irregularity, as +also by touching the dead, as stated above (Q. 102, A. 5, ad 4). But +Our Lord, Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness. By +those things which He did on the sabbath, He did not break the +sabbath in reality, as the Master Himself shows in the Gospel: both +because He worked miracles by His Divine power, which is ever active +among things; and because His works were concerned with the salvation +of man, while the Pharisees were concerned for the well-being of +animals even on the sabbath; and again because on account of urgency +He excused His disciples for gathering the ears of corn on the +sabbath. But He did seem to break the sabbath according to the +superstitious interpretation of the Pharisees, who thought that man +ought to abstain from doing even works of kindness on the sabbath; +which was contrary to the intention of the Law. + +Reply Obj. 4: The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law are +not mentioned in Matt. 5 is because, as stated above (ad 1), their +observance was abolished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial +precepts He mentioned that of retaliation: so that what He said about +it should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, He +taught that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be +sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of +revengeful spite, which He forbade, admonishing man to be ready to +suffer yet greater insults; and this remains still in the New Law. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 3] + +Whether the New Law Is Contained in the Old? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not contained in the +Old. Because the New Law consists chiefly in faith: wherefore it is +called the "law of faith" (Rom. 3:27). But many points of faith are +set forth in the New Law, which are not contained in the Old. +Therefore the New Law is not contained in the Old. + +Obj. 2: Further, a gloss says on Matt. 5:19, "He that shall break one +of these least commandments," that the lesser commandments are those +of the Law, and the greater commandments, those contained in the +Gospel. Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore +the New Law is not contained in the Old. + +Obj. 3: Further, who holds the container holds the contents. If, +therefore, the New Law is contained in the Old, it follows that +whoever had the Old Law had the New: so that it was superfluous to +give men a New Law when once they had the Old. Therefore the New Law +is not contained in the Old. + +_On the contrary,_ As expressed in Ezech. 1:16, there was "a wheel in +the midst of a wheel," i.e. "the New Testament within the Old," +according to Gregory's exposition. + +_I answer that,_ One thing may be contained in another in two ways. +First, actually; as a located thing is in a place. Secondly, +virtually; as an effect in its cause, or as the complement in that +which is incomplete; thus a genus contains its species, and a seed +contains the whole tree, virtually. It is in this way that the New +Law is contained in the Old: for it has been stated (A. 1) that the +New Law is compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect. Hence +Chrysostom, expounding Mk. 4:28, "The earth of itself bringeth forth +fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the +ear," expresses himself as follows: "He brought forth first the +blade, i.e. the Law of Nature; then the ear, i.e. the Law of Moses; +lastly, the full corn, i.e. the Law of the Gospel." Hence then the +New Law is in the Old as the corn in the ear. + +Reply Obj. 1: Whatsoever is set down in the New Testament explicitly +and openly as a point of faith, is contained in the Old Testament as +a matter of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. And accordingly, +even as to those things which we are bound to believe, the New Law is +contained in the Old. + +Reply Obj. 2: The precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than +those of the Old Law, in the point of their being set forth +explicitly. But as to the substance itself of the precepts of the New +Testament, they are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says +(Contra Faust. xix, 23, 28) that "nearly all Our Lord's admonitions +or precepts, where He expressed Himself by saying: 'But I say unto +you,' are to be found also in those ancient books. Yet, since they +thought that murder was only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord +declared to them that every wicked impulse to hurt our brother is to +be looked on as a kind of murder." And it is in the point of +declarations of this kind that the precepts of the New Law are said +to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing, however, prevents the +greater from being contained in the lesser virtually; just as a tree +is contained in the seed. + +Reply Obj. 3: What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared +explicitly. Hence after the publishing of the Old Law, a New Law also +had to be given. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 4] + +Whether the New Law Is More Burdensome Than the Old? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is more burdensome than +the Old. For Chrysostom (Opus Imp. in Matth., Hom. x [*The work of an +unknown author]) say: "The commandments given to Moses are easy to +obey: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery: but the +commandments of Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance: +Thou shalt not give way to anger, or to lust." Therefore the New Law +is more burdensome than the Old. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity than +to suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testament observance of the +Law was followed by temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from +Deut. 28:1-14; whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who +observe the New Law, as stated in 2 Cor. 6:4-10: "Let us exhibit +ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation, +in necessities, in distresses," etc. Therefore the New Law is more +burdensome than the Old. + +Obj. 3: The more one has to do, the more difficult it is. But the New +Law is something added to the Old. For the Old Law forbade perjury, +while the New Law proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man +to cast off his wife without a bill of divorce, while the New Law +forbade divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in Matt. 5:31, +seqq., according to Augustine's expounding. Therefore the New Law is +more burdensome than the Old. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 11:28): "Come to Me, all you +that labor and are burdened": which words are expounded by Hilary +thus: "He calls to Himself all those that labor under the difficulty +of observing the Law, and are burdened with the sins of this world." +And further on He says of the yoke of the Gospel: "For My yoke is +sweet and My burden light." Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden +than the Old. + +_I answer that,_ A twofold difficulty may attach to works of virtue +with which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part +of the outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult +and burdensome. And in this respect the Old Law is a much heavier +burden than the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies +prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law, which, in the +teaching of Christ and the apostles, added very few precepts to those +of the natural law; although afterwards some were added, through +being instituted by the holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says +that moderation should be observed, lest good conduct should become a +burden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the queries of +Januarius (Ep. lv) that, "whereas God in His mercy wished religion to +be a free service rendered by the public solemnization of a small +number of most manifest sacraments, certain persons make it a slave's +burden; so much so that the state of the Jews who were subject to the +sacraments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man, +was more tolerable." + +The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts: +for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude and +pleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue solves: because to act +thus is difficult for a man without virtue: but through virtue it +becomes easy for him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are +more burdensome than those of the Old; because the New Law prohibits +certain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly +forbidden in the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden +in some, without, however, any punishment being attached to the +prohibition. Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus +even the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do what +a righteous man does; but that to do it in the same way, viz. with +pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a man who is not righteous. +Accordingly we read also (1 John 5:3) that "His commandments are not +heavy": which words Augustine expounds by saying that "they are not +heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to him that +loveth not." + +Reply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty +of the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements. + +Reply Obj. 2: The tribulations suffered by those who observe the New +Law are not imposed by the Law itself. Moreover they are easily +borne, on account of the love in which the same Law consists: since, +as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes light and +nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our power." + +Reply Obj. 3: The object of these additions to the precepts of the +Old Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed, as +Augustine states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17, 21; xix, 23, 26]. +Accordingly this does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome, +but rather that it is a lighter burden. +________________________ + +QUESTION 108 + +OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law: +under which head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward +works? + +(2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing +and forbidding external acts? + +(3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man +sufficiently? + +(4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 1] + +Whether the New Law Ought to Prescribe or Prohibit Any External Acts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or +prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the +kingdom, according to Matt. 24:14: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall +be preached in the whole world." But the kingdom of God consists not +in exterior, but only in interior acts, according to Luke 17:21: "The +kingdom of God is within you"; and Rom. 14:17: "The kingdom of God is +not meat and drink; but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." +Therefore the New Law should not prescribe or forbid any external +acts. + +Obj. 2: Further, the New Law is "the law of the Spirit" (Rom. 8:2). +But "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. +3:17). Now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid +certain external acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe or +forbid any external acts. + +Obj. 3: Further, all external acts are understood as referable to the +hand, just as interior acts belong to the mind. But this is assigned +as the difference between the New and Old Laws that the "Old Law +restrains the hand, whereas the New Law curbs the will" [*Peter +Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]. Therefore the New Law should not contain +prohibitions and commands about exterior deeds, but only about +interior acts. + +_On the contrary,_ Through the New Law, men are made "children of +light": wherefore it is written (John 12:36): "Believe in the light +that you may be the children of light." Now it is becoming that +children of the light should do deeds of light and cast aside deeds +of darkness, according to Eph. 5:8: "You were heretofore darkness, +but now light in the Lord. Walk . . . as children of the light." +Therefore the New Law had to forbid certain external acts and +prescribe others. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 106, AA. 1, 2), the New Law +consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth +by faith that worketh through love. Now men become receivers of this +grace through God's Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, +and thence flowed forth to us. Hence it is written (John 1:14): "The +Word was made flesh," and afterwards: "full of grace and truth"; and +further on: "Of His fulness we all have received, and grace for +grace." Hence it is added that "grace and truth came by Jesus +Christ." Consequently it was becoming that the grace which flows from +the incarnate Word should be given to us by means of certain external +sensible objects; and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh +is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue. + +Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. +In the first place, as leading in some way to grace. Such are the +sacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, +the Eucharist, and the like. + +In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from +the promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a difference. For +there are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in +opposition to inward grace consisting in faith that worketh through +love. Such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; +thus confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is +forbidden; for it is written (Matt. 10:32, 33) "(Every one) that +shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father +. . . But he that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him +before My Father." On the other hand, there are works which are not +necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith that worketh through +love. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by +virtue of its primitive institution; but have been left by the +Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so +to each one it is free to decide what he should do or avoid; and to +each superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what +they must do or avoid. Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is +called the "law of liberty" [*Cf. Reply Obj. 2]: since the Old Law +decided many points and left few to man to decide as he chose. + +Reply Obj. 1: The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal acts: +but as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts +belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is +internal righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external acts +that are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, +are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently should be +forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those +things that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance, +to eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom of God; +wherefore the Apostle says before the words quoted: "The kingdom of +God is not meat and drink." + +Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), what is +"free is cause of itself." Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his +own accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a +habit that is suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines one as a +second nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, man +would not act according to his nature, but according to some +corruption affecting that nature. Since then the grace of the Holy +Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to +act aright, it makes us do freely those things that are becoming to +grace, and shun what is opposed to it. + +Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects. +First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain things, +except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, +and come under the prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, +because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and +prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the promptings of grace. +It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called "the law of +perfect liberty" (James 1:25). + +Reply Obj. 3: The New Law, by restraining the mind from inordinate +movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts, +which ensue from inward movements. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 2] + +Whether the New Law Made Sufficient Ordinations About External Acts? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law made insufficient +ordinations about external acts. Because faith that worketh through +charity seems chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to Gal. +5:6: "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor +uncircumcision: but faith that worketh through charity." But the New +Law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set +forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, belief in the Trinity. +Therefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds, +which were not fixed in the Old Law. + +Obj. 2: Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments instituted, +but also certain sacred things, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 4; Q. +102, A. 4). But in the New Law, although certain sacraments are +instituted by Our Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the +sanctification of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration +of some particular feast. Therefore the New Law made insufficient +ordinations about external matters. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain +observances pertaining to God's ministers, so also were there certain +observances pertaining to the people: as was stated above when we +were treating of the ceremonial of the Old Law (Q. 101, A. 4; Q. 102, +A. 6). Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have been +prescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gathered from Matt. +10:9: "Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses," +nor other things which are mentioned here and Luke 9, 10. Therefore +certain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been +instituted in the New Law. + +Obj. 4: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial +precepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law +there are no judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made +insufficient ordinations about external works. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 7:24): "Every one . . . that +heareth these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man +that built his house upon a rock." But a wise builder leaves out +nothing that is necessary to the building. Therefore Christ's words +contain all things necessary for man's salvation. + +_I answer that,_ as stated above (A. 1), the New Law had to make such +prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the +reception or right use of grace. And since we cannot of ourselves +obtain grace, but through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself +instituted the sacraments whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism, +Eucharist, Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution +of the apostles and seventy-two disciples, Penance, and indissoluble +Matrimony. He promised Confirmation through the sending of the Holy +Ghost: and we read that by His institution the apostles healed the +sick by anointing them with oil (Mk. 6:13). These are the sacraments +of the New Law. + +The right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so +far as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the moral precepts, +which also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the +New Law had nothing to add as regards external action. The +determination of these works in their relation to the divine worship, +belongs to the ceremonial precepts of the Law; and, in relation to +our neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as stated above (Q. 99, A. +4). And therefore, since these determinations are not in themselves +necessarily connected with inward grace wherein the Law consists, +they do not come under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the +decision of man; some relating to inferiors--as when a precept is +given to an individual; others, relating to superiors, temporal or +spiritual, referring, namely, to the common good. + +Accordingly the New Law had no other external works to determine, by +prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments, and those moral +precepts which have a necessary connection with virtue, for instance, +that one must not kill, or steal, and so forth. + +Reply Obj. 1: Matters of faith are above human reason, and so we +cannot attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace +came to be bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in +the number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it is +through human reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it +is the rule of human action, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; Q. 63, A. +2). Wherefore in such matters as these there was no need for any +precepts to be given besides the moral precepts of the Law, which +proceed from the dictate of reason. + +Reply Obj. 2: In the sacraments of the New Law grace is bestowed, +which cannot be received except through Christ: consequently they had +to be instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: +for instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar or the like, +or, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left the +institution of such things to the discretion of the faithful, since +they have not of themselves any necessary connection with inward +grace. + +Reply Obj. 3: Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as +ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes: and they can be +understood in two ways. First, following Augustine (De Consensu +Evang. 30), as being not commands but permissions. For He permitted +them to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so on, since +they were empowered to accept their livelihood from those to whom +they preached: wherefore He goes on to say: "For the laborer is +worthy of his hire." Nor is it a sin, but a work of supererogation +for a preacher to take means of livelihood with him, without +accepting supplies from those to whom he preaches; as Paul did (1 +Cor. 9:4, seqq.). + +Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy men, they may be +considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles for the time +during which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ's +Passion. For the disciples, being yet as little children under +Christ's care, needed to receive some special commands from Christ, +such as all subjects receive from their superiors: and especially so, +since they were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the +care of temporalities, so as to become fitted for the preaching of +the Gospel throughout the whole world. Nor must we wonder if He +established certain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the +Old Law endured and the people had not as yet achieved the perfect +liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His +Passion, as though the disciples had by their means become +sufficiently practiced. Hence He said (Luke 22:35, 36) "When I sent +you without purse and scrip and shoes, did you want anything? But +they said: Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a +purse, let him take it, and likewise a scrip." Because the time of +perfect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left entirely +to their own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with +virtue. + +Reply Obj. 4: Judicial precepts also, are not essential to virtue in +respect of any particular determination, but only in regard to the +common notion of justice. Consequently Our Lord left the judicial +precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual or +temporal charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of +the Old Law, some of them He explained, because they were +misunderstood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on (A. 3, ad +2). +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 3] + +Whether the New Law Directed Man Sufficiently As Regards Interior +Actions? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law directed man +insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten +commandments of the decalogue directing man to God and his neighbor. +But Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely, +the prohibition of murder, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it +seems that, by omitting to fulfil the other precepts, He directed man +insufficiently. + +Obj. 2: Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our Lord ordained +nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing a wife, of +punishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies. But +there are many other judicial precepts of the Old Law, as stated +above (Q. 104, A. 4; Q. 105). Therefore, in this respect, He directed +human life insufficiently. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there +were ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination. +Therefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently. + +Obj. 4: Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed, +man should do no good deed for any temporal end whatever. But there +are many other temporal goods besides the favor of man: and there are +many other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and prayer. +Therefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these +three works, and of no other earthly goods ought we to shun the glory +of human favor. + +Obj. 5: Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is +by nature instilled into man, and this solicitude even other animals +share with man: wherefore it is written (Prov. 6:6, 8): "Go to the +ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways . . . she provideth her meat +for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest." +But every command issued against the inclination of nature is an +unjust command, forasmuch as it is contrary to the law of nature. +Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude +about food and raiment. + +Obj. 6: Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a +prohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, according to Ps. +18:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment." Therefore it seems +that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment: and consequently that +the New Law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior +acts. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1): We +should take note that, when He said: "'He that heareth these My +words,' He indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord is replete +with all the precepts whereby a Christian's life is formed." + +_I answer that,_ As is evident from Augustine's words just quoted, +the sermon, which Our Lord delivered on the mountain, contains the +whole process of forming the life of a Christian. Therein man's +interior movements are ordered. Because after declaring that his end +is Beatitude; and after commending the authority of the apostles, +through whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated, He +orders man's interior movements, first in regard to man himself, +secondly in regard to his neighbor. + +This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, corresponding to +man's two interior movements in respect of any prospective action, +viz. volition of what has to be done, and intention of the end. +Wherefore, in the first place, He directs man's will in respect of +the various precepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should +refrain not merely from those external works that are evil in +themselves, but also from internal acts, and from the occasions of +evil deeds. In the second place He directs man's intention, by +teaching that in our good works, we should seek neither human praise, +nor worldly riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth. + +Afterwards He directs man's interior movement in respect of his +neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him rashly, +unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to entrust him too +readily with sacred things if he be unworthy. + +Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz. +by imploring the help of God; by striving to enter by the narrow door +of perfect virtue; and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil +influences. Moreover, He declares that we must observe His +commandments, and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, +or to work miracles, or merely to hear His words. + +Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those +precepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand: +and this affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue. For they +thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered the +external act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this +opinion about murder and adultery rather than about theft and false +witness, because the movement of anger tending to murder, and the +movement of desire tending to adultery, seem to be in us from nature +somewhat, but not the desire of stealing or bearing false witness. +They held a false opinion about perjury, for they thought that +perjury indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves to be +desired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from +reverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath is not desirable +as a good thing; and that it is better to speak without oaths, unless +necessity forces us to have recourse to them. + +Reply Obj. 2: The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the judicial +precepts in two ways. First, because they considered certain matters +contained in the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in +themselves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from +strangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife +(Matt. 5:32); and to receive usury (Luke 6:35), when He said: "Lend, +hoping for nothing thereby." + +In another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the +Old Law commanded to be done for justice's sake, should be done out +of desire for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of +hatred of one's enemies; and this in respect of three precepts. For +they thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on account of the +precept concerning punishment by retaliation: whereas this precept +was given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek +revenge. Wherefore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches +that man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more if +necessary. They thought that movements of covetousness were lawful on +account of those judicial precepts which prescribed restitution of +what had been purloined, together with something added thereto, as +stated above (Q. 105, A. 2, ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this to +be done in order to safeguard justice, not to encourage covetousness. +Wherefore Our Lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from +motives of cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more if +necessary. They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on +account of the commandments of the Law about the slaying of one's +enemies: whereas the Law ordered this for the fulfilment of justice, +as stated above (Q. 105, A. 3, ad 4), not to satisfy hatred. +Wherefore Our Lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and +to be ready to do good to them if necessary. For these precepts are +to be taken as binding "the mind to be prepared to fulfil them," as +Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19). + +Reply Obj. 3: The moral precepts necessarily retained their force +under the New Law, because they are of themselves essential to +virtue: whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to +bind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this was +left to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed +us becomingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts. On the +other hand, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally +abolished by the advent of the reality; wherefore in regard to these +precepts He commanded nothing on this occasion when He was giving the +general points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear +that the entire bodily worship which was fixed by the Law, was to be +changed into spiritual worship: as is evident from John 4:21, 23, +where He says: "The hour cometh when you shall neither on this +mountain, nor in Jerusalem adore the Father . . . but . . . the true +adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth." + +Reply Obj. 4: All worldly goods may be reduced to three--honors, +riches, and pleasures; according to 1 John 2:16: "All that is in the +world is the concupiscence of the flesh," which refers to pleasures +of the flesh, "and the concupiscence of the eyes," which refers to +riches, "and the pride of life," which refers to ambition for renown +and honor. Now the Law did not promise an abundance of carnal +pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. But it did promise +exalted honors and abundant riches; for it is written in reference to +the former (Deut. 28:1): "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy +God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations"; and in +reference to the latter, we read a little further on (Deut. 28:11): +"He will make thee abound with all goods." But the Jews so distorted +the true meaning of these promises, as to think that we ought to +serve God, with these things as the end in view. Wherefore Our Lord +set this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should +not be done for human glory. And He mentions three works, to which +all others may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order to curb +his desires, comes under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does +for the love of his neighbor, comes under the head of alms-deeds; and +whatever a man does for the worship of God, comes under the head of +prayer. And He mentions these three specifically, as they hold the +principal place, and are most often used by men in order to gain +glory. In the second place He taught us that we must not place our +end in riches, when He said: "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on +earth" (Matt. 6:19). + +Reply Obj. 5: Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate +solicitude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in +temporal matters. First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve +God for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore He +says: "Lay not up for yourselves," etc. Secondly, we must not be so +anxious about temporal things, as to despair of God's help: wherefore +Our Lord says (Matt. 6:32): "Your Father knoweth that you have need +of all these things." Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our +solicitude; in other words, we must not be confident of getting the +necessaries of life by our own efforts without God's help: such +solicitude Our Lord sets aside by saying that a man cannot add +anything to his stature (Matt. 6:27). We must not anticipate the time +for anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not of +the present, but of a future time: wherefore He says (Matt. 6:34): +"Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow." + +Reply Obj. 6: Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice, +without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. +But he forbade inordinate judgment, as stated above. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 4] + +Whether Certain Definite Counsels Are Fittingly Proposed in the New +Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that certain definite counsels are not +fittingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that +which is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of +counsel (Q. 14, A. 2). But the same things are not expedient for all. +Therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all. + +Obj. 2: Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no +definite degrees to the greater good. Therefore definite counsels +should not be given. + +Obj. 3: Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But +obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was +unfitting that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the +Gospel. + +Obj. 4: Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection +are found among the commandments, as, for instance, "Love your +enemies" (Matt. 5:44), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His +apostles (Matt. 10). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in +the New Law: both because they are not all mentioned; and because +they are not distinguished from the commandments. + +_On the contrary,_ The counsels of a wise friend are of great use, +according to Prov. (27:9): "Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart: +and the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul." But Christ is +our wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are supremely +useful and becoming. + +_I answer that,_ The difference between a counsel and a commandment +is that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left +to the option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New +Law, which is the law of liberty, counsels are added to the +commandments, and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We +must therefore understand the commandments of the New Law to have +been given about matters that are necessary to gain the end of +eternal bliss, to which end the New Law brings us forthwith: but that +the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end +more assured and expeditious. + +Now man is placed between the things of this world, and spiritual +goods wherein eternal happiness consists: so that the more he cleaves +to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. +Wherefore he that cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as +to make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of +all he does, falls away altogether from spiritual goods. Hence this +disorder is removed by the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to +gain the end aforesaid, he does not need to renounce the things of +the world altogether: since he can, while using the things of this +world, attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his +end in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by giving up +the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the evangelical counsels +are given for this purpose. + +Now the goods of this world which come into use in human life, +consist in three things: viz. in external wealth pertaining to the +"concupiscence of the eyes"; carnal pleasures pertaining to the +"concupiscence of the flesh"; and honors, which pertain to the "pride +of life," according to 1 John 2:16: and it is in renouncing these +altogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels +consist. Moreover, every form of the religious life that professes +the state of perfection is based on these three: since riches are +renounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity; and the +pride of life by the bondage of obedience. + +Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the +counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one of them in a +particular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense, +namely, as applying to that particular case. For instance, when +anyone gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he +follows the counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when a +man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may +give himself to prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular +time. And again, when a man follows not his will as to some deed +which he might do lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular +case: for instance, if he do good to his enemies when he is not bound +to, or if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be +avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels may be reduced to +these three general and perfect counsels. + +Reply Obj. 1: The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are +expedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it +happens that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition +is not inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing the +evangelical counsels, always makes mention of man's fitness for +observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual +poverty (Matt. 19:21), He begins with the words: "If thou wilt be +perfect," and then He adds: "Go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast." +In like manner when He gave the counsel of perpetual chastity, saying +(Matt. 19:12): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs +for the kingdom of heaven," He adds straightway: "He that can take, +let him take it." And again, the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:35), after giving +the counsel of virginity, says: "And this I speak for your profit; +not to cast a snare upon you." + +Reply Obj. 2: The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the +individual; but those which are simply and absolutely the greater +good in general are fixed: and to these all the above particular +goods may be reduced, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have +been given by Our Lord in the words: "And [let him] follow Me." For +we follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying +His commandments, according to John 10:27: "My sheep hear My voice +. . . and they follow Me." + +Reply Obj. 4: Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the true +love of our enemies, and other similar sayings (Matt. 5; Luke 6), may +be referred to the preparation of the mind, and then they are +necessary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared to do +good to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need. +Hence these things are placed among the precepts. But that anyone +should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there +is no special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as +stated above. As to those matters which are set down in Matt. 10 and +Luke 9 and 10, they were either disciplinary commands for that +particular time, or concessions, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3). Hence +they are not set down among the counsels. +________________________ + +TREATISE ON GRACE (QQ. 109-114) +________________________ + +QUESTION 109 + +OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE +(In Ten Articles) + +We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, +in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and, +first, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause; +thirdly, its effects. + +The first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall +consider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its +essence; (3) its division. + +Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether without grace man can know anything? + +(2) Whether without God's grace man can do or wish any good? + +(3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things? + +(4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law? + +(5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life? + +(6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace? + +(7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin? + +(8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin? + +(9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin +without any further Divine help? + +(10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 1] + +Whether Without Grace Man Can Know Any Truth? + +Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man can know no truth. +For, on 1 Cor. 12:3: "No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy +Ghost," a gloss says: "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the +Holy Ghost." Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we +cannot know truth without grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that "the most certain +sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen. Now God +Himself is He Who sheds the light. And reason is in the mind as sight +is in the eye. And the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul." +Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible object, +without the sun's light. Therefore the human mind, however perfect, +cannot, by reasoning, know any truth without Divine light: and this +pertains to the aid of grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, the human mind can only understand truth by +thinking, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). But the +Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): "Not that we are sufficient to think +anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from +God." Therefore man cannot, of himself, know truth without the help +of grace. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): "I do not approve +having said in the prayer, O God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to +know the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless +know many truths." Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according +to Ps. 50:12: "Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right +spirit within my bowels." Therefore without grace man of himself can +know truth. + +_I answer that,_ To know truth is a use or act of intellectual light, +since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13): "All that is made +manifest is light." Now every use implies movement, taking movement +broadly, so as to call thinking and willing movements, as is clear +from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we +see that for movement there is required not merely the form which is +the principle of the movement or action, but there is also required +the motion of the first mover. Now the first mover in the order of +corporeal things is the heavenly body. Hence no matter how perfectly +fire has heat, it would not bring about alteration, except by the +motion of the heavenly body. But it is clear that as all corporeal +movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to the +first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal and +spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And +hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is +supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by +God; but this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and +not by necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body. Now +not only is every motion from God as from the First Mover, but all +formal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. And thus the act +of the intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon God +in two ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form +whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act. + +Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a +determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its own +proper endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a +superadded form, as water can only heat when heated by the fire. And +thus the human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light, +which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible +things, viz. those we can come to know through the senses. Higher +intelligible things the human intellect cannot know, unless it be +perfected by a stronger light, viz. the light of faith or prophecy +which is called the "light of grace," inasmuch as it is added to +nature. + +Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man +needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. +But he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order +to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his +natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some +by His grace in things that can be known by natural reason, even as +He sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do. + +Reply Obj. 1: Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost +as bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and speak +the truth, but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as +bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes +place with regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, and +especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the +Apostle speaks. + +Reply Obj. 2: The material sun sheds its light outside us; but the +intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural +light bestowed upon the soul is God's enlightenment, whereby we are +enlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this +there is required no further knowledge, but only for such things as +surpass natural knowledge. + +Reply Obj. 3: We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch +as He moves the understanding to act; for actually to understand +anything is to think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 2] + +Whether Man Can Wish or Do Any Good Without Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man can wish and do good without +grace. For that is in man's power, whereof he is master. Now man is +master of his acts, and especially of his willing, as stated above +(Q. 1, A. 1; Q. 13, A. 6). Hence man, of himself, can wish and do +good without the help of grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, man has more power over what is according to his +nature than over what is beyond his nature. Now sin is against his +nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of +virtue are according to his nature, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 1). +Therefore since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good. + +Obj. 3: Further, the understanding's good is truth, as the +Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now the intellect can of itself know +truth, even as every other thing can work its own operation of +itself. Therefore, much more can man, of himself, do and wish good. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 9:16): "It is not of him +that willeth," namely, to will, "nor of him that runneth," namely to +run, "but of God that showeth mercy." And Augustine says (De Corrept. +et Gratia ii) that "without grace men do nothing good when they +either think or wish or love or act." + +_I answer that,_ Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in +its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as +it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both +states human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or +wish any good whatsoever, as stated above (A. 1). But in the state of +integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by +his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to +his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing +good, as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt +nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he +is unable to fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because human +nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every +natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue +of its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to build +dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the +good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; just as a sick +man can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly +moved with the movements of one in health, unless by the help of +medicine he be cured. + +And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous +strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. in order +to do and wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state +of corrupt nature, viz. in order to be healed, and furthermore in +order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are +meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, +that he may be moved to act well. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man is master of his acts and of his willing or not +willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one +side or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not +deliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; and +since it cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, +that man's free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is +above the human mind, to wit by God, as the Philosopher proves in the +chapter "On Good Fortune" (Ethic. Eudem. vii). Hence the mind of man +still unweakened is not so much master of its act that it does not +need to be moved by God; and much more the free-will of man weakened +by sin, whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of the +nature. + +Reply Obj. 2: To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which +belongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every created +thing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is +nothing, so does it need to be preserved by another in the good which +pertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of +itself it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God. + +Reply Obj. 3: Man cannot even know truth without Divine help, as +stated above (A. 1). And yet human nature is more corrupt by sin in +regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of +truth. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 3] + +Whether by His Own Natural Powers and Without Grace Man Can Love God +Above All Things? + +Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man cannot love God +above all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all +things is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of +himself possess charity, since the "charity of God is poured forth in +our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," as is said Rom. +5:5. Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above +all things. + +Obj. 2: Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God +above all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the help +of grace no created nature can love God above itself. + +Obj. 3: Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best +love, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace +man is not capable of giving God the best love, which is His due; +otherwise it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace +and with his natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things. + +_On the contrary,_ As some maintain, man was first made with only +natural endowments; and in this state it is manifest that he loved +God to some extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or +less than himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved +God above himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can +love God more than himself and above all things. + +_I answer that,_ As was said above (I, Q. 60, A. 5), where the +various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set +forth, man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, +do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous +gift, though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God +above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only +rational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to +the manner of love which can belong to each creature. And the reason +of this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things +according as they are naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since +"all things act according as they are naturally fit" as stated in +_Phys._ ii, 8. Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for +the good of the whole; hence everything, by its natural appetite and +love, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the +whole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) +that "God leads everything to love of Himself." Hence in the state of +perfect nature man referred the love of himself and of all other +things to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more +than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature +man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, +unless it is cured by God's grace, follows its private good, on +account of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that in +the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace added +to his natural endowments, in order to love God above all things +naturally, although he needed God's help to move him to it; but in +the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help of +grace to heal his nature. + +Reply Obj. 1: Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than +nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is +the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, +as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual +fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of God a +certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue +adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a +man who has not the habit of virtue. + +Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that nature cannot rise above itself, +we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object +above itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural +knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural +knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to +an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God +above all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every +creature, as was said above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Love is said to be best, both with respect to degree of +love, and with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love. +And thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God +as the giver of beatitude, as was said above. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 4] + +Whether Man Without Grace and by His Own Natural Powers Can Fulfil +the Commandments of the Law? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man without grace, and by his own +natural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law. For the +Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles who have not the law, do +by nature those things that are of the Law." Now what a man does +naturally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfil +the commandments of the Law without grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide [*Symboli +Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: +now ascribed to Pelagius]) that "they are anathema who say God has +laid impossibilities upon man." Now what a man cannot fulfil by +himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil all the +commandments of himself. + +Obj. 3: Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is +this, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart" (Matt. +27:37). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command +by loving God above all things, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore man +can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is +part of the Pelagian heresy that "they believe that without grace man +can fulfil all the Divine commandments." + +_I answer that,_ There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of +the Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man +does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this +way man in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the +commandments of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin +in that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the +Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot +fulfil all the Divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly, +the commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards +the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, +i.e. their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the +state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man +fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine +(De Corrept. et Grat. ii) having stated that "without grace men can +do no good whatever," adds: "Not only do they know by its light what +to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know." Beyond this, +in both states they need the help of God's motion in order to fulfil +the commandments, as stated above (AA. 2, 3). + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), "do not be +disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are +of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore +in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made." + +Reply Obj. 2: What we can do with the Divine assistance is not +altogether impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic. +iii, 3): "What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some +sense, by ourselves." Hence Jerome [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, +among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to +Pelagius] concedes that "our will is in such a way free that we must +confess we still require God's help." + +Reply Obj. 3: Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfil +the precept of the love of God, as stated above (A. 3). +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 5] + +Whether Man Can Merit Everlasting Life Without Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man can merit everlasting life +without grace. For Our Lord says (Matt. 19:17): "If thou wilt enter +into life, keep the commandments"; from which it would seem that to +enter into everlasting life rests with man's will. But what rests +with our will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can +merit everlasting life of himself. + +Obj. 2: Further, eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by God +on men, according to Matt. 5:12: "Your reward is very great in +heaven." But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to +his works, according to Ps. 61:12: "Thou wilt render to every man +according to his works." Hence, since man is master of his works, it +seems that it is within his power to reach everlasting life. + +Obj. 3: Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life. Now +every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end. +Much more, therefore, may man attain to life everlasting by his +natural endowments, without grace. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God is +life everlasting." And as a gloss says, this is said "that we may +understand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life." + +_I answer that,_ Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the +end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and +hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation +bring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such +as is proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end +exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we +have said above (Q. 5, A. 5). Hence man, by his natural endowments, +cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; +and for this a higher force is needed, viz. the force of grace. And +thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can +perform works conducing to a good which is natural to man, as "to +toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends," and the +like, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the Pelagians +[*Hypognosticon iii, among the spurious works of St. Augustine]. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man, by his will, does works meritorious of everlasting +life; but as Augustine says, in the same book, for this it is +necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God. + +Reply Obj. 2: As the gloss upon Rom. 6:23, "The grace of God is life +everlasting," says, "It is certain that everlasting life is meted to +good works; but the works to which it is meted, belong to God's +grace." And it has been said (A. 4), that to fulfil the commandments +of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be +meritorious, requires grace. + +Reply Obj. 3: This objection has to do with the natural end of man. +Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of +grace to a higher end, which lower natures can nowise reach; even as +a man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better +disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as the +Philosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12). +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 6] + +Whether a Man, by Himself and Without the External Aid of Grace, Can +Prepare Himself for Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man, by himself and without the +external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing +impossible is laid upon man, as stated above (A. 4, ad 1). But it is +written (Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." +Now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. +Therefore it seems that man of himself, and without the external help +of grace, can prepare himself for grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in +him to do, since if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny +him grace, for it is written (Matt. 7:11) that God gives His good +Spirit "to them that ask Him." But what is in our power is in us to +do. Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for +grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, +with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first +grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that +we must not go beyond what was said first, viz. that man, of himself +and without grace, can prepare himself for grace. + +Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 16:1) that "it is the part of +man to prepare the soul." Now an action is said to be part of a man, +when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can +prepare himself for grace. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 6:44): "No man can come to Me +except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him." But if man could +prepare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man +cannot prepare himself without the help of grace. + +_I answer that,_ The preparation of the human will for good is +twofold: the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to +enjoy God; and this preparation of the will cannot take place without +the habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious +works, as stated above (A. 5). There is a second way in which the +human will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace +itself. Now in order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, +it is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the +soul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a +gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the +good wish. For in these two ways do we need the Divine assistance, as +stated above (AA. 2, 3). Now that we need the help of God to move us, +is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause must +direct is effect to its end, and hence since the order of ends is +according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to +the last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate +end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit of +the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the +leader of the army--and towards following the standard of a regiment +by the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus since God is the First +Mover, simply, it is by His motion that everything seeks to be +likened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) +that "God turns all to Himself." But He directs righteous men to +Himself as to a special end, which they seek, and to which they wish +to cling, according to Ps. 72:28, "it is good for Me to adhere to my +God." And that they are "turned" to God can only spring from God's +having "turned" them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, +to be turned to God; just as, whoever has his eyes turned away from +the light of the sun, prepares himself to receive the sun's light, by +turning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot +prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the +gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is +bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned to +God, when God turns it, according to Jer. 31:18: "Convert me and I +shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God"; and Lam. 5:21: +"Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." + +Reply Obj. 2: Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according to +John 15:5: "Without Me, you can do nothing." Hence when a man is said +to do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according +as he is moved by God. + +Reply Obj. 3: This objection regards habitual grace, for which some +preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in +that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be +moved by God, no further motion is presupposed since God is the First +Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity. + +Reply Obj. 4: It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since he +does this by his free-will. And yet he does not do this without the +help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 7] + +Whether Man Can Rise from Sin Without the Help of Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man can rise from sin without the +help of grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes place without +grace. But to rise from sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of +grace; since it is written (Eph. 5:14): "Arise from the dead and +Christ shall enlighten thee." Therefore man can rise from sin without +grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as +stated above (Q. 71, A. 1, ad 3). Now, man, by force of his nature, +can rise from illness to health, without the external help of +medicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life, +from which the natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with +equal reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the +state of sin to the state of justice without the help of external +grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the act +befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural +coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural +movement. Now a sin is an act against nature, as is clear from +Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself +can return from sin to the state of justice. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 2:21; Cf. Gal. 3:21): "For +if there had been a law given which could give life--then Christ died +in vain," i.e. to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a +nature, whereby he can he justified, "Christ died in vain," i.e. to +no purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself +he cannot be justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin to +a state of justice. + +_I answer that,_ Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the +help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding +in its guilt, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 6), to rise from sin is not +the same as to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that +man has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a +triple loss by sinning, as was clearly shown above (Q. 85, A. 1; Q. +86, A. 1; Q. 87, A. 1), viz. stain, corruption of natural good, and +debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the +lustre of grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good is +corrupted, inasmuch as man's nature is disordered by man's will not +being subject to God's; and this order being overthrown, the +consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains +disordered. Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by +sinning man deserves everlasting damnation. + +Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by +God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of +Divine light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds +His light anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, and this is the +light of grace. Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, +i.e. man's will can only be subject to God when God draws man's will +to Himself, as stated above (A. 6). So, too, the guilt of eternal +punishment can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was +committed and Who is man's Judge. And thus in order that man rise +from sin there is required the help of grace, both as regards a +habitual gift, and as regards the internal motion of God. + +Reply Obj. 1: To man is bidden that which pertains to the act of +free-will, as this act is required in order that man should rise from +sin. Hence when it is said, "Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee," +we are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the +enlightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will, moved by +God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying +grace. + +Reply Obj. 2: The natural reason is not the sufficient principle of +the health that is in man by justifying grace. This principle is +grace which is taken away by sin. Hence man cannot be restored by +himself; but he requires the light of grace to be poured upon him +anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its +resurrection. + +Reply Obj. 3: When nature is perfect, it can be restored by itself to +its befitting and proportionate condition; but without exterior help +it cannot be restored to what surpasses its measure. And thus human +nature undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer perfect, +but corrupted, as stated above (Q. 85); nor can it be restored, by +itself, to its connatural good, much less to the supernatural good of +justice. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 8] + +Whether Man Without Grace Can Avoid Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man can avoid sin. +Because "no one sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine says (De +Duab. Anim. x, xi; De Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in +mortal sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does +not sin, which is impossible. + +Obj. 2: Further, men are corrected that they may not sin. If +therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem +to be given to no purpose; which is absurd. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:18): "Before man is life +and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given +him." But by sinning no one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still in +his power to choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without +grace. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perfect Just. xxi): "Whoever +denies that we ought to say the prayer 'Lead us not into temptation' +(and they deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not +necessary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is +enough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond +all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of all." + +_I answer that,_ We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state +of perfect nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in +the state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid +sinning either mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else +than to stray from what is according to our nature--and in the state +of perfect nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless he could not +have done it without God's help to uphold him in good, since if this +had been withdrawn, even his nature would have fallen back into +nothingness. + +But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature +in order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present +life this healing is wrought in the mind--the carnal appetite being +not yet restored. Hence the Apostle (Rom. 7:25) says in the person of +one who is restored: "I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, +but with the flesh, the law of sin." And in this state man can +abstain from all mortal sin, which takes its stand in his reason, as +stated above (Q. 74, A. 5); but man cannot abstain from all venial +sin on account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality. +For man can, indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they +are sinful and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is +resisting one, another may arise, and also because the reason is not +always alert to avoid these movements, as was said above (Q. 74, A. +3, ad 2). + +So, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by +justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since +it is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But it +cannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin. Hence +Gregory says (Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that "a sin not at once taken +away by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins": and +this because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the +reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and should place in +Him the end of its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts +ought to be regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason +that the movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. And +thus, even as inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot +help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so +likewise, since man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the +consequence is that many disorders occur in the reason. For when +man's heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted +from Him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil, many +things happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays +from God and breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally: +especially since, when surprised, a man acts according to his +preconceived end and his pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says +(Ethic. iii); although with premeditation of his reason a man may do +something outside the order of his preconceived end and the +inclination of his habit. But because a man cannot always have this +premeditation, it cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance +with his will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly +brought back to the due order. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man can avoid each but not every act of sin, except by +grace, as stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own +shortcoming that he does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact +that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin. + +Reply Obj. 2: Correction is useful "in order that out of the sorrow +of correction may spring the wish to be regenerate; if indeed he who +is corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that whilst the noise +of correction is outwardly resounding and punishing, God by hidden +inspirations is inwardly causing to will," as Augustine says (De +Corr. et Gratia vi). Correction is therefore necessary, from the fact +that man's will is required in order to abstain from sin; yet it is +not sufficient without God's help. Hence it is written (Eccles. +7:14): "Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He +hath despised." + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the +spurious works of St. Augustine]), this saying is to be understood of +man in the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave of +sin. Hence he was able to sin and not to sin. Now, too, whatever a +man wills, is given to him; but his willing good, he has by God's +assistance. +________________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 9] + +Whether One Who Has Already Obtained Grace, Can, of Himself and +Without Further Help of Grace, Do Good and Avoid Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace, +can by himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid +sin. For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfil what +it was given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and +keep from sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that +grace is either useless or imperfect. + +Obj. 2: Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according to +1 Cor. 3:16: "Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that +the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Now since the Spirit of God is +omnipotent, He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us +from sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two +things without any further assistance of grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid of +grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, with +equal reason, will he need yet another grace, even though he has +obtained this first help of grace. Therefore we must go on to +infinity; which is impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no +further help of grace in order to do righteously and to keep free +from sin. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxvi) that "as +the eye of the body though most healthy cannot see unless it is +helped by the brightness of light, so, neither can a man, even if he +is most righteous, live righteously unless he be helped by the +eternal light of justice." But justification is by grace, according +to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely by His grace." Hence even a man +who already possesses grace needs a further assistance of grace in +order to live righteously. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), in order to live righteously +a man needs a twofold help of God--first, a habitual gift whereby +corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up +so as to work deeds meritorious of everlasting life, which exceed the +capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order +to be moved by God to act. + +Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a +further help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. Yet he needs the +help of grace in another way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act +righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason +that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the +Divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason--the condition of +the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the +mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it +serves "the law of sin," Rom. 7:25. In the intellect, too, there +remains the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as is written (Rom. +8:26): "We know not what we should pray for as we ought"; since on +account of the various turns of circumstances, and because we do not +know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, +according to Wis. 9:14: "For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful +and our counsels uncertain." Hence we must be guided and guarded by +God, Who knows and can do all things. For which reason also it is +becoming in those who have been born again as sons of God, to say: +"Lead us not into temptation," and "Thy Will be done on earth as it +is in heaven," and whatever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer +pertaining to this. + +Reply Obj. 1: The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us +that we may no longer need the Divine help; for every creature needs +to be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence if after having +received grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be +concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect, +since man will need the Divine help even in the state of glory, when +grace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent +imperfect, inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as stated +above. + +Reply Obj. 2: The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and +protects, is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which +it causes in us; but beyond this effect He, together with the Father +and the Son, moves and protects us. + +Reply Obj. 3: This argument merely proves that man needs no further +habitual grace. +________________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 10] + +Whether Man Possessed of Grace Needs the Help of Grace in Order to +Persevere? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help +to persevere. For perseverance is something less than virtue, even as +continence is, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7, 9). +Now since man is justified by grace, he needs no further help of +grace in order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he +need the help of grace to have perseverance. + +Obj. 2: Further, all the virtues are infused at once. But +perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it seems that, together +with grace, perseverance is given to the other infused virtues. + +Obj. 3: Further, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:20) more was restored to +man by Christ's gift, than he had lost by Adam's sin. But Adam +received what enabled him to persevere; and thus man does not need +grace in order to persevere. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Persev. ii): "Why is +perseverance besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it +not a mocking request to seek what we know He does not give, and what +is in our power without His giving it?" Now perseverance is besought +by even those who are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, when we +say "Hallowed be Thy name," which Augustine confirms by the words of +Cyprian (De Correp. et Grat. xii). Hence man, even when possessed of +grace, needs perseverance to be given to him by God. + +_I answer that,_ Perseverance is taken in three ways. First, to +signify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly, lest he +be moved by the assault of sadness from what is virtuous. And thus +perseverance is to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and +pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7). Secondly, +perseverance may be called a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of +persevering in good unto the end. And in both these ways perseverance +is infused together with grace, even as continence and the other +virtues are. Thirdly, perseverance is called the abiding in good to +the end of life. And in order to have this perseverance man does not, +indeed, need another habitual grace, but he needs the Divine +assistance guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the +passions, as appears from the preceding article. And hence after +anyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to beseech God for +the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he may be kept from evil +till the end of his life. For to many grace is given to whom +perseverance in grace is not given. + +Reply Obj. 1: This objection regards the first mode of perseverance, +as the second objection regards the second. + +Hence the solution of the second objection is clear. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xliii) [*Cf. De +Correp. et Grat. xii]: "in the original state man received a gift +whereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not given him. But +now, by the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace +whereby they may persevere, and the further gift of persevering," and +thus Christ's gift is greater than Adam's fault. Nevertheless it was +easier for man to persevere, with the gift of grace in the state of +innocence in which the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit, +than it is now. For the restoration by Christ's grace, although it is +already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it +will be in heaven, where man will not merely be able to persevere but +will be unable to sin. +________________________ + +QUESTION 110 + +OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE +(In Four Articles) + +We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and +under this head there are four points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether grace implies something in the soul? + +(2) Whether grace is a quality? + +(3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue? + +(4) Of the subject of grace. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 1] + +Whether Grace Implies Anything in the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that grace does not imply anything in the +soul. For man is said to have the grace of God even as the grace of +man. Hence it is written (Gen. 39:21) that the Lord gave to Joseph +"grace [Douay: 'favor'] in the sight of the chief keeper of the +prison." Now when we say that a man has the favor of another, nothing +is implied in him who has the favor of the other, but an acceptance +is implied in him whose favor he has. Hence when we say that a man +has the grace of God, nothing is implied in his soul; but we merely +signify the Divine acceptance. + +Obj. 2: Further, as the soul quickens the body so does God quicken +the soul; hence it is written (Deut. 30:20): "He is thy life." Now +the soul quickens the body immediately. Therefore nothing can come as +a medium between God and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing +created in the soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, on Rom. 1:7, "Grace to you and peace," the gloss +says: "Grace, i.e. the remission of sins." Now the remission of sin +implies nothing in the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute the +sin, according to Ps. 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath +not imputed sin." Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul. + +_On the contrary,_ Light implies something in what is enlightened. +But grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine says (De Natura et +Gratia xxii): "The light of truth rightly deserts the prevaricator of +the law, and those who have been thus deserted become blind." +Therefore grace implies something in the soul. + +_I answer that,_ According to the common manner of speech, grace is +usually taken in three ways. First, for anyone's love, as we are +accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king, +i.e. the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any +gift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act +of grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given +"gratis," inasmuch as we are said to be "grateful" for benefits. Of +these three the second depends on the first, since one bestows +something on another "gratis" from the love wherewith he receives him +into his good "graces." And from the second proceeds the third, since +from benefits bestowed "gratis" arises "gratitude." + +Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something +in him who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly, +the acknowledgment of the gift. But as regards the first, a +difference must be noted between the grace of God and the grace of +man; for since the creature's good springs from the Divine will, some +good in the creature flows from God's love, whereby He wishes the +good of the creature. On the other hand, the will of man is moved by +the good pre-existing in things; and hence man's love does not wholly +cause the good of the thing, but pre-supposes it either in part or +wholly. Therefore it is clear that every love of God is followed at +some time by a good caused in the creature, but not co-eternal with +the eternal love. And according to this difference of good the love +of God to the creature is looked at differently. For one is common, +whereby He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and thereby +gives things their natural being. But the second is a special love, +whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its +nature to a participation of the Divine good; and according to this +love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by this love that +God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the +creature. + +Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is +signified something bestowed on man by God. Nevertheless the grace of +God sometimes signifies God's eternal love, as we say the grace of +predestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously and not from merits +predestines or elects some; for it is written (Eph. 1:5): "He hath +predestinated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise +of the glory of His grace." + +Reply Obj. 1: Even when a man is said to be in another's good graces, +it is understood that there is something in him pleasing to the +other; even as anyone is said to have God's grace--with this +difference, that what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed +to his love, but whatever is pleasing to God in a man is caused by +the Divine love, as was said above. + +Reply Obj. 2: God is the life of the soul after the manner of an +efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body after the +manner of a formal cause. Now there is no medium between form and +matter, since the form, of itself, _informs_ the matter or subject; +whereas the agent _informs_ the subject, not by its substance, but by +the form, which it causes in the matter. + +Reply Obj. 3: Augustine says (Retract. i, 25): "When I said that +grace was for the remission of sins, and peace for our reconciliation +with God, you must not take it to mean that peace and reconciliation +do not pertain to general peace, but that the special name of grace +signifies the remission of sins." Not only grace, therefore, but many +other of God's gifts pertain to grace. And hence the remission of +sins does not take place without some effect divinely caused in us, +as will appear later (Q. 113, A. 2). +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 2] + +Whether Grace Is a Quality of the Soul? + +Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul. +For no quality acts on its subject, since the action of a quality is +not without the action of its subject, and thus the subject would +necessarily act upon itself. But grace acts upon the soul, by +justifying it. Therefore grace is not a quality. + +Obj. 2: Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace is +nobler than the nature of the soul, since we can do many things by +grace, to which nature is not equal, as stated above (Q. 109, AA. 1, +2, 3). Therefore grace is not a quality. + +Obj. 3: Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be in +its subject. But grace remains; since it is not corrupted, for thus +it would be reduced to nothing, since it was created from nothing; +hence it is called a "new creature"(Gal. 6:15). + +_On the contrary,_ on Ps. 103:15: "That he may make the face cheerful +with oil"; the gloss says: "Grace is a certain beauty of soul, which +wins the Divine love." But beauty of soul is a quality, even as +beauty of body. Therefore grace is a quality. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), there is understood to be an +effect of God's gratuitous will in whoever is said to have God's +grace. Now it was stated (Q. 109, A. 1) that man is aided by God's +gratuitous will in two ways: first, inasmuch as man's soul is moved +by God to know or will or do something, and in this way the +gratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the +soul; for "motion is the act of the mover in the moved." Secondly, +man is helped by God's gratuitous will, inasmuch as a habitual gift +is infused by God into the soul; and for this reason, that it is not +fitting that God should provide less for those He loves, that they +may acquire supernatural good, than for creatures, whom He loves that +they may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natural +creatures, that not merely does He move them to their natural acts, +but He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are the +principles of acts, in order that they may of themselves be inclined +to these movements, and thus the movements whereby they are moved by +God become natural and easy to creatures, according to Wis. 8:1: "she +. . . ordereth all things sweetly." Much more therefore does He +infuse into such as He moves towards the acquisition of supernatural +good, certain forms or supernatural qualities, whereby they may be +moved by Him sweetly and promptly to acquire eternal good; and thus +the gift of grace is a quality. + +Reply Obj. 1: Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not +after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a +formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just. + +Reply Obj. 2: Every substance is either the nature of the thing +whereof it is the substance or is a part of the nature, even as +matter and form are called substance. And because grace is above +human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is +an accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, +becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine goodness, as +is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus because the soul +participates in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of +the Divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the soul in a +less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, +inasmuch as it is the expression or participation of the Divine +goodness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its +mode of being. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Boethius [*Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist.] +says, the "being of an accident is to inhere." Hence no accident is +called being as if it had being, but because by it something is; +hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph. +vii, text. 2). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to +what is, properly speaking, no accident comes into being or is +corrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted +inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this +accident. And thus grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are +created with reference to it, i.e. are given a new being out of +nothing, i.e. not from merits, according to Eph. 2:10, "created in +Jesus Christ in good works." +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 3] + +Whether Grace Is the Same As Virtue? + +Objection 1: It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For +Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that "operating grace is faith +that worketh by charity." But faith that worketh by charity is a +virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue. + +Obj. 2: Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But the +definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace, +since "it makes its subject good, and his work good," and "it is a +good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously," etc. +Therefore grace is virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the +_fourth_ species of quality; viz. _form_ which is the "abiding figure +of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the +_third,_ since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like quality," +which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in _Physic._ +viii; and grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the _second_ +species, which is "natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is +above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural +power. Therefore it must be in the _first_ species which is "habit" +or "disposition." Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even +knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (Q. 57, +AA. 1, 2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue. + +_On the contrary,_ If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to +be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith +nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it +charity, since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine says in his +book on the _Predestination of the Saints_ (De Dono Persev. xvi). +Therefore grace is not virtue. + +_I answer that,_ Some held that grace and virtue were identical in +essence, and differed only logically--in the sense that we speak of +grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given +gratuitously--and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act +rightly. And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27). + +But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot +hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), "virtue +is disposition of what is perfect--and I call perfect what is +disposed according to its nature." Now from this it is clear that the +virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the +fact that everything is disposed with reference to what befits its +nature. But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of +which we spoke above (Q. 55, seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man +is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a +man; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and +towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to some higher +nature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, +according to 2 Pet. 1:4: "He hath given us most great and most +precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the +Divine Nature." And it is in respect of receiving this nature that we +are said to be born again sons of God. + +And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides +the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so +also the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature +is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and +are ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8): "For +you were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as +children of the light." For as the acquired virtues enable a man to +walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the +infused virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: Augustine calls "faith that worketh by charity" grace, +since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first +act by which sanctifying grace is manifested. + +Reply Obj. 2: Good is placed in the definition of virtue with +reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or +participated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but +as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and +yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition which +is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 4] + +Whether Grace Is in the Essence of the Soul As in a Subject, or in +One of the Powers? + +Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the +soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says +(Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]) that +grace is related to the will or to the free will "as a rider to his +horse." Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated above (I, +Q. 83, A. 2). Hence grace is in a power of the soul, as in a subject. + +Obj. 2: Further, "Man's merit springs from grace" as Augustine says +(De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which +proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a +power of the soul. + +Obj. 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of +grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of +grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would +be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the +proper subject of grace. + +Obj. 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers. Now +what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it +follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we +suppose no part or power of the soul--viz. neither the will, nor the +intellect, nor anything else; which is impossible. + +_On the contrary,_ By grace we are born again sons of God. But +generation terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore +grace is in the soul's essence prior to being in the powers. + +_I answer that,_ This question depends on the preceding. For if grace +is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the +soul as in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject +of virtue, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 1). But if grace differs from +virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of +grace, since every perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of +virtue, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 1; Q. 56, A. 1). Hence it remains +that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the +powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For as +man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge +through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in +the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature +of the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the +manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation. + +Reply Obj. 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its powers, which +are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the +powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace. +And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, +which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse--but +not as an accident to a subject. + +And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For +grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of +virtues, as the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds +through the medium of the powers. + +Reply Obj. 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the +species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not +classed in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are +natural properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the +soul differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of +dumb animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, if +the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may +be the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul, +inasmuch as it is of such a species. + +Reply Obj. 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural properties +following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them. Yet, +granted that it was without them, the soul would still be called +intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually +have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species, +from which these powers naturally flow. +________________________ + +QUESTION 111 + +OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there +are five points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and +sanctifying grace? + +(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace; + +(3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace; + +(4) Of the division of gratuitous grace; + +(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace. +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 1] + +Whether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Sanctifying Grace and +Gratuitous Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into +sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of God, +as is clear from what has been already stated (Q. 110, A. 1). But man +is not therefore pleasing to God because something is given him by +God, but rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by +God, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying +grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is not given on account of preceding merits +is given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without +preceding merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore +nature itself is given gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided +with grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set +down as a difference of grace, since it is found outside the genus of +grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But even +sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us +gratuitously, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely +(_gratis_) by His grace." Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be +divided against gratuitous grace. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz. to +sanctify and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first +he says (Eph. 1:6): "He hath graced us in His beloved son." And with +regard to the second (Rom. 2:6): "And if by grace, it is not now by +works, otherwise grace is no more grace." Therefore grace can be +distinguished by its having one only or both. + +_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), "those things that +are of God are well ordered [Vulg.: 'those that are, are ordained by +God]." Now the order of things consists in this, that things are led +to God by other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence +since grace is ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a +certain order, so that some are led to God by others. + +And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united +to God, and this is called "sanctifying grace"; the other is that +whereby one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and +this gift is called "gratuitous grace," since it is bestowed on a man +beyond the capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. +But whereas it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather +that he may cooperate in the justification of another, it is not +called sanctifying grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1 +Cor. 12:7): "And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every +man unto utility," i.e. of others. + +Reply Obj. 1: Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently but +formally, i.e. because thereby a man is justified, and is made worthy +to be called pleasing to God, according to Col. 1:21: "He hath made +us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light." + +Reply Obj. 2: Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes +the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first, as +arising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do +meritorious works, according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, +the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to +debt." The second debt regards the condition of nature. Thus we say +it is due to a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human +nature. Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an +obligation to His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be +subject to God, that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, +which is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or +properties, and that by doing certain works it should attain to +something further. And hence natural endowments are not a debt in the +first sense but in the second. But supernatural gifts are due in +neither sense. Hence they especially merit the name of grace. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous +grace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it makes man +pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do this +keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus the +two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and +non-sanctifying grace. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 2] + +Whether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Operating and Cooperating +Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into +operating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated +above (Q. 110, A. 2). Now no accident can act upon its subject. +Therefore no grace can be called operating. + +Obj. 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly brings +about justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine +says, on John 14:12, "the works that I do he also shall do," says +(Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee without thyself, will not justify +thee without thyself." Therefore no grace ought to be called simply +operating. + +Obj. 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior agent, +and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than +free-will, according to Rom. 9:16: "It is not of him that willeth, +nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." Therefore no +grace ought to be called cooperating. + +Obj. 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate +and to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing can both +operate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into +operating and cooperating. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii): +"God by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in +us, since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, +begins by operating that they may will." But the operations of God +whereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is +fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 2) grace may be taken in +two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and +to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us. + +Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and +cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the +thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind +is moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the +operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that +we speak of "operating grace." But in that effect in which our mind +both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God, +but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak +of "cooperating grace." Now there is a double act in us. First, there +is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will +is a thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, +which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch +as God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. +But there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the +will, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 9) the operation of this act is +attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both +by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and +by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect +to this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid +words Augustine subjoins: "He operates that we may will; and when we +will, He cooperates that we may perfect." And thus if grace is taken +for God's gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, +it is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace. + +But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a +double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of +which is _being,_ and the second, _operation;_ thus the work of heat +is to make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus +habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes +it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is +the principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, +it is called cooperating grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it +does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness +makes a surface white. + +Reply Obj. 2: God does not justify us without ourselves, because +whilst we are being justified we consent to God's justification +(_justitiae_) by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this +movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole +operation pertains to grace. + +Reply Obj. 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another not merely +when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it +helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, +through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being +already intended, grace cooperates with us. + +Reply Obj. 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same grace; but +are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what +has been said. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 3] + +Whether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Prevenient and Subsequent +Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into +prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love. +But God's love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according +to 1 John 4:10: "Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath +first loved us." Therefore grace ought not to be divided into +prevenient and subsequent. + +Obj. 2: Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since it +is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for +thee." But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace +is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. + +Obj. 3: Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an +infinite number of effects--one preceding another. Hence if with +regard to these, grace must be divided into prevenient and +subsequent, it would seem that there are infinite species of grace. +Now no art takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not +fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. + +_On the contrary,_ God's grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both +are said in Ps. 58:11: "His mercy shall prevent me," and again, Ps. +22:6: "Thy mercy will follow me." Therefore grace is fittingly +divided into prevenient and subsequent. + +_I answer that,_ As grace is divided into operating and cooperating, +with regard to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into +prevenient and subsequent, howsoever we consider grace. Now there are +five effects of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the +soul; the second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the +good proposed; the fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach +glory. And hence grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, +is called prevenient with respect to the second, and inasmuch as it +causes the second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first +effect. And as one effect is posterior to this effect, and prior to +that, so may grace be called prevenient and subsequent on account of +the same effect viewed relatively to divers others. And this is what +Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxxi): "It is prevenient, +inasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we +are strengthened; it is prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and +subsequent, inasmuch as we are glorified." + +Reply Obj. 1: God's love signifies something eternal; and hence can +never be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a +temporal effect, which can precede and follow another; and thus grace +may be both prevenient and subsequent. + +Reply Obj. 2: The division into prevenient and subsequent grace does +not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was +already said of operating and cooperating grace. For subsequent +grace, inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct +from prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even +as the charity of the earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same +be said of the light of grace, since the notion of neither implies +imperfection. + +Reply Obj. 3: Although the effects of grace may be infinite in +number, even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless all are reduced +to some of a determinate species, and moreover all coincide in +this--that one precedes another. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 4] + +Whether Gratuitous Grace Is Rightly Divided by the Apostle? + +Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly +divided by the Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by God, may +be called a gratuitous grace. Now there are an infinite number of +gifts freely bestowed on us by God as regards both the good of the +soul and the good of the body--and yet they do not make us pleasing +to God. Hence gratuitous graces cannot be contained under any certain +division. + +Obj. 2: Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from sanctifying +grace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we are +justified by it, according to Rom. 5:1: "Being justified therefore by +faith." Hence it is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous +graces, especially since the other virtues are not so placed, as hope +and charity. + +Obj. 3: Further, the operation of healing, and speaking divers +tongues are miracles. Again, the interpretation of speeches pertains +either to wisdom or to knowledge, according to Dan. 1:17: "And to +these children God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and +wisdom." Hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing and +kinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and the +interpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom and knowledge. + +Obj. 4: Further, as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the Holy Ghost, +so also are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear, as +stated above (Q. 68, A. 4). Therefore these also ought to be placed +amongst the gratuitous gifts. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8, 9, 10): "To one +indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and to another the +word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, the +working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning +of spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another +interpretation of speeches." + +_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), gratuitous grace is +ordained to this, viz. that a man may help another to be led to God. +Now no man can help in this by moving interiorly (for this belongs to +God alone), but only exteriorly by teaching or persuading. Hence +gratuitous grace embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct +another in Divine things which are above reason. Now for this three +things are required: first, a man must possess the fullness of +knowledge of Divine things, so as to be capable of teaching others. +Secondly, he must be able to confirm or prove what he says, otherwise +his words would have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of +fittingly presenting to his hearers what he knows. + +Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen +in human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any science +must first be certain of the principles of the science, and with +regard to this there is _faith,_ which is certitude of invisible +things, the principles of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves +the teacher to know the principal conclusions of the science, and +hence we have the word of _wisdom,_ which is the knowledge of Divine +things. Thirdly, he ought to abound with examples and a knowledge of +effects, whereby at times he needs to manifest causes; and thus we +have the word of _knowledge,_ which is the knowledge of human things, +since "the invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being +understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). + +Now the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon +arguments; but the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what +is proper to the Divine power, and this in two ways: first, when the +teacher of sacred doctrine does what God alone can do, in miraculous +deeds, whether with respect to bodily health--and thus there is the +_grace of healing,_ or merely for the purpose of manifesting the +Divine power; for instance, that the sun should stand still or +darken, or that the sea should be divided--and thus there is the +_working of miracles._ Secondly, when he can manifest what God alone +can know, and these are either future contingents--and thus there is +_prophecy,_ or also the secrets of hearts--and thus there is the +_discerning of spirits._ + +But the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom in which a +person can be understood, and thus there is _kinds of tongues_; or it +can regard the sense of what is said, and thus there is the +_interpretation of speeches._ + +Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), not all the benefits divinely +conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but only those that +surpass the power of nature--e.g. that a fisherman should be replete +with the word of wisdom and of knowledge and the like; and such as +these are here set down as gratuitous graces. + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous graces, +not as a virtue justifying man in himself, but as implying a +super-eminent certitude of faith, whereby a man is fitted for +instructing others concerning such things as belong to the faith. +With regard to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power, +according as man is ordained thereby to God. + +Reply Obj. 3: The grace of healing is distinguished from the general +working of miracles because it has a special reason for inducing one +to the faith, since a man is all the more ready to believe when he +has received the gift of bodily health through the virtue of faith. +So, too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches have +special efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are set down as +special gratuitous graces. + +Reply Obj. 4: Wisdom and knowledge are not numbered among the +gratuitous graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the +gifts of the Holy Ghost, i.e. inasmuch as man's mind is rendered +easily movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and +knowledge; for thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated above +(Q. 68, AA. 1, 4). But they are numbered amongst the gratuitous +graces, inasmuch as they imply such a fullness of knowledge and +wisdom that a man may not merely think aright of Divine things, but +may instruct others and overpower adversaries. Hence it is +significant that it is the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of +knowledge that are placed in the gratuitous graces, since, as +Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1), "It is one thing merely to know +what a man must believe in order to reach everlasting life, and +another thing to know how this may benefit the godly and may be +defended against the ungodly." +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 5] + +Whether Gratuitous Grace Is Nobler Than Sanctifying Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than +sanctifying grace. For "the people's good is better than the +individual good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2). Now +sanctifying grace is ordained to the good of one man alone, whereas +gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the whole Church, +as stated above (AA. 1, 4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than +sanctifying grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is a greater power that is able to act upon +another, than that which is confined to itself, even as greater is +the brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of +that which can only shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the +Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) "that justice is the most excellent of +the virtues," since by it a man bears himself rightly towards others. +But by sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in himself; whereas +by gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of others. Hence +gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than what is +common to all; thus to reason, which is proper to man, is nobler than +to feel, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is +common to all members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is the +proper gift of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence +gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), having enumerated the +gratuitous graces, adds: "And I shew unto you yet a more excellent +way"; and as the sequel proves he is speaking of charity, which +pertains to sanctifying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble +than gratuitous grace. + +_I answer that,_ The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained, +the more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than +the means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union +with his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is +preparatory to the end; i.e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth, +men are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And hence +sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text. 52), a +multitude, as an army, has a double good; the first is in the +multitude itself, viz. the order of the army; the second is separate +from the multitude, viz. the good of the leader--and this is better +good, since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is +ordained to the common good of the Church, which is ecclesiastical +order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common +good, which is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler. + +Reply Obj. 2: If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have +sanctifying grace, it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the +nobler; even as the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more +excellent than that of an object that is lit up. But by gratuitous +grace a man cannot cause another to have union with God, which he +himself has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain dispositions +towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more +excellent, even as in fire, the heat, which manifests its species +whereby it produces heat in other things, is not more noble than its +substantial form. + +Reply Obj. 3: Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end; and thus, +to reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary; for what is proper +is ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence there is no +comparison. +________________________ + +QUESTION 112 + +OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE +(In Five Articles) + +We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there +are five points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace? + +(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of +the recipient, by an act of free-will? + +(3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity? + +(4) Whether grace is equal in all? + +(5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 1] + +Whether God Alone Is the Cause of Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace. +For it is written (John 1:17): "Grace and truth came by Jesus +Christ." Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely +the Divine Nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore +a creature may be the cause of grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, there is this difference between the sacraments of +the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law +cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. +Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. +Therefore God is not the only cause of grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii, +viii), "Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and +men." Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and +perfected by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 83:12): "The Lord will give +grace and glory." + +_I answer that,_ Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause +must always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace +surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing +short of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other +nature. And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause +grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing +a partaking of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is +impossible that anything save fire should enkindle. + +Reply Obj. 1: Christ's humanity is an "organ of His Godhead," as +Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not +bring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but +in virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does not +cause grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature +joined to it, whereby the actions of Christ's humanity are saving +actions. + +Reply Obj. 2: As in the person of Christ the humanity causes our +salvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so +likewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from +Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and +principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, +according to John 3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the +Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." + +Reply Obj. 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or men, +by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence +Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "this cleansing and +enlightenment and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of +Divine knowledge." +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 2] + +Whether Any Preparation and Disposition for Grace Is Required on +Man's Part? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no preparation or disposition for +grace is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says (Rom. +4:4), "To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to +grace, but according to debt." Now a man's preparation by free-will +can only be through some operation. Hence it would do away with the +notion of grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing +himself to have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace is +given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he +was "breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples +of the Lord" (Act 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on +man's part. + +Obj. 3: Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in +matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in +creation, to which grace is compared, which is called "a new +creature" (Gal. 6:15). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes +grace, as stated above (A. 1). Hence no preparation is required on +man's part to obtain grace. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Amos 4:12): "Be prepared to meet +thy God, O Israel," and (1 Kings 7:3): "Prepare your hearts unto the +Lord." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 111, A. 2), grace is taken in +two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from +God, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, +a certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can +only be in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies +a help from God to move us to good, no preparation is required on +man's part, that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, but +rather, every preparation in man must be by the help of God moving +the soul to good. And thus even the good movement of the free-will, +whereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace, is an act +of the free-will moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare +himself, according to Prov. 16:1: "It is the part of man to prepare +the soul"; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the free-will. +Hence it is said that man's will is prepared by God, and that man's +steps are guided by God. + +Reply Obj. 1: A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous +with the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not +indeed of grace, which is already possessed--but of glory which is +not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which +sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet it is from +God's motion. But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet +justified by grace, and merit can only arise from grace, as will be +seen further on (Q. 114, A. 2). + +Reply Obj. 2: Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God +prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether anyone +arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For +it is written (Ecclus. 11:23): "It is easy in the eyes of God on a +sudden to make the poor man rich." Now it sometimes happens that God +moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation +precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to +good, and man receives grace suddenly, according to John 6:45: "Every +one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." +And thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in the +midst of sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, +to come; and hence he received grace suddenly. + +Reply Obj. 3: An agent of infinite power needs no matter or +disposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else; +and yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause, +in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the +form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation +is required which He Himself does not bring about. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 3] + +Whether Grace Is Necessarily Given to Whoever Prepares Himself for +It, or to Whoever Does What He Can? + +Objection 1: It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever +prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, +on Rom. 5:1, "Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace," +etc. the gloss says: "God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise +there would be injustice with Him." But it is impossible for +injustice to be with God. Therefore it is impossible for God not to +welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity. + +Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the reason +why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not wish, +nor was he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed, the +effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to +receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity. + +Obj. 3: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from +Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the +good of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to +disposed matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily +bestowed on whoever prepares himself for grace. + +_On the contrary,_ Man is compared to God as clay to the potter, +according to Jer. 18:6: "As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are +you in My hand." But however much the clay is prepared, it does not +necessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a +man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), man's preparation for grace +is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence the +preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from +free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain +grace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human +power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the +Mover, and thus it has a necessity--not indeed of coercion, but of +infallibility--as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's +intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his +book on the _Predestination of the Saints_ (De Dono Persev. xiv) that +"by God's good gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly +liberated." Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose +heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to +it, according to John 6:45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father, +and hath learned, cometh to Me." + +Reply Obj. 1: This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a +meritorious act of their free-will, already _informed_ with grace; +for if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice +which He Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement of +free-will before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight +to God is by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail. + +Reply Obj. 2: The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; +but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's according to +Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me." + +Reply Obj. 3: Even in natural things, the form does not necessarily +ensue the disposition of the matter, except by the power of the agent +that causes the disposition. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 4] + +Whether Grace Is Greater in One Than in Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in +another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated +above (Q. 110, A. 1). Now it is written (Wis. 6:8): "He made the +little and the great and He hath equally care of all." Therefore all +obtain grace from Him equally. + +Obj. 2: Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more or +less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our +last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is +not greater in one than in another. + +Obj. 3: Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above (Q. 110, +A. 1, ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither +is there in grace. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 4:7): "But to every one of us +is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." Now +what is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have +not an equal grace. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; Q. 56, AA. 1, 2), +habits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end or +object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being +ordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject, +which more or less participates in the habit inhering to it. + +Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be +greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest +Good, which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive +more or less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by +grace than another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of +him who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared +for grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek +the first cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself, only +inasmuch as his free-will is prepared by God. Hence the first cause +of this diversity is to be sought on the part of God, Who dispenses +His gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection +of the Church may result from these various degrees; even as He +instituted the various conditions of things, that the universe might +be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said (Eph. 4:7): "To every +one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of +Christ," having enumerated the various graces, he adds (Eph. 4:12): +"For the perfecting of the saints . . . for the edifying of the body +of Christ." + +Reply Obj. 1: The Divine care may be looked at in two ways: first, as +regards the Divine act, which is simple and uniform; and thus His +care looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers +great things and little. But, secondly, it may be considered in those +things which come to be considered by the Divine care; and thus, +inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His care provides greater +gifts to some, and lesser gifts for others. + +Reply Obj. 2: This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude +of grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater +good, but inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or less +participation of the same good. For there may be diversity of +intensity and remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards +the subjects' participation. + +Reply Obj. 3: Natural life pertains to man's substance, and hence +cannot be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace +accidentally, and hence man may possess it more or less. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 5] + +Whether Man Can Know That He Has Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For +grace by its physical reality is in the soul. Now the soul has most +certain knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical +reality, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence +grace may be known most certainly by one who has grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, so is grace. But +whoever receives knowledge from God, knows that he has knowledge, +according to Wis. 7:17: The Lord "hath given me the true knowledge of +the things that are." Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives +grace from God, knows that he has grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, light is more knowable than darkness, since, +according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made manifest is +light." Now sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with +certainty by one that is in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, +which is spiritual light, be known. + +Obj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:12): "Now we have +received not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God; +that we may know the things that are given us from God." Now grace is +God's first gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy +Spirit, by the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him. + +Obj. 5: Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham (Gen. 22:12): +"Now I know that thou fearest God," i.e. "I have made thee know." Now +He is speaking there of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace. +Hence a man may know that he has grace. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 9:1): "Man knoweth not +whether he be worthy of love or hatred." Now sanctifying grace maketh +a man worthy of God's love. Therefore no one can know whether he has +sanctifying grace. + +_I answer that,_ There are three ways of knowing a thing: first, by +revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a +special privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the +joy of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may +carry on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and +may bear the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul +(2 Cor. 12:9): "My grace is sufficient for thee." + +Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty; +and in this way no one can know that he has grace. For certitude +about a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper +principle. Thus it is by undemonstrable universal principles that +certitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no +one can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if he does not know +its principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God, Who +by reason of His very excellence is unknown to us, according to Job +36:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." And hence His +presence in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty, +according to Job 9:11: "If He come to me, I shall not see Him; if He +depart I shall not understand." And hence man cannot judge with +certainty that he has grace, according to 1 Cor. 4:3, 4: "But neither +do I judge my own self . . . but He that judgeth me is the Lord." + +Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may +know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God, and of +despising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of +any mortal sin. And thus it is written (Apoc. 2:17): "To him that +overcometh I will give the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth, +but he that receiveth it," because whoever receives it knows, by +experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not receive it, +does not experience. Yet this knowledge is imperfect; hence the +Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:4): "I am not conscious to myself of anything, +yet am I not hereby justified," since, according to Ps. 18:13: "Who +can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from +those of others spare Thy servant." + +Reply Obj. 1: Those things which are in the soul by their physical +reality, are known through experimental knowledge; in so far as +through acts man has experience of their inward principles: thus when +we wish, we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the +functions of life, we observe that there is life in us. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is an essential condition of knowledge that a man +should have certitude of the objects of knowledge; and again, it is +an essential condition of faith that a man should be certain of the +things of faith, and this, because certitude belongs to the +perfection of the intellect, wherein these gifts exist. Hence, +whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it is +otherwise with grace and charity and such like, which perfect the +appetitive faculty. + +Reply Obj. 3: Sin has for its principal object commutable good, which +is known to us. But the object or end of grace is unknown to us on +account of the greatness of its light, according to 1 Tim. 6:16: "Who +. . . inhabiteth light inaccessible." + +Reply Obj. 4: The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory, +which have been given to us in hope, and these we know most certainly +by faith, although we do not know for certain that we have grace to +enable us to merit them. Or it may be said that he is speaking of the +privileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds (1 +Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit." + +Reply Obj. 5: What was said to Abraham may refer to experimental +knowledge which springs from deeds of which we are cognizant. For in +the deed that Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally +that he had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a revelation. +________________________ + +QUESTION 113 + +OF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE +(In Ten Articles) + +We have now to consider the effect of grace; (1) the justification of +the ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; and (2) merit, +which is the effect of cooperating grace. Under the first head there +are ten points of inquiry: + +(1) What is the justification of the ungodly? + +(2) Whether grace is required for it? + +(3) Whether any movement of the free-will is required? + +(4) Whether a movement of faith is required? + +(5) Whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required? + +(6) Whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the +foregoing? + +(7) Whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is +sudden? + +(8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justification; + +(9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work? + +(10) Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 1] + +Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Is the Remission of Sins? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is +not the remission of sins. For sin is opposed not only to justice, +but to all the other virtues, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 1). Now +justification signifies a certain movement towards justice. Therefore +not even remission of sin is justification, since movement is from +one contrary to the other. + +Obj. 2: Further, everything ought to be named from what is +predominant in it, according to _De Anima_ ii, text. 49. Now the +remission of sins is brought about chiefly by faith, according to +Acts 15:9: "Purifying their hearts by faith"; and by charity, +according to Prov. 10:12: "Charity covereth all sins." Therefore the +remission of sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather +than justice. + +Obj. 3: Further, the remission of sins seems to be the same as being +called, for whoever is called is afar off, and we are afar off from +God by sin. But one is called before being justified according to +Rom. 8:30: "And whom He called, them He also justified." Therefore +justification is not the remission of sins. + +_On the contrary,_ On Rom. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also +justified," the gloss says i.e. "by the remission of sins." Therefore +the remission of sins is justification. + +_I answer that,_ Justification taken passively implies a movement +towards justice, as heating implies a movement towards heat. But +since justice, by its nature, implies a certain rectitude of order, +it may be taken in two ways: first, inasmuch as it implies a right +order in man's act, and thus justice is placed amongst the +virtues--either as particular justice, which directs a man's acts by +regulating them in relation to his fellowman--or as legal justice, +which directs a man's acts by regulating them in their relation to +the common good of society, as appears from _Ethic._ v, 1. + +Secondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain +rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man, in so far as +what is highest in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of +the soul are subject to the superior, i.e. to the reason; and this +disposition the Philosopher calls "justice metaphorically speaking" +(Ethic. v, 11). Now this justice may be in man in two ways: first, by +simple generation, which is from privation to form; and thus +justification may belong even to such as are not in sin, when they +receive this justice from God, as Adam is said to have received +original justice. Secondly, this justice may be brought about in man +by a movement from one contrary to the other, and thus justification +implies a transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid +state of justice. And it is thus we are now speaking of the +justification of the ungodly, according to the Apostle (Rom. 4:5): +"But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth +the ungodly," etc. And because movement is named after its term +_whereto_ rather than from its term _whence,_ the transmutation +whereby anyone is changed by the remission of sins from the state of +ungodliness to the state of justice, borrows its name from its term +_whereto,_ and is called "justification of the ungodly." + +Reply Obj. 1: Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the disorder of a +mind not subject to God, may be called injustice, as being contrary +to the aforesaid justice, according to 1 John 3:4: "Whosoever +committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity." And +thus the removal of any sin is called the justification of the +ungodly. + +Reply Obj. 2: Faith and charity imply a special directing of the +human mind to God by the intellect and will; whereas justice implies +a general rectitude of order. Hence this transmutation is named after +justice rather than after charity or faith. + +Reply Obj. 3: Being called refers to God's help moving and exciting +our mind to give up sin, and this motion of God is not the remission +of sins, but its cause. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 2] + +Whether the Infusion of Grace Is Required for the Remission of Guilt, +i.e., for the Justification of the Ungodly? + +Objection 1: It would seem that for the remission of guilt, which is +the justification of the ungodly, no infusion of grace is required. +For anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the +other, if the contraries are not immediate. Now the state of guilt +and the state of grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the +middle state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt. +Hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his being brought to a +state of grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, the remission of guilt consists in the Divine +imputation, according to Ps. 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the +Lord hath not imputed sin." Now the infusion of grace puts something +into our soul, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 1). Hence the infusion of +grace is not required for the remission of guilt. + +Obj. 3: Further, no one can be subject to two contraries at once. Now +some sins are contraries, as wastefulness and miserliness. Hence +whoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously +subject to the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been +subject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of +wastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And thus a sin +is remitted without grace. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 3:24): "Justified freely by +His grace." + +_I answer that,_ by sinning a man offends God as stated above (Q. 71, +A. 5). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of +the offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted to +us, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love +whereby God loves us. Now God's love, considered on the part of the +Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the +effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we +sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect +of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, +whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts +him out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without +the infusion of grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: More is required for an offender to pardon an offense, +than for one who has committed no offense, not to be hated. For it +may happen amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another. +But if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of the offense can +only spring from a special goodwill. Now God's goodwill is said to be +restored to man by the gift of grace; and hence although a man before +sinning may be without grace and without guilt, yet that he is +without guilt after sinning can only be because he has grace. + +Reply Obj. 2: As God's love consists not merely in the act of the +Divine will but also implies a certain effect of grace, as stated +above (Q. 110, A. 1), so likewise, when God does not impute sin to a +man, there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not +imputed; for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not +imputed to a man by God. + +Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 26), if to +leave off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it would be enough +if Scripture warned us thus: "'My son, hast thou sinned? do so no +more?' Now this is not enough, but it is added: 'But for thy former +sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.'" For the act of sin +passes, but the guilt remains, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 6). Hence +when anyone passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a contrary +vice, he ceases to have the act of the former sin, but he does not +cease to have the guilt, hence he may have the guilt of both sins at +once. For sins are not contrary to each other on the part of their +turning from God, wherein sin has its guilt. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 3] + +Whether for the Justification of the Ungodly Is Required a Movement +of the Free-will? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will is +required for the justification of the ungodly. For we see that by the +sacrament of Baptism, infants and sometimes adults are justified +without a movement of their free-will: hence Augustine says (Confess. +iv) that when one of his friends was taken with a fever, "he lay for +a long time senseless and in a deadly sweat, and when he was +despaired of, he was baptized without his knowing, and was +regenerated"; which is effected by sanctifying grace. Now God does +not confine His power to the sacraments. Hence He can justify a man +without the sacraments, and without any movement of the free-will. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man has not the use of reason when asleep, and +without it there can be no movement of the free-will. But Solomon +received from God the gift of wisdom when asleep, as related in 3 +Kings 3 and 2 Paral 1. Hence with equal reason the gift of +sanctifying grace is sometimes bestowed by God on man without the +movement of his free-will. + +Obj. 3: Further, grace is preserved by the same cause as brings it +into being, for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "so ought +man to turn to God as he is ever made just by Him." Now grace is +preserved in man without a movement of his free-will. Hence it can be +infused in the beginning without a movement of the free-will. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 6:45): "Every one that hath +heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now to learn +cannot be without a movement of the free-will, since the learner +assents to the teacher. Hence, no one comes to the Father by +justifying grace without a movement of the free-will. + +_I answer that,_ The justification of the ungodly is brought about by +God moving man to justice. For He it is "that justifieth the ungodly" +according to Rom. 4:5. Now God moves everything in its own manner, +just as we see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is +light are moved differently, on account of their diverse natures. +Hence He moves man to justice according to the condition of his human +nature. But it is man's proper nature to have free-will. Hence in him +who has the use of reason, God's motion to justice does not take +place without a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift +of justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to +accept the gift of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus. + +Reply Obj. 1: Infants are not capable of the movement of their +free-will; hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls that God +moves them to justice. Now this cannot be brought about without a +sacrament; because as original sin, from which they are justified, +does not come to them from their own will, but by carnal generation, +so also is grace given them by Christ through spiritual regeneration. +And the same reason holds good with madmen and idiots that have never +had the use of their free-will. But in the case of one who has had +the use of his free-will and afterwards has lost it either through +sickness or sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the +exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless he +intended to make use of this sacrament, and this can only be by the +use of his free-will. And it was in this way that he of whom +Augustine speaks was regenerated, because both previously and +afterwards he assented to the Baptism. + +Reply Obj. 2: Solomon neither merited nor received wisdom whilst +asleep; but it was declared to him in his sleep that on account of +his previous desire wisdom would be infused into him by God. Hence it +is said in his person (Wis. 7:7): "I wished, and understanding was +given unto me." + +Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but was the sleep +of prophecy, according to Num. 12:6: "If there be among you a prophet +of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him +in a dream." In such cases the use of free-will remains. + +And yet it must be observed that the comparison between the gift of +wisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not hold. For the gift +of justifying grace especially ordains a man to good, which is the +object of the will; and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of +the will which is a movement of free-will. But wisdom perfects the +intellect which precedes the will; hence without any complete +movement of the free-will, the intellect can be enlightened with the +gift of wisdom, even as we see that things are revealed to men in +sleep, according to Job 33:15, 16: "When deep sleep falleth upon men +and they are sleeping in their beds, then He openeth the ears of men, +and teaching, instructeth them in what they are to learn." + +Reply Obj. 3: In the infusion of justifying grace there is a certain +transmutation of the human soul, and hence a proper movement of the +human soul is required in order that the soul may be moved in its own +manner. But the conservation of grace is without transmutation: no +movement on the part of the soul is required but only a continuation +of the Divine influx. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 4] + +Whether a Movement of Faith Is Required for the Justification of the +Ungodly? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of faith is required for +the justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justified by faith, +so also by other things, viz. by fear, of which it is written +(Ecclus. 1:27): "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is +without fear cannot be justified"; and again by charity, according to +Luke 7:47: "Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much"; +and again by humility, according to James 4:6: "God resisteth the +proud and giveth grace to the humble"; and again by mercy, according +to Prov. 15:27: "By mercy and faith sins are purged away." Hence the +movement of faith is no more required for the justification of the +ungodly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues. + +Obj. 2: Further, the act of faith is required for justification only +inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man may know God in other +ways, viz. by natural knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no +act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. + +Obj. 3: Further, there are several articles of faith. Therefore if +the act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, it +would seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when +he is first justified. But this seems inconvenient, since such +thought would require a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an +act of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:1): "Being justified +therefore by faith, let us have peace with God." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) a movement of free-will is +required for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man's mind +is moved by God. Now God moves man's soul by turning it to Himself +according to Ps. 84:7 (Septuagint): "Thou wilt turn us, O God, and +bring us to life." Hence for the justification of the ungodly a +movement of the mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now +the first turning to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: "He +that cometh to God must believe that He is." Hence a movement of +faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. + +Reply Obj. 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is +quickened by charity; hence in the justification of the ungodly, a +movement of charity is infused together with the movement of faith. +Now free-will is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act +of filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it may happen +that one and the same act of free-will springs from different +virtues, when one commands and another is commanded, inasmuch as the +act may be ordained to various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts +sin either by way of satisfying for it, and thus it follows +justification; or by way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful +obtain mercy; and thus it can either precede justification, or concur +with the other virtues towards justification, inasmuch as mercy is +included in the love of our neighbor. + +Reply Obj. 2: By natural knowledge a man is not turned to God, +according as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of +justification. Hence such knowledge does not suffice for +justification. But the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of +faith, as stated above (Q. 68, A. 4, ad 3). + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Apostle says (Rom. 4:5), "to him that . . . +believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to +justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God." Hence it is +clear that in the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is +required in order that a man may believe that God justifies man +through the mystery of Christ. +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 5] + +Whether for the Justification of the Ungodly There Is Required a +Movement of the Free-will Towards Sin? + +Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will towards +sin is required for the justification of the ungodly. For charity +alone suffices to take away sin, according to Prov. 10:12: "Charity +covereth all sins." Now the object of charity is not sin. Therefore +for this justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will +towards sin is required. + +Obj. 2: Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not to look back, +according to Phil. 3:13, 14: "Forgetting the things that are behind, +and stretching forth myself to those that are before, I press towards +the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation." But whoever is +stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he +ought to forget them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of +his free-will. + +Obj. 3: Further, in the justification of the ungodly one sin is not +remitted without another, for "it is irreverent to expect half a +pardon from God" [*Cap., Sunt. plures: Dist. iii, De Poenit.]. Hence, +in the justification of the ungodly, if man's free-will must move +against sin, he ought to think of all his sins. But this is unseemly, +both because a great space of time would be required for such +thought, and because a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such +sins as he had forgotten. Hence for the justification of the ungodly +no movement of the free-will is required. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 31:5): "I will confess against +myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou hast forgiven the +wickedness of my sin." + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the justification of the +ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God +from the state of sin to the state of justice. Hence it is necessary +for the human mind to regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as +a body in local movement is related to both terms of the movement. +Now it is clear that in local movement the moving body leaves the +term _whence_ and nears the term _whereto._ Hence the human mind +whilst it is being justified, must, by a movement of its free-will +withdraw from sin and draw near to justice. + +Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in an act of +free-will, means detestation and desire. For Augustine says on the +words "the hireling fleeth," etc. (John 10:12): "Our emotions are the +movements of our soul; joy is the soul's outpouring; fear is the +soul's flight; your soul goes forward when you seek; your soul flees, +when you are afraid." Hence in the justification of the ungodly there +must be two acts of the free-will--one, whereby it tends to God's +justice; the other whereby it hates sin. + +Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to the same virtue to seek one contrary and +to avoid the other; and hence, as it belongs to charity to love God, +so likewise, to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from God. + +Reply Obj. 2: A man ought not to return to those things that are +behind, by loving them; but, for that matter, he ought to forget +them, lest he be drawn to them. Yet he ought to recall them to mind, +in order to detest them; for this is to fly from them. + +Reply Obj. 3: Previous to justification a man must detest each sin he +remembers to have committed, and from this remembrance the soul goes +on to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all sins +committed, in which are included such sins as have been forgotten. +For a man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even +for those he does not remember, if they were present to his memory; +and this movement cooperates in his justification. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 6] + +Whether the Remission of Sins Ought to Be Reckoned Amongst the Things +Required for Justification? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be +reckoned amongst the things required for justification. For the +substance of a thing is not reckoned together with those that are +required for a thing; thus a man is not reckoned together with his +body and soul. But the justification of the ungodly is itself the +remission of sins, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the remission of +sins ought not to be reckoned among the things required for the +justification of the ungodly. + +Obj. 2: Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins are the +same; as illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same. But a +thing ought not to be reckoned together with itself; for unity is +opposed to multitude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be +reckoned with the infusion of grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from cause, +from the free-will's movement towards God and sin; since it is by +faith and contrition that sin is forgiven. But an effect ought not to +be reckoned with its cause; since things thus enumerated together, +and, as it were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the +remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things required +for the justification of the ungodly. + +_On the contrary,_ In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought +not to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now +the remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly; +for it is written (Isa. 27:9): "This is all the fruit, that the sin +thereof should be taken away." Hence the remission of sins ought to +be reckoned amongst the things required for justification. + +_I answer that,_ There are four things which are accounted to be +necessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz. the infusion of +grace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the +movement of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The +reason for this is that, as stated above (A. 1), the +justification of the ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved +by God from a state of sin to a state of justice. Now in the movement +whereby one thing is moved by another, three things are required: +first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the movement of the moved; +thirdly, the consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the +end. On the part of the Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; +on the part of the free-will which is moved, there are two +movements--of departure from the term _whence,_ and of approach to +the term _whereto_; but the consummation of the movement or the +attainment of the end of the movement is implied in the remission of +sins; for in this is the justification of the ungodly completed. + +Reply Obj. 1: The justification of the ungodly is called the +remission of sins, even as every movement has its species from its +term. Nevertheless, many other things are required in order to reach +the term, as stated above (A. 5). + +Reply Obj. 2: The infusion of grace and the remission of sin +may be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance of +the act, and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows +grace and remits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of +the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between guilt, +which is taken away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural +things generation and corruption differ, although the generation of +one thing is the corruption of another. + +Reply Obj. 3: This enumeration is not the division of a genus +into its species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous; +but it is division of the things required for the completion of +anything; and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and what +follows, since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing +may precede and some follow. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 7] + +Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Takes Place in an Instant or +Successively? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does +not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already +stated (A. 3), for the justification of the ungodly, there is +required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is +choice, which requires the deliberation of counsel, as stated above +(Q. 13, A. 1). Hence, since deliberation implies a certain reasoning +process, and this implies succession, the justification of the +ungodly would seem to be successive. + +Obj. 2: Further, the free-will's movement is not without actual +consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things +actually and at once, as stated above (I, Q. 85, A. 4). Hence, since +for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of +the free-will towards several things, viz. towards God and towards +sin, it would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to +be in an instant. + +Obj. 3: Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g. blackness +or whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now grace may +be greater or less, as stated above (Q. 112, A. 4). Hence it is not +received suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion +of grace is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would +seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant. + +Obj. 4: Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in +justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace, +without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on (Q. +114, A. 2). Now a thing receives its form before operating by this +form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved +towards God and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at once. + +Obj. 5: Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be an +instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is forgiven +there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot be the +same instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same +simultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between +which there must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1). +Therefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at +once, but successively. + +_On the contrary,_ The justification of the ungodly is caused by the +justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to +men's minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: "And suddenly there came +a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which the gloss +says that "the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts." Hence +the justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous. + +_I answer that,_ The entire justification of the ungodly consists as +to its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that +free-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace +takes place in an instant and without succession. And the reason of +this is that if a form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it +is either because that subject is not disposed, or because the agent +needs time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the +matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form +accrues to the matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself is +disposed to receive light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body +actually luminous. Now it was stated (Q. 112, A. 2) that God, in +order to infuse grace into the soul, needs no disposition, save what +He Himself has made. And sometimes this sufficient disposition for +the reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and +successively, as stated above (Q. 112, A. 2, ad 2). For the reason +why a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the +matter there is a resistant which has some disproportion with the +power of the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent, the +more speedily is the matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine +power is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to +its form; and much more man's free-will, whose movement is by nature +instantaneous. Therefore the justification of the ungodly by God +takes place in an instant. + +Reply Obj. 1: The movement of the free-will, which concurs in the +justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw +near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes, +indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the +substance of justification, but a way of justification; as local +movement is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation. + +Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 85, A. 5), there is nothing to +prevent two things being understood at once, in so far as they are +somehow one; thus we understand the subject and predicate together, +inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And in +the same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in +so far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement +towards sin is ordained to the free-will's movement towards God, +since a man detests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to +cling. Hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will +simultaneously detests sin and turns to God, even as a body +approaches one point and withdraws from another simultaneously. + +Reply Obj. 3: The reason why a form is not received instantaneously +in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less; for +thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air, which can +be illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought on the part +of the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above. + +Reply Obj. 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the thing begins +to operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated moves +upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be +terminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to will--the +movements of the free-will--are not successive, but instantaneous. +Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be successive. + +Reply Obj. 5: The succession of opposites in the same subject must be +looked at differently in the things that are subject to time and in +those that are above time. For in those that are in time, there is no +last instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject; but +there is the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent +form inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that +in time we are not to consider one instant, since neither do instants +succeed each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is +proved in _Physic._ vi, 1. But time is terminated by an instant. +Hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving +towards its form, it is under the opposite form; but in the last +instant of this time, which is the first instant of the subsequent +time, it has the form which is the term of the movement. + +But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be +any succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as +in the angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time, +but by discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous, +as stated above (I, Q. 53, AA. 2, 3). In these, therefore, there is a +last instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which +the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between, since there is +no continuity of time, which this would necessitate. + +Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time, +but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with +continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it +considers the intelligible species, as stated above (I, Q. 85, AA. 1, +2). We must, therefore, decide from this about its change as regards +the condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say that there is +no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; whereas there is a +first instant that grace inheres; and in all the time previous sin +inhered. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 8] + +Whether the Infusion of Grace Is Naturally the First of the Things +Required for the Justification of the Ungodly? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is +naturally required first for the justification of the ungodly. For we +withdraw from evil before drawing near to good, according to Ps. +33:15: "Turn away from evil, and do good." Now the remission of sins +regards the turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace regards +the turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is naturally before +the infusion of grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, the disposition naturally precedes the form to which +it disposes. Now the free-will's movement is a disposition for the +reception of grace. Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of +grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely to God. Now +a hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement takes +place. Hence the remission of sin and the free-will's movement +towards sin are naturally before the infusion of grace. + +_On the contrary,_ The cause is naturally prior to its effect. Now +the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the +justification of the ungodly, as stated above (A. 7). Therefore it is +naturally prior to it. + +_I answer that,_ The aforesaid four things required for the +justification of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since the +justification of the ungodly is not successive, as stated above (A. +7); but in the order of nature, one is prior to another; and in their +natural order the first is the infusion of grace; the second, the +free-will's movement towards God; the third, the free-will's movement +towards sin; the fourth, the remission of sin. + +The reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover +is naturally first; the disposition of the matter, or the movement of +the moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in which the +motion of the mover rests, is last. Now the motion of God the Mover +is the infusion of grace, as stated above (A. 6); the movement or +disposition of the moved is the free-will's double movement; and the +term or end of the movement is the remission of sin, as stated above +(A. 6). Hence in their natural order the first in the justification +of the ungodly is the infusion of grace; the second is the +free-will's movement towards God; the third is the free-will's +movement towards sin, for he who is being justified detests sin +because it is against God, and thus the free-will's movement towards +God naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards sin, since it +is its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the remission of sin, +to which this transmutation is ordained as to an end, as stated above +(AA. 1, 6). + +Reply Obj. 1: The withdrawal from one term and approach to another +may be looked at in two ways: first, on the part of the thing moved, +and thus the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the approach +to a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite which is put +away is prior to the opposite which the subject moved attains to by +its movement. But on the part of the agent it is the other way about, +since the agent, by the form pre-existing in it, acts for the removal +of the opposite form; as the sun by its light acts for the removal of +darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to +the removal of darkness; but on the part of the atmosphere to be +illuminated, to be freed from darkness is, in the order of nature, +prior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time. +And since the infusion of grace and the remission of sin regard God +Who justifies, hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is +prior to the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part +of the man justified, it is the other way about, since in the order +of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of +justifying grace. Or it may be said that the term _whence_ of +justification is sin; and the term _whereto_ is justice; and that +grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and of obtaining of +justice. + +Reply Obj. 2: The disposition of the subject precedes the reception +of the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the action of the +agent, whereby the subject is disposed. And hence the free-will's +movement precedes the reception of grace in the order of nature, and +follows the infusion of grace. + +Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9), in movements of +the soul the movement toward the speculative principle or the +practical end is the very first, but in exterior movements the +removal of the impediment precedes the attainment of the end. And as +the free-will's movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of +nature it moves towards God as to its end, before removing the +impediment of sin. +________________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 9] + +Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Is God's Greatest Work? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is +not God's greatest work. For it is by the justification of the +ungodly that we attain the grace of a wayfarer. Now by glorification +we receive heavenly grace, which is greater. Hence the glorification +of angels and men is a greater work than the justification of the +ungodly. + +Obj. 2: Further, the justification of the ungodly is ordained to the +particular good of one man. But the good of the universe is greater +than the good of one man, as is plain from _Ethic._ i, 2. Hence the +creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification +of the ungodly. + +Obj. 3: Further, to make something from nothing, where there is +nought to cooperate with the agent, is greater than to make something +with the cooperation of the recipient. Now in the work of creation +something is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with +the agent; but in the justification of the ungodly God makes +something from something, i.e. a just man from a sinner, and there is +a cooperation on man's part, since there is a movement of the +free-will, as stated above (A. 3). Hence the justification of the +ungodly is not God's greatest work. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 144:9): "His tender mercies are +over all His works," and in a collect [*Tenth Sunday after Pentecost] +we say: "O God, Who dost show forth Thine all-mightiness most by +pardoning and having mercy," and Augustine, expounding the words, +"greater than these shall he do" (John 14:12) says that "for a just +man to be made from a sinner, is greater than to create heaven and +earth." + +_I answer that,_ A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the +part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the +greatest work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a +work may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the +justification of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of +a share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and +earth, which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, +Augustine, after saying that "for a just man to be made from a sinner +is greater than to create heaven and earth," adds, "for heaven and +earth shall pass away, but the justification of the ungodly shall +endure." + +Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways: +first, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift of glory is greater +than the gift of grace that sanctifies the ungodly; and in this +respect the glorification of the just is greater than the +justification of the ungodly. Secondly, a thing may be said to be +great in proportionate quantity, and thus the gift of grace that +justifies the ungodly is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies +the just, for the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, +who are worthy of punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the +worthiness of the just, who by the fact of their justification are +worthy of glory. Hence Augustine says: "Let him that can, judge +whether it is greater to create the angels just, than to justify the +ungodly. Certainly, if they both betoken equal power, one betokens +greater mercy." + +And thus the reply to the first [objection] is clear. + +Reply Obj. 2: The good of the universe is greater than the +particular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the +good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole +universe. + +Reply Obj. 3: This objection rests on the manner of acting, in +which way creation is God's greatest work. +________________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 10] + +Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Is a Miraculous Work? + +Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a +miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than +non-miraculous. Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than +the other miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from +Augustine (A. 9). Hence the justification of the ungodly is a +miraculous work. + +Obj. 2: Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the +natural inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural +things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous +work, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the +will of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a +man moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of the +ungodly is miraculous. + +Obj. 3: Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. Now +it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God +without study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be +justified by God. + +_On the contrary,_ Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the +justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for +Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that "to be capable of having +faith and to be capable of having charity belongs to man's nature; +but to have faith and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful." +Therefore the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous. + +_I answer that,_ In miraculous works it is usual to find three +things: the first is on the part of the active power, because they +can only be performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, +since their cause is hidden, as stated above (I, Q. 105, A. 7). And +thus both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the +world, and, generally speaking, every work that can be done by God +alone, is miraculous. + +Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form +introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the +resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a +body. And thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous, +because the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having +been made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, +as Augustine says, in the above quotation. + +Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and +customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and +beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives +perfect health; and thus the justification of the ungodly is +sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted +course of justification is that God moves the soul interiorly and +that man is converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, that +it may afterwards become perfect; because "charity begun merits +increase, and when increased merits perfection," as Augustine says +(In Epist. Joan. Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so +vehemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took +place in the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same +time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of +Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous. + +Reply Obj. 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less than +the justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are +beyond the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the +nature of a miracle. + +Reply Obj. 2: It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural thing +is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be +miraculous for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown +upwards; but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the +proper cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save God +can justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water. +Hence the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in +this respect. + +Reply Obj. 3: A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge +from God by his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a +man is made wise or learned outside this order. But a man does not +naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God's. +Hence there is no parity. +________________________ + +QUESTION 114 + +OF MERIT +(In Ten Articles) + +We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace; +and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: + +(1) Whether a man can merit anything from God? + +(2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life? + +(3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly? + +(4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that +grace is the principle of merit? + +(5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself? + +(6) Whether he may merit it for someone else? + +(7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin? + +(8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity? + +(9) Whether he can merit final perseverance? + +(10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit? +________________________ + +FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 1] + +Whether a Man May Merit Anything from God? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For +no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all +the good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet +more is His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). +Hence it is written (Luke 17:10): "When you have done all these +things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we +have done that which we ought to do." Therefore a man can merit +nothing from God. + +Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by +what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting +well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is +written (Job 35:7): "If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or +what shall He receive of thy hand." Hence a man can merit nothing +from God. + +Obj. 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his +debtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one's +debtor; hence it is written (Rom. 11:35): "Who hath first given to +Him, and recompense shall be made to him?" Hence no one can merit +anything from God. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 31:16): "There is a reward for +thy work." Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. +Hence it would seem that a man may merit from God. + +_I answer that,_ Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward +means something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price +for it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for +anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice to +make a return for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as +is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is +simply between those that are simply equal; but where there is no +absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute justice, +but there may be a certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a +father's or a master's right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says. +And hence where there is justice simply, there is the character of +merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but only +relative, there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively, +in so far as the character of justice is found there, since the child +merits something from his father and the slave from his lord. + +Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest +inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from +God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man +and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate +after their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is +in man from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the +presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from +God, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of +operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and +operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God; +differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act +by its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which +is not so in other creatures. + +Reply Obj. 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his +free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a +debt would not be meritorious. + +Reply Obj. 2: God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e. +the manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in +His own works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by +our worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works +anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory. + +Reply Obj. 3: Since our action has the character of merit, only on +the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow +that God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it +is right that His will should be carried out. +________________________ + +SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 2] + +Whether Anyone Without Grace Can Merit Eternal Life? + +Objection 1: It would seem that without grace anyone can merit +eternal life. For man merits from God what he is divinely ordained +to, as stated above (A. 1). Now man by his nature is ordained to +beatitude as his end; hence, too, he naturally wishes to be blessed. +Hence man by his natural endowments and without grace can merit +beatitude which is eternal life. + +Obj. 2: Further, the less a work is due, the more meritorious it is. +Now, less due is that work which is done by one who has received +fewer benefits. Hence, since he who has only natural endowments has +received fewer gifts from God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as +well as nature, it would seem that his works are more meritorious +with God. And thus if he who has grace can merit eternal life to some +extent, much more may he who has no grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, God's mercy and liberality infinitely surpass human +mercy and liberality. Now a man may merit from another, even though +he has not hitherto had his grace. Much more, therefore, would it +seem that a man without grace may merit eternal life. + +_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God, +life everlasting." + +_I answer that,_ Man without grace may be looked at in two states, as +was said above (Q. 109, A. 2): the first, a state of perfect nature, +in which Adam was before his sin; the second, a state of corrupt +nature, in which we are before being restored by grace. Therefore, if +we speak of man in the first state, there is only one reason why man +cannot merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural +endowments, viz. because man's merit depends on the Divine +pre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatsoever is divinely +ordained to anything exceeding the proportion of the powers which are +the principles of its act; for it is a law of Divine providence that +nothing shall act beyond its powers. Now everlasting life is a good +exceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its +knowledge and desire, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "Eye hath not seen, +nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man." And +hence it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an +act meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added a supernatural +gift, which we call grace. But if we speak of man as existing in sin, +a second reason is added to this, viz. the impediment of sin. For +since sin is an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, +as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 71, A. 6; Q. 113, A. +2), no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit eternal life +unless first he be reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven, +which is brought about by grace. For the sinner deserves not life, +but death, according to Rom. 6:23: "The wages of sin is death." + +Reply Obj. 1: God ordained human nature to attain the end of eternal +life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; and in this +way its act can be meritorious of eternal life. + +Reply Obj. 2: Without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a work +proceeding from grace, since the more perfect the principle, the more +perfect the action. But the objection would hold good, if we supposed +the operations equal in both cases. + +Reply Obj. 3: With regard to the first reason adduced, the case is +different in God and in man. For a man receives all his power of +well-doing from God, and not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing +from God except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly saying +(Rom. 11:35): "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be +made to him?" But man may merit from man, before he has received +anything from him, by what he has received from God. + +But as regards the second proof taken from the impediment of sin, the +case is similar with man and God, since one man cannot merit from +another whom he has offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and +is reconciled. +________________________ + +THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 3] + +Whether a Man in Grace Can Merit Eternal Life Condignly? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal +life condignly, for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): "The sufferings of +this time are not worthy (_condignae_) to be compared with the glory +to come, that shall be revealed in us." But of all meritorious works, +the sufferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious. +Therefore no works of men are meritorious of eternal life condignly. + +Obj. 2: Further, on Rom. 6:23, "The grace of God, life everlasting," +a gloss says: "He might have truly said: 'The wages of justice, life +everlasting'; but He preferred to say 'The grace of God, life +everlasting,' that we may know that God leads us to life everlasting +of His own mercy and not by our merits." Now when anyone merits +something condignly he receives it not from mercy, but from merit. +Hence it would seem that a man with grace cannot merit life +everlasting condignly. + +Obj. 3: Further, merit that equals the reward, would seem to be +condign. Now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life, +which surpasses our knowledge and our desire, and moreover, surpasses +the charity or love of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature. +Therefore with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly. + +_On the contrary,_ What is granted in accordance with a fair +judgment, would seem a condign reward. But life everlasting is +granted by God, in accordance with the judgment of justice, according +to 2 Tim. 4:8: "As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of +justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that +day." Therefore man merits everlasting life condignly. + +_I answer that,_ Man's meritorious work may be considered in two +ways: first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds +from the grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the +substance of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, +there can be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But +there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it +would seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should +reward him according to the excellence of his power. + +If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds +from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is +meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its +merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life +everlasting according to John 4:14: "Shall become in him a fount of +water springing up into life everlasting." And the worth of the work +depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker +of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the +inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: "If +sons, heirs also." + +Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these +sufferings. + +Reply Obj. 2: This saying is to be understood of the first cause of +our reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit is a +subsequent cause. + +Reply Obj. 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at present, +although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as the +seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by +grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause +of life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the "pledge" of +our inheritance. +________________________ + +FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 4] + +Whether Grace Is the Principle of Merit Through Charity Rather Than +the Other Virtues? + +Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit +through charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to +work, according to Matt. 20:8: "Call the laborers and pay them their +hire." Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since +virtue is an operative habit, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 2). Hence +every virtue is equally a principle of merit. + +Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): "Every man shall +receive his own reward according to his labor." Now charity lessens +rather than increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis +Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and +next to nothing." Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than +any other virtue. + +Obj. 3: Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be the +one whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and +patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as +appears in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and +bravely even till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle +of merit than charity. + +_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 14:21): "He that loveth Me, +shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest +Myself to him." Now everlasting life consists in the manifest +knowledge of God, according to John 17:3: "This is eternal life: that +they may know Thee, the only true" and living "God." Hence the merit +of eternal life rests chiefly with charity. + +_I answer that,_ As we may gather from what has been stated above (A. +1), human acts have the nature of merit from two causes: first and +chiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said to +merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the +part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has +the power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these +ways does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we must bear in mind +that everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human +mind's movement to the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act +of charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to +this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence +the merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and +secondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded +by charity. So, likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love +we do most willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on +voluntariness, merit is chiefly attributed to charity. + +Reply Obj. 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for object, +moves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end +pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as +was said above (Q. 9, A. 1). + +Reply Obj. 2: A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways: +first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the +work pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not +lessen the toil--rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils, +"for it does great things, if it exists," as Gregory says (Hom. in +Evang. xxx). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is +not done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and +this toil lessens merit and is removed by charity. + +Reply Obj. 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless "faith . . . +worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and +fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity, +according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I should deliver my body to be burned, +and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." +________________________ + +FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 5] + +Whether a Man May Merit for Himself the First Grace? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first +grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), "faith merits +justification." Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore +a man may merit the first grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one is +said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly. +Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly. + +Obj. 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received. Thus +if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good use +of it in his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than +man. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the +first grace already received from God. + +_On the contrary,_ The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of +works, according to Rom. 4:4: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is +not reckoned according to grace but according to debt." Now a man +merits what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of +his works. Hence a man may not merit the first grace. + +_I answer that,_ The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: +first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest +that all merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rom. +11:6), "if by grace, it is not now by works." Secondly, it may be +considered as regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, +it cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace, both because +it exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a +man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. +sin. But when anyone has grace, the grace already possessed cannot +come under merit, since reward is the term of the work, but grace is +the principle of all our good works, as stated above (Q. 109). But of +anyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding +grace, it would not be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no +one can merit for himself the first grace. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was deceived on +this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to be from +us, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he here +retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith +as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a truth +of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from God, the first +act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of the +first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though man, +by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes, +whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is +required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above (Q. +113, A. 4). + +Reply Obj. 2: God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not that +they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them +worthy, Who alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean +seed" (Job 14:4). + +Reply Obj. 3: Man's every good work proceeds from the first grace as +from its principle; but not from any gift of man. Consequently, there +is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts of men. +________________________ + +SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 6] + +Whether a Man Can Merit the First Grace for Another? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for +another. Because on Matt. 9:2: "Jesus seeing their faith," etc. a +gloss says: "How much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set +such a price on another's faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and +outwardly!" Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man +can merit the first grace for another. + +Obj. 2: Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but +efficacious, according to James 5:16: "The continued prayer of a just +man availeth much." Now he had previously said: "Pray one for +another, that you may be saved." Hence, since man's salvation can +only be brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for +another his first grace. + +Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Luke 16:9): "Make unto you friends of +the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive you +into everlasting dwellings." Now it is through grace alone that +anyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does +anyone merit everlasting life as stated above (A. 2; Q. 109, A. 5). +Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel +shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people"--yet they +had great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the +first grace for another. + +_I answer that,_ As shown above (AA. 1, 3, 4), our works are +meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; +and thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from +free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have +congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use +of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still +higher things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit +condignly for another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each +one of us is moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift +of grace; hence condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But +Christ's soul is moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach +the glory of life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, +inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, and the Author of human +salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: "Who hath brought many children +into glory [to perfect] the Author of their salvation." + +But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a +man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony +with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation +of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part +of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense +that the passage from Jeremias speaks. + +Reply Obj. 1: A man's faith avails for another's salvation by +congruous and not by condign merit. + +Reply Obj. 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas +condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things +from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice, +according to Dan. 9:18: "For it is not for our justifications that we +present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy +tender mercies." + +Reply Obj. 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive others +into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their forgiveness +in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works, or +materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy, +exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting +dwellings. +________________________ + +SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 7] + +Whether a Man May Merit Restoration After a Fall? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself +restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he +may justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than +to be restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super +Ps. lxx.], according to Ps. 70:9: "When my strength shall fail, do +not Thou forsake me." Hence a man may merit to be restored after a +fall. + +Obj. 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another. Now +a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after a +fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for +himself restoration after a fall. + +Obj. 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life +everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above (A. 2; Q. +109, A. 5). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is +restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself +restoration. + +_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man +turn himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his +justices which he hath done shall not be remembered." Therefore his +previous merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can +merit for himself restoration after a fall. + +_I answer that,_ No one can merit for himself restoration after a +future fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for +himself condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the +motion of Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the +subsequent sin; hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from +God, whereby he is restored, do not fall under merit--the motion of +the preceding grace not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, +whereby one merits the first grace for another, is prevented from +having its effect on account of the impediment of sin in the one for +whom it is merited. Much more, therefore, is the efficacy of such +merit impeded by the obstacle which is in him who merits, and in him +for whom it is merited; for both these are in the same person. And +therefore a man can nowise merit for himself restoration after a fall. + +Reply Obj. 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall +is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is +besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it +depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy. + +Reply Obj. 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his first +grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of him +who merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice after +the merit of grace. + +Reply Obj. 3: Some have said that no one _absolutely_ merits life +everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only +_conditionally,_ i.e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say +this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less +meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of +illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits +eternal life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an +impediment to the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its +effect; just as natural causes fail of their effects on account of a +supervening impediment. +________________________ + +EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 8] + +Whether a Man May Merit the Increase of Grace or Charity? + +Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of +grace or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no +other reward is due to him; thus it was said of some (Matt. 6:2): +"They have received their reward." Hence, if anyone were to merit the +increase of charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace +has been increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is +unfitting. + +Obj. 2: Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the principle +of merit is grace or charity, as was shown above (AA. 2, 4). +Therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity than he has. + +Obj. 3: Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act +flowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits life +everlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls +under merit, it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a +man would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he +infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for +it is written (2 Tim. 1:12): "I know Whom I have believed, and I am +certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto +Him." Hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by +every meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times +meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suffice for the +increase of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come +under merit. + +_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (super Ep. Joan.; cf. Ep. clxxxvi) +that "charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be +perfected." Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit. + +_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 6, 7), whatever the motion of +grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a +mover extends not merely to the last term of the movement, but to the +whole progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace +is eternal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase of +charity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: "But the path of the just +as a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect +day," which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls +under condign merit. + +Reply Obj. 1: Reward is the term of merit. But there is a double term +of movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is both +beginning and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now the +reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their end +in it; hence such as these receive no other reward. + +Reply Obj. 2: The increase of grace is not above the virtuality of +the pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a +tree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its +quantity. + +Reply Obj. 3: By every meritorious act a man merits the increase of +grace, equally with the consummation of grace which is eternal life. +But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its own time, +so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time, viz. when +a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace. +________________________ + +NINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 9] + +Whether a Man May Merit Perseverance? + +Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit perseverance. For +what a man obtains by asking, can come under the merit of anyone that +is in grace. Now men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; +otherwise it would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of +the Lord's Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. ii). Therefore +perseverance may come under the merit of whoever has grace. + +Obj. 2: Further, it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin. +But not to be able to sin comes under merit, for we merit eternal +life, of which impeccability is an essential part. Much more, +therefore, may we merit not to sin, i.e. to persevere. + +Obj. 3: Further, increase of grace is greater than perseverance in +the grace we already possess. But a man may merit an increase of +grace, as was stated above (A. 8). Much more, therefore, may he merit +perseverance in the grace he has already. + +_On the contrary,_ What we merit, we obtain from God, unless it is +hindered by sin. Now many have meritorious works, who do not obtain +perseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of +the impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; +and thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit +him to fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under merit. + +_I answer that,_ Since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards +good and evil, there are two ways of obtaining from God perseverance +in good: first, inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by +consummate grace, which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of +the Divine motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. Now as +explained above (AA. 6, 7, 8), that which is related as a term to the +free-will's movement directed to God the mover, falls under human +merit; and not what is related to the aforesaid movement as +principle. Hence it is clear that the perseverance of glory which is +the term of the aforesaid movement falls under merit; but +perseverance of the wayfarer does not fall under merit, since it +depends solely on the Divine motion, which is the principle of all +merit. Now God freely bestows the good of perseverance, on whomsoever +He bestows it. + +Reply Obj. 1: We impetrate in prayer things that we do not merit, +since God hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins, which +they do not merit, as appears from Augustine [*Tract. xliv in Joan.] +on John 11:31, "Now we know that God doth not hear sinners," +otherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say: "O God, +be merciful to me a sinner," Luke 18:13. So too may we impetrate of +God in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for +others, although it does not fall under merit. + +Reply Obj. 2: The perseverance which is in heaven is compared as term +to the free-will's movement; not so, the perseverance of the +wayfarer, for the reason given in the body of the article. + +In the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the +increase of grace, as was explained above. +________________________ + +TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 10] + +Whether Temporal Goods Fall Under Merit? + +Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods fall under merit. For +what is promised to some as a reward of justice, falls under merit. +Now, temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of +justice, as appears from Deut. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods +fall under merit. + +Obj. 2: Further, that would seem to fall under merit, which God +bestows on anyone for a service done. But God sometimes bestows +temporal goods on men for services done for Him. For it is written +(Ex. 1:21): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them +houses"; on which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that +"life everlasting might have been awarded them as the fruit of their +goodwill, but on account of their sin of falsehood they received an +earthly reward." And it is written (Ezech. 29:18): "The King of +Babylon hath made his army to undergo hard service against Tyre . . . +and there hath been no reward given him," and further on: "And it +shall be wages for his army . . . I have given him the land of Egypt +because he hath labored for me." Therefore temporal goods fall under +merit. + +Obj. 3: Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on +account of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal +punishments, as appears from the Sodomites, Gen. 19. Hence temporal +goods fall under merit. + +Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ What falls under merit does not come upon +all alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike; +according to Eccles. 9:2: "All things equally happen to the just and +the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the +unclean, to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth +sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit. + +_I answer that,_ What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which +is a kind of good. Now man's good is twofold: the first, simply; the +second, relatively. Now man's good simply is his last end (according +to Ps. 72:27: "But it is good for men to adhere to my God") and +consequently what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall +simply under merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is +what is good to him now, or what is a good to him relatively; and +this does not fall under merit simply, but relatively. + +Hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are +useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall +directly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and +everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the +first grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal +goods to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these +temporal goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:10): "For +there is no want to them that fear Him," and again, Ps. 36:25: "I +have not seen the just forsaken," etc. + +But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are +not man's good simply, but relatively, and thus they do not fall +under merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God +to do temporal works, in which with God's help they reach their +purpose. And thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the +works of justice in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above +(AA. 3, 6), so have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the +nature of reward, with respect to the Divine motion, whereby men's +wills are moved to undertake these works, even though, sometimes, men +have not a right intention in them. + +Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv, 2), "in these +temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come. For the +carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life; and +not merely their speech but even their life was prophetic." + +Reply Obj. 2: These rewards are said to have been divinely brought +about in relation to the Divine motion, and not in relation to the +malice of their wills, especially as regards the King of Babylon, +since he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather +in order to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a good +will with regard to saving the children, yet their will was not +right, inasmuch as they framed falsehoods. + +Reply Obj. 3: Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the +wicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life +everlasting. But to the just who are aided by these evils they are +not punishments but medicines as stated above (Q. 87, A. 8). + +Reply Obj. 4: All things happen equally to the good and the wicked, +as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as regards +the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude by +them. + +And now enough has been said regarding morals in general. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PART I-II (PARS +PRIMA SECUNDAE)*** + + +******* This file should be named 17897.txt or 17897.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/7/8/9/17897 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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