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Title: Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)
       From the Complete American Edition

Author: Thomas Aquinas

Translator: Fathers of the English Dominican Province

Release Date: January 26, 2006 [EBook #17611]

Language: English

Character set encoding: ASCII

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PART I ***




Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and
supplementation by David McClamrock






ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

PART I ("Prima Pars")

Translated by
Fathers of the English Dominican Province

BENZIGER BROTHERS
NEW YORK
_______________________

DEDICATION

To the Blessed Virgin
Mary Immaculate
Seat of Wisdom
_______________________

NOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION

The text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra
K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian
Classics Ethereal Library <http://www.ccel.org>. I have eliminated
unnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in
transcription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,
Prologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they
appeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.
Each article is now designated by part, question number, and article
number in brackets, like this:

> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]

> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?

In a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger
Brothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text
of the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in
brackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first
sentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: "Not only is it
impossible that anything should be created by God...." By reference
to the Latin, "non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari"
(emphasis added), this has been corrected to "Not only is it [not]
impossible that anything should be created by God...."

This electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers
edition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the
original page numbers and headers):

* The repetitive expression "We proceed thus to the [next] Article"
does not appear directly below the title of each article.

* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,
_like this._ Quotations and other "quotable" matter, however, are
ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this
edition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they
were set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers
edition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear
in the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in
parentheses.

* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated
by colons, like this: "Dan. 7:10"--not like this: "Dan. vii. 10."
Small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in
citations to books other than the Bible.

* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers
edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the
footnote mark appeared.

* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.

* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.

* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and
at certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line
for each topic.

* Titles of questions are in all caps.

Anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to
the content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a
defect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).

_______________________

CONTENTS

PROLOGUE

FIRST PART (QQ. 1-119)

Question

1.   The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine
2.   The Existence of God
3.   On the Simplicity of God
4.   The Perfection of God
5.   Of Goodness in General
6.   The Goodness of God
7.   The Infinity of God
8.   The Existence of God in Things
9.   The Immutability of God
10.  The Eternity of God
11.  The Unity of God
12.  How God Is Known by Us
13.  The Names of God
14.  Of God's Knowledge
15.  Of Ideas
16.  Of Truth
17.  Concerning Falsity
18.  The Life of God
19.  The Will of God
20.  God's Love
21.  The Justice and Mercy of God
22.  The Providence of God
23.  Of Predestination
24.  The Book of Life
25.  The Power of God
26.  Of the Divine Beatitude
27.  The Procession of the Divine Persons
28.  The Divine Relations
29.  The Divine Persons
30.  The Plurality of Persons in God
31.  Of What Belongs to the Unity or Plurality in God
32.  The Knowledge of the Divine Persons
33.  Of the Person of the Father
34.  Of the Person of the Son
35.  Of the Image
36.  Of the Person of the Holy Ghost
37.  Of the Name of the Holy Ghost--Love
38.  Of the Name of the Holy Ghost, as Gift
39.  Of the Persons in Relation to the Essence
40.  Of the Persons as Compared to the Relations or Properties
41.  Of the Persons in Reference to the Notional Acts
42.  Of Equality and Likeness Among the Divine Persons
43.  The Mission of the Divine Persons

TREATISE ON THE CREATION

44.  The Procession of Creatures from God, and of the First Cause
       of All Things
45.  The Mode of Emanation of Things from the First Principle
46.  Of the Beginning of the Duration of Creatures
47.  Of the Distinction of Things in General
48.  The Distinction of Things in Particular
49.  The Cause of Evil

TREATISE ON THE ANGELS

50.  Of the Substance of the Angels Absolutely Considered
51.  Of the Angels in Comparison with Bodies
52.  Of the Angels in Relation to Place
53.  Of the Local Movement of the Angels
54.  Of the Knowledge of the Angels
55.  Of the Medium of the Angelic Knowledge
56.  Of the Angels' Knowledge of Immaterial Things
57.  Of the Angels' Knowledge of Material Things
58.  Of the Mode of the Angelic Knowledge
59.  The Will of the Angels
60.  Of the Love or Dilection of the Angels
61.  Of the Production of the Angels in the Order of Natural Being
62.  Of the Perfection of the Angels in the Order of Grace and of
       Glory
63.  The Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin
64.  The Punishment of the Demons

TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS

65.  The Work of Creation of Corporeal Creatures
66.  On the Order of Creation Towards Distinction
67.  On the Work of Distinction in Itself
68.  On the Work of the Second Day
69.  On the Work of the Third Day
70.  On the Work of Adornment, as Regards the Fourth Day
71.  On the Work of the Fifth Day
72.  On the Work of the Sixth Day
73.  On the Things That Belong to the Seventh Day
74.  On All the Seven Days in Common

TREATISE ON MAN

75.  Of Man Who Is Composed of a Spiritual and a Corporeal Substance:
       and in the First Place, Concerning What Belongs to the Essence
       of the Soul
76.  Of the Union of Body and Soul
77.  Of Those Things Which Belong to the Powers of the Soul in General
78.  Of the Specific Powers of the Soul
79.  Of the Intellectual Powers
80.  Of the Appetitive Powers in General
81.  Of the Power of Sensuality
82.  Of the Will
83.  Of Free-Will
84.  How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal
       Things Beneath It
85.  Of the Mode and Order of Understanding
86.  What Our Intellect Knows in Material Things
87.  How the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself and All Within Itself
88.  How the Human Soul Knows What Is Above Itself
89.  Of the Knowledge of the Separated Soul
90.  Of the First Production of Man's Soul
91.  The Production of the First Man's Body
92.  The Production of the Woman
93.  The End or Term of the Production of Man
94.  Of the State and Condition of the First Man as Regards His
       Intellect
95.  Of Things Pertaining to the First Man's Will--Namely, Grace
       and Righteousness
96.  Of the Mastership Belonging to Man in the State of Innocence
97.  Of the Preservation of the Individual in the Primitive State
98.  Of the Preservation of the Species
99.  Of the Condition of the Offspring As to the Body
100. Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Righteousness
101. Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Knowledge
102. Of Man's Abode, Which Is Paradise

TREATISE ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT

103. Of the Government of Things in General
104. The Special Effects of the Divine Government
105. Of the Change of Creatures by God
106. How One Creature Moves Another
107. The Speech of the Angels
108. Of the Angelic Degrees of Hierarchies and Orders
109. The Ordering of the Bad Angels
110. How Angels Act on Bodies
111. The Action of the Angels on Man
112. The Mission of the Angels
113. Of the Guardianship of the Good Angels
114. Of the Assaults of the Demons
115. Of the Action of the Corporeal Creature
116. On Fate
117. Of Things Pertaining to the Action of Man
118. Of the Production of Man from Man As to the Soul
119. Of the Propagation of Man As to the Body
_______________________

PROLOGUE

Because the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach the
proficient, but also to instruct beginners (according to the Apostle:
As Unto Little Ones in Christ, I Gave You Milk to Drink, Not Meat--
1 Cor. iii. 1, 2)--we purpose in this book to treat of whatever
belongs to the Christian Religion, in such a way as may tend to the
instruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this
Science have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written
by other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless
questions, articles, and arguments; partly also because those things
that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the
order of the subject-matter, but according as the plan of the book
might require, or the occasion of the argument offer; partly, too,
because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the
minds of the readers.

Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by
God's help, to set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science
as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow.
_______________________

SUMMA THEOLOGICA

FIRST PART
["I," "Prima Pars"]
_______________________

QUESTION 1

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE
(in Ten Articles)

To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to
investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning
this there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is necessary?

(2) Whether it is a science?

(3) Whether it is one or many?

(4) Whether it is speculative or practical?

(5) How it is compared with other sciences?

(6) Whether it is the same as wisdom?

(7) Whether God is its subject-matter?

(8) Whether it is a matter of argument?

(9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes?

(10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded
in different senses?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]

Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?

Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no
need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is
above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee"
(Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of
in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides
philosophical science is superfluous.

Obj. 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for
nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But
everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science--even God
Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the
divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore,
besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further
knowledge.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): "All Scripture inspired
of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in
justice." Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical
science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is
useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other
knowledge, i.e. inspired of God.

_I answer that,_ It was necessary for man's salvation that there should
be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up
by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as
to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not
seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them
that wait for Thee" (Isa. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men
who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was
necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed
human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as
regards those truths about God which human reason could have
discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine
revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover,
would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the
admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in
God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order
that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more
surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by
divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides
philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred
science learned through revelation.

Reply Obj. 1: Although those things which are beyond man's
knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason,
nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by
faith. Hence the sacred text continues, "For many things are shown to
thee above the understanding of man" (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this, the
sacred science consists.

Reply Obj. 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the
various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer
and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth,
for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e.
abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself.
Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from
philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason,
may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall
within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs
in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 2]

Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Science?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every
science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine
proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since
their truth is not admitted by all: "For all men have not faith" (2
Thess. 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

Obj. 2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this
sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is
not a science.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science
alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished,
protected and strengthened." But this can be said of no science except
sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.

_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that
there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a
principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as
arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed
from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the
science of perspective proceeds from principles established by
geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it
is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from
principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the
science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on
authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred
science is established on principles revealed by God.

Reply Obj. 1: The principles of any science are either in
themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher
science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred
doctrine.

Reply Obj. 2: Individual facts are treated of in sacred
doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they
are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as
in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those
men through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture
or doctrine is based, has come down to us.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 3]

Whether Sacred Doctrine Is One Science?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for
according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) "that science is one which
treats only of one class of subjects." But the creator and the
creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be
grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred
doctrine is not one science.

Obj. 2: Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal
creatures and human morality. But these belong to separate
philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one
science.

_On the contrary,_ Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: "Wisdom
gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things" (Wis. 10:10).

_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty
or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material
aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an
object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise
formality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight.
Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under
the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely
revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this
science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one
science.

Reply Obj. 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and
creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far
as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the
unity of this science is not impaired.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits
from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher
faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards
the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the
_common sense_ is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore,
whatever is visible or audible. Hence the _common sense,_ although one
faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly,
objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical
sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under
one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So
that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the
divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 4]

Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Practical Science?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for
a practical science is that which ends in action according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action:
"Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James 1:22).
Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

Obj. 2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the
New Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical science.
Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

_On the contrary,_ Every practical science is concerned with human
operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and
architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned
with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a
practical but a speculative science.

_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which
belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in
each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known
through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical
sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred
doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows
both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than
practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with
human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man
is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists
eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 5]

Whether Sacred Doctrine Is Nobler than Other Sciences?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other
sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it
establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be
doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its
principles--namely, articles of faith--can be doubted. Therefore
other sciences seem to be nobler.

Obj. 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon
a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in
a sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in
his Epistle to Magnus, that "the ancient doctors so enriched their
books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou
knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or
their scriptural learning." Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to
other sciences.

_On the contrary,_ Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this
one: "Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower" (Prov. 9:3).

_I answer that,_ Since this science is partly speculative and partly
practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one
speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by
reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of
its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses
other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because
other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human
reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the
light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the
higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly
of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while
other sciences consider only those things which are within reason's
grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained
to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military
science; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the
State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical,
is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every
practical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every
standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences.

Reply Obj. 1: It may well happen that what is in itself the
more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the
weakness of our intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest
objects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun"
(Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about
articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths,
but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest
knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable
than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said
in _de Animalibus_ xi.

Reply Obj. 2: This science can in a sense depend upon the
philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but
only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its
principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by
revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon
the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as
handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that
supply their materials, as political of military science. That it thus
uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the
defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known
through natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that
which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 6]

Whether This Doctrine Is the Same as Wisdom?

Objection 1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.
For no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of
wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph.
i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science
is not wisdom.

Obj. 2: Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles
of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is
clear in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of
other sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.

Obj. 3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas
wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among
the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isa. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is
not the same as wisdom.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
understanding in the sight of nations."

_I answer that,_ This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not
merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a
wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be
judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in
any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus
in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called
wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim
the wood and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid
the foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life,
the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a
fitting end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore
he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe,
namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the
knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But
sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest
cause--not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as
philosophers knew Him--"That which is known of God is manifest in
them" (Rom. 1:19)--but also as far as He is known to Himself alone
and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called
wisdom.

Reply Obj. 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from
any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as
through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.

Reply Obj. 2: The principles of other sciences either are
evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through
some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes
through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no
concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge
of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth
of this science must be condemned as false: "Destroying counsels and
every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God" (2
Cor. 10:4, 5).

Reply Obj. 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold
manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one
way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges
rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards
it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and
rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man
learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous
acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine
things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the
Holy Ghost: "The spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Hierotheus is taught not by mere
learning, but by experience of divine things." The second manner of
judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though
its principles are obtained by revelation.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 7]

Whether God Is the Object of This Science?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For
in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this
science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to define the essence of God."
Therefore God is not the object of this science.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science
must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ
we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many
other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is
not the object of this science.

_On the contrary,_ The object of the science is that of which it
principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about
God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is
the object of this science.

_I answer that,_ God is the object of this science. The relation between
a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or
faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty
or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are
referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to
the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things
are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things are
treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God
Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence
it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This
is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the
articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the
principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole
science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however,
looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect
under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to
be something other than God--that is, either things and signs; or the
works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of
all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as
they have reference to God.

Reply Obj. 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the
essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His
effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in
regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even
as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a
cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition
of the cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this
sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or
accidents but as in some way related to Him.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 8]

Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Matter of Argument?

Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For
Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought."
But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things
are written that you may believe" (John 20:31). Therefore sacred
doctrine is not a matter of argument.

Obj. 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is
either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it
seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the
weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting
its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit
in those things of which human reason brings its own experience."
Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

_On the contrary,_ The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that
faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to
exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).

_I answer that,_ As other sciences do not argue in proof of their
principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other
truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of
its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes
on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of
Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15).
However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical
sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles
nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher
science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute
with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make
some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute
with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture,
since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies
its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths
obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics
from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of
faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of
divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the
articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his
objections--if he has any--against faith. Since faith rests upon
infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be
demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith
cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.

Reply Obj. 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot
avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this
doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths.

Reply Obj. 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments
from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation:
thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the
revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of
this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human
reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine
revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of
human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of
faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are
put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy
nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the
natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says:
"Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of
Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the
authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able
to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of
Aratus: "As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His
offspring" (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of
these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly
uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible
proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may
properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the
revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical
books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to
other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only
those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to
hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any
way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem
everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their
having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness
and learning."
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 9]

Whether Holy Scripture Should Use Metaphors?

Objection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors.
For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this
science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the
aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least
of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science
should make use of such similitudes.

Obj. 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth
clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They that
explain me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such
similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths
by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.

Obj. 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they
approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to
represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the
higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in
Scriptures.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied
visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets."
But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use
metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.

_I answer that,_ It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and
spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God
provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now
it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible
objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in
Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of
material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We
cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within
the covering of many sacred veils." It is also befitting Holy Writ,
which is proposed to all without distinction of persons--"To the wise
and to the unwise I am a debtor" (Rom. 1:14)--that spiritual truths
be expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order
that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp
intellectual things may be able to understand it.

Reply Obj. 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a
representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with
representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both
necessary and useful.

Reply Obj. 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished
by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow
the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in
the metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through
those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive
instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught
metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught
more openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the
exercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of
the impious, according to the words "Give not that which is holy to
dogs" (Matt. 7:6).

Reply Obj. 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more
fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of
less noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly,
because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For
then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of
divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been
expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who
could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is
more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For
what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes
drawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer
estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him.
Thirdly, because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the
unworthy.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 10]

Whether in Holy Scripture a Word may have Several Senses?

Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several
senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and
anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion
and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument,
but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of
propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth
without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to
a word.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the
Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy
and allegory." Now these four seem altogether different from the four
divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem
fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four
different senses mentioned above.

Obj. 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical,
which is not one of these four.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner
of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same
sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery."

_I answer that,_ The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to
signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also
by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are
signified by words, this science has the property, that the things
signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore
that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the
first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby
things signified by words have themselves also a signification is
called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and
presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For
as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New
Law, and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a
figure of future glory." Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has
done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things
of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the
allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as
the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do,
there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to
eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense
is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is
God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not
unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the
literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.

Reply Obj. 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not
produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that
these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several
things, but because the things signified by the words can be
themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion
results, for all the senses are founded on one--the literal--from
which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in
allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy
Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to
faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere
put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.

Reply Obj. 2: These three--history, etiology, analogy--are
grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as
Augustine expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it
is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave
the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives--namely, on
account of the hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever
the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the
truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three
spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.)
includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three
senses only--the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.

Reply Obj. 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the
literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively.
Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal
sense. When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not
that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member,
namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever
underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.
_______________________

QUESTION 2

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
(In Three Articles)

Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of
God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of
things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is
clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to
expound this science, we shall treat:

(1) Of God;

(2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God;

(3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.

In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall
consider:

(1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence;

(2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons;

(3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.

Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider:

(1) Whether God exists?

(2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is _not_ the
manner of His existence;

(3) Whatever concerns His operations--namely, His knowledge, will,
power.

Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?

(2) Whether it is demonstrable?

(3) Whether God exists?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 1]

Whether the Existence of God Is Self-Evident?

Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now
those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which
is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first
principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the
knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the
existence of God is self-evident.

Obj. 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which
are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1
Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration.
Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once
recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as
the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen
that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which
nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and
mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore,
since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it
also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God
exists" is self-evident.

Obj. 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For
whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not
exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does
not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be
truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the
life" (John 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.

_On the contrary,_ No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is
self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states
concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of
the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in
his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is
not self-evident.

_I answer that,_ A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on
the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident
because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as
"Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If,
therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all,
the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard
to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are
common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being,
whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the
essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will
be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the
meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it
happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether
all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts
self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are
not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of
itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject,
because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Q. 3,
Art. 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition
is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that
are more known to us, though less known in their nature--namely, by
effects.

Reply Obj. 1: To know that God exists in a general and
confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's
beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally
desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not
to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is
approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even
though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine
that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and
others in pleasures, and others in something else.

Reply Obj. 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God"
understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be
thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted
that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it
does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word
signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can
it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there
actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought;
and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not
exist.

Reply Obj. 3: The existence of truth in general is
self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident
to us.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 2]

Whether It Can Be Demonstrated That God Exists?

Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be
demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what
is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces
scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1).
Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

Obj. 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration.
But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what
it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore
we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

Obj. 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this
could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between
the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a
cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it
seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be
demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we
must know of anything is whether it exists.

_I answer that,_ Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through
the cause, and is called _a priori,_ and this is to argue from what is
prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstration _a posteriori_; this is to argue from what is prior
relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And
from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because
since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is
not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects
which are known to us.

Reply Obj. 1: The existence of God and other like truths about
God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,
but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural
knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to
prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of
faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
known and demonstrated.

Reply Obj. 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated
from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the
cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case
in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of
anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of
the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows
on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are
derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence
of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning
of the word "God".

Reply Obj. 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no
perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect
the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 3]

Whether God Exists?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two
contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But
the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the
world. Therefore God does not exist.

Obj. 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be
accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by
other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things
can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary
things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will.
Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.

_On the contrary,_ It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex.
3:14)

_I answer that,_ The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is
certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are
in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for
nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards
which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from
potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of
actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which
is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes
it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in
actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different
respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be
potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is
therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a
thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.
Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If
that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this
also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another
again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be
no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that
subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the
first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by
the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in
motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world
of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no
case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found
to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to
itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not
possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes
following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause,
and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the
intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause
is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause
among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any
intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on
to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will
there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes;
all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a
first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.
We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since
they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they
are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these
always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is
not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time
there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true,
even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does
not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.
Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been
impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now
nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all
beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the
existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has
its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on
to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by
another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.
Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having
of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but
rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as
God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things.
Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and
the like. But _more_ and _less_ are predicated of different things,
according as they resemble in their different ways something which is
the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more
nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something
which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest
in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in _Metaph._ ii. Now
the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire,
which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore
there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their
being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that
things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an
end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always,
in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain
that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now
whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be
directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the
arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent
being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and
this being we call God.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God
is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His
works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good
even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that
He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Reply Obj. 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under
the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs
be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done
voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things
that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an
immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body
of the Article.
_______________________

QUESTION 3

OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD
(In Eight Articles)

When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the
further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may
know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather
what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but
rather how He is not.

Therefore, we must consider:

(1) How He is not;

(2) How He is known by us;

(3) How He is named.

Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed
to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore

(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in
Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect
and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection;
(3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.

Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is a body?

(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?

(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence
or nature, and subject?

(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?

(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?

(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?

(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?

(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 1]

Whether God Is a Body?

Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has
the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three
dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and
what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The
measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job
11:8, 9). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since
figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gen. 1:26).
Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the
brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His
substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now
Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
God?" (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps.
33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps.
117:16). Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something
which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
Lord sitting" (Isa. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Isa. 3:13).
Therefore God is a body.

Obj. 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local
term _wherefrom_ or _whereto._ But in the Scriptures God is spoken of
as a local term _whereto,_ according to the words, "Come ye to Him and
be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term _wherefrom_: "All they that
depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13).
Therefore God is a body.

_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Gospel of St. John (John 4:24):
"God is a spirit."

_I answer that,_ It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this
can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been
already proved (Q. 2, A. 3), that God is the First Mover, and is
Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.
Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in
no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes
from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to
the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior
to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into
actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already
proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in
potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to
infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body.
Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible
for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either
animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than
any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as
body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation
depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation
on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be
nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a
body.

Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 1, A. 9), Holy Writ
puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of
corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three
dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His
virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing
hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by
length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for
all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is
meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the
procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading
all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.

Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as
regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.
Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness",
it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea"
(Gen. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence;
hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are
incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God.

Reply Obj. 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in
Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain
parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye
attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not
sensibly; and so on with the other parts.

Reply Obj. 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only
attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as
sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as
standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands
Him.

Reply Obj. 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since
He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the
actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near
to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the
metaphor of local motion.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 2]

Whether God Is Composed of Matter and Form?

Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For
whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is
the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it
is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man
liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My
soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the
composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is
composed of matter and form.

Obj. 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization.
But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
Therefore He is composed of matter and form.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body;
for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not
a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not
composed of matter and form.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible that matter should exist in God.
First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Q. 2, A. 3)
that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is
impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly,
because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and
goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch
as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the
best--viz. God--is not a participated good, because the essential
good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that
God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every
agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is
the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily
and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now
God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is
therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts
resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our
soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His
soul.

Reply Obj. 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on
account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly
the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of
as His anger.

Reply Obj. 3: Forms which can be received in matter are
individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject
since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself,
unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is
individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject;
and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
God.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 3]

Whether God is the Same as His Essence or Nature?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or
nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
God--i.e. the Godhead--is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that
God is not the same as His essence or nature.

Obj. 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for
every agent produces its like. But in created things the _suppositum_
is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his
humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of God that He is life itself, and not
only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the
life" (John 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same
as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His
very Godhead.

_I answer that,_ God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
nature or essence must differ from the _suppositum,_ because the
essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of
the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this
that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not
included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh,
these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in
the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the
accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not
included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is
man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has
humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical;
but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal
constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other
hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which
individualization is not due to individual matter--that is to say, to
_this_ matter--the very forms being individualized of themselves--it
is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting _supposita._
Therefore _suppositum_ and nature in them are identified. Since God
then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead,
His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.

Reply Obj. 1: We can speak of simple things only as though
they were like the composite things from which we derive our
knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to
signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist
which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His
simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are
in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect
understands, but not that there is any composition in God.

Reply Obj. 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly,
but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective,
precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by
divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and
therefore, in them _suppositum_ is not the same as nature.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 4]

Whether Essence and Existence Are the Same in God?

Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in
God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it.
Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is
predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in
general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For
men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21).
Therefore God's existence is not His essence.

Obj. 2: Further, we can know _whether_ God exists as said above
(Q. 2, A. 2); but we cannot know _what_ He is. Therefore God's
existence is not the same as His essence--that is, as His quiddity or
nature.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an
accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in
God is His existence.

_I answer that,_ God is not only His own essence, as shown in the
preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in
several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be
caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a
property that necessarily accompanies the species--as the faculty of
laughing is proper to a man--and is caused by the constituent
principles of the species), or by some exterior agent--as heat is
caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing
differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some
exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible
for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent
principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own
existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose
existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by
another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first
efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence
should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which
makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are
spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.
Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a
distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in
God there is no potentiality, as shown above (A. 1), it follows
that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His
essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has
fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that
which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation.
But God is His own essence, as shown above (A. 3); if, therefore, He
is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated
being. He will not therefore be the first being--which is absurd.
Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of
two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for
example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without
reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it,
inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added
to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of
the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the
first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the
second sense.

Reply Obj. 2: "To be" can mean either of two things. It may
mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a
proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.
Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's
existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that
this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is
true; and this we know from His effects (Q. 2, A. 2).
______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 5]

Whether God Is Contained in a Genus?

Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a
substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially
true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its
own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But
God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows
(Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.

_On the contrary,_ In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But
nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is
not in any genus.

_I answer that,_ A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either
absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as
being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a
point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its
principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to
the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He
cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First,
because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that
from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is
always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality
is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive
nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a
sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from
intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an
intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as
actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other
things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it
is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly,
since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus,
He would be the genus _being,_ because, since genus is predicated as
an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher
has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus
has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference
can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference.
It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in
one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is
predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their
existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as
also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus,
existence and quiddity--i.e. essence--must differ. But in God they
do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is
plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it
is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be
any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration
of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of
a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as
reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle
reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point
is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of
discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being.
Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.

Reply Obj. 1: The word substance signifies not only what
exists of itself--for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown
in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has
the property of existing in this way--namely, of existing of itself;
this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God
is not in the genus of substance.

Reply Obj. 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure
which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a
measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of
all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as
it resembles Him.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 6]

Whether in God There Are Any Accidents?

Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance
cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that
which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus
it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because
it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like,
which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God
there are accidents.

Obj. 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But
there are many genera of accidents. If, therefore, the primal
members of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal
beings other than God--which is absurd.

_On the contrary,_ Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a
subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.

_I answer that,_ From all we have said, it is clear there can be no
accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents
as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made
actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as
was shown (Q. 2, A. 3). Secondly, because God is His own
existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may
have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being:
thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to
it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else
than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is
accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in
Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents
(as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man),
because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the
subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first
cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and
of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in
God as there are in us.

Reply Obj. 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the
principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the
substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if
contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all
being, outside of every genus.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 7]

Whether God Is Altogether Simple?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever
is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all
beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which
God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God
altogether simple.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But
with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals
than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God
is altogether simple.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
absolutely simple."

_I answer that,_ The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many
ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a
body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ
from His _suppositum_; nor His essence from His existence; neither is
there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and
accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is
altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to
its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first
being, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Thirdly, because every
composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite
unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown
above (Q. 2, A. 3), since He is the first efficient cause.
Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and
actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts
actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the
whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any
single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of
dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts
of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although
something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part
(as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water),
nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot
be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume
of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every
composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this
could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which
is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does
not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself,
there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form,
or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary
implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is
strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is
light, composed of things that are dim."

Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (Q. 4, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 2: With us composite things are better than simple
things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
goodness is found in one simple thing (QQ. 4, A. 1, and 6, A. 2).
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 8]

Whether God Enters into the Composition of Other Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other
things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
is that which is above being--the Godhead." But the being of all
things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters
into the composition of other things.

Obj. 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb.
Dom. [Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an
uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is
part of some compound.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from
each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no
way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same.
But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also
does God. Proof of the minor--whatever things differ, they differ by
some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary
matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each
other.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling
part with part."

Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).

_I answer that,_ On this point there have been three errors. Some have
affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those
who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others
have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was
the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of
Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all
these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to
enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a
material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause.
Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of
the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But
primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical
with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the
latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient
cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which
enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and
essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not
act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God
cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound
can be absolutely primal among beings--not even matter, nor form,
though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is
merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to
actuality, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 1): while a
form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that
which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so
likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is
posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved
that God is absolutely primal being (Q. 2, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things,
as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.

Reply Obj. 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form
that is part of a compound.

Reply Obj. 3: Simple things do not differ by added
differences--for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and
horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which
differences, however, do not differ from each other by other
differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that
they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the
Philosopher (Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely
distinct, but things which are different differ by something."
Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ,
but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they
are the same.
_______________________

QUESTION 4

THE PERFECTION OF GOD
(In Three Articles)

Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's
perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is
called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly
of the divine goodness.

Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is perfect?

(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the
perfections of all things?

(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 1]

Whether God is Perfect?

Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we
say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit
God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.

Obj. 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the
beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of
animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.

Obj. 3: Further, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), God's essence
is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most
universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is
imperfect.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48).

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient
philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not
predicate "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason
was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material
principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since
matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must
be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first
principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which
must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely
potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the
first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most
perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of
actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the
mode of its perfection.

Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our
lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that
which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because
created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they
are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is
not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.

Reply Obj. 2: The material principle which with us is found to
be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by
something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life
reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from
which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be
that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into
act by some being already actual.

Reply Obj. 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for
it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual;
for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence
is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is
not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but
rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the
existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered
a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which
exists.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 2]

Whether the Perfections of All Things Are in God?

Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in
God. For God is simple, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7); whereas the
perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections
of all things are not in God.

Obj. 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of
things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its
specific difference. But the differences by which genera are
divided, and species constituted, are opposed to each other.
Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it
seems that the perfections of all things are not in God.

Obj. 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely
exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore
life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the
essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the
perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
existence prepossesses all things."

_I answer that,_ All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken
of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,
_Metaph._ v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may
be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection
exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the
same formality, if it is a univocal agent--as when man reproduces man;
or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent--thus in the
sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it
is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause:
and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to
pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect,
and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the
efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more
perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of
things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more
eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of
God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He
is all, as the cause of all." Secondly, from what has been already
proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (Q. 3, A. 4).
Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of
being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole
perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its
full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the
virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is
subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be
wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the
perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they
have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection
of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is
implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists not
in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely,
without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is the
very existence to subsisting things."

Reply Obj. 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div.
Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within
itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many
and diverse qualities; _a fortiori_ should all things in a kind of
natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things
diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as
one, without injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to
the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that,
although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if
they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living
thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things
also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although
therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that
which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of
existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and
wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to
Him who is subsisting being itself.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 3]

Whether Any Creature Can Be Like God?

Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is
written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O
Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are
called by participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be
said to be like God.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no
comparison between things in a different genus. Therefore neither
can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like
whiteness. But no creature is in the same genus as God: since God is
no genus, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore no creature is
like God.

Obj. 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in
form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,
essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to
God.

Obj. 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for
like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will
be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To
whom have you likened God?" (Isa. 40:18).

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
likeness" (Gen. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to
Him" (1 John 3:2).

_I answer that,_ Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication
in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in
form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same
form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode;
and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness;
as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and
this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things
as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality,
though not according to the same measure, but according to more or
less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more
white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are
said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according
to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since
every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything
acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way
resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in
the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form
between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same
formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the
agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will
be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species;
as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as
like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its
specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is
an agent not contained in any genus, its effect will still more
distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to
participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same
specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of
analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created
things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and
universal principle of all being.

Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ
declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all
likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God:
like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not
perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall
short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that
which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but
because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.

Reply Obj. 2: God is not related to creatures as though
belonging to a different genus, but as transcending every genus,
and as the principle of all genera.

Reply Obj. 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on
account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same
genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is
essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.

Reply Obj. 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are
in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like
creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual
likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not
between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue
is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of
as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
_______________________

QUESTION 5

OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL
(In Six Articles)

We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the
goodness of God.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?

(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?

(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?

(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?

(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?

(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the
pleasant?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 1]

Whether Goodness Differs Really from Being?

Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For
Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore
goodness and being really differ.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called
good which has the form of being," according to the commentary on _De
Causis._ Therefore goodness differs really from being.

Obj. 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot
be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
"inasmuch as we exist we are good."

_I answer that,_ Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only
in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of
goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is
clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for
all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as
it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as
it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is
clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 4; Q. 4, A. 1). Hence it is
clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness
presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.

Reply Obj. 1: Although goodness and being are the same really,
nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of
a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies
that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to
potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being,
accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only
in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being.
Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being
simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being
relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white
does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a
thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But
goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of
ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said
to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it
ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some
perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but
only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e.
substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good
relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete
actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply.
Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebdom.), "I perceive that in nature
the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,"
is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being
simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply
exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply--in
such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good,
and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.

Reply Obj. 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness
signifies complete actuality.

Reply Obj. 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less
according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to
knowledge or virtue.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 2]

Whether Goodness Is Prior in Idea to Being?

Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For
names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things
signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the
first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather
than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in
idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius
notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and
non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone."
Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.

Obj. 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But
goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the
aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for
it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been
born" (Matt. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.

Obj. 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life,
knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence
is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible.
Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.

_On the contrary,_ It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first
of created things is being."

_I answer that,_ In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning
signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of
the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that
is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the
first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is
knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the
proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is
prior to goodness.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom.
i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as
he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness,
since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final
cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent
does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to
its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness,
as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore
among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes
being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not
distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was
non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for
primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek
their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed
to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to
non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).

Reply Obj. 2: The same solution is applied to this objection.
Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing
things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it
can cause them--if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply
those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and
not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only
actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even
those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being
implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or
exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which
are actual.

Reply Obj. 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only
relatively--i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only
be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil
cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of
some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only
relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one
cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
relatively good.

Reply Obj. 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only
so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of
being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and
consequently nothing is good except being.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 3]

Whether Every Being Is Good?

Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is
something superadded to being, as is clear from A. 1. But whatever is
added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc.
Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good
and good evil" (Isa. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore
not every being is good.

Obj. 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary
matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires.
Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness.
Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in
mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities;
otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not
every being is good.

_On the contrary,_ Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now
every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest
good. Therefore every being is good.

_I answer that,_ Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as
being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act
implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability
and goodness, as is clear from A. 1. Hence it follows that every being
as such is good.

Reply Obj. 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything
included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or
nature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being
beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper
to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not
limit being.

Reply Obj. 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
because it lacks the power to see well.

Reply Obj. 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so
it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,
primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the
privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a
certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for,
goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to
desire.

Reply Obj. 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as
realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted;
but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted
from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant
that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form
of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness,
as was said in the preceding article.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 4]

Whether Goodness Has the Aspect of a Final Cause?

Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final
cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect
of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal
cause.

Obj. 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and
are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that
"we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as the
efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient
cause.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
which something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
cause.

_I answer that,_ Since goodness is that which all things desire, and
since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes
the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see
that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g.
heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the
heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing,
goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act;
secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes
the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take
place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being;
secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect
in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as
the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the
formality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.

Reply Obj. 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical
fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the
form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ
logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an
end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the
other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due
proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in
what is after their own kind--because even sense is a sort of reason,
just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by
assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs
to the nature of a formal cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the
sense that an end is said to move.

Reply Obj. 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as
he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever
powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good
understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end
as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is
good" has reference to the final cause.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 5]

Whether the Essence of Goodness Consists in Mode, Species and Order?

Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in
mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But
mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it
is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and
weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode
and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the
mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it
rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not
consist in mode, species and order.

Obj. 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good.
Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The
same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.

Obj. 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and
order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the
essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

Obj. 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness
cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
species and order.

Obj. 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight,
number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But
not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says
(Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created
in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does
not consist in mode, species and order.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
three--mode, species and order--as common good things, are in
everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they
do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be
unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the
essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.

_I answer that,_ Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;
for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above, AA. 1, 3). Now
a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the
mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form
(and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form
certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect
and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and
follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or
commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and
this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks
the mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for
everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is
said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like
numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added
to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added
to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the
form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something
of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends
towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to
weight and order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists
in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.

Reply Obj. 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it
is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.

Reply Obj. 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and
to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but
because it is through them that other things are both beings and good.
Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for
they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by
something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus
whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything
else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an
object that is white.

Reply Obj. 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence,
according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus,
a man has a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned
and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil
deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of
that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species
and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.

Reply Obj. 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every
mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and
order). "But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being
less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they
ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out
of place and incongruous."

Reply Obj. 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being
without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison
with corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all
corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first
body that causes change, i.e. the heavens.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 6]

Whether Goodness Is Rightly Divided into the Virtuous*, the Useful
and the Pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered
as fitting. Cf. II-II, Q. 141, A. 3; Q. 145.]

Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the
virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the
ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the
virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under one
predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.

Obj. 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these
three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and
no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the
division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful
would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore
this division is incorrect.

Obj. 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there
is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it
is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided
against the pleasant and the virtuous.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
Offic. i, 9)

_I answer that,_ This division properly concerns human goodness. But if
we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns
goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable,
and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose
movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural
body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end
absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the
end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of
movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the
ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the
thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state
of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the
thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively,
as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the
useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating
the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own
sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is
that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the
movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is
called the pleasant.

Reply Obj. 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being,
is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it
according to its proper formality.

Reply Obj. 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by
opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no
other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant,
being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful
applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are
desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter
medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in
themselves.

Reply Obj. 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as
something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as
something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority
and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then
of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.
_______________________

QUESTION 6

THE GOODNESS OF GOD
(In Four Articles)

We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether goodness belongs to God?

(2) Whether God is the supreme good?

(3) Whether He alone is essentially good?

(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 1]

Whether God is good?

Objection 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For
goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to
belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything
else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.

Obj. 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all
things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and
nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not
belong to God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lam. 3:25): "The Lord is good to them
that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."

_I answer that,_ To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is
good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its
own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a
certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and
hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For
the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its
likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all
things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness
belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to
God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good
"as by Whom all things subsist."

Reply Obj. 1: To have mode, species and order belongs to the
essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence
it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others;
wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.

Reply Obj. 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection,
desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so
many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said
above (Q. 4, A. 3). And so of those things which desire God, some
know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational
creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this
belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire
without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher
intelligence.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 2]

Whether God Is the Supreme Good?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the
supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to
every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a
compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is
supremely simple; as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore God
is not the supreme good.

Obj. 2: Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the
end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This
appears also from what is said (Luke 18:19): "None is good but God
alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g.
supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God
cannot be called the supreme good.

Obj. 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in
the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly
greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same
genus as other good things, as appears above (QQ. 3, A. 5;
4, A. 3) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in
relation to others.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the
divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."

_I answer that,_ God is the supreme good simply, and not only as
existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to
God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired
perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not,
however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above
(Q. 4, A. 2); but as from an agent which does not agree with its
effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in
the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it
is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently
than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but
not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most
excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.

Reply Obj. 1: The supreme good does not add to good any
absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to
creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in
God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation
to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge
depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be
composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are
deficient in comparison with it.

Reply Obj. 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is
not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all;
but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is
said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of
essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.

Reply Obj. 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way
comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now
we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not
that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the
principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess,
and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I. Q. 6, Art. 3]

Whether to Be Essentially Good Belongs to God Alone?

Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to
God alone. For as _one_ is convertible with _being,_ so is _good;_ as
we said above (Q. 5, A. 1). But every being is one essentially, as
appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is
good essentially.

Obj. 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being
itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good.
But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good
essentially.

Obj. 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness.
Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is
necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore
its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by
some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also;
therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness
which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first
supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God
are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.

_I answer that,_ God alone is good essentially. For everything is called
good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is
threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being;
secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its
perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to
something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of
fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness
and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own
place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own
essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence;
in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others
accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and
the like, as appears from what is stated above (Q. 3, A. 6); and
He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the
last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every
kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is
good essentially.

Reply Obj. 1: "One" does not include the idea of perfection,
but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its
own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both
actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided
only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but
not good essentially, as was shown above.

Reply Obj. 2: Although everything is good in that it has
being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore
it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.

Reply Obj. 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very
essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some
added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself
thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it
called being because by it something has being, not because it itself
has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called
good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has
some other goodness whereby it is good.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 4]

Whether All Things Are Good by the Divine Goodness?

Objection 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness.
For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away
this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt
see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good." But
everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by
that very good which is God.

Obj. 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are
called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by
reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the
divine goodness.

_On the contrary,_ All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But
they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their
own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness,
but by their own goodness.

_I answer that,_ As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic
denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and
"measured" from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions
differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (Q. 84, A. 4)
of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as
participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is
called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid
down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and
absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and
of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and
by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and
what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme
good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he
called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by
way of participation.

Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate
ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves--as Aristotle
argues in many ways--still, it is absolutely true that there is first
something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we
call God, as appears from what is shown above (Q. 2, A. 3), and
Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially
such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as
it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far
removed and defective; as appears from the above (Q. 4, A. 3).

Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from
the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness.
Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of
the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own
goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there
is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.

This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.
_______________________

QUESTION 7

THE INFINITY OF GOD
(In Four Articles)

After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine
infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in
all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.

Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is infinite?

(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?

(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?

(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 1]

Whether God Is Infinite?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything
infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts
and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect;
therefore He is not infinite.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite
and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for
He is not a body, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 1). Therefore it
does not belong to Him to be infinite.

Obj. 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be
elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a
thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to
substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or
wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is
infinite and eternal, and boundless."

_I answer that,_ All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to
the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they
considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle.
But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle,
as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as
they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they
attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect
that some infinite body was the first principle of things.

We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it
is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the
form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as
matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms;
but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is
made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is
common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to
this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by
which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter,
has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless
matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but
rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on
the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of
something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as
appears from what is shown above (Q. 4, A. 1, Obj. 3). Since
therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He
is His own subsistent being as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), it is
clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.

From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be
seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated,
is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the
infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to
God; as was said above, in this article.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting,
not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him
to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be
apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a
self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in
anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness
existing in a subject.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 2]

Whether Anything but God Can Be Essentially Infinite?

Objection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be
essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its
essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be
infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the
extent of a power is known by its effect.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite
essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it
apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of
singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is
infinite.

Obj. 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as
was shown above (Q. 3, A. 8). But primary matter is infinite.
Therefore something besides God can be infinite.

_On the contrary,_ The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in
Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first
principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.

_I answer that,_ Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but
not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to
matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a
form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter,
considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in
potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can
be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is
in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of
the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things,
the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way
infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter,
but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these
will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not
terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form
thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows
that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature.
Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.

Reply Obj. 1: It is against the nature of a made thing for its
essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created
being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely
infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot
make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two
contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make
anything to be absolutely infinite.

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that the power of the intellect extends
itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form
not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the
angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the
act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.

Reply Obj. 3: Primary matter does not exist by itself in
nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it
is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary
matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but
relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 3]

Whether an Actually Infinite Magnitude Can Exist?

Objection 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in
magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no
lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But
mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in
his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is
not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.

Obj. 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can
agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of
magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be
properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some
magnitude to be infinite.

Obj. 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the
continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear
from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same
thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase
opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to
infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.

Obj. 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity
derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in
Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be
infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular
movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it
against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.

_On the contrary,_ Every body has a surface. But every body which has a
surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body.
Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and
to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.

_I answer that,_ It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another
to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite
in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in
essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its
form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from
these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still
remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.

We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude,
can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its
quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.

Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite.
For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since
therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is
necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate
form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has
a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for
a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body
could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing
moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place;
and this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy
every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own
place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion
requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a
place occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards
an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre,
the farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from
each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be
infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy
the place belonging to any other.

The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a
mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some
form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the
form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure,
and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.

Reply Obj. 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line
actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he
subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature
of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species
of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or
tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now
what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence
there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude
is infinite.

Reply Obj. 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above,
belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter,
forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we
approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the
infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.

Reply Obj. 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but
successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But
magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity
refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude;
yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper
to matter to be in potentiality.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 4]

Whether an Infinite Multitude Can Exist?

Objection 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible.
For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But
number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an
infinite multitude actually to exist.

Obj. 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species
to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore
an infinite number of actual figures is possible.

Obj. 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct
each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can
still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not
impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to
infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in
measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21).

_I answer that,_ A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as
Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually
infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally
infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be
infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that
something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail
something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its
generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass
through an infinite medium.

A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as
such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example,
in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude;
namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and
supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the
carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would
depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers,
inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental
multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and
it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite
number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way
they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.

This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must
belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to
be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is
infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is
impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either
absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and
everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the
Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be
comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an
actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a
potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of
multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a
thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the
infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous,
because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding
article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially
in the addition of multitude.

Reply Obj. 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to
its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively,
and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to
act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be
succeeded by another multitude to infinity.

Reply Obj. 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of
number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral,
quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is
not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of
figures.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the supposition of some things does not
preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an
infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence
it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
_______________________

QUESTION 8

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS
(In Four Articles)

Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere,
and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and
concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is in all things?

(2) Whether God is everywhere?

(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?

(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 1]

Whether God Is in All Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above
all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to
the Psalm (Ps. 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc.
Therefore God is not in all things.

Obj. 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now
God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them.
Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are,
rather than He is in any place."

Obj. 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended
is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore
His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is
it necessary that He should be in all things.

Obj. 4: Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the
demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor.
6:14). Therefore God is not in all things.

_On the contrary,_ A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in
all things, according to Isa. 26:12, "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all
our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.

_I answer that,_ God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their
essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon
which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts
immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii
that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since
God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper
effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this
effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as
they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun
as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing
has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being.
But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent
in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a
thing, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Hence it must be that God
is in all things, and innermostly.

Reply Obj. 1: God is above all things by the excellence of His
nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of
all things; as was shown above in this article.

Reply Obj. 2: Although corporeal things are said to be in
another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things
contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body.
Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a
certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are
in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.

Reply Obj. 3: No action of an agent, however powerful it may
be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the
great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence
nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself.
But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in
nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own
nature.

Reply Obj. 4: In the demons there is their nature which is
from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him;
therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the
demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But
in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that
God is.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 2]

Whether God Is Everywhere?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere
means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong
to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for
"incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a
place." Therefore God is not everywhere.

Obj. 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same
as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of
action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither
can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every
place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore
God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.

Obj. 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part
elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has
no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not
everywhere.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (Jer.
   23:24).

_I answer that,_ Since place is a thing, to be in place can be
understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things--i.e. as
one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the
accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and
thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some
way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He
is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in
every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things
placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every
place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place
inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by
God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed,
by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every
place, He Himself fills every place.

Reply Obj. 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact
of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.

Reply Obj. 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of
the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in
succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things,
forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of
place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or
movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the
indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in
this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the
continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence,
according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,
and in a small or large place.

Reply Obj. 3: A whole is so called with reference to its
parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form
and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and
difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity
into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any
place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place,
because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the
quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity
without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate
to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is
whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of
it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental
quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the
surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to
the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of
the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity
which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the
surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality
either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the
perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every
part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 3]

Whether God Is Everywhere by Essence, Presence and Power?

Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things
is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For
what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not
essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of
anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by
essence, presence and power.

Obj. 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent
from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His
essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence
of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing.
Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by
His essence, presence and power.

Obj. 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all
things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it
is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore
neither is He present by His power.

Obj. 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance
of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if
God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it
seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special
mode of God's existence in things.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,
"God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and
substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by
grace." [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].

_I answer that,_ God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way
after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of
operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of
the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and
the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is
especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually
or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this
prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Q. 12). He is said
to be thus in the saints by grace.

But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from
human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom
by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is
said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its
inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who
nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.
Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the
Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject
to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were
subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these
it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.

But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He
walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our
things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]"
(Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all
things by His presence.

Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but
that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the
others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things
by His essence.

Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things
are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all
things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His
essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.

Reply Obj. 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not
indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their
essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to
all things as the cause of their being.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing can be said to be present to another,
when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as
was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are
necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.

Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known
should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who
wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than
God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence
by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus
by power an agent may be said to be present to another.

Reply Obj. 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to
substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and
loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's
existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's
existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place
(Part III).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 4]

Whether to Be Everywhere Belongs to God Alone?

Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God
alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is
everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all
bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from
what is said above (Q. 3). Therefore to be everywhere does not
belong to God alone.

Obj. 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole
universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
(Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole
universe, and is thus everywhere.

Obj. 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body"
(Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because
there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not
belong to God alone.

Obj. 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist
outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be
everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.

Obj. 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is
"whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts."
Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be
everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels
where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But
the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it
comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore
the soul is everywhere.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to
call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"

_I answer that,_ To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to
God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole
self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its
parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere,
forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not
belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness
belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is
everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere
accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of
millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It
belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any
supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God
alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite
number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary
that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by
Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to
God and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be
supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of
Him, but as to His very self.

Reply Obj. 1: The universal, and also primary matter are
indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.

Reply Obj. 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of
itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but
only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not
follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.

Reply Obj. 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere,
but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but
according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely,
because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would
not be in them.

Reply Obj. 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be
everywhere; but according to its parts.

Reply Obj. 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be
everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.

Reply Obj. 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere,
this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere"
determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this
sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the
heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not
follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to
exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act
of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that
where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives
according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that
it is everywhere.
_______________________

QUESTION 9

THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD
(In Two Articles)

We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His
immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?

(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 9, Art. 1]

Whether God is altogether immutable?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For
whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit, viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by
time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.

Obj. 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile
than all things active [Vulg. 'mobilior']" (Wis. 7:24). But God is
wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.

Obj. 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But
these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw
nigh to you" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not"
(Malachi 3:6).

_I answer that,_ From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether
immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first
being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act,
without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that,
absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is
in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is
evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in
part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to
blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which
is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has
been shown above (Q. 3, A. 7) that in God there is no composition,
for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be
moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something
by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously.
But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude
of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend
Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence
movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients,
constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first
principle was immovable.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to
Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every
operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing,
and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands
and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself,
not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in
potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.

Reply Obj. 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude,
according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things;
for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by
way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal
principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist.
And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine
wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate
more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of
it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and
movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun
proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth.
In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every
procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement
of the Father of light.

Reply Obj. 3: These things are said of God in Scripture
metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out,
according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to
us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
or decline from Him.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I. Q. 9, Art. 2]

Whether to Be Immutable Belongs to God Alone?

Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God
alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in
everything which is moved." But, according to some, certain created
substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
immutable does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What
therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But
some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the
blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But
forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is
essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does
not belong to God alone to be immutable.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is
immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are
mutable."

_I answer that,_ God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every
creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable
thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a
power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed,
were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal,
but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into
existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends
on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things
should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by
ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from
them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's
power to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise
it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring
them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of
another--namely, of God--they are mutable, inasmuch as they are
producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from
existence to non-existence.

If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also
in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a
twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which
enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in
attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered
according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not
mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is
consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is
mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as
regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with
privation of accident; as, for example, this subject _man_ can exist
with _not-whiteness_ and can therefore be changed from white to
not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the
essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an
accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be
changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot
be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent
with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole
potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as
to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is
consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand
incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with
respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not
consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is
consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form.
Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so
these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards
their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
"intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from
every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances."
Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards
their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a
mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says
(De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their
finite power they attain to certain fresh places--which cannot be
said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above
(Q. 8, A. 2).

Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as
regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as
regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as
regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to
divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all
creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose
power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none
of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
immutable.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as
regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of
such movement.

Reply Obj. 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment
of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine
power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.

Reply Obj. 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they
cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation
because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they
vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though
they were the subject of being, but because through them something has
being.
_______________________

QUESTION 10

THE ETERNITY OF GOD
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six
points of inquiry:

(1) What is eternity?

(2) Whether God is eternal?

(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?

(4) Whether eternity differs from time?

(5) The difference of aeviternity and of time.

(6) Whether there is only one aeviternity, as there is one time, and
one eternity?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 1]

Whether This Is a Good Definition of Eternity, "The Simultaneously-
Whole and Perfect Possession of Interminable Life"?

Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by
Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the
simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For
the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs
to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore
in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be
found.

Obj. 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration.
But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word
"life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather
the word "existence."

Obj. 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to
eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be
"whole."

Obj. 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist
all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it
is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of
eternity" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, "According to the
revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (Rom. 16:25).
Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.

Obj. 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing.
Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously
described as "perfect."

Obj. 6: Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity
is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.

_I answer that,_ As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way
of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by
means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by
_before_ and _after._ For since succession occurs in every movement,
and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and
after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but
the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of
movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As
therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and
after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity
of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.

Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a
beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved
there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly
immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.

Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is
eternal is interminable--that is, has no beginning nor end (that is,
no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession,
being simultaneously whole.

Reply Obj. 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of negation;
as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken
as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our
intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to
the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.

Reply Obj. 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also
living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being.
Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather
than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.

Reply Obj. 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but
because it is wanting in nothing.

Reply Obj. 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture
metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously
whole, is called by names implying time and succession.

Reply Obj. 5: Two things are to be considered in time: time itself,
which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence
the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of
time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.

Reply Obj. 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly;
therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity,
we use the word "possession."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 2]

Whether God is Eternal?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be
predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that
flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of
eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.

Obj. 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is
not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is
before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the
Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and
ever']" (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.

Obj. 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured
belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.

Obj. 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future,
since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding
article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied
to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.

_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal,
the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."

_I answer that,_ The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea
of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article.
Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to
be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity;
whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own
being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own
essence, so He is His own eternity.

Reply Obj. 1: The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity
according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused
in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the
apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the
"now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of
eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God
communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates
His immutability.

Reply Obj. 2: From this appears the answer to the Second Objection.
For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by
immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that
"intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of Exodus, "The
Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age,
as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign
beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e. beyond
every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of
each thing, as is said in the book _De Coelo_ i. Or to reign beyond
eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived
to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some
philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His
reign is simultaneously whole.

Reply Obj. 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is
not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea
of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our
mind alone.

Reply Obj. 4: Words denoting different times are applied to God,
because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were
altered through present, past and future.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 3]

Whether to Be Eternal Belongs to God Alone?

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be
eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all
eternity']" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could
not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal
[Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (Matt. 25:41). Therefore God is not the
only eternal.

Obj. 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are
many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of
demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is
not the only eternal.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum, xv) that "God is the
only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not
eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.

_I answer that,_ Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone,
because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above
(Q. 9, A. 1). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability
from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is
said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" (Eccl. 1:4). Again, some
things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their
duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the
hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal
hills." (Deut. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the
nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either
in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the
blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the
Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De
Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life;
according to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee
the only true God," etc. (John 17:3).

Reply Obj. 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as
many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.

Reply Obj. 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it
never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost,
according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy
waters" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but
rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be
for ever" (Ps. 80:16).

Reply Obj. 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore
in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in
the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does
not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 10, Art. 4]

Whether Eternity Differs from Time?

Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two
measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the
other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together;
nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur
together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since
therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity
exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of
eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now"
of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of
eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the
whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the
"now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore
eternity is not substantially different from time.

Obj. 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the
measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is
the measure of the first being--that is, of the divine being.
Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of
things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either
eternity or is a part of eternity.

_On the contrary,_ Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
"before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same
thing.

_I answer that,_ It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same.
Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has
neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end.
This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute
difference because, granted that time always was and always will be,
according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens
goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity
and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that
eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for
eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure
of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be
considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the
measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is
measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the
movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its
measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is
not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its
revolution which has beginning and end in time.

Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in
themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as
potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it
is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by
considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a
day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these
differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that
eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.

Reply Obj. 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity
were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case
when we consider those things of which the respective measures are
time and eternity.

Reply Obj. 2: The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in
the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as
time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is
movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time,
but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is
movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is
time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and
aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.

Reply Obj. 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being,
so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as
any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change,
it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being
of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by
eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually
changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures
movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is
naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 5]

The Difference of Aeviternity and Time

Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23), that "God moves the
spiritual through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of
spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.

Obj. 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and
"after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole,
as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not
eternity; for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is
before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before"
and "after"; and thus it is the same as time.

Obj. 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in
aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no
difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it
is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that
it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false,
since God can reduce them to nothing.

Obj. 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is
infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is
impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time
to be separate from aeviternity."

_I answer that,_ Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as
the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to
consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end,
aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end.
This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown
above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had
always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they
might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even
granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity,
and from time.

Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the
fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has
both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity
has "before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This
theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears
if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For
since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if
aeviternity has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the
receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of
aeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in
aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to
the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a
thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a
changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing
measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure, as is
clear from _Physic._ iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing
is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its
changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain
"before" and "after." We say then that since eternity is the measure
of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence
of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from
permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or
consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all
movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others
recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being
neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change;
nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or
potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial
being of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they
have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who
have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with
changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness
of intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree.
Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between
eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not
changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has
"before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and
"after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has
neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all.

Reply Obj. 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections
and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23) that to be moved through time, is
to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are
measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they
have a share of eternity.

Reply Obj. 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not
eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.

Reply Obj. 3: In the very being of an angel considered absolutely,
there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards
accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be,
is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of
our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison
with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or
was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not
subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do
not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and
non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the
divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but
He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after
he has been.

Reply Obj. 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as
it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying
that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other
creature.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 10, Art. 6]

Whether There Is Only One Aeviternity?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it
is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power of
ages are with Thee, O Lord."

Obj. 2: Further, different genera have different measures. But
some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly
bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels.
Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

Obj. 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where
there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all
aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after
others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore
there is not only one aeviternity.

Obj. 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem
to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for
all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in
some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not
depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel.
Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

_On the contrary,_ Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is
nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is
aeviternity one only.

_I answer that,_ A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say
there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many
aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the
cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the
knowledge of spiritual things.

Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things,
forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a
number, according to the Philosopher (Physic. iv). This, however,
is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted
from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered;
otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are
continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing
numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the
same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others
assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is
the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that
view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of
the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the
first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as
the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement,
the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is
sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in
subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but
accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be
found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most
simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred
to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but
also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it.
Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to
the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude,
because by one separate measure many things can be measured.

This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed
concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God
in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least
many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual
substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that
among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion,
it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many
aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second
opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity
only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element
of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things
should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing,
which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore
because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later
(Q. 47, A. 2); we concede at present that there is only one
aeviternity.

Reply Obj. 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a
space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when
we mean ages.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things
differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a
changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.

Reply Obj. 3: All temporal things did not begin together;
nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the
first measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one
aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.

Reply Obj. 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary
that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple
than the rest.
_______________________

QUESTION 11

THE UNITY OF GOD
(In Four Articles)

After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?

(2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?

(3) Whether God is one?

(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 1]

Whether "One" Adds Anything to "Being"?

Objection 1: It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For
everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which
penetrates all _genera._ But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is
the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore
"one" adds something to "being."

Obj. 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an
addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many."
Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."

Obj. 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one"
and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to
call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so
to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition
to "being."

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which
exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is
not an addition to "being."

_I answer that,_ "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only
a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is the
very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is
either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both
actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being
whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it.
Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in
undivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it
guards its being.

Reply Obj. 1: Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being"
is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were
divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the
"one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being,"
but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the
same applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And
because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were
the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary,
considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a
reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities
would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one"
convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings;
as "white" to "man." This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as
each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by
anything else but by its substance, since this again would be "one,"
supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven
on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement;
therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with
"being," does not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is
the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging to
the genus of quantity.

Reply Obj. 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is
divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in
number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is
in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is
absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what
belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is
outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many
accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided
potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts;
in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many"
accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and
divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in
idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and "one"
accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or
"one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by "one" and
by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally.
For multitude itself would not be contained under "being," unless it
were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div.
Nom., cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of multitude that is not in
a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole;
and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many
in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one
in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle."

Reply Obj. 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say
"being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 2]

Whether "One" and "Many" Are Opposed to Each Other?

Objection 1: It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed.
For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every
_multitude_ is in a certain way _one,_ as appears from the preceding
article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude."

Obj. 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its
opposite. But _multitude_ is constituted by _one._ Therefore it is not
opposed to "multitude."

Obj. 3: Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few"
is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."

Obj. 4: Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is
opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it
as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because
it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," and is defined by
it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence
there would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is
inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.

_On the contrary,_ Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves
opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in
indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains division.
Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.

_I answer that,_ "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The
_one_ which is the principle of number is opposed to _multitude_ which
is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies
the idea of a primary measure; and number is _multitude_ measured by
_one,_ as is clear from _Metaph._ x. But the _one_ which is convertible
with _being_ is opposed to _multitude_ by way of privation; as the
undivided is to the thing divided.

Reply Obj. 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing,
inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to
the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes
away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the
privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case
in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the
like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good,
which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is
founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in
some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing;
and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being.
Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as
one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative
being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or
what is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being
relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is
relatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is
absolutely _one_ is relatively _many,_ and vice versa.

Reply Obj. 2: A _whole_ is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous,
composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous,
composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the
whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for
instance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution
of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous
whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the
whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any
part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole.
Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the
latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses;
not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are
undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so far as
they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by
the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not
houses.

Reply Obj. 3: "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that
sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind
of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first
sense two are many but not in the second sense.

Reply Obj. 4: "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the
idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to
unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of
apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and
hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning
of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; because we
do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude
except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one"
is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" is not
placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be
understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to
mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus
we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of
one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 3]

Whether God Is One?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For
there be many gods and many lords" (1 Cor. 8:5).

Obj. 2: Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be
predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise,
neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of
God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an
imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.

_On the contrary,_ It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is
one Lord" (Deut. 6:4).

_I answer that,_ It can be shown from these three sources that God is
one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why
any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be
communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be
communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is
only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what
makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates,
so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God
alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above
(Q. 3, A. 3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He
is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.

Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it
was shown above (Q. 4, A. 2) that God comprehends in Himself the
whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would
necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong
to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation,
one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one
of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to
exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by
truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise
that there was only one such principle.

Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things
that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve
others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same
order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced
into one order by one better than by many: because one is the _per se_
cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch
as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most
perfect, and is so _per se_ and not accidentally, it must be that the
first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this
one is God.

Reply Obj. 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who
worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and
other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world.
Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc.

Reply Obj. 2: "One" which is the principle of number is not
predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the
principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematics, which are
material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one"
which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not
depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no
privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is
known to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no
reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of
God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the
same way it is said of God that He is one.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 4]

Whether God Is Supremely One?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely _one._ For "one" is so
called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater
or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are
called "one."

Obj. 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what
is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity.
But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible.
Therefore God is not more _one_ than unity is _one_ and a point is
_one._

Obj. 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good.
Therefore what is essentially _one_ is supremely _one._ But every
being is essentially _one,_ as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv).
Therefore every being is supremely _one;_ and therefore God is not
_one_ more than any other being is _one._

_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called
one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."

_I answer that,_ Since _one_ is an undivided being, if anything is
supremely _one_ it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided.
Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch
as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined;
since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He
is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor
potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple,
as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is
_one_ in the supreme degree.

Reply Obj. 1: Although privation considered in itself is not
susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is
subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in
the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more
divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it
is called more, or less, or supremely, _one._

Reply Obj. 2: A point and unity which is the principle of number, are
not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some
subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely _one._ For as a
subject cannot be supremely _one,_ because of the difference within
it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.

Reply Obj. 3: Although every being is _one_ by its substance, still
every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the
substance of some things is compound and of others simple.
_______________________

QUESTION 12

HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US
(In Thirteen Articles)

As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on
to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures;
concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?

(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any
created image?

(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?

(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its
own natural powers to see the essence of God?

(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order
to see the essence of God?

(6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than
another?

(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?

(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows
all things in it?

(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?

(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?

(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of
God?

(12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?

(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace
above the knowledge of natural reason?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 1]

Whether Any Created Intellect Can See the Essence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of
God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on John 1:18, "No
man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither
angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what
is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God:
"Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor
knowledge of Him."

Obj. 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But
God is infinite, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore in
Himself He is unknown.

Obj. 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things.
For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is
being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather
super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is
not intelligible; but above all intellect.

Obj. 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower
and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no
proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is
an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect
cannot see the essence of God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 John
2:2).

_I answer that,_ Since everything is knowable according as it is actual,
God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself,
may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the
excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for
example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the
bat by reason of its excess of light.

Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can
see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as
the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest
function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that
the created intellect could never see God, it would either never
attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else
beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of
the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of
its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its
principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there
resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect
which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect
of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause
of things, the natural desire would remain void.

Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence
of God.

Reply Obj. 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of
comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words
cited, "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom
likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most
certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration
and comprehension as the Father has of the Son."

Reply Obj. 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is
unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas
the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself
supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first
way: as appears from what was said above (Q. 7, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did not
exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch
as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot
be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which
means that He is not comprehended.

Reply Obj. 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain
relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and
equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of
one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there
can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related
to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act;
and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 2]

Whether the Essence of God Is Seen by the Created Intellect Through an
Image?

Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image
by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when He
shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall
see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2).

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God,
some likeness of God is made in us."

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible;
as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch
as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the
intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God
is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by
some similitude.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle
says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark
manner']," "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are
signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God." But to
see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision,
but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine
essence is not seen through a similitude.

_I answer that,_ Two things are required both for sensible and for
intellectual vision--viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen
with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is
in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that
the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its
likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the
vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not
there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen
were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer
would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from
that one same thing.

Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellectual
power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the
intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it
follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him who is
the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the
creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from
the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or
of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in
order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of
the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing
God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be
united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created
similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), "by the
similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no
way be known;" as by the likeness of a body the essence of an
incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the
essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secondly,
because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown
above (Q. 3, A. 4), which cannot be said of any created form; and so
no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God
to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed,
and contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or
understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be
represented by any created likeness; for every created form is
determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of
being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by
some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at
all; which is false.

Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is
required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of
glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in
the Psalm (35:10), "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of
God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing
the divine essence itself as it really is.

Reply Obj. 1: That authority speaks of the similitude which is
caused by participation of the light of glory.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.

Reply Obj. 3: The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as
other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united
to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself
is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the
created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the
intellect in act by and of itself.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 3]

Whether the Essence of God Can Be Seen with the Bodily Eye?

Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the
corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see
. . . God," and (Job 42:5), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard
Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee."

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those
eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power of
sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of
serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed
by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see
even incorporeal things." Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can
be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.

Obj. 3: Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the
imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a
throne," etc. (Isa. 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from
sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can
be seen by a vision of sense.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one
has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic
life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision."

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of
sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For
every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be
shown later (Q. 78). Now act is proportional to the nature which
possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal
things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 1).
Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by
the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do
not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that
man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God.
Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood of
the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit
of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart"
may be "enlightened" (Eph. 1:17, 18).

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally.
This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have
an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they
shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains this,
saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies
of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God
everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see
the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as
when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the
functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it."
Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our
eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal
eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the
sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with
sense, by some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is
known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through,
corporeal things, happens from two causes--viz. from the perspicuity
of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused
into the body after its renovation.

Reply Obj. 3: The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the
imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God
according to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture
divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible
things.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 4]

Whether Any Created Intellect by Its Natural Powers Can See the Divine
Essence?

Objection 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine
essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
"An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to
say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection is seen, the
original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power
understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he
understands the Divine essence.

Obj. 2: Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to
us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But
the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is
supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is
supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other
intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he
understand God.

Obj. 3: Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand
incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see
the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it
follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of
God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above (A.
1). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to
see the Divine essence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting"
(Rom. 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine
essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that they may
know Thee the only true God," etc. (John 17:3). Therefore to see the
essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not
by nature.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created intellect to see the
essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated
according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is
in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge
of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the
mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must
result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the
knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things
have being only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But
others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which,
however, are not their own existence, but receive it; and these are
the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong
to be His own subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in
individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we
know, is the form of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two
cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally
knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the
singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul,
called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ.
Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in
individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but
according as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of
the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can
understand these objects as universal; and this is beyond the power of
the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are
not in matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our
soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It
follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the
divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natural power of any
created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as
its existence is participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot
see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the
created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.

Reply Obj. 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an
angel--namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel
himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the
essence of God, as was shown above (A. 2). Hence it does not follow
that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.

Reply Obj. 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be
taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it
ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense
every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it
does not possess the excellence which is in God.

Reply Obj. 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material,
cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the
angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own
nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by
grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly
what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature
except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able
to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it
knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves
the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form
separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel,
although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is
able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that
the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since
therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending
the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a
kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know
separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 5]

Whether the Created Intellect Needs Any Created Light in Order to See the
Essence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any
created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of
itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in
order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things.
Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of
any created light.

Obj. 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen
in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a
medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.

Obj. 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature.
Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light,
such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus,
that creature would not need any other light to see God; which is
impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should
require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (Ps.
35:10).

_I answer that,_ Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its
nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for
example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by
some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees
the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible
form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural
disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be
raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural
power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the
essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary
that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now
this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of
the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the
name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
Apocalypse (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath enlightened
it"--viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the
blessed are made "deiform"--i.e. like to God, according to the
saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.:
'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (1 John 2:2).

Reply Obj. 1: The created light is necessary to see the
essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible,
which is of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect
to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act.
Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight,
inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible
of color.

Reply Obj. 2: This light is required to see the divine
essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection
of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be
said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God
is seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not
take away the immediate vision of God.

Reply Obj. 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be
natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory
cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine
nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature
is made deiform, as is said in this article.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 12, Art. 6]

Whether of Those Who See the Essence of God, One Sees More Perfectly Than
Another?

Objection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one
does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 John
3:2): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way.
Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He
will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii):
"One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than
another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine
essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was
shown above (A. 3). Therefore of those who see the divine essence,
one does not see more clearly than another.

Obj. 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another
can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or
on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the
object, it may so happen because the object is received more
perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection
of the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question,
for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of
similitude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him
more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference
of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose
intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this
is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as
their beatitude.

_On the contrary,_ Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according
to John 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in
eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by
the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (1 Cor. 15:41).

_I answer that,_ Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more
perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one
had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision
will not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because
one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than
another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the
created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory,
which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears
from what is said above, in the preceding article.

Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God
the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the
light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the
greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain
degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object
desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the
more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.

Reply Obj. 1: In the words, "We shall see Him as He is," the
conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the
object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is,
because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does
not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if
the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is
the perfect mode of God's existence.

Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said
that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better
than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing
understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is,
does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of
understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the
understanding of another.

Reply Obj. 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of
the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all--viz.
the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation
of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the
part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the
natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 7]

Whether Those Who See the Essence of God Comprehend Him?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence,
comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "But I follow
after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the
Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): "I . . . so
run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the
same way, others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: "So run
that you may comprehend."

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That
is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is
hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen
whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is
simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.

Obj. 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not
"wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either to
the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who
sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing
seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise,
he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the
intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore
all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they
comprehend Him.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful,
the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
in thought" (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created intellect to
comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is
great beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxxviii).

In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is
perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as
it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific
demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof,
it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by
scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two
right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it
as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot
be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to
that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable.
But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the
knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable.
Which thus appears--Everything is knowable according to its
actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above
(Q. 7), is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know
God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence
more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or
lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory
received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly
impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite
degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.

Reply Obj. 1: "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken
strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one
comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by
intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and
cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can
contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this
sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension"
is taken more largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who
attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him.
And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to
the words, "I held him, and I will not let him go" (Cant. 3:4); in
this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the
Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension" is
one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as
vision responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even
among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch
as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our
power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we
possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such
things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and
quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because
they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the
power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the
ultimate fulfilment of desire.

Reply Obj. 2: God is called incomprehensible not because anything of
Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is
capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is
known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it
is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition;
but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being
known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the
whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of
it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely
viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be
completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.

Reply Obj. 3: The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not
that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the
mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he
who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is
infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend
to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person
can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable,
although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 8]

Whether Those Who See the Essence of God See All in God?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all
things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,
who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore
those who see God see all things.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in
the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in
a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees
God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand
the least, as is said in _De Anima_ iii. But all that God does, or can
do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can
understand all that God does, or can do.

Obj. 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know
all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things,
its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it
will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees
God knows all things.

_On the contrary,_ The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not
know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the
inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels."
Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret
thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever
sees the essence of God, does not know all things.

_I answer that,_ The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence,
does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest
that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things
are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all
things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is
clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects
can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as
one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge
of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for
he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect
can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects
in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no
created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above
(A. 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all
that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power;
but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the
more perfectly it sees God.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient,
namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all
things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all
things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should
see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the
mirror itself.

Reply Obj. 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all things
else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are
known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but
the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in
this article that the more things are known in God according as He is
seen more or less perfectly.

Reply Obj. 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to know
everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely,
the species and the genera of things and their types, and these
everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know
other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to
the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire
go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things
that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God
alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of
all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that
nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely
beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who
knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but
happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso
knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee
alone."
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 9]

Whether What Is Seen in God by Those Who See the Divine Essence, Is Seen
Through Any Similitude?

Objection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the
Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of
knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object
known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible,
and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is
informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude
of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine
essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their
similitudes.

Obj. 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul,
seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see
the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34),
remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he
said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to
utter" (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain
similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the
same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain
similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.

_On the contrary,_ A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one
likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own
essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or
ideas.

_I answer that,_ Those who see the divine essence see what they see in
God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to
their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is
in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things
which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the
cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two
ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in
itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles
the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in
itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man
in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to
know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know
them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by
their similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now
there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence,
according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see
the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other
similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect;
by which also God Himself is seen.

Reply Obj. 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is
assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the
Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.

Reply Obj. 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from
those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived
images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden
mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and
difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the
similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the
original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God,
by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the
similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in
Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this
kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus
conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 10]

Whether Those Who See the Essence of God See All They See in It at the
Same Time?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see
all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known,
but only one is understood." But what is seen in God, is understood;
for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not
see all in Him at the same time.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22, 23), "God
moves the spiritual creature according to time"--i.e. by intelligence
and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God.
Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively;
for time means succession.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not
be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall
see all we know at one glance."

_I answer that,_ What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but
at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many
things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of
many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many
diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one
body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many
things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all
at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas
if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are
understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in
God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by
the one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not
successively.

Reply Obj. 1: We understand one thing only when we understand by one
idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood
simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and
"rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the
roof.

Reply Obj. 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know
things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things
simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding
according to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all
at the same time.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 11]

Whether Anyone in This Life Can See the Essence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine
essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gen. 32:30).
But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the
words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to
face" (1 Cor. 13:12).

Obj. 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to
mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the
Lord" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it
is possible to see the essence of God in this life.

Obj. 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby
we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we
know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we
both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say
is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in
me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our
minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all
things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it
is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to
the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the
mind could not be incommutable." Therefore even in this life we see
God Himself.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25),
those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by
intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible
things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also
says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24, 25). Therefore since God is in our soul
by His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (Ex.
32:20), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be
seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own
nature."

_I answer that,_ God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human
being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is
because, as was said above (A. 4), the mode of knowledge follows
the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live
in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it
knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a
form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known
through the nature of material things. For it was shown above
(AA. 2, 9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created
similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible
for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can
be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from
corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract
intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily
senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived
the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this
mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible
objects, i.e. to the divine essence.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said
in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude
representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen
God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some
figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode
of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary
vision; as will later be explained (II-II, Q. 174) in treating of the
degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to
designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary
state.

Reply Obj. 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He
does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds
of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the
vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,
27, 28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher
of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of
rapture (II-II, Q. 175).

Reply Obj. 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all things
are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know
and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a
participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and
judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only
be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in
order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the
substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible
object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.

Reply Obj. 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the
soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our
soul, but by presence, essence and power.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 12]

Whether God Can Be Known in This Life by Natural Reason?

Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in
this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not
grasp simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown
above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know
Him.

Obj. 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason
without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural
knowledge.

Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both
good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the
knowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De
Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that
excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore
God cannot be known by natural reason.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:19), "That which is known of
God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest
in them."

_I answer that,_ Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our
natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.
But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of
God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God
as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole
power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.
But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be
led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to
know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of
all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.

Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the
cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He
is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures
are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but
because He superexceeds them all.

Reply Obj. 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to
know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is."

Reply Obj. 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the
images of His effects.

Reply Obj. 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it
belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason
can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract.
i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said
in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.'
For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many
truths," i.e. by natural reason.
_______________________

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 13]

Whether by Grace a Higher Knowledge of God Can Be Obtained Than by
Natural Reason?

Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not
obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to
Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who
nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred
by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is,"
comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to
us by grace than by natural reason.

Obj. 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by
natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to
the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that
"it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as
screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we
cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.

Obj. 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith.
But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi
in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of
knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent
knowledge of God by grace.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His
spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10),
namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.

_I answer that,_ We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than
by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have
by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the
sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to
abstract from them intelligible conceptions.

Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of
grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the
infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the
human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things
better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as
appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even
voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the
Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice
of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Matt. 3:17).

Reply Obj. 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life we
cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one
unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more
excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we
attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which
natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and
One.

Reply Obj. 2: From the images either received from sense in the
natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much
the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the
intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given
by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the
divine light.

Reply Obj. 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect
is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this
determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the
believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which
belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one
object by the vision and understanding of first principles.
_______________________

QUESTION 13

THE NAMES OF GOD
(In Twelve Articles)

After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine
knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names.
For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.

Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:

(1) Whether God can be named by us?

(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him
substantially?

(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or
are all to be taken metaphorically?

(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?

(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally
or equivocally?

(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are
applied first to God or to creatures?

(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?

(8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?

(9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?

(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God,
by nature, by participation, and by opinion?

(11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name
of God?

(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 1]

Whether a Name Can Be Given to God?

Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be
found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the
name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (Prov. 30:4).

Obj. 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But
concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do
abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any
perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.

Obj. 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality;
verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same
with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to
God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He
cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by
relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned
before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore
God cannot in any way be named by us.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war,
Almighty is His name."

_I answer that,_ Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),
words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is
evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through
the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that
we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now
it was shown above (Q. 12, AA. 11, 12) that in this life we cannot
see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their
principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way
therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the
name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus
the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it
signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the
idea expressed by the name is the definition.

Reply Obj. 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be
above being named, is because His essence is above all that we
understand about God, and signify in word.

Reply Obj. 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the
names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures,
of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of
this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their
form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a
thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a
complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable
to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms,
signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as,
for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And
as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names
to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance
and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His
mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this
life as He is.

Reply Obj. 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify the
_suppositum_ with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.
Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify
His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God
signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles
which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes
all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences
only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express
simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect
has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But
demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is
understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far
as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and
demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be
signified by relative pronouns.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 2]

Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God Substantially?

Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God
substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything
said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what
He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His
nature or operation."

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a
chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God."
Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are
distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what
expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.
Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.

Obj. 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we
understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His
substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied
substantially to God.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is
the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of
that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all
names of this kind signify the divine substance.

_I answer that,_ Negative names applied to God, or signifying His
relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance,
but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His
relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to
Himself.

But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good,"
"wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For
some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God
affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express
some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists
positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives,
we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.
Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship
towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is
the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other
names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons.
First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some
names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the
cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things;
therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is
the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is
a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary
matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to
God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense,
as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies
only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called
healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who
speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more
than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from
inanimate bodies.

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine--viz. that these names
signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God,
although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is
proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects
know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows
Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above
(Q. 4, A. 2) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections
of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence
every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses
some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same
species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the
effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness
thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of
the sun. This was explained above (Q. 4, A. 3), in treating of the
divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine
substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it
imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God
is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is,
"Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a
more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is
good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He
causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what
Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we
are."

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify what God
is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what
He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as
creatures represent Him imperfectly.

Reply Obj. 2: In the significance of names, that from which the name
is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to
signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from
the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed
to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain
kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a
stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word _lapis,_ which
has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine
names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to
the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the
representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise
our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of
procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify
the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense
were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the principle itself
of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it
pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or
signified.

Reply Obj. 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He
really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is
represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names
imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 3]

Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God in Its Literal Sense?

Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For
all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was
explained above (A. 1). But the names of creatures are applied to
God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the
like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

Obj. 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it
should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such
names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from
God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal
sense.

Obj. 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical
sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some
kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time
and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these
names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are
which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which
express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are
which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude."
Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense,
but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.

_I answer that,_ According to the preceding article, our knowledge of
God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures,
which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures.
Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it
apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names
applied to God--viz. the perfections which they signify, such as
goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As
regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God,
and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied
primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do
not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of
signification applies to creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: There are some names which signify these perfections
flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in
which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very
signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a material
being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a
metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections
absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of
their signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the
like, and such names can be literally applied to God.

Reply Obj. 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of
God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to
Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent
way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and
all life.

Reply Obj. 3: These names which are applied to God literally imply
corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their
mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God
metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
signified.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 4]

Whether Names Applied to God Are Synonymous?

Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous
names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But
these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for
the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.
Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.

Obj. 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same
thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea
to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these
ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these
ideas are vain notions.

Obj. 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more
one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and
many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify
different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.

_On the contrary,_ All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as
when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God
are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet
it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts
is Thy name" (Jer. 32:18).

_I answer that,_ These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This
would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to
remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it
would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse
things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even
according to what was said above (A. 2), that these names signify
the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also
clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2) that they have diverse
meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the
intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since
it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms
conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to
creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply,
whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As
therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there
corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections
of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various
and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one
altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions,
imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to God
signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and
different aspects, they are not synonymous.

Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous
terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify
different aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and
absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing
through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and
vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality
represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

Reply Obj. 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are
manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and
unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet
multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold
manner, as things represent Him.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 5]

Whether What Is Said of God and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated
of Them?

Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures
are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as
many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of
the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some
univocally--viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to
infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their
effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are
some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat,
although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems
that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an
univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is
predicated univocally.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things.
Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to
the word of Genesis (Gen. 1:26), "Let us make man to our image and
likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures
univocally.

Obj. 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured.
But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is
homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally
to God and to creatures.

_On the contrary,_ whatever is predicated of various things under the
same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no
name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures;
for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a
different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the
definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever
is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.

Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are
from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal
predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which
are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be
predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal
predication can be applied to them.

_I answer that,_ Univocal predication is impossible between God and
creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an
adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the
similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that
falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects
resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example
the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various
forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the
preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and
multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing
perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection
distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term
"wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a
man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all
similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to
signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence.
Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes
and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when
it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as
incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence
it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to
God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is
predicated univocally of God and of creatures.

Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in
a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so,
it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated
about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the
fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who
proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says:
"The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the
things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that
these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e.
according to proportion.

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things
are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of
medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body,
of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or
according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is
said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in
the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and
creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely
univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (A. 1). Thus
whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the
relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all
perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of
community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple
univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals,
one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but
a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various
proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine
signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine
signifies the cause of the same health.

Reply Obj. 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced to
univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the
univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of
the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the
generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the
universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be
the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a
particular cause of this individual which it places under the species
by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole
species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes
before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is
not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it
could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an
analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one
first non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for
it does not represent one and the same generic thing (Q. 4, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things measured;
hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the
same genus.

The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these
names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do
not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 6]

Whether Names Predicated of God Are Predicated Primarily of Creatures?

Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures
rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it,
since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we
know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us
are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from
creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said
primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the
like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied
primarily to creatures rather than to God.

Obj. 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures,
are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says
(De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its
cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily
predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of
health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather
than of God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our
Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
(Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God
and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God
rather than to creatures.

_I answer that,_ In names predicated of many in an analogical sense,
all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and
this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And
since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily
to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and
secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less
to that first. Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes
into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called
healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the
definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called
healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all
names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures
primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only
similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field
means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the
beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of
"lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His
works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the
signification of names can be defined only from what is said of
creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical
sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the
cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is
good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's
goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its
meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily
to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above (A. 2), these
names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially.
For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is
the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a
more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these
names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because
these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the
imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to
creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of
signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

Reply Obj. 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and
to other names, as said above.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection would be valid if these names were
applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for
instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 7]

Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of
God Temporally?

Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures
are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the
divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (De
Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the
divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is
His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal.
Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but
eternally.

Obj. 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be
described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to
make does not apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of
God temporally.

Obj. 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as
implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all
things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of
God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from
eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I
have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also
other names implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator,"
are applied to God from eternity.

Obj. 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that
relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it
cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case
God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in
creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the
relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be
in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied
to God temporally.

Obj. 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for
instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if
the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it
follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.

Obj. 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in
nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can
exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic.
v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not
simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God
to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus
these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity,
and not temporally.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative
appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.

_I answer that,_ The names which import relation to creatures are
applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a
reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from
the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and
habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has
two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or
logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when
mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the
apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself."
For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it
apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same
applies to relations between _being_ and _non-being_ formed by reason,
apprehending _non-being_ as an extreme. The same is true of relations
that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.

Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both
extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things
according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all
relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and
half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same
applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive
power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.

Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in
the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two
extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively
to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they
are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible
and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real
relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or
to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in
themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real
relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the
intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and
sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called
relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as
others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is
not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the
right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the
animal.

Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all
creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that
creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is
no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch
as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent
these names which import relation to the creature from being
predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but
by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right
of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.

Reply Obj. 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the
relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father,"
and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental
[secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from
which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the
head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives
are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same
two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude
itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine
substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the
divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine
substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and
consequently the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and
suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence.
Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a
habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the
essence, either directly or indirectly.

Reply Obj. 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only
in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God
only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say,
"Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1).

Reply Obj. 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is
in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon
the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity;
whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our
mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as
"Saviour," "Creator," and the like.

Reply Obj. 4: Relations signified by these names which are
applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite
relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should
be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so
that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at
the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the
creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable
relatively because knowledge relates to it.

Reply Obj. 5: Since God is related to the creature for the
reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of
subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in
idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the
manner in which the creature is subject to Him.

Reply Obj. 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by
nature or otherwise, it is not necessary [to consider the order] of
things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations
themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa,
then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and
son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not
vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to
science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a
potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the
knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science,
but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous
with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it
is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the
signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa,
these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by
nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to
Himself.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 8]

Whether This Name "God" Is a Name of the Nature?

Objection 1: It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the
nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God (_Theos_) is so
called from _theein_ which means to take care of, and to cherish all
things; or from _aithein_ that is, to burn, for our God is a fire
consuming all malice; or from _theasthai,_ which means to consider all
things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name
"God" signifies His operation and not His nature.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the
divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not
signify the divine nature.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the
nature.

_I answer that,_ Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies
are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its
properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its
operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from
its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but
still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the
stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in
themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named
from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the
name and its source are the same.

Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made
known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as
said in A. 1; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as
relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from
His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God
intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect
providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name
"God" is imposed to signify the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is
the source of the signification of the name "God."

Reply Obj. 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have
of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can
know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone"
signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the
definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which
the name signifies is the definition, as is said in _Metaph._ iv. Now
from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself,
so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of
causality, and of negation as stated above (Q. 12, A. 12). Thus the
name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to
signify something existing above all things, the principle of all
things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to
signify all this.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 9]

Whether This Name "God" Is Communicable?

Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For
whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name
itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is
communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us
great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we
[Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet.
1:4). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to others.

Obj. 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this
name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears
from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have
said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name "God" is
communicable.

Obj. 3: Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained.
But other names given to God from His operations or effects are
communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name
"God" is communicable.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to
wood and stones" (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name.
Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.

_I answer that,_ A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by
similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole
signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable
according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance
this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same
nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who
participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
strength, and those who thus participate are called lions
metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly
communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the
singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many
either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in
reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to
many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be
understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the
mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the
singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside
the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a
species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular,
from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others.
Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is
incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this
individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no
name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many,
but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called
"Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of
the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms
which are individualized not by any _suppositum,_ but by and of
themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in
themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea;
but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals.
Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms
as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms
in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them
concrete names signifying a nature existing in some _suppositum._
Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we
impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to
us to signify simple subsisting natures.

Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as
stated above (A. 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied
as shown above (Q. 11, A. 3), it follows that this name "God" is
incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the
same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the
opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is
written: "You served them who by nature are not gods," (Gal. 4:8),
and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion."
Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole
signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that
those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to
the text, "I have said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6).

But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as
to His _suppositum,_ accordingly as He is considered as "this
something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for
instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is
like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.

Reply Obj. 1: The divine nature is only communicable according to the
participation of some similitude.

Reply Obj. 2: This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a
proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor;
although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular.
For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon
the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable
according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the
name "sun."

Reply Obj. 3: These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed
from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do
not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections
themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable
to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper
operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine
nature.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 10]

Whether This Name "God" Is Applied to God Univocally by Nature,
by Participation, and According to Opinion?

Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is applied to God
univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For
where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of
affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But
a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who
says: "An idol is God." Therefore "God" in both senses is spoken of
univocally.

Obj. 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth,
so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion,
and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to
this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also
this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also
in opinion.

Obj. 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one
idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by
the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while
the heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God."
Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both.

_On the contrary,_ The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is
in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied
to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore
this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is
applied equivocally.

Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen
does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he
does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, a Catholic
signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore
this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true
God, and to God according to opinion.

_I answer that,_ This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations
is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is
apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same
thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical
terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the
definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance,
"being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition of
being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is
placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine.
For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the
cause of health.

The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as
signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to
denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god
by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of
the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we
understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is
manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said
analogically.

Reply Obj. 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the
predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name
"man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is
predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name
"man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one
meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another
meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence
it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God
contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them
uses this name "God" to signify the true God. For when the pagan says
an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion,
for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use
the name in that sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the
Gentiles are demons" (Ps. 95:5).

The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these
reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not
from its various significations.

Reply Obj. 4 ["On the contrary," par. 1]: The term "animal" applied
to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the
Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including
analogous names; because also being, which is predicated
analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of
different predicaments.

Reply Obj. 5 ["On the contrary," par. 2] : Neither a Catholic nor a
pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one
knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or
remotion (Q. 12, A. 12). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the
same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying
an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God
altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
names the meaning of which we know not.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 11]

Whether This Name, HE WHO IS, Is the Most Proper Name of God?

Objection 1: It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper
name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this
name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE
WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of
good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it
especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things.
Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this
name HE WHO IS.

Obj. 3: Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to
creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this
name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name
HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should
say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord
answered him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to
you" (Ex. 3:13, 14). Therefore this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs
to God.

_I answer that,_ This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God,
for three reasons:

First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but
simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His
essence itself, which can be said of no other (Q. 3, A. 4), it is
clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for
everything is denominated by its form.

Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are
either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above
it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine
it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this
life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining
what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God
is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are
applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO
IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending
all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and
indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of
substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no
mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it
denominates the "infinite ocean of substance."

Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present
existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence
knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).

Reply Obj. 1: This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly
than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and
as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said
above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name
"God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature;
and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the
substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,
singular.

Reply Obj. 2: This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far
as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered
absolutely comes before the idea of cause.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names should
import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed
from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the
first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 12]

Whether Affirmative Propositions Can Be Formed About God?

Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed
about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about
God are true; but affirmations are vague."

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form
cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as
shown (Q. 3): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about
 which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject.
Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.

Obj. 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a
thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any
composition as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore since every
affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows
that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.

_On the contrary,_ What is of faith cannot be false. But some
affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One;
and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can
be formed about God.

_I answer that,_ True affirmative propositions can be formed about God.
To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition
the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in
reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case
both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those
which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and
"white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea
of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same
applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is
man is truly animal; for in the same _suppositum_ there is sensible
nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature
by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and
subject are the same as to _suppositum,_ but different as to idea. But
in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same
rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the
_suppositum_ what it places in the subject; and what it places in the
predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the
_suppositum_; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken
formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea
corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the
intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition
itself.

God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple,
yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot
see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him
under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple
object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of
predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the
intellect represents the unity by composition.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about God
are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous,"
inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of
signification.

Reply Obj. 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting
forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as
compound things in which there is something taken as subject and
something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form
as a subject, and attributes something else to it.

Reply Obj. 3: This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything
otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses,
accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word
"understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part
of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing
understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any
intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is,
is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our
intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that
He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the
one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the
intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in
its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands
material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it
understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of
understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple
things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode,
which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to
be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming
composition in its ideas concerning God.
_______________________

QUESTION 14

OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE
(In Sixteen Articles)

Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now
to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation is
immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior
effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding
abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills);
and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine
operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to
understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge,
we consider the divine life. And as knowledge concerns truth, we
consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the
knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God
are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the
treatment of ideas.

Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:

(1) Whether there is knowledge in God?

(2) Whether God understands Himself?

(3) Whether He comprehends Himself?

(4) Whether His understanding is His substance?

(5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?

(6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?

(7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?

(8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?

(9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?

(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?

(11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?

(12) Whether He knows the infinite?

(13) Whether He knows future contingent things?

(14) Whether He knows enunciable things?

(15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?

(16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Knowledge [*Scientia] in God?

Objection 1: It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For
knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is
the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in
God.

Obj. 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of
knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of
principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in
God.

Obj. 3: Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God
there is no universal or particular (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore in God
there is not knowledge.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the
wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (Rom. 11:33).

_I answer that,_ In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To
prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished
from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own
form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also
the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in
the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent
being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of
intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all
things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence,
as we have said above (Q. 7, A. 1) forms according as they are the
more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore
it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is
cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of
knowledge. Hence it is said in _De Anima_ ii that plants do not know,
because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it
can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still
further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and
unmixed, as said in _De Anima_ iii. Since therefore God is in the
highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1), it
follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1: Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist
in a higher state in God Himself (Q. 4, A. 2), whenever a name taken
from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be
separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that
imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality
of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists
in God simply and unitedly (Q. 13, A. 4). Now man has different kinds
of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He
has _intelligence_ as regards the knowledge of principles; he has
_science_ as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has _wisdom,_
according as he knows the highest cause; he has _counsel_ or
_prudence,_ according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows
all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (A. 7).
Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in
such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so
far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of
imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be
retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength,
He hath counsel and understanding" (Job 12:13).

Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who
knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of
the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than
that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the
mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or
habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 2]

Whether God Understands Himself?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is
said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own
essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go
out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot
return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.

Obj. 2: Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement,
as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind
of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the
perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made
perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing
its own likeness." Therefore God does not understand Himself.

Obj. 3: Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect,
because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it
understands other things, as is said in _De Anima_ iii. Therefore God
understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other
things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The things that are of God no man
knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2:11).

_I answer that,_ God understands Himself through Himself. In proof
whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an
external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the
term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that
remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation,
resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the
operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that
"the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is
intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing
is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible
or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that
sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible
object, since both are in potentiality.

Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure
act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He
neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our
intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible
species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it
differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the
intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus
God understands Himself through Himself.

Reply Obj. 1: Return to its own essence means only that a thing
subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by
giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it
returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore
those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts
of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the
senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know
themselves; hence it is said in _De Causis_ that, "whoever knows his
essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God to be
self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He
supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.

Reply Obj. 2: Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according
as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as
stated in _De Anima_ iii. For to understand is not a movement that is
an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is
an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise
that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is
assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in
potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of
potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and
assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the
likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected
thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the
divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected
by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its
own perfection, and its own intelligible object.

Reply Obj. 3: Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter,
which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now
our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects
as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as
regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural
things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning
intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the
intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands
itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things:
for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it
understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows
the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of
existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He
understands Himself through Himself.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 3]

Whether God Comprehends Himself?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends
itself is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite.
Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.

Obj. 2: If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to
Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is
truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but
infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is
against what was laid down above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore God does
not comprehend Himself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that
"Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God
understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.

_I answer that,_ God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus
proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the
knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known
as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable
proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however,
when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God
knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything
is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing
is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it
is in actuality, as said in _Metaph._ ix. Now the power of God in
knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from
the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality,
that God is cognitive, as shown above (AA. 1, 2). Whence it is
manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that
reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.

Reply Obj. 1: The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that
one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything
comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another.
But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as
if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held
and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by
way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He
is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be
comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden
from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole
is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing
of it is hidden from the seer."

Reply Obj. 2: When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to
be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion,
because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as
anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not
to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood
Himself to be something finite.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 4]

Whether the Act of God's Intellect Is His Substance?

Objection 1: It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His
substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation
signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of
God's intellect is not His substance.

Obj. 2: Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to
understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood,
but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of
understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand
our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not
be something great.

Obj. 3: Further, every act of understanding means understanding
something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is
not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He
understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's
intellect is not His substance.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is
the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to
understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to
understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above
(Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.

_I answer that,_ It must be said that the act of God's intellect is
His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His
substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to
which the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to
act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding
is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now
consider how this is. As was laid down above (A. 2), to understand is
not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the
operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the
perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the
form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible
species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than
His existence, as shown above (Q. 3). Hence as His essence itself is
also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of
understanding must be His essence and His existence.

Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and
the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of
understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said
to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His
substance.

Reply Obj. 1: To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the
operator, but remaining in him.

Reply Obj. 2: When that act of understanding which is not subsistent
is understood, something not great is understood; as when we
understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to
the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.

Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine
understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is
not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 5]

Whether God Knows Things Other Than Himself?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things besides Himself.
For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says
(Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out
of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.

Obj. 2: Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one
who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides
Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be
nobler than He; which is impossible.

Obj. 3: Further, the act of understanding is specified by the
intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence
the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object
understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God
understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified
by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not
understand things other than Himself.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "All things are naked and open to His
eyes" (Heb. 4:13).

_I answer that,_ God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For
it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His
existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of
understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of
necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of
anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power
extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by
the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as
is clear from the aforesaid (Q. 2, A. 3), God must necessarily know
things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we
add that the very existence of the first effective cause--viz.
God--is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects
pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of
understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an
intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it
according to the mode of that in which it is.

Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must
consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another.
A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species
adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through
the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of
that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the
image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in
the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in
another.

So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself
through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but
in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things
other than Himself.

Reply Obj. 1: The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God
"sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as
if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is
outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2: The object understood is a perfection of the one
understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to
which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said
in _De Anima_ iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image."
Now those things which are other than God are understood by God,
inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above
explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in
the divine intellect other than the divine essence.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellectual act is not specified by what is
understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which
other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by
its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the
intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form
which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the
intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which
makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal
thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which
all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that
the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by
anything else than the divine essence itself.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 6]

Whether God Knows Things Other Than Himself by Proper Knowledge?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things other than
Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (A. 5), God knows
things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But
other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and
are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to
know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God
knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.

Obj. 2: Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine
essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence.
But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as
said above (Q. 12, A. 2). Therefore neither can the created essence
be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His
essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its
essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper
knowledge of it.

Obj. 3: Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through
its proper ratio [i.e., concept]. But as God knows all things by His
essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper
ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse
things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a
general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper
ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.

_On the contrary,_ To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them
not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God
knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even
to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the
marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart;
neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Heb. 4:12,13).

_I answer that,_ Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows
things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings.
For as fire, if it knew itself as the principle of heat, would know
the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so
God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the
nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.

But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in
particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect,
when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a
universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in
particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is
clear from _Phys._ i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things
other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow
that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore
neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said
above (Q. 4, A. 1). We must therefore hold that God knows things
other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as
being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from
the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show
that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as,
for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines
that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know
all colors.

Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as
regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect,
that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal
principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction,
but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity
of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different
disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise,
the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position.
Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known
in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In
God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (Q. 4, A. 2)
that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and
is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is
common to creatures--viz. being--belongs to their perfection, but
also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and
understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished
from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent.
Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own
species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not
only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what
distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains
all perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all
other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is
to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines;
but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to
animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained
under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can
be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for
example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and
whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper
knowledge.

As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection
contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can
know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature
proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the
divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly
unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared
by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows
all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each
other.

Reply Obj. 1: So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be
understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode
of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is
false. For the knower does not always know the object known according
to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a
stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image
of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according
to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge
of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in
the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode
of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone
according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect,
inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows
what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be
understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the
knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge
of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly
the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of
knowledge.

We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in
Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their
own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is
in Him.

Reply Obj. 2: The created essence is compared to the essence of God
as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence
cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence,
but rather the converse.

Reply Obj. 3: The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as
the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all
creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ratio of each thing
according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate
in, and imitate it.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 7]

Whether the Knowledge of God Is Discursive?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the
knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now
the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard
many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing
at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as
shown above (AA. 2, 5), it seems that He does not understand all at
once, but discourses from one to another.

Obj. 2: Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through
its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is
known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.

Obj. 3: Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know
it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go
discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that
the same applies to God.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all
things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately
here and there; but He sees all things together at once."

_I answer that,_ In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the
proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold
discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have
actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand
something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to
causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of
conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For
many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered
in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one
thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see
different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing),
which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not
successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be
applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion
presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to
conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to
discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it
is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still
unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the
first. Now the term of discursive reasoning is attained when the
second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their
causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects
in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.

Reply Obj. 1: Although there is only one act of understanding in
itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),
as shown above.

Reply Obj. 2: God does not know by their cause, known, as it were
previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause;
and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.

Reply Obj. 3: God sees the effects of created causes in the causes
themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner
that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge
of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His
knowledge is not discursive.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 8]

Whether the Knowledge of God Is the Cause of Things?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of
things. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also
justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as
future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God,
before it exists."

Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the
knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is
the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.

Obj. 3: Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is
its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is
posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge
of God is not the cause of things.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are,
does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He
knows them, therefore they are."

_I answer that,_ The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the
knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the
artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the
artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact
that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the
intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of
heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a
form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a
principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an
effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a
principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands
unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which
inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a
relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to
opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were
determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His
intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His
knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined
to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually
called the "knowledge of approbation."

Reply Obj. 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge
to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is
joined to it, as is said above.

But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because
they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of
consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things
are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the
futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.

Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is the cause of things according
as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was
not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is
eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God
and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of
which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural
objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure,
so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the
measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the
knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one
who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 9]

Whether God Has Knowledge of Things That Are Not?

Objection 1: It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are
not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and
"being" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
of things that are not.

Obj. 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and
the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any
likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be
known by God.

Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known
by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a
thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of
things that are not.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things
that are not as those that are" (Rom. 4:17).

_I answer that,_ God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are.
Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a
certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas
things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or
of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power
of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning
whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the
creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God,
although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has
knowledge even of things that are not.

Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those
things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act
now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all
these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of
understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since
eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present
glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in
any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in
God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will
be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not
of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the
things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.

Reply Obj. 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as
they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in
potentiality; and as such they are known by God.

Reply Obj. 2: Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it
participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far
as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by
God, although they are not in act.

Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause
of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or
was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills
to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not
that they be, but that they be possible.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 10]

Whether God Knows Evil Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the
Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in
potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of
good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the
intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is
clear from the foregoing (A. 2), it seems that God does not know evil
things.

Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing
known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause
of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil
things.

Obj. 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness,
or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His
essence, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 5). Now the divine
essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it;
for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.

Obj. 4: Further, what is known through another and not through
itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the
thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through
another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly;
which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore
God does not know evil things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 15:11), "Hell and destruction
are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."

_I answer that,_ Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that
can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which
corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good
things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is
knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the
essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that
God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is
known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through
Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing
darkness except through light."

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as
meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not
know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what
he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are
known by privation of division. This is because simple and
indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only
potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not
be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by
separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation
existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.

Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is
the cause of the good whereby evil is known.

Reply Obj. 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence,
which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of
God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the
opposite evils.

Reply Obj. 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to
imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is
not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means
the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor
known except by good.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 11]

Whether God Knows Singular Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the
divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the
human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular
things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do
with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not
know singular things.

Obj. 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which
receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in
God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality.
Therefore God does not know singular things.

Obj. 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some
likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are
singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of
singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is
altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know
singular things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 16:2), "All the ways of a man
are open to His eyes."

_I answer that,_ God knows singular things. For all perfections found
in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
foregoing (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to know singular things is part of our
perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher
considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown
to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and _Metaph._
iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now
the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply
and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the
universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material
things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.

Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows
singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any
singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They
give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal
movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that
are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from
universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however
they may be joined together, are not individualized except by
individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or
because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that
kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence
according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in
their singularity.

On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by
the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this
will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless
he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the
reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of
singular things.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of
things by His knowledge, as stated above (A. 8), His knowledge
extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of
God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality,
but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Q. 44, A. 2), the
knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are
individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than
Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their
active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of
knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in
the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer,
if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.

Reply Obj. 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from
the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our
intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on
that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the
intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of
God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the
principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of
things, whether principles of the species or principles of the
individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also
singular things.

Reply Obj. 2: Although as regards the species in the divine intellect
its being has no material conditions like the images received in the
imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and
material things.

Reply Obj. 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes
from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this
wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 12]

Whether God Can Know Infinite Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the
infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to
those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured,"
as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded
by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no
boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of
God.

Obj. 2: Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are
finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the
essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite
that it is traversable, as said in _Phys._ iii. But the infinite is
not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved
in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite,
nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in
God's knowledge, which is infinite.

Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is
known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be
measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot
number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose
knowledge has no bounds."

_I answer that,_ Since God knows not only things actual but also
things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above (A.
9), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows
infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation
only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite
things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor
that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals
be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we
must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of
vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts,
which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for
ever.

The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of
every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the
principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the
likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of
only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is
the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is
participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the
intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not
however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the
nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible
species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the
individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On
the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect
understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can
be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards
the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows
that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as
distinct from each other.

Reply Obj. 1: The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the
order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode
of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the
infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken,
there will always remain something else outside. But God does not
know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively,
as said above (A. 7). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from
knowing infinite things.

Reply Obj. 2: Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and
hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor
by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because
that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the
comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be
comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can
be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as
if it were traversable.

Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not
quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of
measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things.
For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which
it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees
with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of
things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in
continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients
held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and
finite being, because their being would be limited to some
determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the
knowledge of God.
_______________________

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 13]

Whether the Knowledge of God Is of Future Contingent Things?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future
contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary
effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said
above (A. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He
knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of
contingent things.

Obj. 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the
antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary
consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are
to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary
conclusion can follow, as is proved in _Poster._ i. But this is a true
conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will
be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is
eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent
is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is
necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

Obj. 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be,
because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of
course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no
future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent
future thing is known by God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath made the
hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e.
of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free
will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.

_I answer that,_ Since as was shown above (A. 9), God knows all
things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and
creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it
follows that God knows future contingent things.

In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be
considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in
act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as
present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference)
to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this
it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to
the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its
cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a
contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent
cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent
thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a
contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural
knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they
are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in
itself. And although contingent things become actual successively,
nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they
are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is
because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being;
and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said
above (Q. 10, A. 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to
God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things
present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried
from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.
Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by
God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their
presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to
their own causes.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may
be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as
the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate
contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first
cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent
on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God,
which is the first cause, is necessary.

Reply Obj. 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this
contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because,
although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This
however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had
relation to the future, must have had it, although the future
sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this
antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and
contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man."
But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this
contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter
of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its
contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or
contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it
may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said
Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and
contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely
necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is
absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of
the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause.
But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were
its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a
contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the
grass will grow."

Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains
anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be
taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the
existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a
thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul
understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is
immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself.
Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will be," the consequent
must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as
it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the
antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily
be," as the Philosopher says in _Peri Herm._ i.

Reply Obj. 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us
successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is
above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know
future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God
alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who
goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas
he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it
is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be
known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according
to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as
already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes.
Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must
necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the
thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and
false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary."
If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense
is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."

Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good
with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I
said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as
applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing
which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, "a white thing
is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from
the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
"A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to
be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by
God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these
words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the
subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be
attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be
known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under
actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in
itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
_______________________

FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 14]

Whether God Knows Enunciable Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to
know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and
divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition.
Therefore God does not know enunciable things.

Obj. 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some
likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since
He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable
things.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men"
(Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of
men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.

_I answer that,_ Since it is in the power of our intellect to form
enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in
that of creatures, as said above (A. 9), it follows of necessity
that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.

Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite
things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the
manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were
composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by
simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if
we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand
all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in
our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch
as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not
to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not
forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we
understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this
account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one
by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the
species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to
represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows
the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to
them.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection would avail if God knew enunciable
things after the manner of enunciable things.

Reply Obj. 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a
thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the
similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.
_______________________

FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 15]

Whether the Knowledge of God Is Variable?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For
knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports
relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies
according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of
God is variable according to the variation of creatures.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can
make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows.
Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.

Obj. 3: Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does
not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be
born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once
knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.

_On the contrary,_ It is said, that in God "there is no change nor
shadow of alteration" (James 1:17).

_I answer that,_ Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is
clear from the foregoing (A. 4), just as His substance is altogether
immutable, as shown above (Q. 9, A. 1), so His knowledge likewise
must be altogether invariable.

Reply Obj. 1: "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to
creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of
God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God;
because everything is actually understood according as it is in the
one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable
manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that
"Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent upon
the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures
themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are
attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures.
But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations consequent
upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these
are predicated of God in an invariable manner.

Reply Obj. 2: God knows also what He can make, and does not make.
Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not
follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred
to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know
those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the
fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some
things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge
is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If,
however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and
afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could
not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by
God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in
some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from
eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than
He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did
not know, and then afterwards knew.

Reply Obj. 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing
to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because
the same thing is signified by these three--viz. the nativity of
Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He
knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same
thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false;
both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a
diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a
proposition which is true once would be always true; which is
contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he
says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting,
and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this
proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to
enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that
the knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in
the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime
to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the
divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime
true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be
variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by
composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our
knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if
when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a
thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as
regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was
sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of
which can be in God.
_______________________

SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 16]

Whether God Has a Speculative Knowledge of Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of
things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown
above (A. 8). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the
things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.

Obj. 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from
things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the
knowledge of God is not speculative.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to
God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical
knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics.
Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.

_I answer that,_ Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical
only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof
whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative
in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not
operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or
divine thing[s]. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing--as, for
instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and
considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider
operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically
operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and
not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal
principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect
differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De
Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the
operation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the
consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house
can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to
know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations
as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore
knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is
merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode
or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when
it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.

In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of
Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable.
But of all other things He has both speculative and practical
knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for
whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God
knows all this much more perfectly.

Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has
not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical
from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in
some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are
not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like
good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as
also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician,
inasmuch as he cures them by his art.

Reply Obj. 1: The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of
Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that
is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is
virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make,
and which nevertheless are never made.

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that knowledge is derived from things known
does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only
accidentally in so far as it is human.

In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that
perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are
known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge
of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him,
formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative.
Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative
knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in
Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative
knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical
knowledge of all other things.
_______________________

QUESTION 15

OF IDEAS
(In Three Articles)

After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas.
And about this there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are ideas?

(2) Whether they are many, or one only?

(3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 1]

Whether There Are Ideas?

Objection 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas
are for nothing else except that things may be known through them.
Therefore there are no ideas.

Obj. 2: Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been
already said (Q. 14, A. 5). But He does not know Himself through
an idea; neither therefore other things.

Obj. 3: Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of
knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient
principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore
necessary to suppose ideas.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),
"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless
they are understood."

_I answer that,_ It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind.
For the Greek word _Idea_ is in Latin _Forma._ Hence by ideas are
understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things
themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing
itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of
which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge
of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be
in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is
clear for the following reason:

In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of
any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of
the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the
agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the
thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in
those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire
generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be
made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that
act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in
the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the
house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form
conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but
by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (Q. 46, A. 1),
there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which
the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.

Reply Obj. 1: God does not understand things according to an idea
existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the
opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not
in the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: Although God knows Himself and all else by His own
essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things,
except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with
respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.

Reply Obj. 3: God is the similitude of all things according to His
essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 2]

Whether Ideas Are Many?

Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is
His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only
one idea.

Obj. 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and
operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several
arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.

Obj. 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to
their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the
contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are
many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of
the eternal.

Obj. 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures only,
or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from
eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas
are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are
real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other
than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of
Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore
are not many.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),
"Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types
of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal,
and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the
divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come
into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them
everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually
does so."

_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In
proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the
ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the
order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the
highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the
universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in _Metaph._ xii.
Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and
is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been
supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first
creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so
on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to
this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing
alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by
Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the
order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole,
unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is
made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he
has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in
the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was
created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it
follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be
seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we
consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as
that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he
understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the
form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood
by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now,
it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it
understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its
simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of
images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things
understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own
essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it
can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as
it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of
likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to
which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine
essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of
such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type
and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other
creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types
of things and these are many ideas.

Reply Obj. 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as
it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type
of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as
many types are understood through the self-same essence.

Reply Obj. 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God
understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one
understands many things, and that not only according to what they are
in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is
to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an
architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form
of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as
devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he
understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house.
Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He
also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And
this means that He understands the several types of things; or that
many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.

Reply Obj. 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are
caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect
comparing its own essence with these things.

Reply Obj. 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created
things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those
whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by
God.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 3]

Whether There Are Ideas of All Things That God Knows?

Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things
that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God.
Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.

Obj. 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be,
nor have been, as has been said above (A. 9). But of such things
there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of
the divine will are the determining and effective types of things."
Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.

Obj. 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be
no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.

Obj. 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but
also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of
these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are
not ideas in God of all things known by Him.

_On the contrary,_ Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is
clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the
proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas
of all things known by Him.

_I answer that,_ As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the
knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the
principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and
belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of
knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to
speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect
to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a
principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even
though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows
according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in
a speculative manner.

Reply Obj. 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type, but
through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God,
neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."

Reply Obj. 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of
things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with
respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies
an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."

Reply Obj. 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not
created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a
concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by
God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not
apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can
neither exist, nor be known.

Reply Obj. 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species,
in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist
except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents
that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being
along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the
subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through
the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such
as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other
form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea
than that of species; both because particular things are
individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated
and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature
regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the
species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not
merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (Q. 22,
A. 3).
_______________________

QUESTION 16

OF TRUTH
(In Eight Articles)

Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration
of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this
there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?

(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?

(3) On the comparison of the true to being.

(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.

(5) Whether God is truth?

(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?

(7) On the eternity of truth.

(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 1]

Whether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect?

Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the
intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5)
condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since
it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not
be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following,
"That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and
able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That
is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and
not in the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If,
then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in
so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient
philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so.
Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by
different persons at the same time.

Obj. 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself
more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is
from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is
true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore
truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the
false reside not in things, but in the intellect."

_I answer that,_ As the good denotes that towards which the appetite
tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or
any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing
known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer
tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely
good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing
so far as that thing is related to the appetite--and hence the aspect
of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so
far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since
the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the
object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the
intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood
is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect.
Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either
essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect
on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an
intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is
related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but
accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.

Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by
what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true
absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it
depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as
being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that
expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words
are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so
far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine
mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to
a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus,
then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in
things according as they are related to the intellect as their
principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth.
Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made
manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth
makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as
it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they
are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera
Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to
a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is
rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for that is right which is
in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph.
viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which
is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the
equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either
aspect.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and
excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect;
for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.

Reply Obj. 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of
natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced
by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect,
they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to
our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible,
and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not
follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation
to the divine intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the
thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily,
any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather
than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health,
is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the
same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of
truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or
a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is
true."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 2]

Whether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect Composing and Dividing?

Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that
as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible
objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now
composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the
intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside
only in the intellect composing and dividing.

Obj. 2: Further, Isaac says in his book _On Definitions_ that truth
is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with
regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard
to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing
as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
composing and dividing.

_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to
simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
intellect nor in things."

_I answer that,_ As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect,
in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the
form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing,
must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this
being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the
conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity
is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although
sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the
comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself
apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own
conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it
by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that
a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing,
then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and
dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes
from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the
predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing,
as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does
not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with
complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or
in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is
true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by
the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as
known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect
composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect
knowing "what a thing is."

And thus the Objections given are solved.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 3]

Whether the True and Being Are Convertible Terms?

Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible
terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
(A. 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not
convertible.

Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not
convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not.
Therefore the true and being are not convertible.

Obj. 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of
priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except
under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not
convertible.

_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the
same disposition of things in being and in truth.

_I answer that,_ As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth
is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so
far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in _De Anima_ iii that "the
soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the
intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the
true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true
adds relation to the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as
said before (A. 1). But the true that is in things is convertible
with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect
is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested;
for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (A.
1). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the
intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the
intellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because
truth and being differ in idea.

Reply Obj. 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be
known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it
knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is
a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.

Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except
under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In
the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the
idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In
the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless
the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the
true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended
also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is
the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being
cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be
understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly,
being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by
understanding being.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 4]

Whether Good Is Logically Prior to the True?

Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For
what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from _Phys._
i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a
kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is
logically prior to the true.

Obj. 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect
composing and dividing as said above (A. 2). But that which is in
things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is
logically prior to the true.

Obj. 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from
_Ethic._ iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine
says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind.
Therefore the good is prior to the true.

_On the contrary,_ What is in more things is prior logically. But the
true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in
mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.

_I answer that,_ Although the good and the true are convertible with
being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two
reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than
is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately;
while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some
way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from
the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the
true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true
must be prior in idea to the good.

Reply Obj. 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one
another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills
the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the
object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the
intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable,
good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas
in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case. From the
fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good
is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior
absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to
the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself;
secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it
apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first,
that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in
things.

Reply Obj. 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in
general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows
himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to
"life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in
his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it
has been said that truth exists in other things (A. 1). Whereas the
truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his
neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these
particular truths to truth in general.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 5]

Whether God Is Truth?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the
intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition
and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.

Obj. 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi)
is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to
a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the
first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all
being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is
truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone
sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the
Life" (John 14:6).

_I answer that,_ As said above (A. 1), truth is found in the
intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things
according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to
the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed
to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act
of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of
every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of
understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but
that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.

Reply Obj. 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither
composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He
judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is
truth in His intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its
conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from
which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to
their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect.
Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless
perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a
principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the
negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is
not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a
"likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not
dissimilar to His intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves,
but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension
of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the
statement--"that a person commits fornication is true"--is entirely
from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is
from God", is a fallacy of Accident.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 6]

Whether There Is Only One Truth, According to Which All Things Are True?

Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which
all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1),
"nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is
greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of
truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and
not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth.
Therefore there is no other truth but God.

Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the
relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true
things." But there is only one time for all temporal things.
Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.

_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."

_I answer that,_ In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is
one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must
consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally,
it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal
is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of
many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to
its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not
that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal,
medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health,
and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And
although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either
there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates
health. Now we have said (A. 1) that truth resides primarily in
the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are
related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it
exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are
there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the
same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a
gloss on Ps. 11:2, "Truths are decayed from among the children of
men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a
mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But
if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by
one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its
own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are
many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to
which all things are said to be true.

Reply Obj. 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind
of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is
reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first
principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the
primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth,
which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply,
but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that
nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.

Reply Obj. 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are
said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 7]

Whether Created Truth Is Eternal?

Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine
says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature
of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of
these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals
are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore
is truth, which is the most universal.

Obj. 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present
was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding
the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding
the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.

Obj. 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal.
But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if
their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true
that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that
truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that
truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be,
for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
eternal.

_On the contrary,_ God alone is eternal, as laid down before
(Q. 10, Art. 3).

_I answer that,_ The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of
the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of
itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable
truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on
account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a
subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it
but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it
has been already said that things are called true from the truth of
the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone
truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else
but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God
Himself, as shown already (A. 5).

Reply Obj. 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three
make five, have eternity in the mind of God.

Reply Obj. 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be
understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of
extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be
everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself
determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be
one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all
distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be
everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of
place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are
eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.

Reply Obj. 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually)
was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the
cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the
first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was
always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future
being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.

Reply Obj. 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the
truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but
it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not
true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the
divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now
to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by
reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason
of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being;
and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our
intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not
exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 8]

Whether Truth Is Immutable?

Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De
Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals,
otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."

Obj. 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as
primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after
all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for
after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not.
Therefore truth is immutable.

Obj. 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes
mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change.
For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain
rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the
divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits",
receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does
sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.

Obj. 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same
effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three
propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of
each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one.
Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for
the same reason that of any other.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
among the children of men."

_I answer that,_ Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the
intellect, as said before (A. 1); but things are called true in
virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of
truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the
truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now
this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness,
through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth
varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of
opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in
another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in
either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there
is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and
the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth.
Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
before (Q. 14, A. 15). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is
immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it
is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect
changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable.
Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which
natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.

Reply Obj. 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as
being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in
so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in
_Phys._ i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but
because that truth does not remain which was before.

Reply Obj. 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things are
said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which
is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it is said
to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth
of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect
with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes,
and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this
proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both
with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is
significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it
signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth
remains, but the second is changed.

Reply Obj. 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the
truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning
when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the
truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these
propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not
follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same
truth remains invariable.
_______________________

QUESTION 17

CONCERNING FALSITY
(In Four Articles)

We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether falsity exists in things?

(2) Whether it exists in the sense?

(3) Whether it exists in the intellect?

(4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 1]

Whether Falsity Exists in Things?

Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For
Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it
will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may
appear to the contrary."

Obj. 2: Further, false is derived from _fallere_ (to deceive). But
things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33),
they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not
found in things.

Obj. 3: Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to
the divine intellect, as stated above (Q. 16). But everything, in so
far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without
admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a
true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being
unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of
it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.

_I answer that,_ Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites
stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where
primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in
things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the
intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs
to it _per se,_ but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it
accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared
with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared
_per se_ but may be called false relatively as directed to another
intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things
depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human.
Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in
themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art;
whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short
of the proper operation of his art.

In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as
they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes
place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless
perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their
power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein
consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and
lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do
you love vanity, and seek after lying?" (Ps. 4:3): as on the other
hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient
to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth
truth, cometh to the light" (John 3:21).

But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared
thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively;
and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and
thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by
word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to
be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should
say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher
says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The
true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything
can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In
another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause--and thus a
thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And
whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances,
since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and
naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external
accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be
false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and
tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We
call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the
true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called
false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what
they are not." In this way a man is called false as delighting in
false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in
this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as
stated in _Metaph._ v, 34.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true
in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not.
Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq.
ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain
non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.

Reply Obj. 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by
accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they
bear to things which they actually are not.

Reply Obj. 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared with the
divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as
compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.

To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective
representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far
as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always
said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when
the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not
in any one case, but in the majority of instances.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 2]

Whether There Is Falsity in the Senses?

Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine
says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are
affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it
seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that
falsity is not in them.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity
is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.

Obj. 3: Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor
false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do
not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the
senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."

_I answer that,_ Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as
truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the
senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things
truly, as said above (Q. 16, A. 2), and this takes place through
the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that
falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging
things to be otherwise than they really are.

The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the
existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing
can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and
of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of
other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature,
though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape,
size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense.
Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as
in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as
it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.

Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except
accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it
does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive
subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the
impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on
account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person.
But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a
rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, because it is
referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence
of being directed to other things.

Reply Obj. 1: The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence,
from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that
we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we
experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected
erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports
erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about
the object, but not about the fact of sensation.

Reply Obj. 2: Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense
is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation
it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never
false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents
the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone
perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself,
falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams
are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things
that are not present in substance.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that the false is not in the
sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 3]

Whether Falsity Is in the Intellect?

Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For
Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived,
understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to
exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore
falsity does not exist in the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the
intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the
intellect.

_On the contrary,_ It is said in _De Anima_ iii, 21, 22 that "where
there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and
falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth
and falsehood exist in the intellect.

_I answer that,_ Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the
knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known.
Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs
to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent
qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail
to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of
the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental
thereto. For it has been said (A. 2) that sight is not deceived in
its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent
to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the
sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so
is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the
intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither
the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the
intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it
understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it,
or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as
regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common,
or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference,
as before mentioned regarding truth (Q. 16, A. 2), that falsity can
exist in the intellect not only because the knowledge of the
intellect is false, but because the intellect is conscious of that
knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does
not exist as known, as stated above (A. 2).

But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only
with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also
accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the
essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is
mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the
intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as
that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is
false of another. In another way, by composing a definition of parts
which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only
false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as "a
reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the
intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some
reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this
reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple
essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at all.

Reply Obj. 1: Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of
the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we
reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in
demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense
Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived,
understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense
that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellect is always right as regards first
principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason
that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known
principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood,
from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of
the subject.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 4]

Whether True and False Are Contraries?

Objection 1: It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true
and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for
"truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But
that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries.
Therefore true and false are not contrary things.

Obj. 2: Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But
falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10),
"A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true
tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.

Obj. 3: Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is
contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in
Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (Jer. 8:5), that is
to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not
contraries.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false
opinion is contrary to a true one.

_I answer that,_ True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as
some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must
be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines
any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for
instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing,
whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject,"
as stated in _Metaph._ iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of
one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert
something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of
color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or
seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is.
For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity
implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are
contraries.

Reply Obj. 1: What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what
is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth
primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as
apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety;
for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this
statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."

Reply Obj. 2: Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary
to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to
it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either,
because true and good are universals, and convertible with being.
Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being,
so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some
truth.

Reply Obj. 3: Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation,
are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is
nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect
to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be
nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for
the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols
are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine
unity.
_______________________

QUESTION 18

THE LIFE OF GOD
(In Four Articles)

Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the
divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life.
About this, four points of inquiry arise:

(1) To whom does it belong to live?

(2) What is life?

(3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?

(4) Whether all things in God are life?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 1]

Whether to Live Belongs to All Natural Things?

Objection 1: It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For
the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of
life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural
things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake
of life.

Obj. 2: Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they have in
themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local
movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of
growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56, 57).
Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of
local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.

Obj. 3: Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less
perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living
waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last
echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that
their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are
inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.

_I answer that,_ We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what
it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life
manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in _De Vegetab._ i [*De
Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore,
distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by
reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life
is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such
movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When
it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another
power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead.
Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that
move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement
properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing
in potentiality, is called movement; or movement in a more general
sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding
and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be
alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind:
whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be
called living, unless by a similitude.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of the Philosopher may be understood either
of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of
the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called
the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude,
and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the
heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of
the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also
every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain
similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal
universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an
"intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that case
movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.

Reply Obj. 2: To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not
belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural
conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in
the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest.
Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in
accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by
approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they
recede from such movement, so far do they recede from their natural
disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force,
either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles
from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living
bodies.

Reply Obj. 3: Waters are called living that have a continuous
current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a
continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and
ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are
seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is
not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is
not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same
is the case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 2]

Whether Life Is an Operation?

Objection 1: It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is
divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by
certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment,
sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an
operation.

Obj. 2: Further, the active life is said to be different from the
contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the
active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.

Obj. 3: Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life,
as is clear from the words of John 18:3, "Now this is eternal life,
that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an
operation.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living
things, to live is to be."

_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said (Q. 17, A. 3),
our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as
its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper
objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we
come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a
thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what
has already been said (Q. 13, A. 1), so from external properties
names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are
sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the
signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and
less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are
imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus
of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and
is sometimes taken to denote the dimensions themselves; in which
sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said
of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance,
namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather
a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to
any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is
nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies
this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running" denotes "to
run" in the abstract.

Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate.
Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from
which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9)
that to live is principally to sense or to understand.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an
operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and
intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations,
sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says
(Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand--in other
words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus,
then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in
this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the
nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment,
and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in
addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other
animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from
place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and
so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.

Reply Obj. 2: By vital operations are meant those whose principles
are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces
such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not
merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their
natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits
inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of
operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus,
as by a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so
that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life
ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence
some are said to lead a life of self-indulgence, others a life of
virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the
active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 3]

Whether Life Is Properly Attributed to God?

Objection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God.
For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as
previously stated (A. 2). But movement does not belong to God.
Neither therefore does life.

Obj. 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some
principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But
God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.

Obj. 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things that
exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in
corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal
things.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
rejoiced in the living God."

_I answer that,_ Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In
proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to
live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another,
the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect
is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a
threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the
agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form,
and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue
not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more
than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move
themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in
them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form
by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined
for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move
themselves according to their inherent nature, with regard only to
executing the movements of growth and decay.

Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only
with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the
form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of
themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of
movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through
sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is
their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as
shellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and
thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as
have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only
connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move
themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals
of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the
principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves
propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for
this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct
they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense.
Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they
themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by
reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion
between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them.
Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligent beings;
for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the
fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the
sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of
movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e.
the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in
its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the
material for the ship.

But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are
supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt;
and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with
respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other
things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of
understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally
possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most
perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life.
From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing
God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal,
since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Metaph._ ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions
of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst
actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to
sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the
former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of
the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the
agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement,
the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is
called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act
of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent,
although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in
potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that
is to say, of what is in act as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 28. In the
sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which
understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that
Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which
movement is an act of the imperfect.

Reply Obj. 2: As God is His own very existence and understanding, so
is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has no
principle of life.

Reply Obj. 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible
nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and
nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not
found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold
good with incorruptible natures.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 4]

Whether All Things Are Life in God?

Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is
said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all
things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.

Obj. 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But
things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all
things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life
in God.

Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living
substance is better than a substance that does not live. If,
therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God,
it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this
appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in
God potentially.

Obj. 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are
known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but
that never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God,
inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things
that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this
appears inadmissible.

_On the contrary,_ (John 1:3, 4), it is said, "What was made, in Him
was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things
are life in God.

_I answer that,_ In God to live is to understand, as before stated
(A. 3). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of
understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as
understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since
all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood,
it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.

Reply Obj. 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In
one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the
divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in
us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in
their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the
Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our
being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another
sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in
which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God
are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in
God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and
not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner
are not movement, but life.

Reply Obj. 2: The thing modelled must be like the model according to
the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of
another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing
modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect
immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists
outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of
things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine
mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.

Reply Obj. 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural
things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in
the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which
reason, in fact, Plato held that the _separate_ man was the true man;
and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation.
But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say
that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly
than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated
being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular
being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its
own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human
nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is
not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in
matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the
one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter
only potential.

Reply Obj. 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being
comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by
Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are
known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be
said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in
time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding
only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far
as life implies a principle of operation.
_______________________

QUESTION 19

THE WILL OF GOD
(In Twelve Articles)

After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we
consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is
about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly
to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in
relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is will in God?

(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?

(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?

(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?

(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?

(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?

(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?

(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?

(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?

(10) Whether God has free will?

(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?

(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the
divine will?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Will in God?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of
will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.
Therefore there is not will in God.

Obj. 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it
is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which
cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54),
the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,
and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there
is not will in God.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 12:2): "That you may prove
what is the will of God."

_I answer that,_ There is will in God, as there is intellect: since
will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual
existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by
its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its
natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when
it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural
perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also
intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its
intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not
possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will.
Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every
sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in
God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own
existence, so is His will.

Reply Obj. 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He
Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this
by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (Q. 6,
A. 3): for the end has the aspect of good.

Reply Obj. 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,
although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking
what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in
what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as
having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is
not distinct from His essence.

Reply Obj. 3: A will of which the principal object is a good outside
itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will
is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God
is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself
alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be
movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover
moves itself.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 2]

Whether God Wills Things Apart from Himself?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from
Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not
other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than
Himself.

Obj. 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the
appetite, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which
is impossible.

Obj. 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks
nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely
satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
Himself.

Obj. 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the
number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things
apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold,
and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is
impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of
God, your sanctification."

_I answer that,_ God wills not only Himself, but other things apart
from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
(A. 1). For natural things have a natural inclination not only
towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and,
if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own
good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every
agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It
pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far
as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this
pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in
some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they
are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it
appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good
to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to
be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things
as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness
that other things should be partakers therein.

Reply Obj. 1: The divine will is God's own existence essentially,
yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of
understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has
already been said (Q. 13, A. 4). For when we say that God exists, no
relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say
that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from
Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.

Reply Obj. 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole
reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the
will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of
the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills
nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is
different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone
may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own
sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for
the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow
that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own
essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own
goodness.

Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine
will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but
rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus,
too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very
knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other
things.

Reply Obj. 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only
in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as
willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own
goodness.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 3]

Whether Whatever God Wills He Wills Necessarily?

Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily.
For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills
from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore
whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Obj. 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He
wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary,
for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all
necessity, as above shown (Q. 2, A. 3). But it belongs to His nature
to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and
above His nature as stated in _Metaph._ v, 6. Therefore whatever He
wills, He wills necessarily.

Obj. 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is
possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God
does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for
Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He
does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the
other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is
imperfect and mutable.

Obj. 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or
the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to
one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes]
says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with
regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes
from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.

Obj. 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the
divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who worketh all things
according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to
the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God
does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

_I answer that,_ There are two ways in which a thing is said to be
necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the
predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is
absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the
subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is
absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it
is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary
absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he
is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting.
Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills
something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He
wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine
goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own
goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily,
and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and
principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to
it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so
far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in
willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it,
unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as,
we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to
cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the
end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on
foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to
other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can
exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him
from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is
not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as
His will cannot change.

Reply Obj. 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He
wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by
supposition.

Reply Obj. 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He
does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness;
for it can exist without other things.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those other
things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural
or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.

Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary
relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not
in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation
to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the
solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the
cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of
the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine
will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed,
namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such
defect accompanies all created good.

Reply Obj. 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act
by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
necessary relation.

Reply Obj. 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the
divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a
necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the
thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as
they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they
exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary
existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so
as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in
themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills,
but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 4]

Whether the Will of God Is the Cause of Things?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things.
For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor
by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can
participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours
the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary
agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by
will; and so His will is not the cause of things.

Obj. 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially
so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is
fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by
His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not
by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.

Obj. 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being
_such_ a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is
the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the
cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God
is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.

Obj. 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the [cause of]
created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (Q. 14, A. 8).
Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 11:26), "How could anything endure,
if Thou wouldst not?"

_I answer that,_ We must hold that the will of God is the cause of
things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed,
by a necessity of His nature.

This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of
active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as
proved in _Phys._ ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the
necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the
end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the
archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the
agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of
agents, He must act by intellect and will.

This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of
which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature
operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is
because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent;
and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in
accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate
being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in
Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a
necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something
undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has
been already shown (Q. 7, A. 2). He does not, therefore, act by a
necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own
infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and
intellect.

Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For
effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they
pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now
effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause.
Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects
pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed
from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him
after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His
intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of
God is the cause of things.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude
election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far,
that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain
things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.

Reply Obj. 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and will,
from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts
after the mode of intellect and will.

Reply Obj. 3: Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore,
"Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is
the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A. 2, ad
2).

Reply Obj. 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is
knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived,
and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect
only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except
by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to
operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it
denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God all these
things are one.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 5]

Whether Any Cause Can Be Assigned to the Divine Will?

Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine
will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say
that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what
is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the
will of God has some cause.

Obj. 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and
whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause
of all things, as has been already shown (A. 4). If, then, there is
no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause,
except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain,
since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems
inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine
will.

Obj. 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause,
depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no
cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and
have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient
cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than
the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.

_I answer that,_ In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of
which we must consider that, since the will follows from the
intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the
same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that
understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the
premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other,
the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is
known. If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss
itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in
this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by
understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause;
and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the
premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the
will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the
means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to
the understanding.

Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means
to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the
means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and
means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say
that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by
one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills
all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause
is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands
the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause
of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to
the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not
will this on account of that.

Reply Obj. 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is
to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be
on account of another.

Reply Obj. 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite
causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not
unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It
would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as
primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense
Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have
thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being
utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others,
the will of God."

Reply Obj. 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all
effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the
will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect
depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that
God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work,
and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he
might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things
depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of
other causes.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 6]

Whether the Will of God Is Always Fulfilled?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled.
For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved,
and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen.
Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.

Obj. 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that
of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all
good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might
exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.

Obj. 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does
not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may
be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the
motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore
the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the
secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 113:11): "God hath done all things,
whatsoever He would."

_I answer that,_ The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In
proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to
the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active
causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although
a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of
the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a
man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the
same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the
order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the
universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and
if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the
hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the
order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly
escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this
is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from
producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal
things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred
through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first
heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all
things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its
effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one
order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by
sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls
back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be
saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted
application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De
praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved
that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case
they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be
saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not
all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not
of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as
applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing
antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.

To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it
is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some
additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent
consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should
live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely
considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a
murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live
is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he
wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be
hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved,
but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor
do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in
a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular
qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it
when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is
meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge
wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he
would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a
qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute
will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place;
although what He wills antecedently may not take place.

Reply Obj. 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the
thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is
directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have
the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does
not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but
does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom
all good virtually exists.

Reply Obj. 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by
deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first
cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could
in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as
said above.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 7]

Whether the Will of God Is Changeable?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is changeable. For the Lord
says (Gen. 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever
repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has
a changeable will.

Obj. 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak
against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull
down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil,
I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them"
(Jer. 18:7, 8). Therefore God has a changeable will.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does
not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to
be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a
changeable will.

Obj. 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as
said before (A. 3). Therefore He can both will and not will the
same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is
changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not
in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as
regards His will.

_On the contrary,_ It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie,
nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Num. 23:19).

_I answer that,_ The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this
point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will
that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to
will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for
the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be
changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed;
or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen,
unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the
disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will
regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way
when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take
place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it
becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In
another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for
him, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in order
to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both
the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (QQ.
9, A. 1; 14, A. 15). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood
metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when
we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so
without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the
same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to
have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so
far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
He had made.

Reply Obj. 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal
cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to
produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are
inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the
divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order
of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one
who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said:
"Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the
order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the
order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will
conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a
thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior
causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not
being in the designs of the divine and higher cause. Thus He foretold
to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not
live" (Isa. 38:1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it
was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is
unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of
God changes, but not His counsel"--that is to say, the counsel of His
will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be
understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not
fulfill what they have threatened.

Reply Obj. 3: It does not follow from this argument that God has a
will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
change.

Reply Obj. 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute
necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the
unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above (A. 3).
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 8]

Whether the Will of God Imposes Necessity on the Things Willed?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the
things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to
will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."

Obj. 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its
effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84)
"Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder
it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says
(Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God
imposes necessity on the things willed.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is
necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die,
being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are
related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they
have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God
wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement
is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
necessary absolutely.

_On the contrary,_ All good things that exist God wills to be. If
therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that
all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will,
counsel, and all other such things.

_I answer that,_ The divine will imposes necessity on some things
willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign
to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary
causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes
contingent.

This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of
the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause
is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is
hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause
can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if
the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the
divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better
therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the
divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect
follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to
its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power
in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in
accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the
divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things
are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in
the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done
necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for
the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has
attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible
and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it
is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects
willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent
causes for them, it being His will that they should happen
contingently.

Reply Obj. 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a
necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but
conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a
thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.

Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the divine
will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills
to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently
according to His will.

Reply Obj. 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents
according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by
the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to
have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore,
are absolute necessities.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 8]

Whether God Wills Evils?

Objection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that
exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For
Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is
evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should
exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would
conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And
Augustine says (Enchiridion 10, 11): "Out of all things is built up
the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is
called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more
evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when
contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the
perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires
above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.

Obj. 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the
cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in
wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse;
and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will
it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it
is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not
evil things.

_I answer that,_ Since the ratio of good is the ratio of
appetibility, as said before (Q. 5, A. 1), and since evil is opposed
to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought
for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the
intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be
sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in
each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some
other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the
corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is
food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means.
Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the
deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that
accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never
therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless
the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of
which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He
wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another.
Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of
right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or
of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils
are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things
to be naturally corrupted.

Reply Obj. 1: Some have said that although God does not will evil,
yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil
is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This
they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good
end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that
evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil
is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside
the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his
sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of
the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot
therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the
statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done,
since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it
accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.

Reply Obj. 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty
of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore
Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the
universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.

Reply Obj. 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists
not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone
wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so
opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills
evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit
evil to be done; and this is a good.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 10]

Whether God Has Free-Will?

Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in
a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He
who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having
free-will, can be inclined to either side."

Obj. 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by
which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has
been said (A. 9). Therefore there is not free-will in God.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit
divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free
choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."

_I answer that,_ We have free-will with respect to what we will not of
necessity, nor by natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not
appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals,
that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by
free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but
other things not necessarily, as shown above (A. 3), He has free
will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.

Reply Obj. 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but
only as regards the inclination to sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the
divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown, it is
manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can
make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing
to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can
will to sit down, and not will to sit down.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 11]

Whether the Will of Expression Is to Be Distinguished in God?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be
distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things,
so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine
wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine
will.

Obj. 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the
mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the
expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with
that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are
superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine
will.

_On the contrary,_ The will of God is one, since it is the very
essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the
words of Ps. 110:2: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out
according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be
taken for the will.

_I answer that,_ Some things are said of God in their strict sense;
others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before
(Q. 13, A. 3). When certain human passions are predicated of the
Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the
effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is
signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus
with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment
becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is
signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the
same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes
metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a
precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a
divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in
the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (Matt.
6:10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that
anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary
meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him
properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper
sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper
sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically
taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will
is called will.

Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done,
unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know,
unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to
knowledge, but to will.

Reply Obj. 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as
being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the
usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus
punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called
anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in
ourselves.
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 12]

Whether Five Expressions of Will Are Rightly Assigned to the Divine
Will?

Objection 1: It seems that five expressions of will--namely,
prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission--are not
rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God
bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in
us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes
permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.

Obj. 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the
Scripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct
from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be
comprehended in the will of expression.

Obj. 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures
in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in
them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational
creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one
division, not being of one order.

Obj. 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good
happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by
the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It
is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of
evil--namely, prohibition--and two--namely, counsel and precept--in
the case of good.

_I answer that,_ By these signs we name the expression of will by
which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may
show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of
another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either
directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when
he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is
his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing
of a thing; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental
mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He
declares his will by means of another when he orders another to
perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept,
and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of
counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the
same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will,
as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and
prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of
Matt. 6:10: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That
permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from
Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the
Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually
doing it."

Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time,
permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good.
Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept
to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of
supererogation.

Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will
about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that
mean the same thing. Hence there is no reason why the same thing
should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of
prohibition or permission.

Reply Obj. 2: As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His
will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said
to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing
to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good
pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the
same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not;
both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the
future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will;
the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.

Reply Obj. 3: Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and
for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are
assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to
act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved
by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are
concerned with these.

Reply Obj. 4: All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees
in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to
evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the
other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness,
since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the
fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and
there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these
are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not
only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the
avoiding of lesser evils.
_______________________

QUESTION 20

GOD'S LOVE
(In Four Articles)

We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of
God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves
both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the
habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like.
Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His
justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether love exists in God?

(2) Whether He loves all things?

(3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?

(4) Whether He loves more the better things?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 1]

Whether Love Exists in God?

Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God
there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not
in God.

Obj. 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually
divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed
to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to
Him.

Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting
and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is
simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "God is love" (John 4:16).

_I answer that,_ We must needs assert that in God there is love:
because love is the first movement of the will and of every
appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every
appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper
objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of
the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object
secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the
acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be
prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to
sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior
to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is
naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first
directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular
and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and
appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy and
delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope
regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good
universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the
first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other
appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For
nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good
that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to
the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other
things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first
principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there
must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is
also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (Q. 19, A.
1), and hence we must attribute love to Him.

Reply Obj. 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except through the
medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal
reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated
in _De Anima_ iii, 58, 75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite,
or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the
sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the
proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore
always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change
affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De
part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals.
Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have
annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts
of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight
are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective
appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they
are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by
an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He
loves without passion.

Reply Obj. 2: In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be
distinguished a certain material element--namely, the bodily
change--and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the
appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,
63, 64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the
heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards
the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is
implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in
sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger,
which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and
joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be
attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1);
neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection
be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of
effects, as already show (Q. 3, A. 2, ad 2; Q. 19, A. 11). Whereas,
those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be
properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to
Him, as said before (Q. 19, A. 11).

Reply Obj. 3: An act of love always tends towards two things; to the
good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since
to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we
love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible,
union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in
God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for
Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as
above shown (Q. 6, AA. 1, 3). And by the fact that anyone loves
another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it
were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as
done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates
another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again
the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to
others; yet it implies no composition in God.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 2]

Whether God Loves All Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover
outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object
of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed
outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is
inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.

Obj. 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from
God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love
anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it
is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other
than Himself.

Obj. 3: Further, love is twofold--the love, namely, of desire, and
the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures
with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself.
Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship
with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2).
Therefore God does not love all things.

Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the
workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and
loved. Therefore God does not love all things.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things
that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."

_I answer that,_ God loves all existing things. For all existing
things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a
thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it
possesses. Now it has been shown above (Q. 19, A. 4) that God's will
is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing
has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by
God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since
to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it
is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we
love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of
things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we
will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but
conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our
love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and
receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our
actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.

Reply Obj. 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass
into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the
beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works
for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of
the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the
cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed
outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."

Reply Obj. 2: Although creatures have not existed from eternity,
except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God
has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason
has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know
things existing in themselves.

Reply Obj. 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational
creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one
with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or
ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to
them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational
creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the
intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking,
therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of
friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He
orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is
not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His
goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a
thing for others as well as for ourselves.

Reply Obj. 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved
under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners
in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and
have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not
existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from
God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 3]

Whether God Loves All Things Equally?

Objection 1: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is
said: "He hath equally care of all" (Wis. 6:8). But God's providence
over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He
loves all things equally.

Obj. 2: Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence
does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does
not therefore love some things more than others.

Obj. 3: Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His
knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things
more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither
therefore does He love some things more than others.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all
things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and
of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son
Himself."

_I answer that,_ Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a
twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the
part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In
this way God does not love some things more than others, because He
loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and
always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a
person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that
one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our
will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God
loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause
of goodness in things, as has been said (A. 2), no one thing would be
better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than
for another.

Reply Obj. 1: God is said to have equally care of all, not because by
His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers
all things with a like wisdom and goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love on the
part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the
good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence.
Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.

Reply Obj. 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do
not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God
may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with
respect to God's love.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 4]

Whether God Always Loves More the Better Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better
things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human
race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He
loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but
delivered Him up for us all" (Rom. 8:32). Therefore God does not
always love more the better things.

Obj. 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of
man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Ps. 8:6).
But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said:
"Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham
He taketh hold" (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love more
the better things.

Obj. 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ
more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying:
"Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ
loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says,
commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By
this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not
that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest."
Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since
repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after
shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since
He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that
there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance,
more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (Luke 15:7).
Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Obj. 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the
predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since
He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not
always love more the better things.

_On the contrary,_ Everything loves what is like it, as appears from
(Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing
is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more
loved by God.

_I answer that,_ It must needs be, according to what has been said
before, that God loves more the better things. For it has been shown
(AA. 2, 3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing
else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's
will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some
things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater
good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.

Reply Obj. 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole
human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe:
because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that
is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything
of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the
salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious
conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," according
to Isa. 9:6.

Reply Obj. 2: God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God
in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that
nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the
Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it
with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and
of glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of
an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are
found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But
as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore
did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely
speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as
the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick
servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.

Reply Obj. 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in
various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the
active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the
contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious
of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently
desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves
more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it
does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.

Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore
was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care
of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was
loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his
care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more
with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved
more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter
is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and
fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain
marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others,
on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved
Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more,
from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the
better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better,
and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass
judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the
weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2).

Reply Obj. 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding
and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better
and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal,
innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to
rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often
penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence
Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and
bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has
never done a brave deed."

Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are
more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as
conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a
hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a
king.

Reply Obj. 5: Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things,
the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according
to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness.
According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the
divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is
better; although according to some other time he is the worse;
because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.
_______________________

QUESTION 21

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (In Four Articles)

After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and
mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is justice in God?

(2) Whether His justice can be called truth?

(3) Whether there is mercy in God?

(4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Justice in God?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is
divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God:
neither therefore does justice.

Obj. 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does
not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh
all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).
Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.

Obj. 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But
God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.

Obj. 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice
cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards
the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to
God.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 10:8): "The Lord is just, and hath
loved justice."

_I answer that,_ There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in
mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds
of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls
commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of
business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says:
"Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Rom.
11:35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive
justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank
deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any
kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the
order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in
effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in
seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the
condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and
with the powers that properly belong to it."

Reply Obj. 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the
passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and
daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only
metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (Q. 20,
A. 1), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which
is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those
virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with
works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and
magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in
the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these
virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as
are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,
8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of
the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His
wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in
accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does
according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do
according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power,
God is a law unto Himself.

Reply Obj. 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is
directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the
servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause.
In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or
necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order
has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is
directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to
substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby
all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations
debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to
creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God
that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom
require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's
justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself
what is due to Himself. It is also due to a created thing that it
should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have
hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God
exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by
its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the
former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it
according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays
each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not
directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice,
therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment
of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on
either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): "When Thou dost punish the
wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou
dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."

Reply Obj. 4: Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its
being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of
a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always
regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to
act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason
it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the
general to the special.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 2]

Whether the Justice of God Is Truth?

Objection 1: It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For
justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13),
it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect,
as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore
justice does not appertain to truth.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not
appertain to the idea of justice.

_On the contrary,_ it is said (Ps. 84:11): "Mercy and truth have met
each other": where truth stands for justice.

_I answer that,_ Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as
said above (Q. 16, A. 1). Now the mind, that is the cause of the
thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse
is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things.
When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth
consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in
ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our
words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or
measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the
mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in
accordance with his art.

Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice
related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice,
which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His
wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth.
Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.

Reply Obj. 1: Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the
reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are
governed according to the law, it resides in the will.

Reply Obj. 2: The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this
passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed
such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign
with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its
cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 3]

Whether Mercy Can Be Attributed to God?

Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For
mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14).
But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.

Obj. 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot
remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13):
"If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself."
But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His
words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.

_On the contrary,_ it is said (Ps. 110:4): "He is a merciful and
gracious Lord."

_I answer that,_ Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen
in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which
it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful
[misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum
cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though
it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the
misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of
mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to
God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery,
whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not
removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the
primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). It
must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains
not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality,
and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of
perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown
above (Q. 6, AA. 1, 4); in so far as perfections are given to things
in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been
already said (A. 1); in so far as God does not bestow them for His
own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to
liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God expel
defects, it belongs to mercy.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an
affection of passion.

Reply Obj. 2: God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His
justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who
pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one
hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or
mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence
committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a
gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
another, as Christ has forgiven you" (Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear
that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness
thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgement"
(James 2:13).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 4]

Whether in Every Work of God There Are Mercy and Justice?

Objection 1: It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and
justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the
justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation
of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that
hath not done mercy" (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work of God
do mercy and justice appear.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to
justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rom. 15).
Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.

Obj. 3: Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which
is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.

Obj. 4: Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of
mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose
something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing.
Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 24:10): "All the ways of the Lord
are mercy and truth."

_I answer that,_ Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's
works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect.
Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only
defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is
opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because
since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to
God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking
in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord
with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have
said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him
in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion
wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all
God's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the
work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to
creatures, except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown.
Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of
something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we
must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine
will--which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to
possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his
rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is
on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at
its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the
power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as
the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second
causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness
bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is
proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for
preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers;
because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no
proportion.

Reply Obj. 1: Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain
others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in
others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen,
which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in
punishing short of what is deserved.

In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits
sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that
love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she
hath loved much" (Luke 7:47).

Reply Obj. 2: God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion
of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in
the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the
Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises
made to the fathers.

Reply Obj. 3: Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just
in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in
them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God.
As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us
in this world force us to go to God."

Reply Obj. 4: Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe;
yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way
too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production
of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and
goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of
creatures from non-existence to existence.
_______________________

QUESTION 22

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD
(In Four Articles)

Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must
now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect
and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things;
predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these
acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation.
For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves,
comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem
to belong. Concerning God's providence there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?

(2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?

(3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all
things?

(4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things
foreseen?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 1]

Whether Providence Can Suitably Be Attributed to God?

Objection 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For
providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of
prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi, 5, 9, 18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never
has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence
cannot belong to God.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is
not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that
are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29).
Therefore there is no providence in God.

Obj. 3: Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence
seems to be something composite, because it includes both the
intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, Father,
governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O
Father, governeth it.']."

_I answer that,_ It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For
all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as
was shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). In created things good is found not
only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order
towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said
above, is the divine goodness (Q. 21, A. 4). This good of order
existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however,
God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves
that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear
from what has gone before (Q. 19, A. 4), it is necessary that the
type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the
divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is,
properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence,
to which two other parts are directed--namely, remembrance of the
past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the
remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present,
we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things
towards an end whether in regard to oneself--as for instance, a man
is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of
life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city or
kingdom; in which sense it is said (Matt. 24:45), "a faithful and wise
servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way
prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God
Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the
last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in
God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that
"Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler;
which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to
the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the
order of parts in the whole.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9, 10),
"Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has
rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. I-II, Q. 57,
A. 6]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from
the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful,
nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards
an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God,
according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass
away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God.
Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of
things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any
inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to
which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who
worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).

Reply Obj. 2: Two things pertain to the care of providence--namely,
the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition;
and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the
first is eternal, and the second is temporal.

Reply Obj. 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes
the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done
for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the
moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed
towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do
with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the
divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one
and the same thing, as we have said above (Q. 19).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 2]

Whether Everything Is Subject to the Providence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine
providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then
everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And
thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.

Obj. 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far
as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils
existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not
omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require
providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
vi, 5, 9, 10, 11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent
concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many
things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to
providence.

Obj. 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to
the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God
in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and
left him in the hand of his own counsel" (Ecclus. 15:14). And
particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to
the desires of their heart" (Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore,
cannot be subject to divine providence.

Obj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God doth not care
for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the
same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under
the care of divine providence.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from
end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).

_I answer that,_ Certain persons totally denied the existence of
providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the
world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things
only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their
individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this
respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job
22:14): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our
things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses,
however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on
account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in
reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the
opinion of the others.

We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine
providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual
selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an
end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the
causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the
effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference
towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than,
and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who
is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent
principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles;
not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible.
Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily
directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things
that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg. 'Those powers that are, are
ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas
often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt,
ordinata sunt.']" (Rom. 13:1). Since, therefore, as the providence of
God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an
end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things,
inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject
to divine providence. It has also been shown (Q. 14, AA. 6, 11) that
God knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His
knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge
of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under
His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the
ordering of that art.

Reply Obj. 1: There is a difference between universal and particular
causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not
the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a
particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of
some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented
from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular
causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that
any effect should take place outside the range of that universal
cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular
cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that
cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no
effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the
meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance
circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has
purposely sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the
one knows not about the other.

Reply Obj. 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular
thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular
provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far
as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little
defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered.
Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be
contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields
to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the
corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it
is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides
universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit
certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the
universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much
good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live,
if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience
of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine
says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to
exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to
produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account
of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were
persuaded to consider corruptible things--e.g. casual and evil
things--as removed from the care of divine providence.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural
things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human
providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from
necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the
author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those
who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence,
attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
others of the ancients.

Reply Obj. 4: When it is said that God left man to himself, this does
not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that
he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one
effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon
as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of
themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like
rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which
these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is
significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since the
very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily
follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must
be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included
under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause.
God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more
excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything
happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that
love God, all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). But from
the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin,
He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His
providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they
were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the
reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of
divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.

Reply Obj. 5: Since a rational creature has, through its free will,
control over its actions, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 10), it is
subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something
is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it
accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way,
the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that
individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence;
as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 3]

Whether God Has Immediate Providence Over Everything?

Objection 1: It seems that God has not immediate providence over all
things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be
attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he
should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his
subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence
over all things.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an
end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it
appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore
every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If
therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all
secondary causes would be withdrawn.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better
to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile
things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But
whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not
immediate providence over bad and vile things.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Job 34:13): "What other hath He
appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He
made?" On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He
ruleth the world which He Himself hath made."

_I answer that,_ Two things belong to providence--namely, the type of
the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of
this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these,
God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His
intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever
causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to
produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the
type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain
intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs things inferior by
superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of
the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is
imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by
Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a
threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity,
Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus
over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes.
The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can
be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who
circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which
move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence,
over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic
philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De
Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).

Reply Obj. 1: It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who
execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of
those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in
himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it
considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.

Reply Obj. 2: God's immediate provision over everything does not
exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of
His order, as was said above (Q. 19, AA. 5, 8).

Reply Obj. 3: It is better for us not to know low and vile things,
because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and
higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because
the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This
does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one
glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 4]

Whether Providence Imposes Any Necessity on Things Foreseen?

Objection 1: It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon
things foreseen. For every effect that has a _per se_ cause, either
present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity;
as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God,
since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of
necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore
divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.

Obj. 2: Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he
can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He
assigns the stability of necessity to things provided.

Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the
immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes
by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that
providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt
nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some
things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose
any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.

_I answer that,_ Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things;
not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs
to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which
is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things
themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were
not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine
providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared
for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity;
for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency,
according to the nature of their proximate causes.

Reply Obj. 1: The effect of divine providence is not only that
things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by
necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence
ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and
of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of
divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.

Reply Obj. 2: The order of divine providence is unchangeable and
certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been
foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.

Reply Obj. 3: That indissolubility and unchangeableness of
which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which
fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but
they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember
that properly speaking "necessary" and "contingent" are consequent
upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of
contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally
for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for
some particular order of things.
_______________________

QUESTION 23

OF PREDESTINATION
(In Eight Articles)

After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of
predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there
are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?

(2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the
predestined?

(3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?

(4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is
to say, the predestined are chosen?

(5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or
reprobation, or election?

(6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will
infallibly be saved?

(7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?

(8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the
saints?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 1]

Whether Men Are Predestined by God?

Objection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by God, for
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that
God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows
all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit
and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts
by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not
predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done away.

Obj. 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine
providence, as was said above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). But other creatures
are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.

Obj. 3: Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men.
But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there
never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine
says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity
[miserendi]" [*See Q. 22, A. 3]. Therefore men are not predestined.

Obj. 4: Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by
the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1
Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but
the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given
us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since
predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be
made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 8:30): "Whom He predestined,
them He also called."

_I answer that,_ It is fitting that God should predestine men. For
all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Q. 22,
A. 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their
end, as was also said (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). The end towards which
created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all
proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life
eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of
every creature, as shown above (Q. 12, A. 4). The other end, however,
is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can
attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot
attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed
thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards
a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of
eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The
reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of
the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be
providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be
done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done.
Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature
towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to
destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination,
as regards its objects, is a part of providence.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition of
necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined
towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will
malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not
excluded by Him.

Reply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which
exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly
said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in
respect of any other end.

Reply Obj. 3: Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to
men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not
take its species from the term _wherefrom_ but from the term
_whereto._ Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of
making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow
or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of
predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the
state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring
of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown
previously (Q. 21, AA. 3, 4).

Reply Obj. 4: Even if by a special privilege their predestination
were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed
to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would
despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 2]

Whether Predestination Places Anything in the Predestined?

Objection 1: It seems that predestination does place something in the
predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore
predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the
predestined.

Obj. 2: Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined,"
etc. (Rom. 1:4): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination,
of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is
predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore
predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places
something in the predestined.

Obj. 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But
predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine
says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something
in the predestined.

Obj. 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of
eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the
definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation
of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore
predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is
in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that
"predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But
foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who
foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who
predestines, and not in the predestined.

_I answer that,_ Predestination is not anything in the predestined;
but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that
predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not
anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the
provider, as was proved above (Q. 22, A. 1). But the execution of
providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the
thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is
clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some
persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The
execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the
predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is
the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:30):
"Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He
also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."

Reply Obj. 1: Actions passing out to external matter imply of
themselves passion--for example, the actions of warming and cutting;
but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and
willing, as said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 18, A. 3, ad 1).
Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does
not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes
out to external things, has an effect in them.

Reply Obj. 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone
to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone
actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a
mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we
are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In
this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any
unlawful things for the love of life" (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus
destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination,
however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be
attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever
way destination is accepted.

Reply Obj. 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to
passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to
action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is
predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare
itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to
be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination,
conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.

Reply Obj. 4: Grace does not come into the definition of
predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch
as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect,
and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that
predestination is anything temporal.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 3]

Whether God Reprobates Any Man?

Objection 1: It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody
reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wis.
11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the
things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.

Obj. 2: Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for
reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as
predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the
cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will
likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false.
For it is said (Osee 13:9): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy
help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate any man.

Obj. 3: Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot
avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is
said (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can
correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to
any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not
reprobate anyone.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Malachi 1:2,3): "I have loved Jacob, but
have hated Esau."

_I answer that,_ God does reprobate some. For it was said above (A.
1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence,
however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which
are subject to providence, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2). Thus, as
men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it
likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from
that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a
part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation,
so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn
aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only
foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was
said above (Q. 22, A. 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the
will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will
to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of
damnation on account of that sin.

Reply Obj. 1: God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He
wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them
all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular
good--namely, eternal life--He is said to hate or reprobated them.

Reply Obj. 2: Reprobation differs in its causality from
predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in
the future life by the predestined--namely, glory--and of what is
received in this life--namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not
the cause of what is in the present--namely, sin; but it is the cause
of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned
in the future--namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from
the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace.
In this way, the word of the prophet is true--namely, "Destruction is
thy own, O Israel."

Reply Obj. 3: Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the
power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the
reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as
implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility:
as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), that the predestined must
necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do
away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated
by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or
that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is
rightly imputed to him as guilt.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 4]

Whether the Predestined Are Chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]

Objection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his
rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the
goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through
a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any
selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to
predestination.

Obj. 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination
from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore,
some are predestined without election.

Obj. 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills
all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination which
ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Eph. 1:4): "He chose us in Him before
the foundation of the world."

_I answer that,_ Predestination presupposes election in the order of
reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that
predestination, as stated above (A. 1), is a part of providence. Now
providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect
directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved
above (Q. 22, A. 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless
the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of
some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that
God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and
love:--love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of
eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated
above (Q. 20, AA. 2 ,3):--election, inasmuch as He wills this good to
some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated
above (A. 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in
God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not
cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already
exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in
us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will,
by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that
good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that
love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes
predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election
and love.

Reply Obj. 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general
be considered, God communicates His goodness without election;
inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His
goodness, as we said above (Q. 6, A. 4). But if we consider the
communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it
without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He
does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory
election is implied.

Reply Obj. 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make
a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the
choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens
in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Q. 20, A.
2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are
chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."

Reply Obj. 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will,
which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent
will, which is to will simply.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 5]

Whether the Foreknowledge of Merits Is the Cause of Predestination?

Objection 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of
predestination. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew,
He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 9:15: "I will
have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to
him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore
it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.

Obj. 2: Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will,
which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the
purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17).
But there can be no other reason for predestination than the
foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of
predestination.

Obj. 3: Further, "There is no injustice in God" (Rom. 9:14). Now
it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all
men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality
in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore
God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and
reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and
demerits.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): "Not by works of
justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us."
But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved.
Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of
predestination.

_I answer that,_ Since predestination includes will, as was said
above (A. 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the
same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above
(Q. 19, A. 5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on
the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part
of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of
something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that
merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the
predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the
effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same
thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of
predestination to anyone on account of any merits.

Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of
predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing
merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought
that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to
the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them
in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts
this opinion where he says (Rom. 9:11,12): "For when they were not
yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of
Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the
younger."

Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and
cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that
the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from
God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was
granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning
by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the
saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to
think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of
action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it
cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the
effect of predestination.

And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination
are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God
gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because
He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a
king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make
good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between
that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as
if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that
what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be
considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in
the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the
reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of
predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from
free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction
between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For
the providence of God produces effects through the operation of
secondary causes, as was above shown (Q. 22, A. 3). Wherefore,
that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must
say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in
a twofold light--in one way, in particular; and thus there is no
reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or
cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous
effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason
of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the
disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to
give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace
to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be
considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the
effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming
from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation,
is all included under the effect of predestination; even the
preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by
divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): "convert
us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination
has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its
reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed
as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving
principle.

Reply Obj. 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of
conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was
explained above.

Reply Obj. 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of
God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular
effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already
stated.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and
reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus
He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the
divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary
that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be
manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in
themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for
the completion of the universe there are required different grades of
being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe.
That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God
allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was
said above (Q. 22, A. 2). Let us then consider the whole of the
human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest
His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means
of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he
reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the
reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle
refers, saying (Rom. 9:22, 23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath
[that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known,
endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath,
fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on
the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Tim.
2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and
silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor,
but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and
reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence
Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another
He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus
too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary
matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God
from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of
earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature.
Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form,
and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from
the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part
of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some
stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on
this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares
unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary
to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted
as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given
gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases
(provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of
justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is
thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?"
(Matt. 20:14,15).
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 6]

Whether Predestination Is Certain?

Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because
on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy
crown," (Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another
will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown
which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost.
Therefore predestination cannot be certain.

Obj. 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible
follows. But it is possible that one predestined--e.g. Peter--may
sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that
the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not
impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do
now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined.
Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore
predestination is not certain.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also
predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and
preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will
most certainly be freed."

_I answer that,_ Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes
effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its
effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above (A.
1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things
subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from
contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which
divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of
providence is infallible, as was shown above (Q. 22, A. 4). So also
the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not
destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency.
Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will
(Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 19, A. 4) must also be taken into consideration;
since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they
themselves are most certain and infallible.

Reply Obj. 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in two
ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his
crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a
certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal
sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he
takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall,
without raising others; according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in
pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their
stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels;
and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for
another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen
in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has
done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by
himself or by others.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it is possible for one who is predestinated
considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible,
supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence
it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.

Reply Obj. 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as stated
above (A. 4): and the fact that God wills any created thing is
necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the
immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so
the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to
say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has
predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely
speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty
of predestination is not destroyed.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 7]

Whether the Number of the Predestined Is Certain?

Objection 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not
certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain.
But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it
seems; for it is written (Deut. 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number
many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who
belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not
certain.

Obj. 2: Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to
salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged
by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained
by God cannot be certain.

Obj. 3: Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of
nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of
things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the
saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more
saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Matt. 7:13,14: "For
wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and
many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait
is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!"
Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not
certain.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number
of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor
diminished."

_I answer that,_ The number of the predestined is certain. Some have
said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were
to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be
saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the
certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above (A. 6).
Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is
certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be
observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to
God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows
how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain
and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His
deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which
we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as
is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite
(Q. 7, AA. 2 ,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in
his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts,
which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the
whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but
only on account of something else, he does not select any definite
number _per se_; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are
necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder
thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite
number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite
measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a
definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are
sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we
consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His
effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the
universe, and what number would befit the essential parts of that
universe--that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in
perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and
how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are
not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a
secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved
through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of
individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not
pre-ordained by God _per se_; but divine providence produces just so
many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all
creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of
the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who
attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the
ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God;
not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal
pre-ordination.

It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the
reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of
the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rom.
8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so
many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were
angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God.
It is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number
for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of
the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"

Reply Obj. 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to
those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present
righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not
the number of the predestined.

Reply Obj. 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must be
judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the
reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things,
or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the
principal parts to the good of the whole universe.

Reply Obj. 3: The good that is proportionate to the common state of
nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the
minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be
found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is
clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the
guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to
be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound
knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect
to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision
of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far
as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin,
those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however,
appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation,
from which very many in accordance with the common course and
tendency of nature fall short.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 8]

Whether Predestination Can Be Furthered by the Prayers of the Saints?

Objection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the
prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything
temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making
something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore,
since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as
to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not
furthered by the prayers of the saints.

Obj. 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of
defective knowledge, so there is no need of help except through
defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when
He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the
Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath
been His counsellor?" (Rom. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot
be furthered by the prayers of the saints.

Obj. 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered.
But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it
cannot be furthered by anything.

_On the contrary,_ It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his
wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to
conceive" (Gen. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and
he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if
he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by
the prayers of the saints.

_I answer that,_ Concerning this question, there were different
errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said
that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain
salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the
predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal
salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy
Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.

Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through
prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who
thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be
frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the
authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel
will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Kings 15:29);
and that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance"
(Rom. 11:29).

Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are
to be considered--namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As
regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered
by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that
anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is
said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good
works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not
do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order
of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural
effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are
directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those
effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined
by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards
salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's
own prayers or those of another; or other good works, and such like,
without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the
predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through
these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this
reason it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure
your calling and election" (2 Pet. 1:10).

Reply Obj. 1: This argument shows that predestination is not
furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.

Reply Obj. 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one
way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus
belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are
to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another
way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out
his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by
us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We
are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the
power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order
that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also
that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.

Reply Obj. 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first
universal cause, as has been said above (Q. 19, A. 6), indeed, they
execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by
creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.
_______________________

QUESTION 24

THE BOOK OF LIFE
(In Three Articles)

We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three
points of inquiry:

(1) What is the book of life?

(2) Of what life is it the book?

(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, Art. 1]

Whether the Book of Life Is the Same As Predestination?

Objection 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as
predestination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
(Ecclus. 4:32)--i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss.
This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is
not predestination.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book
of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each
one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy
belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power.
Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.

Obj. 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the
book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a
book of death, as there is a book of life.

_On the contrary,_ It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, "Let them be
blotted out of the book of the living," "This book is the knowledge
of God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew."

_I answer that,_ The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical
sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual
among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed
in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly
were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding
(Q. 23, A. 4) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess
eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined is
called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written
upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory,
according to Prov. 3:3: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My
commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy
heart." For things are written down in material books to help the
memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers
that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of
life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done,
so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be
brought to eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: "The sure
foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth
who are His."

Reply Obj. 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses. In
one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we
now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of
those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life;
and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus
the Old and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things
already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to
each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the
book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether
it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service;
or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.

Hence the solution of the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are
rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death
corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.

Reply Obj. 4: Predestination and the book of life are different
aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of
predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, Art. 2]

Whether the Book of Life Regards Only the Life of Glory of the
Predestined?

Objection 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard
the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the
knowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other
life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine
life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.

Obj. 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does
the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory
is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life
of nature be so called.

Obj. 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not
chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have
not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (John 6:71). But
the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated
above (A. 1). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.

_On the contrary,_ The book of life is the knowledge of
predestination, as stated above (ibid.). But predestination does not
regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory;
for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain
glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the
life of glory.

_I answer that,_ The book of life, as stated above (A. 1), implies a
conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is
chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and
again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a
soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to
fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is
directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as
said above (Q. 23, A. 1). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of
life regards the life of glory.

Reply Obj. 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is
natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in
consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen
to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are
consequent on nature.

From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is
no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of
something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen
to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed
to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain
glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise
they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but
relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life,
according to their participation in grace.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, Art. 3]

Whether Anyone May Be Blotted Out of the Book of Life?

Objection 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of
life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge,
which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be
taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.
Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the
disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal
and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not
in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.

Obj. 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But
nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither
therefore can he be blotted out.

_On the contrary,_ It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book
of the living" (Ps. 68:29).

_I answer that,_ Some have said that none could be blotted out of the
book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For
it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when
it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of
life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of
the present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes
evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen
from that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted
out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out
of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the
book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the
text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white
garments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life" (Apoc.
3:5) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the
opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and
not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the
opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life
is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is
directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which
direction never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this
very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails
sometimes; because some are directed by possessing grace, to obtain
eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore
those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine
predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because
they are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are
never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are
ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but
through grace, are said to be written in the book of life not simply,
but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life
in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said
to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be
referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it
not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first
ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls
from grace.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of
life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any
change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.

Reply Obj. 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves
they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of
the book of life refers.

Reply Obj. 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the
book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew;
either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have
relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included
in the knowledge of God, although not anew.
_______________________

QUESTION 25

THE POWER OF GOD
(In Six Articles)

After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things
pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God.
About this are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is power in God?

(2) Whether His power is infinite?

(3) Whether He is almighty?

(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?

(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?

(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Power in God?

Objection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter
is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary
matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the
first agent--namely, God--is devoid of power.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19),
better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter;
and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is
better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as
was shown above (Q. 3, A. 3). Therefore, there is no power in
God.

Obj. 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine
power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and
of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no
power in God.

Obj. 4: Further, it was shown above (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4) that
God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and
principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to
assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.

_On the contrary,_ It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth
is round about Thee" (Ps. 88:9).

_I answer that,_ Power is twofold--namely, passive, which exists not
at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act
and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas
everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now
it was shown above (Q. 3, A. 2; Q. 4, AA. 1, 2), that God is pure
act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection
find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active
principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand,
the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For
active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas
passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else,
as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that
in God there is active power in the highest degree.

Reply Obj. 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded
upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive
power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is
potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active
power.

Reply Obj. 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler
than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for both
are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His
essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in
God nobler than His power.

Reply Obj. 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of
action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is
retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however,
as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence
itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding,
inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all
perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either
under the notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is
understood under the notion of _suppositum_ possessing nature, and
under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in
God in so far as it is the principle of an effect.

Reply Obj. 4: Power is predicated of God not as something really
distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them
logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting
into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,
which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the
knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle,
has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of
the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His
power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 2]

Whether the Power of God Is Infinite?

Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For
everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher
(Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore
it is not infinite.

Obj. 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise
it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it
could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the
power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause
instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous
movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal
creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20, 22,
23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is
immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is
immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), active power exists in God
according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is
infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it,
as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of
the divine essence (Q. 7, A. 1). Wherefore, it is necessary that
the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it
found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts
the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite
power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the
divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown
above (Q. 7, A. 1) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in
regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs
to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above
(Q. 7, A. 1); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow,
therefore, that it is imperfect.

Reply Obj. 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in
its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to
do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does
not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for
example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the
production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear
that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either
in species or in genus, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 5; Q. 4, A. 3).
Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It
is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be
manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were
to produce no effect, the power of God would not be ineffectual;
because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to
which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered toward
its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect
produced by it.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body
had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he
shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it
can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his
reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would
move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover.
The reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal
agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made
known in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving
body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that
if its power were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster,
and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is
not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of
its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time;
and especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of
its will.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 3]

Whether God Is Omnipotent?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and
passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God,
for He is immovable, as was said above (Q. 2, A. 3). Therefore He
is not omnipotent.

Obj. 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin,
nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is
not omnipotent.

Obj. 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence
"especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after
Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power
is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however,
than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world,
and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

Obj. 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of
this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of
this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those
things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it
would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges
them; but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were
omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore
impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also
the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to
exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in
things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility.
Therefore God is not omnipotent.

_On the contrary,_ It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God"
(Luke 1:37).

_I answer that,_ All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that
God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is
said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v,
17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to
some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be
possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in
which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be
omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to
created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If,
however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all
things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle
in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying
nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He
is able to do.

It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.

It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of
being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of
power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus
of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being.
Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered
among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,
but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is
numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is
called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not
come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have
the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to
the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God."
For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no
intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.

Reply Obj. 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active
power, not to passive power, as was shown above (A. 1). Whence the
fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His
omnipotence.

Reply Obj. 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to
be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is
repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin,
because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says
(Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this
must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is
impossible--as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil
things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional
proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and
consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a
donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God
can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He
did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the
common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like
Jupiter or Mercury.

Reply Obj. 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and
having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has
supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one
who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them
on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate
effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (Q. 21, A.
4), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the
divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of
something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the
divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it
pertains the first foundation of all good things.

Reply Obj. 4: The absolute possible is not so called in reference
either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to
itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible
in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it
belongs to God alone to do immediately--as, for example, to create,
to justify, and the like--are said to be possible in reference to a
higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be
done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those
inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the
proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was
shown above (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the
world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it
judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence
of God does not take away from things their impossibility and
necessity.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 4]

Whether God Can Make the Past Not to Have Been?

Objection 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been.
For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that
which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is
impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the
dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible
accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible
accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally
impossible, from the fact that his running is a thing of the past.
Therefore God can make the past not to have been.

Obj. 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is
not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that
he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that
he did not run.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity.
But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost
virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should
not have been corrupt.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.): "Although God can
do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been
corrupted." Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that
anything else which is past should not have been.

_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 7, A. 2), there does not
fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a
contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a
contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates
is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did
not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the
past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen.
Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the
scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says
(Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him
make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to
say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very
fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived--namely, to make undone
the things that have been done."

Reply Obj. 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not
to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for
instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is
considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not
only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction.
Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which
there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible
in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for
such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power.

Reply Obj. 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine
power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His
power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we
regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do,
He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature
of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short
of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God
said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be
done.

Reply Obj. 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from
a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot
be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having
sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 5]

Whether God Can Do What He Does Not?

Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For
God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would
do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything
except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.

Obj. 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is
right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is
it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do
except what He does.

Obj. 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and
befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting
them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except
what He does.

_On the contrary,_ It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My
Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of
angels?" (Matt. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His
Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He
does not.

_I answer that,_ In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some
laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as
from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually
takes place--as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come,
and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation
there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than
that which now is. But we showed above (Q. 19, A. 3) that God
does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of
all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity
determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present
course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other
things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power
is restricted to this present course of events through the order of
the divine wisdom and justice without which God does nothing. But
since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His
wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the
divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the
divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the
order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion
of His justice consists, as said above (Q. 21, A. 2), is not so
adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be
restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the
whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is
taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things
made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some
definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all
proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so
restricted to any particular order that no other course of events
could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other
things than those He has done.

Reply Obj. 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct
from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will
from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the
just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence,
will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence,
there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His
just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will
cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things,
except upon supposition, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), neither are
the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as
was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the
divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the
order which He has place in things. Again, because power is
considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect
and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered
in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His
absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of
being, as was said above (A. 3). What is, however, attributed to the
divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a
just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In
this manner, we must say that God can do other things by His absolute
power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But
it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not
foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His
actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination,
though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things
because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come
from His will, but from His nature.

Reply Obj. 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is
said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by
this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself,
and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in
two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they
would be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern
His power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense
is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If,
however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the
effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the
present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The
sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything
except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just."

Reply Obj. 3: Although this order of things be restricted to what now
exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence,
although no other order would be suitable and good to the things
which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them
another order.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 6]

Whether God Can Do Better Than What He Does?

Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For
whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a
thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely
done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8):
"If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have
been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better
things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have
been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes
everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better
than He does.

Obj. 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be
bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine
says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and,
taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists
the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the
universe could not be made better by God.

Obj. 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has
the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created
happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be
better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of
angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore
make all things better than He has made them.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Eph. 3:20): "God is able to do all
things more abundantly than we desire or understand."

_I answer that,_ The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of
the essence of it--thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the
essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better
than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it;
even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if
it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For
the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the
manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another
kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus,
the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of
goodness, God can make better the things He has made. Absolutely
speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing
made by Him.

Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that God can make a thing better than
He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is
true. For He can always make something else better than each
individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better
than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If,
however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the
making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it,
because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it
implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better;
because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of
existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the
substance.

Reply Obj. 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to
his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of
anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God.
Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: The universe, the present creation being supposed,
cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to
things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any
one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed;
as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody
of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or
add something to the present creation; and then there would be
another and a better universe.

Reply Obj. 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united
to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the
fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the
mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite
good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything
better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God.
_______________________

QUESTION 26

OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE
(In Four Articles)

After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine
essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this,
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?

(2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act
of intellect?

(3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?

(4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 1]

Whether Beatitude Belongs to God?

Objection 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For
beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made
perfect by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of
goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude
does not belong to God.

Obj. 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply
to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall
show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and
Lord of Lords." (1 Tim. 6:15).

_I answer that,_ Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner.
For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than
the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of
knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to
which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can
control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most
excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess
intelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.

Reply Obj. 1: Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of
composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures
is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (Q. 4, A. 2; Q. 13,
A. 4), in simplicity and unity.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to
be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even
as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so
far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being,
though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by
merit.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 2]

Whether God Is Called Blessed in Respect of His Intellect?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to
His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to
be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to
being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De
Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to
His essence, and not to His intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is
the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is
said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference
to His intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory,
Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be
in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we
enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole
of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem
that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect. it
would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His
intellect.

_I answer that,_ Beatitude, as stated above (A. 1), is the perfect
good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires
the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to
be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is
the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps
everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists
in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the
same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them.
Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His
intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blessed [beati] by
reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not
that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His
essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the
will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power.
Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the
act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of
the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the
intellect.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 3]

Whether God Is the Beatitude of Each of the Blessed?

Objection 1: It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the
blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (Q. 6, AA. 2,
4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme
goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (Q. 11, A. 3).
Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be
the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God
Himself.

Obj. 2: Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational
nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to
God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.

_On the contrary,_ The beatitude of one is greater than that of
another, according to 1 Cor. 15:41: "Star differeth from star in
glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is
something different from God.

_I answer that,_ The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in
an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely,
the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act
itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on
the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is
blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance
with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who
knoweth Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of
understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures;
but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.

Reply Obj. 1: Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good
absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is
their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a
creature can participate.

Reply Obj. 2: End is twofold, namely, _objective_ and _subjective,_
as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing
itself" and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its
acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational
creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as
the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 4]

Whether All Other Beatitude Is Included in the Beatitude of God?

Objection 1: It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all
other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing
false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace
all other beatitudes.

Obj. 2: Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists
in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none
of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His
beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.

_On the contrary,_ Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine
perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above
(Q. 4, A. 2). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other
beatitudes.

_I answer that,_ Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether
true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the
divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a
continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things
else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the
whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight,
riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His
delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency,
which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence;
for dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He
possesses the admiration of all creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it
falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God.
But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the
whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.

Reply Obj. 2: The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal
manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.

We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of
the divine essence.
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ. 27-43)
_______________________

QUESTION 27

THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS
(In Five Articles)

Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it
remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God.
And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other
according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads
us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession;
secondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.

Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is procession in God?

(2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?

(3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides
generation?

(4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?

(5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Procession in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God.
For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing
mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession
in God.

Obj. 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence
it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme
simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.

Obj. 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the
nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as
shown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Therefore in God there is no procession.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (John 8:42).

_I answer that,_ Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which
signify procession. This procession has been differently understood.
Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its
cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father
as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the
Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what
is said of the Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is
true God" (1 John 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you
not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?" (1 Cor.
6:19). Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this
procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it,
or impressing its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood
by Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming
flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost
in sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words
of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, "The
Son cannot of Himself do anything" (John 5:19); while many other
passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the
Son. Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take
procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms
procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession
always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession
corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be
an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the
agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of
which remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by
the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us,
which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing
from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that
object. This conception is signified by the spoken word; and it is
called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice.

As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God,
not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but
from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual
substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short
in the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not
to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local
movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect,
as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot.
Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for
example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet
remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands
procession as existing in God.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection comes from the idea of procession in the
sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, or
to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not exist in
God, as we have explained.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is
necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas,
whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not
necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the
more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is
clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the
intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent;
since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with
the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very
supreme perfection of God (Q. 14, A. 2), the divine Word is of
necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without
any kind of diversity.

Reply Obj. 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be something
outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the
idea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform procession
by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first
principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house,
in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and it
would be included in the idea of the first principle were the builder
the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first principle of
all things, may be compared to things created as the architect is to
things designed.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 2]

Whether Any Procession in God Can Be Called Generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called
generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence,
and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both.
Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist
in God.

Obj. 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an
intelligible mode, as above explained (A. 1). But such a process is
not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called
in God.

Obj. 3: Further, anything that is generated derives existence from
its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But
no derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the
divine existence is self-subsisting (Q. 3, A. 4), it follows that no
generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is
no generation in God.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 2:7): "This day have I begotten
Thee."

_I answer that,_ The procession of the Word in God is called
generation. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a
twofold meaning: one common to everything subject to generation and
corruption; in which sense generation is nothing but change from
non-existence to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs
to living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living
being from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called
birth. Not everything of that kind, however, is called begotten; but,
strictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a
hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship, but only that has
which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice;
for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of
generation and sonship, although it has a generic similitude; for
this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by
way of similitude in the same specific nature; as a man proceeds from
a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed
from potential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation
includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is a being
whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if
found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of
generation; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs
to living things. So in this manner the procession of the Word in God
is generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which
is a vital operation:--from a conjoined principle (as above
described):--by way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the
intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:--and exists in the
same nature, because in God the act of understanding and His
existence are the same, as shown above (Q. 14, A. 4). Hence the
procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word
Himself proceeding is called the Son.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection is based on the idea of generation in
the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to
act; in which sense it is not found in God.

Reply Obj. 2: The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the
substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds
within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the
source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be
properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence
is the very substance itself of the one who understands (Q. 14, A.
4). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same
nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture
employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to
signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and
birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths
were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was
brought forth." (Prov. 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the
word "conception" in order to signify that in the word of our
intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although
there be no identity of nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Not everything derived from another has existence in
another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance
of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could
receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God
receives its existence from the generator, not as though that
existence were received into matter or into a subject (which would
conflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His
existence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine
existence from another; not, however, as if He were other from the
divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the divine existence
are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle
of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection (Q. 4, A. 2).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 3]

Whether Any Other Procession Exists in God Besides That of the Word?

Objection 1: It would seem that no other procession exists in God
besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we
admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and
so on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the
first, and hold that there exists only one procession in God.

Obj. 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of
self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity
from their terms. But procession in God is only by way of
communication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one
divine nature (Q. 11, A. 4), it follows that only one procession
exists in God.

Obj. 3: Further, if any other procession but the intelligible
procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the
procession of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a
procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the
intellect, inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect
(Q. 19, A. 1). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the
procession of the Word.

_On the contrary,_ The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (John
15:26); and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I
will ask My Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" (John
14:16). Therefore in God another procession exists besides the
procession of the Word.

_I answer that,_ There are two processions in God; the procession of the
Word, and another.

In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God,
only according to an action which does not tend to anything external,
but remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual
nature is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of
the Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the
will within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love,
whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the
word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent.
Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him
another procession called the procession of love.

Reply Obj. 1: There is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine
processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the
agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the
will.

Reply Obj. 2: All that exists in God, is God (Q. 3, AA. 3, 4);
whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine
nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward, and
this does not apply to other natures.

Reply Obj. 3: Though will and intellect are not diverse in God,
nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the
processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order.
For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the
procession of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless
it is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order
of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the
substance of the intellect and its concept are the same; so, although
in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as
love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the
concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the
procession of love and the procession of the Word in God.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 4]

Whether the Procession of Love in God Is Generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is
generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among
living things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in
God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it
would be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external
procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds
as generated and born.

Obj. 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does
it belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves its
like" (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by
way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of
generation.

Obj. 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So
if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some
special name besides this common name of procession. But no other
name is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love
in God is generation.

_On the contrary,_ Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost
Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the
statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the
Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding."

_I answer that,_ The procession of love in God ought not to be called
generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect
and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual
by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the
intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of
the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination
to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of
similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets
its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of
similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an
object.

So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten,
or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a
certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described
as moved or impelled by love to perform an action.

Reply Obj. 1: All that exists in God is one with the divine nature.
Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one
procession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of
this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must be
taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is
derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each
procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and
intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really
is; and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives the
divine nature, but is not said to be born.

Reply Obj. 2: Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to
love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object
understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator;
but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness,
but because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not
follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the
principle of love.

Reply Obj. 3: We can name God only from creatures (Q. 13, A. 1). As
in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of
nature, procession in God has no proper or special name, except that
of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has
remained without a special name; but it can be called spiration, as
it is the procession of the Spirit.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 5]

Whether There Are More Than Two Processions in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions
in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power.
Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will,
it seems that there must also be a third procession of power.

Obj. 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of
procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there
must be a procession of goodness in God.

Obj. 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than
in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but
there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also
from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more
than two processions.

_On the contrary,_ In God there are not more than two who
proceed--the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him
but two processions.

_I answer that,_ The divine processions can be derived only from
the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is
intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the
acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also
appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the
intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from
the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected
by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no
other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word,
and of Love.

Reply Obj. 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on
another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the
divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but
is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to
the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the
object of the will.

Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain
actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to
goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love,
according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and
goodness.

Reply Obj. 3: As above explained (Q. 14, A. 5; Q. 19, A. 5), God
understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He
wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of
Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one
perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His
perfect fecundity.
_______________________

QUESTION 28

THE DIVINE RELATIONS
(In Four Articles)

The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether there are real relations in God?

(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are
extrinsic to it?

(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from
each other?

(4) The number of these relations.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 1]

Whether There Are Real Relations in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God.
For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as
regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be
predicated relatively." But whatever really exists in God can be
predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in the
Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is
the relation of the same to the same." But a relation of this kind is
only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in
reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real
relations, but are formed only by the mind.

Obj. 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a
principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not
import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity
in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same
reason to the other relations in God.

Obj. 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an
intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of
the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and
filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical
relations.

_On the contrary,_ The Father is denominated only from paternity;
and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or
filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really
Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is
the Sabellian heresy.

_I answer that,_ relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we
may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only
in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any
other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in
their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a
subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what
refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the
nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature
are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such
relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found
an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the
heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same
applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another,
signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of
reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation
only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the
species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of
the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of
procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real
relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in
the identity of the same nature, as above explained (Q. 27, AA. 2,
4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are
necessarily real relations.

Reply Obj. 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according to its
proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper
meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but
only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not
wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was
not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in
Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of
relation to another.

Reply Obj. 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is a
logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing;
because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by
reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some
two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are
called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically.
Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity,
not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance
is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation
of identity.

Reply Obj. 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of
nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any
relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not
produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect
and will, as is above explained (Q. 14, AA. 3, 4; Q. 19, A. 8).
Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas
in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are
contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails
dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in
one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.

Reply Obj. 4: Relations which result from the mental operation alone
in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as
reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the
mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the
intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding
and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only,
but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are
real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them
intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds
from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations
in God.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 2]

Whether Relation in God Is the Same As His Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as
the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that
is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things
relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not
refer to the substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine
essence.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every relative
expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is
a man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in God,
there must be something else besides relation in God. This can only
be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.

Obj. 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to
another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the
divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially
itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the
perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and
self-subsisting (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore relation is not the divine
essence.

_On the contrary,_ Everything which is not the divine essence is a
creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the
divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of
latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the
distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty."

_I answer that,_ It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on
this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims.
For he said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally
affixed.

To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of
the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is
the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident;
which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for
the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is
the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart
from that of _relation,_ as in quantity and quality, even the true
idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for
quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the
disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken
from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to
something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations
formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and
not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect
which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something
else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in
a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree
considered relation in the former mode only.

Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered
as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no
accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as
relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really
existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way
distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to
something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to
its opposite term.

Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the
same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility;
as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not
expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God
relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and
the same.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or
any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same
as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode
of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a
relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since
other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken,
both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that
exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of
whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by
reason of God's supreme simplicity.

Reply Obj. 2: As the relation which exists in creatures involves not
only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same
applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the
creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of
relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God
there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is
not perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were
comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above
explained (Q. 13, A. 2), in treating of the divine names, that more
is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be
signified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in
God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various
names imposed by us.

Reply Obj. 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is
signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect,
being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing
more were contained in it than what is signified by the word
"wisdom," it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the
perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included in
any name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other name
applied to God signify something imperfect, that the divine essence
is in any way imperfect; for the divine essence comprehends within
itself the perfection of every genus (Q. 4, A. 2).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 3]

Whether the Relations in God Are Really Distinguished from Each Other?

Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really
distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with
the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God
is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are
not really distinguished from each other.

Obj. 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished
from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this
kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine
goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real
distinction of paternity and filiation.

Obj. 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of
origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another.
Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance
contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore,
if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there
would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is
the error of Sabellius.

_I answer that,_ The attributing of anything to another involves the
attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is
attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him.
The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to
another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in
God there is a real relation (A. 1), there must also be a real
opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes
distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not,
indeed, according to that which is absolute--namely, essence, wherein
there is supreme unity and simplicity--but according to that which is
relative.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument
holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are
identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as,
for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ
logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is
the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow
that action and passion are the same; because action implies
reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing
moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is
from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is
really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in
their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence
they are distinguished from each other.

Reply Obj. 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition in
their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.

Reply Obj. 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or
proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed
according to the procession of one from another.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 3]

Whether in God There Are Only Four Real Relations--Paternity,
Filiation, Spiration, and Procession?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real
relations--paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it
must be observed that in God there exist the relations of the
intelligent agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to
the object willed; which are real relations not comprised under those
above specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in
God.

Obj. 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming
from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible
relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore
in God there exists an infinite series of real relations.

Obj. 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal (Q. 15, A. 1); and are only
distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things, as
above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal relations.

Obj. 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations:
and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations
are eternal in God than the above named.

Obj. 5: Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are
fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to the
Philosopher (Phys. iii text 24), "It is the same way from Athens to
Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens." By the same way of reasoning there
is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity,
and from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are
not four relations in God.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every
relation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on
action and passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son,
the master and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity
in God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin.
i, 1) it follows that a real relation in God can be based only on
action. Such relations are not based on the actions of God according
to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to
creatures are not real in Him (Q. 13, A. 7). Hence, it follows that
real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those
actions according to which there are internal, and not external,
processions in God. These processions are two only, as above
explained (Q. 27, A. 5), one derived from the action of the
intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action
of the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these
processions two opposite relations arise; one of which is the
relation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is
the relation of the principle Himself. The procession of the Word is
called generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is
applied to living things. Now the relation of the principle of
generation in perfect living beings is called paternity; and the
relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called
filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own
(Q. 27, A. 4); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper
name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession
is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is
called procession: although these two names belong to the processions
or origins themselves, and not to the relations.

Reply Obj. 1: In those things in which there is a difference between
the intellect and its object, and the will and its object, there can
be a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the willer
to the object willed. In God, however, the intellect and its object
are one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God
understands all other things; and the same applies to His will and
the object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds of
relations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to
itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real relation;
because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible
action; and not as a thing understood. For when we understand a
stone; that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood,
is called the word.

Reply Obj. 2: Intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely
multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act, and by
another act understands that he understands the stone, and again by
another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of
understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the
relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He
understands all things by one act alone.

Reply Obj. 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it
does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in
God; but that God knows these many relations.

Reply Obj. 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real relations;
but are only logical relations (Q. 42, A. 3, ad 4).

Reply Obj. 5: The way from one term to another and conversely is the
same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we
cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the
same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of
something absolute, if there were such between them.
_______________________

QUESTION 29

THE DIVINE PERSONS
(In Four Articles)

Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the
processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the
persons.

First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then
comparatively as regards each other. We must consider the persons
absolutely first in common; and then singly.

The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four
points:

(1) The signification of this word "person";

(2) the number of the persons;

(3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto;
as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and

(4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons.

Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:

(1) The definition of "person."

(2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.

(3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?

(4) What does it signify in Him?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 1]

The Definition of "Person"

Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by
Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient--that is, "a person is an
individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can
be subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular.
Therefore person is improperly defined.

Obj. 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of
person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the
former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance
is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word
"individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since
second substances are the genera or species. Therefore this
definition is incorrect.

Obj. 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the
definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal"
would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing,
and species is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is
the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational
nature), the word "individual" which is an intentional name comes
improperly into the definition.

Obj. 4: Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in
those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as
Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as
in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to
enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be
"essence."

Obj. 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of
the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not
properly defined as above.

_I answer that,_ Although the universal and particular exist in every
genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs
to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself;
whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the
substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because
it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the
individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their
own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.

Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and
the individual are found in the rational substances which have
dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act,
like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to
singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have
a special name even among other substances; and this name is "person."

Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of
person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the
term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in
rational substances.

Reply Obj. 1: Although this or that singular may not be definable,
yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined;
and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a
definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines
person.

Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some, the term "substance" in the
definition of person stands for first substance, which is the
hypostasis; nor is the term "individual" superfluously added,
forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of
universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in
general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a
part. But where "individual" is added, the idea of assumptibility is
excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person,
since it is assumed by a greater--that is, by the Word of God. It is,
however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general
sense, as divided into first and second, and when "individual" is
added, it is restricted to first substance.

Reply Obj. 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at
least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental
differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say
that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are
the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise,
terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if
used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term
"individual" is placed in the definition of person to signify the
mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances.

Reply Obj. 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the word
"nature" was first used to signify the generation of living things,
which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes
from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the
intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines
"nature" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either
formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature.
And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the
essence of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called
nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says
(De Duab. Nat.) that, "nature is the specific difference giving its
form to each thing," for the specific difference completes the
definition, and is derived from the special form of a thing. So in
the definition of "person," which means the singular in a determined
genus, it is more correct to use the term "nature" than "essence,"
because the latter is taken from being, which is most common.

Reply Obj. 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and so,
although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains
its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance,
which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand
nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name
of person belongs to it.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 2]

Whether "Person" Is the Same As Hypostasis, Subsistence, and Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that "person" is the same as "hypostasis,"
"subsistence," and "essence." For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that
"the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by
the name hypostasis." But this with us signifies "person." Therefore
"person" is altogether the same as "hypostasis."

Obj. 2: Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we say
there are three subsistences in God; which implies that "person" and
"subsistence" have the same meaning. Therefore "person" and
"subsistence" mean the same.

Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek _ousia,_
which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and form.
Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual
substance called "hypostasis" and "person." Therefore all the
aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that genera
and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only
subsistent, but also substand. But subsistences are so called from
subsisting, as substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding.
Therefore, since genera and species are not hypostases or persons,
these are not the same as subsistences.

Obj. 5: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that matter is called
hypostasis, and form is called _ousiosis_--that is, subsistence. But
neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person
differs from the others.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance
is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified
by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the
substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the
Greeks _ousia,_ what we may call "essence." In another sense
substance means a subject or _suppositum,_ which subsists in the
genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be
applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called
_suppositum._ It is also called by three names signifying a
reality--that is, "a thing of nature," "subsistence," and
"hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration of the substance
thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is
called "subsistence"; as we say that those things subsist which exist
in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common
nature, it is called "a thing of nature"; as, for instance, this
particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the
accidents, it is called "hypostasis," or "substance." What these
three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this
name "person" signifies in the genus of rational substances.

Reply Obj. 1: Among the Greeks the term "hypostasis," taken in the
strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the
genus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the
individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of
that nature.

Reply Obj. 2: As we say "three persons" plurally in God, and "three
subsistences," so the Greeks say "three hypostases." But because the
word "substance," which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to
"hypostasis," is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it
sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to
avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use
"subsistence" for hypostasis, rather than "substance."

Reply Obj. 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by
the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the
species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed
of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only
the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as
the principles of the species. But what is composed of this matter
and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For soul,
flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this
flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore
hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of
essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed
of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine
simplicity (Q. 3, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch
as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact
that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament
of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves
subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the
species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To
substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation
to the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.

Reply Obj. 5: The individual composed of matter and form substands in
relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius
says (De Trin.): "A simple form cannot be a subject." Its
self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does
not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to
the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account,
therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and _ousiosis,_ or
subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of
substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 3]

Whether the Word "Person" Should Be Said of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be said
of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare to
say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity,
beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles." But the
name "person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament.
Therefore "person" is not to be applied to God.

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person
seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies
and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando],
since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the
mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called _prosopa,_ as they
were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes."
This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense.
Therefore the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically.

Obj. 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word
"hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab.
Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not
exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, "in this word
hypostasis, poison lurks in honey." Therefore the word "person"
should not be said of God.

Obj. 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing
defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as
given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a
discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above
(Q. 14, A. 12); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational
nature." And also because God cannot be called an individual
substance, since the principle of individuation is matter; while God
is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called
a substance. Therefore the word "person" ought not to be attributed
to God.

_On the contrary,_ In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person
of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost."

_I answer that,_ "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all
nature--that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence,
since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch
as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" is
fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures,
but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving
them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when
treating of the names of God (Q. 13, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: Although the word "person" is not found applied to God
in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what
the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of
Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the
most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in
the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one
could speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or
New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to
find new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a
kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for
it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle
warns us to avoid "profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. 6:20).

Reply Obj. 2: Although this name "person" may not belong to God as
regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs
to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented
in comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to signify
those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the
Church came to be called "persons." Thence by some the definition of
person is given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity." And
because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity,
therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a
"person." Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other
dignity; and thus the name "person" pre-eminently belongs to God.

Reply Obj. 3: The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as regards
its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it
applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify
the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this word,"
forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the
heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess
many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the
word "substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is
commonly taken amongst us to mean essence.

Reply Obj. 4: It may be said that God has a rational _nature,_ if
reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general
sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an
"individual" in the sense that His individuality comes from matter;
but only in the sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance"
can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence.
There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius,
quoted above (A. 1), is not a definition of person in the sense we
use when speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor
amends this definition by adding that "Person" in God is "the
incommunicable existence of the divine nature."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 4]

Whether This Word "Person" Signifies Relation?

Objection 1: It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God,
does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin.
vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing
else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to
Himself, and not in regard to the Son."

Obj. 2: Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to essence. But, as
Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness in
heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked,
Three what? the answer is, Three persons." Therefore person signifies
essence.

Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a
word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: "The
individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated.
Therefore "person" signifies substance.

Obj. 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation,
but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation,
it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that
refers to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to
person more strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore
this word "person" signifies relation.

_I answer that,_ A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this
word "person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally
of the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the
essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words
which express relation.

Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses
absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and this word
"Wise"; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by
conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and
especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing
adjective; as when we say, "Three persons," or, "one is the person of
the Father, another of the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular,
it may be either absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a
satisfactory explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its
own signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that
forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from the heretics
being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this,
others maintained that this word "person" in God signifies both the
essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies
directly the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as "person"
means as it were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to
the essence. And what is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for
the Father is understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct
from the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it
signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in
the definition of "person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly;
and these come nearer to the truth.

To determine the question, we must consider that something may be
included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included
in the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of
"man," and not in the meaning of "animal." So that it is one thing to
ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning
when the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the
meaning of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the
meaning of "person" as applied to God. For "person" in general
signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The
individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others.
Therefore "person" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that
nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and
this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which,
though not belonging to "person" in general, nevertheless do belong to
the meaning of a particular human person.

Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above
(Q. 28, AA. 2, 3), while relation in God is not as an accident in
a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent,
for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so
the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person.
Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this
is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a
hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that
which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus
it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly,
and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as
expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly
the essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is
the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed
as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into
the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this
signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it
was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as
any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express
relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word
"person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the
first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.

Reply Obj. 1: This word "person" is said in respect to itself, not to
another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way
of a substance--which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says
that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same
as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are
the same.

Reply Obj. 2: The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature
expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we
answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the
_suppositum,_ as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A
fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.

Reply Obj. 3: In God the individual--i.e. distinct and incommunicable
substance--includes the idea of relation, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 4: The different sense of the less common term does not
produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass
have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally
in animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both.
So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the
signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a
human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though
neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said
univocally of God and creatures (Q. 13, A. 5).
_______________________

QUESTION 30

THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD
(In Four Articles)

We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are several persons in God?

(2) How many are they?

(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?

(4) The community of the term "person."
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 1]

Whether There Are Several Persons in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God.
For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature." If then
there are several persons in God, there must be several substances;
which appears to be heretical.

Obj. 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a
distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less
therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God
there is no plurality but of relations (Q. 28, A. 3). Therefore
there cannot be several persons in God.

Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is
truly one which has no number." But plurality implies number.
Therefore there are not several persons in God.

Obj. 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus,
if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and
part in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.

_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father,
another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost." Therefore the Father,
and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.

_I answer that,_ It follows from what precedes that there are several
persons in God. For it was shown above (Q. 29, A. 4) that this
word "person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine
nature. It was also established (Q. 28, A. 1) that there are
several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are
also several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means
that there are several persons in God.

Reply Obj. 1: The definition of "person" includes "substance," not as
meaning the essence, but the _suppositum_ which is made clear by the
addition of the term "individual." To signify the substance thus
understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis." So, as we say,
"Three persons," they say "Three hypostases." We are not, however,
accustomed to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean
three essences or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification
of the term.

Reply Obj. 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness and
wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they really
distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist,
nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities--that is,
several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not
subsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as
whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties
in God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other (Q. 28,
A. 3). Hence the plurality of persons in God.

Reply Obj. 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every
kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations.
Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations
do not import composition in that of which they are predicated, as
Boethius teaches in the same book.

Reply Obj. 4: Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and three
and four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men and
two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly,
there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him, and
thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding; forasmuch as
number regarded apart from things numbered exists only in the
intellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things numbered, in
that sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of
three, as one man is part of two men, and two of three; but this does
not apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the
whole Trinity, as we shall show further on (Q. 42, AA. 1, 4).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 2]

Whether There Are More Than Three Persons in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in
God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of
the relative properties as stated above (A. 1). But there are four
relations in God as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), paternity, filiation,
common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four persons in
God.

Obj. 2: The nature of God does not differ from His will more than
from His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, as
love; and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another
proceeds from His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds
from His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not
only three persons in God.

Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior
operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond other
animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God
not only is there a person proceeding from the will, and another from
the intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore
there are an infinite number of persons in God.

Obj. 4: Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that
He communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine
person. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore
the Holy Ghost produces a divine person; and that person another; and
so to infinity.

Obj. 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is measured,
for number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense, as we
say in the Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son is
immense, the Holy Ghost is immense." Therefore the persons are not
contained within the number three.

_On the contrary,_ It is said: "There are three who bear witness in
heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" (1 John 5:7). To
those who ask, "Three what?" we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii,
4), "Three persons." Therefore there are but three persons in God.

_I answer that,_ As was explained above, there can be only three
persons in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are
the several subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But
a real distinction between the divine relations can come only from
relative opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs
refer to two persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must
needs belong to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation
are opposite relations, they belong necessarily to two persons.
Therefore the subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and
the subsisting filiation is the person of the Son. The other two
relations are not opposed to each other; therefore these two cannot
belong to one person: hence either one of them must belong to both of
the aforesaid persons; or one must belong to one person, and the
other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to the Father and
the Son, or to either of them; for thus it would follows that the
procession of the intellect, which in God is generation, wherefrom
paternity and filiation are derived, would issue from the procession
of love, whence spiration and procession are derived, if the person
generating and the person generated proceeded from the person
spirating; and this is against what was laid down above (Q. 27, AA.
3, 4). We must consequently admit that spiration belongs to the
person of the Father, and to the person of the Son, forasmuch as it
has no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and
consequently that procession belongs to the other person who is
called the person of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as
above explained. Therefore only three persons exist in God, the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of them,
spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the
Son, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not
called a property, because it does not belong to only one person; nor
is it a personal relation--i.e. constituting a person. The three
relations--paternity, filiation, and procession--are called personal
properties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the
person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession
is the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.

Reply Obj. 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word,
proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way
of nature; thus, as above explained (Q. 27, A. 3), the procession of
the divine Word is the very same as generation by way of nature. But
love, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it
proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being divine; and
therefore the procession of love is not called generation in God.

Reply Obj. 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more
intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is
something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more
simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no
imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one
real operation--that is, His essence. How there are in Him two
processions was above explained (Q. 27, AA. 1, 4).

Reply Obj. 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed
another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for then if
the Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost
also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and the
same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by
the personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as
derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle
of its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not
allow the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation
of principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds
from the other persons who are in God.

Reply Obj. 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple number,
existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a
number of things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of
measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three persons is
the same (Q. 42, AA. 1, 4), and the same is not measured by the same.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 3]

Whether the Numeral Terms Denote Anything Real in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something
real in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every
number is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God
signifies the essence; and therefore it denotes something real in
God.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to
God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral terms
denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God.

Obj. 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in
God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as
plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality;
it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and
obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be
said that the numeral terms denote something real in God.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit
companionship"--that is, plurality--"we exclude the idea of oneness
and of solitude;" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God,
unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God."
Hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove
something; and not to denote anything positive.

_I answer that,_ The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral
terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative
meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.

In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a
consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and
is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a
species of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material
things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called
formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of
division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but
is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by
many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things.

Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete
quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God,
asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God,
but remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of
multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the
strict sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God
there is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the
proper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is
quantity.

But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from
number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only
a metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as
length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude
in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to
the many of which it is predicated, as "one" convertible with "being"
is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to
being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the
divine unity (Q. 11, A. 1); for "one" signifies undivided being.
So, of whatever we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus,
for instance, "one" applied to man signifies the undivided nature or
substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things,
multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each
undivided in itself.

But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident
added to being; as also does "one" which is the principle of that
number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which
they are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated
(Sent. i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D,
24). So when we say, the essence is one, the term "one" signifies the
essence undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the
person undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify
those persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is of the
very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units.

Reply Obj. 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more
general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude;
hence in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to
the context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a
negation of division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained
above.

Reply Obj. 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures,
is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God:
unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those
of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable to
God.

Reply Obj. 3: "One" does not exclude multitude, but division, which
logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity,
but division from each of the individuals which compose the
multitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity (Q.
11, A. 2).

It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not
sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude
is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does
not follow that these terms express this signification alone. For
blackness is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness
does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 4]

Whether This Term "Person" Can Be Common to the Three Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to
the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the
essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly.
Therefore it is not common to all three.

Obj. 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable.
But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as
appears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (Q. 29, A.
3, ad 4). Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three
persons.

Obj. 3: Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it is
common either really, or logically. But it is not so really;
otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so
logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is
neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we
proved above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore this term 'person' is not common
to the three.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask,
"Three what?" we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is
common to them.

_I answer that,_ The very mode of expression itself shows that this
term "person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for
when we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three.
Now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one
essence were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one
person of the three, as also one essence.

What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by
those who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community
of exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the
word "incommunicable." Others thought it to be a community of
intention, as the definition of person contains the word "individual";
as we say that to be a species is common to horse and ox. Both of
these explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is
not a name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality.
We must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name
"person" is common by a community of idea, not as genus or species,
but as a vague individual thing. The names of genera and species, as
man or animal, are given to signify the common natures themselves, but
not the intentions of those common natures, signified by the terms
genus or species. The vague individual thing, as "some man,"
signifies the common nature with the determinate mode of existence of
singular things--that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from
others. But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that
which distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates
signifies this flesh and this bone. But there is this
difference--that the term "some man" signifies the nature, or the
individual on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of
singular things; while this name "person" is not given to signify the
individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in
that nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine persons, that
each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature.
Thus this name "person" is common in idea to the three divine persons.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument is founded on a real community.

Reply Obj. 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself
of incommunicable existence can be common to many.

Reply Obj. 3: Although this community is logical and not real, yet it
does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or
genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the
community of person the same as community of genus or species; and
because the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species
and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in
being.
_______________________

QUESTION 31

OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD
(In Four Articles)

We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which
gives rise to four points of inquiry:

(1) Concerning the word "Trinity";

(2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?

(3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can
be joined to an essential name in God?

(4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Trinity in God?

Objection 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name
in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does
not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each
one of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not
express a name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is
not to be applied to God.

Obj. 2: Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since it
signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the
unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God
there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word
"trinity" does not apply to God.

Obj. 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not
triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore
neither is there trinity in God.

Obj. 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the
divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity
exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus
in God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy.

Obj. 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is
predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the
Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would
be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore
the word trinity is not to be applied to God.

_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in
Unity is to be revered."

_I answer that,_ The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate
number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires
that we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately
signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate
manner.

Reply Obj. 1: In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity" seems to
signify the one essence of the three persons, according as trinity
may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it rather
signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this account
we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three
persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the
Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and
hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to
another.

Reply Obj. 2: Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality
of the _supposita,_ and a unity of some kind of order. For "people"
is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the
first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective words; but
in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine
Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is
unity of essence.

Reply Obj. 3: "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it
signifies the threefold number of persons. "Triplicity" signifies a
proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion,
according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not
triplicity, but Trinity.

Reply Obj. 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number
and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we do
not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three
times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature;
as the _supposita_ of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On
the other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity"; meaning that the nature is
in its _supposita._

Reply Obj. 5: When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the
number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by
itself; since the word trine imports a distinction in the _supposita_
of which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity
is trine; otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there
would be three _supposita_ of the Trinity; as when we say, "God is
trine," it follows that there are three _supposita_ of the Godhead.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 2]

Whether the Son Is Other Than the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father.
For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If,
then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the
Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that
when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity."

Obj. 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in
some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the
Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against
what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one
in Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them,
nor any diversity."

Obj. 3: Further, the term alien is taken from _alius_ (other).
But the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin.
vii) that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing
alien, nothing separable." Therefore the Son is not other than the
Father.

Obj. 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius et
aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son
is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing
apart from the Father.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says:
"There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which
the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost
another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the
Holy Ghost another."

_I answer that,_ Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii.], a
heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we
must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the
quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful." Now, in treating of
the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed
cautiously between them--namely, the error of Arius, who placed a
Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of
Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.

Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms
diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of
essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the
relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or
"difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of
"diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction." But lest
the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the
terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a
whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the
use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid
the terms "alien" and "discrepant." For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that
"in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead":
and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing
alien, nothing separable."

To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity,"
lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence
Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father
and the Son are separate in Godhead." We must avoid the adjective
"only" (unici) lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary
says in the same book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or
uniqueness." Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is
no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity
is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away
from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De
Fide i): "What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity
where there is no difference." The word "solitary" is also to be
avoided, lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as
Hilary says (De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a
diverse God."

This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only
a distinction of _suppositum_; and hence we can properly say that "the
Son is other than the Father," because He is another _suppositum_ of
the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.

Reply Obj. 1: "Other," being like the name of a particular thing,
refers to the _suppositum_; and so, there is sufficient reason for
using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of
hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in
the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from
the Father, although He is another.

Reply Obj. 2: "Difference" implies distinction of form. There is one
form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the form
of God" (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not
properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet,
Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the
divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by
way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from
each other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But
"difference" is taken for "distinction," as above stated.

Reply Obj. 3: The term "alien" means what is extraneous and
dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and
therefore we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not
that He is anything "alien."

Reply Obj. 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is
formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence is
properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the
masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the
common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this
man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the _suppositum_;
whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal
animal. So, because in God distinction is by the persons, and not by
the essence, we say that the Father is other than the Son, but not
something else; while conversely we say that they are one thing, but
not one person.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 3]

Whether the Exclusive Word "Alone" Should Be Added to the Essential
Term in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is
not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the
Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another."
But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we
cannot say that God is alone.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can
be predicated of every person _per se,_ and of all the persons
together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say
the Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But
Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that
the Father is not true God alone." Therefore God cannot be said to be
alone.

Obj. 3: Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an essential
term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate
or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is
false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father; nor,
again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying
were true, "God alone creates," it would follow that the "Father
alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father;
and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this
expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in God.

_On the contrary,_ It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal,
invisible, the only God" (1 Tim. 1:17).

_I answer that,_ This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical
term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one
which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given _suppositum_; as, for
instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." If the term
"alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any
term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is
joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is
above stated (A. 2). A syncategorematical term imports the order
of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or
"no one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other
_suppositum_ from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone
writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no
companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way
nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term
in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we
said "God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints are
always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist
in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by
association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone
is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are
with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary,
though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons
were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls
does not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it
remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.

Reply Obj. 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not
affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the
_suppositum,_ as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it
qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied
either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"--that
is, no one else--"runs: and Socrates runs only"--that is, he does
nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God
alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be
assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who
alone is God." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is
that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the
predicate, and not to the _suppositum._ So, when Augustine says that
the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he
speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of
ages, invisible, the only God," as applying not to the Father, but to
the Trinity alone.

Reply Obj. 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an
essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean
two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the
Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can
signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the
relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a
univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor,
does it follow, "therefore the Father alone creates," because, as
logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is
joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said
exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for instance,
from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot
conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 4]

Whether an Exclusive Diction Can Be Joined to the Personal Term?

Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to
the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord
speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true
God" (John 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.

Obj. 2: Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father" (Matt.
11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know
the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion
follows.

Obj. 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters
into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not
exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if
we say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not
white," or that "man is not white." But one person is in the
concept of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and
conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do
not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of
speaking is true.

Obj. 4: Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus
Christ."

_On the contrary,_ This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes
two assertions--namely, that the Father is God, and that no other
besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for
the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is
false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.

_I answer that,_ When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a
proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude
in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in
a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways.
For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is
true, the sense being "the Father alone is God"--that is, "He who
with no other is the Father, is God." In this way Augustine expounds
when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because
He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they
are not the Father together with Him." This, however, is not the usual
way of speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though
we said "He who alone is called the Father is God." But in the strict
sense the exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is
false if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it
excludes it in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person
than the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to the
Holy Ghost. But because this diction "alone," properly speaking,
refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person rather than
other things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too
literally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in
an authentic work.

Reply Obj. 1: When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not
understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the
whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if
understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not
excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word
"only" excludes another thing, as above explained.

The same Reply can be given to Obj. 2. For an essential term applied
to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of
the unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted
the term "no one" [*Nemo = non-homo, i.e. no man] is not the same as
"no man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person
of the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the
usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational
nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into
the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not
differ in _suppositum,_ as part and universal. But the Son differs in
_suppositum_ from the Father; and so there is no parity.

Reply Obj. 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most
High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the
glory of God the Father."
_______________________

QUESTION 32

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS
(In Four Articles)

We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons;
and this involves four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?

(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?

(3) The number of the notions?

(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these
notions?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 1]

Whether the Trinity of the Divine Persons Can Be Known by Natural
Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can
be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of
God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said
many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo
et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"--namely, three--"we bring
ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all
things created." And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in
their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various
reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with
God, and the Word was God," and so on; in which passage the
distinction of persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on
Rom. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third
sign--that is, as regards knowledge of a third person--i.e. of the
Holy Ghost--and thus it is clear that they knew at least two
persons. Likewise Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and
reflected upon itself its own heat." By which words the generation of
the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated.
Therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural
reason.

Obj. 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I believe
without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found
for any explanation of the truth." So even to prove the Trinity some
have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who
communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine
persons; while some are moved by the consideration that "no good
thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership." Augustine
proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11, 12) to prove the trinity of persons
by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; and we
have followed him in this (Q. 27, AA. 1, 3). Therefore the trinity of
persons can be known by natural reason.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be
known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine
tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of
persons can be known by natural reason.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to
reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind." And Ambrose
says (De Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of
generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent." But the trinity of
the divine persons is distinguished by origin of generation and
procession (Q. 30, A. 2). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with
his understanding grasp that for which no necessary reason can be
given, it follows that the trinity of persons cannot be known by
reason.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the
Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained (Q. 12, AA. 4,
12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason except
from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as
effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know
of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the principle
of things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in treating
of God as above (Q. 12, A. 12). Now, the creative power of God is
common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the
essence, and not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by
natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence,
but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons. Whoever,
then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason,
derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of
faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible
things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that
"faith is of things that appear not" (Heb. 11:1), and the same
Apostle says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the
wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak
the wisdom of God in a mystery which is hidden" (1 Cor. 2:6, 7).
Secondly, as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For
when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons
which are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers:
since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we
believe on such grounds.

Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by
authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards
others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.
Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists
the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the
truth of the word"--i.e. "the sacred word, we too follow this rule."

Reply Obj. 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the
trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as
paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's
words, "We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the
world"--i.e. the philosophers--"knew" (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless,
they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the
persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the
Holy Ghost; as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, "By this
number," etc., we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold
number in God, but that he wished to say that the ancients used the
threefold number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some
perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic books also
we find, "In the beginning was the word," not as meaning the Person
begotten in God, but as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all
things, and which is appropriated to the Son. And although they knew
these were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said to
have failed in the third sign--that is, in the knowledge of the third
person, because they deviated from the goodness appropriated to the
Holy Ghost, in that knowing God "they did not glorify Him as God"
(Rom. 1); or, because the Platonists asserted the existence of one
Primal Being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe,
they consequently maintained the existence of another substance
beneath him, which they called "mind" or the "paternal intellect,"
containing the idea of all things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip.
iv). They did not, however, assert the existence of a third separate
substance which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not
assert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which was the
error of Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists. When
Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad," etc., this does not refer to
the generation of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy Ghost, but
to the production of the world. For one God produced one world by
reason of His love for Himself.

Reply Obj. 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a
point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of
some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be
brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform
velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a
sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already
established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in
astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as
established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly
movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were
sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In the
first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. In the second
way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as, when assumed to be true,
such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity
of persons is adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident
when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of God is
manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an
act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His
infinite goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should
proceed from God: but that according to its own mode and capacity it
should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that
joyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds in the
case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some
other's good, in order to have the goodness of complete happiness.
Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God,
forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally.
Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we
arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two reasons why the knowledge of the divine
persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of
creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word
excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by
necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we
show that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor
because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of
His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there be light,"
to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that
it was good," to show proof of the divine love. The same is also
found in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly,
that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race,
accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Notions in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of God
but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy Scripture
does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in
God.

Obj. 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the
essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern
the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither
can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for
instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can
what belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not
say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore
there do not exist notions in God.

Obj. 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions
as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: for
they are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely
simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): "We
recognize difference of hypostases [i.e. of persons], in the three
properties; i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional."
Therefore we must admit properties and notions in God.

_I answer that,_ Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the
persons, said that in God there were no properties or notions, and
wherever there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the
concrete. For as we are accustomed to say, "I beseech your
kindness"--i.e. you who are kind--so when we speak of paternity in
God, we mean God the Father.

But, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 3, ad 1), the use of concrete and
abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine
simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it.
Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the
divine essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human
intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own
mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, whence
its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to
signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete
terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by
abstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their
subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.

But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in
the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but
the same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity
and Father.

Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the
obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask:
"Whereby are They one God? and whereby are They three persons?" as we
answer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be
some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are
distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an
abstract term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine
essence is signified as "What"; and the person as "Who"; and the
property as "Whereby."

The second motive is because one person in God is related to two
persons--namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son
and the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one
relation; otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy
Ghost would be related to the Father by one and the same relation.
Thus, since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow
that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it
be said with Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to
creatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the
Father is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost;
whereas these two persons are related to the Father by two relations.
For, since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to
another, it must be said that two relations are not specifically
different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For the
relation of lord and father must differ according to the difference of
filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His
creatures by one specific relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are
not related to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence
there is no parity.

Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the
creature (Q. 28, A. 1, 3); while there is no reason against our
admitting in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there
must be a real relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence,
corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,
whereby they are related to the Father, we must understand two
relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to the
Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is
necessary that the relations should be separately signified in the
abstract; and these are what we mean by properties and notions.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy
Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of
notions, as the abstract is contained in the concrete.

Reply Obj. 2: In God the notions have their significance not after
the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the
persons are known; although in God these notions or relations are
real, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1). Therefore whatever has order to
any essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions;
forasmuch as this is against their mode of signification. Hence we
cannot say that paternity begets, or creates, or is wise, or is
intelligent. The essentials, however, which are not ordered to any
act, but simply remove created conditions from God, can be predicated
of the notions; for we can say that paternity is eternal, or immense,
or such like. So also on account of the real identity, substantive
terms, whether personal or essential, can be predicated of the
notions; for we can say that paternity is God, and that paternity is
the Father.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the persons are simple, still without
prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be
abstractedly signified, as above explained.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 3]

Whether There Are Five Notions?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not five notions. For the
notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are
distinguished from each other. But the relations in God are only four
(Q. 28, A. 4). Therefore the notions are only four in number.

Obj. 2: Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called
one God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called the
Trine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be
called quinary; which cannot be allowed.

Obj. 3: Further, if there are five notions for the three persons in
God, there must be in some one person two or more notions, as in the
person of the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common
spiration. Either these three notions really differ, or not. If they
really differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed
of several things. But if they differ only logically, it follows that
one of them can be predicated of another, so that we can say that as
the divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the
common reality, so common spiration is paternity; which is not to be
admitted. Therefore there are not five notions.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It seems that there are more; because as
the Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion of
innascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And
in this respect there ought to be a sixth notion.

Obj. 5: Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin of
the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost to
proceed from the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the
Father and the Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son
and to the Holy Ghost.

_I answer that,_ A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine
Person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their
origin: and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another
comes, and of someone that comes from another, and by these two modes
a person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be
known by the fact that He is from another; but by the fact that He is
from no one; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called
"innascibility." As the source of another, He can be known in two
ways, because as the Son is from Him, the Father is known by the
notion of "paternity"; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known
by the notion of "common spiration." The Son can be known as begotten
by another, and thus He is known by "filiation"; and also by another
person proceeding from Him, the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in
the same way as the Father is known, by "common spiration." The Holy
Ghost can be known by the fact that He is from another, or from
others; thus He is known by "procession"; but not by the fact that
another is from Him, as no divine person proceeds from Him.

Therefore, there are Five notions in God: "innascibility,"
"paternity," "filiation," "common spiration," and "procession." Of
these only four are relations, for "innascibility" is not a relation,
except by reduction, as will appear later (Q. 33, A. 4, ad 3).
Four only are properties. For "common spiration" is not a property;
because it belongs to two persons. Three are personal notions--i.e.
constituting persons, "paternity," "filiation," and "procession."
"Common spiration" and "innascibility" are called notions of Persons,
but not personal notions, as we shall explain further on (Q. 40, A. 1,
ad 1).

Reply Obj. 1: Besides the four relations, another notion must be
admitted, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine essence is signified as a reality; and
likewise the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions
are signified as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God
is one by unity of essence, and trine by trinity of persons,
nevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions.

Reply Obj. 3: Since the real plurality in God is founded only on
relative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they
are not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor
again are they predicated of each other, because they are different
ideas of the persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is
the attribute of knowledge, although we do say that knowledge is
power.

Reply Obj. 4: Since Person implies dignity, as stated above (Q. 19,
A. 3), we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact
that no person is from Him. For this does not belong to His dignity,
as it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from no one.

Reply Obj. 5: The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special
mode of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and the Son
agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the
principle on which a notion is based must be something special; thus
no parity of reasoning exists.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Lawful to Have Various Contrary Opinions of Notions?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to have various
contrary opinions of the notions. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3):
"No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity": to which
mystery the notions assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in
some way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary
opinions of the notions.

Obj. 2: Further, the persons are known by the notions. But no
contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated. Therefore
neither can there be about the notions.

_On the contrary,_ The notions are not articles of faith. Therefore
different opinions of the notions are permissible.

_I answer that,_ Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any
truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and
unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning
these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if
it be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial
of it involves as a consequence something against faith; as for
instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for it
follows that the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such
things anyone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy,
before the matter has been considered or settled as involving
consequences against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown;
whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided
that consequences follow against faith, then the error cannot be free
from heresy. For this reason many things are now considered as
heretical which were formerly not so considered, as their consequences
are now more manifest.

So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about
the notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with
faith. If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the
notions, knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would
follow, he would lapse into heresy.

By what has been said all the objections may be solved.
_______________________

QUESTION 33

OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER
(In Four Articles)

We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the
Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Father is the Principle?

(2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this
name "Father"?

(3) Whether "Father" in God is said personally before it is said
essentially?

(4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 1]

Whether It Belongs to the Father to Be the Principle?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Father cannot be called the
principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause
are the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not
say that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say
that He is the principle of the Son.

Obj. 2: Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing
principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows
that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which
appears false.

Obj. 3: Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in
God there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore
in speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), "The Father is
the Principle of the whole Deity."

_I answer that,_ The word "principle" signifies only that whence
another proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way
we call a principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one
whence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.

Reply Obj. 1: The Greeks use the words "cause" and "principle"
indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not
use the word "cause," but only "principle." The reason is because
"principle" is a wider term than "cause"; as "cause" is more common
than "element." For the first term of a thing, as also the first
part, is called the principle, but not the cause. Now the wider a
term is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God (Q. 13, A.
11), because the more special terms are, the more they determine the
mode adapted to the creature. Hence this term "cause" seems to mean
diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is
not implied in the word "principle." For in all kinds of causes there
is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of
perfection or of power: whereas we use the term "principle" even in
things which have no such difference, but have only a certain order
to each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a
line; or also when we say that the first part of a line is the
principle of a line.

Reply Obj. 2: It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son
and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom
with our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father
something of authority by reason of His being the principle, still we
do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or
to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this way,
Hilary says (De Trin. ix): "By authority of the Giver, the Father is
the greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of
nature is give."

Reply Obj. 3: Although this word principle, as regards its
derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not
signify priority, but origin. For what a term signifies, and the
reason why it was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above
(Q. 13, A. 8).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 2]

Whether This Name "Father" Is Properly the Name of a Divine Person?

Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not properly
the name of a divine person. For the name "Father" signifies
relation. Moreover "person" is an individual substance. Therefore
this name "Father" is not properly a name signifying a Person.

Obj. 2: Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every
father begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is
more properly applied to God, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 11).
Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and
genitor than Father.

Obj. 3: Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of
anyone. But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or
offspring; and consequently, he of whom is the word, is
metaphorically called father. Therefore the principle of the Word in
God is not properly called Father.

Obj. 4: Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of
God first before creatures. But generation appears to apply to
creatures before God; because generation seems to be truer when the
one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not
only by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name "Father"
taken from generation does not seem to be the proper name of any
divine person.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 88:27): "He shall cry out to me:
Thou art my Father."

_I answer that,_ The proper name of any person signifies that whereby
the person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and
soul belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular
man belong this particular soul and this particular body; and by these
is this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is
paternity which distinguishes the person of the Father from all other
persons. Hence this name "Father," whereby paternity is signified, is
the proper name of the person of the Father.

Reply Obj. 1: Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So this
name "father" among us does not signify a person, but the relation of
a person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for
in God the relation signified by the name "Father" is a subsisting
person. Hence, as above explained (Q. 29, A. 4), this name "person"
in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 49), a
thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now
generation signifies something in process of being made, whereas
paternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the
name "Father" is more expressive as regards the divine person than
genitor or begettor.

Reply Obj. 3: In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and
hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is
something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly
and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father.

Reply Obj. 4: The terms "generation" and "paternity" like the other
terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as
regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of
signification. Hence also the Apostle says, "I bend my knee to the
Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and
on earth is named" (Eph. 3:14). This is explained thus. It is
manifest that generation receives its species from the term which is
the form of the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of
the generator, the truer and more perfect is the generation; as
univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs
to the essence of a generator to generate what is like itself in
form. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of
the Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in
creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same,
shows that generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God
before creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction
exists of the Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only,
belongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 3]

Whether This Name "Father" Is Applied to God, Firstly As a Personal
Name?

Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not applied to
God, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common
precedes the particular. But this name "Father" as a personal name,
belongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential sense
it is common to the whole Trinity; for we say "Our Father" to the
whole Trinity. Therefore "Father" comes first as an essential name
before its personal sense.

Obj. 2: Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is
no priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem to be of
the same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son,
and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's; since,
according to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the
creature and to the Son. Therefore "Father" in God is not taken as an
essential name before it is taken personally.

Obj. 3: Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not
a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by reason
of filiation or generation, according to Col. 1:15: "Who is the image
of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature." Therefore
paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same
concept as, paternity taken essentially.

_On the contrary,_ The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is
the Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the
creature in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal
sense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the
creature.

_I answer that,_ A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly
contained its whole signification, before it is applied to that which
only partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of
a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the
signification of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from
perfect things. Hence this name "lion" is applied first to the animal
containing the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so
called, before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's
nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of whom it is said
by way of similitude.

Now it is manifest from the foregoing (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 28, A. 4),
that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in
God the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the nature and
glory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is
found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator
and the creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain
likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach to the
true idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of some
creatures, by reason only of a trace, for instance of irrational
creatures, according to Job 38:28: "Who is the father of the rain? or
who begot the drops of dew?" Of some, namely, the rational creature
(He is the Father), by reason of the likeness of His image, according
to Deut. 32:6: "Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and
created thee?" And of others He is the Father by similitude of grace,
and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage
of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received,
according to Rom. 8:16, 17: "The Spirit Himself gives testimony to
our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also."
Lastly, He is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch
as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according
to Rom. 5:2: "We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God."
Therefore it is plain that "paternity" is applied to God first, as
importing regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports
the regard of God to creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our
intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included in
the understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the
concept of the person of the Father, God is understood; but not
conversely. But common terms which import relation to the creature
come after proper terms which import personal relations; because the
person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production
of creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is
first understood to proceed from the artist before the thing
designed, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the
artist's mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father before the
creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it
participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the words
of Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made
conformable to the image of His Son."

Reply Obj. 2: To "receive" is said to be common to the creature and
to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote
similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence
the authority quoted subjoins: "That He may be the First Born among
many brethren," after saying that some were conformed to the image of
the Son of God. But the Son of God possesses a position of
singularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as
Basil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only
begotten (John 1:18): "The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the
Father, He hath declared unto us."

From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 4]

Whether It Is Proper to the Father to Be Unbegotten?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be
unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it
is the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the Father; it
only removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of
the Father.

Obj. 2: Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in
a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not
begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten;
neither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also
to the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be
taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies imperfection
in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that the
Person of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be.

Obj. 3: Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify relation,
for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance;
therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son,
Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance.
Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.

Obj. 4: Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since,
then, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there
is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another.
Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten.

Obj. 5: Further, as the Father is the principle of the person
begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his
opposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be
unbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to be
unproceeding.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "One is from one--that
is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten--namely, by the property in
each one respectively of innascibility and origin."

_I answer that,_ As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary
principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before
or after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the
Father; and the principle from a principle, Who is the Son.

Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one
way as the first _principle,_ by reason of its having a relation to
what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a _first_
principle by reason of its not being from another. Thus therefore the
Father is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards
the persons proceeding from Himself. But as the principle, not from a
principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another; and
this belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word
"begotten."

Reply Obj. 1: Some there are who say that innascibility, signified by
the word "unbegotten," as a property of the Father, is not a negative
term only, but either that it means both these things
together--namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the
principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also
His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem
true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct
from paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is
included in the common. For source and authority signify in God
nothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with
Augustine (De Trin. v, 7) that "unbegotten" imports the negation of
passive generation. For he says that "unbegotten" has the same
meaning as "not a son." Nor does it follow that "unbegotten" is not
the proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are
notified by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as what
has no part.

Reply Obj. 2: "Unbegotten" is taken sometimes in a negative sense
only, and in that sense Jerome says that "the Holy Ghost is
unbegotten," that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise "unbegotten" may
be taken in a kind of privative sense, but not as implying any
imperfection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way
when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another, even
though it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a
stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally
belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so
called when something has not what naturally belongs to some members
of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third
sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in
which sense, privation imports an imperfection. In this sense,
"unbegotten" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it
may be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain
person of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the
same nature is begotten. In this sense the term "unbegotten" can be
applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper
to the Father alone, it must be further understood that the name
"unbegotten" belongs to a divine person as the principle of another
person; so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of
principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in the
term "unbegotten" that He is not in any way derived from another; and
not only that He is not from another by way only of generation. In
this sense the term "unbegotten" does not belong at all to the Holy
Ghost, Who is from another by procession, as a subsisting person; nor
does it belong to the divine essence, of which it may be said that it
is in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from another--namely, from the
Father.

Reply Obj. 3: According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9),
"unbegotten" in one sense signifies the same as "uncreated"; and thus
it applies to the substance, for thereby does the created substance
differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not
begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation
is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not man" is reduced to
the genus of substance, and "not white" to the genus of quality.
Hence, since "begotten" implies relation in God, "unbegotten" belongs
also to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father unbegotten
is substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by
relation; that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.

Reply Obj. 4: In every genus there must be something first; so in the
divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from
another, and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two innascibles is
to suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Hence
Hilary says (De Synod.): "As there is one God, so there cannot be two
innascibles." And this especially because, did two innascibles exist,
one would not be from the other, and they would not be distinguished
by relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from
each other by diversity of nature.

Reply Obj. 5: The property of the Father, whereby He is not from
another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of
the Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost;
both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as
stated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3), and because also in the order of
nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being
denied of the Father that He is begotten, although He is the
principle of generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does
not proceed by the procession of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy
Ghost is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the
person begotten.
_______________________

QUESTION 34

OF THE PERSON OF THE SON
(In Three Articles)

We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to
the Son--namely, "Son," "Word," and "Image." The idea of Son is
gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider
Word and Image.

Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term?

(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son?

(3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 34, Art. 1]

Whether Word in God Is a Personal Name?

Objection 1: It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name.
For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and
Son. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on
(John 1:1), "In the beginning was the Word." Therefore Word is not a
personal name in God.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), "The Word
is knowledge with love;" and according to Anselm (Monol. lx), "To
speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought." But
knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God.
Therefore Word is not a personal term in God.

Obj. 3: Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according
to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son is
intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father speaks,
the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of
them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term
in God, and not in a personal sense.

Obj. 4: Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is
something made. For it is said, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms
which do His Word" (Ps. 148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal
name in God.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "As the Son is
related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is."
But the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore
so also is Word.

_I answer that,_ The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense,
is a personal name, and in no way an essential name.

To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its
proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense it is
taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense
is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds
from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior
word--that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the
sound. For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound
signifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds
from the signification or the imagination, as stated in _De Anima_ ii,
text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called
a word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the
fact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it
follows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is
called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the
interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the
vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of
words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that "word" is called "the natural
movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and
thinks, as light and splendor;" which is the first kind. "Again," he
says, "the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is
uttered in the heart;" which is the third kind. "Again," also, "the
word is the angel"--that is, the messenger "of intelligence;" which
is the second kind. Word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for
that which is signified or effected by a word; thus we are wont to
say, "this is the word I have said," or "which the king has
commanded," alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way
of assertion or of command.

Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the
intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): "Whoever can
understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before
thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some
likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the
Word." The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to
proceed from something other than itself--namely, from the knowledge
of the one conceiving. Hence "Word," according as we use the term
strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which
belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine
persons are distinguished by origin (Q. 27, AA. 3, 4, 5). Hence the
term "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be
taken as said not essentially, but personally.

Reply Obj. 1: The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the
Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored to
maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to
be understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word proceeding
should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same
substance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a
manner from the one who pronounces it, as to remain within him. But
supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit
Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word
metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation;
either it makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by
a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it
is manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly
manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except
in as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which
anyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word
may be sometimes said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must
also admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to
God personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that
which emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its
conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is
made actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely;
likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect
what existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding
does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an
act remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is
knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing
intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the
intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin.
vii, 1) that the Word is "begotten wisdom;" for it is nothing but the
concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called
"begotten knowledge." Thus can also be explained how "to speak" is in
God "to see by thought," forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the
gaze of the divine thought. Still the term "thought" does not
properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
16): "Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of the
Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something
unstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form
and remaining latent and as it were formless." For thought consists
properly in the search after the truth, and this has no place in God.
But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does not
think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx)
takes "thought" in an improper sense for "contemplation."

Reply Obj. 3: As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally,
and not essentially, so likewise is to "speak." Hence, as the Word is
not common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that
the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says
(De Trin. vii, 1): "He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is
understood as not alone in God, but as being with that very Word,
without which, forsooth, He would not be speaking." On the other
hand, "to be spoken" belongs to each Person, for not only is the word
spoken, but also the thing understood or signified by the word.
Therefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to
be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in the way
whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs
to each Person to be spoken. For the Father, by understanding
Himself, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and all other things comprised
in this knowledge, conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity
is "spoken" in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the
intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of
understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term "speak"
improperly for the act of understanding; whereas they really differ
from each other; for "to understand" means only the habitude of the
intelligent agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace
of origin is conveyed, but only a certain information of our
intellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of
the thing understood. In God, however, it means complete identity,
because in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether
the same, as was proved above (Q. 14, AA. 4, 5). Whereas to "speak"
means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for "to speak" is
nothing but to utter a word. But by means of the word it imports a
habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is
manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who
utters the Word is "speaker" in God, although each Person understands
and is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word.

Reply Obj. 4: The term "word" is there taken figuratively, as the
thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus
creatures are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect,
whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine
wisdom; as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the
work to which he is appointed by the king's word.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 34, Art. 2]

Whether "Word" Is the Son's Proper Name?

Objection 1: It would seem that "Word" is not the proper name of the
Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not
signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word
cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son.

Obj. 2: Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered.
Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from the
Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine;
as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).

Obj. 3: Further, every proper name of a person signifies some
property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper
name, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be
several more properties in God than those above mentioned.

Obj. 4: Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act of
understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs
to the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.

Obj. 5: Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3): "Bearing all
things by the word of His power;" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom.
v, 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is
not proper to the Son.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): "By Word we
understand the Son alone."

_I answer that,_ "Word," said of God in its proper sense, is used
personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it
signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds
in God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and
this procession is called generation, as we have shown above (Q. 27,
A. 2). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in
God.

Reply Obj. 1: "To be" and "to understand" are not the same in us.
Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our
nature. But in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and the same:
hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of His;
but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be
something subsistent; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists;
and so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that "the Word of God is
substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own]
are activities if the soul."

Reply Obj. 2: The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the Arians
pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being
uttered, as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the
different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from
Augustine (De Haeres. xi).

Reply Obj. 3: In the term "Word" the same property is comprised as in
the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "Word and Son
express the same." For the Son's nativity, which is His personal
property, is signified by different names, which are attributed to
the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is
of the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son; to show that
He is co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that He is
altogether like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten
immaterially, He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be
expressed by only one name.

Reply Obj. 4: To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way
as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God
essentially, as stated above (Q. 14, AA. 2, 4). Now the Son is God
begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as
producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the
Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but
is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation.

Reply Obj. 5: When it is said of the Son, "Bearing all things by the
word of His power"; "word" is taken figuratively for the effect of
the Word. Hence a gloss says that "word" is here taken to mean
command; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things
are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word
things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely and figuratively
in applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that
everything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so
in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, because He
manifests the Son.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 34, Art. 3]

Whether the Name "Word" Imports Relation to Creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import
relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in
creatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said
essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation
to creatures.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of
God in time; as "Lord" and "Creator." But Word is said of God from
eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature.

Obj. 3: Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it
proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it
follows that the Word proceeds from the creature.

Obj. 4: Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various
relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to
creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but
many.

Obj. 5: Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can
only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know
beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are
implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be false.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that "the
name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also
relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His
operative power."

_I answer that,_ Word implies relation to creatures. For God by
knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the
mind is representative of everything that is actually understood.
Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things
which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself
and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the
Father, but of all creatures.

And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas
as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word
of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both
expressive and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps.
32:9): "He spake, and they were made;" because in the Word is implied
the operative idea of what God makes.

Reply Obj. 1: The nature is also included indirectly in the name of
the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational
nature. Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the
personal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is
implied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to
prevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is
included in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be
the Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the
Creator begotten; and in this way the name Word imports relation to
creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the relations result from actions, some names
import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on
the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to
create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But
others import a relation which follows from an action which does not
pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent--as to know and
to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of
relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it
true that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are
applied to Him in time; but only those names are applied in time
which import relation following on the action of God passing into
exterior effect.

Reply Obj. 3: Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived
from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is
not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although
the Word is expressive of creatures.

Reply Obj. 4: The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation
to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God;
and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed
chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to
creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands
every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and that is a
personal one.

Reply Obj. 5: God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about
non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less
than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14).
Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is
expressive and manifestive of non-beings.
_______________________

QUESTION 35

OF THE IMAGE
(In Two Articles)

We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether Image in God is said personally?

(2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 35, Art. 1]

Whether Image in God Is Said Personally?

Objection 1: It would seem that image is not said personally of God.
For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, "The Godhead
of the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one."
Therefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally.

Obj. 2: Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): "An image is a like
species of that which it represents." But species or form is said
of God essentially. Therefore so also is Image.

Obj. 3: Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies
"before" and "after." But in the divine persons there is no "before"
and "after." Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "What is more
absurd than to say that an image is referred to itself?" Therefore
the Image in God is a relation, and is thus a personal name.

_I answer that,_ Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not
any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only
similitude of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal
things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we see
that the species of different animals are of different figures; but
not of different colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on
a wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise
depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or of figure is
enough for an image, which requires also the idea of origin; because,
as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74): "One egg is not the image of
another, because it is not derived from it." Therefore for a true
image it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in
species, or at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports procession
or origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name "Image" is a
personal name.

Reply Obj. 1: Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth
in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything
proceeds, is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly
called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the name
of Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the
Holy Trinity is the Image to whom man was made.

Reply Obj. 2: species, as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of
image, means the form derived from one thing to another. In this
sense image is said to be the species of anything, as that which is
assimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has a like
form.

Reply Obj. 3: Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but
only assimilation.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 35, Art. 2]

Whether the Name of Image Is Proper to the Son?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the
Son; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), "The Holy Ghost
is the Image of the Son." Therefore Image does not belong to the Son
alone.

Obj. 2: Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an
image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs to
the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude.
Therefore the Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image does not
belong to the Son alone.

Obj. 3: Further, man is also called the image of God, according to 1
Cor. 11:7, "The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image
and the glory of God." Therefore Image is not proper to the Son.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): "The Son alone is
the Image of the Father."

_I answer that,_ The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost
is the Image of both the Father and of the Son; but the Latin Doctors
attribute the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the
canonical Scripture except as applied to the Son; as in the words,
"Who is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures"
(Col. 1:15) and again: "Who being the brightness of His glory, and
the figure of His substance." (Heb. 1:3).

Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not
in nature only, but also in the notion of principle: whereas the Holy
Ghost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion.
This, however, does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by
reason of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality
in God, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6), so neither (by reason
thereof do we consider) that similitude which is essential to image.
Hence others say that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the
Son, because there cannot be an image of an image; nor of the Father,
because again the image must be immediately related to that which it
is the image; and the Holy Ghost is related to the Father through the
Son; nor again is He the Image of the Father and the Son, because then
there would be one image of two; which is impossible. Hence it follows
that the Holy Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for
the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, as we
shall explain further on (Q. 36, A. 4). Hence there is nothing
to prevent there being one Image of the Father and of the Son,
inasmuch as they are one; since even man is one image of the whole
Trinity.

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the
Holy Ghost, although by His procession He receives the nature of the
Father, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be
"born"; so, although He receives the likeness of the Father, He is
not called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is
essential to word to be like species with that whence it proceeds;
whereas this does not essentially belong to love, although it may
belong to that love which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the
divine love.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly employ
the term image as meaning a perfect similitude.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and the
Son, still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above
explained.

Reply Obj. 3: The image of a thing may be found in something in two
ways. In one way it is found in something of the same specific
nature; as the image of the king is found in his son. In another way
it is found in something of a different nature, as the king's image
on the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father;
in the second sense man is called the image of God; and therefore in
order to express the imperfect character of the divine image in man,
man is not simply called the image, but "to the image," whereby is
expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot
be said that the Son of God is "to the image," because He is the
perfect Image of the Father.
_______________________

QUESTION 36

OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST
(In Four Articles)

We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost,
Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of
God. Concerning the name "Holy Ghost" there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether this name, "Holy Ghost," is the proper name of one divine
Person?

(2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds
from the Father and the Son?

(3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son?

(4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
Ghost?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 1]

Whether This Name "Holy Ghost" Is the Proper Name of One Divine Person?

Objection 1: It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the
proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the
three persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of
'Holy Ghost' [*It should be borne in mind that the word "ghost" is the
old English equivalent for the Latin "spiritus,"] whether in the sense
of "breath" or "blast," or in the sense of "spirit," as an immaterial
substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x, 7),
"The Gost of Storms" [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter
"Trubled gost is sacrifice of God" (Prose Psalter, A.D. 1325), and
"Oure wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the
ayre" (More, "Comfort against Tribulation"); and in our modern
expression of "giving up the ghost." As applied to God, and not
specially to the third Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder,
"Jhesu Criste was the worde and the goste of Good." (See Oxford
Dictionary).) is common to the three persons; for Hilary (De Trin.
viii) shows that the "Spirit of God" sometimes means the Father, as in
the words of Isa. 61:1: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me;" and
sometimes the Son, as when the Son says: "In the Spirit of God I cast
out devils" (Matt. 12:28), showing that He cast out devils by His own
natural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in the
words of Joel 2:28: "I will pour out of My Spirit over all flesh."
Therefore this name 'Holy Ghost' is not the proper name of a divine
person.

Obj. 2: Further, the names of the divine persons are relative terms,
as Boethius says (De Trin.). But this name "Holy Ghost" is not a
relative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine
Person.

Obj. 3: Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He
cannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is spoken
of as of this or that man, as appears in the words, "The Lord said to
Moses, I will take of thy spirit and will give to them" (Num. 11:17)
and also "The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus" (4 Kings 2:15).
Therefore "Holy Ghost" does not seem to be the proper name of a
divine Person.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (1 John 5:7): "There are three who bear
witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." As
Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4): "When we ask, Three what? we say,
Three persons." Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine
person.

_I answer that,_ While there are two processions in God, one of
these, the procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as
stated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3). Hence the relations also which
follow from this procession are without a name (Q. 28, A. 4): for
which reason the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper
name. But as some names are accommodated by the usual mode of
speaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we use the names
of procession and spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly
signify the notional acts than the relations; so to signify the
divine Person, Who proceeds by way of love, this name "Holy Ghost" is
by the use of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The
appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from
the fact that the person who is called "Holy Ghost" has something in
common with the other Persons. For, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
17; v, 11), "Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is
called that properly which both are called in common. For the Father
also is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is holy,
and the Son is holy." Secondly, from the proper signification of the
name. For the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify
impulse and motion; for we call the breath and the wind by the term
spirit. Now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of
the lover towards the object loved. Further, holiness is attributed
to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the divine person
proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved, that person is most
properly named "The Holy Ghost."

Reply Obj. 1: The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is
applicable to the whole Trinity: because by 'spirit' the
immateriality of the divine substance is signified; for corporeal
spirit is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this
term to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the
word "holy" we signify the purity of divine goodness. But if Holy
Spirit be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the
usage of the Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three
persons, the one who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above
explained.

Reply Obj. 2: Although this name "Holy Ghost" does not indicate a
relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it
is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by
relation only. Yet this name may be understood as including a
relation, if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed
[spiratus].

Reply Obj. 3: In the name Son we understand that relation only which
is of something from a principle, in regard to that principle: but in
the name "Father" we understand the relation of principle; and
likewise in the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power.
But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a
divine person; but rather the reverse. Therefore we can say "our
Father," and "our Spirit"; but we cannot say "our Son."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 2]

Whether the Holy Ghost Proceeds from the Son?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say
anything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been
divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles." But in the Sacred
Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son;
but only that He proceeds from the Father, as appears from John 15:26:
"The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the Father." Therefore the
Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Obj. 2: Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople (Can.
vii) we read: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver,
who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son to be
adored and glorified." Therefore it should not be added in our Creed
that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added such a
thing appear to be worthy of anathema.

Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): "We say that the
Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of the
Father; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we
name Him the Spirit of the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not
proceed from the Son.

Obj. 4: Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the
Holy Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of St.
Andrew: "Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the
Father, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one
Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son."
Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Obj. 5: Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath
[spiritus] does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word.
Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Obj. 6: Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father.
Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the Son.

Obj. 7: Further "the actual and the possible do not differ in things
perpetual" (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But it is
possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if
He did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir.
Sancti, ii): "The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the
Father; but each in a different way; one by Birth, the other by
Procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another." And
further on he says: "For even if for no other reason were the Son and
the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice." Therefore the
Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.

_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father
and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."

_I answer that,_ It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son.
For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally
distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above (Q.
28, A. 3; Q. 30, A. 2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons
are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would
follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons:
since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs
to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine
persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now
the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they
are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father
has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by
the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations,
and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the
one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost
there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to
the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as
neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to
them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that
the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two
relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is
heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the
Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite
relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each
other, except relations of origin, as proved above (Q. 28, A. 4). And
opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a
"principle," and of what is "from the principle." Therefore we must
conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the
Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the
Son, as we confess.

Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this
conclusion. For it was said above (Q. 27, AA. 2, 4; Q. 28, A. 4),
that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and the
Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a
word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental
conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost
proceeds from the Son.

We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature
itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one
without order except in those which differ only by their matter; as
for instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other
materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which
there is not only a material distinction we always find that some
order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of
creatures produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So
if from the one Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the Son and
the Holy Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any
other be assigned except the order of their nature, whereby one is
from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy
Ghost proceed from the Father in such a way as that neither of them
proceeds from the other, unless we admit in them a material
distinction; which is impossible.

Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the
Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy
Ghost is the Spirit "of the Son"; and that He is from the Father
"through the Son." Some of them are said also to concede that "He is
from the Son"; or that "He flows from the Son," but not that He
proceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just
consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word
procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin
of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; as
when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a
stream from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, granted
that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can
conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Reply Obj. 1: We ought not to say about God anything which is not
found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But although
we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy
Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of
Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost,
"He will glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine" (John 16:14).
It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of the
Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive
term; except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations,
whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For
when the Lord says, "No one knoweth the Son, but the Father," the
idea of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we
say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be
added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not
thereby be at all excluded; because as regards being the principle of
the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed to each other,
but only as regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is
the Son.

Reply Obj. 2: In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has
been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council
at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as
making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in
the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against
rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of Chalcedon it
is declared that those who were congregated together in the council
of Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not
implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their
predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what
those fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the
time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the
Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not
necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas,
later on, when certain errors rose up, another council [*Council of
Rome, under Pope Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was
explicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose
authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed.
Nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that
the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father.

Reply Obj. 3: The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error
that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a
Nestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was
embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him,
among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is
not to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by some that
while Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son,
neither do those words of his express a denial thereof.

Reply Obj. 4: When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in the
Son, it does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the Son
also is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the
Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of
the lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature
of Christ, by reason of what is written: "On whom thou shalt see the
Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes" (John
1:33).

Reply Obj. 5: The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of
the vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for it
would then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the
mental word, whence proceeds love.

Reply Obj. 6: For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds
from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one
power belongs to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from
the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property
of filiation; for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from
the Father.

Reply Obj. 7: The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch
as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other;
but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son
is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father
and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished
from each other, as explained above, and in Q. 27.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 3]

Whether the Holy Ghost Proceeds from the Father Through the Son?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through
another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost
proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed
immediately; which seems to be unfitting.

Obj. 2: Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through
the Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account of the
Father. But "whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so."
Therefore He proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.

Obj. 3: Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if
the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that
the Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds;
and thus the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is
heretical.

Obj. 4: Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be
said conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the
bailiff, so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through
the king. But we can never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost
through the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father
spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. xii): "Keep me, I pray, in
this expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the
Father--namely Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee:
and that I may deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only
Begotten."

_I answer that,_ Whenever one is said to act through another, this
preposition "through" points out, in what is covered by it, some cause
or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent
and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition
"through" is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent;
and in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be
a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It
is a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works
through love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works
through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works
through the command of another. Sometimes, however, that which is
covered by this preposition "through" is the cause of the action
regarded as terminated in the thing done; as, for instance, when we
say, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that
the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause
why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even
this effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that
this preposition "through" sometimes denotes direct authority, as when
we say, the king works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect
authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through the king.

Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy
Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the
Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
Father through the Son, which has the same meaning.

Reply Obj. 1: In every action two things are to be considered, the
_suppositum_ acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for instance,
fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son
the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no mean, for
this is one and the same power. But if we consider the persons
themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the
Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He
is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did Abel
proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and
mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although,
indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the
immaterial procession of the divine persons.

Reply Obj. 2: If the Son received from the Father a numerically
distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow
that He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the
Holy Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son;
whereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the
Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally
from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or
properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the
Father.

Reply Obj. 3: As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the
begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the
Son), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His
principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost
proceeded; but each of the operations is eternal.

Reply Obj. 4: When anyone is said to work through anything, the
converse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the
mallet works through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the
bailiff acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place to
act, since he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's
place to act, but only to be made to act, and hence it is used only
as an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through the
king, although this preposition "through" denotes a medium, for the
more a _suppositum_ is prior in action, so much the more is its power
immediate as regards the effect, inasmuch as the power of the first
cause joins the second cause to its effect. Hence also first
principles are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences.
Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order
of the subject's acting, the king is said to work through the
bailiff; but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is said to
act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king gives the
bailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order of power between
Father and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence we say that
the Father spirates through the Son; and not conversely.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 4]

Whether the Father and the Son Are One Principle of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one
principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
the Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature,
for the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is
one in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any
one property, for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two
subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the
Son as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are
not one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, in this proposition "the Father and the Son are one
principle of the Holy Ghost," we do not designate personal unity,
because in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor
again do we designate the unity of property, because if one property
were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the
Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father
would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, which
cannot be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one
principle of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3: Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the
Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle
as regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father
and the Son.

Obj. 4: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the
Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father.
But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is
the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and if the one is
not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father.
Therefore we cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle
of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 5: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the
Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one
principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems
to be false; for this word "principle" stands either for the person
of the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it
is false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father
and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 6: Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father
and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows that
they are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we
cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle of the
Holy Ghost.

Obj. 7: Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one
Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the
Father and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert;
and this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "the
Holy Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as
authors." Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of
the Holy Ghost.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and
the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost.

_I answer that,_ The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever
there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since
there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the
Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of
the Holy Ghost.

Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: "The Father
and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," because, they
declare, since the word "principle" in the singular number does not
signify "person," but "property," it must be taken as an adjective;
and forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective,
it cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one
principle of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that
the meaning should be: They are one principle--that is, in one and
the same way. But then it might be equally right to say that the
Father is two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost--namely, in
two ways. Therefore, we must say that, although this word "principle"
signifies a property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as
do the words "father" and "son" even in things created. Hence it takes
its number from the form it signifies, like other substantives.
Therefore, as the Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the
unity of the form that is signified by this word "God"; so they are
one principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of the property
that is signified in this word "principle."

Reply Obj. 1: If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost
proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative
power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property,
as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one
property being in two _supposita_ that possess one common nature. But
if we consider the _supposita_ of the spiration, then we may say that
the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct; for
He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both.

Reply Obj. 2: In the proposition "the Father and the Son are one
principle of the Holy Ghost," one property is designated which is the
form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by reason
of the several properties the Father can be called several
principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not by reason of relative properties that we
speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the
essence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is
to the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father
than is the Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 4: These two propositions, "The Father and the Son are one
principle which is the Father," or, "one principle which is not the
Father," are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not
necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father
and the Son are one principle, this word "principle" has not
determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for two
persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of "figure of speech" as
the argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate.

Reply Obj. 5: This proposition is also true:--The one principle of
the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word
"principle" does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for
the two persons as above explained.

Reply Obj. 6: There is no reason against saying that the Father and
the Son are the same principle, because the word "principle" stands
confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together.

Reply Obj. 7: Some say that although the Father and the Son are one
principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of
the distinction of _supposita,_ as also there are two spirating,
because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the
name "Creator"; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and
the Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the
creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but
as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because
spirating is an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say
that the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the
plurality of the _supposita_ but not two spirators by reason of the
one spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the
_supposita_ but substantives from themselves, according to the form
signified. As to what Hilary says, that "the Holy Ghost is from the
Father and the Son as His authors," this is to be explained in the
sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective.
_______________________

QUESTION 37

OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST--LOVE
(In Two Articles)

We now inquire concerning the name "Love," on which arise two points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 37, Art. 2]

Whether "Love" Is the Proper Name of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that "Love" is not the proper name of the
Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): "As the Father, Son
and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one;
I know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not be called
Charity, and all together one Charity." But no name which is
predicated in the singular of each person and of all together, is a
proper name of a person. Therefore this name, "Love," is not the
proper name of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love is
not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action passing
from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name
of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3: Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a unitive force." But a bond is a
medium between what it joins together, not something proceeding from
them. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and
the Son, as was shown above (Q. 36, A. 2), it seems that He is not
the Love or bond of the Father and the Son.

Obj. 4: Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost is a
lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, He must
be love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): "The Holy
Ghost Himself is Love."

_I answer that,_ The name Love in God can be taken essentially and
personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy
Ghost; as Word is the proper name of the Son.

To see this we must know that since as shown above (Q. 27, AA. 2, 3,
4, 5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect,
which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will,
which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more
known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to
express our various considerations as regards that procession, but
not as regards the procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to
employ circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the
relations following from this procession which are called
"procession" and "spiration," as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3),
and yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict
sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of
each procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone,
there results in the one who understands a conception of the object
understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an
object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved
in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is
said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one
who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he
is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object
understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in
the lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found
to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object
understood, as appears in the word "to understand"; and other words
are used to express the procession of the intellectual
conception--namely, "to speak," and "word." Hence in God, "to
understand" is applied only to the essence; because it does not
import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas "Word" is said
personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term "to
speak" is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle
of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other hand, on the part of
the will, with the exception of the words "dilection" and "love,"
which express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there
are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the
impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by
fact that he loves--to the principle of that impression, or "vice
versa." And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary,
we express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just
as if we were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom
begotten."

It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to
the object loved, "love" and "to love" are said of the essence, as
"understanding" and "to understand"; but, on the other hand, so far as
these words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what
proceeds by way of love, and "vice versa," so that by "love" is
understood the "love proceeding," and by "to love" is understood "the
spiration of the love proceeding," in that sense "love" is the name of
the person and "to love" is a notional term, as "to speak" and "to
beget."

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the
divine essence, as was said above (here and Q. 24, A. 2, ad 4).

Reply Obj. 2: Although to understand, and to will, and to love
signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are
actions that remain in the agents, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 4),
yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain
relation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves is something
that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something
abiding in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed by
word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there
is more than this; because both Word and Love are subsistent.
Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father
for the Son, or for something else; we do not mean anything that
passes into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as
also in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to the thing
expressed by the Word.

Reply Obj. 3: The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the Father and
Son, inasmuch as He is Love; because, since the Father loves Himself
and the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the
Holy Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and
conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact
that the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it necessarily
follows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As
regards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the
third person in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid
relation He is the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from
both.

Reply Obj. 4: As it does not belong to the Son, though He
understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand
as the word proceeding; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost
loves, taking Love as an essential term, still it does not belong to
Him to spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term;
because He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as the one
whence love proceeds.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 37, Art. 2]

Whether the Father and the Son Love Each Other by the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love
each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves
that the Father is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is
Wisdom begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as
explained above (Q. 27, A. 3). Therefore the Father and the Son do
not love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, in the proposition, "The Father and the Son love
each other by the Holy Ghost," this word "love" is to be taken either
essentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken
essentially, because in the same way we might say that "the Father
understands by the Son"; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for
then, in like manner, it might be said that "the Father and the Son
spirate by the Holy Ghost," or that "the Father generates by the
Son." Therefore in no way is this proposition true: "The Father and
the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost."

Obj. 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and
Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy
Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the
act; since it cannot be said that the "Father begets Himself," or
that "He spirates Himself." Therefore, neither can it be said that
"He loves Himself by the Holy Ghost," if "to love" is taken in a
notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy
Ghost; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs
to the essence. Therefore this also is false: "The Father loves the
Son by the Holy Ghost."

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): "The Holy Ghost
is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves
His Begetter."

_I answer that,_ A difficulty about this question is objected to the
effect that when we say, "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost,"
since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean
that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the
Son; which cannot be admitted.

In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that "the
Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost"; and they add
that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to
the effect that "the Father is wise by the Wisdom begotten." Others
say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as
that "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost"--that is, "by His
essential Love," which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others
further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a
sign, so that it means, "the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father
loves the Son"; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as
Love. Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as
importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the
love whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others,
again, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a
formal effect; and these approach nearer to the truth.

To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is
commonly denominated from its forms, as "white" from whiteness, and
"man" from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in
this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form.
So when I say, "this man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is
to be construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the
garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be
denominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is
from its action, but also as from the term itself of the action--that
is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the
action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not
the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding
from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with the flower,
although the flower is not the tree's form, but is the effect
proceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we must say that
since in God "to love" is taken in two ways, essentially and
notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and
the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence.
Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): "Who dares to say that the
Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except
by the Holy Ghost?" The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this
sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means
nothing else than "to spirate love"; just as to speak is to produce a
word, and to flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a
tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word
or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and
the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love
proceeding.

Reply Obj. 1: To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in
God; therefore we cannot say that "the Father is wise or intelligent
by the Son." But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a
notional sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the
Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained.

Reply Obj. 2: When the idea of an action includes a determined
effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the
action, and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree
flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea
of an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case,
the principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect,
but only from the action. For we do not say that the tree produces
the flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So
when we say, "spirates" or "begets," this imports only a notional
act. Hence we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost,
or begets by the Son. But we can say that the Father speaks by the
Word, as by the Person proceeding, "and speaks by the speaking," as
by a notional act; forasmuch as "to speak" imports a determinate
person proceeding; since "to speak" means to produce a word. Likewise
to love, taken in a notional sense, means to produce love; and so it
can be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by
the person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act.

Reply Obj. 3: The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and
us, by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to love, taken in
a notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person,
but also the person produced, by way of love, which has relation to
the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every
creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the Word "begotten"
adequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves
Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy
Ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father
loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to
the creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love,
as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and
goodness are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures.
_______________________

QUESTION 38

OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT
(In Two Articles)

There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which
there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether "Gift" can be a personal name?

(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 38, Art. 1]

Whether "Gift" Is a Personal Name?

Objection 1: It would seem that "Gift" is not a personal name. For
every personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of
"Gift" does not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De
Trin. xv, 19): that "the Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift, that He
also gives Himself as God." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.

Obj. 2: Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But
the divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son, as
Hilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there
is no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift implies
a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards
him by whom it is given. Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.

Obj. 4: Further, "Gift" imports relation to the creature, and it thus
seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said of God
from eternity; as "Father," and "Son." Therefore "Gift" is not a
personal name.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): "As the body of
flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing
but the Holy Ghost." But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also
therefore is "Gift."

_I answer that,_ The word "gift" imports an aptitude for being given.
And what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to
that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless
it was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine
person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son
belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to
possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in this way
a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature
united to God. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not,
however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and
to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain
thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the
Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God
rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine
person. Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner,
its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from above;
for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source.
Thus a divine person can "be given," and can be a "gift."

Reply Obj. 1: The name "Gift" imports a personal distinction, in so
far as gift imports something belonging to another through its
origin. Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is
His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man
belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix):
"What is more yours than yourself?" Or we might say, and more
fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the
phrase, "this is this one's," can be understood in several senses. In
one way it means identity, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix);
and in that sense "gift" is the same as "the giver," but not the same
as the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in that
sense. In another sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as
a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the
giver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third
sense "this is this one's" through its origin only; and in this sense
the Son is the Father's; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both.
Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the
giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a
personal name.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine essence is the Father's gift in the first
sense, as being the Father's by way of identity.

Reply Obj. 3: Gift as a personal name in God does not imply
subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the
one to whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as
above explained.

Reply Obj. 4: Gift is not so called from being actually given, but
from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift
from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that
it is an essential name because it imports relation to the creature;
but that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the
essence is included in the idea of person, as stated above (Q. 34, A.
3).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 38, Art. 2]

Whether "Gift" Is the Proper Name of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the
Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Isaiah
says (9:16): "A Son is given to us." Therefore to be Gift belongs to
the Son, as well as to the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 2: Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property.
But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost.
Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3: Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man,
whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but "God's Gift"
only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "As 'to be born'
is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, 'to be
the Gift of God' is to proceed from Father and Son." But the Holy
Ghost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from
Father and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

_I answer that,_ Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of
the Holy Ghost.

In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable
giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)--i.e. a thing which is not
given with the intention of a return--and it thus contains the idea
of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being
gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone
gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him
is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love
has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are
given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above (Q.
27, A. 4; Q. 37, A. 1), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): "By the gift, which is the Holy
Ghost, many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of
Christ."

Reply Obj. 1: As the Son is properly called the Image because He
proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of
its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so
also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is
properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the
Son is given is from the Father's love, according to the words, "God
so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son" (John 3:16).

Reply Obj. 2: The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the
Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the
origin of the Holy Ghost--that is, His procession.

Reply Obj. 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver;
but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore,
because "Gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called
a gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been
given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.
_______________________

QUESTION 39

OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE
(In Eight Articles)

Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely,
we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence,
to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of
these with each other.

As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?

(2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?

(3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in
the plural, or in the singular?

(4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be
predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?

(5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in
the abstract?

(6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete
essential names?

(7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?

(8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 1]

Whether in God the Essence Is the Same As the Person?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as
person. For whenever essence is the same as person or _suppositum,_
there can be only one _suppositum_ of one nature, as is clear in the
case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really
one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But
in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what
is above expounded (Q. 28, A. 3; Q. 30, A. 2). Therefore essence is
not the same as person.

Obj. 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same
things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and
negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct,
whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is
subject to essence; whence it is called _suppositum_ or "hypostasis."
Therefore person is not the same as essence.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we say the
person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the
Father."

_I answer that,_ The truth of this question is quite clear if we
consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Q. 3, A. 3)
that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same
as _suppositum,_ which in intellectual substances is nothing else
than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while
the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains
its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), "relation
multiplies the Trinity of persons," some have thought that in God
essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be
"adjacent"; considering only in the relations the idea of "reference
to another," and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown
above (Q. 28, A. 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in
God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God
essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons
are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated
(Q. 29, A. 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature.
But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom
really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an
opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that
opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.

Reply Obj. 1: There cannot be a distinction of _suppositum_ in
creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles;
because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God
relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between
them they distinguish the _supposita_; and yet the essence is not
distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished
from each other so far as they are identified with the essence.

Reply Obj. 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way
of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and
affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need
not suppose the other.

Reply Obj. 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of
created things, as above explained (Q. 13, AA. 1, 3). And since
created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of
the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called
"subjects," _supposita,_ or "hypostases." So the divine persons are
named _supposita_ or "hypostases," but not as if there really existed
any real "supposition" or "subjection."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 2]

Whether It Must Be Said That the Three Persons Are of One Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are
of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and
Holy Ghost "are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony." But
the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are
not of one essence.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be
confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius
(Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy
Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.

Obj. 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence.
It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.

Obj. 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the
essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it
does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one
essence.

Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say
that the three persons are "from one essence [ex una essentia]," lest
we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the
persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the
oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three
persons are "of one essence [unius essentiae]."

Obj. 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion
of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or
substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De
Synod.): "One substance predicated of the Father and the Son
signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one
substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior
substance taken and assumed by the other two." Therefore it must not
be said that the three persons are of one substance.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word
_homoousion,_ which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians,
means that the three persons are of one essence.

_I answer that,_ As above explained (Q. 13, AA. 1, 2), divine things
are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for
in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things
created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect
derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by
the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is
the _suppositum_ of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as
the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification.
Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is
the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we
do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form,
unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: "That woman
is of a handsome figure," or: "This man is of perfect virtue." In like
manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not
multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three
persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be
understood as designating the form.

Reply Obj. 1: Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and not
for the essence.

Reply Obj. 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so
many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we
find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, "I and the
Father are one (John 10:30)," and "I am in the Father, and the Father
in Me (John 10:38)"; and there are many other texts of the same
import.

Reply Obj. 3: Because "nature" designates the principle of action
while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be
of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give
heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence" which
have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying
that the three persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are
"of one nature."

Reply Obj. 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated
as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the virtue
of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be
designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or
designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one
signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of
the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of great virtue
[magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the force of two,
as, for instance, "he is a man of blood"--that is, he is a man who
sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence
signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that
the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless
we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the
Father is a person of the "divine essence"; or, the three persons are
"of one essence."

Reply Obj. 5: The preposition "from" or "out of" does not designate
the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an
efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases
distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For
nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a
thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So,
when we say, "three persons of one essence," taking essence as having
the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from
person, which we should mean if we said, "three persons from the same
essence."

Reply Obj. 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): "It would be prejudicial to
holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not
think them holy. So if some misunderstand _homoousion,_ what is that
to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does
not result from division, or from union or from community of
possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 3]

Whether Essential Names Should Be Predicated in the Singular of the
Three Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that essential names, as the name "God,"
should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in
the plural. For as "man" signifies "one that has humanity," so God
signifies "one that has Godhead." But the three persons are three who
have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are "three Gods."

Obj. 2: Further, Gen. 1:1, where it is said, "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth," the Hebrew original has "Elohim," which may
be rendered "Gods" or "Judges": and this word is used on account of
the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are "several
Gods," and not "one" God.

Obj. 3: Further, this word "thing" when it is said absolutely,
seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three
persons in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5):
"The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father,
Son and Holy Ghost." Therefore other essential names can be
predicated in the plural of the three persons.

Obj. 4: Further, as this word "God" signifies "a being who has
Deity," so also this word "person" signifies a being subsisting in
an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for
the same reason we can say there are "three Gods."

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Deut. 6:4): "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy
God is one God."

_I answer that,_ Some essential names signify the essence after the
manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of
adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of
the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those
which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three
persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives
signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify
something by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as
substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or
multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive
name depends upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents
have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality
from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of
adjectives depends upon their _supposita._ In creatures, one form
does not exist in several _supposita_ except by unity of order, as
the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a
form are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular,
but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a
college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are
collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a
form, as above explained (A. 2), which, indeed, is simple and
supremely one, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7; Q. 11, A. 4). So, names
which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are
predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the
plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and
Cicero are "three men"; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and
Holy Ghost are "three Gods," but "one God"; forasmuch as in the three
_supposita_ of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in
the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the
other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner
are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the
plurality of _supposita._ For we say there are three "existent" or
three "wise" beings, or three "eternal," "uncreated," and "immense"
beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if
taken in a substantive sense, we say "one uncreated, immense, eternal
being," as Athanasius declares.

Reply Obj. 1: Though the name "God" signifies a being having Godhead,
nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name
"God" is used substantively; whereas "having Godhead" is used
adjectively. Consequently, although there are "three having Godhead,"
it does not follow that there are three Gods.

Reply Obj. 2: Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So
as by reason of the plurality of _supposita_ the Greeks said "three
hypostases," so also in Hebrew "Elohim" is in the plural. We,
however, do not apply the plural either to "God" or to "substance,"
lest plurality be referred to the substance.

Reply Obj. 3: This word "thing" is one of the transcendentals.
Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God
in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it
is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage
quoted, that "the same Trinity is a thing supreme."

Reply Obj. 4: The form signified by the word "person" is not essence
or nature, but personality. So, as there are three
personalities--that is, three personal properties in the Father, Son
and Holy Ghost--it is predicated of the three, not in the singular,
but in the plural.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 4]

Whether the Concrete Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?

Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot
stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For,
as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for."
But this name "God" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be
predicated in the plural, as above explained (A. 3). Therefore, since
it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.

Obj. 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in
the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense
signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name
"God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot," this term
"God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.

Obj. 3: Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father
generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget,"
because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets,
and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there
are two Gods.

Obj. 4: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is
Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself;
for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself."
Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore
it is false to say, "God begot God."

Obj. 5: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the
Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then
God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there
is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it
cannot be said that "God begot God."

_On the contrary,_ In the Creed it is said, "God of God."

_I answer that,_ Some have said that this name "God" and the like,
properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by
reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This
opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which
requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be
the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name
God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of
expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no
less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the
divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man"
signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this
word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense,
stand for person, as does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes
stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this
predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form
signified--that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person,
either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when
we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King
of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).

Reply Obj. 1: Although this name "God" agrees with singular terms as
regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it
agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be
found in several _supposita._ So it need not always stand for the
essence it signifies.

Reply Obj. 2: This holds good against those who say that the word
"God" does not naturally stand for person.

Reply Obj. 3: The word "God" stands for the person in a different way
from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified
by this word "man"--that is, humanity--is really divided among its
different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there
is no adjunct determining it to the person--that is, to a distinct
subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not
a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this
term "man" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is
required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a species"; whereas
the form signified by the name "God"--that is, the divine essence--is
really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature,
but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the
person. So, when we say, "God generates," by reason of the notional
act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father. But when we
say, "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this
name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that
generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something
be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for
instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it
does not follow that there exists a "God generator," and a "God not
generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as,
for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the generator"
and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not follow that
there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was
said above (A. 3).

Reply Obj. 4: This is false, "the Father begot God, that is Himself,"
because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same
_suppositum._ Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi
ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum se],"
forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then
it means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single
relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however,
either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would
really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself." Likewise also
it is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son
is another than the Father, as above explained (Q. 31, A. 2),
nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as
this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the
substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a
distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God"
is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a
substantive, and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it.
This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for
fear of giving occasion to error.

Reply Obj. 5: To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is
wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to
"God," the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so
that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and
then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false.
Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot God Who
is not God the Father." If however, we understand these words not to
be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the
contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is
false; so that the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is
the Father." Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that
it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false,
and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the
negative and affirmative are false, because this relative "Who" in
the affirmative proposition can be referred to the _suppositum_;
whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the
_suppositum._ Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God
the Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the
negative sense is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from
the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however,
appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri
Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 5]

Whether Abstract Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?

Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand
for the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets
essence." For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and
the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken
singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence."

Obj. 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies
generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is
generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it
seems that the divine essence is generated.

Obj. 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear
from what is above explained (Q. 3, A. 3). But, as was shown, it is
true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true:
"Essence begets essence."

Obj. 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is
predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence
can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.

Obj. 5: Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the
essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is
not begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not
begetting": which cannot be.

Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the
principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by
begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the
Godhead.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets
itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only,
since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence.
Therefore the essence does not beget essence.

_I answer that,_ Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in
asserting that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence
begot essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity
God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong,
because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into
account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of
its signification as above stated (A. 4). Now although "God" is
really the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification
is not in each case the same. For since this word "God" signifies the
divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of
signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the
things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of
this word, "God," as, for instance, we can say "God is begotten" or
is "Begetter," as above explained (A. 4). The word "essence,"
however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person,
because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently,
what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished
from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would
imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there
exists distinction in the _supposita._

Reply Obj. 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy
Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis
than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of
enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus,
for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names,
or even by personal names; as when we find "essence from essence"; or
"wisdom from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, _the Son_ who
is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom.
Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should
be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly
allied to the persons because actions belong to _supposita._ So
"nature from nature," and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than
"essence from essence."

Reply Obj. 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature
numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically
distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and
ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted
accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as
the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either
directly or accidentally.

Reply Obj. 3: Although God and the divine essence are really the
same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of
signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.

Reply Obj. 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode
of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not
follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification
being different. This objection would hold good as regards things
which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.

Reply Obj. 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names
consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them,
whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the
substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is
considered in the light of _suppositum,_ whereas the adjective
indicates something added to the _suppositum._ Therefore substantive
personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are
really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a
distinct essence; but it belongs to the _suppositum_ implied in the
substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be
predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot
say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence
is a thing begetting," or that it is "God begetting," if "thing" and
God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently
there exists no contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing
begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in the first case
"thing" stands for person, and in the second it stands for the
essence.

Reply Obj. 6: So far as Godhead is one in several _supposita,_ it
agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So
when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the
term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as
it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow
that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the
ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say
that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or
spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 6]

Whether the Persons Can Be Predicated of the Essential Terms?

Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of
the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God is
three persons"; or "God is the Trinity." For it is false to say, "man
is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards any particular
subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every
man. In the same way this proposition, "God is the Trinity," cannot be
verified of any one of the _supposita_ of the divine nature. For the
Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So
to say, "God is the Trinity," is false.

Obj. 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except
by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for it is
accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the
three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of
the persons cannot be predicated of this name "God," except in an
accidental sense.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii,
in coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named
Trinity."

_I answer that,_ As above explained (A. 5), although adjectival
terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the
essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to
the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not
only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the
three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be
predicated of the essence as if we were to say, "The essence is the
Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." And because this word "God"
can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (A. 4, ad 3),
hence, as it is true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so
likewise it is true to say, "God is the three persons."

Reply Obj. 1: As above explained this term "man" can of itself stand
for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the
universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man";
because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the
contrary, this word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine
essence. So, although to say of any of the _supposita_ of the divine
nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is true of
the divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not
take note of this distinction.

Reply Obj. 2: When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the
Father," the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in
regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and
singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is God" is of
itself true, so this proposition "God is the Father" is true of
itself, and by no means accidentally.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 7]

Whether the Essential Names Should Be Appropriated to the Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be
appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in
faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as
Jerome says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [*In substance
Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are
common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may
be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they
are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than
to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be
appropriated to the persons.

Obj. 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract
signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another;
since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is
the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when
expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.

Obj. 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property
is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential
attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as
what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential
attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.

_On the contrary,_ the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the
wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24).

_I answer that,_ For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting
that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons.
For although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by
demonstration, as was above expounded (Q. 32, A. 1), nevertheless it
is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us.
Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the
standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can
derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures
which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain
regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (Q. 32, A.
1). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image
found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so
also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes.
And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the
essential attributes is called "appropriation."

The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the
essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things
which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who
proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by
dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine
says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble;
lest anything of the kind be imagined of God.

Reply Obj. 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to the
persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make
the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above
explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation
of the truth.

Reply Obj. 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to the
persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would
follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which
Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the
Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son
were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be
called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is
called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father
Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both
together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom
begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper
concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding;
nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to
prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is
appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body,
but is naturally prior to "white body," considered as white.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 8]

Whether the Essential Attributes Are Appropriated to the Persons in
a Fitting Manner by the Holy Doctors?

Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are
appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For
Hilary says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in
the Image; and use is in the Gift." In which words he designates
three names proper to the persons: the name of the "Father," the name
"Image" proper to the Son (Q. 35, A. 2), and the name "Bounty" or
"Gift," which is proper to the Holy Ghost (Q. 38, A. 2). He also
designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity"
to the Father, species to the Son, and "use" to the Holy Ghost.
This he does apparently without reason. For "eternity" imports
duration of existence; species, the principle of existence; and
'use' belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not
found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are
not fittingly appropriated to the persons.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity is
in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the
concord of equality and unity." This does not, however, seem fitting;
because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is
appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom
begotten, as above explained (Q. 37, A. 2, ad 1). But, as he
subjoins, "All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by
the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost." The above, therefore, are
not fittingly appropriated to the Persons.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed
"power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness." Nor does
this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas strength
is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text,
"Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is
likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words,
"strength [*Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all" (Luke
6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.

Obj. 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the Apostle
says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken in a
confused sense." And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the
Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost." This,
however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to
imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes.
Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the
Father, Who is "the principle from no principle."

Obj. 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to John
14:6, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the book
of life," according to Ps. 39:9, "In the beginning of the book it is
written of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father Who
is My head," also this word "Who is"; because on the text of Isaias,
"Behold I go to the Gentiles" (65:1), a gloss adds, "The Son speaks
Who said to Moses, I am Who am." These appear to belong to the Son,
and are not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De
Vera Relig. 36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without
any dissimilitude." So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son,
Who has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son,
as signifying "a thing from another"; for every book is written by
someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son;
because if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who am," the Trinity
spoke, then Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have said
further, "He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent
me to you," pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false;
because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot
be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.

_I answer that,_ Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God
from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from
creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves
to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is
considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its
intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth
point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence
this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.

According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider
God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary
applies, according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father,
species to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For "eternity" as
meaning a "being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property
of the Father, Who is "a principle without a principle." Species or
beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes
three conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things
which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion" or
"harmony"; and lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are
called beautiful which have a bright color.

The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch
as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the
Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin.
vi, 10): "Where--that is, in the Son--there is supreme and primal
life," etc.

The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the
express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be
beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is
indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), "Where there
exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc.

The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is
the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin.
vi, 10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to
speak, the art of the omnipotent God," etc.

"Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the
"use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of "to
enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of
the will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each
other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is
what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation,
that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the
"use" by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy
Ghost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin.
vi, 10): "In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the
Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His
immense bounty and wealth." Thus it is clear how "eternity,"
species, and "use" are attributed or appropriated to the persons,
but not essence or operation; because, being common, there is nothing
in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons.

The second consideration of God regards Him as "one." In that view
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity" to the Father,
"equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is
manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For
"unity" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else;
and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any
other person is not presupposed since He is the "principle without
principle." "Equality" implies unity as regards another; for that is
equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is
appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a principle."
"Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the
Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can
understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5)
that "The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by
reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost." For it
is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first:
just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul,
because therein we find the first trace of life. Now "unity" is
perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an
impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other
persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons
be removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as
soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son,
not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but
that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be
called equal; because His equality is considered firstly in regard to
the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from
the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be
excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the
Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost;
because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son
are said to be united.

According to the third consideration, which brings before us the
adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be
a third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness."
This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as
regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of
dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For "power" has
the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly
Father, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly
father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. "Wisdom" has
likeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but
the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by
reason of lack of years. "Goodness," as the nature and object of love,
has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly
spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to
Isa. 25:4: "The spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the
wall." "Strength" is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost,
not as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to
express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that the
strong work done by an agent is its strength.

According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His
effects, there arise[s] appropriation of the expression "from Whom, by
Whom, and in Whom." For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies
a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God;
and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which
can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is
appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition
"by" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say
that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is not always
appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly,
according to the text, "All things were made by Him" (John 1:3); not
that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a
principle." Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form "by" which
an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence,
as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the
expression "by Whom." The preposition "in" strictly denotes the
habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in
one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as
existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him"
should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are
contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and
governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the
expression "in Him" is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is
"goodness." Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first
of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle
without a principle": because the divine persons, of Whom the Father
is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since
each of Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural
procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural
power.

Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth"
belongs to the intellect, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), it is
appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His.
For truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing
itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are
referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be
said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth
as appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means
knowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained
(Q. 24, A. 1), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to
possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son;
although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain
kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of
the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence
of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work
produced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an
appropriation to a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to
the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an
adjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the
delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as
the word "Who" is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate
to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken
personally; as, for instance, were we to say, "The Son is the
begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten is personal." But
taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun
"this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person,
nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically
treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person;
as we may say, "this stone," and "this ass." So, speaking in a
grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for
the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun
"this," according to Ex. 15:2: "This is my God, and I will glorify
Him."
_______________________

QUESTION 40

OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES
(In Four Articles)

We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or
properties; and there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether relation is the same as person?

(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?

(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons
leaves the hypostases distinct?

(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding,
presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 1]

Whether Relation Is the Same As Person?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God relation is not the same as
person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others
are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in
the person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration.
Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the
Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 24),
nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor
can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for
otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation,
or property, is not the same as person in God.

Obj. 3: Further, when several things are identical, what is
predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is
predicated of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say
that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting.
Therefore property is not the same as person in God.

_On the contrary,_ in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same,
according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by
paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the
persons.

_I answer that,_ Different opinions have been held on this point. Some
have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons;
and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the
relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in" something, but
rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the
relations "assistant," as above explained (Q. 28, A. 2). But
since relation, considered as really existing in God, is the divine
essence Itself, and the essence is the same as person, as appears from
what was said above (Q. 39, A. 1), relation must necessarily be
the same as person.

Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties
were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said,
there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as
stated above (Q. 32, A. 2). We must, however, say that there are
properties in God; as we have shown (Q. 32, A. 2). These are
designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons.
So, since the nature of a form requires it to be "in" that of which it
is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and
yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God,
and yet is God.

Reply Obj. 1: Person and property are really the same, but differ in
concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied,
the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in
God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity
exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the
divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it
follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as
"Godhead" and "God." And as the divine simplicity excludes the
composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is
attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power
are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence.
According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same as
person. For personal properties are the same as the persons because
the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the
subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself,
and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the
non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the
other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is
His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of
the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one
self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two
persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above
explained (Q. 30, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: The properties are said to be in the essence, only by
mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity,
not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the
form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and
distinguish the persons, but not the essence.

Reply Obj. 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the notional
acts: and acts belong to a _suppositum._ Now, properties are not
designated as _supposita,_ but as forms of _supposita._ And so their
mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being
predicated of the properties.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 2]

Whether the Persons Are Distinguished by the Relations?

Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by
the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the
persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by
themselves, and not by the relation.

Obj. 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its
genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But
"hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance.
Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.

Obj. 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But
the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction.
Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.

Obj. 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first
principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which
comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is
towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God
cannot be relation.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone
multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons."

_I answer that,_ In whatever multitude of things is to be found
something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of
distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence,
we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are
several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the
divine persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although these
do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification;
for "origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and
"relation" by way of the form, as "paternity."

Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that
the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say
that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former
begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the
properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons
as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest
the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the
material principles.

This opinion, however, cannot stand--for two reasons. Firstly,
because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their
distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic
to both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their
form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but
means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies
the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator.
Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator
should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and
in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be
distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to
presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the
persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons
are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because
the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if
what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence
remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must
constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the
properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons,
inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity
is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract
and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin
that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an
active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it
presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as
"nativity," signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet
constituting the person.

It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are
distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in
both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of
understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations;
whence this name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the
hypostasis; whereas this term "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies
property only; forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation
which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term
"Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive
and constitutive of the hypostasis.

Reply Obj. 1: The persons are the subsisting relations themselves.
Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them
to be distinguished by the relations.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as regards
being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as
regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their
distinction.

Reply Obj. 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it
approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible
distinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by that which
distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation.

Reply Obj. 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects,
when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does
not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said
that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word "another"
signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the
order of nature.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 3]

Whether the Hypostases Remain If the Relations Are Mentally Abstracted
from the Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the hypostases remain if the
properties or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For
that to which something is added, may be understood when the addition
is taken away; as man is something added to animal which can be
understood if rational be taken away. But person is something added to
hypostasis; for person is "a hypostasis distinguished by a property of
dignity." Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a
person, the hypostasis remains.

Obj. 2: Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is someone,
are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by paternity,
supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that the Son,
in Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone." So when
paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains
"someone"--that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed
from person, the hypostasis remains.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is not
the same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son,
nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten." But if He had not
begotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if
paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the
Father as unbegotten.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing
else than birth." But He is Son by "birth." Therefore, if filiation
be removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds
as regards the other persons.

_I answer that,_ Abstraction by the intellect is twofold--when the
universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from
man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a
circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The
difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in
the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which
the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of
rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the
intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the
form from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the
intellect; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from
brass, there remains in our intellect separately the understanding
both of a circle, and of brass. Now, although there is no universal
nor particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless,
as regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of
these things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6)
that "substance is common and hypostasis is particular." So, if we
speak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular, the
common universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties
are removed; but not the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it
were, a particular.

But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the
non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases
and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's
being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father,
the Father's hypostasis or person remains.

If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of
the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not
to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added
to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own
_supposita,_ inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus
paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something
distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So,
as relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above
explained (A. 2), it follows that if the personal relations are
mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however,
think, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not
distinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father
is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as
from another by generation. And that the consequent relations which
are to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of
a person, and are thus called "personal properties." Hence, if these
relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the
persons, remain.

But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations
distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above (A. 2);
secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person,
as appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that,
"person is the individual substance of a rational nature." Hence, to
have hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the
rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.

Reply Obj. 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing
property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all
of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing
property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood as
subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing
property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer
remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature
removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual substances.
Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially
to both.

Reply Obj. 2: By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a
person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow,
however, that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it
does not follow that He is not a person.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of
the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity were removed,
as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of
the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being unbegotten"
says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But
he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not every unbegotten being
is the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the hypostasis of the
Father does not remain in God, as distinguished from the other
persons, but only as distinguished from creatures; as the Jews
understand it.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 4]

Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are understood
before the properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. i,
D, xxvii) that "the Father always is, because He is ever begetting the
Son." So it seems that generation precedes paternity in the order of
intelligence.

Obj. 2: Further, in the order of intelligence every relation
presupposes that on which it is founded; as equality presupposes
quantity. But paternity is a relation founded on the action of
generation. Therefore paternity presupposes generation.

Obj. 3: Further, active generation is to paternity as nativity is
to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity; for the Son is so
called because He is born. Therefore paternity also presupposes
generation.

_On the contrary,_ Generation is the operation of the person of the
Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore
in the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation.

_I answer that,_ According to the opinion that the properties do not
distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest
them as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that
the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional
acts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that "because
He begets, He is the Father." A distinction, however, is needed if we
suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the divine
hypostases. For origin has in God an active and passive
signification--active, as generation is attributed to the Father, and
spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and
the Son; passive, as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession
to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in the
passive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the person
proceeding; because origin, as passively understood, signifies the way
to a person constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified
actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal
relation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration
precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative property
common to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father
can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus
again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act,
for relation, as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as
it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the
relation, as an action presupposes a person acting.

Reply Obj. 1: When the Master says that "because He begets, He is
Father," the term "Father" is taken as meaning relation only, but not
as signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary
to say conversely that because He is Father He begets.

Reply Obj. 2: This objection avails of paternity as a relation, but
not as constituting a person.

Reply Obj. 3: Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and so,
in the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as
constituting the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a
proceeding from the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes
the personal property of the Father.
_______________________

QUESTION 41

OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS
(In Six Articles)

We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts,
concerning which six points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?

(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?

(3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or
from something?

(4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?

(5) What this power means?

(6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 1]

Whether the Notional Acts Are to Be Attributed to the Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be
attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever
is predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine
substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action is one
of the ten genera. Therefore any action attributed to God belongs
to His essence, and not to a notion.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, "everything
which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance,
or relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by
the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by
the names of the persons, or by the names of the properties.
Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be
attributed to the persons.

Obj. 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion.
But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional
acts to be placed in God.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says:
"It is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional
acts are to be placed in God.

_I answer that,_ In the divine persons distinction is founded on
origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts.
Wherefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we
must attribute notional acts to the persons.

Reply Obj. 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a
twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from
Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions
which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures
from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God
regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts
which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because
the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons,
as is clear from what was above explained (Q. 32, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of the
persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are
altogether the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and
nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D,
xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing
from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be
changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some
cause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement;
for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called
"passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another
and terminating in what is moved, is called "action." Hence, if we
take away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin,
in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is
from that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists,
the personal action of the one producing a person is only the
habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle;
which habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we
cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the
manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and
wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ
from the relations which result from action and passion, and
therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons
separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner
of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same,
differing only in their mode of signification.

Reply Obj. 3: Action, so far as it means origin of movement,
naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not
attributed to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a
grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of
speaking, as we attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son
"to be begotten."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 2]

Whether the Notional Acts Are Voluntary?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For
Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led
to beget the Son."

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom
of the Son of His love" (Col. 1:13). But love belongs to the will.
Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy
Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He
proceeds voluntarily.

Obj. 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the
Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore
the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.

Obj. 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the
Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He
begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad
Orosium qu. vii).

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father
begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."

_I answer that,_ When anything is said to be, or to be made by the
will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the
ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man
by my will--that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be
said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by
will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the
other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it
is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the
principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the God
the Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the
creature by His will. Whence in the book _De Synod.,_ it is said: "If
anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is
said to be made, let him be anathema." The reason of this is that
will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way
that nature is determined to one, while the will is not determined to
one; and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the
agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing
there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as
it is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the will
acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas
understood. Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on
the quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and understanding.
So the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or
that way; whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the
principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is
far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a
created being; because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a
creature is made from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the
Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will,
taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must
assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature.
Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of God gave to all
creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son a nature
derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things created
are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God, subsists
in the perfect likeness of God."

Reply Obj. 1: This saying is directed against those who did not admit
even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the
Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by
nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves
suffer many things against our will from natural necessity--as, for
instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what
precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus
we read: "Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He
were led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son."

Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God,
inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if
love were the principle of the Son's generation.

Reply Obj. 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills something
naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise
God naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things
other than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in
itself, as above explained (Q. 19, A. 3). Now, the Holy Ghost
proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He
proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of will.

Reply Obj. 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the
mind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally
understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the
conception of the divine Word is natural.

Reply Obj. 5: A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and "by
reason of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold
meaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus
necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause,
when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far
as without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well
attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation
necessary; because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject
to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of itself" which
cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in
the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 3]

Whether the Notional Acts Proceed from Something?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from
anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will
be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else,
since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it
follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son,
and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that,
"In them nothing diverse or different exists." If the Father begets
the Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if
it be something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated
therefrom just as we say, "The man is white," since the man remains,
when not from white he is made white--it follows that either the
Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father
is the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the
Son from something, but from nothing.

Obj. 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle
regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from
His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of
the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a material
principle, because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it
is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the principle
of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates,
which was disproved above (Q. 39, A. 5).

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three
persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not
another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another
thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the
Father's essence.

Obj. 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture
the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus. 24:5), in the
person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most
High, the first-born before all creatures": and further on (Ecclus.
24:14) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning,
and before the world was I created." Therefore the Son was not
begotten from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object
concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (Zech. 12:1):
"Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the
foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him";
and (Amos 4:13) according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "I
Who form the earth, and create the spirit."

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says:
"God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal
to Himself."

_I answer that,_ The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the
Father's substance. For it was explained above (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 33,
AA. 2 ,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly
exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true "generation,"
whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and "making," that the
maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a
bench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a
created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out
of nothing, as will be shown later on (Q. 45, A. 1), not as if this
nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because
the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him without anything
else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the
Father as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what
the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of
filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if
the Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not
be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated
(1 John 5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ."
Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made,
but begotten.

That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of
God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain
likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is
the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the "only
begotten," according to John 1:18, "The only begotten Son, Who is in
the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are
entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the
"first begotten," according to Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew He also
predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He
might be the first born of many brethren." Therefore the Son of God is
begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as
man is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation
passes into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine
nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father
in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but
communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin
remaining as explained above (Q. 40, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the
preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle,
but not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter,
is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the
divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.

Reply Obj. 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the
Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this
denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he
expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"--that
is, of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
13): "When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I
said more explicitly, of the essence of the Father."

This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the
words. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence;
but not that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them
otherwise, by observing that the preposition "of" [de] always denotes
consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the
builder, since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say,
however, that something is "of" another, if this is its
consubstantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether it
be an active principle, as the son is said to be "of" the father, or
a material principle, as a knife is "of" iron; or a formal principle,
but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not
accidental to another, for we can say that an angel is "of" an
intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is
begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of
the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of
the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we
say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is
nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the
preposition, so there is no parity of argument.

Reply Obj. 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be
understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created
wisdom given by God to creatures: for it is said, "He created her
[namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all
His works" (Ecclus. 1:9, 10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in
one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for
wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom.
The saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the
Son, so that the sense be, "From the beginning and before the world
was I made"--that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or
the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into
our minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what
is generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains
to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but
the creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is
called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of
creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from
generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way
Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The
other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the
created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the
breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible
substance.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 4]

Whether in God There Is a Power in Respect of the Notional Acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect
of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or
passive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God
nothing which we call passive power, as above explained (Q. 25, A.
1); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another,
since the divine persons were not made, as stated above (A. 3).
Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the
divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary.
Therefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons
proceed, there cannot be power in God.

Obj. 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept
of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs
to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as
regards intellect and will, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). Therefore,
in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the
Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of
God the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional
acts.

_I answer that,_ As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be
also a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the
principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of
generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of
spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father,
and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power
of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every
generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we
must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power
of spirating.

Reply Obj. 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not
proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts
has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the
person as proceeding.

Reply Obj. 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a
consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence,
in God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only
in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in
this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to
be, so also is it possible that the Son should be generated.

Reply Obj. 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies
distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must
observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real
distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real
distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of
which He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct
from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God
the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise
action would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to
those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are
distinct from God, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe
power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to
God the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting
and of spirating. But "to understand" and "to will" are not such
actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from
God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to
these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but
only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we
designate by different terms the intellect and the act of
understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His
very essence which has no principle.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 5]

Whether the Power of Begetting Signifies a Relation, and Not the
Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of
spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power
signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active
power is the principle of action, as we find in _Metaph._ v, text 17.
But in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally.
Therefore, in God, power does not signify essence but relation.

Obj. 2: Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are
not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore,
the same applies to the power of begetting.

Obj. 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to
the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the
three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not
signify the essence.

_On the contrary,_ As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He
wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence.
Therefore, also, the power to beget.

_I answer that,_ Some have said that the power to beget signifies
relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is
properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that
produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as
to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his
begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the
power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power
of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter.

Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine
nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power
of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God
cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot
subsist other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God."

We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies
principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii),
and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as
identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For
although paternity is signified as the form of the Father,
nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person
of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature.
Now the individual form in things created constitutes the person
begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise
Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood
as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person of
the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by
which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like
to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that
generation is the "work of nature," not of nature generating, but of
nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore
the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the
relation indirectly.

Reply Obj. 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a
principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it
signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in
which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that
by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it
makes, and the generator from that which it generates: but that by
which the generator generates is common to generated and generator,
and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since,
therefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the
Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of
identity, and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore,
from the fact that we say that the divine essence "is the principle
by which the Begetter begets," it does not follow that the divine
essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we
were to say that the divine essence begets.

Reply Obj. 2: As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the
act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the
act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of
reason.

Reply Obj. 3: When I speak of the "power of begetting," power is
signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say,
the "essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence,
which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three
persons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper
to the person of the Father.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 6]

Whether Several Persons Can Be the Term of One Notional Act?

Objection 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to
several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or
spirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But
the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He
cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore
there can be several Sons in God.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son
did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved
Him not."

Obj. 3: Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than
has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God
can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished
after begetting the Son.

_On the contrary,_ In God "that which is possible," and "that which is"
do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be
several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be
more than three Persons in God; which is heretical.

_I answer that,_ As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father,
one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given.

The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are
the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations
themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or
several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or
more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible
except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species
are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God.
Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as
there could be but one subsistent whiteness.

The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God
understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there
can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which
person is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of
love, which person is the Holy Ghost.

The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons
proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said
(A. 2), and nature is determined to one.

The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons.
For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation
is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is
similar in regard to the other persons.

Reply Obj. 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the
same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the
power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the
gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son
has the "power to beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the
same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason
of the notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of being
begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power
"generandi" is in the Son--that is, the power of being begotten. The
same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal
verb, so that the sense be "the power of generation"--that is, a
power by which it is generated by some person.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the
Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He
could not, as we shall see later on (Q. 42, A. 6, ad 3).

Reply Obj. 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in
God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have
explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to
any lack of begetting power in the Father.\
_______________________

QUESTION 42

OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS
(In Six Articles)

We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another:
firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard
to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.

(1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?

(2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He
proceeds in eternity?

(3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?

(4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?

(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?

(6) Whether they are equal in power?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Equality in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the
divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one
in quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the
divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic
quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity,
which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of
discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore
equality is not becoming to the divine persons.

Obj. 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have
said (Q. 39, A. 2). Now essence is signified by way of form. But
agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal.
Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not
of equality.

Obj. 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are
equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine
persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine
says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly to that
whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that
which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image." But the
Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the
Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.

Obj. 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to
the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the
relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.

_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says that "the three persons are
co-eternal and co-equal to one another."

_I answer that,_ We must needs admit equality among the divine persons.
For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15, 16, 17),
equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot
admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius
says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of
Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do,
who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus
involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things
cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else
than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any
inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same
essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is
impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons.

Reply Obj. 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk" or
dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things,
and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of
"virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some
nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of
something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or
less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly
by its source--that is, by the perfection of that form or nature:
such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great
heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine
says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great, but not in
bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is
the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the
effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for
everything has being by reason of its form. The second effect is
operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently
virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to
action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect
nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as
things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as
Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: "We understand
equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one
of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or
surpasses in power."

Reply Obj. 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity,
equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes
excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be
alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as
the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said
to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than
another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and
Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not
only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the
error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude
the error of Arius.

Reply Obj. 3: Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two
ways--namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns,
equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the
Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because
the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's.
Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is
therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the
Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to
creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are
not mutual." For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch
as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the
form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.

But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not
in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son
receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the
Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is
equalled to the Father, but not conversely.

Reply Obj. 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to
consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations
in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both--namely,
distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to
itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons
equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and
essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is
not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another
by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to
filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity
and filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied
indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons
is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in
its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the
persons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says
(Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these "it is only the terms that are
relative."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 2]

Whether the Person Proceeding Is Co-eternal with His Principle, As
the Son with the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not
co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius
gives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of
a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The
second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent
equality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a
seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The
fourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also
consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an
accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The
sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives
the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of
spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by
knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is
transformation, as an image is made of brass; which transformation is
material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have
effect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but
this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the
Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an
idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind.
The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which
implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that
equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one
thing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say
that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.

Obj. 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a principle.
But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not
eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence
everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is
existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He
begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.

Obj. 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is
always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is
begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process
of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive
things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion,
it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be
admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of
the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist.

_On the contrary,_ Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are
co-eternal with each other."

_I answer that,_ We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the
Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which
proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due
to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the
part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently
as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account
of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it
gives to the effect, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 2), so it can choose
the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however,
the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural
power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as,
for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first.
Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle
cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is
successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to
act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the
instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to
what has been said (Q. 41, A. 2), that the Father does not beget the
Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was
perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father
produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be
successively generated, and this generation would be material, and
accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we
conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus
the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is
co-eternal with both.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode
of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine
generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of
these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied
from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let
Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the
Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the
name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the
procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly;
the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an
intellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said
of God.

Reply Obj. 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not
the principle of origin.

Reply Obj. 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts
begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however,
is not changed, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 2). Hence the Son is ever
being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.

Reply Obj. 4: In time there is something indivisible--namely, the
instant; and there is something else which endures--namely, time. But
in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said
above (Q. 10, A. 2, ad 1; A. 4, ad 2). But the generation of the Son
is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to
express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that
"He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as
Gregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is
better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence
of eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus,
therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when
He was not," as Arius said.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 3]

Whether in the Divine Persons There Exists an Order of Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does
not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the
essence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not
signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore
there is no order of nature in God.

Obj. 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes
before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in
the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as
declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no
order of nature.

Obj. 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists.
But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is
not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.

Obj. 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But
there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there
of nature.

_On the contrary,_ Where plurality exists without order, confusion
exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius
says. Therefore in God order exists.

_I answer that,_ Order always has reference to some principle.
Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle--namely, according
to site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of
demonstration; and according to each individual cause--so are there
many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without
priority, exists in God as we have stated (Q. 33, A. 1): so there
must likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and
this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine
(Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby
one is from another."

Reply Obj. 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in
general, not a special kind of origin.

Reply Obj. 2: In things created, even when what is derived from a
principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle
still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally
considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of
cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding
therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in
the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the
definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the
persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the
nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to
another, not even in the order of nature and reason.

Reply Obj. 3: The order of nature means not the ordering of nature
itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to
natural origin.

Reply Obj. 4: Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a
principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more
correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 4]

Whether the Son Is Equal to the Father in Greatness?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in
greatness. For He Himself said (John 14:28): "The Father is greater
than I"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:28): "The Son Himself shall
be subject to Him that put all things under Him."

Obj. 2: Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But
paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not
possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness
to the Father.

Obj. 3: Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts
are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more
than two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a
part; for under relation or notion, several notions are included.
Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the
Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Phil. 2:6): "He thought it not robbery
to be equal with God."

_I answer that,_ The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in
greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of
His nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and
filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession
of the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same
way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a
certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to
act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who
begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a
defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise.
From what precedes (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 33, AA. 2 ,3), it is evident that
in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say
that the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that
the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by
change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the
Father in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): "Remove
bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and
all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural
nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature."

Reply Obj. 1: These words are to be understood of Christ's human
nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but
in His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by
Athanasius, "Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the Father
in humanity": and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): "By the fact of giving,
the Father is greater; but He is not less to Whom the same being is
given"; and (De Synod.): "The Son subjects Himself by His inborn
piety"--that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas
"creatures are subject by their created weakness."

Reply Obj. 2: Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness
signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (A. 1, ad 1),
and belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have
reference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or
dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations.
Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), "The question of
origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what
kind, or how great, is he?" Therefore, paternity is the Father's
dignity, as also the Father's essence: since dignity is something
absolute, and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same
essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation,
so the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is
filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever
dignity the Father has; but we cannot argue--"the Father has
paternity, therefore the Son has paternity," for there is a
transition from substance to relation. For the Father and the Son
have the same essence and dignity, which exist in the Father by the
relation of giver, and in the Son by relation of receiver.

Reply Obj. 3: In God relation is not a universal whole, although it
is predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are
one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of
universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being. Person
likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above (Q. 30,
A. 4). Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only
one; nor are all the persons something greater than only one; because
the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 5]

Whether the Son Is in the Father, and Conversely?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each
other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes of
one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son
in the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each
mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing that has come out from another is within.
But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to Mic.
5:2: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of
eternity." Therefore the Son is not in the Father.

Obj. 3: Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the
Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be in
the other.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 14:10): "I am in the Father, and
the Father is in Me."

_I answer that,_ There are three points of consideration as regards
the Father and the Son; the essence, the relation and the origin; and
according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The
Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His
own essence and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change
on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's essence is in the
Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His
own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is
His essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), "The
unchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an
unchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature of God to
subsist in Him, for He is God in God." It is also manifest that as
regards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the
concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the
procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect,
inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is
uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the
Holy Ghost.

Reply Obj. 1: What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently
represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes
enumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each
other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be
found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle,
except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which
proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created.

Reply Obj. 2: The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the
interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and
remains therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the
distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation.

Reply Obj. 3: The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not
essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in
the other.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 6]

Whether the Son Is Equal to the Father in Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father
in power. For it is said (John 5:19): "The Son cannot do anything of
Himself but what He seeth the Father doing." But the Father can act
of Himself. Therefore the Father's power is greater than the Son's.

Obj. 2: Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches
than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son
according to John 14:31: "As the Father gave Me commandment so do I."
The Father also teaches the Son: "The Father loveth the Son, and
showeth Him all things that Himself doth" (John 5:20). Also, the Son
hears: "As I hear, so I judge" (John 5:30). Therefore the Father has
greater power than the Son.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able to
beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii,
7), "Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the
omnipotence of God the Father?" But the Son cannot beget a Son, as
proved above (Q. 41, A. 6). Therefore the Son cannot do all that
belongs to the Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him
power.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 5:19): "Whatsoever things the
Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner."

_I answer that,_ The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power.
Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In
creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the
greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above (A. 4) that
the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that
the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness--that is, in
perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the
Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation
to both.

Reply Obj. 1: The words, "the Son cannot of Himself do anything," do
not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it
is immediately added, "Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son
doth in like manner"; but their meaning is to show that the Son
derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature.
Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), "The unity of the divine nature
implies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does not
act by Himself [a se]."

Reply Obj. 2: The Father's "showing" and the Son's "hearing" are to
be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the
Son, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be
explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge
and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be
referred to Christ in His human nature.

Reply Obj. 3: As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and
filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the
Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the
Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to
argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for
generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the same
omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father
possessing power as "giving" signified when we say that He is able to
beget; while the Son possesses the power of "receiving," signified by
saying that He can be begotten.
_______________________

QUESTION 43

THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS
(In Eight Articles)

We next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which
there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent?

(2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?

(3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent?

(4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent?

(5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent?

(6) To whom the invisible mission is directed?

(7) Of the visible mission.

(8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 1]

Whether a Divine Person Can Be Properly Sent?

Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly
sent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine
person is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by
another.

Obj. 2: Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence
Jerome says, commenting on Ezech. 16:53: "What is joined and tied in
one body cannot be sent." But in the divine persons there is nothing
that is separable, as Hilary says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one
person is not sent by another.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes
anew into another. But this does not apply to a divine person, Who is
everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be
sent.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 8:16): "I am not alone, but I and
the Father that sent Me."

_I answer that,_ the notion of mission includes two things: the
habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to
the end whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind
of procession of the one sent from the sender: either according to
command, as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as
an adviser may be said to send the king to battle; or according to
origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term
to which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to
be present there: either because in no way was he present before in
the place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in
some way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a
divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the
procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of
existing in another; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father
into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by
taking our nature; whereas "He was" previously "in the world" (John
1:1).

Reply Obj. 1: Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it
means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel;
forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is
the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which
is according to equality, as explained above (Q. 42, AA. 4, 6).

Reply Obj. 2: What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously
it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it is
necessarily separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no
place in the mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent
neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases
to exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without a
separation, having only distinction of origin.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection rests on the idea of mission according
to local motion, which is not in God.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 2]

Whether Mission Is Eternal, or Only Temporal?

Objection 1: It would seem that mission can be eternal. For Gregory
says (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), "The Son is sent as He is begotten." But
the Son's generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something
temporally. But a divine person is not changed. Therefore the
mission of a divine person is not temporal, but eternal.

Obj. 3: Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of
the divine persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gal. 4:4): "When the fullness of the
time was come, God sent His Son."

_I answer that,_ A certain difference is to be observed in all the
words that express the origin of the divine persons. For some express
only relation to the principle, as "procession" and "going forth."
Others express the term of procession together with the relation to
the principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as
"generation" and "spiration"; for generation is the procession of the
divine person into the divine nature, and passive spiration is the
procession of the subsisting love. Others express the temporal term
with the relation to the principle, as "mission" and "giving." For a
thing is sent that it may be in something else, and is given that it
may be possessed; but that a divine person be possessed by any
creature, or exist in it in a new mode, is temporal.

Hence "mission" and "giving" have only a temporal significance in
God; but "generation" and "spiration" are exclusively eternal;
whereas "procession" and "giving," in God, have both an eternal and a
temporal signification: for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but
temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or
likewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible mission.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son,
not from the Father, but from His mother; or it may be taken to mean
that He could be sent because eternally begotten.

Reply Obj. 2: That a divine person may newly exist in anyone, or be
possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the divine
person, but from change in the creature; as God Himself is called
Lord temporally by change of the creature.

Reply Obj. 3: Mission signifies not only procession from the
principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession.
Hence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the
eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the
relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence
the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal,
not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double
term, temporal and eternal.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 3]

Whether the Invisible Mission of the Divine Person Is Only According
to the Gift of Sanctifying Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission of the divine
person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For the
sending of a divine person means that He is given. Hence if the divine
person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the
divine person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and this
is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is not given, but
that His gifts are given.

Obj. 2: Further, this preposition, "according to," denotes the
habitude of some cause. But the divine person is the cause why the
gift of sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according
to Rom. 5:5, "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the
Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." Therefore it is improperly said that
the divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "the Son, when
temporally perceived by the mind, is sent." But the Son is known not
only by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith
and knowledge. Therefore the divine person is not sent only according
to the gift of sanctifying grace.

Obj. 4: Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the
apostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a gift of
sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine
person is not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the Holy
Ghost proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification." But
mission is a temporal procession. Since then the creature's
sanctification is by sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission
of the divine person is only by sanctifying grace.

_I answer that,_ The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that
He exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone;
and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace.

For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according
to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which
participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode,
however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature
wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the
knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature
by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself,
according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the
rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So
no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is
in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace.
Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only
according to sanctifying grace.

Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy:
and to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be
according to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed
by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying
grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.

Reply Obj. 1: By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature
is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift
itself, but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the
invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying
grace; and yet the divine person Himself is given.

Reply Obj. 2: Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the
divine person; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy
Ghost is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift
itself of grace is from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the words,
"the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost."

Reply Obj. 3: Although the Son can be known by us according to other
effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us
according to those effects.

Reply Obj. 4: The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as
also does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces. Hence
gratuitous grace is called the "manifestation of the Spirit" (1 Cor.
12:7). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for the
working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given to them with
the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to
them without the grace itself, it would not be simply said that the
Holy Ghost was given, except with some qualifying term; just as we
read of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy, or
of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying
or of working miracles.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 4]

Whether the Father Can Be Fittingly Sent?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is fitting also that the Father
should be sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given.
But the Father gives Himself since He can only be possessed by His
giving Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father sends
Himself.

Obj. 2: Further, the divine person is sent according to the
indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us
according to John 14:23: "We will come to him and make Our abode with
him." Therefore each one of the divine persons is sent.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs to them all,
except the notions and persons. But mission does not signify any
person; nor even a notion, since there are only five notions, as
stated above (Q. 32, A. 3). Therefore every divine person can be sent.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), "The Father alone
is never described as being sent."

_I answer that,_ The very idea of mission means procession from
another, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above
expounded. Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it
fitting for Him to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and
to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another.

Reply Obj. 1: In the sense of "giving" as a free bestowal of
something, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to
be enjoyed by the creature. But as implying the authority of the
giver as regards what is given, "to be given" only applies in God to
the Person Who is from another; and the same as regards "being sent."

Reply Obj. 2: Although the effect of grace is also from the Father,
Who dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost, still
He is not described as being sent, for He is not from another. Thus
Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Father, when known by
anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He
is, or from whom He proceeds."

Reply Obj. 3: Mission, meaning procession from the sender, includes
the signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in
general; thus "to be from another" is common to two of the notions.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 5]

Whether It Is Fitting for the Son to Be Sent Invisibly?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be
sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the divine person is
according to the gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the
Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:11: "One and the same Spirit
worketh all things." Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.

Obj. 2: Further, the mission of the divine person is according to
sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of the
intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held
without the gift of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I should
have prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and
if I should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and have
not charity, I am nothing." Therefore, since the Son proceeds as the
word of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent
invisibly.

Obj. 3: Further, the mission of the divine person is a procession, as
expounded above (AA. 1, 4). But the procession of the Son and of the
Holy Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct
missions if both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous,
since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of divine Wisdom (Wis. 9:10): "Send her
from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness."

_I answer that,_ The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying
grace, according to John 14:23: "We will come to him, and will make Our
abode with him." But that a divine person be sent to anyone by
invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way
within him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both
to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by
grace, and to be from another, it therefore belongs to both of them to
be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace,
still it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently
He is not sent.

Reply Obj. 1: Although all the gifts, considered as such, are
attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the
first Gift, since He is Love, as stated above (Q. 38, A. 1), some
gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are
appropriated in a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong
to the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of
the Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Son is sent
to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone."

Reply Obj. 2: The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a
divine person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a
likening of the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift
of grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to
the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy
Ghost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas the Son is the
Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. Hence
Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): "The Word we speak of is knowledge
with love." Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any
kind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual
illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love, as is
said (John 6:45): "Everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath
learned, cometh to Me," and (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire
shall flame forth." Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20):
"The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone." Now
perception implies a certain experimental knowledge; and this is
properly called wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge
[sapida scientia], according to Ecclus. 6:23: "The wisdom of doctrine
is according to her name."

Reply Obj. 3: Since mission implies the origin of the person Who is
sent, and His indwelling by grace, as above explained (A. 1), if we
speak of mission according to origin, in this sense the Son's mission
is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost, as generation is
distinguished from procession. If we consider mission as regards the
effect of grace, in this sense the two missions are united in the
root which is grace, but are distinguished in the effects of grace,
which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling
of the affection. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be
without the other, because neither takes place without sanctifying
grace, nor is one person separated from the other.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 6]

Whether the Invisible Mission Is to All Who Participate Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission is not to all
who participate grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their
share of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission; for it is
said (John 7:39): "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was
not yet glorified." Therefore the invisible mission is not to all
partakers in grace.

Obj. 2: Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the
invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue; because
progress in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or
decreases; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the
invisible mission is not to all who share in grace.

Obj. 3: Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace.
But mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas
Christ, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God.
Therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace.

Obj. 4: Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and
it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore
the invisible mission is not to all that have grace.

_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27),
the invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every
creature that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission
is to every such creature.

_I answer that,_ As above stated (AA. 3, 4 ,5), mission in its very
meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he
was not before, as occurs to creatures; or begins to exist where he
was before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to
the divine persons. Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is
sent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain
renewal by grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom
are to be found these two conditions.

Reply Obj. 1: The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament
Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that
the invisible mission of the Son "is in man and with men. This was
done in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets." Thus the
words, "the Spirit was not yet given," are to be applied to that
giving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day
of Pentecost.

Reply Obj. 2: The invisible mission takes place also as regards
progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De
Trin. iv, 20), that "the Son is sent to each one when He is known
and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived
according to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards
God, or united perfectly to Him." Such invisible mission, however,
chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of
a new act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace; as, for
example, the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or of
prophecy, or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself
to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his possessions, or to
undertake any arduous work.

Reply Obj. 3: The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the
very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made to
them subsequently, not by "intensity" of grace, but by the further
revelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such
an increase is by the "extension" of grace, because it extends to a
greater number of objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent
at the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards, since from
the beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and
grace.

Reply Obj. 4: Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the
New Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments
of the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent
to the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to
its term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the
sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the sacraments.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 7]

Whether It Is Fitting for the Holy Ghost to Be Sent Visibly?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent
in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is said
to be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be
less than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent
in a visible manner.

Obj. 2: Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union to
a visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. But
the Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it
cannot be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in
others, unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the
sacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost
is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes
place in all these things.

Obj. 3: Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth
the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason
of those visible creatures more than any other person.

Obj. 4: Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest
kind of creature--namely, the human nature. Therefore if the Holy
Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational
creatures.

Obj. 5: Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the
ministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So
visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the
angels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.

Obj. 6: Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner
is only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as
invisible things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the
invisible mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible
mission; and to all who received the invisible mission, whether in
the New or in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise
to be sent; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is
not sent visibly.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Matt. 3:16) that, when our Lord was
baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove.

_I answer that,_ God provides for all things according to the nature of
each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the
invisible by visible things, as explained above (Q. 12, A. 12).
Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by
the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has
demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible
creatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the
invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest
by some visible creatures.

This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and
to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as
Love, to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of
the Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus
the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the
Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification.

Reply Obj. 1: The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He
appeared, into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said
of that creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of
the nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the
Holy Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared,
into the unity of His person; so that what is said of it cannot be
predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the Father by
reason of any visible creature.

Reply Obj. 2: The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not apply to
the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as Augustine
says (De Trin. ii, 6): "The prophetic vision is not displayed to
corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the
spiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire,
saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost the same
relation to these images that the Son has to the rock, because it is
said, 'The rock was Christ' (1 Cor. 10:4). For that rock was already
created, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it
typified; whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify
only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame
of the burning bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people
followed in the desert, and to the lightning and thunder issuing
forth when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the
bodily appearances of those things was that they might signify, and
then pass away." Thus the visible mission is neither displayed by
prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the
body, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament,
wherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify
something. But the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as
He showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made
for that purpose.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still
they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that
person. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by
diverse names, so also can They each one be signified by different
things; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.

Reply Obj. 4: It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the
author of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible
mission of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational
nature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of
sanctification; whereas any other creature could be the sign of
sanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a
purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His
person, since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action,
but only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not
required to last beyond what its use required.

Reply Obj. 5: Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of
the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify the
Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those
visible creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that account
the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel.

Reply Obj. 6: It is not necessary that the invisible mission should
always be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as is
said (1 Cor. 12:7)--"the manifestation of the Spirit is given to
every man unto profit"--that is, of the Church. This utility consists
in the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible
signs. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles,
according to Heb. 2:3, "which having begun to be declared by the
Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard."

Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to
Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints on whom the
Church was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the
visible mission made to Christ should show forth the invisible mission
made to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of
His conception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the time
of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show
forth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual
regeneration; hence the Father's voice spoke, "This is My beloved Son"
(Matt. 3:17), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the
only Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance
of a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it
was said, "Hear ye Him" (Matt. 17:5). To the apostles the mission was
directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their
ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said,
"Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven" (John 20:23): and
again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of
teaching; whence it is said that, "they began to speak with divers
tongues" (Acts 2:4). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was
fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the
visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the
Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son
manifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine persons were,
however, given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed,
cannot be called visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De
Trin. ii, 17), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the
divine person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 8]

Whether a Divine Person Is Sent Only by the Person Whence He Proceeds
Eternally?

Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the
one whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin. iv),
"The Father is sent by no one because He is from no one." Therefore if
a divine person is sent by another, He must be from that other.

Obj. 2: Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But
there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from
origin. Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one
sending.

Obj. 3: Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He does
not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although He
proceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De
Trin. xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence
He proceeds.

_On the contrary,_ The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to Isa.
48:16, "Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit." But the Son is
not from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent by one from
Whom He does not proceed.

_I answer that,_ There are different opinions on this point. Some say
that the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds
eternally; and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the
Holy Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature, by
reason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine,
however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent by Himself, and by
the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the Son;
so that to be sent in God does not apply to each person, but only to
the person proceeding from another, whereas to send belongs to each
person.

There is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person
is described as being sent, the person Himself existing from another
is designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the
mission of the divine person. Thus if the sender be designated as the
principle of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but
that person only Who is the principle of that person who is sent; and
thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by the
Father and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as
the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the
whole Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a
man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect
of grace.

The answers to the objections appear from the above.
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ. 44-49)
_______________________

QUESTION 44

THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL
THINGS
(In Four Articles)

After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must
consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration
will be threefold:

(1) of the production of creatures;

(2) of the distinction between them;

(3) of their preservation and government.

Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered:

(1) the first cause of beings;

(2) the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause;

(3) the principle of the duration of things.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?

(2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent
coordinate principle with Him?

(3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there
are other exemplar causes?

(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Necessary That Every Being Be Created by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being
be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be
found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its
cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can
be understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and
therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by
God.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to
exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an
efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because
whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are
many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are
from God.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated
by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the
efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text
3); therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient
cause.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Rom. 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and
in Him are all things."

_I answer that,_ It must be said that every being in any way existing
is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must
be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron
becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Q. 3, A. 4)
when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially
self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (Q. 11, AA. 3, 4) that
subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting,
it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients.
Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are
beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which
are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be
more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses
being most perfectly.

Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude;
and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in
being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every
truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all
heat.

Reply Obj. 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of the
definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on
what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has
being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a
being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without
having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not
enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for
us to find a being uncaused.

Reply Obj. 2: This objection has led some to say that what is
necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly
false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are
the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says
(Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have
a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is
required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but
because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this
conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and
consequent be possible or impossible.

Reply Obj. 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as though
it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in
reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient
cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of
mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause
is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the
mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from
its efficient cause.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 2]

Whether Primary Matter Is Created by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God.
For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else
(Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore
primary matter cannot have been made by God.

Obj. 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a
division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first
passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two
principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the
other.

Obj. 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since
every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only
in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is
against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast
Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"--viz. angels--"the other
nigh unto nothing"--viz. primary matter.

_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were
step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of
grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except
sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not
consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in
relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation.
And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was
uncreated, they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes,
as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that
kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a
distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter
they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation
to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such
transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as
the oblique circle [*The zodiac, according to Aristotle (De Gener.
ii)], or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into
consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate
species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is
contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being;
for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore,
considered "being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or
as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to
things. Then others there were who arose to the consideration of
"being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as
"these," or as "such," but as "beings."

Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must
be the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by
accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial
forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in
any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is
created by the universal cause of things.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of
"becoming" in particular--that is, from form to form, either
accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things
according to their emanation from the universal principle of being;
from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is
excluded from the former mode of being made.

Reply Obj. 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable
that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first
active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one
perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
says (Metaph. xii, text 40).

Reply Obj. 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is not
created, but that it is not created without form; for though
everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is
necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all
that belongs to its being is created.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 3]

Whether the Exemplar Cause Is Anything Besides God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something
besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures
are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar
cause.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something
self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated above
(A. 1). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by
participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all
sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but
also individuating principles added to the principles of the species.
Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for
instance, a _per se_ man, and a _per se_ horse, and the like, which
are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.

Obj. 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species
themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there
is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are
some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular
things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion
follows as above.

Obj. 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div.
Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life,
and before self-subsisting wisdom.

_On the contrary,_ The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas,
according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which
are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of
things are not outside God.

_I answer that,_ God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In
proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything
an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive
a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in
matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the
exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in
the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive
determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the
divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the
order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things.
And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of
all things, which types we have called ideas--i.e. exemplar forms
existing in the divine mind (Q. 15, A. 1). And these ideas, though
multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart
from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence
can be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore
God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things
created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of
its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some
kind of imitation.

Reply Obj. 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness
to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like
to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him,
forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is
like to the house in the architect's mind.

Reply Obj. 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man
without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man
is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to
anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior
species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other
sensible things.

Reply Obj. 3: Although every science and definition is concerned only
with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the
same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding.
For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from
the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the
universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their
exemplars.

Reply Obj. 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing
life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself,
sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any
self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 4]

Whether God Is the Final Cause of All Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all
things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God
needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.

Obj. 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing
generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),
because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But
God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the
final cause of all things.

Obj. 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not
desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the
end of all things.

Obj. 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If,
therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it
follows that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has made all
things for Himself."

_I answer that,_ Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would
not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it
were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered
as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the
impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient
intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are
both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents,
and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition
of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent
only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to
communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every
creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness
of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness
is the end of all things.

Reply Obj. 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent,
which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not
belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal
giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His
own goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of
generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the
generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise
the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the
generator, since the end is more noble than the means to the end.

Reply Obj. 3: All things desire God as their end, when they desire
some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or
natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and
desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.

Reply Obj. 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final
cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows
that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this
does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him,
some of which come into our mind before others.
_______________________

QUESTION 45

THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE
(In Eight Articles)

The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from
the First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight
points of inquiry:

(1) What is creation?

(2) Whether God can create anything?

(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?

(4) To what things it belongs to be created?

(5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?

(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any
one Person?

(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?

(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature
and of the will?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 1]

Whether to Create Is to Make Something from Nothing?

Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything
from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To
make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make
something by bringing forth something from what was already."

Obj. 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered
from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and
from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation
appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions.
Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being
to being.

Obj. 3: Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some
cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a
statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of
being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make
something from nothing.

_On the contrary,_ On the text of Gen. 1, "In the beginning God
created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from
nothing."

_I answer that,_ As said above (Q. 44, A. 2), we must consider not
only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but
also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is
God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now
what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that
emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is
made from "not-man," and white from "not-white." Hence if the
emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be
considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed
before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore
as the generation of a man is from the "not-being" which is
"not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from
the "not-being" which is "nothing."

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense,
according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when
we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of
creation in that way here, but as it is described above.

Reply Obj. 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term
_wherefrom,_ but from the term _whereto._ Therefore a change is more
perfect and excellent when the term _whereto_ of the change is more
noble and excellent, although the term _wherefrom,_ corresponding to
the term _whereto,_ may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply
nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial
form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the
substantial form, which is the term _wherefrom_ in generation, is
more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term _wherefrom_ in
alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than
generation and alteration, because the term _whereto_ is the whole
substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term
_wherefrom_ is simply not-being.

Reply Obj. 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing, this
preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only
order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after
morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition
"from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word
"nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense,
then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now
and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the
preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It is made
from nothing--i.e. it is not made from anything"--as if we were to
say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does not speak of anything.
And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is
made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition "from" [ex]
implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense,
it imports the material cause, which is denied.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 2]

Whether God Can Create Anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because,
according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient
philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing
is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the
contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make
the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation
are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything
from nothing, or create.

Obj. 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to
be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as
appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of
what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to
be made out of nothing by God.

Obj. 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been
becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same
time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what
is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it
would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time.
Therefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having
been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which
the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything
should be made from nothing.

Obj. 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite
distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not
happen that something is made from nothing.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth."

_I answer that,_ Not only is it [not] impossible that anything should
be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were
created by God, as appears from what has been said (Q. 44, A. 1). For
when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from
which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by
his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or
brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action
of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards
their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act
from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing
presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above
(Q. 44, AA. 1, 2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is
the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that
God brings things into being from nothing.

Reply Obj. 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above (Q. 44, A. 2),
considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular
causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action;
whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing."
But this has no place in the first emanation from the universal
principle of things.

Reply Obj. 2: Creation is not change, except according to a mode of
understanding. For change means that the same something should be
different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the
same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in
motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is
the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the
subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole
substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as
different now and before only according to our way of understanding,
so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and
afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the
substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations
(Phys. iii, text 20, 21), it must follow that when motion is
withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the
creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of
understanding as was said above (Q. 13, A. 1), creation is signified
by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is
to make something from nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made"
are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be
changed," because "to make" and "to be made" import a relation of
cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change
only as a consequence.

Reply Obj. 3: In things which are made without movement, to become
and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the
term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated
and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of
movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the
same time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak
of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not
previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is
being created and is already created at the same time.

Reply Obj. 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if
there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is
plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken
to signify a change existing between two forms.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 3]

Whether Creation Is Anything in the Creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that creation is not anything in the
creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to
the creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to
the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the
Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be
something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything
in the creature.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the
creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:
since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the
creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same
reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to
infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.

Obj. 3: Further, if creation is anything besides the created
substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident
is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of
creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term
of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the
accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the
action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action
and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.

_On the contrary,_ It is greater for a thing to be made according to
its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or
accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby
anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form,
is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation,
whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something
in the thing created.

_I answer that,_ Creation places something in the thing created
according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by
movement, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is
made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the
particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the
production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is
God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when
movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as
was said above (A. 2, ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a
certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even
as in passion, which implies movement, is implied a relation to the
principle of motion.

Reply Obj. 1: Creation signified actively means the divine action,
which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God
relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation
of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real
relation, as was said above (Q. 13, A. 7) in treating of the divine
names.

Reply Obj. 2: Because creation is signified as a change, as was said
above (A. 2, ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover
and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium
between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation
is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further
creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature
being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations,
but by themselves; as was also shown above (Q. 42, A. 1, ad 4), in
treating of the equality of the Persons.

Reply Obj. 3: The creature is the term of creation as signifying a
change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and
is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident.
Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of
the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the
creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it
should be created; because creation imports a relation of the
creature to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 4]

Whether to Be Created Belongs to Composite and Subsisting Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to
composite and subsisting things. For in the book, _De Causis_ (prop.
iv) it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a
thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking
does not belong to subsisting and composite things.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite
things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.

Obj. 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is
properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the
thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter,
and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting
composite things. Therefore creation belongs to them.

_I answer that,_ To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was
shown above (Q. 44, A. 2, ad 2, 3). Now, to be made is directed to the
being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong
to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to
subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of
separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material
substances. For being belongs to that which has being--that is, to
what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like
are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because
something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its
subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a
being." Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting
things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought
to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas,
properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.

Reply Obj. 1: In the proposition "the first of created things is
being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation,
but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created
thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is
"this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the
Universal Being, as was said above (A. 1). We use a similar way of
speaking when we say that "the first visible thing is color,"
although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.

Reply Obj. 2: Creation does not mean the building up of a composite
thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite"
is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all
its principles.

Reply Obj. 3: This reason does not prove that matter alone is
created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for
creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 5]

Whether It Belongs to God Alone to Create?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to
create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34),
what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures
are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make
their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man.
Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself.
But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no
matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.

Obj. 2: Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the
thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But
a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more
power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a
creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more
therefore can a creature do this.

Obj. 3: Further, the power of the maker is considered according to
the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we
proved above when treating of the infinity of God (Q. 7, AA. 2, 3,
4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by
creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of
a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good
nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other
creatures.

_I answer that,_ It sufficiently appears at the first glance,
according to what precedes (A. 1), that to create can be the action
of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the
more universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most
universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of
the first and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is
said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither intelligence nor the soul
gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now
to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to
creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God
alone.

It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of
another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts
by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of
fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper
act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the
power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that
the first separate substance created by God created another after
itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the
substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in
the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can
communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter
can create ministerially, not by its own power.

But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause
does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch
as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect
of the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to
what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be
any need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that
a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form,
produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the
principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is
presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence
nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect,
since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed
by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible
for any creature to create, either by its own power or
instrumentally--that is, ministerially.

And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no
body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its
action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which
is contrary to the very idea of creation.

Reply Obj. 1: A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a
likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by
applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the
cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause
of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man
begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter
whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man
participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to
speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own being, as we
have said above (Q. 7, AA. 1, 2). Therefore no created being can
produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in
"this": and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is
this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But
in an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything
whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form,
whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an
immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like
to itself as regards its being, but only as regards some added
perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an
inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x). In this way even in
heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (Eph. 3:15): "From
whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which
evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless
something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i,
text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. And
so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the
potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire
intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but
is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the
potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act;
and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is
required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much
greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality
pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much
greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.

Reply Obj. 3: The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the
substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being
made; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore
although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power,
yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which
appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is
required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the
potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which
produces something from no presupposed potentiality is infinite,
because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the
potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural agent, as there is
no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no
creature has simply an infinite power, any more than it has an
infinite being, as was proved above (Q. 7, A. 2), it follows that no
creature can create.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 6]

Whether to Create Is Proper to Any Person?

Objection 1: It would seem that to create is proper to some Person.
For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is
perfect is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the
divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and is more
perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of
its principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude.
Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the
processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.

Obj. 2: Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each
other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever
difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them
according to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the
causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons;
for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that "He is the Creator
of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by
Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that
He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation of creatures
belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.

Obj. 3: Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature
flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person,
this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect
is caused by every essential attribute--viz. by power, goodness and
wisdom--and thus does not belong to one more than to another.
Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed
to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in
creating according to relations and processions.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things
caused are the common work of the whole Godhead.

_I answer that,_ To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce
the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the
principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action;
for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create
belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is
common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one
Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.

Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their
procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For
as was said above (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4), when treating of the
knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His
intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made
by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in
his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object.
Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which
is His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so
the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of
creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes,
knowledge and will.

Reply Obj. 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of
creation, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2: As the divine nature, although common to the three
Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the
Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost
from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to
the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son
receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to
be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not
receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said
(John 1:3), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has
the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through"
usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle."
But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is
attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created
by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for this particular
appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the
appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (Q.
39, A. 8, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly
shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to be the
Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the
intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through Whom all
things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to
which belong both government, which brings things to their proper
end, and the giving of life--for life consists in a certain interior
movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.

Reply Obj. 3: Although every effect of God proceeds from each
attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is
naturally connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom,"
and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" poured
out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the
very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power."
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 7]

Whether in Creatures Is Necessarily Found a Trace of the Trinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily
found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its
traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the
creatures, as was above stated (Q. 32, A. 1). Therefore there is no
trace of the Trinity in creatures.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if
the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of
their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the
Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each
of these (properties): and so on to infinitude.

Obj. 3: Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the
causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the
relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered.
Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity
but of the unity of essence.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace
of the Trinity appears in creatures."

_I answer that,_ Every effect in some degree represents its cause,
but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the
cause, but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a
representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone
has passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as
regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents fire
generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is
called the representation of "image." Now the processions of the
divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was
said above (Q. 27). For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect;
and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in
rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the
representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is
found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.

But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch
as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily
reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature
subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to
a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a
created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in
that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle
from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it
represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the
conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it
represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order
of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And
therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the
Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one
individual," and according "as it is formed by a species," and
according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also
are reduced those three, "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned
in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of
the thing limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species,
"weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the other
three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," species,
and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): "that which
exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing
exists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and agrees by its
order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.

Reply Obj. 1: The representation of the trace is to be referred to
the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a
knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we
have said (Q. 32, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2: A creature properly speaking is a thing
self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to
be found. Nor is it necessary that these three things should be found
in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being is
the trace ascribed in regard to those three things.

Reply Obj. 3: The processions of the persons are also in some way the
cause and type of creation; as appears from the above (A. 6).
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 8]

Whether Creation Is Mingled with Works of Nature and Art?

Objection 1: It would seem that creation is mingled in works of
nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is
produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no
part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every
operation of nature and art there is creation.

Obj. 2: Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But
in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which is an
active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not
produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be
produced by creation.

Obj. 3: Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are
found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident in
animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these
is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to
other things.

Obj. 4: Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore
in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow that
nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes
the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of
creation.

_I answer that,_ The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which,
some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but
previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent.
This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how
to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms
pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they asserted that they
pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or
caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that
to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this opinion arose
from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the
form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a
thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong
properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown above (A. 4), it
does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be
"concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is
the "composite," which is made from matter.

Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is
presupposed to the work of nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are
made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly."

Reply Obj. 2: The active qualities in nature act by virtue of
substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces
its like according to quality, but according to species.

Reply Obj. 3: For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal
agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to
which they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind
of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created
by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals
the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is required,
in the shape of a univocal generator.

Reply Obj. 4: The operation of nature takes place only on the
presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature
are called creatures.
_______________________

QUESTION 46

OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES
(In Three Articles)

Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures,
about which there are three points for treatment:

(1) Whether creatures always existed?

(2) Whether that they began to exist is an article of Faith?

(3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the
beginning?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 1]

Whether the Universe of Creatures Always Existed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the
world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything
which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise
it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began
to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But
possible being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence,
which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from
privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must
have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist without form:
while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore
the world existed before it began to exist: which is impossible.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is
and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing extends
so long it exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be
always; for its power does not extend to any determinate time.
Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not:
but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and at some
time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But
there are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial
bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not
begin to exist.

Obj. 3: Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the
Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and
also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten.
Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.

Obj. 4: Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there
might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body
where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there,
otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world
there was a vacuum; which is impossible.

Obj. 5: Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through
either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was
before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved.
Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement.
Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved
always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.

Obj. 6: Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But
neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For
nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change
precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing,
there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not
there before. And the will, without itself being changed, puts off
doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined
change, at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a
house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be
tomorrow, but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass,
and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because
time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before
every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so the same
conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 7: Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in
its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is not in
its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is
in its beginning and end, because there is no time except "now" which
is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore
time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can movement, the
measure of what is time.

Obj. 8: Further, God is before the world either in the order of
nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only,
therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if
God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior in
duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the
world, which is impossible.

Obj. 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect;
for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause,
requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the
sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of
His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the
efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above (Q.
44, AA. 2, 3, 4). Since therefore God is eternal, the world is also
eternal.

Obj. 10: Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But
the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the
world is eternal.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 17:5), "Glorify Me, O Father,
with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and
(Prov. 8:22), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways,
before He made anything from the beginning."

_I answer that,_ Nothing except God can be eternal. And this
statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown
above (Q. 19, A. 4) that the will of God is the cause of things.
Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God
to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the
necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above
(Q. 19, A. 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that
God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore
necessary for God to will that the world should always exist; but the
world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of
the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not
therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot
be proved by demonstration.

Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively,
demonstrative--viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the
ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite
impossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both
in _Phys._ viii and in _De Coelo_ i, text 101, he premises some
opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings
forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks
of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is
not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is
probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that
there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say
from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal."

Reply Obj. 1: Before the world existed it was possible for the world
to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, but
according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing
is called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from
the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other;
in which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears from the
Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of
having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but
before it received that power, it did not exist.

Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120)
does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist;
but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things
generated and corruptible begin.

Reply Obj. 3: Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is
unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to
derive its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves
that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from
which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows
either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by
generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that
matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears
above (Q. 44, A. 1, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 4: The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is
nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in
which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text
60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the
world was.

Reply Obj. 5: The first mover was always in the same state: but the
first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas
hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by
creation, which is not change, as said above (Q. 45, A. 2, ad 2).
Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys.
viii), is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal
movable things, but not eternal movement, as appears from the
opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the
moment that movable things began to exist movement also existed.

Reply Obj. 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He
had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce
an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be
presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take
into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that
presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal
agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the
form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it
introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it
is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and
not into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But
it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter
together: whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces
matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent
presupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly
described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before,"
according to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the
universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not
correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an
imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were
presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time
to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what
was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more
evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was
not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was
not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest
of what always was.

Reply Obj. 7: As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after"
belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning
and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now,
granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given
moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need
not be if movement be a beginning. The same applies to the "now" of
time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as being
always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of
time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys.
viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but
denied the eternity of movement.

Reply Obj. 8: God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But
the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or
we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not
of time really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there is
nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place,
according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those
of the heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 9: As the effect follows from the cause that acts by
nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows
from the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and
determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (Q. 19,
A. 4; Q. 41, A. 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity the
sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was
produced by Him, except as preordained by His will--that is, that it
should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to
declare its author.

Reply Obj. 10: Given the action, the effect follows according to the
requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in
agents acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be
taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from
the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such
an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not
being.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 2]

Whether It Is an Article of Faith That the World Began?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a
demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that
is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved
demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed
this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can
be demonstratively proved that the world began.

Obj. 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by
God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something.
But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world
would have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of
Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated.
Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and
thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which works by intellect works from some
principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by
intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore,
which is His effect, did not always exist.

Obj. 4: Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have
developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some
fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been
always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.

Obj. 5: Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But
if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration.
Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.

Obj. 6: Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that
infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass
through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at
this present day; which is manifestly false.

Obj. 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was
eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite
series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii,
text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite
series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).

Obj. 8: Further, if the world and generation always were, there have
been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: therefore
an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is
impossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world
began, and not only is it known by faith.

_On the contrary,_ The articles of faith cannot be proved
demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (Heb.
11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world
began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in one God,"
etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses
prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated.
Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and
therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.

_I answer that,_ By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration
can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said
above of the mystery of the Trinity (Q. 32, A. 1). The reason of this
is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part
of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the
essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is
abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence it is said that universals
are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man,
or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be
demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will.
For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as
regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He
wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Q. 19,
A. 3). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which
faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of
faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to
consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of
faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to
give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds
we believe things that are of faith.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of
philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For
some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is
an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are
cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made
by God. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time,
but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was
always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei
x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity,
there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by
him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker
always existed." To understand this we must consider that the
efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its
effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action,
and every agent must be the principle of action. But if the action is
instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker
to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of
illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if
God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the
world in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world,
is not a successive change, as was said above (Q. 45, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Those who would say that the world was eternal, would
say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made
after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation,
but that it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do
not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix,
text 4).

Reply Obj. 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys.
viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion,
except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out
what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human
intellect, but not the divine intellect (Q. 14, AA. 7, 12).

Reply Obj. 4: Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that
some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being
uninhabitable to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise
they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and
accidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay.
Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such
particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole
world.

Reply Obj. 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it would not
be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6);
because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without
succession; but with the world it is otherwise.

Reply Obj. 6: Passage is always understood as being from term to
term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there
is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection
is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite
number of mean terms.

Reply Obj. 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to
infinity _per se_--thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes
that are _per se_ required for a certain effect; for instance, that a
stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to
infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity
_accidentally_ as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the
causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one
cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by
means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may
be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer
acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to
this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for
he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men
generating hold one grade in efficient causes--viz. the grade of a
particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be
generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible
if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an
elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

Reply Obj. 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this
reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to
be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of
Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But
this was disproved above (Q. 7, A. 4). Some say that the soul is
corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will
remain. But others, as Augustine says [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4, 5; De
Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a
circuit of souls--viz. that souls separated from their bodies return
again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which
matters will be given later (Q. 75, A. 2; Q. 118, A. 6). But be it
noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one
might say that the world was eternal, or at least some creature, as
an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in
general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 3]

Whether the Creation of Things Was in the Beginning of Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that the creation of things was not in the
beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of
time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation
the substance of things was brought into being; and time does not
measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things.
Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that
everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies
a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is
indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, since to be
created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not
created in the beginning of time.

Obj. 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be
created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the
beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things
was not in the beginning of time.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth."

_I answer that,_ The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to
exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and
that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the
beginning" are expounded--viz. "of time." And some said that there
are two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of
evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded--"in the
Son." For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by
reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son
by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), "Thou
hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made
all things in the beginning--that is, in the Son; according to the
word of the Apostle (Col. 1:16), "In Him"--viz. the Son--"were
created all things." But others said that corporeal things were
created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to
exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"--i.e. before
all things--"God created heaven and earth." For four things are
stated to be created together--viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal
matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Things are said to be created in the beginning of time,
not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but
because together with time heaven and earth were created.

Reply Obj. 2: This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being
made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because,
since in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one
point in a given movement--that is, whilst anything is in the process
of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after,"
because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not
in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the term of
movement, as was said above (Q. 45, AA. 2, 3). Hence a thing is
created in such a way that it was not being created before.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists
of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according to
some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from
it time begins.
_______________________

QUESTION 47

OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL
(In Three Articles)

After considering the production of creatures, we come to the
consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be
threefold--first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly,
of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of
the spiritual and corporeal creature.

Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:

(1) The multitude or distinction of things.

(2) Their inequality.

(3) The unity of the world.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 1]

Whether the Multitude and Distinction of Things Come from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of
things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one.
But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Q. 11, A.
4). Therefore He produces but one effect.

Obj. 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar.
But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (Q.
44, A. 3). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not
diverse.

Obj. 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end
of the creation is one--viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above
(Q. 44, A. 4). Therefore the effect of God is but one.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:4, 7) that God "divided the
light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore
the distinction and multitude of things is from God.

_I answer that,_ The distinction of things has been ascribed to many
causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by
itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the
ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter,
attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction
of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter.
Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of
things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the
intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in
matter.

But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown
above (Q. 44, A. 2), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we
must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause.
Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the
form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their
proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account
of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is
formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms.

Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents,
as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced
the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own
being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as
will appear later (Q. 50, A. 3). And so the first intelligence,
inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second
intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality
it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as
it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the
heavens.

But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it
was shown above (Q. 45, A. 5) that to create belongs to God alone,
and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God
alone--viz. all those things which are not subject to generation and
corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the
universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the
first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such
an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore,
the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of
things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible.

Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come
from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought
things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to
creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could
not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many
and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the
representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another.
For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is
manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together
participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it
better than any single creature whatever.

And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of
things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word
of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read
in Gen. 1:3, 4: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the
light from the darkness."

Reply Obj. 1: The natural agent acts by the form which makes
it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its
effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was
shown above (Q. 19, A. 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since,
therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand
many things, as was shown above (Q. 15, A. 2), it follows that,
although He is one, He can make many things.

Reply Obj. 2: This reason would apply to the representation
which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by
reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is
only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly,
which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by
many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the
plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of
things.

Reply Obj. 3: In speculative things the medium of
demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one
only; whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when
operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the
end, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to
its end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is
necessary.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 2]

Whether the Inequality of Things Is from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the inequality of things is not from
God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things
that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs
to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal.

Obj. 2: Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text
20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.

Obj. 3: Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal
things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no
inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives
being to things, it seems that He has made all things equal.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ecclus. 33:7): "Why does one day excel
another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun
another sun? [Vulg.: 'when all come of the sun']. By the knowledge of
the Lord they were distinguished."

_I answer that,_ When Origen wished to refute those who said that the
distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and
evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by
God. For he asserted that God first created only the rational
creatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from
free-will, some being turned to God more and some less, and others
turned more and others less away from God. And so those rational
creatures which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the
order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those who
were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the
diversity of their sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation
and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, it would
follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the
effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it
would be for the sake of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to
what is said: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were
very good" (Gen. 1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 3):
"What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect
provided this one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its
beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened
through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned,
there would be a hundred suns in the world?"

Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of
the distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the cause of their
inequality. This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction
is found in things; one is a formal distinction as regards things
differing specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards
things differing numerically only. And as the matter is on account
of the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal
distinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only
one individual of each species, forasmuch as the species is
sufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in things generated and
corruptible there are many individuals of one species for the
preservation of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction
is of greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinction
always requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
viii, 10), the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary
by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species
seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect
than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants,
and men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more
perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of
the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the
universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not
be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.

Reply Obj. 1: It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which
is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every
part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the
whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be
taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus,
therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole,
according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each
single creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we
find it said of each creature, "God saw the light that it was good"
(Gen. 1:4); and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all
together it is said, "God saw all the things that He had made, and
they were very good" (Gen. 1:31).

Reply Obj. 2: The first effect of unity is equality; and then comes
multiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to
Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son
proceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the
creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless
even creatures share in a certain equality--namely, of proportion.

Reply Obj. 3: This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but it
holds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of
which is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things
there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality,
either of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality
comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears also in works
done by art; for the roof of a house differs from the foundation, not
because it is made of other material; but in order that the house may
be made perfect of different parts, the artificer seeks different
material; indeed, he would make such material if he could.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 3]

Whether There Is Only One World?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not only one world, but many.
Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to say
that God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason
He created one, He could create many, since His power is not limited
to the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown
above (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore God has produced many worlds.

Obj. 2: Further, nature does what is best and much more does God.
But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many
good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been
made by God.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which has a form in matter can be
multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because
multiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form
in matter. Thus as when I say "man" I mean the form, and when I say
"this man," I mean the form in matter; so when we say "world," the
form is signified, and when we say "this world," the form in the
matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the
existence of many worlds.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 1:10): "The world was made by
Him," where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.

_I answer that,_ The very order of things created by God shows the
unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of
order, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things
come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God
Himself, as shown above (Q. 11, A. 3; Q. 21, A. 1). Hence it must be
that all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can
assert that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining
wisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that
this world, besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made
from a casual concourse of atoms.

Reply Obj. 1: This reason proves that the world is one because all
things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from
the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52)
the unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of
the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.

Reply Obj. 2: No agent intends material plurality as the end
forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself
tends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end.
Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this has
reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the
intention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it
might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if
He had made three; and so on to infinite.

Reply Obj. 3: The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For
it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since
every earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever
it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are part of the
world.
_______________________

QUESTION 48

THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and
firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of
the spiritual and corporeal creatures.

Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.

Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:

(1) Whether evil is a nature?

(2) Whether evil is found in things?

(3) Whether good is the subject of evil?

(4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?

(5) The division of evil into pain and fault.

(6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 1]

Whether Evil Is a Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is
a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x)
that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other
things." Therefore evil is a nature.

Obj. 2: Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a
nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality;
for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality
from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.

Obj. 3: Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil
and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries,
as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good
and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to
good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.

Obj. 4: Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it
corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.

Obj. 5: Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe
except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the
perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir.
10, 11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all
things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its
place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore evil
is a nature.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither
a being nor a good."

_I answer that,_ One opposite is known through the other, as darkness
is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the
nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything
appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its
own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection
of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being,
or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil
is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying
that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such,
is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.

Reply Obj. 1: Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of
Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and
therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil.
For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward
examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some
philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and
privation," as being verified in all contraries; since one contrary
is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to
white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil
are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries;
because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as
such, has the nature of evil.

Reply Obj. 2: Good and evil are not constitutive differences except
in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the
object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has
the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific
differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence
of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself
constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end;
just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in
natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore,
the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain
good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by
the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but
the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a
constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is
annexed.

Reply Obj. 3: This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks
there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between
good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something
rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but
also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not evil." And from this evil
in morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of
evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although
blindness is an evil.

Reply Obj. 4: A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one
way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that
sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good,
forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In
another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter
makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final
cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause.
But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that
is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For
every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as
an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some
good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside
the scope of our will and intention."

Reply Obj. 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe are
ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and
according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was
said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good.
Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor
does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that
is, by reason of some good joined to it.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 2]

Whether Evil Is Found in Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not found in things. For
whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of
something, that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from
non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things.

Obj. 2: Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore
evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is
contrary to what has been said (A. 1).

Obj. 3: Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as
the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed
with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best,
much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is
no evil.

_On the contrary,_ On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and
penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.

_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 47, AA. 1, 2), the perfection
of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things,
so that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of
goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of
goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this
grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are
which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while
some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.

As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there
should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings;
so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some
which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they
do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact
that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found
in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an
evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple
"not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a
privation.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is
twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a
thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it
is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and
neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the
truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by
a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense being is what
answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of
blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way
even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this
distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil
is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in
itself.

Reply Obj. 3: God and nature and any other agent make what is best in
the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order
to the whole, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 2). And the whole itself,
which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more
perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes
fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it
belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may
fail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says
(Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of
evil." Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no
evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not
corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass
were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a
sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 3]

Whether Evil Is in Good As in Its Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject.
For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv,
4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists."
Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.

Obj. 2: Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But
"non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither
does evil require good as its subject.

Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good
and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its
subject.

Obj. 4: Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore
also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as
in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said
(Isa. 5:20): "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!"

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists
only in good."

_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), evil imports the absence
of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good
can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good,
taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what
does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil,
through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance,
a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the
strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative
sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called
blindness.

Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same--viz.
being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality,
as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and
of privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative
potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent
body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however,
manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and
a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every
potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For
as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality.
Therefore, the subject of evil is good.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as
a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.

Reply Obj. 2: "Not-being," understood negatively, does not require a
subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher
says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its
subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not
"sight," but "animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says
(Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is
laid down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be
taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference
to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and
bitter, and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in
a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus;
whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with
the privation of another good.

Reply Obj. 4: The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as
such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is
clear from the explanation given.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 4]

Whether Evil Corrupts the Whole Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For
one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are
contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts
inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and
uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.

Obj. 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away
good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at
some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of
any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot
wholly consume good."

_I answer that,_ Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must
consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed
by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly
destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is
neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good
which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air
is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished
by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude
of a subject to some actuality.

The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered
by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of
remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission
likewise of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity.
For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions
whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are
multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its
perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission
by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the
matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the
potentiality remitted as regards the actuality.

Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and
intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the
aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in
the active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and
humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is
diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the
contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid
aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless,
it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is
the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed
to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to
light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be
wholly removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is
transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude,
whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened;
and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and
God, according to Isa. 59:2: "Our sins have divided between us and
God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away,
for it belongs to its very nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away;
but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.

Reply Obj. 2: The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and
act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where
it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although
good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different
things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.

Reply Obj. 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of
good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the
continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an
ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a
third), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not
avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we
continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than
half of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the
above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance
either equally or more.

Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite
thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not _per se,_ but
accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also
increased infinitely, as explained above.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 5]

Whether Evil Is Adequately Divided into Pain* and Fault?

[*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification,
being derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain of death, Pain
of loss, Pain of sense."--Ed.]

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into
pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all
creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own
existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore
evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.

Obj. 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor
pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are
evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.

Obj. 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for
"temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion
for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not
is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain
follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into
pain and fault.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It would seem that this division is
superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil
"because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil
comes under pain.

_I answer that,_ Evil, as was said above (A. 3), is the privation of
good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act,
however, is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and
integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil
also is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form,
or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness
is an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the
body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due
operation, either because it does not exist, or because it has not its
due mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the
will, evil, which is the privation of good, is found in a special way
in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which
comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has
the nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition that all
things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown
above (Q. 22, A. 2); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be
against the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of
the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for
this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect
action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in
voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.

Reply Obj. 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere
negation, as was said above (A. 3), therefore not every defect of
good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due.
For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil
in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So,
likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in
existence by itself, because existence and conservation come from one
and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as
regards a creature.

Reply Obj. 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely
considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.

Reply Obj. 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always
an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not,
properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change
is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of the
agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the
tempter he falls into fault.

Reply Obj. 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said
that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent
in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to
the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as
including the idea of injury.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 6]

Whether Pain Has the Nature of Evil More Than Fault Has?

Objection 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For
fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good
than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault
has.

Obj. 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the
greater good. But pain, as was said above (A. 5), is opposed to
the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the
action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it
seems that pain is worse than fault.

Obj. 3: Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in
forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation
of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.

_On the contrary,_ A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to
prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole
body. But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore
fault is a greater evil than pain.

_I answer that,_ Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not
only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal
goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any
kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to
include privation of grace or glory.

There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil
by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to
be made worthy of punishment." And this because, since good absolutely
considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate
act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that
the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use
of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will.
Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is
called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a
bad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his
own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself
consists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in
the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in
it than pain has.

The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of
the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because
the evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either
something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something
uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature
forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed
to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine
will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself,
and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that
fault has more evil in it than pain has.

Reply Obj. 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet
fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the
reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that
the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.

Reply Obj. 2: The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the
more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection,
than the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection.

Reply Obj. 3: Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order
to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way,
both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed
from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch as
this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due
end.
_______________________

QUESTION 49

THE CAUSE OF EVIL
(In Three Articles)

We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are
three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?

(2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?

(3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of
all evils?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 1]

Whether Good Can Be the Cause of Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For
it is said (Matt. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit."

Obj. 2: Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But
evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of
evil.

Obj. 3: Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient
cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause, if it has
one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the
cause of evil can only be evil.

Obj. 4: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no
cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no
possible source of evil except good."

_I answer that,_ It must be said that every evil in some way has a
cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due
to a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due
disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper
disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some
impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some
impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a
cause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is
good.

And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the
agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which
belongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to
good, has the nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by
way of the material cause was shown above (Q. 48, A. 3). For it was
shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause,
rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final
cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since
not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which
is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent,
not directly, but accidentally.

In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action
otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason
of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or
the instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal
may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the
case of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the
instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a
thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the
power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the
agent or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or
perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form
intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance,
when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of
air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in
strength, so much the more perfectly does it impress its own form, so
also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil
and corruption befall air and water comes from the perfection of the
fire: but this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the
privation of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own
form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other.
But if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire--as, for
instance, that it fails to heat--this comes either by defect of the
action, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above,
or by the indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the
action of the fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a
deficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to
act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental
cause; and thus is good the cause of evil.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord calls
an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree." Now, a good
will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good
will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the
movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature,
which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.

Reply Obj. 2: Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to
itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes
evil to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act
morally evil. And, as explained above (Q. 19, A. 9), this is by
accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes
another by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold
heats (the body) through the concentration of the inward heat.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things
otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the
same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some
exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it.
Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil
pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in
voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will
actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself
to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault
follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.

Reply Obj. 4: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause,
as was said above.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]

Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of
evil. For it is said (Isa. 45:5,7): "I am the Lord, and there is no
other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and
creating evil." And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which
the Lord hath not done?"

Obj. 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the
first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (A. 1).
Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above
(Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, AA. 1, 4), it follows that also every evil is from
God.

Obj. 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30),
the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God
is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause
of all perdition and of all evil.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not
the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to
not-being."

_I answer that,_ As appears from what was said (A. 1), the evil which
consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of
the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection,
as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 1). Hence, the evil which consists in
defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not
reduced to God as to its cause.

But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is
reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural
things and voluntary things. For it was said (A. 1) that some agent
inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows
corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and
defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in
things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the
order of the universe requires, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2, ad 2;
Q. 48, A. 2), that there should be some things that can, and do
sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the
order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident,
causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord
killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made
death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its
own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of
the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to
sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but
not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.

Reply Obj. 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to
the evil of fault.

Reply Obj. 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced
to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and
perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as
whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the
motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not
come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And,
likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is
reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not
caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.

Reply Obj. 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as
the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of
the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary
for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 3]

Whether There Be One Supreme Evil Which Is the Cause of Every Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is
the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes.
But contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good
is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner
against a just man." Therefore there are many contrary principles,
one of good, the other of evil.

Obj. 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But
the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was
shown above (Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, AA. 2, 4). Therefore, also, there is a
supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.

Obj. 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil
and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what
is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to
some supreme evil.

Obj. 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is
essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not
essentially, but by participation. Therefore we must seek for
some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.

Obj. 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is
_per se._ But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we
must suppose some supreme evil which is the _per se_ cause of evils.
Nor can it be said that evil has no _per se_ cause, but only an
accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist
in the many, but only in the few.

Obj. 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the
cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause,
as was said above (AA. 1, 2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in
this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause
of every evil.

_On the contrary,_ The supreme good is the cause of every being, as
was shown above (Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, A. 4). Therefore there cannot be
any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.

_I answer that,_ It appears from what precedes that there is no one
first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.

First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially
good, as was shown above (Q. 6, AA. 3, 4). But nothing can be
essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such,
is good (Q. 5, A. 3); and that evil can exist only in good as in
its subject (Q. 48, A. 3).

Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and
perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above
(Q. 6, A. 2). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was
shown above (Q. 48, A. 4), although evil always lessens good, yet
it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains,
nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would
destroy itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be
for something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away,
since its subject is good.

Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a
first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was
shown above (A. 1), and because evil can be only an accidental
cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental
cause is subsequent to the direct cause.

Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the
other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also
arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they
failed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered
only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account,
if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own
nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as,
for instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil
because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of
the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any
particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its
order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly
ordered place, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1).

Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two
contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these
contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and
therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first
principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it
is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own
contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the
elements exists the power of a heavenly body; and above all things
that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being,
as was shown above (Q. 2, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree
in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary
particular causes, nevertheless we must come at last to one first
common cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same
subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as
was said above (Q. 48, A. 3). Hence, since evil is privation of good,
as appears from what was said above (Q. 48, AA. 1, 2, 3), it is
opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the
supreme good, who is pure act.

Reply Obj. 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature
of  a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a
perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by
approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from
that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason
of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be
good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.

Reply Obj. 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by
privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it
to any essential evil.

Reply Obj. 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown
above (A. 1). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is
impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply
false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone
can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole
universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the
smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as in the greater
number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good
of man as man--that is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good
in regard to the senses than good according to reason.

Reply Obj. 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity,
but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows
accidentally.
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ. 50-64)
_______________________

QUESTION 50

OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED
(In Five Articles)

Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures:
firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is
called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the
composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.

Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their
substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what
belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.

Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal
things.

Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether
incorporeal?

(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed
of matter and form?

(3) We ask concerning their number.

(4) Of their difference from each other.

(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 1]

Whether an Angel Is Altogether Incorporeal?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal.
For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation
to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as
regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material.
Therefore he is not simply incorporeal."

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher
says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that
"an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance." Therefore an
angel is a corporeal substance.

Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every creature
is limited within its own nature." But to be limited belongs to
bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's
creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His
angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were
made; He commanded, and they were created." Therefore angels are
corporeal.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels
spirits."

_I answer that,_ There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what
is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this
consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation
of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the
cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as
heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and
will (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4). Hence the perfection of the universe
requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now
intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal
faculty; for every body is limited to "here" and "now." Hence the
perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal
creature.

The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of
intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense
and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what
could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies
alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed
except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57).
Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit
(Acts 23:8).

But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof
that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect
alone.

Reply Obj. 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal
creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the
other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold;
and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and
corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.

Reply Obj. 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is
applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an
ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and
not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we
are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.

Reply Obj. 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies
only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all
creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir.
Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in
corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their
substance."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 2]

Whether an Angel Is Composed of Matter and Form?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and
form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of
the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the
species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from
the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a
genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of
substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is
matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand;
whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that "a simple form cannot be a
subject": and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore
an angel is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But
an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an
angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.

Obj. 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So
the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of
an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the
form of an angel is in matter.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first
creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal."

_I answer that,_ Some assert that the angels are composed of matter
and form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book
of the _Fount of Life._ For he supposes that whatever things are
distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards
incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which
distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in
common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes
incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and
whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something
common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of
spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be
understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the
matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity
is impressed in the matter of corporeal things.

But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of
spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a
spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part
of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and
spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the
corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter,
however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under
quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle
says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of
spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it
is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same
matter.

It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any
kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according
to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether
immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act
receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according
to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are
individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence
it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.

But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily
distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend
things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence
material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect
in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances,
on the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect
cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its
own mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way
also it apprehends God (Q. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: It is difference which constitutes the species. Now
everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined
to some special grade of being because "the species of things are
like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as
the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material things
there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is
the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the
matter; and hence from the latter the genus is derived, and from
the former the "difference." Whereas in immaterial things there is
no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its
own self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them
genus and "difference" are not derived from different things, but
from one and the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of
conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as
indeterminate, it derives the idea of their genus; and inasmuch
as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their
"difference."

Reply Obj. 2: This reason is given in the book on the _Fount of
Life,_ and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of
the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false.
For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in
some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But
the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise
the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to
the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the
intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of
a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way
of receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.

Reply Obj. 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in
an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made
evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a
twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby
the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own
existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is
related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if
there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists
without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the
form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a
kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is
what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and
"what is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For
"what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is
whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs.
But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was
explained above (Q. 3, A. 4). Hence God alone is pure act.

Reply Obj. 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its
existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature
to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being
considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on
the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the
matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are
finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that
their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say,
for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards
the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one
subject; while its "being" is finite as determined to some one
special nature.

Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite
from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is
"infinite from below," as not received in any matter.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 3]

Whether the Angels Exist in Any Great Number?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers.
For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a
continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are
incorporeal, as was shown above (A. 1). Therefore the angels
cannot exist in any great number.

Obj. 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the
less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other
created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God.
Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the
least possible number in the angelic nature.

Obj. 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems
to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the
heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we
can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than
the movements of the heavenly bodies.

Obj. 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and
intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine
goodness." But a ray is only multiplied according to the different
things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is
receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are
immaterial, as was shown above (A. 2). Therefore it seems that the
multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to
the requirements of the first bodies--that is, of the heavenly ones,
so that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be
terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as
before.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands
ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood
before Him."

_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions with regard to the
number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate
substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to
maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and
according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number
of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible
things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31)
because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible
things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar
species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures,
which are higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless
Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures
bear relation to these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and
therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances
according to the number of the first movements.

But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred
Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony,
held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial
substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly
movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he
contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are
styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which
manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the
custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be
designated as angels.

Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are
immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all
material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv):
"There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences,
surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers."
The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the
universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more
perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created
by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their
magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their
multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed
corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire
sphere of things active and passive is something very small in
comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to
conclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably
exceed material substances as to multitude.

Reply Obj. 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete
quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that
which is caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is
reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above (Q. 30, A. 3; Q. 11).

Reply Obj. 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto
God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not
so as to be found in few subjects.

Reply Obj. 3: This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text
44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were
made for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances
would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to
appear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial
substances exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is
nobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii,
text 44) that this is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He
was forced to make use of this argument, since only through sensible
things can we come to know intelligible ones.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as
hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this
was refuted above (Q. 47, A. 1). Accordingly, the multiplication
of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to
bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders
of immaterial substances.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 4]

Whether the Angels Differ in Species?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species.
For since the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things
which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their
ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according
to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them--that is
to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one
species.

Obj. 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the
angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and
less--namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener
intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.

Obj. 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually
from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore
are the angels.

Obj. 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more
ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but
one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of
one species.

_On the contrary,_ In things of one species there is no such thing as
"first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there
are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x).
Therefore the angels are not of the same species.

_I answer that,_ Some have said that all spiritual substances, even
souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are
of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the
angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.

But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ
in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If,
therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said
above (A. 2), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to
be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be
several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses
are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances.
And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several
angels of one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the
principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according
to the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according
to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes
diversity not merely of species, but of genus.

Reply Obj. 1: "Difference" is nobler than genus, as the determined
is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common,
but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be
necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that
there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible
soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the
various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner
all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of
intellectual nature.

Reply Obj. 2: More and less change the species, not according as they
are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according
as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we
say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels
are diversified according to more or less.

Reply Obj. 3: The good of the species preponderates over the good
of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be
multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in
the one species.

Reply Obj. 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out
infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific
multiplication, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 3). Hence the perfection
of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not
for the multiplying of individuals in one species.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 5]

Whether the Angels Are Incorruptible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for
Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he
is "an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and
not by nature."

Obj. 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose
maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature,
yet indissoluble because I so will it." But gods such as these can
only be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are
corruptible by their nature

Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things would
tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved
them." But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore,
since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are
corruptible of their own nature.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the
intellectual substances "have unfailing life, being free from all
corruption, death, matter, and generation."

_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be maintained that the angels
are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that
nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the
matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from
what was said above (A. 2), it is impossible for its substance to
be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can
never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in
relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else
is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never
be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a
bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its
circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for
everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is
an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter
and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the
matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the
angels, as was said above (A. 2), it cannot lose its being.
Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is
incorruptible by its own nature.

A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual
operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the
operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and
nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an
intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every
intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which
includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of
death," as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain
perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later (Q. 62).

Reply Obj. 2: By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the heavenly
bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore
dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in
existence by the Divine will.

Reply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 44, A. 1) there is a kind of
necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not
repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its
existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that
all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless
preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is
any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the
angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be
corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by
withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some
principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at
least the potentiality of matter.
_______________________

QUESTION 51

OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES
(In Three Articles)

We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things;
and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly,
of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of
their comparison with local movement.

Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?

(2) Whether they assume bodies?

(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 1]

Whether the Angels Have Bodies Naturally United to Them?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united
to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute
alone--that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist
without any material substance and without any companionship of
corporeal addition." Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.):
"Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality,
whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of
anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear
that every created spirit needs corporeal substance." Augustine also
says (Gen. ad lit. iii): "The demons are called animals of the
atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies."
But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels
have bodies naturally united to them.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational
animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore
angels have bodies naturally united to them.

Obj. 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls.
But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore
the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels
are understood to be incorporeal."

_I answer that,_ The angels have not bodies naturally united to
them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found
universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings,
because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to
every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor
of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (Q. 75, A. 2), it
follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an
intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some
intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it
belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is
imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual
substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature,
but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as
will be explained later on (Q. 84, A. 6; Q. 89, A. 1). Now whenever
we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something
perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are
some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire
knowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual
substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from
bodies, and these we call angels.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said above (Q. 50, A. 1) it was the opinion of
some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have
thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as
united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the
soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this
is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted
above all things, according to Ps. 8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted
beyond the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of
God, followed the above opinion of others regarding the other
substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points,
by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's
expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some
bodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed
for some purpose, as will be explained (A. 2). Augustine speaks,
not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the
Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals,
which they termed demons.

Reply Obj. 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal
metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.

Reply Obj. 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply
speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kings 2:6): "The
Lord killeth, and maketh alive." But to give life formally belongs to
a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within
itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual
substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one
which is united to a body.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 2]

Whether Angels Assume Bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there
is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of
the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the
angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body,
since his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does
not assume a body.

Obj. 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union;
because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a
body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated (A. 1); while
in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said
to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the
angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.

Obj. 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water,
or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise
they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air,
because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not
assume bodies.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels
appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies.

_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the angels never assume
bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of
angels happened in prophetic vision--that is, according to
imagination. But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for
whatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder's
imagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine
Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be
seen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were
seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of
Sodom; in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all
present. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were
beheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the
person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a
vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are
not bodies, nor have they bodies naturally united with them, as is
clear from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 50, A. 1), it follows that
they sometimes assume bodies.

Reply Obj. 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on
our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give
evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have
with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies
under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God
would take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old
Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared
in the flesh.

Reply Obj. 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as its
form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the
assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties
of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things
sensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so
fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible
properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel
assuming a body.

Reply Obj. 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction
has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped
and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume
bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is
needful for forming the assumed body.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 3]

Whether the Angels Exercise Functions of Life in the Bodies Assumed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life
in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But
it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live
and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions.
Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.

Obj. 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without
a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the
senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by
the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the
angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special
function of life.

Obj. 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions
of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels are
manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said
(Gen. 18:16) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had appeared
to him, "bringing them on the way"; and when Tobias said to the angel
(Tob. 5:7, 8): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of
Medes?" he answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all
the ways thereof." Therefore the angels often exercise functions of
life in assumed bodies.

Obj. 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it
is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed
from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred
Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their
assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.

Obj. 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord
after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having
resumed life (Luke 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed
bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having
previously adored them as God (Gen. 18). Therefore the angels
exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.

Obj. 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has
befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related:
"After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they
brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of
renown" (Gen. 6:4). Consequently the angels exercised vital
functions in their assumed bodies.

_On the contrary,_ The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was
stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise
functions of life through assumed bodies.

_I answer that,_ Some functions of living subjects have something in
common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of
a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so
far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far
as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in
assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such
operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects;
because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that
which has the faculty has the action." Hence nothing can have a
function of life except what has life, which is the potential
principle of such action.

Reply Obj. 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible
things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since it
is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things
are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may
be understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it
is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their
assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they are really
not. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the
spiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the
properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be
done if they were to assume true men; because the properties of such
men would lead us to men, and not to angels.

Reply Obj. 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it
can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of
their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for
they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but
to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the
angels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power of the
angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other
members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.).

Reply Obj. 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper
function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus
moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved
accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as
movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be
elsewhere, which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is
not moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is
everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the
movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to
the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as
the movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not
change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the
world is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of
the world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west,
but according to a fixed quarter; because "the moving energy is
always in the east," as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.

Reply Obj. 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their
assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as they
fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.

Reply Obj. 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat,
because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the
substance of the eater.

Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the
substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing matter;
nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could
be changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by
angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of
such a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was
not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what
the angel said to Tobias: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat
and to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink" (Tob. 12:19).

Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom,
nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the
prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).

Reply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): "Many persons
affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as
have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk
call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have
sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny
it. But God's holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the
deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of
Seth, who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture
designates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be
wondered at that giants should be born of them; for they were not all
giants, albeit there were many more before than after the deluge."
Still if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from
the seed of such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the
seed of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first
the form of a woman, and afterwards of a man; just as they take the
seed of other things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says
(De Trin. iii), so that the person born is not the child of a demon,
but of a man.
_______________________

QUESTION 52

OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE
(In Three Articles)

We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are
three subjects of inquiry:

(1) Is the angel in a place?

(2) Can he be in several places at once?

(3) Can several angels be in the same place?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 1]

Whether an Angel Is in a Place?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For
Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "The common opinion of the learned is
that things incorporeal are not in a place." And again, Aristotle
observes (Phys. iv, text 48,57) that "it is not everything existing
which is in a place, but only a movable body." But an angel is not
a body, as was shown above (Q. 50). Therefore an angel is not in a
place.

Obj. 2: Further, place is a "quantity having position." But
everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a
position cannot befit an angel, since his substance is devoid of
quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position.
Therefore an angel is not in a place.

Obj. 3: Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be
contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys.
iv, text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained
by a place, because the container is more formal than the contained;
as air with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an
angel is not in a place.

_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline,
Dominican Breviary]: "Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us
in peace."

_I answer that,_ It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel
and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A
body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such
place according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no
such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently
an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the
angelic power in any manner whatever to any place.

Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed
commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the
continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with
dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this
account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an
incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes
into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body
as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is
said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained,
but as somehow containing it.

And hereby we have the answers to the objections.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 2]

Whether an Angel Can Be in Several Places at Once?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at
once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But
the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every
part of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel
can be in several places at once.

Obj. 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since
the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is
in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are
various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.

Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "where the
angel operates, there he is." But occasionally he operates in several
places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom
(Gen. 19:25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one
time.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "while the
angels are in heaven, they are not on earth."

_I answer that,_ An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the
Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things,
is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things,
and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since
the angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to
one determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be
compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all
being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one
particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since
the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place,
it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in
only one place.

Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were
unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the
indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently
they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point.
But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something
indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is
indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation.
Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one
indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible
or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own
free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the
entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one
place to him.

Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to
be everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to
what is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in
which there is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east:
hence the Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of
the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly,
because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves
all the spheres immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.

So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite
differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a
place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place.
An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he
is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a
place in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither
circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.

From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because
the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied,
is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 3]

Whether Several Angels Can Be at the Same Time in the Same Place?

Objection 1: It would seem that several angels can be at the same
time in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time
in the same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not
fill a place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not
empty, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58).
Therefore several angels can be in the one place.

Obj. 2: Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a
body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body are at
the one time in the one place: because there is no place which is not
filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv, text. 58.
Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.

Obj. 3: Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to
Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess
souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon
are at the one time in the same place; and consequently for the same
reason all other spiritual substances.

_On the contrary,_ There are not two souls in the same body.
Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same
place.

_I answer that,_ There are not two angels in the same place. The
reason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to
be the causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident
in every class of causes: for there is one proximate form of one
thing, and there is one proximate mover, although there may be
several remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several
individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a perfect mover,
because no one man's strength is sufficient for moving the boat;
while all together are as one mover, in so far as their united
strengths all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since the
angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches
the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said (A.
1), there can be but one angel in one place.

Reply Obj. 1: Several angels are not hindered from being in the same
place because of their filling the place; but for another reason, as
has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way;
hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body
according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its
form, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.
_______________________

QUESTION 53

OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS
(In Three Articles)

We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which
heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.

(2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through
intervening space?

(3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 53, Art. 1]

Whether an Angel Can Be Moved Locally?

Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as
the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32, 86) "nothing which is devoid
of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term _wherefrom,_ it
is not moved; nor while it is in the term _whereto,_ for it is then
already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved,
while it is being moved, is partly in the term _wherefrom_ and partly
in the term _whereto._ But an angel is without parts. Therefore an
angel cannot be moved locally.

Obj. 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as
the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is
not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.

Obj. 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy
angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.

_On the contrary,_ It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be
moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be
said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of
faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified
angel is moved locally.

_I answer that,_ A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however,
to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so
likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as
it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place.
Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate
with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the
continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude;
and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place
as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it
is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be
commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the
exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is
a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by
virtual contact, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 1), it follows
necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else
than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at
once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as
was said above (Q. 52, A. 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts
to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be
found in such contacts. Because, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 1),
there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an
angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is
assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body
successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was
before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so
likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which
he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all
at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself
to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be
continuous.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold
reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with
what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place
necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which
is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be
said that a thing is moved where it is in the term _wherefrom,_ and
while it is in the term _whereto_: because the very succession of
"wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence,
in whichever of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said
to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because
nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the
line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing
moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being
moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore,
according as the angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's
demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's
movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while
an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term _wherefrom,_ and
partly in the term _whereto_ (yet so that such partiality be not
referred to the angel's substance, but to the place); because at the
outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible
place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in
movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part
of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can
occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that
he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does
by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which
is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to
magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to
something which is divisible.

Reply Obj. 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the
act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application
of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the
act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any
need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our
need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are
all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to
minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 53, Art. 2]

Whether an Angel Passes Through Intermediate Space?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not pass through
intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space
first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing
through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is
indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes
through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement:
which is not possible.

Obj. 2: Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul.
But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another
without going through the middle: for I can think of France and
afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands
between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one
extreme to another without going through the middle.

_On the contrary,_ If the angel be moved from one place to another,
then, when he is in the term "whither," he is no longer in motion, but
is changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change:
consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he
was not moved so long as he was in the term "whence." Therefore, he
was moved while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him
to pass through intervening space.

_I answer that,_ As was observed above in the preceding article, the
local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it
be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another
without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the
Philosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), "The middle is that into
which a thing which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the
last into which it is moved"; because the order of first and last in
continuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last
in magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99).

But if an angel's movement be not continuous, it is possible for him
to pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle:
which is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are
infinite intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible
or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which
are indivisible; because between every two points that are infinite
intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a
middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of
necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the
continuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to
place except in time. But in the whole time which measures the
movement of a body, there are not two "nows" in which the body moved
is not in one place and in another; for if it were in one and the same
place in two "nows," it would follow that it would be at rest there;
since to be at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now
and previously. Therefore since there are infinite "nows" between the
first and the last "now" of the time which measures the movement,
there must be infinite places between the first from which the
movement begins, and the last where the movement ceases. This again is
made evident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm's
length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it
travels; it is evident that the first place from which the movement
starts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the movement
ends is that of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to
move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second.
According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are
the intermediate places multiplied; because every distinct point in
the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a
distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the
same. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the
points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, it
follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate
places.

Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate
places by the continuity of its movement; because, as the
intermediate places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must
there be reckoned some infinitudes in movement which is continuous.
Consequently, if the movement be not continuous, then all the parts
of the movement will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable
body be moved, but not by continuous movement, it follows, either
that it does not pass through all the intermediate places, or else
that it actually numbers infinite places: which is not possible.
Accordingly, then, as the angel's movement is not continuous, he does
not pass through all intermediate places.

Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going
through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's nature;
but not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and
contained under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of
place in its movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to
place as contained thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence
it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills,
either through or without the intervening place.

Reply Obj. 1: The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him
according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the
angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet
even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said
above: but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is
evident from the foregoing.

Reply Obj. 2: While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied
to various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the
things thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So
there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3: In continuous movement the actual change is not a part
of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede
change. Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in
movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is
a part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even
without the mid-space, constitutes such movement.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 53, Art. 3]

Whether the Movement of an Angel Is Instantaneous?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous.
For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist
the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel
moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a
body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the
lessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other
length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in
time, an angel is moved in an instant.

Obj. 2: Further, the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily
change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as
illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated
successively, as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does not
reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is
the angel's movement instantaneous.

Obj. 3: Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it
is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term
_whereto_: but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in
the place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term
_wherefrom_; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the
other, it follows that he is divisible; which is impossible.
Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term
_wherefrom._ Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest is to be
in the same place now and previously, as was said (A. 2). Therefore
it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time.

_On the contrary,_ In every change there is a before and after. Now
the before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently
every movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before
and after in it.

_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the local movement of an
angel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from
place to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the
term _wherefrom_; but in the last instant of such time he is in the
term _whereto._ Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms,
just as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But
there is a mid-time between two "nows" of time: hence they say that a
last "now" cannot be assigned in which it was in the term _wherefrom,_
just as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire,
there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or
in which the matter was under the privation of the form of fire: but a
last time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time
there is light in the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so
illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous
movements.

But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown
thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not
otherwise disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every
"now" of time which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the
same "where" in the first, in the middle, and in the last "now." On
the other hand, it is of the very nature of movement for the subject
moved to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in every
"now" of time which measures movement, the movable subject is in
various dispositions; hence in the last "now" it must have a
different form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest
during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in
whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time. Hence it is
not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the
preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be
in the other term. But this is possible in movement: because to be
moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in
every instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of
the kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is
the term of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of
the local movement of the illuminating body. Now the local movement
of an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is
of itself, depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is
impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and
that in the last "now" he is in another place: but some "now" must be
assigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there
are many "nows" succeeding one another, there is necessarily time;
since time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in
movement. It remains, then, that the movement of an angel is in time.
It is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in
non-continuous time if his movement is non-continuous for, as was
said (A. 1), his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity
of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the Philosopher says
(Phys. iv, text 99).

But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as
the time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all
corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from
the movement of the heavens; because the angel's movement does not
depend upon the movement of the heavens.

Reply Obj. 1: If the time of the angel's movement be not continuous,
but a kind of succession of 'nows,' it will have no proportion to the
time which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is
continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be
continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the
proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the
proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides,
the swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity
of his power, but according to the determination of his will.

Reply Obj. 2: Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an
alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood
to be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote.
But the angel's movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term
of movement; hence there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection is based on continuous time. But the
same time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. So an angel
can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next
instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel's
movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places
throughout the whole time which precedes the last 'now'; as was
already shown (A. 2). Nevertheless he is partly in one of the
continuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance
is susceptible of parts, but because his power is applied to a part
of the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above
(A. 2).
_______________________

QUESTION 54

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS
(In Five Articles)

After considering what belongs to the angel's substance, we now
proceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In
the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge:
secondly, into his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects
known: and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them.

Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Is the angel's understanding his substance?

(2) Is his being his understanding?

(3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?

(4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?

(5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the
intellect?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 1]

Whether an Angel's Act of Understanding Is His Substance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is
his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the
active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect
is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and
from his Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more
is the angel's substance his action--that is, his act of
understanding.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that
"the action of the intellect is life." But "since in living things to
live is to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life
is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of
an angel who understands.

Obj. 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not
differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the
middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood
are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence.
Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect
and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who
understands.

_On the contrary,_ The action of anything differs more from its
substance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its
substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was
said above (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore neither the action of an angel,
nor of any other creature, is its substance.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of
any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the
actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a
substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which
is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to
be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality.
But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the
same as His existence and His action.

Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it
would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of
intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists.
Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from
God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in
itself, nor from the substance of another angel.

Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then
be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes
about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.

Reply Obj. 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own action,
such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since
its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself,
action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive intellect,
for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.

Reply Obj. 2: The relation between "life" and "to live" is not the
same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that
between "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the
abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow,
if "to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence." Although life is
sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x),
"Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life": yet it
is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that "the
act of the intellect is life."

Reply Obj. 3: The action which is transient, passing to some
extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the
subject receiving the action. The action which remains within the
agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but
only according to the manner of expression; for it really follows the
union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is
brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who
understands it, as an effect which differs from both.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 2]

Whether in the Angel to Understand Is to Exist?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to
exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says
(De Anima ii, text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live"
(De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to
exist.

Obj. 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to
effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form
by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to
understand is to exist.

_On the contrary,_ The angel's act of understanding is his movement,
as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not
movement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.

_I answer that,_ The action of the angel, as also the action of any
creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text.
16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to
something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting;
and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the
agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing
outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent.
It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be
the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence is signified
as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from
the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature
has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple
infinity, we have the act "to understand," of which the object is "the
true"; and the act "to will," of which the object is "the good"; each
of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will,
of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its
species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively
infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does
to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted
to one in genus and species; God's being alone is simply infinite,
comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its
own act of will.

Reply Obj. 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living
subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one
whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher
says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he
distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the
various functions of life.

Reply Obj. 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire
existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding,
since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently
in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the
existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is
compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely,
truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the
same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding
according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow
that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand.'
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel's Power of Intelligence Is His Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of
understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and
"intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages
of his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds."
Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.

Obj. 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything
besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which
is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple
form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an
angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been
previously said (Q. 50, A. 2).

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the
angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh
unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler
nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter
is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of
intelligence.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels
are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore
substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.

_I answer that,_ Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power
or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident
thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the
diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account
it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in
every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared
to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been
already said (Q. 44, A. 1). Now the act to which the operative
power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not
the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other
created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is
not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its
power of operation.

Reply Obj. 1: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all
his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is
partly intellectual and partly sensitive.

Reply Obj. 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject
of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality
is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking
there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is
compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of
accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for
such accident belongs to the form--whereas an accident which belongs
to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species,
results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And
such a simple form is an angel.

Reply Obj. 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to
substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards
accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 4]

Whether There Is an Active and a Passive Intellect in an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive
intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17)
that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something
whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it
can make all things." But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore
there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel.

Obj. 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to
receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active
intellect, as is made clear in _De Anima_ iii, text. 2, 3, 18. But an
angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a
lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive
intellect.

_On the contrary,_ The distinction of active and passive intellect in
us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive
intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as
colors to the light, as is clear from _De Anima_ iii, text. 18. But
this is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive
intellect in the angel.

_I answer that,_ The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in
us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in
potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power,
which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to
intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when
it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is
the power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity
for admitting an active intellect is due to this--that the natures of
the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul,
as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in
potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is
necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such
natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the
active intellect.

But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are
neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to
such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their
intelligible objects intelligible in potentiality, but they are
actually such; for they first and principally understand immaterial
things, as will appear later (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1). Therefore
there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them, except
equivocally.

Reply Obj. 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher
understands those two things to be in every nature in which there
chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not
generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is
no need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them.

Reply Obj. 2: It is the function of the active intellect to
enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible
in potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be
actually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in
potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of
being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one
angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active
intellect: neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the
angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the
knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone
wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect, he
will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we
need trouble.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 5]

Whether There Is Only Intellectual Knowledge in the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not
exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that
in the angels there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore
there is a sensitive faculty in them as well.

Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have
learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many
remembrances, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1. Consequently they have
likewise a power of memory.

Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort
of "perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the
imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the
demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are
of the same nature.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man senses
in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels."

_I answer that,_ In our soul there are certain powers whose operations
are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry
parts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There
are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed
through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of
any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined
to them, as is manifest from what has been said already (Q. 51, A. 1).
Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them.

The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the
separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in
keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual
creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul.
For this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was
said above (A. 3, ad 1).

A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First,
it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to
the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have
bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this
opinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence
he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that "such an inquiry does not call for
much labor." Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the
like are to be understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense
has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common
usage of speech, when we understand something for certain, to say
that we "sense it." And hence it is that we use the word "sentence."
Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness
of the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing
them. We have experience when we know single objects through the
senses: the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show (Q.
57, A. 2), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in
the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind;
although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the
sensitive soul. In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is attributed
to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the
true good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy,
whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things
themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.
_______________________

QUESTION 55

OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE
(In Three Articles)

Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic
knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some
species?

(2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as
they have derived from things?

(3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the
lower angels?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 1]

Whether the Angels Know All Things by Their Substance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their
substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels,
according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are
happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence.
Therefore the angel knows things by his essence.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51;
_De Anima_ iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, the
intellect is the same as the object understood." But the object
understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that
whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as
the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very
substance of the one understanding it.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there
according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an
intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an
intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower
orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are
in the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv) that God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in all.
Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are
enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know by the forms
of things, and not by their own substance.

_I answer that,_ The medium through which the intellect understands,
is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it
is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may
be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to
which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is
that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly
complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of
the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or
that form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to
understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is
universal being or universal truth. The angel's essence, however,
does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence
restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine
essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all
things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His
essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his
intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things.

Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that the angel knows things according
to his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine the
medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the
thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the
angel of his own nature.

Reply Obj. 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated
in _De Anima_ ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the
sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one
thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the
intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that
the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it
understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is
precisely the same thing to say "in things which are without matter,
the intellect is the same thing as the object understood," as to say
that "the intellect in act is the thing understood in act"; for a
thing is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial.

Reply Obj. 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those which
are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed
perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality--because the
angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own
formality from other things--but according to some common formality.
Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in
God's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from
which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore
God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this
the angel has not, but only a common knowledge.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 2]

Whether the Angels Understand by Species Drawn from Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn
from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness
within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing
in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness
is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is
caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding
must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by
it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things;
that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary
for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived
from things.

Obj. 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the
active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect
abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of
the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So
there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands
through species drawn from things.

Obj. 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to
what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from
sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by
species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to
things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no
purpose.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do
not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible."

_I answer that,_ The species whereby the angels understand are not
drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that
there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual
substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The
highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully
perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of
matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some
agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower
intellectual substances --that is to say, human souls--have a power
of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively
completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things.
But in the higher spiritual substances--that is, the angels--the
power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species,
in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to
understand all things which they can know naturally.

The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances.
The lower spiritual substances--that is, souls--have a nature akin to
a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently
from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their
intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise
they would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand,
the higher substances--that is, the angels--are utterly free from
bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible
nature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection
through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God
the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature.
Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): "The other things which
are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive
existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in
their own nature."

Reply Obj. 1: There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not,
indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of
creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type, according to
which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the
creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists
first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very
fashioning of the creature."

Reply Obj. 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to
pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination,
which form is without matter but not without material conditions,
stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and
the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from
matter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful
the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms to an
intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the
nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no
imagination, as was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Even granted that he
could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he
would not do so; because he would not need them, for he has
connatural intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 3: The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what
is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not
purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the
purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 3]

Whether the Higher Angels Understand by More Universal Species Than
the Lower Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand
by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal,
seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not
understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be
said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less
universal.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known
than what is known generically; because to know anything generically
is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore,
the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it
follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the
lower; which is not befitting.

Obj. 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if
the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which
the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the
higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things.
Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each;
which seems unbecoming.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher
angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in _De
Causis_ it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.

_I answer that,_ For this reason are some things of a more exalted
nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which
is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is
contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by
which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in
created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it
is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what
God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the
intellect is lower.

Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be
able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore
his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were,
extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be
observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an
intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and
detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are
others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.

Reply Obj. 1: It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from
particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its
knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not
derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will
not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing
to them; either according to the order of causality, as the universal
ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the order of
nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind.

Reply Obj. 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two
senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only
the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is
something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge
of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the
part of the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect
to know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one
universal medium can know each of the things which are properly
contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot.

Reply Obj. 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of
several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the
proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a
universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which
can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which
in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of
wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of
Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each
thing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according to
its proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in
the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many
things can be known through it with a proper knowledge.
_______________________

QUESTION 56

OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS
(In Three Articles)

We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the
objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of
immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first
heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Does an angel know himself?

(2) Does one angel know another?

(3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art 1]

Whether an Angel Knows Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For
Dionysius says that "the angels do not know their own powers" (Coel.
Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known.
Therefore an angel does not know his own essence.

Obj. 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would
not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing single
is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only knowledge
which is intellectual, no angel can know himself.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object:
because, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 4 understanding is a kind of
passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears
in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that "the angel
knew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth."

_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been previously said
(Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2), the object is on a different footing in
an immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient action the
object or matter into which the action passes is something separate
from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and
the building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for the
action to proceed, the object must be united with the agent; just as
the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that
sense may actually perceive. And the object which is united to a
faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the
form which is the principle of action in other agents: for, as heat
is the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of
the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.

It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object
exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then
there is only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may
be actual knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be
actuated by the species. But if it always actually possesses the
species, it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding
change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the
nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as
knowing in potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the
action, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something
else, or self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the
less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something
else. So therefore, if in the order of intelligible beings there be
any subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since
an angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he
is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself
by his form, which is his substance.

Reply Obj. 1: That is the text of the old translation, which is
amended in the new one, and runs thus: "furthermore they," that is
to say the angels, "knew their own powers": instead of which the
old translation read--"and furthermore they do not know their own
powers." Although even the letter of the old translation might be
kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own power
perfectly; according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine
Wisdom, Which to the angels is incomprehensible.

Reply Obj. 2: We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not
because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which
is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any
single things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is
nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as it is in
potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not
happen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that
he understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is not of
the same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes
into some other matter.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art. 2]

Whether One Angel Knows Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not know another. For
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 4), that if the human
intellect were to have in itself any one of the sensible things, then
such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending
external things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored
with some particular color, it could not see every color. But as the
human intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is
the angelic mind for understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since
the angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate nature
from the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot
understand other natures.

Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in _De Causis_ that "every intelligence
knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and what is
beneath it, in so far as it is its cause." But one angel is not the
cause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another.

Obj. 3: Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the
essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected by way
of a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the
essence of the angel known, except generically; as is clear from what
has been said before (Q. 50, A. 4; Q. 55, A. 1, ad 3). Hence, it
follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of
another, but only a general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be
said that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known;
because that whereby the intellect understands is something within
the intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind.
Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species;
because that species would not differ from the angel understood,
since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one
angel can understand another.

Obj. 4: Further, if one angel did understand another, this would be
either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if God were
now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the
existing angels; or else he would have to be known by a species drawn
from things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could not
know the lower, from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way
does it seem that one angel knows another.

_On the contrary,_ We read in _De Causis_ that "every intelligence
knows the things which are not corrupted."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. ii), such things
as pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him
in two ways: first, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to
subsist in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in
such a way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the
things which He produced in their own natural being. Now in the Word
of God from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal
things, but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every
one of these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both
corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so
that in every angel there was impressed the form of his own species
according to both its natural and its intelligible condition, so that
he should subsist in the nature of his species, and understand himself
by it; while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were
impressed in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that
by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual
creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished
from one another in a certain order, as was already observed (Q. 50,
A. 4, ad 1, 2). So the nature of an angel does not hinder him from
knowing the other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower
bear affinity to his nature, the only difference being according to
their various degrees of perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel
to know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause and
effect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted
in the angels, this will suffice for one to know another.

Reply Obj. 3: One angel knows another by the species of such angel
existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose image
it is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but according
to natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself a
subsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the
intellect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only
an intelligible existence. As the form of color on the wall has a
natural existence; but, in the deferent medium, it has only
intentional existence.

Reply Obj. 4: God made every creature proportionate to the universe
which He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to make more
angels or more natures of things, He would have impressed more
intelligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if he
had intended to build a larger house, would have made larger
foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the universe,
means that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel Knows God by His Own Natural Principles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their
natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by His
incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds." Afterwards
he adds that, "since He is above all substances, He is remote from all
knowledge."

Obj. 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel.
But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it appears
that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a
glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." From this it appears
that there is a twofold knowledge of God; the one, whereby He is seen
in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to
face; the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was
already shown (Q. 12, A. 4), an angel cannot have the former
knowledge by his natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror
belong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God
from sensible things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii).
Therefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers.

_On the contrary,_ The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet
men can know God through their natural principles; according to Rom.
1:19: "what is known of God is manifest in them." Therefore much more
so can the angels.

_I answer that,_ The angels can have some knowledge of God by their
own principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a
thing is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence
in the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said
that an angel knows himself--secondly, by the presence of its
similitude in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye
from its image being in the eye--thirdly, when the image of the
object known is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from
something else in which it is made to appear, as when we behold a man
in a mirror.

To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He
is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue
to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above
(Q. 12, A. 4). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we
know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in
creatures, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Hence,
too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby
according to his natural principles the angel knows God, stands midway
between these two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is
seen through the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is
impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence, the angel
knows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold
God's essence; because no created likeness is sufficient to represent
the Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the
specular kind; because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror
representing the Divine image.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of
comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not
known by any created intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely
remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can he
see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on
that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: because, as
God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God
has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has
of Him.

Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway
between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more
to one of them, as was said above.
_______________________

QUESTION 57

OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS
(In Five Articles)

We next investigate the material objects which are known by the
angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things?

(2) Whether they know single things?

(3) Whether they know the future?

(4) Whether they know secret thoughts?

(5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 1]

Whether the Angels Know Material Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material
things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who
understands it. But material things cannot be the perfections of
angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not
know material things.

Obj. 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist
within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On 2 Cor.
12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the material
things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into the
angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision,
but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are
apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in
themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in
the angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know
material things.

Obj. 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but
are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which does
not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do
likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is
inferior to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much
more can the mind of an angel.

_I answer that,_ The established order of things is for the higher
beings to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is
contained deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower
beings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain
degree of fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest
source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect
of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among
other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most;
hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness,
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things
pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in
themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in
God.

Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the
manner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of
their own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His
essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the
angels by their intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 1: The thing understood is the perfection of the one who
understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in
his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the
intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that
intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but
only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the
imagination; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The
intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said
(De Anima iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is "what a
thing is," regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense
regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of
material things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing
understood is in him who understands, and not according to their real
natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according
to both natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision.

Reply Obj. 3: If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material
things from the material things themselves, he would require to make
them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does
not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves;
he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species
of things, which species are connatural to him; just as our intellect
has, by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 2]

Whether an Angel Knows Singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the
Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has for its object
singulars, but the intellect, universals." Now, in the angels there is
no power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident
from what was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Consequently they do not
know singulars.

Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of
the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any
assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so
far as it is singular; because, as was observed above (Q. 50, A. 2),
an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity.
Therefore the angel cannot know singulars.

Obj. 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by
singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species;
because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of
species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not
the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because
singular things are not known in the universal except potentially.
Therefore the angel does not know singulars.

_On the contrary,_ No one can guard what he does not know. But angels
guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: "He hath given His
angels charge over Thee." Consequently the angels know singulars.

_I answer that,_ Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of
singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith,
which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels,
according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all ministering spirits." Now, if
they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision
over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals:
and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: "Say not before the
angel: There is no providence." Secondly, it is also contrary to the
teachings of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to
be the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to
their knowledge and will.

Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of
singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular
effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming
eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This
opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know
a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as
singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing
from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to
happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking
place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and
movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing.

Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various
powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending
universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things
singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his
one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that
the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power united and
far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common
sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one
faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses,
and some other things which no outer sense knows; for example, the
difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in
other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of
nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his
powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge,
namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it
ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be
unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; _Metaph._ text. 15).

The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered
from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may
subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that
they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes
forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature,
but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of
individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the
thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He
causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as
was shown above (Q. 14, A. 8). Therefore as by His essence, by which
He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows
all things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to
their singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the
angels know things, not only as to their universal nature, but
likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the
manifold representations of that one simple essence.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which
apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction
from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal.
Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of
the angels, as was said above (Q. 55, A. 2, A. 3 ad 1), and
consequently there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not according to their nature that the angels
are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by
agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears
resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way
there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and
form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever
is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the
angel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence,
are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to
their matter.

Reply Obj. 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which
nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and
as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by
the same species, has been already stated above (Q. 55, A. 3, ad 3).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 3]

Whether Angels Know the Future?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For
angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many
future events. Therefore much more do the angels.

Obj. 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of time.
But the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said in _De
Causis,_ "an intelligence keeps pace with eternity," that is,
aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future are not
different, but he knows each indifferently.

Obj. 3: Further, the angel does not understand by species derived
from things, but by innate universal species. But universal species
refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears
that the angels know indifferently things past, present, and future.

Obj. 4: Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of
time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are
distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things
distant according to future time.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity,
does not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the
exclusive sign of the Divinity, according to Isa. 41:23: "Show the
things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are
gods." Therefore the angels do not know future events.

_I answer that,_ The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be
known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily
from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will
rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their causes in the
majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus
the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of
knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the more
than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more
universally and more perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply
into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the
future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their causes in
the minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance
events.

In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the
future in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely to know those
events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but
even casual and chance events; for God sees all things in His
eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces
all time. And therefore God's one glance is cast over all things
which happen in all time as present before Him; and He beholds all
things as they are in themselves, as was said before when dealing
with God's knowledge (Q. 14, A. 13). But the mind of an angel, and
every created intellect, fall far short of God's eternity; hence the
future as it is in itself cannot be known by any created intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Men cannot know future things except in their causes,
or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way,
but much more distinctly.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the angel's intellect is above that time
according to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a
time in his mind according to the succession of intelligible
concepts; of which Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that "God moves
the spiritual creature according to time." And thus, since there is
succession in the angel's intellect, not all things that happen
through all time, are present to the angelic mind.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the species in the intellect of an angel, in
so far as they are species, refer equally to things present, past,
and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future; nevertheless
the present, past, and future do not bear the same relations to the
species. Present things have a nature according to which they
resemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they can be
known thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nature
whereby they are likened to such species; consequently, they cannot
be known by those species.

Reply Obj. 4: Things distant according to place are already existing
in nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the angel;
whereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated.
Consequently there is no comparison.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 4]

Whether Angels Know Secret Thoughts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For
Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: "Gold or crystal cannot
equal it," says that "then," namely in the bliss of those rising from
the dead, "one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and
when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same
time be penetrated." But those who rise shall be like the angels, as
is stated (Matt. 22:30). Therefore an angel can see what is in
another's conscience.

Obj. 2: Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the
intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its shape
is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the
intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one
angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the
thoughts of both.

Obj. 3: Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more
than do the images in our imagination; because the former are
actually understood, while the latter are understood only
potentially. But the images in our imagination can be known by an
angel as corporeal things are known: because the imagination is a
corporeal faculty. Therefore it seems that an angel can know the
thoughts of the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ What is proper to God does not belong to the
angels. But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts,
according to Jer. 17:9: "The heart is perverse above all things, and
unsearchable; who can know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart."
Therefore angels do not know the secrets of hearts.

_I answer that,_ A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in
its effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also
by man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect
is the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by
outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell
some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more then can
angels, or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those occult
bodily modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that
demons "sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions,
not only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought,
when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body"; although
(Retract. ii, 30) he says "it cannot be asserted how this is done."

In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and
affections as they are in the will: and thus God alone can know the
thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is,
because the rational creature is subject to God only, and He alone
can work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be
developed later (Q. 63, A. 1; Q. 105, A. 5). Consequently all that is
in the will, and all things that depend only on the will, are known
to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will
for anyone actually to consider anything; because a man who has a
habit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will.
Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11): "For what man knoweth the
things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?"

Reply Obj. 1: In the present life one man's thought is not known
by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the
grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets.
The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not
exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in
the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show
forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of
glory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of another.

Reply Obj. 2: Although one angel sees the intelligible species of
another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of
these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it
does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by
actual consideration.

Reply Obj. 3: The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but
follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause.
Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their
dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite
or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of
man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through following
some bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in
brutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the
sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far
as these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower
part of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as
is said in _Ethics_ iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the
angel knows what is passing through man's sensitive appetite or
imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the
intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appetite or the
imagination, but can make various uses of them.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 5]

Whether the Angels Know the Mysteries of Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace.
For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all
mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through the
ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly
places." And the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): "That great mystery of
godliness appeared unto angels*." [*Vulg.: 'Great is the mystery of
godliness, which . . . appeared unto angels.'] Therefore the angels
know the mysteries of grace.

Obj. 2: Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained
in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom, which is
His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.

Obj. 3: Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is
clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew
mysteries of grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): "For the Lord God doth
nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets."
Therefore angels know the mysteries of grace.

_On the contrary,_ No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the
highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated
(Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly
essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of
His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is
evident in Isa. 63:1, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who
cometh up from Edom?" Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice."
Therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace.

_I answer that,_ There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first
is his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by
his essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels
cannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the
pure will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of
another angel, which depend upon the will of such angel, much less
can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle
reasons in this fashion (1 Cor. 2:11): "No one knoweth the things of
a man [*Vulg.: 'What man knoweth the things of a man, but . . . ?'],
but the spirit of a man that is in him." So, "the things also that
are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God."

There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it
is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By
such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor
do they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by
revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath
revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels
beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper
mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to
the lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they
knew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught
afterwards, as befits their ministrations.

Reply Obj. 1: One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the
Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was
revealed to all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason
of this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all
their duties are ordered. For "all are [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all.']
ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the
inheritance of salvation" (Heb. 1:14); and this is brought about by
the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of
them to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning.

We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to
its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on
all points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these
afterwards, as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom,
yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to
know everything hidden in it.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the
mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the
angels. And although God revealed in general to the prophets what He
was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still
the apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets
did not know. Thus we read (Eph. 3:4, 5): "As you reading, may
understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other
generations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed
to His holy apostles." Among the prophets also, the later ones knew
what the former did not know; according to Ps. 118:100: "I have had
understanding above ancients," and Gregory says: "The knowledge of
Divine things increased as time went on" (Hom. xvi in Ezech.).
_______________________

QUESTION 58

OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE
(In Seven Articles)

After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic
knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the angel's intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and
sometimes in act?

(2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?

(3) Whether the angel's knowledge is discursive?

(4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?

(5) Whether there can be error in the angel's intellect?

(6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?

(7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do
they differ?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 1]

Whether the Angel's Intellect Is Sometimes in Potentiality, Sometimes
in Act?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's intellect is sometimes in
potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is
in potentiality, as stated in _Phys._ iii, 6. But the angels' minds
are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.

Obj. 2: Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but
possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality
thereto. But it is said (1 Pet. 1:12): "On Whom the angels desire to
look." Therefore the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality.

Obj. 3: Further, in the book _De Causis_ it is stated that "an
intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance."
But the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality.
Therefore it sometimes understands potentially.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): "Since the
angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy
and devout contemplation." Now a contemplating intellect is not in
potentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not
in potentiality.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8;
Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first,
"as before learning or discovering," that is, before it has the habit
of knowledge; secondly, as "when it possesses the habit of knowledge,
but does not actually consider." In the first way an angel's
intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which
his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the
heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not
fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, the angels,
have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by
connatural intelligible species. But with regard to things divinely
revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in
potentiality: because even the heavenly bodies are at times in
potentiality to being enlightened by the sun.

In the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with
regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always
actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge.
But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds
in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is
always actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the
Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and
beatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 8).

Reply Obj. 1: Movement is taken there not as the act of something
imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the
act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this
way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated in _De
Anima_ iii, text. 28.

Reply Obj. 2: Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude
the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire
the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they
receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.

Reply Obj. 3: In the angel's substance there is no potentiality
divested of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so
in potentiality as to be without act.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 2]

Whether an Angel Can Understand Many Things at the Same Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things
at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that "it may
happen that we know many things, but understand only one."

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be
informed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by
shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore
neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various
intelligible things.

Obj. 3: Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement
terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be
understood altogether.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): "The
spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at
the same time all things that it wills."

_I answer that,_ As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement,
so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens
that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts
of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered
severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by
intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In
another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they
are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one
operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as
is stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect
understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming
parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together,
according as they agree in one point of comparison. From this it is
evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be
understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised under one
intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything
is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect.
All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are
known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood
simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are
apprehended as different intelligible objects.

Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through
the Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which
is the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know
all things at once: just as in heaven "our thoughts will not be
fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall
survey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance," as Augustine
says (De Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels
know things by innate species, they can at one time know all things
which can be comprised under one species; but not such as are under
various species.

Reply Obj. 1: To understand many things as one, is, so to
speak, to understand one thing.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellect is informed by the intelligible
species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many
intelligible objects under one species; as one body can by one shape
be likened to many bodies.

To the third objection the answer is the same as the first.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel's Knowledge Is Discursive?

Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is
discursive. For the discursive movement of the mind comes from one
thing being known through another. But the angels know one thing
through another; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore
the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do.
But the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects;
all of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the
angel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with greater
reason do this.

Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that "demons learn
more things by experience." But experimental knowledge is discursive:
for, "one experience comes of many remembrances, and one universal from
many experiences," as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii; _Metaph._ vii).
Therefore an angel's knowledge is discursive.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do
not acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they
led to something particular from something common."

_I answer that,_ As has often been stated (A. 1; Q. 55, A. 1), the
angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly
bodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius calls them
"heavenly minds" (loc. cit.). Now, the difference between heavenly
and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last
perfection by chance and movement: while the heavenly bodies have
their last perfection at once from their very nature. So, likewise,
the lower, namely, the human, intellects obtain their perfection in
the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive
intellectual operation; that is to say, as they advance from one
known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known
principle they were straightway to perceive as known all its
consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at
all. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which
they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that
can be known in them.

Therefore they are called "intellectual beings": because even with
ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said
to be understood [intelligi]; hence "intellect" is defined as the
habit of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of
truth by the discursive method are called "rational"; and this comes
of the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed
the fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first
aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range,
by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.

Reply Obj. 1: Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all
movement is from something before to something after. Hence
discursive knowledge comes about according as from something
previously known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards
known, and which was previously unknown. But if in the thing
perceived something else be seen at the same time, as an object and
its image are seen simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive
knowledge. And in this way the angels know things in the Word.

Reply Obj. 2: The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing a
syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet
they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by
syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.

Reply Obj. 3: Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by
way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are
present, yet without any discursion withal.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 4]

Whether the Angels Understand by Composing and Dividing?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by composing and
dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there
is composition of the same, as is said in _De Anima_ iii, text. 21. But
there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because
angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at
one time. Therefore there is composition and division in the angel's
mind.

Obj. 2: Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than
any two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions is
that of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant
natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what
was said (A. 2). Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by
diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and
dividing.

Obj. 3: Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in speaking
to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which are
signs of composition and of division in the intellect; as is manifest
from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the
angel understands by composing and dividing.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the
intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear
simplicity of divine concepts." But a simple intelligence is without
composition and division. Therefore the angel understands without
composition or division.

_I answer that,_ As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion
is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and
dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our
intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the
principle, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In
like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the
subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed
to, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by
composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus it
is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by
discursion, and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first
apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp
all that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the
weakness of the intellectual light within us, as has been said
(A. 3). Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the
angel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv), it follows that as the angel does not understand by
reasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing.

Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of
enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: for
he understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable
immovably, and material things immaterially.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every multitude of things understood causes
composition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of
them is attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends
the nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever can
be either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a
nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by
composing and dividing.

Reply Obj. 2: The various natures of things differ less as to their
mode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the way
in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something more
in common; because directly the truth of an affirmation is known, the
falsehood of the opposite negation is known also.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms
of speech, shows that they know both composition and division: yet
not that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply
the nature of a thing.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 5]

Whether There Can Be Falsehood in the Intellect of an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's
intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv), there is "a perverted fancy" in the demons.
Therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of
the angels.

Obj. 2: Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely. But,
as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in the
angels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom,
and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its
intellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons.
Therefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that
"the intelligence is always true." Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83,
qu. 32) that "nothing but what is true can be the object of
intelligence" Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood
in the angel's knowledge.

_I answer that,_ The truth of this question depends partly upon what
has gone before. For it has been said (A. 4) that an angel
understands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what
a thing is. Now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing
is, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in _De
Anima_ iii, text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood creep
in, when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of
composition, and this happens either when we take the definition of
one thing for another, or when the parts of a definition do not hang
together, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature,
"a four-footed flying beast," for there is no such animal. And this
comes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn
from diverse elements, one of which is as matter to the other. But
there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is
stated in _Metaph._ ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at
all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known
precisely as they exist.

So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in
the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; but very
differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the
quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by
division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition.
Such is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowledge of
the) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said
regarding it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can
be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such
thing, or excluded from it; but not of what may be dependent on God's
supernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright will,
from their knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form
no judgments as to the nature of the qualities therein, save under the
Divine ordinance; hence there can be no error or falsehood in them.
But since the minds of demons are utterly perverted from the Divine
wisdom, they at times form their opinions of things simply according
to the natural conditions of the same. Nor are they ever deceived as
to the natural properties of anything; but they can be misled with
regard to supernatural matters; for example, on seeing a dead man,
they may suppose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding Christ,
they may judge Him not to be God.

From all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the
question are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes of their
not being subject to the Divine wisdom; while nescience is in the
angels as regards things knowable, not naturally but supernaturally.
It is, furthermore, evident that their understanding of what a thing
is, is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an
undue manner, referred to some composition or division.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, A. 6]

Whether There Is a "Morning" and an "Evening" Knowledge in the
Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is neither an evening nor a
morning knowledge in the angels; because evening and morning have an
admixture of darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of
an angel; since there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the
angelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening
knowledge.

Obj. 2: Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes;
while noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently, if
there be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the
same reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night
knowledge.

Obj. 3: Further, knowledge is diversified according to the difference
of the objects known: hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text.
38), "The sciences are divided just as things are." But there is a
threefold existence of things: to wit, in the Word; in their own
natures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning and an evening knowledge be
admitted in the angels, because of the existence of things in the
Word, and in their own nature, then there ought to be admitted a
third class of knowledge, on account of the existence of things in
the angelic mind.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22, 31; De Civ. Dei
xii, 7, 20) divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and
evening knowledge.

_I answer that,_ The expression "morning" and "evening" knowledge was
devised by Augustine; who interprets the six days wherein God made all
things, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the
sun was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely, the day
of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the
ordinary day, morning is the beginning, and evening the close of day,
so, their knowledge of the primordial being of things is called
morning knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word.
But their knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it
stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the
being of things flows from the Word, as from a kind of primordial
principle; and this flow is terminated in the being which they have in
themselves.

Reply Obj. 1: Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge
are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as
compared to beginning and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine
puts it (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent us
from calling something light in comparison with one thing, and
darkness with respect to another. In the same way the life of the
faithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked,
according to Eph. 5:8: "You were heretofore darkness; but now, light
in the Lord": yet this very life of the faithful, when set in
contrast to the life of glory, is termed darkness, according to 2
Pet. 1:19: "You have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well
to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place." So the
angel's knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature, is
day in comparison with ignorance or error; yet it is dark in
comparison with the vision of the Word.

Reply Obj. 2: The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day,
that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the
darkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while
knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn
to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of
God, in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things.
Consequently after "evening" there is no night, but "morning"; so
that morning is the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of
the following, in so far as the angels refer to God's praise their
knowledge of the preceding work. Noonday is comprised under the name
of day, as the middle between the two extremes. Or else the noon can
be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who has neither
beginning nor end.

Reply Obj. 3: The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly
the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under
evening knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own
nature.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 7]

Whether the Morning and Evening Knowledge Are One?

Objection 1: It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge
are one. For it is said (Gen. 1:5): "There was evening and morning, one
day." But by the expression "day" the knowledge of the angels is to be
understood, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the
morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same.

Obj. 2: Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two
operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their
morning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in
God, according to Matt. 18:10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were
different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening
knowledge.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is
perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." But,
if the evening knowledge be different from the morning, it is
compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the
evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): "There is a
vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God,
and as it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day,
and the latter to the evening."

_I answer that,_ As was observed (A. 6), the evening knowledge is
that by which the angels know things in their proper nature. This
cannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper
nature of things, so that the preposition "in" denotes the form of a
principle; because, as has been already stated (Q. 55, A. 2), the
angels do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that
when we say "in their proper nature" we refer to the aspect of the
thing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge; that is to say,
that the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the
being of things which those things have in their own nature.

Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas,
or by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by beholding the
Word, they know not merely the being of things as existing in the
Word, but the being as possessed by the things themselves; as God by
contemplating Himself sees that being which things have in their own
nature. It, therefore, it be called evening knowledge, in so far as
when the angels behold the Word, they know the being which things have
in their proper nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are
essentially one and the same, and only differ as to the things known.
If it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas
they know the being which things have in their own natures, then the
morning and the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to
understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other.

Reply Obj. 1: The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken
as the six classes of things known by the angels; so that the day's
unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood; which,
nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it.

Reply Obj. 2: There can be two operations of the same faculty at the
one time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident when
the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end; and
the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and
conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired
knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), the evening
knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence
there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the
angels.

Reply Obj. 3: On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite
imperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things that
are not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection
of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the
morning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not
opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is there any
inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is
more perfect and the other less perfect; just as we can have a
demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion.
In like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the
uncreated Word, and through an innate idea.
_______________________

QUESTION 59

THE WILL OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)

In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of
the angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself;
secondly, of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is will in the angels?

(2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?

(3) Is there free-will in the angels?

(4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Will in the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For
as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in the
reason." But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher
than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something
higher than the will.

Obj. 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is
evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the
appetite argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of
something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no
imperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it
seems that there is no will in them.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that
the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible
object understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are
incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the
image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory,
understanding, and will. But God's image is found not only in the
soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable
of knowing God. Therefore there is will in the angels.

_I answer that,_ We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In
evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow
from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by
appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to
good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and
inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural
appetite." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some
knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they
apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the
sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this
apprehension is called "a sensitive appetite." Other things, again,
have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they
perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This
is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it
were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like
things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as
things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards
good in general. Such inclination is termed "will." Accordingly, since
the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness,
it is manifest that there is a will in them.

Reply Obj. 1: Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in
which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to
the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular
objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be
one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite
belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular
good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason
differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by
simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from
one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to
know what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal.
Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the
part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in
the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher
than the will.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the name of the appetitive part is derived
from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part
reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things;
thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot
[laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the
same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger [ira];
though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as
hope, daring, and the rest.

Reply Obj. 3: The will is called a mover which is moved, according as
to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there
is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the
angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated
in _De Anima_ iii, text. 28.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 2]

Whether in the Angels the Will Differs from the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ
from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple
than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form
towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the
angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists,
or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel
inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an
intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to
the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his
nature or his intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the
object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ,
not really but only logically [*Cf. Q. 16, A. 4]. Therefore will
and intellect are not really different.

Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not
differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives
color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually
related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to
wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good,
does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.

_On the contrary,_ The will in the angels regards good things only,
while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know
both. Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their
intellect.

_I answer that,_ In the angels the will is a special faculty or power,
which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not
their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a
thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to
anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies
that the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded
to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before
possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when
once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic comes
from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes
from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make something
like itself comes from the active qualities.

Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there
alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained
within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills
nothing beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot
be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to
the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the
angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.

In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect
of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object
known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself
to what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside
it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will
goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination
it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one
faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to
another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect
and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is
not so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, and the
universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.

Reply Obj. 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its
substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by
something additional, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material
difference of their objects, but according to their formal
distinction, which is taken from the nature of the object as such.
Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true
suffices for the difference of intellect from will.

Reply Obj. 3: Because the good and the true are really convertible,
it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something
true; while the true is desired by the will as something good.
Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for
diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 3]

Whether There Is Free-Will in the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels.
For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice
with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after
taking counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of
inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason.
Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.

Obj. 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives.
But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such
indifference; because, as was observed already (Q. 58, A. 5),
their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally
intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their
appetitive faculty can there be free-will.

Obj. 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them
according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels
the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the
free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will
in them.

_On the contrary,_ Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the
angels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will
is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.

_I answer that,_ Some things there are which act, not from any
previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others;
just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others
act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as
irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of
judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a
judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent
endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in
so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it
can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever
there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that
just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and
in a higher degree of perfection than in man.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man.
As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in
this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so
need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the
angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by
the sudden acceptance of truth.

Reply Obj. 2: As was observed already (A. 2), knowledge is effected
by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of
imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should
naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his
nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he
can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of
this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the
perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is
inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore
it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not
determined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue
imperfection in him, were he to be indeterminate to what is above him.

Reply Obj. 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher
angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the
intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of
compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less
degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor
increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or
through the addition of some qualification.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 4]

Whether There Is an Irascible and a Concupiscible Appetite in the
Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a
concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv) that in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild
concupiscence." But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin
has not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a
concupiscible appetite in the angels.

Obj. 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger,
hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred
Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the
wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
appetite in the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible
appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance
appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the
irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is
both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that
the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does
not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or
concupiscible appetite in the angels.

_I answer that,_ The intellective appetite is not divided into
irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so
divided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are
distinguished from one another not according to the material but only
by the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond
an object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction
of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things
contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the
power of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of
sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white:
whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white,
then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the
faculty of seeing black.

Now it is quite evident from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1),
that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the
will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can
there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the
intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the
distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite
is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its
common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly,
since there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their
appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but
remains undivided; and it is called the will.

Reply Obj. 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in
the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;--on account of
the resemblance in the effect.

Reply Obj. 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in
the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple
act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to
love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to
repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these
things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei ix).

Reply Obj. 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible
appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible
appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine
goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind.
For the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the
irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible appetite is
something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue
of hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and
divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with
the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible
faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside
in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a
human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the
irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in
them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring,
to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is
predicated of them according as in moderation they display their will
in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed
to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of
this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible
appetite.
_______________________

QUESTION 60

OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS
(In Five Articles)

The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which
is love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty
comes of love.

Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?

(2) Whether there is in them love of choice?

(3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love
of choice?

(4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves
himself?

(5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Natural Love or Dilection in an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection
in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from
intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an
angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.

Obj. 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted
upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own
nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves;
because they possess free-will, as was shown above (Q. 59, A. 3).
Consequently there is no natural love in them.

Obj. 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now
ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to
wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is
above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is
no natural love in the angels.

_On the contrary,_ Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved
except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But
there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also
natural love.

_I answer that,_ We must necessarily place natural love in the angels.
In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is
always sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before
intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence.
Consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in
such subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to
have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This
inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in
each according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature
there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in
the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a
nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the
nature to something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual
nature, there must be a natural love in his will.

Reply Obj. 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that
natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a
nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or
intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: All things in the world are moved to act by something
else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in
no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the
same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in
so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author
of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act
himself, because he has free-will.

Reply Obj. 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love
well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the
inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural
inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of
nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the
rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects
the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and
the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 2]

Whether There Is Love of Choice in the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the
angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice
follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3.
Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to
angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of
choice in the angels.

Obj. 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such
as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire
the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything
they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles,
which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been
already stated (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1). Consequently, besides their
infused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore
there is no love of choice in them.

_On the contrary,_ We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts.
But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is
love of choice in them.

_I answer that,_ There exists in the angels a natural love, and a
love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of
choice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the
nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in
everything, what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.

This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect
and his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from
such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are
known by him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like
manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle
does in the intellect, as is laid down in _Phys._ ii, text. 89.
Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man
naturally wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this
natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the
end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as
an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes of this, which
is of something loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.

There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the
part of the will. Because, as was stated already (Q. 59, A. 2), the
mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known
within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual
nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things
capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is
moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive
faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards
things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are
appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to
something else, and being appetible on account of something else.
Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring,
for him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else
from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the
intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not
deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found
in them both natural love and love of choice.

In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which
are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle
thereof: but we shall speak of them later on (Q. 62).

Reply Obj. 1: Not all love of choice is rational love, according as
rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love
is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said
above (Q. 59, A. 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice
does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human
choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.

The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 4]

Whether the Angel Loves Himself with Both Natural Love, and Love of
Choice?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both
with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (A. 2),
natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the
means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot
be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the
love of choice cannot have the same object.

Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a
uniting and a binding power." But uniting and binding imply various
things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.

Obj. 3: Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement
tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel
cannot love himself with either natural or elective love.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for
others comes of love for oneself."

_I answer that,_ Since the object of love is good, and good is to be
found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from _Ethic._ i,
6, a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting
good; and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved
as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But
that which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or
inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to
it but that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by
the name "concupiscence" while the first is called "friendship."

Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything
naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to
mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their
own good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man
naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires
what is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the
love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something
which will benefit himself.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not under the same but under quite different
aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with
elective love, as was observed above.

Reply Obj. 2: As to be one is better than to be united, so there is
more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which
unites one to others. Dionysius used the terms "uniting" and
"binding" in order to show the derivation of love from self to things
outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.

Reply Obj. 3: As love is an action which remains within the agent, so
also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not of
necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back
upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is
reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 4]

Whether an Angel Loves Another with Natural Love As He Loves Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not love another with
natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an
angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows
himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as
was said above (Q. 56, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it seems that one angel
does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.

Obj. 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and the
principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes of
love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one
angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.

Obj. 3: Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is
unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love
can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no
love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another
with natural love as he loves himself.

_On the contrary,_ That seems to be a natural property which is found
in all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, "every beast loves its
like," as is said, Ecclus. 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves
another as he loves himself.

_I answer that,_ As was observed (A. 3), both angel and man naturally
love self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself:
consequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if this
be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love; but
if it be one with it by non-natural union, then it loves it with
non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social
love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so
far as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.

Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with
another, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves
another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in
so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things
devoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate
its form to another thing, wherein consists this other thing's good;
as it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne
upwards.

So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural
affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an
angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from
him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.

Reply Obj. 1: The expression 'as himself' can in one way qualify the
knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved: and
thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other
to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the expression
can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and
lover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself, because
he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the other's
essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves himself,
because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love
another by the other's will.

Reply Obj. 2: The expression "as" does not denote equality, but
likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the
angel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he
loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one
only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a
like love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he
loves self in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing
well to him.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that
end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one
wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to
oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked
angels, without their still retaining a natural affection towards the
good angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But
they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to
righteousness and unrighteousness.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 5]

Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love God by
natural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated (A. 4),
natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far
above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the
angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.

Obj. 2: Further, "That on account of which a thing is such, is yet
more so." But every one loves another with natural love for his own
sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore
the angel does not love God more than self with natural love.

Obj. 3: Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we
behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But
nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards
anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does
not love God more than himself from natural love.

Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self.
But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it is
poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to
them," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels
do not love God more than themselves by natural love.

Obj. 5: Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the
love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who
sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two
cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the
earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made
the heavenly city." Therefore it is not natural to love God more
than self.

_On the contrary,_ All the moral precepts of the law come of the law
of nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral
precept of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature.
Consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself.

_I answer that,_ There have been some who maintained that an angel
loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of
concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather
than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in
so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself;
because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he
wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the
natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he
naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.

The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider
whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because
the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of
the natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual
nature. Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally
belongs to another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that
other to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural
tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature:
because "according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn
aptitude to be thus moved," as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we
observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard
the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed
to the blow for the whole body's safety. And since reason copies
nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it
behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death
for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part of
the city, then such inclination would be natural to him.

Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good
both man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every
creature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it
follows that from natural love angel and man alike love God before
themselves and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them
loved self more than God, it would follow that natural love would be
perverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided
whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the
other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it
does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is
with the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and
goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self;
because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more
than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the
species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the
good of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence
everything in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.

Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in so
far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far"
denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God
for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of
love on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the
nature of anyone to love God, except from this--that everything is
dependent on that good which is God.

Reply Obj. 3: Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as to
certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for
everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but
likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural
inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.

Reply Obj. 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom
every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love.
So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with
supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.

Reply Obj. 5: Since God's substance and universal goodness are one
and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement
of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other
things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is
naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is
impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him.
But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular
effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way
they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the
universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than
itself.
_______________________

QUESTION 61

OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING
(In Four Articles)

After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will,
it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a
general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the
first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence;
secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly,
how some of them became wicked.

Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?

(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?

(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?

(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 1]

Whether the Angels Have a Cause of Their Existence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their
existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created
by God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were
not created by God.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16) that
if any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has being
and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity." But
the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above (Q. 50, A. 2).
Therefore they have no cause of their being.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very
fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the
angels are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent.
Therefore the angels have no active cause.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 148:2): "Praise ye Him, all His
angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made."

_I answer that,_ It must be affirmed that angels and everything
existing, except God, were made by God. God alone is His own
existence; while in everything else the essence differs from the
existence, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 4). From this it is clear
that God alone exists of His own essence: while all other things have
their existence by participation. Now whatever exists by participation
is caused by what exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused
by fire. Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the angels
were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things,
but are designated by the name "heavens" or of "light." And they were
either passed over, or else designated by the names of corporeal
things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as yet
incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had been
divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature,
it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they
were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard
them.

Reply Obj. 2: Substances that are subsisting forms have no 'formal'
cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as produces
its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality to
actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire substance.

From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 2]

Whether the Angel Was Produced by God from Eternity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from
eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does
not act through something besides His essence. But His being is
eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.

Obj. 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at
another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid
down in the book _De Causis._ Therefore the angel is not at one time
existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's
incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as
truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual
nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but
likewise eternal.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person of begotten
Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He
made anything from the beginning." But, as was shown above (A. 1), the
angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.

_I answer that,_ God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from
eternity. Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to
the contrary must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced
creatures that He made them "from nothing"; that is, after they had
not been.

Reply Obj. 1: God's being is His will. So the fact that God produced
the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude that He
made them also by His will. But, as was shown above (Q. 19, A. 3; Q.
46, A. 1), God's will does not act by necessity in producing
creatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and when He
willed.

Reply Obj. 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure of the
movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a
corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the
measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence,
and which is also the measure of the succession which is in his
operations. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that "God
moves the spiritual creature according to time."

Reply Obj. 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the
very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth.
But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed
upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not follow
that the angels existed from eternity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 3]

Whether the Angels Were Created Before the Corporeal World?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the
corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand
years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the
time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones,
Dominations, and the other orders served God?" Damascene also says
(De Fide Orth. ii): "Some say that the angels were begotten before
all creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all
devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the
making thereof."

Obj. 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine
and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity;
while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was
produced ere time was made, and after eternity.

Obj. 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal
nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal
nature was made before another; hence the six days of the production
of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more,
therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth." Now, this would not be true if anything
had been created previously. Consequently the angels were not created
before corporeal nature.

_I answer that,_ There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found
in the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the
angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the
angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of
themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting
one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of
creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures
makes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate
from the whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose "works
are perfect," as it is said Deut. 32:4, should have created the
angelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the
contrary is not to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the
opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, "whose authority in Christian doctrine
is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his
teaching, as is also the case with the doctrine of Athanasius," as
Jerome says.

Reply Obj. 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the
Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have
taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.

Reply Obj. 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole
universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the
universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the
universe. Hence the comparison does not hold.

Reply Obj. 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the
angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation
of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the
creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not
involve creation of the universe.

If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gen. 1, "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the
beginning," must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In the beginning
of time": but not, "In the beginning, before which there was
nothing," unless we say "Before which there was nothing of the
nature of corporeal creatures."
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 4]

Whether the Angels Were Created in the Empyrean Heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the
empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a
substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its
existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation.
Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that the
angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the
empyrean heaven.

Obj. 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest
heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven,
it would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And
this is contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of
the sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" (Isa. 14:13).

_On the contrary,_ Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the
visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or
intellectual firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but
from its splendor; and which was filled with angels directly it was
made."

_I answer that,_ As was observed (A. 3), the universe is made up of
corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures
were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal
creature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was
fitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place,
as presiding over all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the
empyrean heaven, or whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that
the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage
of Deut. 10:14: "Behold heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven
of heaven."

Reply Obj. 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not as
if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their
being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal
creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal
place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and
that they are by their power in touch with bodies.

Reply Obj. 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means
the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of
affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not
speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the
opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is
nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an
exalted and universal power over all corporeal things, were created
in the highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other
angels, as having more restricted powers, were created among the
inferior bodies.

Reply Obj. 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven,
but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the sinning
angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some manner
to God, as will appear later on (Q. 63, A. 3).
_______________________

QUESTION 62

OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY
(In Nine Articles)

In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the
order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine
points of inquiry:

(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?

(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?

(3) Were they created in grace?

(4) Did they merit their beatitude?

(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?

(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural
capacities?

(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge
remain?

(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?

(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 1]

Whether the Angels Were Created in Beatitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude.
For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue
in the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature
possess the excellence they have." Therefore the angels were created
in beatitude.

Obj. 2: Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal
creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation
was made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take
precedence in time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. i, 15). Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature
imperfect and incomplete. But its formation and perfection are
derived from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was
created in beatitude.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34; v, 5),
the things which we read of as being made in the works of the six
days, were made together at one time; and so all the six days must
have existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according
to his exposition, in those six days, "the morning" was the angelic
knowledge, according to which they knew the Word and things in the
Word. Therefore straightway from their creation they knew the Word,
and things in the Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing
the Word. Consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from
the very beginning of their creation.

_On the contrary,_ To be established or confirmed in good is of the
nature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as
soon as they were created; the fall of some of them shows this.
Therefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.

_I answer that,_ By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate
perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that
it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its
ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of
rational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can
procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure called
beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man's
ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby
in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and that is
God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look
forward to in the future, whereby "we shall see God as He is." This is
beyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above
(Q. 12, A. 4).

So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first
beatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was
created already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such
beatitude by any progressive action, as man does, but, as was
observed above (Q. 58, AA. 3, 4), is straightway in possession
thereof, owing to his natural dignity. But the angels did not have
from the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is
beyond the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of
their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not to have it
immediately from the beginning.

Reply Obj. 1: Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection
which the angel had in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 2: The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of
its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by
its operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v,
4, 23; viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take
place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating
power of the plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the
angelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection
of its nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to
come by its operation.

Reply Obj. 3: The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word; the one
which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a natural
knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude thereof
shining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he
knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the
angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge,
and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first
knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the
outset of his creation; while the second was not, but only when the
angels became blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly
termed their morning knowledge.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 2]

Whether an Angel Needs Grace in Order to Turn to God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in
order to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can
accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because
he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 60,
A. 5). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.

Obj. 2: Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks. Now
it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because
there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had
no need of grace in order to turn to God.

Obj. 3: Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for
grace; hence it is said (Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn
to you." But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare
ourselves for grace: for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore
the angel did not need grace to turn to God.

_On the contrary,_ It was by turning to God that the angel reached to
beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God,
it would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess
everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle
(Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God is life everlasting."

_I answer that,_ The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn
to God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above
(Q. 60, A. 2) the natural movement of the will is the principle
of all things that we will. But the will's natural inclination is
directed towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if
there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined
towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus
it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and
to generate fire; whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural
power of fire; consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in
so far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.

Now it was shown above (Q. 12, AA. 4, 5), when we were treating of
God's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate
beatitude of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of
every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have
the movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be
moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help
of grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own
will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace.

Reply Obj. 1: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the
author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to
God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing is "difficult" which is beyond a power; and
this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the
natural capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some
help, it is said to be "difficult"; but if it can in no way be
attained, then it is "impossible"; thus it is impossible for a man to
fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to
the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening
hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order
of the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered in
itself, can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing
by the weight of the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to
mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult
for man, both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a
hindrance from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But
it is difficult for an angel, only because it is supernatural.

Reply Obj. 3: Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a
conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The
first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature
enjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion, consummate
grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits
beatitude; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is
the principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man
disposes himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual
grace is required; but the operation of God, Who draws the soul
towards Himself, according to Lament. 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to
Thee, and we shall be converted." Hence it is clear that there is no
need to go on to infinity.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 3]

Whether the Angels Were Created in Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in grace.
For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature was
first made without form, and was called "heaven": but afterwards it
received its form, and was then called "light." But such formation
comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.

Obj. 2: Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If,
therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever
have turned away from God.

Obj. 3: Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the
angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems that
they were not created in grace; but that they were first created in
nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were
beatified.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), "Who wrought
the good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His
will, that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the
same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them?"

_I answer that,_ Although there are conflicting opinions on this
point, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural
state, while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it
seems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy
men, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all
things which, in the process of time, being created by the work of
Divine Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were
created in the first fashioning of things according to seedlike
forms, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees,
animals, and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears
the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to
the natural effect; hence (1 John 3:9) grace is called the "seed" of
God. As, then, in Augustine's opinion it is contended that the
seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creature
when corporeally created, so straightway from the beginning the
angels were created in grace.

Reply Obj. 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be understood
either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so the
absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or else
it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so it
did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as
Augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things
(Gen. ad lit. i, 15).

Reply Obj. 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the
subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be
inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the
movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace
can fail to make use of it, and can sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes midway
between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in
created nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory
is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace
stands not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but
as the principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for
grace to be given straightway with nature.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 4]

Whether an Angel Merits His Beatitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude.
For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the
angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous
action was not meritorious for him.

Obj. 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But it
was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not
thereby merit beatitude.

Obj. 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he did
so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not
before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before
whereby to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he
would be meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that
case a lower angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher,
and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is
not admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the "measure of
the angel" in that heavenly Jerusalem is "the measure of a man."
Therefore the same is the case with the angel.

_I answer that,_ Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because
existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude,
however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now
everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation
leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is
not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing
art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when
such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it;
wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. Now it is
evident from what has gone before (AA. 1, 2; Q. 12, AA. 4, 5),
ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It
remains, then, that both man and angel merited their beatitude.

And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no
merit, there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited
beatitude: as also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way
before he had glory.

But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then
have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have
grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which
conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as
some others have maintained, that the angels merit beatitude by their
present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary,
again, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means
to an end; while what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking,
be moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he
already enjoys. Or else it will have to be said that one and the same
act of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is
meritorious; and so far as it attains the end, is the fruition of
beatitude. Even this view will not stand, because free-will is not the
sufficient cause of merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be
meritorious as coming from free-will, except in so far as it is
informed by grace; but it cannot at the same time be informed by
imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by perfect
grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it does not appear to
be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude, and at the same time to
merit it.

Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was
admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.

Reply Obj. 1: The angel's difficulty of working righteously does not
come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but from
the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity.

Reply Obj. 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natural movement
towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of grace.

The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 5]

Whether the Angel Obtained Beatitude Immediately After One Act of
Merit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude
instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man
to do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after
one act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel.

Obj. 2: Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant, from
the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to be
moved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of a
body could be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it
would have movement in the first instant of its generation.
Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will,
he merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their
beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the
first instant.

Obj. 3: Further, there must be many intervals between things which
are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far
remote from their natural condition: while merit comes midway
between. Therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages
of merit in order to reach beatitude.

_On the contrary,_ Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for
beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the
saints. Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit
deserving beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be
some obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in
his first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since
there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by
only one meritorious act.

_I answer that,_ The angel was beatified instantly after the first
act of charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is
because grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature;
as every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection,
according to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to
receive its natural perfection not by passing from one stage to
another; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown above (A. 1;
Q. 58, AA. 3, 4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to
natural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence
instantly after merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of
beatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act; because
man merits beatitude by every act informed by charity. Hence it
remains that an angel was beatified straightway after one act of
charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection
at once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to man than
to the angel for securing beatitude.

Reply Obj. 2: The angel is above the time of corporeal things; hence
the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except
as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which
merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of
beatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect
grace, and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains
for different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel
merited beatitude, and in another was beatified.

Reply Obj. 3: It is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain
the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one
meritorious act is required; which act can so far be called an
interval as through it the angel is brought to beatitude.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 6]

Whether the Angels Receive Grace and Glory According to the Degree of
Their Natural Gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and
glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is
bestowed of God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace
depends on God's will, and not on the degree of their natural gifts.

Obj. 2: Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with
grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace.
But grace does not come "of works," as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore
much less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their
natural gifts.

Obj. 3: Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or
grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of
his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.

_On the contrary,_ Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences
(Sent. ii, D, 3) that "those angels who were created with more subtle
natures and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed
with greater gifts of grace."

_I answer that,_ It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and
perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the
degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from
two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of
His wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as
the angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude,
so likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for
the various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the
builder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he
prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is
clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the
house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of
grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.

Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is
not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the
one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man,
in whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or
thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is
nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy.
So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher
nature, were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same
thing happens in men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed
according to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it
appears that the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the
more grace and glory.

Reply Obj. 1: As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise does
the nature of the angel: and as God's will ordained nature for grace,
so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees
of grace.

Reply Obj. 2: The acts of the rational creature are from the creature
itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it seems
rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than
according to works.

Reply Obj. 3: Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels,
who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another way
in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on
account of the end; while numerical difference is because of the
matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or
impede the movement of his intellective nature; but not in the
angels. Consequently the argument is not the same for both.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 7]

Whether Natural Knowledge and Love Remain in the Beatified Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not
remain in the beatified angels. For it is said (1 Cor. 13:10): "When
that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be
done away." But natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison
with beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural
knowledge and love cease.

Obj. 2: Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But the
knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels.
Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and
love to remain.

Obj. 3: Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts, as
the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points.
But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified
knowledge and love; for, as is said _Ethic._ i, 8, happiness consists
not in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural
knowledge and love in the angels.

_On the contrary,_ So long as a nature endures, its operation
remains. But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its
perfection. Therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and
love.

_I answer that,_ Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For
as principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations
themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to
second; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must
ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved
in beatitude: and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved
in the act of beatitude.

Reply Obj. 1: The advent of a perfection removes the opposite
imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the
perfection of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the
power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken
away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In
the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to
the perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing hinders us from
knowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at
the one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative
one. In like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this
appertains to his knowledge of glory; and at the same time he can know
God by his own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: All things which make up beatitude are sufficient of
themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the
natural gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the
uncreated beatitude.

Reply Obj. 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at
the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural
knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory.
Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love
from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 8]

Whether a Beatified Angel Can Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as
as said above (A. 7), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it
is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore
a beatified angel can sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as
the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the
angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is
inclined towards good and evil.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be
able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened
in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there is
in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin." Therefore the holy
angels cannot sin.

_I answer that,_ The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for
this is, because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His
essence. Now, God's essence is the very essence of goodness.
Consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the
same way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of
goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do
anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn
away from good precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can
neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills
or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel
cannot sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Created good, considered in itself, can fail.
But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the
union of beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason
already alleged.

Reply Obj. 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites in
the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the
things whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred
to opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known
principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good,
formally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to
its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to
opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have
no tendency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom they see to
be the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards
God, which ever alternative they choose, that is not sinful.

Reply Obj. 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end is
disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident
that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to
different conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to
proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the
principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the
perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose
between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it
comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning
away from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is
greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is
in ourselves, who can sin.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 3]

Whether the Beatified Angels Advance in Beatitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in
beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is
perfect charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can
merit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases.
Therefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that "God
makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same
thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual
ministrations"; since "they are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not
all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who
shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (Heb. 1:14). This would
not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to
advance to beatitude. It remains, then, that the beatified angels
can merit, and can advance in beatitude.

Obj. 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying
the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not
in the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend
higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in
them; which is not admissible.

_On the contrary,_ Merit and progress belong to this present
condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards
beatitude, they are already in possession of beatitude. Consequently
the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude.

_I answer that,_ In every movement the mover's intention is centered
upon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable
subject; because intention looks to the end, to which infinite
progress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature
cannot of its own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in
the vision of God, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. 12, A.
4), that it needs to be moved by God towards its beatitude. Therefore
there must be some one determined thing to which every rational
creature is directed as to its last end.

Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist
precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all
the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of
vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of
Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the
rational creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it
should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which
is comprehension, for this belongs to God only; as is evident from
what was said above (Q. 12, A. 7; Q. 14, A. 3). But since infinite
efficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature's
efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite being is
in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pass that
the rational creature understands God more or less clearly according
to infinite degrees. And as beatitude consists in vision, so the
degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.

Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its
beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a
determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is
once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.

Reply Obj. 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its
end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely
passively, but also by working actively. If the end is within the
power of the rational creature, then its action is said to procure
the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be
beyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the action
will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the ultimate
term is not said to be moved, but to have been moved. Consequently,
to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life; whereas
perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as
in acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is productive
of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is both
perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity has
no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the
reward.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all,
as being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is
useful. Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall
for a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the
beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for
to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what
is perfect, considered as perfect.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the
highest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the
highest degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the
joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of
such as are saved by their ministrations, according to Luke 15:10:
"There is [Vulg.'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon one
sinner doing penance." Such joy belongs to their accidental reward,
which can be increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that
they can merit as to their accidental reward. But it is better to say
that the Blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time
a wayfarer and a comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was such. For
the Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude,
rather than merit it.
_______________________

QUESTION 63

THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN
(In Nine Articles)

In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of
all with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil
of punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for
consideration:

(1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?

(2) What kind of sins can be in them?

(3) What did the angel seek in sinning?

(4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing,
are any of them naturally evil?

(5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil
in the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will?

(6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his
creation and fall?

(7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among
the angels?

(8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others
sinning?

(9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 1]

Whether the Evil of Fault Can Be in the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the
angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in
potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19),
because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the
angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting
forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them.

Obj. 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But
philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies.
Therefore neither can there be in the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it
is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards
God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving
God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.

Obj. 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good.
Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true
good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at
least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it
truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good.
Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Job 4:18): "In His angels He found
wickedness."

_I answer that,_ An angel or any other rational creature considered in
his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to
sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the
condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing
else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have;
whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the
rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of
rectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he
could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the
rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving
may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God's
act, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created
will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to
the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every
desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his
superior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of
his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no
sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature;
considering the condition of its nature.

Reply Obj. 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural
existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as
regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this
respect there can be evil in them.

Reply Obj. 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation.
Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so
neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But
besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the
angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.

Reply Obj. 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the
movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural
being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural
beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away
by sinning.

Reply Obj. 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will.
First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing
adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance
or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The
adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an
inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the
inclination of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in
his universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect.
In this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there are no
passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest
from what has been said above (Q. 59, A. 4); nor, again, could any
habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin
comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not
according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces
sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly
regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to
pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin
does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of
the things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel
sinned, by seeking his own good, from his own free-will,
insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 2]

Whether Only the Sin of Pride and Envy Can Exist in an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels
besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any
kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even
in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.

Obj. 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth,
avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit,
just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there
be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices
spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is
granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and
envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other
vices in them.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil
"is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort;
yet he is proud and envious."

_I answer that,_ Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all
by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are
in the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of
all sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in the demons
which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot
be affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by
such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is
affected except with regard to something which is in some way suited
to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good
of the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the
superior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride--not to be
subject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first
sin of the angel can be none other than pride.

Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them,
since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on
its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines
over the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his
neighbor's good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good
could not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked
angel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which
would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other.
So, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the
sinning angel, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the
Divine excellence, according as against the devil's will God makes
use of man for the Divine glory.

Reply Obj. 1: The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the
sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal
pleasures: it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all
sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man's good.

Reply Obj. 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the
immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human
life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons
are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures.
Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if
every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed
avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in
the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence;
consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth
is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual
exercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to the
demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual
sins which can be found in demons; yet so that envy is not to be
taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.

Reply Obj. 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are
comprised all other sins derived from them.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 3]

Whether the Devil Desired to Be As God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as
God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under
desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite,
whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only
in such desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall
under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the
finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite.
Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God.

Obj. 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin.
But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature
naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not
by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby
sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom
than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the
equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only
things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation.
Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.

_On the contrary,_ It is said, in the person of the devil (Isa.
14:13, 14), "I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most
High." And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being
"inflated with pride, he wished to be called God."

_I answer that,_ Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as
God. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality;
secondly, by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first
way; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible:
and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any
passion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was
impossible by failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in
ourselves. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against
the natural desire; because there exists in everything the natural
desire of preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved
were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature
of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as
an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so upraised,
it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us
false; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy
a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the
destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of
nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it
is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in
accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another.
Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire
equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with God.

To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways.
In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be
likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike,
he commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper
order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin
were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his
own, and not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like
unto God in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were
to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which
desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired
to be as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to
no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own
'not-being'; since no creature can exist except by holding its
existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this
respect--by desiring, as his last end of beatitude, something which
he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite
away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God's grace.
Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is
bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own
nature; and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering.
This harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who says [*De casu diaboli,
iv.] that "he sought that to which he would have come had he stood
fast." These two views in a manner coincide; because according to
both, he sought to have final beatitude of his own power, whereas
this is proper to God alone.

Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of
another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have
dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like
unto God.

From this we have the answer to all the objections.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 4]

Whether Any Demons Are Naturally Wicked?

Objection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For
Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There is
a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and
the souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore
some demons are naturally wicked.

Obj. 2: Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men.
But some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Wis. 12:10):
"Their malice is natural." Therefore some angels may be naturally
wicked.

Obj. 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions
by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally
rapacious; yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the
demons are God's creatures, they may be naturally wicked.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the demons
are not naturally wicked."

_I answer that,_ Everything which exists, so far as it exists and
has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it
comes from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to
its principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil
connected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it
consumes other things: but with the universal good no evil can be
connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined
towards some particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil;
not as evil, but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if
anything of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its
own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that
every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which
it can apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence, since
the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a
natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they
cannot be naturally evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons
are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not
naturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held
that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons
are animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is
inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may be
connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to
evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good.

Reply Obj. 2: The malice of some men can be called natural, either
because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the
natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some
inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful
or lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their
sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain
evils are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural
inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit.
Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to
him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes
(De Div. Nom. iv).
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 5]

Whether the Devil Was Wicked by the Fault of His Own Will in the
First Instant of His Creation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of
his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of
the devil (John 8:44): "He was a murderer from the beginning."

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the
lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order
of time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 8), the "heaven," which is said to have been created in the
beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed:
and when it is said that God said: "Be light made: and light was
made," we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning
to the Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and
light was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light
was made, it was made distinct from "darkness," whereby the angels who
sinned are denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation
some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned.

Obj. 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual
nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of
Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could
sin in the first instant of their creation.

Obj. 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the
corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation
in the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards
in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also
have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this
operation was either ordinate or inordinate. If ordinate, then, since
he had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the
reward follows immediately upon merit; as was said above (Q. 62, A.
5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would
never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned
by inordinate action in their first instant.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:31): "God saw all the things
that He had made, and they were very good." But among them were also
the demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good.

_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the demons were wicked
straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their
nature, but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was
made, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree
with those Manichean heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil
of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the
authority of Scripture--for it is said of the devil under the figure
of the prince of Babylon (Isa. 14:12): "How art thou fallen . . . O
Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning!" and it is said to the devil
in the person of the King of Tyre (Ezech. 28:13): "Thou wast in the
pleasures of the paradise of God,"--consequently, this opinion was
reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous.

Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their
creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is
repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the
other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one
instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to
his creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel's very
being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems,
then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first
instant of his existence.

This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in
such movements as are measured by time, and take place successively;
thus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the
local movement cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the
changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant
there can be a term to the first and the second change; thus in the
same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere
is lit up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is
instantaneous; so also is the movement of free-will in the angels;
for, as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison
or discursive reasoning (Q. 58, A. 3). Consequently, there is nothing
to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the
same instant.

We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for
the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of
free-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant
of its existence, nevertheless, that operation which begins with the
existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as
upward movement in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if
there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause,
which can be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first
instant of its existence have a defective operation; just as the leg,
which is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of
generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which brought the
angels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin.
Consequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the
first instant of his creation.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is
stated that "the devil sins from the beginning," "he is not to be
thought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but
from the beginning of sin": that is to say, because he never went
back from his sin.

Reply Obj. 2: That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the
sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken
as according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xi, 15), that "He alone could discern light and darkness, Who
also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall."

Reply Obj. 3: All that is in merit is from God; and consequently an
angel could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same
reason does not hold good of sin; as has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: God did not distinguish between the angels before the
turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself,
as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were
created in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of
them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby
destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were
deprived of the beatitude which they had merited.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 6]

Whether There Was Any Interval Between the Creation and the Fall of
the Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was some interval between the
angel's creation and his fall. For, it is said (Ezech. 28:15): "Thou
didst walk perfect [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast walked in the midst of the
stones of fire; thou wast perfect . . .'] in thy ways from the day of
thy creation until iniquity was found in thee." But since walking is
continuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore there was some
interval between the devil's creation and his fall.

Obj. 2: Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that "the serpent
of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly"; which
refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the
first instant of his creation.

Obj. 3: Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and
angel. But there was some delay between man's formation and his sin.
Therefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the
devil's formation and his sin.

Obj. 4: Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was
distinct from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a
middle time between every two instants. Therefore there was an
interval between his creation and his fall.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of the devil (John 8:44): "He stood not
in the truth": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), "we must
understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not
remain in it."

_I answer that,_ There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the
more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings
of the Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first
instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held that
he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation,
and that he was created in grace; as we have said (Q. 62, A. 3). For
since the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said
above (Q. 62, A. 5), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the
first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that
first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.

If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace,
or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant,
then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed
between his creation and fall.

Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous
movements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured
by time. In this way by "walking" we are to understand the movement
of free-will tending towards good.

Reply Obj. 2: Origen says, "The serpent of old did not from the first
walk upon his breast and belly," because of the first instant in
which he was not wicked.

Reply Obj. 3: An angel has an inflexible free-will after once
choosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a
natural movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to
beatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with
man; and therefore the argument does not hold good.

Reply Obj. 4: It is true to say that there is a middle time between
every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved
_Phys._ vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the
heavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time,
time is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of
their affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood to
respond to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects
itself by its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is
mentioned, but not morning. This operation was good in them all. From
such operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word
by their morning knowledge while others, absorbed in themselves,
became night, "swelling up with pride," as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act was common to them all; but in
their second they were separated. Consequently they were all of them
good in the first instant; but in the second the good were set apart
from the wicked.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 7]

Whether the Highest Angel Among Those Who Sinned Was the Highest of
All?

Objection 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who
sinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezech. 28:14):
"Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in
the holy mountain of God." Now the order of the Cherubim is under
the order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii).
Therefore, the highest angel among those who sinned was not the
highest of all.

Obj. 2: Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it
might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels
sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the
noblest creature which is unfitting.

Obj. 3: Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so
much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is,
so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the
less can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the
angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower
angels.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief
angel who sinned, "being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed
them in brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among
them."

_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the
proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels
we consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels
were less likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set
over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view
of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6, 7; x,
9, 10, 11). For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some
of the demons were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods' the
intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling
by the name of "demons" the intellectual substances which are beneath
it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion
to be rejected as contrary to faith; because the whole corporeal
creation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from
saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding
over the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies; and the
highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels;
yet in that order some of them remained good.

But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed
in the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said
(A. 2), the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is
excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory
says that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be
the more probable view: because the angels' sin did not come of any
proneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argument seems
to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet
this must not be prejudicial to the other view; because there might be
some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower
angels.

Reply Obj. 1: Cherubim is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," while
"Seraphim" means "those who are on fire," or "who set on fire."
Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible
with mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity,
which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who
sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.

Reply Obj. 2: The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those
who sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the end
of both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His
goodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual
creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this
unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual creature
was so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its
end.

Reply Obj. 3: However great was the inclination towards good in the
highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently
it was in his power not to follow it.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 8]

Whether the Sin of the Highest Angel Was the Cause of the Others
Sinning?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not
the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect.
But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at
one time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others'
sinning.

Obj. 2: Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was
shown above (A. 2). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more
contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than
to a superior; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by
desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the
sin of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if
he had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear
that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.

Obj. 3: Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to
another against God, than to wish to be over another against God;
because there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of
the foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that he
induced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would
have sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is contrary to a
gloss on Ps. 103:26: "This dragon which Thou hast formed--He who was
the more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in
malice." Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of
the others sinning.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the dragon "drew"
with him "the third part of the stars of heaven."

_I answer that,_ The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the
others sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind
of exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons
are subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord's words:
"Go [Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which
was prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matt. 25:41). For the order
of Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil
suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to
(2 Pet. 2:19): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the
slave."

Reply Obj. 1: Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet
the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel
needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man,
who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal
speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it
is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he
takes thought; and in the last instant of speech, another who catches
his meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially evident with
regard to primary concepts, "which everyone accepts directly they are
heard" [*Boethius, De Hebdom.].

Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is
required in us; in the same instant in which the highest angel
expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for
the others to consent thereto.

Reply Obj. 2: Other things being equal, the proud would rather be
subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to
be subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an
advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior.
Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to
serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have
him as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their
ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers; especially because in
the order of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel.

Reply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 62, A. 6), an angel has
nothing in him to retard his action, and with his whole might he is
moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently
since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower
angels, he fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he
became the greater in malice.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 9]

Whether Those Who Sinned Were As Many As Those Who Remained Firm?

Objection 1: It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm.
For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Evil is in many, but
good is in few."

Obj. 2: Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way
in men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than
good; according to Eccles. 1:15: "The number of fools is infinite."
Therefore for the same reason it is so with the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, the angels are distinguished according to
persons and orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it
would appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (4 Kings 6:16): "There are more with us
than with them": which is expounded of the good angels who are with us
to aid us, and the wicked spirits who are our foes.

_I answer that,_ More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is
contrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the
natural order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its
effects either always, or more often than not.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom
evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are
known to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason,
which good is known to the few. In the angels there is only an
intellectual nature; hence the argument does not hold.

And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.

Reply Obj. 3: According to those who hold that the chief devil
belonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly
affairs, it is evident that some of every order did not fall, but
only those of the lowest order. According to those who maintain that
the chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some
fell of every order; just as men are taken up into every order to
supply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free-will is
more established; which in every degree of creature can be turned to
evil. In the Sacred Scripture, however, the names of some orders, as
of Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are
derived from the ardor of love and from God's indwelling, which are
not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of Cherubim, Powers,
and Principalities are attributed to them; because these names are
derived from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both
good and bad.
_______________________

QUESTION 64

THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS
(In Four Articles)

It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons;
under which heading there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Of their darkness of intellect;

(2) Of their obstinacy of will;

(3) Of their grief;

(4) Of their place of punishment.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 1]

Whether the Demons' Intellect Is Darkened by Privation of the
Knowledge of All Truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened by
being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For if they knew any
truth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to
know separated substances. But this is not in keeping with their
unhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as
that some writers have assigned as man's last happiness the knowledge
of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all
knowledge of truth.

Obj. 2: Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be
specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the same
is not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of
our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes
from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of
the sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most manifest of
Himself, because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because they
are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore
neither can they know other things.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22), the
proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and
evening. But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do
not see things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge,
because this evening knowledge refers the things known to the
Creator's praise (hence, after "evening" comes "morning" [Gen. 1]).
Therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things.

Obj. 4: Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the
kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei
xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: "for if they had
known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory," as is
said 1 Cor. 2:8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of
all other knowledge of truth.

Obj. 5: Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either
naturally, as we know first principles; or by deriving it from
someone else, as we know by learning; or by long experience, as the
things we learn by discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth
by their own nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33),
the good angels are separated from them as light is from darkness;
and every manifestation is made through light, as is said Eph. 5:13.
In like manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from
the good angels: because "there is no fellowship of light with
darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath . . . ?']" (2 Cor. 6:14). Nor
can they learn by long experience: because experience comes of the
senses. Consequently there is no knowledge of truth in them.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain gifts
were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at
all, but remain entire and most brilliant." Now, the knowledge of
truth stands among those natural gifts. Consequently there is some
knowledge of truth in them.

_I answer that,_ The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes
of nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of
grace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when
Divine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other is effective,
and produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the
gift of wisdom.

Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor
lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very nature of the
angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on
account of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn
from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural
powers, as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or
of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the
natural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural
knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however,
which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been
utterly taken away from them, but lessened; because, of these Divine
secrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is
done either by means of the angels, or "through some temporal workings
of Divine power," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 21); but not in
the same degree as to the holy angels, to whom many more things are
revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third
knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived.

Reply Obj. 1: Happiness consists in self-application to something
higher. The separated substances are above us in the order of nature;
hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated
substances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the
first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one
separate substance to know another; as it is natural for us to know
sensible natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not consist in
knowing sensible natures; so neither does the angel's happiness
consist in knowing separated substances.

Reply Obj. 2: What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us
by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely because
our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine
substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect,
but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his
own nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the perfection of
his intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God
than man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons.
Although they do not possess the purity which comes with grace,
nevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the
knowledge of God which belongs to them from their nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The creature is darkness in comparison with the
excellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature's
knowledge in its own nature is called "evening" knowledge. For the
evening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when
the light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of
things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of the
Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the Divine
light, and can be called evening knowledge; but if it be not referred
to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but
"nocturnal" knowledge. Accordingly we read in Gen. 1:5 that the
darkness, which God separated from the light, "He called night."

Reply Obj. 4: All the angels had some knowledge from the very
beginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its
completion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were
beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never
had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence
the demons much less fully understood the mystery of the Incarnation,
when Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei
ix, 21), "It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels,
who enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; but it was made known
by some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them." For had
they fully and certainly known that He was the Son of God and the
effect of His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion
of the Lord of glory.

Reply Obj. 5: The demons know a truth in three ways: first of all by
the subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by
privation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the
light of their intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the
holy angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will,
they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual
nature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by
others: thirdly, they know by long experience; not as deriving it
from the senses; but when the similitude of their innate intelligible
species is completed in individual things, they know some things as
present, which they previously did not know would come to pass, as we
said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels (Q. 57, A. 3, ad
3).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 2]

Whether the Will of the Demons Is Obstinate in Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not
obstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an
intellectual being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said
above (A. 1). But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained
to good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons' will is not so
obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good.

Obj. 2: Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than
the demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the
malice of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy.
Therefore the demons can likewise return from their state of malice
to the state of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then
their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they
fell. But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the
motive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore
the demon is not obstinate in malice.

Obj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be reinstated
by another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed
already (Q. 63, A. 8), the lower demons fell through the highest one.
Therefore their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they
are not obstinate in malice.

Obj. 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any
good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses
the truth, saying to Christ: "I know Who Thou art, the holy one of
God" (Mark 1:24). "The demons" also "believe and tremble" (James
2:19). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that "they desire what
is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand." Therefore
they are not obstinate in malice.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
hate Thee, ascendeth continually"; and this is understood of the
demons. Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.

_I answer that,_ It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that
every will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to
good and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of
the union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of
true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature
of true beatitude; hence it is termed "life everlasting." It is also
contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that
demons and wicked men shall be sent "into everlasting punishment,"
and the good brought "into everlasting life." Consequently such an
opinion must be considered erroneous; while according to Catholic
Faith, it must be held firmly both that the will of the good angels
is confirmed in good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate
in evil.

We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of
the sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to men, what the fall is
to the angels." Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave
or less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they
are without remission and endure for ever.

To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind
that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the
apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For
the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks
the universal good, as was said above (Q. 59, A. 1); as also the
sense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers
universals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this
respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we
apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit
of "intelligence"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably,
passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by
which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's
will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it
and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres
fixedly and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its
adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite
(namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he
has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that
man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after
choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before
the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to
justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are
obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who
are damned (Suppl., Q. 98, AA. 1, 2).

Reply Obj. 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but
according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been
said.

Reply Obj. 2: God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But
such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and
are not delivered by the Divine mercy.

Reply Obj. 3: The devil's first sin still remains in him according to
desire; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he
desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder,
and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him;
nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would
he had done it, or still would do it if he could.

Reply Obj. 4: The fact that man sinned from another's suggestion, is
not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable. Consequently the
argument does not hold good.

Reply Obj. 5: A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will;
and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon's
part is always wicked; because, although at times he does something
good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth in order
to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly,
but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act is
natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the
goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 3]

Whether There Is Sorrow in the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For
since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the
same subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing
against the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: "The devil
has power over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices
over this sinister power." Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.

Obj. 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things
cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are
present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24,
"Who was made to fear no one." Therefore there is no grief in the
demons.

Obj. 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the
demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least
for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.

_On the contrary,_ The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man
is punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin,
according to Apoc. 18:7, "As much as she hath glorified herself, and
lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her."
Consequently much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow,
because he especially glorified himself.

_I answer that,_ Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are
passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the
sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According,
however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the
demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because
sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the
resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is
evident that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are,
and others to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish
others to be damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said
to exist in them: and especially because it is of the very notion of
punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are
deprived of happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked
will is curbed in many respects.

Reply Obj. 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but
not about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man
from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another; especially so
far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will; because, not
merely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there
can be something that we will, and something that we will not.

Reply Obj. 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so
also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He was made
to fear no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God which
restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the devils
believe and tremble" (James 2:19).

Reply Obj. 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin
bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin
is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, or for the
evil of sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the
goodness of nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow for good lost by
punishment, is the witness to a good nature." Consequently, since the
demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil
of sin.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 4]

Whether Our Atmosphere Is the Demons' Place of Punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons'
place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a
spiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no
place of punishment for demons.

Obj. 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But
man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the
demons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome
atmosphere.

Obj. 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire.
But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the
darksome atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the
darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment
day."

_I answer that,_ The angels in their own nature stand midway between
God and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it
procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But
man's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of
all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil;
and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way,
indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against
opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be
brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be
of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of
punishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this
is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the
darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.

Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment
day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with
demons endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to
us here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial:
although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they
have led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy
souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men
and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.

Reply Obj. 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting
the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it:
because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not
agreeable to its will.

Reply Obj. 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of
nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature;
consequently there is no parallel.

Reply Obj. 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons
and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the beatitude
of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this
is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2 Cor.
5:1): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have
a house in heaven." Others, again, while not admitting the same of
souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same
judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on
good souls and good angels.

Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs
to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their
coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the
same way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is
not actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said,
that although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of
hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their
punishment is none the less; because they know that such confinement
is their due. Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3:6: "They carry
fire of hell with them wherever they go." Nor is this contrary to what
is said (Luke 8:31), "They besought the Lord not to cast them into the
abyss"; for they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for
them to be cast out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it
is stated, "They [Vulg. 'He'] besought Him that He would not expel
them [Vulg. 'him'] out of the country" (Mark 5:10).
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ. 65-74)
_______________________

QUESTION 65

THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES
(In Four Articles)

From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of
corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture
makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as
given in the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth";
the work of distinction as given in the words, "He divided the light
from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from
the waters that are under the firmament"; and the work of adornment,
expressed thus, "Let there be lights in the firmament."

First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the
work of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the
first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

(2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness?

(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the
angels?

(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately
from God.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 1]

Whether Corporeal Creatures Are from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God.
For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works
which God hath made, continue for ever." But visible bodies do not
continue for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): "The things which are
seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."
Therefore God did not make visible bodies.

Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Gen. 1:31): "God saw all things that
He had made, and they were very good." But corporeal creatures are
evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in
serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called
evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore,
are not from God.

Obj. 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God,
but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God.
Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): "While we look not at the things
which are seen." Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 145:6): "Who made heaven and
earth, the sea, and all things that are in them."

_I answer that,_ Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not
created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof
of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), "The god of this
world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers." But this position is
altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point,
there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in
nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different
things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these
different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as
different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being
is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different.
There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things
in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible
and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the
god of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings
serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense,
"Whose god is their belly" (Phil. 3:19).

Reply Obj. 1: All the creatures of God in some respects continue for
ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be
annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature
approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For
corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though
they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible
creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are
mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly
bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle's
words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true even as
regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as every
visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to
movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they
are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these
visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure
for ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor. 4:17): "It worketh for us . .
. an eternal weight of glory."

Reply Obj. 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good,
though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the
consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities,
though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who
estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they
themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to
themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in
some way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that
even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but
good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially
evil and harmful.

Reply Obj. 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God,
but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). If,
then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use
them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): "Creatures are turned
into a snare to the feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they
can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for
they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements
of some good that they have from Him.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 2]

Whether Corporeal Things Were Made on Account of God's Goodness?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made
on account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God
"created all things that they might be." Therefore all things were
created for their own being's sake, and not on account of God's
goodness.

Obj. 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the
greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual
creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to
the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake
of spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.

Obj. 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the
unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God
must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not
created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all
inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now,
corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the
former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on
account of God's goodness.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all
things for Himself."

_I answer that,_ Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal
creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in
punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that
God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal
nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God,
and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given a
higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others
turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies
according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is
erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture,
which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal
creatures, subjoins, "God saw that it was good" (Gen. 1), as if to
say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was
good for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal
creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but
that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it
would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal
world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun's body was made
what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin
of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual
creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the
sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so
of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible.
Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the
entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists
of its parts.

Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that
whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the
sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly,
that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses
for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all
parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form,
since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore,
the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the
fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also
every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the
less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than
man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists
for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire
universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end,
inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine
goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in
some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain
to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is
plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.

Reply Obj. 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it
represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that
God created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude
that He created them for His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end.
Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the
sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account
of God's goodness.

Reply Obj. 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since
equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But
this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an
architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in
different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent
difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection
of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the
different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning,
to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of
various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without
injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 3]

Whether Corporeal Creatures Were Produced by God Through the Medium
of the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by
God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed
by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps.
103:24: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But "it belongs to
wisdom to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the _Metaphysics_
(i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the
higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii,
4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the
corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the
higher.

Obj. 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes,
since like always produces like. If then all creatures, both
spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there
would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further
removed from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the
Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are
far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).

Obj. 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite
effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be,
and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in
suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is
possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to
that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal
creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.

_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from
God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from
Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until
the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is
untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by
creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of
coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and
it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.

In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause,
the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the
underlying principle in things is always more universal than that
which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than
living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely,
then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing
proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily
all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause.
Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is
presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a
higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire
substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created.
Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the
first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created
immediately by God, Moses said: "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth."

Reply Obj. 1: In the production of things an order exists, but not
such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible;
but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are
constituted in creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and
different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature,
as has been shown above (Q. 15, A. 2); so that by His wisdom He is
the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer,
by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.

Reply Obj. 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured not
only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one
and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another
by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is
presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as
such, can belong to no creature.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 4]

Whether the Forms of Bodies Are from the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the
angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without
matter come the forms that are in matter." But forms that are without
matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the
forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual
substances.

Obj. 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that
which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms
essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation.
Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual
substances.

Obj. 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation
than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things
here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and
corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from
spiritual substances.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not
suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod,
but rather that it obeys God thus." But corporeal matter may be said
thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms,
then, are not from the angels, but from God.

_I answer that,_ It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms
are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And
there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that
the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms
immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held
that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so
forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see
are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the
impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of
assimilation, or as he calls it, "participation" (Phaedo xlix). And,
according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the
order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a
single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all
horses, whilst above this is separate life, or _per se_ life, as they
term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is
that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being.
Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms
of corporeal things do not subsist _per se_ in matter, but in the
intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the
intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but
"angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the
form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the
craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain
heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things,
but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it
into species.

But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in
fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself
brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26, 27,
28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite."
Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they
exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or
corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the
"composite"; since even forms have not being, but composites have
being through forms: for, according to a thing's mode of being, is
the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is
produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms
in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this
fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are
caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter
being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But
since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created
spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4, 5), it
follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual
substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their
movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect,
which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be
referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of
corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can
have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies
had when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding
alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses
prefaces each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or
"that," to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God,
from Whom, according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad
lit. i. 4], is "all form and fitness and concord of parts."

Reply Obj. 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of
things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3): "By
faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God;
that from invisible things visible things might be made." But if by
immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them
come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.

Reply Obj. 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to
self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but
either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which
they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the
Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in
created things, that they may be able to be brought by movement
into act.

Reply Obj. 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement,
not by emanation.
_______________________

QUESTION 66

ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering
of creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its
formation?

(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?

(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with
formless matter?

(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 1]

Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in
time its formation. For it is said (Gen. 1:2): "The earth was void
and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another
version [*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of
matter, as Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was
formless until it received its form.

Obj. 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God,
as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of
nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in
the Divine working.

Obj. 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part
of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without
substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore,
cause matter to exist without form.

_On the contrary,_ An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the
agent. But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said
of Him (Deut. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." Therefore the
work of His creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation
of corporeal creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But
confusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. If,
therefore, formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter,
it follows that at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients
chaos, existed in the corporeal creation.

_I answer that,_ On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine
for instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of
matter was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or
the order of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.),
Ambrose (In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that
formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. And although
these opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but
little; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different
sense from the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form,
and if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of
matter was prior in time either to its formation or to its
distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For if formless
matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied
by duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself
is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to
say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a
contradiction in terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some
common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that
distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient
natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some
corporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate
substance. Hence, it followed that to be made means merely to be
changed; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial
being, and made some particular thing to be, it would result that the
supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but 'this'
actual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus
the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not
generation, but alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter
was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form,
but under distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be
taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself
is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation
or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in
the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the
whole. But the other holy writers understand by formlessness, not the
exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness
which are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say
that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in
duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine
agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will be
shown later (Q. 69, A. 1; Q. 74, A. 2).

As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty
was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to
be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that
transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that
"darkness was upon the fact of the deep." And the earth lacked beauty
in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil
was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or
"invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from
view; secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and
plants, for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to
another reading [*Septuagint], "shapeless"--that is, unadorned. Thus
after mention of two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the
formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the words, "darkness was
upon the face of the deep," since the air is included under heaven;
and the formlessness of the earth, by the words, "the earth was void
and empty."

Reply Obj. 1: The word earth is taken differently in this passage by
Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the words
"earth" and "water," in this passage, primary matter itself is
signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the
idea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under
the similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of
figures in speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only,
lest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the
same time it has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is
susceptible of form, and to water in its adaptability to a variety
of forms. In this respect, then, the earth is said to be "void and
empty," or "invisible and shapeless," that matter is known by means
of form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called "invisible" or
"void," and its potentiality is completed by form; thus Plato says
that matter is "place" [*Timaeus, quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv,
text. 15]. But other holy writers understand by earth the element of
earth, and we have said (A. 1) how, in this sense, the earth was,
according to them, without form.

Reply Obj. 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in
potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature
potentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form.
But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore,
produce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of
His power.

Reply Obj. 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act;
whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence
it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than
for accident to be without subject.

In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if,
according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the
informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's
part, but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due
order in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from
imperfection.

In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient
natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction;
except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct
and without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy
Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first
being that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material
distinction is expressed, as will be shown later (A. 3; Q. 68, A. 1).
This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven
and earth." The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements
according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That
air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the
corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth
and water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus
xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words,
"Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered
that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be
composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But
Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says
that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire
does not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable
to hold to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God"
Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the
waters," not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will
may be said to move over the material to which he intends to give a
form. The third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said
to be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air,
the subject of darkness, is described as being above the waters, in
the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep." The remaining
distinctions will appear from what follows (Q. 71).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 2]

Whether the Formless Matter of All Corporeal Things Is the Same?

Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal
things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find
two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he
says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby,
he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore
the matter of all corporeal things is the same.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): "Things
that are one in genus are one in matter." But all corporeal things
are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is
the same.

Obj. 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and
the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the
same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.

Obj. 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in
potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter
considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.

_On the contrary,_ Things of which the matter is the same are
mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said
(De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act
upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.

_I answer that,_ On this question the opinions of philosophers have
differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies
are of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four
elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and
corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the
same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed
by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the
artificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies:
"By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you
are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that
binds you together." But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5)
disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the
heavenly bodies have a natural movement, different from that of the
elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For
movement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not
by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually
opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the
heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies
have contrariety in their nature. And as generation and corruption are
from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are
corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of
this difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicebron
taught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of
form. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the
other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this
argument would necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would
inhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be
incorruptible. But corruption would then be merely accidental through
the disappearance of successive forms--that is to say, it would be
corruption, not pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act
would subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural
philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual
being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in
corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and
corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and
incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself,
is in potentiality to form.

Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all
those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is
in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to
all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more
perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves.
For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection
and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in
potentiality to a perfect form, and _vice versa._ Matter, therefore,
whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in
potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not
actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of
form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is
privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore
impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature
incorruptible, should possess the same matter.

Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines,
that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven--being in
potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its
form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it
is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it
be act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside,
then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with
motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form--that
is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form--it
follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing
is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not,
being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly
bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone
which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to
inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form
perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no
potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle
[*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly
bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so
far as they agree in the character of potentiality.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato,
who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter
is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of
corporeal creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense,
corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on
account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in
_Metaph._ x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one
genus of all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of
corporeity.

Reply Obj. 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same
in all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies
are distinguished, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 4: As potentiality is directed towards act,
potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight
is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of
the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because
the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental
form.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 3]

Whether the Empyrean Heaven Was Created at the Same Time As Formless
Matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created
at the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is
anything at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are
movable, and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so,
its movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible
body, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not
created contemporaneously with formless matter.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the lower
bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order." If, therefore,
the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily
exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to
be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for
one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore
the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.

Obj. 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place
of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the
contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "In so far as we mentally
apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world"; from
which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things
of this world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of
contemplation.

Obj. 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly
transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven.
There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the
aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher
heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the
air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night.
Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless
matter.

_On the contrary,_ Strabus says that in the passage, "In the
beginning God created heaven and earth," heaven denotes not the
visible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven.

_I answer that,_ The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of
Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect,
namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede
say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil
[*Hom. ii. in Hexaem.] says: "Just as the lost are driven into the
lowest darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the
light beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of
rest." But they differ in the reasons on which they base their
statement. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven,
because the firmament, which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is
said to have been made, not in the beginning, but on the second day:
whereas the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to
have made darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert,
when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These
reasons, however, are not very cogent. For the question of the
firmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one
way by Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the
question of the darkness is explained according to Augustine [*Gen. ad
lit. i; vii.], by supposing that formlessness, signified by darkness,
preceded form not by duration, but by origin. According to others,
however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, it
is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it created from nothing
it produced first of all in an imperfect state, and afterwards brought
them to perfection. But a better reason can be drawn from the state of
glory itself. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked
for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be
glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the
spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the
blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the
saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there
should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal,
free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change,
and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the
Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the
empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness. It
is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9, 27) says
that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that
the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But
Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be
fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal
to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it,
swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said
to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean
heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.

Reply Obj. 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present
state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is
secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is
finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must
have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.

Reply Obj. 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the
empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does
not influence inferior bodies of another order--those, namely, that
are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable
that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself
motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [*Infra,
Q. 112, A. 3], influence those of lower degree who act as messengers,
though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel.
Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of the
empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved,
produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of
movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of
conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to
dignity.

Reply Obj. 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as
necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond
to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: "The
ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual
dwelling in light and joy."

Reply Obj. 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): "It is certain that
the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and
sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it
encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the
light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region." But
since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for
that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can
see the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that
the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun
does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of
glory which differs from mere natural brightness.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 4]

Whether Time Was Created Simultaneously with Formless Matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously
with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find
two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary
corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. "Therefore time was not
created with formless matter.

Obj. 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the
beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when "God
divided the light from the darkness." Therefore in the beginning
time was not.

Obj. 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement;
and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day.
Therefore in the beginning time was not.

Obj. 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be
reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.

Obj. 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created
things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be
reckoned among the things first created.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both
spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of
time."

_I answer that,_ It is commonly said that the first things created
were these four--the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless
corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this
is not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies
only two things as first created--the angelic nature and corporeal
matter--making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two,
namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the
formation, by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as
they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time,
therefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above
given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness
of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the
existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there
would be no such measure.

Reply Obj. 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the
angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.

Reply Obj. 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in
some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was
in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished
into day and night.

Reply Obj. 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin
immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the
measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement
of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of
the firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement.
But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been
its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And
it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was
movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and
affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be
conceived, since time is nothing else than "the measure of priority
and succession in movement."

Reply Obj. 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned those
which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among
these time must be included, as having the nature of a common
measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable
subject.

Reply Obj. 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven,
this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has
reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its
totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its
beginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of
time save the "now."
_______________________

QUESTION 67

ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF
(In Four Articles)

We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the
work of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly
the work of the third day.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking
of spiritual things?

(2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?

(3) Whether light is a quality?

(4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 1]

Whether the Word "Light" Is Used in Its Proper Sense in Speaking of
Spiritual Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that "light" is used in its proper sense
in spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that
"in spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is
not called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the
former is to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically."

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the
intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper
sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper
sense in spiritual matters.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13): "All that is made
manifest is light." But to be made manifest belongs more properly
to spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that "Splendor" is
among those things which are said of God metaphorically.

_I answer that,_ Any word may be used in two ways--that is to say,
either in its original application or in its more extended meaning.
This is clearly shown in the word "sight," originally applied to the
act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most
trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge
obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, "Seeing how it
tastes," or "smells," or "burns." Further, sight is applied to
knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those words: "Blessed
are the clean of heart, for they shall see God" (Matt. 5:8). And thus
it is with the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that
which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended
to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the
word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be
understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose
says (De Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as
applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to
spiritual things.

The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has
been said.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 2]

Whether Light Is a Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says
(De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that "light takes the first place among
bodies."Therefore light is a body.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that "light is a
species of fire." But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.

Obj. 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection,
belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and
its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div.
Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they
are bodies. Therefore light is a body.

_On the contrary,_ Two bodies cannot occupy the same place
simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore
light is not a body.

_I answer that,_ Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons.
First, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is
different from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally
speaking, for any two bodies of whatever nature, to exist
simultaneously in the same place; since contiguity requires
distinction of place.

The second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its
diffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no local movement
of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one
place to another must pass through the intervening space before
reaching the end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor
can it be argued that the time required is too short to be perceived;
for though this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in
distances so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet
as soon as the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is
illuminated from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part
of movement that whereas all bodies have their natural determinate
movement, that of light is indifferent as regards direction, working
equally in a circle as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the
diffusion of light is not the local movement of a body.

The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were
a body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the
absence of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and
its matter would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that
darkness is a body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does
it appear from what matter a body can be daily generated large enough
to fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say
that a body of so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the
luminary. And should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but
approaches and moves around with the sun, we may ask why it is that
when a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the whole
room is darkened? It is not that the light is condensed round the
candle when this is done, since it burns no more brightly then than
it burned before.

Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but
to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act--in
other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.

Reply Obj. 2: Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its
own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is "flame," or in
earthly matter is "burning coal." Nor must too much attention be paid
to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he
merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various
writers.

Reply Obj. 3: All these properties are assigned to light
metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For
because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order
of movement as is proved _Phys._ viii, text. 55, we use terms
belonging to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of
all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea of
remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said _Metaph._
x, text. 13.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 3]

Whether Light Is a Quality?

Objection 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every
quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the
quality be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire.
But light does not remain in the air when the source of light is
withdrawn. Therefore light is not a quality.

Obj. 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is
opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case
with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light
therefore is not a sensible quality.

Obj. 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the
light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of
earthly bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by
making them actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality,
but rather a substantial or spiritual form.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a
species of quality.

_I answer that,_ Some writers have said that the light in the air has
not a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an
intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this
cannot be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name
to the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color
does not do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Secondly,
because light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun
bodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere
intentions. Others have said that light is the sun's substantial form,
but this also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because
substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the
object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said _De Anima_ iii,
text. 26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place,
because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one
thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial
forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the
substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But
light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air
would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the
substantial form of the sun.

We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the
substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on
the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself
luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays
of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse
natures of bodies.

Reply Obj. 1: Since quality is consequent upon substantial form, the
mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode
differs in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when
matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the
form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted
into fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly,
so as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than
fully impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not
permanent; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns
in time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the
transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a
substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial
form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its
active cause.

Reply Obj. 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary,
forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause
of change, which is itself removed from contrariety.

Reply Obj. 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an
instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does light
act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards
producing substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually
visible, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 4]

Whether the Production of Light Is Fittingly Assigned to the First
Day?

Objection 1: It would seem that the production of light is not
fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above (A.
3), is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such should
have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of
light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day.

Obj. 2: Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day, and
this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made on
the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have been
on the first day.

Obj. 3: Further, night and day are brought about by the circular
movement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an
attribute of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made
on the second day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night
from day, ought not to be assigned to the first day.

Obj. 4: Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken
of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels
the darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for
even the demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown (Q. 63,
A. 5). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to
the first day.

_On the contrary,_ That without which there could not be day, must
have been made on the first day. But there can be no day without
light. Therefore light must have been made on the first day.

_I answer that,_ There are two opinions as to the production of light.
Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not
have fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature,
and therefore when we read, "In the beginning God created heaven and
earth," a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the
word "heaven," and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the
word "earth." And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of
higher dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this
spiritual nature is signified by the production of light, that is to
say, of spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by
the enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.

Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was
purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil [*Hom. i
in Hexaem.] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning
of time which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or
angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand.

Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Genes.] gives as a reason for the omission
that Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things
alone appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the
service of idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry
if he had spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler
than all corporeal creatures; for they would have paid them Divine
worship, since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon,
and stars, which was forbidden them (Deut. 4).

But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the
corporeal creature. One is where we read that "the earth was void and
empty," and another where it is said that "darkness was upon the face
of the deep." Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the
formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the
production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of
the first body, as was stated (A. 3), and thus by means of light
it was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The
second reason is because light is a common quality. For light is
common to terrestrial and celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we
proceed from general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For
the living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before
the man, as is shown in _De Gener. Anim._ ii, 3. It was fitting, then,
as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of
distinction the production of light should take first place, since
light is a form of the primary body, and because it is more common
quality.

Basil [*Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all
other things are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth,
already touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless
light exists, which was made therefore on the first day.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the opinion of those who hold that the
formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must be
held to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms,
afterwards receiving those that are accidental, among which light
holds the first place.

Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a
kind of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this
returned to the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot
well be maintained, as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture
records the institution of that order of nature which henceforth is
to endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that time
afterwards ceased to exist.

Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula continues in
existence, but so closely attached to the sun as to be
indistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that it is
superfluous, whereas none of God's works have been made in vain. On
this account it is held by some that the sun's body was made out of
this nebula. This, too, is impossible to those at least who believe
that the sun is different in its nature from the four elements, and
naturally incorruptible. For in that case its matter cannot take on
another form.

I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that the light was the
sun's light, formless as yet, being already the solar substance, and
possessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was
afterwards added the special and determinative power required to
produce determinate effects. Thus, then, in the production of this
light a triple distinction was made between light and darkness.
First, as to the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we
have the cause of light, and in the opaque nature of the earth the
cause of darkness. Secondly, as to place, for in one hemisphere there
was light, in the other darkness. Thirdly, as to time; because there
was light for one and darkness for another in the same hemisphere;
and this is signified by the words, "He called the light day, and the
darkness night."

Reply Obj. 3: Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that day and night were
then caused by expansion and contraction of light, rather than by
movement. But Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that there
was no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction since
there were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time, for
whose service this was required. Nor does the nature of a luminous
body seem to admit of the withdrawal of light, so long as the body is
actually present; though this might be effected by a miracle. As to
this, however, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. i) that in the first
founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles, but
for what is in accordance with nature. We hold, then, that the
movement of the heavens is twofold. Of these movements, one is common
to the entire heaven, and is the cause of day and night. This, as it
seems, had its beginning on the first day. The other varies in
proportion as it affects various bodies, and by its variations is the
cause of the succession of days, months, and years. Thus it is, that
in the account of the first day the distinction between day and night
alone is mentioned; this distinction being brought about by the
common movement of the heavens. The further distinction into
successive days, seasons, and years recorded as begun on the fourth
day, in the words, "let them be for seasons, and for days, and years"
is due to proper movements.

Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine teaches (Confess. xii; Gen. ad lit. 1,
15), formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we must
understand the production of light to signify the formation of
spiritual creatures, not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in
which they were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which
they possessed from their creation as said above (Q. 62, A. 3). Thus
the division of light from darkness will denote the distinction of
the spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form.
But if all created things received their form at the same time, the
darkness must be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked,
not as existing from the beginning but such as God foresaw would
exist.
_______________________

QUESTION 68

ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider the work of the second day. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day?

(2) Whether there are waters above the firmament?

(3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?

(4) Whether there is more than one heaven?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 1]

Whether the Firmament Was Made on the Second Day?

Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament was not made on the
second day. For it is said (Gen. 1:8): "God called the firmament
heaven." But the heaven existed before days, as is clear from the
words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore
the firmament was not made on the second day.

Obj. 2: Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably to
the order of Divine wisdom. Now it would ill become the Divine wisdom
to make afterwards that which is naturally first. But though the
firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are
mentioned before the formation of light, which was on the first day.
Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

Obj. 3: Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out of
matter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have been
formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to
generation and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on
the second day.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:6): "God said: let there be
a firmament," and further on (verse 8); "And the evening and morning
were the second day."

_I answer that,_ In discussing questions of this kind two rules are
to be observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. i, 18). The first
is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is
that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of
senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation, only in such
measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty
to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of
unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing.

We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as
made on the second day can be understood in two senses. They may be
understood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is
necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some
of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the
opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the
firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are,
so to say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament
to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of
them, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of
Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that
the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a
fifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of
Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32).

According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted
that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day.
For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the
elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to
give forms to the elements that pre-exist.

But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on
the second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to
whom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element
of fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at
least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter
preceded in time its formation, since the first form received by
matter is the elemental.

Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the
firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle,
seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas
the firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not
susceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of
matter existing antecedently in time.

Hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of
creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second
day, according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
the light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and
afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form.

If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the
natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not
succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying,
whilst holding any one of the opinions given above, that the
substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day.

Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that
was made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but
the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which
has received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the
air. "For a body is called firm," that is dense and solid, "thereby
differing from a mathematical body" as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii
in Hexaem.). If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these
opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen.
ad lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: "I consider this view of the
question worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor
difficult to be proved and believed."

Reply Obj. 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses
prefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively, in
the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and then
proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the same way as
one might say: "This house was constructed by that builder," and then
add: "First, he laid the foundations, then built the walls, and
thirdly, put on the roof." In accepting this explanation we are,
therefore, not bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in
the words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and when
we read that the firmament was made on the second day.

We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning
is not the same as that made on the second day; and there are several
senses in which this may be understood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
i, 9) that the heaven recorded as made on the first day is the
formless spiritual nature, and that the heaven of the second day is
the corporeal heaven. According to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the
heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament made
on the second day, the starry heaven. According to Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii) that of the first day was spherical in form and without
stars, the same, in fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it
the ninth sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with diurnal
movement: while by the firmament made on the second day he understands
the starry heaven. According to another theory, touched upon by
Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 1] the heaven made on the first day was
the starry heaven, and the firmament made on the second day was that
region of the air where the clouds are collected, which is also called
heaven, but equivocally. And to show that the word is here used in an
equivocal sense, it is expressly said that "God called the firmament
heaven"; just as in a preceding verse it said that "God called the
light day" (since the word "day" is also used to denote a space of
twenty-four hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as
pointed out by Rabbi Moses.

The second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has
been already said.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Waters Above the Firmament?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not waters above the
firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend
naturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there are not waters
above the firmament.

Obj. 2: Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest
on a sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament is a
sphere, there cannot be water above it.

Obj. 3: Further, water is an element, and appointed to the
generation of composite bodies, according to the relation in which
imperfect things stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature
have their place upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that
water would be useless there. But none of God's works are useless.
Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:7): "(God) divided the
waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the
firmament."

I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, "These words of
Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect.
Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of
existence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there." As to
the nature of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i in
Gen.) that the waters that are above the firmament are "spiritual
substances." Wherefore it is written (Ps. 148:4): "Let the waters that
are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord," and (Dan. 3:60):
"Ye waters that are above the heavens, bless the Lord."To this Basil
answers (Hom. iii in Hexaem.) that these words do not mean that these
waters are rational creatures, but that "the thoughtful contemplation
of them by those who understand fulfils the glory of the Creator."
Hence in the same context, fire, hail, and other like creatures, are
invoked in the same way, though no one would attribute reason to
these.

We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact
nature will be differently defined according as opinions on the
firmament differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry
heaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, for the same
reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the
same nature as the elemental waters. But if by the firmament we
understand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of
the four elements, then the waters above the firmament will not be of
the same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according to
Strabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on
account of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aqueous
solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven is above the
starry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held to be of other nature
than the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we
understand by water not the element but formless matter. Augustine,
in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides
bodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters.

If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in
which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament
must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised
above a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to
say, as some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4),
that waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the starry
heaven, is a mere absurdity. The solid nature of the firmament, the
intervening region of fire, wherein all vapor must be consumed, the
tendency in light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the
vault of the moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not
to rise even to the tops of the higher mountains, all to go to show
the impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, in support of
this opinion, that bodies may be rarefied infinitely, since natural
bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied or divided, but up to a certain
point only.

Reply Obj. 1: Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by
supposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in
its place above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 1), however will not admit this solution, but says "It is our
business here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His
creatures, not how far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way
of miracle." We leave this view, then, and answer that according to
the last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution
appears from what has been said. According to the first opinion, an
order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by
Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are
of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer
consistency, in proportion to the respective density of the earth
and of the heaven.

Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to
be signified.

Reply Obj. 2: The solution is clear from what has been said,
according to the last two opinions. But according to the first
opinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers
first, that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be
rounded, or convex, above. Secondly, that the waters above the
firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a
mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the third opinion given, the waters above
the firmament have been raised in the form of vapors, and serve to
give rain to the earth. But according to the second opinion, they
are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This,
according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily
revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance of
generation is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the
zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are
generated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars,
and their various influences. But according to the first opinion
these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial
bodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to be proved by
the extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the waters that
are above the firmament.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 3]

Whether the Firmament Divides Waters from Waters?

Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters
from waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have
naturally one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (Topic.
i, 6): "All water is the same species." Water therefore cannot be
distinct from water by place.

Obj. 2: Further, should it be said that the waters above the
firmament differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be
argued, on the contrary, that things distinct in species need nothing
else to distinguish them. If then, these waters differ in species, it
is not the firmament that distinguishes them.

Obj. 3: Further, it would appear that what distinguishes waters from
waters must be something which is in contact with them on either
side, as a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident
that the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore
the firmament does not divide the waters from the waters.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:6): "Let there be a
firmament made amidst the waters; and let it divide the waters from
the waters."

_I answer that,_ The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might
lead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain
philosophers of antiquity, who taught that water was a body infinite
in dimension, and the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the
words, "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the word "deep" might
be taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as the
principle of all other bodies. These philosophers also taught that not
all corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our
senses, but that a body of water, infinite in extent, exists above
that heaven. On this view the firmament of heaven might be said to
divide the waters without from those within--that is to say, from all
bodies under the heaven, since they took water to be the principle of
them all.

As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it
cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. It should rather be
considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of
condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as
are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by
their senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not
evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been
philosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled
with air a vacuum.

Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no
express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant
persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to
express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in
the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the existence of
air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood
from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body
was extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is
the air.

Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or
the cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the
waters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless
matter, or any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated
under the name of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower
transparent bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides
that higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are
generated, from the lower part, which is connected with the water
and included under that name.

Reply Obj. 1: If by the firmament is understood the starry heaven,
the waters above are not of the same species as those beneath. But
if by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air, both
these waters are of the same species, and two places are assigned to
them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being the place of
their begetting, the lower, the place of their repose.

Reply Obj. 2: If the waters are held to differ in species, the
firmament cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of
their destruction, but only as the boundary of each.

Reply Obj. 3: On account of the air and other similar bodies being
invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water,
and thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the
firmament, whatever be the sense in which the word is used.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 4]

Whether There Is Only One Heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one heaven. For the
heaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, "In the beginning
God created heaven and earth." But there is only one earth. Therefore
there is only one heaven.

Obj. 2: Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own
matter, must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher
proves (De Coel. i, text. 95). Therefore there is but one heaven.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally
is predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there
are more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if
equivocally only, they could not properly be called many. If, then,
they are many, there must be some common notion by reason of which
each is called heaven, but this common notion cannot be assigned.
Therefore there cannot be more than one heaven.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 148:4): "Praise Him, ye heavens
of heavens."

_I answer that,_ On this point there seems to be a diversity of
opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is
only one heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), and that the words 'heavens of
heavens' are merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to
which the word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there
are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the other hand,
Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.), whom Damascene follows (De Fide Orth.
ii), says that there are many heavens. The difference, however, is
more nominal than real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the
whole body that is above the earth and the water, for which reason
the birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven [*Ps. 8:9].
But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil said
that there are more heavens than one.

In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be
borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense.
Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it
denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially,
and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the
first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the
aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called
the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous,
and divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the
fixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens,
are the spheres of the planets.

In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that
participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and
luminosity, actual or potential. Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii)
holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon's
orb, calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three
heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of
which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself
that he was "rapt to the third heaven."

But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and
in each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region
Rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher
region of fire he calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian
heaven from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he
calls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven; the lower, the
aerial. When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three
enumerated above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the
opinion of Rabanus.

Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this
name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most
High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words,
"I will ascend into heaven"; whereby the evil spirit is represented as
seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual
blessings, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all
good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so
signified, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the
words, "Your reward is very great in heaven" (Matt. 5:12).

Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and
intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, in reference to
which Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) expounds Paul's rapture "to the
third heaven."

Reply Obj. 1: The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the
centre of a circle to its circumference. But as one center may have
many circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be
many heavens.

Reply Obj. 2: The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as
it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it
is one.

Reply Obj. 3: All the heavens have in common sublimity and some
degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said.
_______________________

QUESTION 69

ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY
(In Two Articles)

We next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are
two points of inquiry:

(1) About the gathering together of the waters.

(2) About the production of plants.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 69, Art. 1]

Whether It Was Fitting That the Gathering Together of the Waters
Should Take Place, As Recorded, on the Third Day?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering
together of the waters should take place on the third day. For what
was made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been
"made" in the words, "God said: Be light made," and "Let there be a
firmament made."But the third day is contradistinguished from the
first and the second days. Therefore the work of the third day
should have been described as a making not as a gathering together.

Obj. 2: Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by
the waters, wherefore it was described as "invisible" [* See Q. 66,
A. 1, Obj. 1]. There was then no place on the earth to which the
waters could be gathered together.

Obj. 3: Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot
occupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact,
and therefore all were not gathered together into one place.

Obj. 4: Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement.
But the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea.
In their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was
unnecessary.

Obj. 5: Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by
the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore
the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded
without necessity.

_On the contrary,_ The authority of Scripture suffices.

_I answer that,_ It is necessary to reply differently to this
question according to the different interpretations given by
Augustine and other holy writers. In all these works, according to
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv, 22, 34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i,
5, 7), there is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature.
He says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures
were created first of all, and that the latter are at first indicated
by the words "earth" and "water." Not that this formlessness preceded
formation, in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation
preceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature.
Agreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highest or
spiritual nature is recorded in the first place, where it is said
that light was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is
higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler than the
lower. Hence the formation of the higher bodies is indicated in the
second place, by the words, "Let there be made a firmament," by which
is to be understood the impression of celestial forms on formless
matter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only.
But in the third place the impression of elemental forms on formless
matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only. Therefore
the words, "Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry land
appear," mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the
substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with
the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance.

According, however, to other holy writers [* See Q. 66, A. 1], an
order of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is meant
that the formlessness of matter precedes its formation, and one form
another, in order of time. Nevertheless, they do not hold that the
formlessness of matter implies the total absence of form, since
heaven, earth, and water already existed, since these three are named
as already clearly perceptible to the senses; rather they understand
by formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect beauty,
and in respect of these three Scripture mentions three kinds of
formlessness. Heaven, the highest of them, was without form so long
as "darkness" filled it, because it was the source of light. The
formlessness of water, which holds the middle place, is called the
"deep," because, as Augustine says (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this
word signifies the mass of waters without order. Thirdly, the
formless state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is said to
be "void" or "invisible," because it was covered by the waters. Thus,
then, the formation of the highest body took place on the first day.
And since time results from the movement of the heaven, and is the
numerical measure of the movement of the highest body, from this
formation, resulted the distinction of time, namely, that of night
and day. On the second day the intermediate body, water, was formed,
receiving from the firmament a sort of distinction and order (so that
water be understood as including certain other things, as explained
above (Q. 68, A. 3)). On the third day the earth, the lowest body,
received its form by the withdrawal of the waters, and there resulted
the distinction in the lowest body, namely, of land and sea. Hence
Scripture, having clearly expressed the formless state of the earth,
by saying that it was "invisible" or "void," expresses the manner in
which it received its form by the equally suitable words, "Let the
dry land appear."

Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 7, 8; iii,
20], Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it was
made, as it says of those that precede, in order to show that higher
and spiritual forms, such as the angels and the heavenly bodies, are
perfect and stable in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect and
mutable. Hence the impression of such forms is signified by the
gathering of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For "water,"
to use Augustine's words, "glides and flows away, the earth abides"
(Gen. ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold that the work of the third
day was perfected on that day only as regards movement from place to
place, and that for this reason Scripture had no reason to speak of
it as made.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument is easily solved, according to
Augustine's opinion (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), because we need not
suppose that the earth was first covered by the waters, and that
these were afterwards gathered together, but that they were produced
in this very gathering together. But according to the other writers
there are three solutions, which Augustine gives (Gen. ad lit. i,
12). The first supposes that the waters are heaped up to a greater
height at the place where they were gathered together, for it has
been proved in regard to the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than the
land, as Basil remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the
water that covered the earth as being rarefied or nebulous, which was
afterwards condensed when the waters were gathered together. The
third suggests the existence of hollows in the earth, to receive the
confluence of waters. Of the above the first seems the most probable.

Reply Obj. 3: All the waters have the sea as their goal, into which
they flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the reason
why they are said to be gathered together into one place. Or, "one
place" is to be understood not simply, but as contrasted with the
place of the dry land, so that the sense would be, "Let the waters be
gathered together in one place," that is, apart from the dry land.
That the waters occupied more places than one seems to be implied by
the words that follow, "The gathering together of the waters He
called Seas."

Reply Obj. 4: The Divine command gives bodies their natural movement
and by these natural movements they are said to "fulfill His word."
Or we may say that it was according to the nature of water completely
to cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds both water
and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, namely, that
plants and animals might be on the earth, it was necessary for the
waters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth. Some philosophers
attribute this uncovering of the earth's surface to the action of the
sun lifting up the vapors and thus drying the land. Scripture,
however, attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book of
Genesis, but also Job 38:10 where in the person of the Lord it is
said, "I set My bounds around the sea," and Jer. 5:22, where it is
written: "Will you not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have set
the sand a bound for the sea?"

Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i),
primary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned,
but in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself.
Again it may be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that the earth
is mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature, but here
in respect of its principal property, namely, dryness. Wherefore it
is written: "He called the dry land, Earth." It may also be said with
Rabbi Moses, that the expression, "He called," denotes throughout an
equivocal use of the name imposed. Thus we find it said at first that
"He called the light Day": for the reason that later on a period of
twenty-four hours is also called day, where it is said that "there
was evening and morning, one day." In like manner it is said that
"the firmament," that is, the air, "He called heaven": for that which
was first created was also called "heaven." And here, again, it is
said that "the dry land," that is, the part from which the waters had
withdrawn, "He called, Earth," as distinct from the sea; although the
name earth is equally applied to that which is covered with waters or
not. So by the expression "He called" we are to understand throughout
that the nature or property He bestowed corresponded to the name He
gave.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 69, Art. 2]

Whether It Was Fitting That the Production of Plants Should Take Place
on the Third Day?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the production
of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as
animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not
of distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants,
as also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded
as taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of
distinction.

Obj. 2: Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have
been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But
the words of Gen. 3:17, "Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and
thistles shall it bring forth to thee," show that by the production
of certain plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of
plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day,
which is concerned with the work of formation.

Obj. 3: Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are
stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the work
of formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the
third day.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:12): "The earth brought forth
the green herb," after which there follows, "The evening and the
morning were the third day."

_I answer that,_ On the third day, as said (A. 1), the formless state
of the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold.
On the one hand, the earth was "invisible" or "void," being covered
by the waters; on the other hand, it was "shapeless" or "empty," that
is, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe
it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either respect
this formless state ends on the third day: first, when "the waters
were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared";
secondly, when "the earth brought forth the green herb." But
concerning the production of plants, Augustine's opinion differs
from that of others. For other commentators, in accordance with the
surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced
in act in their various species on this third day; whereas Augustine
(Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then
produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then
the power to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of
Scripture, for it is said (Gen. 2:4, 5): "These are the generations
of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that
. . . God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field
before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before
it grew." Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within
the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface.
And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first days God
created all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He
subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in
the work of propagation, "He worketh until now." Now the production
of plants from the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they
were not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only.
However, in accordance with other writers, it may be said that the
first constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days,
but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the government
of the universe. And Scripture indicates this in the words, "before
it sprung up in the earth," and "before it grew," that is, before
like was produced from like; just as now happens in the natural
course by the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly
(Gen. 1:11): "Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as
may seed," as indicating the production of perfect species, from
which the seed of others should arise. Nor does the question where
the seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect
the argument.

Reply Obj. 1: Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and
local movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly
discernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth,
their production is treated as a part of the earth's formation.

Reply Obj. 2: Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles
had been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were not
produced in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled
to gain his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence it is
said: "Shall it bring forth _to thee."_

Reply Obj. 3: Moses put before the people such things only as were
manifest to their senses, as we have said (Q. 67, A. 4; Q. 68, A. 3).
But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the
earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth,
and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he
makes no mention of them.
_______________________

QUESTION 70

OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY
(In Three Articles)

We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by
itself, secondly as to all seven days in general.

In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day,
secondly, that of the fifth day, thirdly, that of the sixth day, and
fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) As to the production of the lights;

(2) As to the end of their production;

(3) Whether they are living beings?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 70, Art. 1]

Whether the Lights Ought to Have Been Produced on the Fourth Day?

Objection 1: It would seem that the lights ought not to have been
produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature
incorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without
their form. But as their matter was produced in the work of creation,
before there was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows,
then, that the lights were not produced on the fourth day.

Obj. 2: Further, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light.
But light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore,
should have been made on the first day, not on the fourth.

Obj. 3: Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants
are fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says: "He set them in the
firmament." But plants are described as produced when the earth, to
which they are attached, received its form. The lights, therefore,
should have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is
to say, on the second day.

Obj. 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other
heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature.
The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth
day, but on the third day.

Obj. 5: Further, as astronomers say, there are many stars larger than
the moon. Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly
described as the "two great lights."

_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says
(Gen. 2:1): "So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the
furniture of them," thereby indicating that the work was threefold.
In the first work, that of "creation," the heaven and the earth were
produced, but as yet without form. In the second, or work of
"distinction," the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by
adding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine holds (Gen.
ad lit. ii, 11), or by giving them the order and beauty due to them,
as other holy writers suppose. To these two works is added the work
of adornment, which is distinct from perfect[ion]. For the perfection
of the heaven and the earth regards, seemingly, those things that
belong to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are
extrinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper parts
and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such like. Now just as
distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local
movement, as separating one from another; so the work of adornment is
set forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens,
and upon the earth. But it has been stated above (Q. 69, A. 1), that
three things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water,
and the earth; and these three received their form from the three
days' work of distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first
day; on the second day the waters were separated; and on the third
day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land. So also is it in
the work of adornment; on the first day of this work, which is the
fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by
their movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and
fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate
element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one;
while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought
forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be
noted that Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production
of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since
he says that they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for
the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has
of producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: "Let the
firmament produce lights," though it says: "Let the earth bring forth
the green herb."

Reply Obj. 1: In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty here; for
he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there
was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form.
Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the
heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may
be said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as
animals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the
heavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and
naturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were
substantially created at the beginning, but that their substance, at
first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving not its
substantial form, but a determination of power. As to the fact that
the lights are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only
as made on the fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) explains this
by the need of guarding the people from the danger of idolatry: since
the lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not
from the beginning.

Reply Obj. 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in holding
the light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made on
this day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first
day is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to
have been produced on that day merely as light in general; and that
on the fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce
determinate effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have
one effect, those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speaking
of such a determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that
the sun's light which previously was without form, was formed on the
fourth day.

Reply Obj. 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not
fixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the
movement of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.)
that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not because He
fixed them there immovably, but because He bade them to be there,
even as He placed man in Paradise, to be there. In the opinion of
Aristotle, however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in
reality have no other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our
senses perceive the movement of the luminaries and not that of the
spheres (De Coel. ii, text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious
to sense, out of condescension to popular ignorance, as we have
already said (Q. 67, A. 4; Q. 68, A. 3). The objection, however,
falls to the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day
as having a natural distinction from that in which the stars are
placed, even though the distinction is not apparent to the senses,
the testimony of which Moses follows, as stated above (De Coel. ii,
text. 43). For although to the senses there appears but one
firmament; if we admit a higher and a lower firmament, the lower will
be that which was made on the second day, and on the fourth the stars
were fixed in the higher firmament.

Reply Obj. 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem.), plants were
recorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry,
since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that
plants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom
remarks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the
work of production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates
by his labor.

Reply Obj. 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great,
not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their influence and
power. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the
influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower
world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent
size is greater.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 70, Art. 2]

Whether the Cause Assigned for the Production of the Lights Is
Reasonable?

Objection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production
of the lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): "Be not
afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear." Therefore the
heavenly lights were not made to be signs.

Obj. 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the
lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore
they are not signs.

Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from the
first day. Therefore the lights were not made "for seasons, and days,
and years," that is, in order to distinguish them.

Obj. 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is
inferior to itself, "since the end is better than the means" (Topic.
iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were
not made "to enlighten it."

Obj. 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said "to rule the night." But
such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from the
new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made "to rule the night."

_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 65, A. 2), a corporeal
creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper
act, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the
glory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the
usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order
to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Deut. 4:19):
"Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the
moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou
adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service
of all nations." Now, he explains this service at the beginning of
Genesis as threefold. First, the lights are of service to man, in
regard to sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful
for perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: "Let them shine
in the firmament and give life to the earth." Secondly, as regards the
changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and
provide for the necessities of food; all of which things could not be
secured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he
says: "Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years." Thirdly, as
regards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights
are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable
to various occupations. And in this respect he says: "Let them be for
signs."

Reply Obj. 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes
effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which
depend upon the free-will.

Reply Obj. 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden
effects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence nothing
prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says "signs,"
rather than "causes," to guard against idolatry.

Reply Obj. 3: The general division of time into day and night took
place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is
common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on
that first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons
and years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season
than another, and one year than another, are due to certain
particular movements of the stars: which movements may have had their
beginning on the fourth day.

Reply Obj. 4: Light was given to the earth for the service of man,
who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies. Nor
is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake
of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of
the universe.

Reply Obj. 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in the
evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and it
was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding
seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect
is developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect
must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad
lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting
that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 70, Art. 3]

Whether the Lights of Heaven Are Living Beings?

Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living
beings. For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned.
But a body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings,
with fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of
heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.

Obj. 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form.
But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or
animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all
forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence
Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: "Every living substance stands
higher in the order of nature than one that has not life." The lights
of heaven, therefore, are living beings.

Obj. 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun,
moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in
the case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life
from the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the
heavenly bodies a living soul.

Obj. 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies
are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7, 8): and natural movement is from an
intrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the heavenly
bodies is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as the
desirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36).
Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the
heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings.

Obj. 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all
things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is
proved in _Phys._ viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself
precedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living
move themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore
the heavenly bodies are living beings.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "Let no one
esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for
they have neither life nor sense."

_I answer that,_ Philosophers have differed on this question.
Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii,
41), "was condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a
fiery mass of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being." On
the other hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have
life. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the
Church. It was the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that
these bodies were alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense
the words (Eccles. 1:6), "The spirit goeth forward, surveying all
places round about." But Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem.) and Damascene
(De Fide Orth. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate.
Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself to
either theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly
bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the
angelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).

In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of
opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of
soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body;
for the form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the
form. Now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through
its operation, which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of
these operations, as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessary
instrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls
must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions. There
are, however, operations of the soul, which are not exercised through
the medium of the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to
their production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the
phantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus far is dependent
on the body, although capable of existing apart from it. It is not,
however, possible that the functions of nutrition, growth, and
generation, through which the nutritive soul operates, can be
exercised by the heavenly bodies, for such operations are
incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible
is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the
heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense of touch,
which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs of the senses
require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements, whereas
the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. It follows, then,
that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be
attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and
moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual
perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the
intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as
their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses.
Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen,
cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union
of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the
operations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider
whether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the
motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body,
need be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of power, as
a mover is united to that which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys.
viii, text. 42, 43), after showing that the first mover is made up of
two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of
the union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by
contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only,
if one is a body and the other not. The Platonists explain the union
of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with
the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be
living beings, this means nothing else but that substances of
spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A
proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and
contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific
gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one
fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in
the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved
by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the same
opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are
ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. iii, 4).

From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies
are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and
that if they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also
be seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and
those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of
things but of words.

Reply Obj. 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe
by reason of their proper movement; and in this way the heavenly
luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment, for they
are moved by a living substance.

Reply Obj. 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely, but
not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that the
souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals
absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with
regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their
matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas
a soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that
moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.

Reply Obj. 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the
nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and
therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body
can impart life in virtue of that agent.

Reply Obj. 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not
on account of their active principle, but on account of their passive
principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being
moved by an intelligent power.

Reply Obj. 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is
compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the
form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive
power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may
be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with
respect to that active principle; just as we say that voluntary
movement is natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).
_______________________

QUESTION 71

ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY
(In One Article)

We must next consider the work of the fifth day.

Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.
For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to
produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production
of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are
generated from seed. Therefore the words, "Let the waters bring forth
the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the
earth," do not fittingly describe this work.

Obj. 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only,
but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, as is
shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and
rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly said that fishes and birds
are produced from water.

Obj. 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If,
then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be produced
from the air, and not from the waters.

Obj. 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some,
as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of
fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, "Let the waters
bring forth the creeping creature having life."

Obj. 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes
which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and
generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings,
whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has
precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought
not to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals.

_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ As said above, (Q. 70, A. 1), the order of the work
of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction.
Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction,
the middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of
water, which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the
work of adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to
the adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds
and fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light
on the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the
first day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this
fifth day he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show
that the fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be
observed that Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion
about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the
production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were
produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the
waters produced them on that day potentially.

Reply Obj. 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds
can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally,
without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to the fact
that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and
consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed
cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then,
rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that
are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative
power of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from
putrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly
bodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either
kind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of
the elements. But at the first beginning of the world the active
principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material
elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as
Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or
earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the water
themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to
the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of
seed or the influence of the stars.

Reply Obj. 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from
two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be evident
that the earthly element must predominate, since the element that is
least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in
quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body
of the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move
with certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity
with the bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which
their generation is described.

Reply Obj. 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses, is not
enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the water,
because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery
exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But
birds move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly
"beneath the firmament," even if the firmament be taken to mean the
region of clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to the
water.

Reply Obj. 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through the
medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type
between the animals of the air and those of the water, having
something in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to
that class to which they are most allied, through the characters
possessed in common with that class, rather than with the other. But
in order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have
special characters like to theirs, the words, "Let the waters bring
forth the creeping creature having life," are followed by these: "God
created great whales," etc.

Reply Obj. 5: The order in which the production of these animals is
given has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set
to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves.
Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached through the
less perfect.
_______________________

QUESTION 72

ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY
(In One Article)

We must now consider the work of the sixth day.

Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.
For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals.
But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the
words, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature," should rather
have been, "Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed
creatures."

Obj. 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But
beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to
be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.

Obj. 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and
species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said
of his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been
said about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is
said "according to its genus" and "in its species."

Obj. 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded
to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes
are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more
reason, of the other animals as well.

Obj. 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction,
which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the
first founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have
been produced at that time.

Obj. 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man.
But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man
sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at
all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had
sinned.

_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the
water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so
the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by
the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence
the earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says
(Gen. ad lit. v) that the production was potential, and other holy
writers that it was actual.

Reply Obj. 1: The different grades of life which are found in
different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in
which Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.).
The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to
discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said
of their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in
generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of
nutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will
be shown later on (Q. 78, A. 2). But amongst animals, those that
live on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and
fishes, not because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds
(Hom. viii in Hexaem.) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but
because their limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher
order, (yet some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more
intelligent in certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call
fishes "living creatures," but "creeping creatures having life";
whereas it does call land animals "living creatures" on account of
their more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely
bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from
the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls
with bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being the most
perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other
animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God.

Reply Obj. 2: By "cattle," domestic animals are signified, which in
any way are of service to man: but by "beasts," wild animals such as
bears and lions are designated. By "creeping things" those animals
are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth,
as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to lift them far from
the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals, as
deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word
"quadrupeds" is added. Or perhaps the word "quadruped" is used first
as being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for
even some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed.

Reply Obj. 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of
genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it
was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been
said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals
and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to
signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas
man is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God."

Reply Obj. 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by
generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of
the making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of
the earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however,
is repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children
has a special relation to the number of the elect [*Cf. Augustine,
Gen. ad lit. iii, 12], and to prevent anyone from saying that there
was any sin whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants,
since they experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation
in generating, they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing.

Reply Obj. 5: Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of
another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things,
that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should
be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of
inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But
those generated from corruption of animals could not have been
produced then otherwise than potentially.

Reply Obj. 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich.
i): "If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he
sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use,
and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary.
Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself
with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the
things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use,
laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with
many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their
existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house,
these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe." And,
since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world
conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have
injured him.
_______________________

QUESTION 73

ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY
(In Three Articles)

We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day.
Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) About the completion of the works;

(2) About the resting of God;

(3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 73, Art. 1]

Whether the Completion of the Divine Works Ought to Be Ascribed to
the Seventh Day?

Objection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works
ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are
done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation
of the world will be at the end of the world (Matt. 13:39, 40).
Moreover, the time of Christ's Incarnation is a time of completion,
wherefore it is called "the time of fulness [*Vulg.: 'the fulness of
time']" (Gal. 4:4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death,
cried out, "It is consummated" (John 19:30). Hence the completion of
the Divine works does not belong to the seventh day.

Obj. 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But we
do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather that
He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works
does not belong to the seventh day.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many things
are added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is called
perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess. But
many things were made after the seventh day, as the production of
many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are
frequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated
from putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work
of the Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22):
"The Lord hath created a new thing upon the earth." Miracles also are
new works, of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): "Renew thy signs, and
work new miracles." Moreover, all things will be made new when the
Saints are glorified, according to Apoc. 21:5: "And He that sat on
the throne said: Behold I make all things new." Therefore the
completion of the Divine works ought not to be attributed to the
seventh day.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 2:2): "On the seventh day God
ended His work which He had made."

_I answer that,_ The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first
perfection and the second perfection. The _first_ perfection is
that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this
perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the
whole having its parts complete. But the _second_ perfection is the
end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to
play the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the
end of the builder is the house that he makes by building. But the
first perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the
principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end
of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the
consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the
completeness of the universe at its first founding, and this is what
is ascribed to the seventh day.

Reply Obj. 1: The first perfection is the cause of the second, as
above said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are
required, nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection
of beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation
existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding
of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, "Grace
and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John 1:17). So, then, on the seventh
day was the consummation of nature, in Christ's Incarnation the
consummation of grace, and at the end of the world will be the
consummation of glory.

Reply Obj. 2: God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new
creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work
proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the _second_
perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the
completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though
according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either version,
however, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the
completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its
completion as regards their operation, to the seventh. It may also be
added that in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is
possible, movement cannot be called completed till it comes to rest,
for rest denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made
many other creatures besides those which He made in the six days, and
hence, by the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He
is said on that day to have consummated His work.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but
all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the
work of the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience
materially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed
Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their
causes, as those individual creatures that are now generated existed
in the first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if any such
appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals,
and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction
by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning.
Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of
individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the
offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in
their causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed
beforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And the
work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read
(Phil. 2:7), The Son of God "was made in the likeness of men." And
again, the glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by
way of similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the
empyrean. Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), "Nothing under the sun
is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before
us."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 73, Art. 2]

Whether God Rested on the Seventh Day from All His Work?

Objection 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day
from all His work. For it is said (John 5:17), "My Father worketh until
now, and I work." God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all
His work.

Obj. 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which
movement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and
without labor, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day
from His work.

Obj. 3: Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh day
by causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that rest is
set down in contradistinction to His work; now the words "God
created" or "made" this thing or the other cannot be explained to
mean that He made man create or make these things. Therefore the
resting of God cannot be explained as His making man to rest.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 2:2): "God rested on the seventh
day from all the work which He had done."

_I answer that,_ Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and
consequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although
movement, strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is
applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one
hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine
goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating
itself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other
hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to
move towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense
meaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire.
Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day.
First, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for,
as said above (A. 1, ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not
existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly,
because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was
happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He
is not said to have rested "in" His works, as though needing them for
His own happiness, but to have rested "from" them, as in fact resting
in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And
even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in
Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest
which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the
meaning of God's resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).

Reply Obj. 1: God indeed "worketh until now" by preserving and
providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of
new ones.

Reply Obj. 2: Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement, but
to the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an
external object.

Reply Obj. 3: Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in the
enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment
of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His
works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that God
rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set
down as the only one, and the other is the first and principal
explanation.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 73, Art. 3]

Whether Blessing and Sanctifying Are Due to the Seventh Day?

Objection 1: It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due
to the seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for
that some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided.
But whether God works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is
lost to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to
the seventh day.

Obj. 2: Further, the Latin "benedictio" [blessing] is derived from
"bonitas" [goodness]. But it is the nature of good to spread and
communicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days,
therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather
than the day on which He ceased producing them.

Obj. 3: Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as
upon each work it was said, "God saw that it was good." Therefore it
was not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day
should be blessed.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:3), "God blessed the seventh
day and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work."

_I answer that,_ As said above (A. 2), God's rest on the seventh day
is understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing
new works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures
He has made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in
Himself. According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the
seventh day, since, as we explained (Q. 72, ad 4), the blessing
referred to the increase by multiplication; for which reason God said
to the creatures which He blessed: "Increase and multiply." Now, this
increase is effected through God's Providence over His creatures,
securing the generation of like from like. And according to the
second meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have been
sanctified, since the special sanctification of every creature
consists in resting in God. For this reason things dedicated to God
are said to be sanctified.

Reply Obj. 1: The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because
anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because
something is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their
resting in God.

Reply Obj. 2: In the first six days creatures were produced in their
first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and
preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the
perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that
in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its
fruition.

Reply Obj. 3: The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to
the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the
seventh day, to its propagation.
_______________________

QUESTION 74

ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON
(In Three Articles)

We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three
points of inquiry:

(1) As to the sufficiency of these days;

(2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?

(3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating
the works of the six days.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 74, Art. 1]

Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that these days are not sufficiently
enumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the
works of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one
another. But separate days are assigned to distinction and to
adornment, and therefore separate days should be assigned to creation.

Obj. 2: Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and
water. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and
another to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought
to be devoted to the distinction of fire and air.

Obj. 3: Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ from
the beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other animals
than all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day is
devoted to the production of fishes, and another to that of the beast
of the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the
production of birds and another to that of man.

Obj. 4: Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of these
days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the luminaries
in the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is produced
at the same time as the accident proper to it. The light and the
luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different
days.

Obj. 5: Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting of
the world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that day
ought not to be enumerated with the others.

_I answer that,_ The reason of the distinction of these days is made
clear by what has been said above (Q. 70, A. 1), namely, that the
parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part
adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now
the parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three,
according to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or
highest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest
part. Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three
things, the beginning, the middle, and the end. The first part, then,
is distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the
middle part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth,
and the third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the
sixth. But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the
last three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him,
spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the
two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first these two
days, and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the
Divine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which
is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is
assigned to the forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of
corporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation belongs
to the production of formless matter, and of the formless spiritual
nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says
(Confess. xii, 12). Thus, then, the creation of either is set down
before there was any day. But it may also be said, following other
holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment imply
certain changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas
the work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the
substance of beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore,
every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place "in a
day," but creation "in the beginning" which denotes something
indivisible.

Reply Obj. 2: Fire and air, as not distinctly known by the
unlettered, are not expressly named by Moses among the parts of the
world, but reckoned with the intermediate part, or water, especially
as regards the lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which
the higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
ii, 13).

Reply Obj. 3: The production of animals is recorded with reference to
their adorning the various parts of the world, and therefore the days
of their production are separated or united according as the animals
adorn the same parts of the world, or different parts.

Reply Obj. 4: The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made
on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day
does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they
then received a form that they had not before, as said above (Q. 70,
[A. 1] ad 2).

Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15), after all
that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something
distinct is attributed to the seventh--namely, that on it God rested
in Himself from His works: and for this reason it was right that the
seventh day should be mentioned after the six. It may also be said,
with the other writers, that the world entered on the seventh day
upon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, and that
therefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being
devoted to cessation from work.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 74, Art. 2]

Whether All These Days Are One Day?

Objection 1: It would seem that all these days are one day. For it is
written (Gen. 2:4, 5): "These are the generations of the heaven and
the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord . . .
made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field, before
it sprung up in the earth." Therefore the day in which God made "the
heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field," is one and the
same day. But He made the heaven and the earth on the first day, or
rather before there was any day, but the plant of the field He made
on the third day. Therefore the first and third days are but one day,
and for a like reason all the rest.

Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Ecclus. 18:1): "He that liveth for ever,
created all things together." But this would not be the case if the
days of these works were more than one. Therefore they are not many
but one only.

Obj. 3: Further, on the seventh day God ceased from all new works.
If, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows
that He did not make that day; which is not admissible.

Obj. 4: Further, the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected in
an instant, for with each work are the words (God) "said . . . . and
it was . . . done." If, then, He had kept back His next work to
another day, it would follow that for the remainder of a day He would
have ceased from working and left it vacant, which would be
superfluous. The day, therefore, of the preceding work is one with
the day of the work that follows.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1), "The evening and the
morning were the second day . . . the third day," and so on. But
where there is a second and third there are more than one. There was
not, therefore, only one day.

_I answer that,_ On this question Augustine differs from other
expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven,
are one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22;
De Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were
seven distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as
explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely
different. For Augustine understands by the word "day," the knowledge
in the mind of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day
denotes their knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second
day their knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest.
Thus, then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one of
these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe without
impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind; which can know
many things at the same time, especially in the Word, in Whom all
angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of
days denotes the natural order of the things known, and not a
succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced.
Moreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately called "day," since
light, the cause of day, is to be found in spiritual things, as
Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28). In the opinion of the
others, however, the days signify a succession both in time, and in
the things produced.

If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the
mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the
diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown (Q. 67,
A. 1; Q. 69, A. 1), between Augustine and other writers is taken into
account. First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as
first created, to signify matter totally without form; but the making
of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of
dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter.
But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first
created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing
under the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort
of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown
(Q. 67, AA. 1, 4; Q. 69, A. 1). Secondly, some writers hold that
plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six
days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now the opinion
of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is
consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other
writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter
existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with
him also that in the first instituting of the world animals and
plants did not exist actually. There remains, however, a difference
as to four points; since, according to the latter, there was a time,
after the production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the
firmament had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the
waters, nor had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth
difference; which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. In
order, therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of
either side.

Reply Obj. 1: On the day on which God created the heaven and the
earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed,
actually, but "before it sprung up in the earth," that is,
potentially. And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day,
but other writers to the first instituting of the world.

Reply Obj. 2: God created all things together so far as regards their
substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all things
together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in
distinction and adornment. Hence the word "creation" is significant.

Reply Obj. 3: On the seventh day God ceased from making new things,
but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work it
belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days.

Reply Obj. 4: All things were not distinguished and adorned together,
not from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in which to
work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the
world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to
the different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to
the world a fresh state of perfection.

Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the
natural order of the works attributed to the days.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 74, Art. 3]

Whether Scripture Uses Suitable Words to Express the Work of the Six
Days?

Objection 1: It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words
to express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament,
and other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the
heaven and the earth. For "all things were made by Him" (John 1:3).
Therefore in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works,
mention should have been made of the Word of God.

Obj. 2: Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is
not mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not
sufficiently described.

Obj. 3: Further, it is said (Gen. 1:31): "God saw all the things that
He had made, and they were very good." It ought, then, to have been
said of each work, "God saw that it was good." The omission,
therefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the
second day, is not fitting.

Obj. 4: Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not
befit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, "The
Spirit of God moved over the waters," are unbecoming.

Obj. 5: Further, what is already made is not made over again.
Therefore to the words, "God said: Let the firmament be made . . .
and it was so," it is superfluous to add, "God made the firmament."
And the like is to be said of other works.

Obj. 6: Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide the
day, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, "The evening
and morning were the second day" or, "the third day," are not
suitable.

Obj. 7: Further, "first," not "one," corresponds to "second" and
"third." It should therefore have been said that, "The evening and
the morning were the first day," rather than "one day."

Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the person
of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and
in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place.
For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world
receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by
means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be
called his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is
by the word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction
and adornment the Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is
mentioned as the beginning, by the words, "In the beginning God
created," since by creation is understood the production of formless
matter. But according to those who hold that the elements were
created from the first under their proper forms, another explanation
must be given; and therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.)
that the words, "God said," signify a Divine command. Such a command,
however, could not have been given before creatures had been produced
that could obey it.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the
heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth,
the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is
omitted. But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), the heaven and
the earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the intervening
things being left to be understood, since all these move heavenwards,
if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that under the
word, "earth," Scripture is accustomed to include all the four
elements as (Ps. 148:7,8) after the words, "Praise the Lord from the
earth," is added, "fire, hail, snow, and ice."

Reply Obj. 3: In the account of the creation there is found something
to correspond to the words, "God saw that it was good," used in the
work of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the
consideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, "there are two
things," says Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God's
love of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. That
they might then exist, and exist permanently, "the Spirit of God," it
is said, "moved over the waters"--that is to say, over that formless
matter, signified by water, even as the love of the artist moves over
the materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work. And
the words, "God saw that it was good," signify that the things that
He had made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction
taken by God in His works, as of an artist in his art: not as though
He knew the creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to
Him otherwise, than before He made it. Thus in either work, of
creation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In
creation the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator,
the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and the
Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that moved over the waters.
But in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated by God
that speaks, and the Person of the Son by the Word in which He
speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with
which God saw that what was made was good. And if the words, "God saw
that it was good," are not said of the work of the second day, this
is because the work of distinguishing the waters was only begun on
that day, but perfected on the third. Hence these words, that are
said of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it may be that
Scripture does not use these words of approval of the second day's
work, because this is concerned with the distinction of things not
evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the firmament
is simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is not one
of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal
divisions of the world. The above three reasons are given by Rabbi
Moses [*Perplex. ii.], and to these may be added a mystical one
derived from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom
the work of the second day is not marked with approval because the
second number is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection
of unity.

Reply Obj. 4: Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the "Spirit of
the Lord," the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says that it
is so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which these
things are throughout attributed to God. But according to the holy
writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is said
to "move over the water"--that is to say, over what Augustine holds
to mean formless matter, lest it should be supposed that God loved of
necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in need of
them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the
object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit
moved over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that
movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. i, 7). It is the opinion, however, of Basil (Hom.
ii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit moved over the element of water,
"fostering and quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as
the hen broods over her chickens." For water has especially a
life-giving power, since many animals are generated in water, and the
seed of all animals is liquid. Also the life of the soul is given by
the water of baptism, according to John 3:5: "Unless a man be born
again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom
of God."

Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these three
phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their being
in the Word, denoted by the command "Let . . . be made"; secondly,
their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, "It was . .
. done"; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words,
"He made." And because the formation of the angels is recorded on the
first day, it was not necessary there to add, "He made." It may also
be said, following other writers, that the words, "He said," and "Let
. . . be made," denote God's command, and the words, "It was done,"
the fulfilment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the sake
of those especially who have asserted that all visible things were
made by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in
order to remove that error, that God Himself made them. Hence, in
each work, after the words, "It was done," some act of God is
expressed by some such words as, "He made," or, "He divided," or,
"He called."

Reply Obj. 6: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22, 30), by
the "evening" and the "morning" are understood the evening and the
morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained (Q. 58,
A. 6, 7). But, according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire
period takes its name, as is customary, from its more important part,
the day. An instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, "The
days of my pilgrimage," where night is not mentioned at all. But the
evening and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day,
since day begins with morning and ends with evening, or because
evening denotes the beginning of night, and morning the beginning of
day. It seems fitting, also, that where the first distinction of
creatures is described, divisions of time should be denoted only by
what marks their beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening
first is that as the evening ends the day, which begins with the
light, the termination of the light at evening precedes the
termination of the darkness, which ends with the morning. But
Chrysostom's explanation is that thereby it is intended to show that
the natural day does not end with the evening, but with the morning
(Hom. v in Gen.).

Reply Obj. 7: The words "one day" are used when day is first
instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours.
Hence, by mentioning "one," the measure of a natural day is fixed.
Another reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the
return of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course.
And yet another, because at the completion of a week of seven days,
the first day returns which is one with the eighth day. The three
reasons assigned above are those given by Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.).
_______________________

TREATISE ON MAN (QQ. 75-102)
_______________________

QUESTION 75

OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND
IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL
(In Seven Articles)

Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now
proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal
substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of
his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation
to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the
body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our
consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi)
says that three things are to be found in spiritual
substances--essence, power, and operation--we shall treat first of
what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to
its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.

Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is
the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union
of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven
points of inquiry.

(1) Whether the soul is a body?

(2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?

(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?

(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?

(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?

(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?

(7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 1]

Whether the Soul Is a Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is
the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved.
First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved,
since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot
does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves
and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging
movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to
be the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul.
Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body.
Therefore the soul is a body.

Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness.
But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If,
therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of
corporeal things.

Obj. 3: Further, between the mover and the moved there must be
contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the
soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is
simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy
space by its bulk."

_I answer that,_ To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that
the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things
which live: for we call living things "animate," [*i.e. having a
soul] and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is
shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The
philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination,
supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal:
for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is
not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is
something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many
ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, based on universal and
certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.

It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul,
for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and
the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but
it is the _first_ principle of life, which we call the soul. Now,
though a body may be a principle of life, as the heart is a principle
of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first
principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or
to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if
that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a
principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing
or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is
actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its
act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not
a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of
calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.

Reply Obj. 1: As everything which is in motion must be moved by
something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we
must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is
to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has
to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as
is shown in _Phys._ viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether
immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and
such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however,
another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved
accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable
movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again, another mover,
which is moved essentially--namely, the body. And because the
philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they
maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved
directly, and is a body.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity
actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows
potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing
known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only
potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but
only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of
corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but
that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the
ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and
potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order
to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the
principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of
"power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the
latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves
that body.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 2]

Whether the Human Soul Is Something Subsistent?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something
subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular
thing." Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of
that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not
something subsistent.

Obj. 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does
not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to say
that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul
weaves or builds." Therefore the soul is not subsistent.

Obj. 3: Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some
operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the
body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding
does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from
the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands
that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a
body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the
soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things
without which they are unable to think of any nature--i.e. imaginary
pictures of corporeal things." Therefore the nature of the human
intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that
is, something subsistent.

_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of
intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both
incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the
intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever
knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature;
because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of
anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated
by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and
everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual
principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know
all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore
it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is
likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ;
since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of
all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the
pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase
seems to be of that same color.

Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the
intellect has an operation _per se_ apart from the body. Now only that
which subsists can have an operation _per se._ For nothing can operate
but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts
heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore,
that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is
something incorporeal and subsistent.

Reply Obj. 1: "This particular thing" can be taken in two senses.
Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists,
and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the
inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes
also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this
particular thing" in the first sense, but not in the second.
Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed
be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being
something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what
is composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing."

Reply Obj. 2: Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own
opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to
be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to
operate _per se_ belongs to what exists _per se._ But for a thing to
exist _per se,_ it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an
accident or a material form; even though it be part of something.
Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist _per se,_ which is
neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In
this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist _per se_;
nor can it for that reason be said to operate _per se._ Hence the
operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole.
For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and
not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by
its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may
therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is
more correct to say that man understands through the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: The body is necessary for the action of the intellect,
not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the
phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither
does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be
non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is
non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses
in order to perform its act of perception.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 3]

Whether the Souls of Brute Animals Are Subsistent?

Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are
subsistent. For man is of the same genus as other animals; and,
as we have just shown (A. 2), the soul of man is subsistent.
Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent.

Obj. 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible
objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to
intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body,
apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty,
apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since
the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are
subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.

Obj. 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the
body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute
animals has an operation apart from the body.

_On the contrary,_ Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi,
xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the
souls of animals are not subsistent."

_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers made no distinction between
sense and intellect, and referred both to a corporeal principle, as
has been said (A. 1). Plato, however, drew a distinction between
intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal
principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs
to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of
brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the
operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a
corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent
operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with
change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye
is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses.
Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no _per se_ operation
of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to
the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute
animals have no _per se_ operations they are not subsistent. For the
operation of anything follows the mode of its being.

Reply Obj. 1: Although man is of the same genus as other animals, he
is of a different species. Specific difference is derived from the
difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily
imply a diversity of genus.

Reply Obj. 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible
object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to
the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its
object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the
impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in
the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense;
a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an
intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is
more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. If, however,
in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this
result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the
operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.

Reply Obj. 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive
power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive
soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a
like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive
power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for
obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in
moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an
act of the sensitive soul without the body.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 4]

Whether the Soul Is Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2
Cor. 4:16): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man
is renewed day by day." But that which is within man is the soul.
Therefore the soul is the inward man.

Obj. 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a
universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore
it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person.
Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as
holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul
and body."

_I answer that,_ The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two
senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man,
Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body.
I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the
species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species.
This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the
definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not
signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural
things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter,
which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as
it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this
soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion
of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs
in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a
given species, must belong to the substance of the species.

It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man;
and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the
sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in
that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong
to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a
thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of
a man is man. But it has been shown above (A. 3) that sensation is
not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an
operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not
a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through
supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man
to be a soul making use of the body.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing
seems to be chiefly what is princip[al] in it; thus what the governor
of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what
is princip[al] in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the
intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the
"inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body is
called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go
beyond the senses. And this is called the "outward" man.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a
person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence
a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor,
likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the
human species.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 5]

Whether the Soul Is Composed of Matter and Form?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and
form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever
things are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God;
by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are
living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom.
v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of
the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter.
Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality;
which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially
understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of
primary matter, as part of itself.

Obj. 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there
matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the
soul--namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject
to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge
and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their
existence, as the Philosopher says _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 6). But
the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God.
Therefore the soul has matter.

Obj. 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure
act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the
soul has matter.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that
the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual
matter.

_I answer that,_ The soul has no matter. We may consider this question
in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it
belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either
it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of
some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it
is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we
understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act;
and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since
potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If,
however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that
part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the
"primary animate."

Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul
inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is
received into something is received according to the condition of the
recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the
knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature
absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and
therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal
idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul
itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and
form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form,
the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so
it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the
sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since
matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows,
therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual
substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from
composition of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all acts;
because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not
as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as
potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act.
But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and
are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one
potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which
all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive
potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act.
Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than
the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the
diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives
individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms.
Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul
does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by
reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality
of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary
matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection
and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is
changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in
potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent;
wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it
by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however,
does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a
cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words
quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of
matter and form "there is no other cause but that which moves from
potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are
simply beings at once." [*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter sunt
quod vere entia aliquid." The Parma edition of St. Thomas's
Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim per se unum quiddam est . . .
et ens quiddam."]

Reply Obj. 4: Everything participated is compared to the participator
as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per
se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or
anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the
capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own
existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances
there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of
matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore
some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that
"which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 6]

Whether the Human Soul Is Incorruptible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For
those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a
like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of
animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is
alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing
more than the beast," as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as
the same text concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the
condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are
corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to
nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But
as it is written (Wis. 2:2), "We are born of nothing"; which is true,
not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is
concluded in the same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had
not been," even as to our soul.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the
operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a
phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands
nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body
as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot
survive the dissolution of the body.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe
to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have
"an incorruptible substantial life."

_I answer that,_ We must assert that the intellectual principle which
we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted
in two ways--_per se,_ and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any
substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the
generation or corruption of something else. For generation and
corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which
is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever
has existence _per se_ cannot be generated or corrupted except "per
se"; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and
material forms, acquire existence or lose it through the generation
or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (AA. 2, 3)
that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human
soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies
are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it
were corrupted _per se._ This, indeed, is impossible, not only as
regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that
is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by
virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a
form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires
actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so
far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form
to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a
subsistent form to cease to exist.

Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some
pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is
incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is
contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and
into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no
matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no
contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to
the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are
without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not
themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge.
Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be
corruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that
everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now,
in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The
senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of
"here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends existence
absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an
intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire
cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is
incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as
expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying that man and
animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for
all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul.
For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body;
whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is
written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth the living
soul" (Gen. 1:24): while of man it is written (Gen. 2:7) that "He
breathed into his face the breath of life." And so in the last
chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: "(Before) the dust
return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to
God Who gave it." Again the process of life is alike as to the body,
concerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): "All things breathe
alike," and (Wis. 2:2), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But
the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas
animals are not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than
beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to
the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive
potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who
can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can
be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality
to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain
existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in
it a potentiality to non-existence.

Reply Obj. 3: To understand through a phantasm is the proper
operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After
separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding,
similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear
later on (Q. 89, A. 1).
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 7]

Whether the Soul Is of the Same Species As an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an
angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of
its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the
end of the soul is the same as that of an angel--namely, eternal
happiness. Therefore they are of the same species.

Obj. 2: Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest,
because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing
nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual
nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate
specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel
except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the
essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species.
Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species.

_On the contrary,_ Things which have different natural operations are
of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of
an angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii),
"Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering
their knowledge of Divine things from visible things." Subsequently
he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an
angel are not of the same species.

_I answer that,_ Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls
and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed
that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as
resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above (Q. 47, A. 2).
But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be
diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of
nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are
subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a
diversity of species. For a separate form cannot be understood
otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate
whiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness
does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But
diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of
nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another;
and the same applies to other species, because differences which
divide a genus are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are
compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the
"principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof," as is
written, _Metaph._ x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the
aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. For if the
matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that
either the form is the principle of the distinction of matter--that
is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to
divers forms; and even then there would result a difference of
species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle
of the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from
another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in
these incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that
it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same
species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will
be explained later (Q. 76, A. 2, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 1: This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural
end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end.

Reply Obj. 2: The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because
it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler
than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the
noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of
intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in
the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one
species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species.

Reply Obj. 3: The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the
soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that,
properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the "composite," is the
species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires
the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a
grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not
united to a body.
_______________________

QUESTION 76

OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL
(In Eight Articles)

We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning
this there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its
form?

(2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically
according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence for
all men?

(3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual
principle, there is some other soul?

(4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?

(5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual
principle is the form?

(6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?

(7) Whether by means of an accident?

(8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 1]

Whether the Intellectual Principle Is United to the Body As Its Form?

Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to
the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that
the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body.
Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.

Obj. 2: Further, every form is determined according to the nature
of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would
be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were
united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate
nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature;
and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear
from what has been said (Q. 75, A. 2); which is contrary to the
nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to
the body as its form.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body,
receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must
be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form
of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially
and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise
the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and
universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore
the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

Obj. 4: Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same
subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is
not the action of a body, as appears from above (Q. 75, A. 2).
Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body.
But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the
essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither
is the substance of the intellect the form of a body.

Obj. 5: Further, whatever has _per se_ existence is not united to the
body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: so
that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by
itself. But the intellectual principle has _per se_ existence and is
subsistent, as was said above (Q. 75, A. 2). Therefore it is not
united to the body as its form.

Obj. 6: Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature
exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form
by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an
accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form
would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one.
Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the
intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above
(Q. 75, A. 6), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution
of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to
the body as its form.

_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher, _Metaph._ viii (Did.
vii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which
constitutes man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of
his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is
the form of man.

_I answer that,_ We must assert that the intellect which is the
principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For
that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which
the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is
primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily
is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a
form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as
it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now
it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul.
And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of
living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these
vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of
our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our
understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily
understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual
soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by
Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2).

But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the
body he must first explain how it is that this action of
understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is
conscious that it is himself who understands. Now an action may be
attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher
(Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of
its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a
part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as
when we say that something that is white builds, because it is
accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates
or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him
accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated
of him essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates
understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding
that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part of
Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 4),
for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious
both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense
without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It
follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is
a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of
Socrates.

The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible
species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and
in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the
intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of
this or that particular man. But this link or union does not
sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the
act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the
sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things
relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the
intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he
says _De Anima_ iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of colors are in
the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect.
Now it is clear that because the colors, the images of which are in
the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to
the wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is
seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in
the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are
the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are
understood.

Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the
body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one
thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the
whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. First, because the
intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the
movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. The
reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved
by his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his
intellect because he understands. Secondly, because since Socrates is
an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form,
if the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside
the essence, and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor
to the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent,
and does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating.
Therefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates
for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the
action of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to
an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore if
understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves
him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument. This
is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that
understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima
iii, 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be
attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a
man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps
indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees.
Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above
manner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates.
If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect
with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be
united to those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates
is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely,
for a thing is a being according as it is one.

There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by
Aristotle--namely, that this particular man understands, because the
intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of
the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is
united to the body as its form.

The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species.
For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper
operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses
all other animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the
ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly
belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that
which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything
is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual
principle is the proper form of man.

But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above
corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it
excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the
form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental
qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the
more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter;
as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive
soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and
noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by
the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal
matter has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect.

It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of
matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the
form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in
potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the
form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by
virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we
call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the "primary
animate," as was said above (Q. 75, A. 5).

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the ultimate
natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is
directed is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He proves this
from the fact that "man and the sun generate man from matter." It is
separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the
intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power
of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which
cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But
it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, to which this power
belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation.
And so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is
separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ.

From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections:
since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by
means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand
immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the
intellectual power be not the act of the body.

Reply Obj. 4: The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a
form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore
there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of
the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body.

Reply Obj. 5: The soul communicates that existence in which it
subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual
soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the
whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the
case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul
retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas
it is not so with other forms.

Reply Obj. 6: To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason
of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be
raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its
proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for
its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when
separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination
to be united to the body.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 2]

Whether the Intellectual Principle Is Multiplied According to the
Number of Bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not
multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one
intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied
in number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial
substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown
above (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore there are not many human souls in
one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but
one intellect in all men.

Obj. 2: Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also
removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the
number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number
of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a
single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the
distinction of rewards and punishments.

Obj. 3: Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my
intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are
things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever
is received into anything must be received according to the condition
of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received
individually into my intellect, and also into yours: which is
contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals.

Obj. 4: Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which
understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what
is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you;
and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be
only potentially something understood; so that the common intention
will have to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse
something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is
contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would
seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to
follow that there is one intellect in all men.

Obj. 5: Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the
master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets
knowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an
active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems,
therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master
is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is
one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the
disciple and master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies
to all men.

Obj. 6: Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: "If I were
to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself."
But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect.
Therefore there is one intellect of all men.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the
relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of
particular causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul,
one in species, should belong to animals of different species.
Therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul
should belong to several individuals.

_I answer that,_ It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to
belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the
intellect itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are
one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by
something outside the essence of each. The distinction between
Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a
tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd.

It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the
opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the
intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man.
For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form,
as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is
the principle of existence.

Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the
manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is
manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two
instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but
several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two
hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the
contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we
might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if
there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many
drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and
one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when
the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one
stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or
coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all
the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey
the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two
men to have several intellects and one sense--for instance, if two
men had one eye--there would be several seers, but one sight. But if
there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things
of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it
possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one
understanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is
the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the
intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent
and one action: that is to say that all men are but one
"understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard,
that is, of one intelligible object.

However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action
from yours by the distinction of the phantasms--that is to say, were
there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you--if the
phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a
form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to
divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of
things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the
phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the
intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now
in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only
one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom
there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only
one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the
intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of
a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if
there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which
are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of
intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows,
therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to
maintain that there exists one intellect for all men.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no
matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain
matter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the
division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is
quite impossible for many angels to be of one species.

Reply Obj. 2: Everything has unity in the same way that it has being;
consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge
of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue
of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the
dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being.
In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the
multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies,
the souls retain their multiplied being.

Reply Obj. 3: Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the
species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding
of universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent
substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand
universals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species
whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as
every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent
acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge
is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows.
Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by
reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter.
Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is
material--that is, not abstracted from material conditions--its
likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the
distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of
individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing
in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from
the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the
nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied;
thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter,
as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many;
because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an
individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an
individual species.

Reply Obj. 4: Whether the intellect be one or many, what is
understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not
according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the
stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, _De
Anima_ iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the
likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on
itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but
only intelligible species. Now it happens that different things,
according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And
since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the
knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen
to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the
senses; for several see the same color, according to different
likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object
understood. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of
Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence--that a thing is
perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has
outside the soul--that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature
of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode
according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode
according to which it is understood. For the common nature is
understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such
is not its mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the
opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the
same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed
that the natures of things exist separate from matter.

Reply Obj. 5: One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the
master. How it is caused will be shown later on (Q. 117, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would
involve a plurality of species.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 3]

Whether Besides the Intellectual Soul There Are in Man Other Souls
Essentially Different from One Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there
are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such
as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and
incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual
soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and
the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 6).
Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive
soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same.

Obj. 2: Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is
incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ
generically," says the Philosopher, _Metaph._ x (Did. ix, 10). But
the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals,
is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the
sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same
genus. Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul;
and, therefore, "animal" will not be one genus common to man and
other animals, which is absurd.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 2),
that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the
form. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is
taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" by
reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore
the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a
sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual
soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but
presupposes it as a material subject.

_On the contrary,_ It is said in the book _De Ecclesiasticis
Dogmatibus_ xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man,
as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is
animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual,
which obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul
in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and
orders itself by its own reasoning."

_I answer that,_ Plato held that there were several souls in one body,
distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different
vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the
concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain.
Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard
to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this
reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have
been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as
sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various
principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and
distributed in the various parts of the body. But with regard to the
intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be "only
logically" distinct from the other parts of the soul, "or also
locally."

The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was
supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor.
For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be
moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to
its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to
the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially
different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three
different reasons.

In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which
there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one
form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the
same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are
denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance,
"a white man." If, therefore, man were _living_ by one form, the
vegetative soul, and _animal_ by another form, the sensitive soul, and
_man_ by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man
is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii,
6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the
idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this
reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the
body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), "what contains them?"--that is, what
makes them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one
body; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one,
than the reverse.

Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one
thing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from
various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if
the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that
something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of
essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the
subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is
presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is
colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.)
Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and
another form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these
two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally,
supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another--or that
one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of
essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But
both of these consequences are clearly false: because "animal" is
predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not
part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about.
Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man;
otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so
that animal can be essentially predicated of man.

Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one
operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never
be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one.

We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the
intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul.
This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of
species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things
differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order
of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and
animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in
each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason
Aristotle, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things
to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of
unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the
species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon
contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains
virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and
to the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of
a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by
another--since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained
in the pentagonal--so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and
animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and
man.

Reply Obj. 1: The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of
its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When,
therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with
sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For
although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot
deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility.

Reply Obj. 2: Not forms, but composites, are classified either
generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other
animals. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which
is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference
between man and the other animals.

Reply Obj. 3: The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely
sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more
perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be
shown further on (Q. 118, A. 2, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 4: We must not consider the diversity of natural things as
proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow
from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one
and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said,
the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the
sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately
what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something
imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is
something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the
notion of the genus; while that wherein the intellectual soul
exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting;
thence it gathers the "difference" of man.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 4]

Whether in Man There Is Another Form Besides the Intellectual Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides
the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that
"the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially."
Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body
has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other
substantial form in the body precedes the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now
everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one
moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,
5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part
must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved
(Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything
that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there
must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted.

Obj. 3: Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to
primary matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to some
beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial
form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately
to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most
imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.

Obj. 4: Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does
not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere
corruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a
mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human
body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.

_On the contrary,_ Of one thing there is but one substantial being.
But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one
thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the
substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be
in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul.

_I answer that,_ If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not
united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the
Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there
is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its
being as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be
united to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above
(A. 1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the
intellectual soul to be found in man.

In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial
form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental
form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat
does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by
the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or
generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular
condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a
thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the
substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing
is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted
simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that
primary matter was some actual being--for instance, fire or air, or
something of that sort--maintained that nothing is generated simply,
or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an
alteration," as we read, _Phys._ i, 4. Therefore, if besides the
intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form
by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would
follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that
it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there
would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption,
all of which is clearly false.

Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in
man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually
contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually
contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the
imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the
sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants,
and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the
imperfect.

Reply Obj. 1: Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a
body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life
potentially"; and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul."
Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul
itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is
hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were
two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light.
In like manner, the soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc.,
because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life
potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the
second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality "does not
reject"--that is, does not exclude--the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the
form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which
presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that
the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate
body is the part moved.

Reply Obj. 3: We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as
existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is
always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the
first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form
which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the
most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.

Reply Obj. 4: Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the
elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is
made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an
average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the
elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the
distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter
cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be
found except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same
place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be
distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture
which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to
sense, by the juxtaposition of particles.

Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their
imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms,
and so can be "more" or "less"; and therefore in the mixture they are
modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from
them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial
being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every
addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated
in _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for
any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less
impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident.

Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener.
i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not
actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements
remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary
forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the
substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone,
or of any sort of soul.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 5]

Whether the Intellectual Soul Is Properly United to Such a Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly
united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form.
But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not
properly united to a corruptible body.

Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial
form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does
not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter.
Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire,
for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial
body.

Obj. 3: Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one
form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual soul
is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is
composed of parts belonging to various species.

Obj. 4: Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should
itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect
of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally
provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes,
and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided
with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual
soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as
being deprived of the above means of protection.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the
soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially."

_I answer that,_ Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the
matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the
matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual
soul, as we have seen above (Q. 55, A. 2) in the order of nature,
holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it
is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels
are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the
senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in
necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed
not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of
feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a
corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to
be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.

Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the
organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot
and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has
the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries,
and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is
reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the
touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its
completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists
more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be
a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For
this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among
men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best
intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are
refined in body are well endowed in mind," as stated in _De Anima_ ii,
9.

Reply Obj. 1: Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying
that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does
not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal
not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its
immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the
immortality of the devil.

Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two
conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the
matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of
the first disposition. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the
saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that
the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of
the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable
complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If,
however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the
formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but
what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy
against death in the gift of grace.

Reply Obj. 2: A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by
reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on
account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable
temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such
a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which
fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an
equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament
has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from
contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 3: The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand,
flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the
whole does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that
these are of different species, but that they are of various
dispositions. This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which,
although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection,
is manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it
requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is
united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety of
parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater
variety than in plants.

Reply Obj. 4: The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has
a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by
nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed
means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other
animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in
regard to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man has by
nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of organs" (De
Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments
of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 6]

Whether the Intellectual Soul Is United to the Body Through the Medium
of Accidental Dispositions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the
body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form
exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are
accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter
before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the
soul is a substantial form.

Obj. 2: Further, various forms of one species require various parts
of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without
division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose
dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many
belonging to one species.

Obj. 3: Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is
corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its
power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by
means of a power, which is an accident.

_On the contrary,_ Accident is posterior to substance, both in the
order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says,
_Metaph._ vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any
accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the
substantial form.

_I answer that,_ If the soul were united to the body, merely as a
motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain
dispositions mediating between the soul and the body; on the
contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would
be required the power to move the body; and on the part of the body,
a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul.

If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the
substantial form, as we have already said above (A. 1), it is
impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body
and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its
matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all
manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the
acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first among
all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be
apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But
matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it
to exist absolutely, as we have said above (A. 4). Wherefore it is
impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter
before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: As appears from what has been already said (A. 4), the
more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior
forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter
according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same
essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an
animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every genus follow its own
proper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in
its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so
those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist
before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter
before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the
subsequent effect.

Reply Obj. 2: Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the
corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once
understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct
in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according
to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially
the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection,
as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different when
brought under the observation of reason.

Reply Obj. 3: A spiritual substance which is united to a body as
its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the
intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a
form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 7]

Whether the Soul Is United to the Animal Body by Means of a Body?

Objection 1: It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by
means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that "the
soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air,
which is most akin to a spirit." But fire and air are bodies.
Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body.

Obj. 2: Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing
the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when
breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the
breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul
and body.

Obj. 3: Further, things which are very distant from one another, are
not united except by something between them. But the intellectual
soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal,
and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to
the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some
heavenly light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them
together.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need
not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and
its shape are one." But the shape is united to the wax without a body
intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body.

_I answer that,_ If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united
to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some
other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any
animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it
by means of something nearer.

If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have
said (A. 1), it is impossible for it to be united by means of
another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as
it is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be
actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give
existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing
composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by
reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there
any other cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be
in act, as the Philosopher says, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 6).

From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who
maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and
body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual
soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it
is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the
corruptible body of man. Others said that the soul is united to the
body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the
body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature
of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to
the body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible
soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the
intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now
all this is fictitious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and
the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a
mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly,
because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to
matter.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the
body; whence he uses the word "administration." It is true that it
moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And
the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the
Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x).

Reply Obj. 2: The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of
breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the
removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such
a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first
instrument of motion.

Reply Obj. 3: The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we
consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a
separate existence, many means of connection would have to intervene.
But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an
existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own
existence is united to the body immediately. This is the case with
every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from
matter, which is a being only in potentiality.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 8]

Whether the Soul Is in Each Part of the Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of
the body; for the Philosopher says in _De causa motus animalium_ (De
mot. animal. x): "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part
of the body; it suffices that it be in some principle of the body
causing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement
of its own."

Obj. 2: Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But
it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in an
organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body.
Therefore the whole soul is not in each part.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1) that the
relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the
sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the
soul to the whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the whole soul is
in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an
animal.

Obj. 4: Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence
of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the
body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of
the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye,
and this is absurd.

Obj. 5: Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each
part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus one part
would not depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than
another; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each
part of the body.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that "in each
body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire."

_I answer that,_ As we have said, if the soul were united to the body
merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the
body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But
since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily
be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an
accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the
substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the
whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which
does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form
consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and
such a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and
therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but
also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do
not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a
painted animal or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the
flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof of
which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body
retains its proper action; although that which retains its species,
retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it
actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each
part thereof.

That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this,
that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are
three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division.
There is a whole which is divided into parts of quantity, as a whole
line, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into
logical and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the
parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There
is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into
virtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to forms,
except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have
an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as
whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to
be in the whole surface and in each part of the surface; and,
therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally
divided. But a form which requires variety in the parts, such as a
soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally
related to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided
accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative
totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or
accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on
logical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs
to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the
principle of operation.

Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole
surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If
we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then
the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to
be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the
whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a
small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence,
then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface.

Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither
essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say
that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of
perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not
in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with
regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is
in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the
soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the
same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is compared
primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate
perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are
ordained to the whole.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power
of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its
primary and proportionate perfectible.

Reply Obj. 3: An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a
whole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate
perfectible. Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not
follow that a part of an animal is an animal.

Reply Obj. 4: Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as
it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and
the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the
body. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of
these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part
of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power.

Reply Obj. 5: One part of the body is said to be nobler than another,
on account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body are
the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a
nobler part of the body: as also is that part which serves the same
power in a nobler manner.
_______________________

QUESTION 77

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL
(In Eight Articles)

We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the
soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head
there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?

(2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?

(3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?

(4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;

(5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?

(6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?

(7) Whether one power rises from another?

(8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 1]

Whether the Essence of the Soul Is Its Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power.
For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and love
are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing,
essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, and
will are one life, one mind, one essence."

Obj. 2: Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary
matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its
own power.

Obj. 3: Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental
form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified
or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own
power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul.

Obj. 4: Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by
the intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and
understand" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
2). Therefore the soul is its own power.

Obj. 5: Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an
accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else
besides the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to
Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see Obj. 1) "are not in the
soul as in a subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or
quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the
subject in which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other
things" (De Trin. ix, 4).

Obj. 6: Further, "a simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is
a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as we
have said above (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore the power of the soul cannot
be in it as in a subject.

Obj. 7: Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial
difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences;
and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the
soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it
would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly
spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more,
then, in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul
is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present
purpose this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power
and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power
and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the
genus of substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the
genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus
of substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His
own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of
His operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true
either of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when
speaking of the angels (Q. 54, A. 3). Secondly, this may be also
shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence
is an act. Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the
immediate principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always
have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an
actually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained
to a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore,
for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it
according to its essence, as a form, but according to its power. So
the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first
act, with a further relation to the second act. Now we observe that
what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital
operations; whence also it is said in the definition of the soul,
that it is "the act of a body having life potentially"; which
potentiality, however, "does not exclude the soul." Therefore it
follows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing
is in potentiality by reason of an act, as act.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves
itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known and
loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very
substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the same way
are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those
things are "one life, one mind, one essence." Or, as some say, this
passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is
predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole,
and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each part
according to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in
a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each part. But
the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its
whole essence, nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way
can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated,
though improperly, of all the parts together; as if we were to say
that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential
whole is in each part according to its whole essence, not, however,
according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated
of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this
sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the will
are the one essence of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is
the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing
else but its essence.

Reply Obj. 3: Action belongs to the composite, as does existence;
for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial
existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power
which results from the substantial form. Hence an active accidental
form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat
compared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the
soul.

Reply Obj. 4: That the accidental form is a principle of action is
due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the
first principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this
sense the Philosopher says that "the soul is that whereby we
understand and sense."

Reply Obj. 5: If we take accident as meaning what is divided against
substance, then there can be no medium between substance and
accident; because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that
is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a
subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence,
it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species of
accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five
universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and
accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a
thing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be
called accident in this sense; but only what is not caused by the
essential principle of the species. For the 'proper' does not belong
to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles
of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and
accident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be
said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural
properties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love
are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be
understood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared
to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His
argument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved
as in a subject, it would follow that an accident transcends its
subject, since even other things are loved through the soul.

Reply Obj. 6: Although the soul is not composed of matter and form,
yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (Q.
75, A. 5, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an
accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure
Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De
Trin. i).

Reply Obj. 7: Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken
from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and
rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in
themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing
prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial
differences.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Several Powers of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several powers of the
soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of
God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the
intellectual soul.

Obj. 2: Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But
the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore
above all others it has one virtue or power.

Obj. 3: Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the
one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different
degrees of perfection, as we have seen above (Q. 76, AA. 3, 4).
Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of
various degrees.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher places several powers in the soul
(De Anima ii, 2,3).

_I answer that,_ Of necessity we must place several powers in the
soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says
(De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect
goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few
movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect
goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect
goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in
those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement
whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only
acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed
is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and
better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has
perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that
things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and
so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can
acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire
beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature,
of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul
requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a
smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power
or action beyond His own Essence.

There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of
powers--because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal
creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine
likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire
perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it
falls short of more perfect creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: A unified power is superior if it extends to equal
things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many
things.

Reply Obj. 3: One thing has one substantial existence, but may have
several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several
powers.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 3]

Whether the Powers Are Distinguished by Their Acts and Objects?

Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul are not
distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its
species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is
subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore
the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.

Obj. 2: Further, contraries are what differ most from each other.
Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows
that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly
false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to
white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.

Obj. 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.
Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects,
the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly
false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired
by the appetitive.

Obj. 4: Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is
the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong
to various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color
belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they
come under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are
not distinguished according to the difference of their objects.

_On the contrary,_ Things that are subsequent are distinguished by
what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "acts
and operations precede the powers according to reason; and these
again are preceded by their opposites," that is their objects.
Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and
objects.

_I answer that,_ A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we
seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is
directed, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as
the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is
diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every
act is either of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the
object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving
cause: for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the
sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the object is
a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect
quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from these two things an
act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end
or term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in
this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active
principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is the
active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity
distinguished by their acts and objects.

Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not
change the species. For since to be colored is accidental to an
animal, its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a
difference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is
to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes
rational, and sometimes otherwise. Hence "rational" and "irrational"
are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In
like manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the
powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its
very nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are
directed to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color,
sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with
regard to color, namely, the sight, and another with regard to sound,
namely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for
instance, to something colored, to be a musician or a grammarian,
great or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such
differences the powers of the soul are not distinct.

Reply Obj. 1: Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is,
nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is
with regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is,
nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those
conditions which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its
principle and end.

Reply Obj. 2: If any power were to have one of two contraries as such
for its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. But
the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as
such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does
not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of two
contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the other, since
they are to one another as perfect and imperfect.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from
being considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong
to various powers of the soul.

Reply Obj. 4: The higher power of itself regards a more universal
formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a
power is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore
many things are combined in the one formality of the object, which
the higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the
formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is
that various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects,
however, are subject to one higher power.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 4]

Whether Among the Powers of the Soul There Is Order?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order among the powers of
the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is
no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the
powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore
there is no order among them.

Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects
and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not order
among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are
various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no
order among the powers of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the
operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the action
of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for
sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore
there is no order among the powers of the soul.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts
or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among
themselves. Therefore the powers of the soul have order.

_I answer that,_ Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and
since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a
certain order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul.
Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of which
correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third
is taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence of one
power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of
nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to
imperfect things; and according to the order of generation and time;
forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus,
according to the first kind of order among the powers, the
intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they
direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior
in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul.

In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers
of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of
the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The
same is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the
intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers
are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling.
For the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher
and lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally
prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the result.

Reply Obj. 1: The species of a given genus are to one another as
before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their
nature; although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as
they receive the predication of the common genus.

Reply Obj. 2: This order among the powers of the soul is both on the
part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence,
has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the
part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we
have said above.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument is verified as regards those powers among
which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the
two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one
depends on another.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 5]

Whether All the Powers of the Soul Are in the Soul As Their Subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the
soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body;
so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject
of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the
powers of the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are
attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2), "The soul is that by which we
sense and understand primarily." But the natural principles of the
operations of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are
primarily in the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the
soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without
the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body.
But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their
subject, the soul could not sense anything without the body.
Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; and for
a similar reason, of all the other powers.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that
"sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the
composite." Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as
its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the
powers.

_I answer that,_ The subject of operative power is that which is able
to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now
the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does
operate. Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the
subject of operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning
of _De Somno et Vigilia._ Now, it is clear from what we have said
above (Q. 75, AA. 2, 3; Q. 76, A. 1, ad 1), that some operations of
the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding
and will. Hence the powers of these operations are in the soul as
their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means
of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And
so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive
parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these
operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul
alone.

Reply Obj. 1: All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as
their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that
the composite has the power to perform such operations.

Reply Obj. 2: All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared
to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.

Reply Obj. 3: Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation
proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things
relating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato,
not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far as the
present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses
some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be
taken in two ways. Firstly, the words "with the body or without the
body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from
the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because
the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a
corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be understood as determining the
act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses
some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as
when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some
things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but
only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful
on hearing something.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 6]

Whether the Powers of the Soul Flow from Its Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow
from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one
simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since,
therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot
proceed from its essence.

Obj. 2: Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause.
But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the
powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes.
Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.

Obj. 3: Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But
nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii,
1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal
is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and
another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher
proves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its
powers within itself.

_On the contrary,_ The powers of the soul are its natural properties.
But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it
is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from _Metaph._
vii (Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its
essence as their cause.

_I answer that,_ The substantial and the accidental form partly agree
and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that
by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ,
however, in two respects. First, because the substantial form makes
a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely
potential. But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist
absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular
condition; for its subject is an actual being. Hence it is clear that
actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being
observed in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is
the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its
subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of
the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental
form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the
actuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as it is in
potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as
it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and _per se_
accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is
receptive only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent.
Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that
which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the
more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial
form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of
the completeness of the subject.

Now it is clear, from what has been said (A. 5), that either the
subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be
the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of
potentiality, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 6); or else this subject
is the composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it
is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the
soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as
from their principle; because it has already been said that the
accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is
received into it according as it is in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 1: From one simple thing many things may proceed
naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of
recipients. Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various
powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and
also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.

Reply Obj. 2: The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the
active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the
material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From
this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all
its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some
as receptive thereof.

Reply Obj. 3: The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is
not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance;
thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 7]

Whether One Power of the Soul Arises from Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise
from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does
not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at
the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from
another.

Obj. 2: Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an
accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the
subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident.
Therefore one power does not arise from another.

Obj. 3: Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite;
but everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the
powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species.
Therefore one of them does not proceed from another.

_On the contrary,_ Powers are known by their actions. But the action
of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action
of the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power
of the soul is caused by another.

_I answer that,_ In those things which proceed from one according to
a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is
nearer to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more
remote. Now it has been shown above (A. 4) that among the powers of
the soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the
soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another.
But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a
principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either
separately by itself, or together with the body; and since the agent
and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such,
is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which
precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the
principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active
principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of the
intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are
a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore,
according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence
as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive
principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the
others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is
considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to
the intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede
the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated
before the man.

Reply Obj. 1: As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not
by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is
simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as
regards another.

Reply Obj. 2: An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an
accident; but one accident is received prior to another into
substance, as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident
is said to be the subject of another; as surface is of color,
inasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of
another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as
perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and
figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from
another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect
things.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 8]

Whether All the Powers Remain in the Soul When Separated from the
Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in
the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book _De Spiritu
et Anima_ that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself
sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and
irascibility."

Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties.
But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never
separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even
after death.

Obj. 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not
weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says
(De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he
would see even as well as a young man." But weakness is the road to
corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when
the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.

Obj. 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the
Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the
separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in
hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy
lifetime" (Luke 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated
soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.

Obj. 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which
is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls
grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive.
Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.

Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the
soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some
things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite
separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the
sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in
the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two
substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the
body with its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive
powers do not remain.

_I answer that,_ As we have said already (AA. 5, 6, 7), all the
powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But
some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the
intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul,
after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected
in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive
parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the
subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not
remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their
principle or root.

So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even
after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they
say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul;
because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.

Reply Obj. 1: That book has no authority, and so what is there
written can be despised with the same facility as it was said;
although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers,
not actually but virtually.

Reply Obj. 2: These powers, which we say do not actually remain in
the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of
the composite.

Reply Obj. 3: These powers are said not to be weakened when the body
becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the
virtual principle of these powers.

Reply Obj. 4: The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the
same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the
mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul.

Reply Obj. 5: In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the
sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.

Reply Obj. 6: Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not
as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said
there (Retrac. ii, 24).
_______________________

QUESTION 78

OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL
(In Four Articles)

We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian,
however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual
and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the
knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other
powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken
specifically will be divided into three parts: first, we shall
consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect;
secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The powers of the soul considered generally;

(2) The various species of the vegetative part;

(3) The exterior senses;

(4) The interior senses.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 1]

Whether There Are to Be Distinguished Five Genera of Powers in the
Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not to be distinguished
five genera of powers in the soul--namely, vegetative, sensitive,
appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul
are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly
assigned--namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the
rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in
the soul, and not five.

Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of its
vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): "In several ways a thing is said
to live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is said
to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly,
movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment." Therefore
there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive
is excluded.

Obj. 3: Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as
regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to
each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible
object; whence we read (Ecclus. 40:22): "The eye desireth favor and
beauty, but more than these green sown fields." In the same way every
other power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive
power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.

Obj. 4: Further, the moving principle in animals is sense,
intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10).
Therefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a
special genus of soul.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers
are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion, and
the intellectual."

_I answer that,_ There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above
numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes
of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls
being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul
transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for
the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to
it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation
of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not
even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the operation of
the _rational soul._ Below this, there is another operation of the
soul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal organ, but not
through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the
_sensitive soul;_ for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other such
corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they
are not required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes
place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the proper disposition
of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which
is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal
quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature;
because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle,
while these operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is
common to all the operations of the soul; since every animate thing,
in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the _vegetative
soul;_ for digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by
the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4).

Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their
objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object
to which it extends, as we have said above (Q. 77, A. 3, ad 4). But
the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple
order. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only
the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are
called "vegetative" for the vegetative power acts only on the body to
which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the
soul, which genus regards a more universal object--namely, every
sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And
there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus
regards a still more universal object--namely, not only the sensible
body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the
latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard
not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something
extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to
the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this
something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation,
must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as
this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the
soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are
two kinds of powers--namely, the "sensitive" in regard to the less
common object--the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard
to the most common object--universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as
the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something
extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the
soul: one--the "appetitive"--in respect of which the soul is referred
to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention;
the other--the "locomotive" power--in respect of which the soul is
referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and
movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its
desires and intentions.

The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of
living things. There are some living things in which there exists only
vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the
vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive
power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which
besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require
many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek
necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things
which with these have intellectual power--namely, men. But the
appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things;
because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima ii,
3).

Thus the first two objections are hereby solved.

Reply Obj. 3: The "natural appetite" is that inclination which each
thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural
appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the
"animal appetite" results from the form apprehended; this sort of
appetite requires a special power of the soul--mere apprehension does
not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature,
whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own
nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight
desires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act
only--namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the
appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose
of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not
require things perceived by the senses, except on account of the
actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them;
there would be no need for a special genus of appetitive powers,
since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice.

Reply Obj. 4: Although sense and appetite are principles of movement
in perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not
sufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them;
for immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not
the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the
appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the parts
of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves
them. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are
deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience
to the appetite.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 2]

Whether the Parts of the Vegetative Soul Are Fittingly Described As
the Nutritive, Augmentative, and Generative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are
not fittingly described--namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and
generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of
the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class
the above forces as powers of the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, we should not assign a particular power of the
soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But
generation is common to all things that can be generated and
corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative
force should not be classed as a power of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the
body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more,
therefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the
soul is not distinct from the generative power.

Obj. 4: Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it
exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing
exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved.
Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living
thing (De Anima ii, 4), being "a power which is capable of preserving
whatever receives it." Therefore we should not distinguish the
nutritive power from the generative.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the
operations of this soul are "generation, the use of food," and (cf.
_De Anima_ iii, 9) "growth."

_I answer that,_ The vegetative part has three powers. For the
vegetative part, as we have said (A. 1), has for its object the body
itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the
soul is required. One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this
is directed the _generative_ power. Another is whereby the living
body acquires its due quantity; to this is directed the
_augmentative_ power. Another is whereby the body of a living thing
is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is
directed the _nutritive_ power.

We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The
nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist,
since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the
augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same
soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same
body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the
generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive
soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although
in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is
highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in
the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii).
Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater
finality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima
ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to "produce
another like unto itself." And the generative power is served by the
augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the
nutritive.

Reply Obj. 1: Such forces are called natural, both because they
produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence,
quantity and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these
things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform their
actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities,
which are the principles of natural actions.

Reply Obj. 2: Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an
extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a
higher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is
the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore
there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen;
and this is the generative power.

Reply Obj. 3: Since the generation of living things is from a semen,
it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be
generated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby
it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is
generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore
it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to the
condition of the matter.

Reply Obj. 4: As we have said above (A. 1), the operation of the
vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of
which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the
humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food
is changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for
the action of the augmentative and generative powers.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 3]

Whether the Five Exterior Senses Are Properly Distinguished?

Objection 1: It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior
senses. For sense can know accidents. But there are many kinds of
accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects,
it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of
the kinds of accidents.

Obj. 2: Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are
called "common sensibles," are "not sensibles by accident," but are
contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6).
Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since,
therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is,
it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power
than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or
sound.

Obj. 3: Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards
white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries;
such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a
single sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses.

Obj. 4: Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But
taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a
distinct sense of touch.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): "There is
no other besides the five senses."

_I answer that,_ The reason of the distinction and number of the
senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other
of the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others
it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or
extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have
ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities,
according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from
complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are
not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there
are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs;
on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs,
that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature
provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the
convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the
natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to
the intellect.

The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must
therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and
_per se._ Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by
the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation
is what is _per se_ perceived by the sense, and according to the
diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified.

Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual.
Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being
received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted,
as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual
immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received,
according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as
the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby
become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual
immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is
effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation
alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel
when they undergo alteration.

But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in _sight:_
while in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural
immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the
part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural
immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of _hearing;_
for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find
natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of
_smelling;_ for in order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a
measure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation
takes place in _touch_ and _taste;_ for the hand that touches
something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the
humidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and
hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any
natural immutation unless indirectly.

Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its
organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and
the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and
then the smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the
object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior
to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,
7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction
of which we shall speak later on (ad 3, 4). Hence it is that the three
other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them, to
obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards
these two senses.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation
but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of
alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the
senses; because "the senses are affected by the same things whereby
inanimate bodies are affected," as stated in Phys. vii, 2.

Reply Obj. 2: Size, shape, and the like, which are called "common
sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and "proper
sensibles," which are the objects of the senses. For the proper
sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since
they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles
are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear
that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity,
since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude.
Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in
one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local
distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again,
according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the
movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a
way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate
subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of
color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first
and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as
the surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental
sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of
the senses. For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a
small surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small,
and therefore it is divided according to its proper subject.

Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11),
the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several
specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various
contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one
another in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so
that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the
sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the
whole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also
say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus,
and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of
touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate
genus of hot and cold is unnamed.

Reply Obj. 4: The sense of taste, according to a saying of the
Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the
tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from
the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one
sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must
say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different
formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only a
spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is
its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted
by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper
object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: but by
reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based,
the flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 4]

Whether the Interior Senses Are Suitably Distinguished?

Objection 1: It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably
distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper.
Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior
sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of
apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the
proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things;
for each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem
to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the
action of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it
seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as
being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other
senses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior
power, called the common sense.

Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin.
i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first
sensitive." But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore
memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from
the senses.

Obj. 4: Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any
power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what
it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that
"those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge." Therefore much
less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call
the "estimative" power, for the perception of intentions which the
sense does not perceive.

Obj. 5: Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists
in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the
reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for
the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the
estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative
is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add
the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative
powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made
distinct from the imagination.

Obj. 6: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7, 24) describes
three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the
sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy;
and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there
is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the
imagination.

_On the contrary,_ Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior
sensitive powers; namely, "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and
the estimative and memorative powers."

_I answer that,_ As nature does not fail in necessary things, there
must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice
for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be
reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse
powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate
principle of the soul's operation.

Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal
should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but
also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action
follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something
absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect
animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards
something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the
sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things,
when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and
preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things,
reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive,
but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things.
Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ,
it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible
things must be distinct from the power which preserves them.

Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and
disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no
need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of
those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes
pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs
to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing
or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages
and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a
wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy:
and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are
pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its
nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the
exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is
necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an
immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the
perception of those intentions.

Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper
sense" and the _common sense_ are appointed, and of their distinction
we shall speak farther on (ad 1, 2). But for the retention and
preservation of these forms, the "phantasy" or "imagination" is
appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it
were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore,
for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the
senses, the "estimative" power is appointed: and for the preservation
thereof, the "memorative" power, which is a storehouse of such-like
intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of
memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that
something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past,
which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.

Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference
between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the
extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above
intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some
natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of
ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the
natural estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some
sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also
called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain
particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares
individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares
universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only
memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past;
but also "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a
recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions.
Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative,
a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when
from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we
compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen.
But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in
whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes
attribute this action in his book _De sensu et sensibilibus_ (viii).
So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the
sensitive part--namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the
estimative and memorative powers.

Reply Obj. 1: The interior sense is called "common" not by
predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and
principle of the exterior senses.

Reply Obj. 2: The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by
discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for
instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight
nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between
two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be
assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all
apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again,
all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees
that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only
knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which
immutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation
follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.

Reply Obj. 3: As one power arises from the soul by means of another,
as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 7), so also the soul is the subject
of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the
memory are called passions of the "first sensitive."

Reply Obj. 4: Although the operation of the intellect has its origin
in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the
intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like
manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.

Reply Obj. 5: The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their
excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to
a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so
to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct
powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.

Reply Obj. 6: Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected
by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear
that it is common to all interior apprehensions.
_______________________

QUESTION 79

OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS
(In Thirteen Articles)

The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head
there are thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?

(2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?

(3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?

(4) Whether it is something in the soul?

(5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?

(6) Whether memory is in the intellect?

(7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?

(8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?

(9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?

(10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?

(11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct
powers?

(12) Whether "synderesis" is a power of the intellectual part?

(13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 1]

Whether the Intellect Is a Power of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the
soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the
same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the
essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not
relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect
is the essence of the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united
in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the
appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's
powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united
in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence
and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of
the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension
(xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels are
called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of
man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.

Obj. 4: Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is
immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore
it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty
as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).

_I answer that,_ In accordance with what has been already shown (Q.
54, A. 3; Q. 77, A. 1) it is necessary to say that the intellect is
a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then
alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle
of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is to
operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone
His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone
is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures,
the intellect is a power.

Reply Obj. 1: Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes
for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from
its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual
soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus
we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in
this sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence
(De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).

Reply Obj. 2: The appetitive and intellectual powers are different
genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities
of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the
intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of
operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for
appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the
will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii,
9).

Reply Obj. 3: In the angels there is no other power besides the
intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this
reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his
whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers,
such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the
comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 4: The immateriality of the created intelligent substance
is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power
of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the
substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 2]

Whether the Intellect Is a Passive Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power.
For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the
intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent
substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive
power.

Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have
said above (Q. 79, A. 6). But "if the intellect is passive, it is
corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is
not passive.

Obj. 3: Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine
(Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all
the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest
among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the
intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to
understand is in a way to be passive."

_I answer that,_ To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly,
in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which
belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper
inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a
man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to
be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken
away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be
passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also
he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly,
in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact
that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it
was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And
accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to
be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand
is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the
intellect, as we have seen above (Q. 78, A. 1), has an operation
extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the
intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the
nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we
find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the
act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the
Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being
pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect
is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can
be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it
would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect
is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very
existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a
potentiality to act.

Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a
potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of
the heavenly bodies (Q. 58, A. 1). And there is another potentiality
which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as
we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the
angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it
can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect,
which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect,
which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote
from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with
regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet
on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in
potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand
actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a
way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And
consequently the intellect is a passive power.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection is verified of passion in the first and
second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense
passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.

Reply Obj. 2: "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the
sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which
appetite is also called "rational by participation," because it
"obeys the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive
intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular
reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the two first
senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a
corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things
intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the
"possible" intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the
third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is
incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 3: The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and
the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they
refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in
regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is
active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united
to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being
nobler than such an active one.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 3]

Whether There Is an Active Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as
the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things
intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible,
the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since
our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that
we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is
passive.

Obj. 2: Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something
active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight,
inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of
its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the
intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into
act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the
patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive
intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature
suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form
is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial.
Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the
species actually intelligible.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in
every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes
all things, and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we
must admit an active intellect.

_I answer that,_ According to the opinion of Plato, there is no
need for an active intellect in order to make things actually
intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to
the intellect, as will be explained farther on (A. 4). For Plato
supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from
matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is
actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And
he called such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of
which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that
individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and
species: and that our intellect was formed by such participation in
order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But
since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist
apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually
intelligible; it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible
things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing
is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as
the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must
therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make
things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from
material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active
intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and
hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear
that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the
sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there
is something active and something passive.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For
some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors
actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is
required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as
light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is
required for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible;
but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the
Commentator says on _De Anima_ ii. And according to this, Aristotle's
comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that
as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing;
but not for the same reason.

Reply Obj. 3: If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its
likeness is received variously into various things, on account of
their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the
disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now
the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we
consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart
from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the
immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for
the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually
intelligible by way of abstraction.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 4]

Whether the Active Intellect Is Something in the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active intellect is not something
in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light
for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher
than the soul: according to John 1:9, "He was the true light that
enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Therefore the active
intellect is not something in the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active
intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not
understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it
understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active
intellect is not something in our soul.

Obj. 3: Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore,
the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something
belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an
active power: it follows that a man would always be able to
understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the
active intellect is not something in our soul.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the
active intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can
be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If,
therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all
things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible
for the active intellect to be also something in our soul.

Obj. 5: Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul,
it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since
habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the
passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the
passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But
every power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore
follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul.
And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from
some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the active
intellect is not something in our soul.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it
is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active
intellect, "to be in the soul."

_I answer that,_ The active intellect, of which the Philosopher
speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we
must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs
suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power
of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is
mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of
something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul
is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual
power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only
in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by
arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it
has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand
everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it
passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some
higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.

Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is
the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were,
makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the
existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be
necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in
that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things
actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things,
besides the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its
proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone
does not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and
in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower
things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must
say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect,
whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by
experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from
their particular conditions, which is to make them actually
intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some
principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the
passive intellect (Q. 76, A. 1). Therefore the power which is the
principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this
reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to
light, which is something received into the air: while Plato compared
the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius
says in his commentary on _De Anima_ iii. But the separate intellect,
according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the
soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (Q. 90,
A. 3; I-II, Q. 3, A. 7). Wherefore the human soul derives its
intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7, "The light of Thy
countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."

Reply Obj. 1: That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from
which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says those words not of the active
intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said:
"Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those
words to the active intellect, then they are said because it is not
owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we
do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 3: If the relation of the active intellect to the passive
were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the
visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand
all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes
all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object,
rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for
which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the
presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers,
and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing
understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are
made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this
point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is
something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul.

Reply Obj. 4: The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial,
but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary,
phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in
potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul,
inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it
makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions
of individual matter: which power is called the "active intellect";
and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the
"passive intellect" by reason of its being in potentiality to such
species.

Reply Obj. 5: Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by
the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives
from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter,
flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other
powers.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 5]

Whether the Active Intellect Is One in All?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is one active intellect in all.
For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the
number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in
the many human bodies, but is one for all men.

Obj. 2: Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal,
which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is still
more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all.

Obj. 3: Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts.
But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all
agree in one active intellect.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the
active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the
various things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is
not in various men.

_I answer that,_ The truth about this question depends on what we
have already said (A. 4). For if the active intellect were not
something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance,
there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what
they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if
the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of
its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active
intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the
number of men, as we have said above (Q. 76, A. 2). For it is
impossible that one same power belong to various substances.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is
separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate:
because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than
the patient." Now the passive intellect is said to be separate,
because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same
sense the active intellect is also called "separate"; but not as a
separate substance.

Reply Obj. 2: The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by
abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the
same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its
relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the
universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And
this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.

Reply Obj. 3: All things which are of one species enjoy in common the
action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently
the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that
power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible
principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore
all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this
action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need
for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one
principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first
principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato
compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which
Aristotle compares to light.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 6]

Whether Memory Is in the Intellectual Part of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual
part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to
the higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not
"common to man and beast." But memory is common to man and beast,
for he says (De Trin. xii, 2, 3, 8) that "beasts can sense corporeal
things through the senses of the body, and commit them to memory."
Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the
soul.

Obj. 2: Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of
something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a
thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge
under the conditions of "here" and "now." But this is not the
province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is
not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive.

Obj. 3: Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those
things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen
in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact
that the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect
in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect
actually understands all things of which it has the species.
Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory,
understanding, and will are one mind."

_I answer that,_ Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve
the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we
must first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus
be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was
impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive
part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal
organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual
apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ,
nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of
which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually
understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to
understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be
in our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we
must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate
substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow
again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of
turning to the active intellect there is formed, according to him, a
certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active
intellect; which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According,
therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the
intellectual part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would
not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part.

But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle.
For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect "is
identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act,"
and that "this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then,
it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and
discovering." Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing,
inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To
the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible
things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so
that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in
a certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of
understanding--namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual
knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration.

The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received
into something is received according to the conditions of the
recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more
immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter
holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does
something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them,
much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the
species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from
things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus,
therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species,
we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion
of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is
not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which
apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies
being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.

Reply Obj. 1: Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not
common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the
sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul
united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the
intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association
of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
4) that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but
the intellect."

Reply Obj. 2: The condition of past may be referred to two
things--namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of
knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which
apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present
sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have
sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible
thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental,
and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the
intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is
accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the
part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be
understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because
our soul's act of understanding is an individual act, existing in
this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or
yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not incompatible with the
intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though
something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above
of the intellect (Q. 76, A. 1); and therefore, as the intellect
understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so
also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual
act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion
of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the
intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood:
but not in the sense that it understands the past as something "here"
and "now."

Reply Obj. 3: The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect
only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in
potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect
as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it
understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a
middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual
knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when
it does not understand in act.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 7]

Whether the Intellectual Memory Is a Power Distinct from the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct
from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul
memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a
distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the
intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the
sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in
the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (Q. 78, A.
4). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the
intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7),
memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one
flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect
were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power.

_On the contrary,_ From its nature the memory is the treasury or
storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes
this to the intellect, as we have said (A. 6, ad 1). Therefore the
memory is not another power from the intellect.

_I answer that,_ As has been said above (Q. 77, A. 3), the powers of
the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their
objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to
which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said
above (Q. 59, A. 4) that if any power by its nature be directed to an
object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will
not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that
object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under
the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of
black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the
common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that "in which
all are in potentiality." Wherefore the passive intellect is not
differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a
distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the
passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active
power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the
passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the
active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a
being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is
compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act.
Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the
intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that
memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to
the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.

Reply Obj. 1: Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory,
intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with
the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if
we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul,
whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the
memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand
when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection
which unites the child and its parent." Wherefore it is clear that
Augustine does not take the above three for three powers; but by
memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence,
the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.

Reply Obj. 2: Past and present may differentiate the sensitive
powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above.

Reply Obj. 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from
habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to
a power.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 8]

Whether the Reason Is Distinct from the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from
the intellect. For it is stated in _De Spiritu et Anima_ that "when we
wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our
aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect." Therefore the
reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is
compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to
the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason
and intellect are not the same power.

Obj. 3: Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and
sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man,
whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense.
Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the
intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called
intellectual.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that
in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or
intelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to give it."
Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power.

_I answer that,_ Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct
powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their
respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend
intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing
understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And
therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect
knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one
thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental
discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at
the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to
another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore,
is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition
to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the
imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something
immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human
reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain
things simply understood--namely, the first principles; and, again,
by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the
light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that
rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to
one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a
thing is moved towards a certain place, and rests in that place. Much
more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and
so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.

Reply Obj. 1: That enumeration is made according to the order of
actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that
book is not of great authority.

Reply Obj. 2: The answer is clear from what we have said. For
eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus
Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.

Reply Obj. 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that they
cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But
man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible
truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of
knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the
human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 9]

Whether the Higher and Lower Reason Are Distinct Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are
distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the
image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in
the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the
higher and lower reason are two powers.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason
flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the
higher reason is another power from the lower.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the
scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary
things, is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative"
and "reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And he
proves this from the principle that for those things which are
"generically different, generically different parts of the soul are
ordained." Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as
corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same
as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what
the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the
higher reason, which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) "is
intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal"; and
that what the Philosopher calls the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part
is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, "is
intent on the disposal of temporal things." Therefore the higher
reason is another power than the lower.

Obj. 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion
rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or
error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence _mens_ (mind) is
derived from _metiendo_ (measuring). And therefore the intellect
regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true
decision." Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower
reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may
understand the higher reason.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher
and lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore
they are not two powers.

_I answer that,_ The higher and lower reason, as they are understood
by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says
that "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation
and consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation it
sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of
action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent
on the disposal of temporal things." Now these two--namely, eternal
and temporal--are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of
them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we
come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal,
according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), "The invisible
things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that
are made": while by way of judgment, from eternal things already
known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things
eternal we dispose of temporal things.

But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong
to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to
the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw
from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from
the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another
science--for example, perspective. But the power of the reason is
such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the
reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the
same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end.
Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power.
But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of
their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is
attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower.

Reply Obj. 1: We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided.
And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the
higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are
different powers.

Reply Obj. 2: The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or
to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower
reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher
reason.

Reply Obj. 3: The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher speaks,
is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found
even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics
treat. And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part is more
limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent.
Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by
which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power
by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the
same objective aspect--namely, under the aspect of being and truth.
Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect
being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which
it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows
contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but
imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do
not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of
acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits
themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts
of the soul--namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," not
because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according
to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the
variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though
differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the
common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which
they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.

Reply Obj. 4: That distinction given by Damascene is according to
the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For
"opinion" signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side
of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" or
"measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain
principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word
"mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed
judgment with approval.
_______________________

TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 10]

Whether Intelligence Is a Power Distinct from Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than
the intellect. For we read in _De Spiritu et Anima_ that "when we wish
to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid,
then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards
intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers.
Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct.

Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense
considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another,
intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason.
Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from
intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.

Obj. 3: Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from
others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii) that "the first movement is called intelligence; but that
intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that
which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is
called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man,
examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis (that is,
wisdom), and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly
internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the
tongue." Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that
"intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing
false." But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect.
Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect.

_I answer that,_ This word "intelligence" properly signifies the
intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works
translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call
angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that
such substances are always actually understanding. But in works
translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds."
Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from
power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized
even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four
intellects--namely, the "active" and "passive" intellects, the
intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the
active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all
things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of
these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which
is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive;
sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is
called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act,
which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or
actual intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means
the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as
act against power.

Reply Obj. 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the
intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also
says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence
alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things
without any investigation.

Reply Obj. 3: All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one
power--namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all
only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence."
Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something
else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when
it goes on in search of what it "intends," it is called "invention."
When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what
it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to
"phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to the wise man to judge,"
as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained
something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the
means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of
"interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech." For every
difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what
cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above
(Q. 78, A. 4).
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 11]

Whether the Speculative and Practical Intellects Are Distinct Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical
intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are
different kinds of powers, as is clear from _De Anima_ ii, 3. But
the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the
practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct
powers.

Obj. 2: Further, the different nature of the object differentiates
the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is _truth,_
and of the practical is _good;_ which differ in nature. Therefore the
speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.

Obj. 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is
compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative
power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the
imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above (Q. 78, A.
4). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the
practical.

_On the contrary,_ The speculative intellect by extension becomes
practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into
another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not
distinct powers.

_I answer that,_ The speculative and practical intellects are not
distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above
(Q. 77, A. 3), what is accidental to the nature of the object of
a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a
thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such
things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing
apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed
to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and
practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which
directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration
of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it
apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De
Anima iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in
its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the
other practical--i.e. operative.

Reply Obj. 1: The practical intellect is a motive power, not as
executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to
it according to its mode of apprehension.

Reply Obj. 2: Truth and good include one another; for truth is
something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is
something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as
the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the
aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth;
so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the
operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect
knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth
to operation.

Reply Obj. 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers,
which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said
above (A. 7, ad 2; Q. 77, A. 3, ad 4).
_______________________

TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 12]

Whether Synderesis Is a Special Power of the Soul Distinct from the
Others?

Objection 1: It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power,
distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one
division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome
on Ezech. 1:6, "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the
concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore
"synderesis" is a power.

Obj. 2: Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But
"synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because
"synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites
to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from
Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that
"synderesis" is a power just as sensuality is.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the
natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of
virtue, both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call
synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our
judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is the same as reason:
and thus it is a power.

_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2),
"rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not
regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis"
is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power,
since it is not found in brute animals.

_I answer that,_ "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though
some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf.
Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q. 73] said that it is reason
itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear
we must observe that, as we have said above (A. 8), man's act of
reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the
understanding of certain things--namely, those which are naturally
known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an
immovable principle--and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as
by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things
which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the
speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical
reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed
on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical
principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by
nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which
is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher
explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles,
bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a
special natural habit, which we call "synderesis." Whence "synderesis"
is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through
first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have
discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power,
but a natural habit.

Reply Obj. 1: The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety
of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can
belong to one power.

Reply Obj. 2: In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to
"syneresis" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different
species of one genus.

Reply Obj. 3: Those unchangeable notions are the first practical
principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to
reason as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit. Wherefore
we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis."
_______________________

THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 13]

Whether Conscience Be a Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen
says [*Commentary on Rom. 2:15] that "conscience is a correcting and
guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from
evil and made to cling to good." But in the soul, spirit designates a
power--either the mind itself, according to the text (Eph. 4:13), "Be
ye renewed in the spirit of your mind"--or the imagination, whence
imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the
soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some that
"their mind and conscience are defiled" (Titus 1:15). Therefore it
seems that conscience is a power.

Obj. 3: Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a
habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always
exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but
many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of
knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power.

_On the contrary,_ Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot
be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.

_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an
act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things
which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For
conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the
relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved
into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to an individual
case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some
act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that
conscience is an act.

The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to
conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite,
and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the
application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application
is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have
done or not done something; "Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast
often spoken evil of others" (Eccles. 7:23), and according to this,
conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the
conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in
this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way,
so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or
ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or
torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual
application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking,
conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act,
sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural
habit--namely, "synderesis": thus Jerome calls "synderesis"
conscience (Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the
"natural power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22]
says that it is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for
causes and effects to be called after one another.

Reply Obj. 1: Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the
same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the
mind.

Reply Obj. 2: The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject,
but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he is
defiled.

Reply Obj. 3: Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet
it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the
habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless
have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first
principles, which is called "synderesis." And for this special
reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said
above.
_______________________

QUESTION 80

OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL
(In Two Articles)

Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are
four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general;
second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the
first there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the
soul?

(2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and
sensitive as distinct powers?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 1]

Whether the Appetite Is a Special Power of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power
of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those
things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But
appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since "all desire
good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite
is not a special power of the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what
we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power
is not distinct from the apprehensive power.

Obj. 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each
power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing--namely its
own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is
the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power
distinct from the others, called the appetitive power.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the
appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii,
22) distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.

_I answer that,_ It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the
soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination
follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to
rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more
perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in
those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the
form is found to determine each thing only to its own being--that is,
to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural
inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things
which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being
by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless
receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives
the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things
intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by
sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in
a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist,"
as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a
higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be
in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is
called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to
the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to
desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined
by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive
power to the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above
the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said
above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular
power.

Reply Obj. 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in
reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as
something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable
or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not
material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.

Reply Obj. 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a
natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the
natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which
natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the
apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to
this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing;
but simply as suitable to the animal.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 2]

Whether the Sensitive and Intellectual Appetites Are Distinct Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual
appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated
by accidental differences, as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 3). But
it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by
the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and
intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.

Obj. 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it
is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things.
But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part:
for since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual
things, seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual
thing. Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from
the sensitive.

Obj. 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is
subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the
motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from
the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a
like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a
double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite
moves the lower.

_I answer that,_ We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a
distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power
is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended:
wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved,
while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in _De
Anima_ iii, 10 and _Metaph._ xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things passive and
movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the
corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be
proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive: indeed,
the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its
active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the
intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different;
consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the
sensitive.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not accidental to the thing desired to be
apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this
belongs to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the
appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the
thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And
so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of
the things apprehended, as their proper objects.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual appetite, though it tends to
individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as
standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it
is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred
can regard a universal, as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the
same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial
good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue,
and suchlike.
_______________________

QUESTION 81

OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY
(In Three Articles)

Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which
there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?

(2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct
powers?

(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 1]

Whether Sensuality Is Only Appetitive?

Objection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive,
but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the
sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses
is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong to the
apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

Obj. 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be
of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality
against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge.
Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive.

Obj. 3: Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place
of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, the
serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing
sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a
cognitive power.

_On the contrary,_ Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things
belonging to the body."

_I answer that,_ The name sensuality seems to be taken from the
sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13),
just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance,
sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following
sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not
so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the
operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact
that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the
operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he
who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the
operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the
operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement.
Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the
appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive
appetite.

Reply Obj. 1: By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is
directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to
understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but
rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to
the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended
through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to
sensuality as a preamble.

Reply Obj. 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and lower
reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the
apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason,
is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.

Reply Obj. 3: The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but
also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is
signified by the serpent.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 2]

Whether the Sensitive Appetite Is Divided into the Irascible and
Concupiscible As Distinct Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided
into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same
power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight
regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima
ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the
concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is
concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and
concupiscible are the same power in the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable
according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible
power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the
concupiscible.

Obj. 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on
Matt. 13:33: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible
power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible
part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive
appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.

_I answer that,_ The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and
is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are
species of the sensitive appetite--the irascible and the
concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in
natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to
the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is
harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary
agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is
suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural
inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is
unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but
also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore,
since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive
apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the
natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive
powers--one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is
suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful,
and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal
resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm,
and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is
something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above
obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for
sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the
inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following
the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles.
Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the
passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on
being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes
concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that
the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the
concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of
the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what
inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason
all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of
the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger
rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy.
For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things
concupiscible--namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [*De
Animal. Histor. viii.].

Reply Obj. 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable
and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to
resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.

Reply Obj. 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part
there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do
not impress the senses, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 2); so also
in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which
regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but
because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the
irascible power.

Reply Obj. 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite:
but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong
to the irascible appetite.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 3]

Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible
appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are
parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore
it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii,
12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not
obey reason.

Obj. 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But
the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according to
the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting
against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and
concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.

Obj. 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational
part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive
part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see
just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers
of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupiscible, obey
reason.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided
into concupiscence and anger."

_I answer that,_ In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers
obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the
will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the
reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive
appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance,
a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the
estimative power, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 4), is replaced
by the cogitative power, which is called by some "the particular
reason," because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man
the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason.
But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved
according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters
particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions.
Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive
appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this
appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from
universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but
of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are
said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone
can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal
considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.

To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution,
which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals
movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites:
for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it
has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not
moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible
appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the
superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of
motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first:
wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement,
unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher
says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower
appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way,
therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is
proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and
concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the
part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in
an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates
the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the
appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called
despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to
resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since
they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and
royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject
to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their
own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who
commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic
power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the
sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and
whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved
at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible
and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite
has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the
commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved,
not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the
cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the
imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the
irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we
sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or
unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the
irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not
conclude that they do not obey.

Reply Obj. 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior
sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which
is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and
apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are
subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify
the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the
phantasms of the imagination.
_______________________

QUESTION 82

OF THE WILL
(In Five Articles)

We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?

(2) Whether it desires everything of necessity?

(3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?

(4) Whether the will moves the intellect?

(5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Desires Something of Necessity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing of
necessity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything
is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is
voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of
necessity.

Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a
rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is
in the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and
therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.

Obj. 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But
we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act
of the will cannot be necessitated.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire
happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but
contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the
will desires something of necessity.

_I answer that,_ The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For
that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong
to it by an intrinsic principle--either material, as when we say that
everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible--or
formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a
triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is "natural" and
"absolute necessity." In another way, that a thing must be, belongs
to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or
the agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not
to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be
necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is
called "necessity of end," and sometimes also "utility." On the part
of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent,
so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called "necessity
of coercion."

Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will.
For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing.
But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something.
Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the
inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is
according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is
impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so
it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and
voluntary.

But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot
be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea,
arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.

In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will.
Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to
the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last
end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what
the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing
naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else
appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in
everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of the
necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away
the liberty of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10).

Reply Obj. 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally,
corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles
than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in
this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.

Reply Obj. 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of our
being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end,
but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9).
Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those
actions of which we are masters.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 2]

Whether the Will Desires of Necessity, Whatever It Desires?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of
necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will
tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as
the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable
necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's
object moves it of necessity.

Obj. 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of
the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is
the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will.
But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of
necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals
are moved by things seen." Therefore it seems that whatever is
apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the
will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to
opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all
things whatsoever it desires.

_I answer that,_ The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it
desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the
intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles,
so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already (A. 1).
Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary
connection with the first principles; such as contingent
propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the
first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of
necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary
connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable
conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first
principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when
once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions
with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until
through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such
connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain
individual goods which have not a necessary connection with
happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the
will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which
have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things
man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists.
Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the
necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to
God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will
of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God,
just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear
that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.

Reply Obj. 1: The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of
good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is
not of necessity determined to one.

Reply Obj. 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the
thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable,
so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the
capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its
capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is
not of necessity moved by it.

Reply Obj. 3: The sensitive power does not compare different things
with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one
thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive
appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that
compares several things together: therefore from several things the
intellectual appetite--that is, the will--may be moved; but not of
necessity from one thing.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 3]

Whether the Will Is a Higher Power Than the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the
intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the
end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first
and highest power.

Obj. 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress
from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers
of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble.
Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the
intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than
the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as
perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects
the will--namely, charity--is more noble than the habits which
perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should
know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not
charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will is a higher power than
the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the
higher power than the intellect.

_I answer that,_ The superiority of one thing over another can be
considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is
considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself:
but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If
therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to
themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear
if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object
of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of
the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of
appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the
intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the
more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and
therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of
the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its
order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and
absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by
comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes
higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will
occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of
the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is
relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is
sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though color
is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above (Q. 16,
A. 1; Q. 27, A. 4), the action of the intellect consists in
this--that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who
understands; while the act of the will consists in this--that the
will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And
therefore the Philosopher says in _Metaph._ vi (Did. v, 2) that "good
and evil," which are objects of the will, "are in things," but "truth
and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind."
When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the
soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such
a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing
which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison
with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the
love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the
contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love
thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.

Reply Obj. 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one
thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found
to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and
extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something
true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect
is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most
excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.

Reply Obj. 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is less
perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act,
and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely
and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes
potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the
motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes
the passive; for good which is understood moves the will.

Reply Obj. 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared with
what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love
God.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 4]

Whether the Will Moves the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect.
For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves
is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5).
But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above
(A. 3). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except
perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the
good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas
the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved
by the will.

Obj. 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If,
therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to
understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of
the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the
will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will
does not move the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in
our power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our
power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the
will moves the intellect.

_I answer that,_ A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an
end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this
way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the
object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said
to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what
impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the
intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De
Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among
a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end
moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe
this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims
at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and
corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the
preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also,
who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves
all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own
particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in
general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to
it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the
intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent
moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the
natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our
will.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as
apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a
particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the
will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of
its object--that is to say, as appetitive of universal good--and as
a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If,
therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another
according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as
we have said above (A. 3), the intellect is simply higher and nobler
than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the
common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then
again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under
the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and
its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will,
and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of
things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of
being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common
nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and
a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its
object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are
contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is
higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily
understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because
the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the
intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth,
inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as
it is a desired good.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will
moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.

Reply Obj. 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must
stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement
of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every
apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle
of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher
than our intellect--namely, God--as also Aristotle says (Eth.
Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need
to proceed indefinitely.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 5]

Whether We Should Distinguish Irascible and Concupiscible Parts in
the Superior Appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and
concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For
the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" (to desire),
and the irascible part from "irasci" (to be angry). But there is a
concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only
to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of
wisdom, of which it is said (Wis. 6:21): "The concupiscence of wisdom
bringeth to the eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which
cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual;
as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome
commenting on Matt. 13:33 warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the
irascible part." Therefore we should distinguish irascible and
concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the
sensitive.

Obj. 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the
concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in
the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but
intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible
power to the intellectual part.

Obj. 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul
has these powers"--namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and
rational--"before it is united to the body." But no power of the
sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body
united, as we have said above (Q. 78, AA. 5, 8). Therefore the
irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the
intellectual appetite.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says that
the irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and
irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while
in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or
"desire and animus."

_I answer that,_ The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the
intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said
above (Q. 59, A. 4; Q. 79, A. 7), a power which is directed to an
object according to some common notion is not differentiated by
special differences which are contained under that common notion. For
instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common
notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied
according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power
regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be
distinct from a power regarding black as black.

Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of
good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And
therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by
the different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible
regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to
the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the
notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is
hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of
good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite,
there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in
the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a
concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are
the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of
the senses.

Reply Obj. 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in
two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions--arising, that is,
with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly
understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive
appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they
are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and
thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are
attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they
do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is
called the will.

Reply Obj. 2: The will itself may be said to [be] irascible, as far
as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion,
but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may
be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And
thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope--that
is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may
understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible
and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the
body (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time),
although there is no need to have faith in what that book says.
Whence the answer to the third objection is clear.
_______________________

QUESTION 83

OF FREE-WILL
(In Four Articles)

We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four
points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man has free-will?

(2) What is free-will--a power, an act, or a habit?

(3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?

(4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or
distinct?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 1]

Whether Man Has Free-Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever
has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for
it is written (Rom. 7:19): "For the good which I will I do not, but
the evil which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not
free-will.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or
not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for
it is written (Rom. 9:16): "It is not of him that willeth"--namely,
to will--"nor of him that runneth"--namely, to run. Therefore man has
not free-will.

Obj. 3: Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another
is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. 21:1):
"The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He
will He shall turn it" and (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in
you both to will and to accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will.

Obj. 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions.
But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (Jer.
10:23): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to
walk." Therefore man has not free-will.

Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as
each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in our
power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from
nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end,
and therefore we are not free in so doing.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from
the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the
gloss adds: "That is of his free-will."

_I answer that,_ Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations,
commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In
order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act
without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all
things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a
free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf,
judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free
judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural
instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute
animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power
he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this
judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural
instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he
acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to
various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite
courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments.
Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such
matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not
determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary
that man have a free-will.

Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 81, A. 3, ad 2), the
sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case
can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore
the good which man does not when he wishes--namely, "not to desire
against reason," as Augustine says.

Reply Obj. 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as
though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but
because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved
and helped by God.

Reply Obj. 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by
his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity
belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of
itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be
the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes
both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He
does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary
causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but
rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates
in each thing according to its own nature.

Reply Obj. 4: "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of
his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The
choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.

Reply Obj. 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and
adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual
part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore,
that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the
intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is
happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not
subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (Q.
82, AA. 1, 2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be
such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a
temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by
corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it
is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue
of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because
from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject
something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of
reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (Q. 81, A.
3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.

The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which
a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even
these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such
qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to
acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them,
or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant
to free-will.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 2]

Whether Free-Will Is a Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For
free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an
act, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power.

Obj. 2: Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and
reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to
a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De
Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the soul's habit of
disposing of itself." Therefore it is not a power.

Obj. 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But
free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, by
abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is
not a power.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of
a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which
it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.

_I answer that,_ Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium--i.e. free
judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of
speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by
which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both
power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge
and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a
power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit
nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.
First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit;
for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not
natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under
free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we
have natural habits--for instance, to assent to first principles:
while those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject
to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q. 82, AA.
1, 2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it
should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit
is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason
of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and
passions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as
regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by
knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we
know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will
is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible
for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act.
And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power
which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will
denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.

Reply Obj. 2: Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for
operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of
free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but
as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of
relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit:
for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by
the habit he is apt to act well or ill.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin,
not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as
regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat
later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work
(I-II, Q. 85, seqq.; Q. 109).
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 3]

Whether Free-will Is an Appetitive Power?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but
a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that
"free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature." But reason
is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

Obj. 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free
judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore
free-will is a cognitive power.

Obj. 3: Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose.
But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain
comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive
power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice
is "the desire of those things which are in us." But desire is an act
of the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is
that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.

_I answer that,_ The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say
that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing
another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature
of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things
concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other
on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive
power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be
preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is
required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel.
Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice
belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since
he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an
intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being
an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire
proceeding from counsel." And the reason of this is because the
proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such,
is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since
good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice
is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is
an appetitive power.

Reply Obj. 1: The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and
in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies
the rational power.

Reply Obj. 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel.
Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason;
secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher
(Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, we
desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice
itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name.

Reply Obj. 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs
to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the
appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by
the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of
comparison by choosing one in preference to another.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 4]

Whether Free-will Is a Power Distinct from the Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the
will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that _thelesis_ is one
thing and _boulesis_ another. But _thelesis_ is the will, while
_boulesis_ seems to be the free-will, because _boulesis,_ according to
him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two
things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the
will.

Obj. 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is
the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because
"the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the
means to the end" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct
power from the will.

Obj. 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the
intellect there are two powers--the active and the passive.
Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must
be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be
free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will
is nothing else than the will.

_I answer that,_ The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the
apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q. 64, A. 2). Now, as on
the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and
reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and
free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is
clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For
the act of _understanding_ implies the simple acceptation of
something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which
are known of themselves without any comparison. But to _reason,_
properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of
another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions,
which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of
the appetite to "will" implies the simple appetite for something:
wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for
itself. But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of
obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards
the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles
are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the
principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to
the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is
evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the
power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q.
79, A. 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to
reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be
in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and
to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two
powers, but one.

Reply Obj. 1: _Boulesis_ is distinct from _thelesis_ on account of a
distinction, not of powers, but of acts.

Reply Obj. 2: Choice and will--that is, the act of willing--are
different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to
understand and to reason, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the
will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an
active and a passive will.
_______________________

QUESTION 84

HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS
BENEATH IT
(In Eight Articles)

We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the
intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the
soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian.
Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under
the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat
of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration
of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part
we shall treat now.

In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order:
First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the
body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.

The former of these inquiries will be threefold:

(1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it;

(2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself;

(3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.

In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three
points to be considered:

(1) Through what does the soul know them?

(2) How and in what order does it know them?

(3) What does it know in them?

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?

(2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any
species?

(3) If through some species, whether the species of all things
intelligible are naturally innate in the soul?

(4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain
separate immaterial forms?

(5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it
understands?

(6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?

(7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is
possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms?

(8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle
in the sensitive powers?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 1]

Whether the Soul Knows Bodies Through the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through
the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that "bodies cannot
be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless
it can be perceived by the senses." He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii,
24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul
by their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot
know bodies through the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect
to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the senses,
understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no
means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are
necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable.
Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the
intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of
bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile
bodies.

_I answer that,_ It should be said in order to elucidate this
question, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures
of things, thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And
because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them
to be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have
no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is in a
continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of
certitude, for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment
thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, that "it is not
possible twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent," as
the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, Did. iii, 5).

After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our
knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, besides
these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate
from matter and movement, which beings he called species or
"ideas," by participation of which each one of these singular and
sensible things is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like.
Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever
appertains to the act of the intellect, are not referred to these
sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate: so
that according to this the soul does not understand these corporeal
things, but the separate species thereof.

Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because,
since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge of
movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge
is proper to natural science), and likewise all demonstration through
moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous,
when we seek for knowledge of things which are to us manifest, to
introduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those
others, since they differ from them essentially: so that granted that
we have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that
reason claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things.

Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having
observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of
similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of
necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known.
Then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the
intellect under conditions of universality, immateriality, and
immobility: which is apparent from the very operation of the
intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal extension, and
is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action
corresponds to the mode of the agent's form. Wherefore he concluded
that the things which we understand must have in themselves an
existence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility.

But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is
to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in
another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one,
and of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with
sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible
form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the
soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things
without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving
gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives
under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of
material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver
according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore,
that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which
is immaterial, universal, and necessary.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of Augustine are to be understood as
referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its
object. For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not
indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species;
but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the
soul by their own essence.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is not
correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect
knows only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels
would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that
the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the
higher power; whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent
manner those things which belong to the lower power.

Reply Obj. 3: Every movement presupposes something immovable: for
when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and
when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved.
Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves
immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet
it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one
place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an
immovable science of movable things.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 2]

Whether the Soul Understands Corporeal Things Through Its Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things
through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the soul
"collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in
the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it gives them something
of its own substance." But the soul understands bodies by images of
bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence, which it
employs for the formation of such images, and from which it forms
them.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that "the
soul, after a fashion, is everything." Since, therefore, like is known
by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself.

Obj. 3: Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now
lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in
themselves, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all
corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in
themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through
its essence.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that "the mind
gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses." But
the soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore
it does not know corporeal things through itself.

_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows
bodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that
"like is known by like." But they thought that the form of the thing
known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. The
Platonists however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having
observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an
immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known
subsist immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers,
observing that things known are corporeal and material, held that
things known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them.
And therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of all
things, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And
because the nature of a result is determined by its principles, they
ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who
thought fire to be the principle of all, held that the soul had the
nature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly,
Empedocles, who held the existence of our four material elements and
two principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these.
Consequently, since they held that things exist in the soul
materially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is
material, thus failing to discern intellect from sense.

But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material
principle of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save
in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in
potentiality, but only according as it is in act, as is shown
_Metaph._ ix (Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known
except through its act. It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to
the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact
that it knows all, unless we further admit in the soul natures and
forms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and
the like; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i,
5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the thing known to
exist materially in the knower, there would be no reason why things
which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of
knowledge; why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that
fire also which is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire.

We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs
exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of
this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the
knower: for we know things even that are external to us. Now by
matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore
it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality. And
consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially,
have no power of knowledge whatever--such as plants, as the
Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing
receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its
knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not
only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of
matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the
form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to
material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most
perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have
remarked above (Q. 78, A. 3): while among intellects the more perfect
is the more immaterial.

It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an
intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence
must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early
philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all
things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material
things. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all
things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause.
God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence:
but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary
vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the
formation of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just
as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this
way the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some
part of the soul be turned into this or that image; but just as we
say that a body is made into something colored because of its being
informed with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what
follows. For he says that the soul "keeps something"--namely, not
informed with such image--"which is able freely to judge of the
species of these images": and that this is the "mind" or "intellect."
And he says that the part which is informed with these
images--namely, the imagination--is "common to us and beasts."

Reply Obj. 2: Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually
composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that
the soul is all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in
potentiality to all--through the senses, to all things
sensible--through the intellect, to all things intelligible.

Reply Obj. 3: Every creature has a finite and determinate essence.
Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain
likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in
common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof,
because it is determined to a certain species other than the species
of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness
of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being the
universal principle of all.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 3]

Whether the Soul Understands All Things Through Innate Species?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands all things
through innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the
Ascension (xxix in Ev.), that "man has understanding in common with
the angels." But angels understand all things through innate species:
wherefore in the book _De Causis_ it is said that "every intelligence
is full of forms." Therefore the soul also has innate species of
things, by means of which it understands corporeal things.

Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than
corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under
the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the
intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. And so
the soul understands corporeal things through innate species.

Obj. 3: Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what
he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired
knowledge, answers the truth to every question if put to him in
orderly fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato,
concerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of
things even before we acquire knowledge; which would not be the case
unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands
corporeal things through innate species.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says
(De Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is
written."

_I answer that,_ Since form is the principle of action, a thing must
be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is
to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness,
then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only
potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs
be actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a
potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is
reduced from such potentiality to act--through the action of sensible
objects on his senses, to the act of sensation--by instruction or
discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that
the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are
the principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles of
understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 4) held that
the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species,
but is at first in potentiality to all such species.

But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act
according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing
may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold
that naturally man's intellect is filled with all intelligible
species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from
the realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. First,
because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems
impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such
knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for no man
forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is
larger than the part, and such like. And especially unreasonable does
this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united
to the body, as we have established above ([Q. 76] , A. 1): for it is
unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally
hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the
falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a
sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that
sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind can have
no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had
innate images of all intelligible things. We must therefore conclude
that the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species.

Reply Obj. 1: Man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels,
but not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower grades of
bodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on
Ascension, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection as
the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally
completed by its form, but is in potentiality to forms which it has
not: whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by
its form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we
have said above (Q. 66, A. 2). In the same way the angelic intellect
is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature;
whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species.

Reply Obj. 2: Primary matter has substantial being through its form,
consequently it had need to be created under some form: else it would
not be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in
potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not
receive substantial being through the intelligible species; and
therefore there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3: If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed
from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now by
such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner.
Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is
not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns
for the first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed
from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by
asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of
what follows by that which preceded.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 4]

Whether the Intelligible Species Are Derived by the Soul from Certain
Separate Forms?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species are derived
by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by
participation is caused by what is such essentially; for instance,
that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But
the intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding,
participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in
act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in
its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual
soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually
understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the
intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused by
some separate forms.

Obj. 2: Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the
sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the
senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object
which exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible
species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some
things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these
can be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the
intelligible forms of our intellect are derived from some separate
substances.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by
something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in
potentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be
caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a
separate intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we
actually understand, are caused by some separate substances.

_On the contrary,_ If this were true we should not need the senses in
order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from
the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any
knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.

_I answer that,_ Some have held that the intelligible species of our
intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And
this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said (A. 1), held that the
forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for
instance, the form of a man which he called _per se_ man, and the
form or idea of a horse which is called _per se_ horse, and so forth.
He said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul
and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge
thereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that,
just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone,
becomes an individuating stone, so our intellect, by participating
the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation
of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator,
just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that
the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from
the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible
species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom.
And for this reason, as we have said above (A. 1), he referred
sciences and definitions to those ideas.

But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their
forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways
(Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held
that the intelligible species of all sensible things, instead of
subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the
separate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such species
are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect
which he called the "active intelligence," from which, according to
him, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible species
into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that
the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain
separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while
Avicenna placed them in the "active intelligence." They differ, too,
in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do
not remain in our intellect after it has ceased actually to
understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in
order to receive them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the
soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated
ideas remain immovably in the soul.

But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul
being united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual
soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is
form for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the
moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary
to the intellectual soul, for the latter's proper operation which is
to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the
body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for
receiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain
separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it
would not need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no
purpose would it be united to the body.

But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to
understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the
consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it
receives from the separate principles: even this seems an insufficient
explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul,
except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists
expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body:
and thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except
for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters
through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union
of the soul with the body still remains to be sought.

And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to
the soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the "active
intelligence" from which it receives the species: neither is this
a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to
understand through species derived from the "active intelligence,"
it follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one
of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the
inclination of its very nature, or through being roused by another
sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which
the corresponding sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born
blind could have knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We
must therefore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our
soul understands, are not derived from separate forms.

Reply Obj. 1: The intelligible species which are participated by our
intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle
which is by its essence intelligible--namely, God. But they proceed
from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material
things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
vii).

Reply Obj. 2: Material things, as to the being which they have
outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually
intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and
intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to
act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is
a power of the soul, as we have said (Q. 79, A. 4); and not by a
separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as
remote cause.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 5]

Whether the Intellectual Soul Knows Material Things in the Eternal
Types?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know
material things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is
known must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual
soul of man, in the present state of life, does not know the eternal
types: for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but
is "united to God as to the unknown," as Dionysius says (Myst.
Theolog. i). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal
types.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 1:20) that "the invisible things
of God are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made." But among
the invisible things of God are the eternal types. Therefore the
eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse.

Obj. 3: Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that "ideas are permanent types
existing in the Divine mind." If therefore we say that the
intellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come back
to the opinion of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from
them.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): "If we both see
that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is
true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor
do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth
which is above our minds." Now the unchangeable truth is contained in
the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all true
things in the eternal types.

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): "If
those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was
true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as
from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are
spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be
careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens."
Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of
the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with
faith, he adopted it: and those thing which he found contrary to
faith he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above (A. 4), that
the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and
these he called ideas, by participation of which he said that our
intellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by
participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our intellect,
by participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since
it seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves, outside
the things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held,
asserting that _per se_ life or _per se_ wisdom are creative
substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); therefore Augustine
(QQ. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas defended by Plato, substituted the
types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to
which types all things are made in themselves, and are known to the
human soul.

When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all
things in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said to
be known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known;
as one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In
this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all
things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all
things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types. Secondly,
one thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of
knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by
the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all
things in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we
know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is
nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in
which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Ps. 4:6,
7), "Many say: Who showeth us good things?" which question the
Psalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed
upon us," as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light
in us, all things are made known to us.

But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible
species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us
to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge
is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the
Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas
sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16):
"Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all
things occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able
to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds
of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for
this information from the story of times and places?"

But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their
"eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as though the eternal
types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu.
46)--viz. that "not each and every rational soul can be said to be
worthy of that vision," namely, of the eternal types, "but only those
that are holy and pure," such as the souls of the blessed.

From what has been said the objections are easily solved.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 6]

Whether Intellectual Knowledge Is Derived from Sensible Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived
from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we
cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the
body." This he proves in two ways. First, because "whatever the
bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never
the same cannot be perceived." Secondly, because, "whatever we
perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be
present to the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we
cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the
sensible object or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be
perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit." And so
he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the
senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. Therefore
intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16): "We must not
think that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as though
the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's
action; for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that
which it acts on." Whence he concludes that "the body does not cause
its image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself."
Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.

Obj. 3: Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause.
But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for we
understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses.
Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii,
15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses.

_I answer that,_ On this point the philosophers held three opinions.
For Democritus held that "all knowledge is caused by images issuing
from the bodies we think of and entering into our souls," as
Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle
says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is
caused by a "discharge of images." And the reason for this opinion
was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not
distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De
Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the
sensible, they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this
mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression
Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images.

Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from
the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a
corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be
affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not
brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by
separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as
we have said above (AA. 4 ,5). Moreover he held that sense is a power
operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a
spiritual power, affected by the sensible: but the sensible organs
are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a
way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible.
Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where
he says that the "body feels not, but the soul through the body,
which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within
itself what is announced from without." Thus according to Plato,
neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge,
nor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these
rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse
the intellect to the act of understanding.

Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that
intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not
its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to
feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the "composite." And he
held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part.
Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects
which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the
"composite," Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the
operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the
sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by
some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every
operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from _De
Gener._ i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation
which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal
can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to
cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the
impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something
more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the
patient," as he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that
the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression
of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more
noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have
spoken above (Q. 79, AA. 3, 4) causes the phantasms received from the
senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.

According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms,
intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the
phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and
require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it
cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause
of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the
material cause.

Reply Obj. 1: Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect
the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active
intellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth
of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their
likeness.

Reply Obj. 2: In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual
but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of
Plato, the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul
only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed
on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same
argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect must
be separate, namely, because "the agent is more noble than the
patient." And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the
imagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active
power. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that
the action of the imagination is an action of the "composite," there
is no difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the
organ of the animal, in so far as it is compared to it as a being in
act to a being in potentiality; even as the object actually colored
is compared to the pupil which is potentially colored. It may,
however, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is
through the agency of the sensible, since "fancy is movement produced
in accordance with sensation" (De Anima iii, 3), that nevertheless
there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms
images of various things, even of things not perceived by the senses.
And Augustine's words may be taken in this sense.

Reply Obj. 3: Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of
intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that
intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 7]

Whether the Intellect Can Actually Understand Through the
Intelligible Species of Which It Is Possessed, Without Turning to
the Phantasms?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can actually understand
through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without
turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the
intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the intellect is
in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices
for the intellect to understand actually, without turning to the
phantasms.

Obj. 2: Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses
than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can
actually imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more
can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms.

Obj. 3: There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the
imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our
intellect cannot understand anything actually without turning to the
phantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal.
Which is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the
angels.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that "the
soul understands nothing without a phantasm."

_I answer that,_ In the present state of life in which the soul is
united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to
understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms.
First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make
use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act
through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were
not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal
organ. Now sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the
sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear
that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it
acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already
acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the
other powers. For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a
lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance in a case of frenzy; or
when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we
see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which
he had a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience this of
himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain
phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he
examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is
that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay
examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of
understanding.

Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned
to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelic
intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible
substance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human
intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing
in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it
rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to
such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from
corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to
be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an
individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any
material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much
as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the
individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for
the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of
necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal
nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our
intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists say, the
natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there
would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever
it understands.

Reply Obj. 1: The species preserved in the passive intellect exist
there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we
have said above (Q. 79, A. 6). Wherefore for us to understand
actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice;
we need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things
of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in
individuals.

Reply Obj. 2: Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual
thing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness
of the individual, whereas the intellect does.

Reply Obj. 3: Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms,
are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are
phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which
we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we
know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other
incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by
way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And,
therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need
to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of
the things themselves.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 8]

Whether the Judgment of the Intellect Is Hindered Through Suspension
of the Sensitive Powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not
hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does
not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is
higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is
not hindered through suspension of the senses.

Obj. 2: Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during
sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in _De Somn. et Vigil._ i
and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep.
Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through
suspension of the senses.

_On the contrary,_ What a man does while asleep, against the moral
law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
xii, 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had
free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the
intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses.

_I answer that,_ As we have said above (A. 7), our intellect's proper
and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a
perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all
that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be
ignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher
says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is
action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived
principally through the senses"; for the smith does not seek
knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that
he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the
natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and
of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties
of those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear
that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the
action of the knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher
cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible
things. But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we
know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not
possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the
senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellect is superior to the senses,
nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first
and principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore
suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the
judgment of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain
evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in _De
Somn. et Vigil._ iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of such
evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the
amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also
the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does it happen,
especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking
copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms
appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus it happens in a case
of fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the
phantasms will have a certain sequence: thus especially does it
happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those who are gifted
with a strong imagination. If the evaporation be very slight, not
only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common
sense is partly freed; so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge
that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things,
and their images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly
suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from
the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore,
while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination are free, so
is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely.
Consequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes up he
invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect.
_______________________

QUESTION 85

OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING
(In Eight Articles)

We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under
this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from
the phantasms?

(2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are
what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?

(3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more
universal?

(4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?

(5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition
and division?

(6) Whether the intellect can err?

(7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?

(8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the
divisible?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 1]

Whether Our Intellect Understands Corporeal and Material Things by
Abstraction from Phantasms?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand
corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For
the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as
it really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as
abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms.
Therefore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the
species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, material things are those natural things which
include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood
apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material
things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the
principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be
understood by abstraction of the universal from the particular, which
is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the
phantasm.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the
phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. But
seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by
color impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act
of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the
phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are
two things in the intellectual soul--the passive intellect and the
active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to
abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive
them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the
active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to
color; since light does not abstract anything from color, but rather
streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction
from phantasms.

Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that "the
intellect understands the species in the phantasm"; and not,
therefore, by abstraction.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "things
are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter."
Therefore material things must needs be understood according as they
are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely,
phantasms.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), the object of
knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are
three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power,
namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the
object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal
matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality,
therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge
of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is
neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with
corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose
cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for
though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in
something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the
human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an
organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body,
as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 76, A. 1). And therefore
it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal
matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know
what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to
abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the
phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands
material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through
material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of
immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material
things through the immaterial.

But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect,
and not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects
of the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by
abstraction, but by participating things abstract, as stated above
(Q. 84, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of
composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does
not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly,
by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand one
thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to
abstract one from another things which are not really abstract from
one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood.
But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract
things which are not really abstract from one another, does not
involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For
if we understood or said that color is not in a colored body, or that
it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or
assertion. But if we consider color and its properties, without
reference to the apple which is colored; or if we express in word
what we thus understand, there is no error in such an opinion or
assertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and therefore
color can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the
things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a
stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the
individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the
species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the
particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is,
by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual
qualities represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect
is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it
is, that is so, if the word "otherwise" refers to the thing
understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing
otherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be false if it
abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to
regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it
is not so, if the word "otherwise" be taken as referring to the one
who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding,
in one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in
existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who
understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not
materially, according to the mode of a material thing.

Reply Obj. 2: Some have thought that the species of a natural thing
is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that
were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural
things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold,
common, and "signate" or individual; common, such as flesh and bone;
and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect
therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the
individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter;
for example, it abstracts the species of man from "this flesh and
these bones," which do not belong to the species as such, but to the
individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in
the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the
intellect from "flesh and bones."

Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect
from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common
matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual
matter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to
sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the
like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity.
Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other
sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension,
and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be
considered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract
them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without
understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for
that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet
they can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is
to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things
can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as
"being," "unity," "power," "act," and the like; all these can exist
without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because
Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above
explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated
to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality.

Reply Obj. 3: Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have
the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can
impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are
images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the
same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have
not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive
intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which
by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a
certain likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions
only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the
intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm;
not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is
subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from
one place to another.

Reply Obj. 4: Not only does the active intellect throw light on
the phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the
intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the
phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater
power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power
of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the
abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the
active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the
phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are
able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into
our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs
the passive intellect.

Reply Obj. 5: Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species
from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things
in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the
phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of which it
abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have
said above (Q. 84, A. 7).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 2]

Whether the Intelligible Species Abstracted from the Phantasm Is
Related to Our Intellect As That Which Is Understood?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted
from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is
understood. For the understood in act is in the one who understands:
since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But
nothing of what is understood is in the intellect actually
understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore
this species is what is actually understood.

Obj. 2: Further, what is actually understood must be in something;
else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the
soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing
therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually
understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else
than the aforesaid intelligible species.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that "words
are signs of the passions in the soul." But words signify the things
understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore
these passions of the soul--viz. the intelligible species, are what
is actually understood.

_On the contrary,_ The intelligible species is to the intellect what
the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not
what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives.
Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually
understood, but that by which the intellect understands.

_I answer that,_ Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties
know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is
cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to
this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression,
namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this
species is what is understood.

This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because
the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if
what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it
would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects
outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the
soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science
is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [*Q. 84, A.
1]]. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of
the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true"
[*Aristotle, _Metaph._ iii. 5, and that consequently contradictories
are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression
only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the
impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive
faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every
judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own
impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is
sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste
perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each
would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every
opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.

Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to
the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus.
There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which
remains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and
another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat
and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some
form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something
external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the
heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which
proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the
object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the
visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the
intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands.
But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it
understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by
which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is
understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the
object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from
the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known
by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself,
by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we
take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to
Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says "that a stone is not in the
soul, but only the likeness of the stone"; it follows that the soul
knows external things by means of its intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 1: The thing understood is in the intellect by its own
likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually
understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing
understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a
sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not
follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually
understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: In these words "the thing actually understood" there
is a double implication--the thing which is understood, and the fact
that it is understood. In like manner the words "abstract universal"
imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or
universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be
understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in
individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as
universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in
the senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple apart from its
smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen
apart from the smell, it is quite clear that the color which is seen
is only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell,
this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight
receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner
humanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity be
apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be
abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to
humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the
intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but
not of the principles of individuality.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in
regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes
place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is
formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of
an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these
operations are found in the intellect. For in the first place there
is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the
intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed
forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a
word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and
a proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition. Words
do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but
that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging
of external things.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 3]

Whether the More Universal Is First in Our Intellectual Cognition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in
our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its
own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves.
But universals come first as regards their nature, because "that is
first which does not involve the existence of its correlative"
(Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as
regards our intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to
us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known
secondarily by us.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object
defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition.
But the more universal is part of the definition of the less
universal, as "animal" is part of the definition of "man." Therefore
the universals are secondarily known by us.

Obj. 4: Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But
universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known
by us.

_On the contrary,_ "We must proceed from the universal to the
singular and individual" (Phys. i, 1)

_I answer that,_ In our knowledge there are two things to be
considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises
from sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and
individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for
its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before
our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our
intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of
actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to
actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium
between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect
act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the
object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete
act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly,
and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known
partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher
says (Phys. i, 1), that "what is manifest and certain is known to us
at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its
principles and elements." Now it is evident that to know an object
that comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing
contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can
have knowledge not only of the universal whole, which contains parts
potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be
known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know
distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the
less common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know it as "animal";
whereas to know "animal" distinctly is know it as "rational" or
"irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our
intellect knows "animal" before it knows man; and the same reason
holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.

Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to
act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense
we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both
to place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar
off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to
be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it
seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time,
for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes
this man from that, and therefore "children at first call men fathers,
and later on distinguish each one from the others" (Phys. i, 1). The
reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is
in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as
he who knows genus is in a state of potentiality as regards
"difference." Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway
between potentiality and act.

We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and
individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal;
as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both
sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the
knowledge of the less common.

Reply Obj. 1: The universal can be considered in two ways. First,
the universal nature may be considered together with the intention
of universality. And since the intention of universality--viz. the
relation of one and the same to many--is due to intellectual
abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary
consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the "universal
animal is either nothing or something secondary." But according to
Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal
considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter,
according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent
universals which he called ideas.

Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself--for
instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And
thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of
generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come
first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature;
as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for "the
animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
Animal ii, 3). The other order is the order of perfection or of the
intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is
naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect:
thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man
comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at
the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man.

Reply Obj. 2: The more common universal may be compared to the less
common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that
in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less
universal, but also other things, as in "animal" is contained not
only "man" but also "horse." As part, considering that the less
common contains in its idea not only the more common, but also more;
as "man" contains not only "animal" but also "rational." Therefore
"animal" in itself comes into our knowledge before "man"; but "man"
comes before "animal" considered as part of the same idea.

Reply Obj. 3: A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely
considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known
before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known.
Secondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know
the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we
know its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are
known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined
would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are
known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to
distinguish all that belongs to human nature.

Reply Obj. 4: The universal, as understood with the intention of
universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so
far as the intention of universality results from the mode of
understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of
knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato
thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and
substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered,
according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of
existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi,
13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as
existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a
formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the
result of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the
generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the
fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken
from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is
taken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken
from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the
intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature
is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because
the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of
the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of
any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through
sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and
sometimes conversely.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 4]

Whether We Can Understand Many Things at the Same Time?

Objection 1: It would seem that we can understand many things at the
same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of
before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not
understand different things in succession, but at the same time.

Obj. 2: Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not
opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as,
for instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible
species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to
prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different
intelligible species, and thus it can understand many things at the
same time.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time,
such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore
the intellect understands many things at the same time.

Obj. 4: Further, we cannot know the difference between two things
unless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the same
is to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the
difference and comparison between one thing and another. Therefore
it knows many things at the same time.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that "understanding is
of one thing only, knowledge is of many."

_I answer that,_ The intellect can, indeed, understand many things
as one, but not as many: that is to say by _one_ but not by _many_
intelligible species. For the mode of every action follows the form
which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the
intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the
same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same time,
because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever
things the intellect understands under different species, it does
not understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it is
impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same
time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is
impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have
different colors or different shapes. Now all intelligible species
belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one
intellectual faculty: although the things which the species represent
belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and
the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different
intelligible species so as actually to understand different things.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellect is above that time, which is the measure
of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of
intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible
operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this
vicissitude is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
20, 22), that "God moves the spiritual creature through time."

Reply Obj. 2: Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist
at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms
belonging to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one
another, as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes.

Reply Obj. 3: Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a
confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known
through the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In
another way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its
species; and so they are not understood at the same time.

Reply Obj. 4: If the intellect sees the difference or comparison
between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their
difference or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as
it knows the parts in the whole.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 5]

Whether Our Intellect Understands by Composition and Division?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand by
composition and division. For composition and division are only of
many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same
time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division.

Obj. 2: Further, every composition and division implies past,
present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as
also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does
not understand by composition and division.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect understands things by a process of
assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things,
for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and
the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the
composition be true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore
the intellect does not act by composition and division.

_On the contrary,_ Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as
the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition
and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions.
Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division.

_I answer that,_ The human intellect must of necessity understand by
composition and division. For since the intellect passes from
potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated,
which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by
degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect
knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends
something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its
first and proper object; and then it understands the properties,
accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it
necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or
division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to
another, which is the process of reasoning.

But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible
things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the
angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing
at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a
thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division,
and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition,
division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic
intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by
the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence.

Reply Obj. 1: Composition and division of the intellect are made by
differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things
by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and
comparison of things.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it
does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as we
have said (A. 1; Q. 84, A. 7). And forasmuch as it turns to the
phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time.

Reply Obj. 3: The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect
according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode of
the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds
to the composition and division of the intellect; but it does not
exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the
proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material
thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the
imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition.
First, there is the composition of form with matter; and to this
corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal
whole is predicated of its part: for the genus is derived from common
matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived
from the form, and the particular from individual matter. The second
comparison is of accident with subject: and to this real composition
corresponds that composition of the intellect, whereby accident is
predicated of subject, as when we say "the man is white."
Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of
things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition
of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the
above composition of the intellect does not imply that "man" and
"whiteness" are identical, but the assertion, "the man is white,"
means that "the man is something having whiteness": and the subject,
which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is
the same with the composition of form and matter: for animal
signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has
an intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and Socrates that
which has all these things together with individual matter; and
according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the
composition of one thing with another.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 6]

Whether the Intellect Can Be False?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that "truth and falsehood
are in the mind." But the mind and intellect are the same, as is
shown above (Q. 79, A. 1). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.

Obj. 2: Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But
falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.

Obj. 3: Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves
falsehood: for "those err that work evil" (Prov. 14:22). Therefore
falsehood can be in the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), that "everyone
who is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is
deceived." And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that "the
intellect is always true."

_I answer that,_ The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect
with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper
object, as sight in regard to color; [unless] accidentally through
some hindrance occurring to the sensile organ--for example, the taste
of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through
his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may be
deceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when,
for example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas
in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived
concerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that
vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same. The reason of
this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is _per se_ directed to
its proper object; and things of this kind are always the same.
Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own
proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the intellect
is the "quiddity" of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking,
the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it
may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence
or quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards
composition or division, or also in the process of reasoning.
Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, which are
understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first
principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of
scientific conclusions.

The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity
of composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the
intellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the
part of the composition affecting the definition, when, for instance,
the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as
the definition of a circle applied to a triangle; or when a
definition is false in itself as involving the composition of things
incompatible; as, for instance, to describe anything as "a rational
winged animal." Hence as regards simple objects not subject to
composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we
understand nothing whatever about them, as is said _Metaph._ ix, Did.
viii, 10.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect
in regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to the
Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the Third
Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs in the
practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute
consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things which
are known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense are
to be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite
conclusion.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 7]

Whether One Person Can Understand One and the Same Thing Better Than
Another Can?

Objection 1: It would seem that one person cannot understand one and
the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83,
qu. 32), "Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does
not understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect
understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore
there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one
person understand a thing better than another can."

Obj. 2: Further, the intellect is true in its act of understanding.
But truth, being a certain equality between thought and thing, is not
subject to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be more or
less equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less understood.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is in
man. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if one
man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not
belong to the same species.

_On the contrary,_ Experience shows that some understand more
profoundly than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its
first principles and ultimate causes understands it better than the
one who reduces it only to its proximate causes.

_I answer that,_ A thing being understood more by one than by another
may be taken in two senses. First, so that the word "more" be taken as
determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood;
and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another,
because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or
worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one would not
understand it, as Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu. 32). In another sense
the word "more" can be taken as determining the act of understanding
on the part of him who understands; and so one may understand the same
thing better than someone else, through having a greater power of
understanding: just as a man may see a thing better with his bodily
sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The
same applies to the intellect in two ways. First, as regards the
intellect itself, which is more perfect. For it is plain that the
better the disposition of a body, the better the soul allotted to it;
which clearly appears in things of different species: and the reason
thereof is that act and form are received into matter according to
matter's capacity: thus because some men have bodies of better
disposition, their souls have a greater power of understanding,
wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9), that "it is to be observed that
those who have soft flesh are of apt mind." Secondly, this occurs in
regard to the lower powers of which the intellect has need in its
operation: for those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and
memorative powers are of better disposition, are better disposed to
understand.

The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above; likewise the
reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect consists in the
intellect understanding a thing as it is.

Reply Obj. 3: The difference of form which is due only to the
different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a
numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms,
diversified according to the difference of matter.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 8]

Whether the Intellect Understands the Indivisible Before the
Divisible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect understands the
indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i,
1) that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and
elements." But principles are indivisible, and elements are of
divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the
divisible.

Obj. 2: Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known
previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more
known," as is said _Topic._ vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the
definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of
a line; for as Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the
extremities of which are points"; also unity comes into the
definition of number, for "number is multitude measured by one," as
is said _Metaph._ x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands
the indivisible before the divisible.

Obj. 3: Further, "Like is known by like." But the indivisible is more
like to the intellect than is the divisible; because "the intellect
is simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the
indivisible.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible
is expressed as a privation." But privation is known secondarily.
Therefore likewise is the indivisible.

_I answer that,_ The object of our intellect in its present state
is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the
phantasms, as above stated (Q. 84, A. 7). And since that which is
known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper
object, we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order
to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the
indivisible is threefold, as is said _De Anima_ iii, 6. First, the
continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although
potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its
division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge
is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said above (A. 3).
Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as
man's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, the
indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as
we have said above (De Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect
disposes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason of this
is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the
intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third kind of
indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity,
which cannot be divided either actually or potentially. And this
indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of
divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of privation "as
that which has no parts"; and in like manner the notion of "one" is
that is "indivisible," as stated in _Metaph._ x, Did. ix, 1. And the
reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to
a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and proper
object of the intellect.

But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate
indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow
that a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to
the Platonists what is first is first participated by things.

Reply Obj. 1: In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and
elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible
effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible
causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always
depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the
Philosopher says in the same passage: "Then do we consider that we
know, when we can resolve principles into their causes."

Reply Obj. 2: A point is not included in the definition of a line in
general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and
in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid
defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions a point in
the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is
limited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore it is included in
the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the
definition of the divisible, but rather conversely.

Reply Obj. 3: The likeness through which we understand is the species
of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on
account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on
account of the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would
perceive hearing rather than color.
_______________________

QUESTION 86

WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS
(In Four Articles)

We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it knows singulars?

(2) Whether it knows the infinite?

(3) Whether it knows contingent things?

(4) Whether it knows future things?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 4]

Whether Our Intellect Knows Singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For
whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our
intellect knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs
to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows
this singular, Socrates.

Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But
action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows
the singular.

Obj. 3: Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it
is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for
actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.

Obj. 4: Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an
inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore,
can the intellect know it.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that "the
universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense."

_I answer that,_ Our intellect cannot know the singular in material
things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the
principle of singularity in material things is individual matter,
whereas our intellect, as have said above (Q. 85, A. 1), understands
by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is
abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our
intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as
it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because,
as we have said above (Q. 85, A. 7), even after abstracting the
intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to
turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said
_De Anima_ iii, 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly
through the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular
represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition
"Socrates is a man." Wherefore the reply to the first objection is
clear.

Reply Obj. 2: The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the
conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is
said _Ethic._ vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly
concluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of
a singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the
practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the
particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said _De Anima_
iii, 11.

Reply Obj. 3: Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not
as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise
than immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such
as the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be
intelligible.

Reply Obj. 4: The higher power can do what the lower power can, but
in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and
concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect
knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the
universal.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 2]

Whether Our Intellect Can Know the Infinite?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite.
For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God,
as we have said above (Q. 12, A. 1). Much more, therefore, can our
intellect know all other infinite things.

Obj. 2: Further, our intellect can naturally know genera and
species. But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in
number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know
the infinite.

Obj. 3: Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same
place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being
in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in
the same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the
same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of
an infinite number of things.

Obj. 4: Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we
have said (Q. 76, A. 1), it appears to be an infinite power. But an
infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our
intellect can know the infinite.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite,
considered as such, is unknown."

_I answer that,_ Since a faculty and its object are proportional to
each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its
object, which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material
things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in
the sense of one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6.
Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering
successively one thing after another: because never does our
intellect understand so many things, that it cannot understand more.

On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite
either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot
know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one
species. But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if
it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it
cannot be understood except by a successive consideration of one part
after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for
the infinite is that "from which, however much we may take, there
always remains something to be taken." Thus the infinite could not be
known actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is
impossible.

For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite:
because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration:
since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said _Ethic._ ii, 1.
Wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an
infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered
the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession
of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually
nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only
potentially as explained above.

Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 7, A. 1), God is called
infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in
material things, the term "infinite" is applied to that which is
deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas
matter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material
infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is
of Himself known; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble
intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for
material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present
life except through material effects. In the future life this defect
of intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be
able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to
comprehend Him.

Reply Obj. 2: The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted
from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually
species of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except
in a general way and in their universal principles; and this is to
know them potentially and confusedly.

Reply Obj. 3: If two or more bodies were in the same place, there
would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order
for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of
occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into
our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually
understood at the same time: and therefore there must be a definite
and not an infinite number of species in our intellect.

Reply Obj. 4: As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know
the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not
terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal,
which is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is
not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to
an infinite number of individuals.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 3]

Whether Our Intellect Can Know Contingent Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent
things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects
of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but
necessary things.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, "what sometimes is and
sometimes is not, is measured by time." Now the intellect abstracts
from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is
proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be,
it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect.

_On the contrary,_ All knowledge is in the intellect. But some
sciences are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the
objects of which are human actions subject to free-will; and again,
the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated
and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things.

_I answer that,_ Contingent things can be considered in two ways;
either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity,
since every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for
example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the
relation of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that
Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for
contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality
belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form, because
whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But
matter is the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes
from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover
it was laid down above (A. 1) that the intellect of itself and
directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense
is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the
intellect, as we have said above (A. 1). Therefore the contingent,
considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the
intellect; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent
things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the
objects of science in their universal principles, then all science is
of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus
some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.

From which the replies to the objections are clear.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 4]

Whether Our Intellect Can Know the Future?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For
our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from
the "here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it
can know the present. Therefore it can know the future.

Obj. 2: Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know
some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect
is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the
intellect of its own nature can know the future.

Obj. 3: The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any
knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows
by their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can
the intellect know the future.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 8:6, 7), "There is a great
affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things
to come he cannot know by any messenger."

_I answer that,_ We must apply the same distinction to future things,
as we applied above (A. 3) to contingent things. For future things
considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect
knows them by reflection only, as stated above (A. 1). But the
principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter
the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science.

Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way,
we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in
itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by
God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events
is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole
course of time, as we have said above when treating of God's
knowledge (Q. 14, A. 13). But forasmuch as it exists in its cause,
the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such
as to have a necessary connection with its future result, then the
future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer
foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to
produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the
future be known more or less conjecturally, according as its cause
is more or less inclined to produce the effect.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn
from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known,
according to the order of the effects to the cause.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit. xii.
13]), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very
nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal
sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the
knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we
were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the
ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by
its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would
only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and hence when
withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future.

But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus,
but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for
the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather
does it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and
corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human
intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the
phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the
influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the
future known to the demons, as explained above (Q. 57, A. 3). The
soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of
spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then
nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions.
The same may also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is
clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in
consequence of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal
organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination
to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future
events, the imagination receives certain images of some such events.
These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in
the daytime and while we are awake, because, as stated in _De Somn.
et Vigil._ ii [*De Divinat. per somn. ii], "impressions made by day
are evanescent. The night air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence
bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements
are felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements produce in the
imagination images from which the future may be foreseen."

Reply Obj. 3: Brute animals have no power above the imagination
wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their
imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies.
Thus from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain
and the like, may be known rather than from human movements directed
by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), that "some
who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence
is not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all
anxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it."
_______________________

QUESTION 87

HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF
(In Four Articles)

We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and
all within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?

(2) Whether it knows its own habits?

(3) How does the intellect know its own act?

(4) How does it know the act of the will?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 1]

Whether the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself by Its Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by
its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the mind
knows itself, because it is incorporeal."

Obj. 2: Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of
intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own
essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.

Obj. 3: Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that
which is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human
mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above
(Q. 76, A. 1). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in
the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by
its own essence.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect
understands itself in the same way as it understands other things."
But it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their
similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own
essence.

_I answer that,_ Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and
not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for
a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as
it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the
eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored.
In like manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows
material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does
not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated
Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by
their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence.

Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is
simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own
Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence
belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as _act,_ but
not as a _pure act,_ nor as a _complete act,_ and hence the angel's
act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an
angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot
understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things
other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is
only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as
primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and
hence it is called "possible" [*Possibilis--elsewhere in this
translation rendered "passive"--Ed.]. Therefore in its essence the
human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the
power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made
actual. For even the Platonists asserted that an order of
intelligible beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch
as the intellect understands only by participation of the
intelligible; for they said that the participator is below what it
participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists
held, became actual by participating separate intelligible forms, it
would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings.
But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things
for its proper natural object, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), it
understands itself according as it is made actual by the species
abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active
intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things
themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive
intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence,
but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place,
singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an
intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the
second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the
human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true,
however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we
know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation
of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the
types of all things as above stated (Q. 84, A. 5). Hence Augustine
says (De Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can
as perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but
what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types." There is,
however, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it
consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the
first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it
perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own
presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the mere
presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required
a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the soul's
nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x,
9), concerning such mental inquiry: "Let the mind strive not to see
itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present"--i.e.
to know how it differs from other things; which is to know its
essence and nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at
length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own
act: because it is itself that it knows, since it loves itself, as he
says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in
two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except
itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is
not accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas
substance is visible by its accident.

Reply Obj. 2: The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of
intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing
understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself:
not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to
intelligible things--as is the passive intellect--or is the act of
intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms--as is the active
intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in
every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act,
by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act,
so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by
reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of
the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by
the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the
same species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without
matter the intellect and what is understood are the same," is equal
to saying that "as regards things actually understood the intellect
and what is understood are the same." For a thing is actually
understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn:
since the essences of some things are immaterial--as the separate
substances called angels, each of which is understood and
understands, whereas there are other things whose essences are not
wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence
the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is
true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified
in their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already
stated (Reply Obj. 2).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 2]

Whether Our Intellect Knows the Habits of the Soul by Their Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the
soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith
is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may
be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most
certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence";
and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul.
Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by
themselves.

Obj. 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by their
likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be
known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their
essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by
their essence.

Obj. 3: Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is
still more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things to
be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul
in themselves.

_On the contrary,_ Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But
as is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior
to powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and
thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.

_I answer that,_ A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and
mere act. Now, it has been said (A. 1) that nothing is known but as
it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect
act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known
only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from
the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may
inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act.
The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being
present, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it
is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a
careful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind (A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: Although faith is not known by external movement of
the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the
interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless
he knows that he believes.

Reply Obj. 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object
since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the
nature of a material thing as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), but as that
by which it understands.

Reply Obj. 3: The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing being
such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same
order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may
say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life
is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders
the axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by
medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than
health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas
medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two things
belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the
one which is the cause of the other being known, is the more known,
as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does
not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are things known
on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on
account of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and
therefore the argument does not prove.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 3]

Whether Our Intellect Knows Its Own Act?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not know its own
act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the
act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know
its own act.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then,
the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again
it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely,
which seems impossible.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as
sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act,
for this belongs to the common sense, as stated _De Anima_ iii, 2.
Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand
that I understand."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2) a thing is intelligible
according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the
intellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act
tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work
accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but
it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said
_Metaph._ ix, Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of
the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in
different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect,
namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in
God the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of
His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act
of understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which
is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above (Q. 79,
A. 1), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence.
Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act
whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he
understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same
act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection
of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with
its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the
human intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor
is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for
this object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that
which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this
kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that
object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known,
the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason
did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and
acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).

Reply Obj. 1: The object of the intellect is something universal,
namely, _being_ and _the true,_ in which the act also of
understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand
its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our
intellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything
true, but _being_ and _true,_ as considered in material things, as
we have said above (Q. 84, A. 7), from which it acquires knowledge
of all other things.

Reply Obj. 2: The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the
act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the
nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood
by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one
act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is
distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a
stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being
thus potentially infinite, as explained above (Q. 86, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3: The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in
the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material
object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another,
and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common
sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of
understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there
is no comparison.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 4]

Whether the Intellect Understands the Act of the Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand the
act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be
in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not
in the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct.
Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object
of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore
the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the
intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the
intellect.

Obj. 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that
"they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their
presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not
seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but
either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof.
Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such
affections of the soul as the acts of the will.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand
that I will."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 59, A. 1), the act of the will
is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just
as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural
form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its
mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a
natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible
appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the
intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the
intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper
subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii,
9)--that "the will is in the reason." Now whatever is intelligibly in
an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the
act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one
knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this
act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit
or power.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold good if the will and the
intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers;
for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But
as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one
is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is
in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: The "good" and the "true" which are the objects of the
will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in
the other, as we have said above (Q. 82, A. 4, ad 1; Q. 16, A. 4, ad
1); for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects
of the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can
fall under the will.

Reply Obj. 3: The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by
similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject,
as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which
contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that
the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions.
_______________________

QUESTION 88

HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF
(In Three Articles)

We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself,
viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand
the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?

(2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of
material things?

(3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 88, Art. 1]

Whether the Human Soul in the Present State of Life Can Understand
Immaterial Substances in Themselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul in the present state of
life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine
(De Trin. ix, 3) says: "As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of
corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from
itself the knowledge of incorporeal things." But these are the
immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial
substances.

Obj. 2: Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more
akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature is
immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 76, A. 1).
Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it able
to understand immaterial things.

Obj. 3: Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most
sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted by
their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a
corrupting influence from its object, as is stated _De Anima_ iii, 4.
Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of
intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material
things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them
actually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear
that those substances are more intelligible in themselves whose
nature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than
are material things.

Obj. 4: Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that "nature would
be frustrated in its end" were we unable to understand abstract
substances, "because it would have made what in itself is naturally
intelligible not to be understood at all." But in nature nothing is
idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be
understood by us.

Obj. 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the
intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether
superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our
intellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the
superior and immaterial.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 9:16): "The things that are in
heaven, who shall search out?" But these substances are said to be in
heaven, according to Matt. 18:10, "Their angels in heaven," etc.
Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human
investigation.

_I answer that,_ In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are
not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first
of all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he
called "Ideas," are the proper objects of our intellect, and thus
first and _per se_ understood by us; and, further, that material
objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are
mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the
more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial
things.

But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our
intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to
the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand
by turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (Q. 84, A. 7).
Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall
under sense and imagination, cannot first and _per se_ be known by us,
according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have.

Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this
present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate
substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance,
which he calls the "active intellect," and which, being a separate
substance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence,
when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to
understand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate
substances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive
intellect united to us, we can understand material things. Now he
said that the active intellect is united to us, thus. For since we
understand by means of both the active intellect and intelligible
objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles
understood; it is clear that the active intellect must be compared to
the objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the
instrument, or as form to matter. For an action is ascribed to two
principles in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an
instrument, as cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its
subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active
intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is
to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now a subject is
made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as
the reception of what is actually visible synchronizes with the
reception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect
receives the intelligible object and the active intellect together;
and the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much the
nearer do we come to the point of perfect union between ourselves and
the active intellect; so much so that when we understand all the
intelligible objects, the active intellect becomes one with us, and
by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and
immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist.
Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether the
passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate
substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect, as he
himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive
intellect can never understand separate substances (because according
to him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by
means of the active intellect.

This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active
intellect to be a separate substance, we could not formally understand
by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action
consists in its form and act, since every agent acts according to its
actuality, as was said of the passive intellect (Q. 70, A. 1).
Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation,
the active intellect, supposing it to be a separate substance, would
not be joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as
participated in things understood; and would not extend to the other
acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand
immaterial substances; just as when we see colors set off by the sun,
we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the
sun, but its light only is united to us, that we may see the colors.
Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above
explained, the active intellect were united to us in substance, still
it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard to one
intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all intelligible
objects. But all such objects together do not equal the force of the
active intellect, as it is a much greater thing to understand separate
substances than to understand all material things. Hence it clearly
follows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the
active intellect to be so united to us as to enable us by its
instrumentality to understand separate substances.

Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for
anyone in this world to understand all material things: and thus no
one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against
what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a "kind of
common good, communicable to all capable of virtue." Further, it is
unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of
the species.

Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that
happiness is "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and after
enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i,
7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest
things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which
in the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative
sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man
in the knowledge of separate substances, obtainable by speculative
science; and not by being united to the active intellect as some
imagined.

Sixthly, as was shown above (Q. 79, A. 4), the active intellect is
not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself
actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends
receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive
intellect is "all things potentially," and the active intellect is
"all things in act." Therefore both intellects, according to the
present state of life, extend to material things only, which are made
actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in
the passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot
understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by
the passive or by the active intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of
incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This
is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning
the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances. For
by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal
substances, such as is within its compass; not that the knowledge of
itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of
knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true--that the
soul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But
knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the
knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in
the present state of life, is such that it can be informed with
similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows
material things rather than immaterial substances.

Reply Obj. 3: There must needs be some proportion between the object
and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive,
and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of
great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the
fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being
improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that
immaterial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our
present state of life, so that it cannot understand them.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways.
First, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it
does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for
they are understood by themselves, and by one another.

Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate
substances: while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails
to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial
substances are purposeless, even if they are not understood by us
at all.

Reply Obj. 5: Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in
the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do
not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way.
The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which is
impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of
what is immaterial.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 88, Art. 2]

Whether Our Intellect Can Understand Immaterial Substances Through Its
Knowledge of Material Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial
substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius
says (Coel. Hier. i) that "the human mind cannot be raised up to
immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is
led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature."
Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial
substances.

Obj. 2: Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are
sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene
defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of
both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can
be understood by us.

Obj. 3: Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial
substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which
it understands material things. Therefore also other material
substances can be understood by us, through their material effects.

Obj. 4: Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through
its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and this
belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances
can be understood by us through material things.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "intelligible
things cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite
things through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal."

_I answer that,_ Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher
named Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught
that by the understanding of natural substances we can be led,
according to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of
immaterial substances. For since the nature of our intellect is to
abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, anything
material residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made
subject to abstraction; and as the process of abstraction cannot go
on forever, it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity,
absolutely without matter; and this would be the understanding of
immaterial substance.

Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms
and species of these material things; as the Platonists supposed.
But supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ
altogether from the quiddity of material things, it follows that
however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things
from matter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial
substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand
immaterial substances through material substances.

Reply Obj. 1: From material things we can rise to some kind of
knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge
thereof; for there is no proper and adequate proportion between
material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from
material things for the understanding of immaterial things are
very dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).

Reply Obj. 2: Science treats of higher things principally by way of
negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies
by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows
that much less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a way
as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific
knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to
material things.

Reply Obj. 3: The human soul understands itself through its own act
of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power
and nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot
be perfectly known through such act, nor through any other material
thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and the
power of the former.

Reply Obj. 4: Created immaterial substances are not in the same
natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power
or in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even
immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their
essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection
with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical
genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 5).
Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know
something positive concerning the angels, according to some common
notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we
cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 88, Art. 3]

Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Human Mind?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is the first object known by the
human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by
which we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to
the eye, and first principles to the intellect. But we know all things
in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as
Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi); [*Confess. xii,
25]. Therefore God is the first object known to us.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But
God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is "the true light
which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" (John 1:9).
Therefore God is our first and most known object.

Obj. 3: Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to
which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine
says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to
our mind.

_On the contrary,_ "No man hath seen God at any time" (John 1:18).

_I answer that,_ Since the human intellect in the present state of
life cannot understand even immaterial created substances (A. 1),
much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance.
Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first object of our
knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the
Apostle (Rom. 1:20), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made": while the first object
of our knowledge in this life is the "quiddity of a material thing,"
which is the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many
passages (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 8; Q. 87, A. 2, ad 2)

Reply Obj. 1: We see and judge of all things in the light of the
first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether
natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the
first truth upon it, as stated above (Q. 12, A. 2). Hence, as the
light itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, much
less can it be said that God is the first object known by our
intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: The axiom, "Whatever causes a thing to be such is more
so," must be understood of things belonging to one and the same
order, as explained above (Q. 81, A. 2, ad 3). Other things than God
are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object,
but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 3: If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God,
as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know
God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the
argument does not prove.
_______________________

QUESTION 89

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL
(In Eight Articles)

We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this
head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?

(2) Whether it understands separate substances?

(3) Whether it understands all natural things?

(4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?

(5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?

(6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?

(7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge?

(8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 1]

Whether the Separated Soul Can Understand Anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul separated from the body can
understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4)
that "the understanding is corrupted together with its interior
principle." But by death all human interior principles are corrupted.
Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.

Obj. 2: Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when
the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained
above (Q. 84, AA. 7,8). But death destroys the senses and
imagination, as we have shown above (Q. 77, A. 8). Therefore after
death the soul understands nothing.

Obj. 3: Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be
by means of some species. But it does not understand by means of
innate species, because it has none such; being at first "like a
tablet on which nothing is written": nor does it understand by
species abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs
of sense and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of
species: nor does it understand by means of species, formerly
abstracted and retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child's
soul would have no means of understanding at all: nor does it
understand by means of intelligible species divinely infused, for
such knowledge would not be natural, such as we treat of now, but the
effect of grace. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands
nothing.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), "If the soul
had no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body."
But the soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper
operation and above all, that which consists in intelligence.
Therefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body.

_I answer that,_ The difficulty in solving this question arises from
the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by
turning to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed
from the soul's very nature, but accidentally through its being bound
up with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would
vanish; for in that case when the body was once removed, the soul
would at once return to its own nature, and would understand
intelligible things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is
exemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case,
however, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul's good,
for evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it;
but for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since
matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for the sake
of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it
to understand by turning to the phantasms, it will seem, since death
does not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand
nothing; as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn.

To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except
so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from
its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the
body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the
same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an
accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very
nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it
is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper
place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to
the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of
understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in
corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a
mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as
is proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the
soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be
joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in
accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning
to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to the
body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable
to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is
always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand
by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the
phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the
nobler way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it
would not have needed the body for that purpose.

In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is
true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something
higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a
mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible
to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual
substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine
light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther
off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the
more is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines
radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one
Essence understands all things; while the superior intellectual
substances understand by means of a number of species, which
nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper
comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the
intellectual power of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual
natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal,
and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they
recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If,
therefore, the inferior substances received species in the same degree
of universality as the superior substances, since they are not so
strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through
them would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can
see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker
intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal
conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things
are explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in
the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual
substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades
of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the
same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge,
so far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to
make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper
knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be
joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate
knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus
we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by
sensible examples.

It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united
to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms.
Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and
also to understand in another way.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher's words carefully examined will show
that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is a
movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had
not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We
may also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by
turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of the second
objection.

Reply Obj. 3: The separated soul does not understand by way of
innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species
retained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state
understands by means of participated species arising from the
influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other
separate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it
ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at
once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural,
for God is the author of the influx of both of the light of grace
and of the light of nature.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 2]

Whether the Separated Soul Understands Separate Substances?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not
understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when
joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an
essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more
perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does
not understand separate substances as shown above (Q. 88, A. 1).
Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or
by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul
by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by
means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel
is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at
all understand separate substances.

Obj. 3: Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness
of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If,
therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its
happiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot be
reasonably be said.

_On the contrary,_ Souls apart from the body know other separated
souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus
and Abraham (Luke 16:23). Therefore separated souls see the devils
and the angels.

_I answer that,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires
the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"--i.e. by knowing
itself (Q. 88, A. 1, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the
separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other
separate things. Now it was said above (A. 1), that as long as it is
united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and
therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming
actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms;
for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above
(Q. 87, A. 1). When, however, it is separated from the body, it
understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to
simply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands
itself through itself. Now, every separate substance "understands
what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode
of its substance" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood
according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in
another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode
of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but
is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul
apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls,
but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far
as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is
otherwise.

Reply Obj. 1: The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering
its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but
it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care
of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the
present life.

Reply Obj. 2: The separated soul understands the angels by means of
divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect
knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to
that of an angel.

Reply Obj. 3: Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge
of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen
only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if
perfectly understood gives great happiness--not final and ultimate
happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly,
as was shown above in this article.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 3]

Whether the Separated Soul Knows All Natural Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural
things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate
substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances,
they also know all natural things.

Obj. 2: Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will
be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the
separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the
highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it
understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of
intelligibility.

_On the contrary,_ The devils have greater natural knowledge than the
separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to
learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono
i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the separated soul, like the
angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence
of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior
to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul
apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect
knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge.
Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such
species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the
angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such
species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has
produced in the respective natures of natural things has been
produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated souls know all
natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a
general and confused manner.

Reply Obj. 1: Even an angel does not understand all natural things
through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above
(Q. 87, A. 1). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural
things because it knows separate substances after a fashion.

Reply Obj. 2: As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly
understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural
things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in
this article.

Reply Obj. 3: Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which
neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far
as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine
revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural
things.

Reply Obj. 4: Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect;
the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow
that to study in order to learn is useless.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 4]

Whether the Separated Soul Knows Singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not know
singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in
the separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 77,
A. 8). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (Q.
86, A. 1). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.

Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate
than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no
determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore
much less can it know singulars.

Obj. 3: Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the
same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all
singulars. Therefore it knows none.

_On the contrary,_ The rich man in hell said: "I have five brethren"
(Luke 16:28).

_I answer that,_ Separated souls know some singulars, but not all,
not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider
that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of
abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be
directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above
(Q. 86, A. 1). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of
species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to
know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular,
by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles
(Q. 14, A. 2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by
species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine
Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated
souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a
perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated souls have
only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their
perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific
natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species;
whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to
which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by
some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the
Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is
conditioned according to the mode of the recipient.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellect does not know the singular by way of
abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as
explained above.

Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to
those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of
determinate relation, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3: The separated soul has not the same relation to all
singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore
there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 5]

Whether the Habit of Knowledge Here Acquired Remains in the Separated
Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in
this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for
the Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" (1 Cor. 13:8).

Obj. 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge
denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of
knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some
who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are
better; which seems unreasonable.

Obj. 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence
of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here
acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two
forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which
cannot be.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4, 5), that "a
habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is
destroyed by sickness or the like." But in this life there is no
change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of
knowledge is destroyed by death.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn
on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven."

_I answer that,_ Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in
the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the
imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible
species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it
would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here
acquired would also be entirely destroyed.

But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode
of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of
knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive
powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering
the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the
actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of
the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by
the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers.
Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain
facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid
sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action
of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible
object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in
the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively
in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to
habit.

Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in
the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers;
but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain;
because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form
may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its
contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its
subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not
corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an
incorruptible faculty, as above stated (Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Neither
can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted
by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible
"intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a
thing is." But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards
mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what
is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus
knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument
seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the
Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge
is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part of the
memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false argument.
But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must
conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the
intellect, remains in the separated soul.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit,
but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the
assertion quoted, "Now, I know in part."

Reply Obj. 2: As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily
stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the
future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however,
cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better
man.

Reply Obj. 3: These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same
species, so there is no impossibility.

Reply Obj. 4: This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on
the part of the sensitive powers.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 6]

Whether the Act of Knowledge Acquired Here Remains in the Separated
Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired
does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De
Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither
remembers nor loves." But to consider what is previously known is an
act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of
knowledge here acquired.

Obj. 2: Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in
the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But
in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without
turning to phantasms, as shown above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore the
separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by
intelligible species acquired in this life.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits
produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But the
habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning
to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts,
however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in
the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired
in this life.

_On the contrary,_ It was said to Dives in hell (Luke 16:25):
"Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime."

_I answer that,_ Action offers two things for our consideration--its
species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the
faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which
is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the
power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the
species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due
to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species
remain in the separated soul, as stated above (A. 5), and since the
state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it
follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life
the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood
formerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by
a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of
knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a
different way.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as
memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way
to the intellect, as explained above (Q. 79, A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2: The different mode of intelligence is produced by the
different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species.

Reply Obj. 3: The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused
by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just
things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of
political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic.
v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 7]

Whether Local Distance Impedes the Knowledge in the Separated Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that local distance impedes the separated
soul's knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that
"the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here."
But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance
impedes the knowledge in the separated soul.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the
demons' rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to
us." But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless
their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a
much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose
nature is inferior to the demon's.

Obj. 3: Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance
of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated
soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that
distance of place also impedes its knowledge.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 16:23), that Dives, "lifting
up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore
local distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul.

_I answer that,_ Some have held that the separated soul knows the
singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might
be that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the
sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the
sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be
necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the
species from the sensible is done through the senses and other
sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart
from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by
species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what
is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not
hindered by local distance.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot
see what is done here, not because they are "there," as if impeded by
local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain (A. 8).

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion
that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have
sensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he
expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of
narration than of assertion, as we may gather from _De Civ. Dei_ xxi,
10.

Reply Obj. 3: The future, which is distant in time, does not actually
exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a
thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being
knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is
knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to
distance of place.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 8]

Whether Separated Souls Know What Takes Place on Earth?

Objection 1: It would seem that separated souls know what takes place
on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have,
according to what Dives said (Luke 16:27, 28), "I have five brethren
. . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of
torments." Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth.

Obj. 2: Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or
awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared to
Saul (1 Kings 28:11). But this could not be unless they knew what
takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth.

Obj. 3: Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves.
If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be
by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false (A. 7).

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 14:21): "He will not understand
whether his children come to honor or dishonor."

_I answer that,_ By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now,
the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows
from what has been laid down (A. 4), since the separated soul has
knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either
by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine
order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the
living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst
they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and
hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory
gives the reason thus: "The dead do not know how the living act, for
the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as
corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are
distinct in knowledge" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same
(De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, "the souls of the
dead have no concern in the affairs of the living."

Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as
regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the
passage above quoted: "The case of the holy souls is different, for
since they see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that
external things are unknown to them." But Augustine (De Cura pro
Mort. xiii) expressly says: "The dead, even the saints do not know
what is done by the living or by their own children," as a gloss
quotes on the text, "Abraham hath not known us" (Isa. 63:16). He
confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled
in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not
think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and
again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he
should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions (4 Kings
22:20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, "Let every
one take, as he pleases, what I say." Gregory, on the other hand, is
positive, since he says, "We cannot believe." His opinion, indeed,
seems to be the more probable one--that the souls of the blessed who
see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the
angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among
those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most
perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow,
nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with
Divine justice.

Reply Obj. 1: The souls of the departed may care for the living, even
if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring
forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state.
Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not
immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and
demons, or even by "the revelation of the Holy Ghost," as Augustine
says in the same book.

Reply Obj. 2: That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever
is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls
of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living--and this is to be
accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the
instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the
departed; as may likewise happen when the living appear, without
their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says in the same
book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine
revelation; according to Ecclus. 46:23, "he slept, and told the king
the end of his life." Or, again, this apparition was procured by the
demons; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside
through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture.

Reply Obj. 3: This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the
obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above.
_______________________

QUESTION 90

OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL
(In Four Articles)

After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man,
concerning which there are four subjects of treatment:

(1) the production of man himself;

(2) the end of this production;

(3) the state and condition of the first man;

(4) the place of his abode.

Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be
considered:

(1) the production of man's soul;

(2) the production of man's body;

(3) the production of the woman.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of the Divine
substance?

(2) Whether, if made, it was created?

(3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?

(4) Whether it was made before the body?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 1]

Whether the Soul Was Made or Was of God's Substance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's
substance. For it is written (Gen. 2:7): "God formed man of the slime
of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man
was made a living soul." But he who breathes sends forth something of
himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine
substance.

Obj. 2: Further, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 5), the soul is a
simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act;
which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's substance.

Obj. 3: Further, things that exist and do [not] differ are the same.
But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only
be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be
composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions
certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse,
and contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the
opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself."

_I answer that,_ To say that the soul is of the Divine substance
involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has
been said (Q. 77, A. 2; Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6), the human soul
is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence
--acquires its knowledge somehow from things--and thus has various
powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which
is a pure act--receives nothing from any other--and admits of no
variety in itself, as we have proved (Q. 3, AA. 1, 7; Q. 9, A. 1).

This error seems to have originated from two statements of the
ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things,
being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing
but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which
they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they
held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they
regarded as the first principle, as is stated _De Anima_ i, 2, it
followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According
to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was
corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up
with the body.

Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the
existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the
form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the
world by movement and reason," as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii,
6 [*The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.]). So some supposed
man's soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole
world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the
different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the
distinction of bodies.

But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (Q. 3, AA. 1,
8; and Q. 75, A. 1), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is
of the substance of God.

Reply Obj. 1: The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material
sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe (spirare), is the
same as to _make a spirit._ Moreover, in the material sense, man by
breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an
extraneous thing.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet
it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as
above explained (Q. 75, A. 5, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act
like God.

Reply Obj. 3: That which differs, properly speaking, differs in
something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also
resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be
compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble
each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet
all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are
diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which
enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ
by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that
these again differ by some further difference.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 2]

Whether the Soul Was Produced by Creation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not produced by
creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced
from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure
act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not
created.

Obj. 2: Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the
potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to
act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the
act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore
the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter.

Obj. 3: Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is
created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come
into existence by generation; which is not true.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:27): "God created man to His
own image." But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul
was created.

_I answer that,_ The rational soul can be made only by creation;
which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because,
since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in
such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly
exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own
existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called
beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is
(modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance,
whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence
it is said _Metaph._ vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be
described as "of something rather than as something." The same is to
be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking,
it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are
said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the
other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above
explained (Q. 75, A. 2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be
made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter--whether
corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being--or spiritual,
which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into
another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.

Reply Obj. 1: The soul's simple essence is as the material element,
while its participated existence is its formal element; which
participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence,
because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds
if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as
some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to
another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise
the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way
be made of pre-existent matter.

Reply Obj. 2: The production of act from the potentiality of matter
is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was
in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its
existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the
capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q. 75, A. 2), it is
not educed from the potentiality of matter.

Reply Obj. 3: As we have said, there is no comparison between the
rational soul and other forms.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 3]

Whether the Rational Soul Is Produced by God Immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately
made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual
things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are
produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are
produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels.

Obj. 2: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for
God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things
from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their
end. But "inferior things are forwarded by the higher," as Dionysius
says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into
existence by the higher, and souls by angels.

Obj. 3: Further, "perfect is that which can produce its like," as is
stated _Metaph._ v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect
than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their
own species, much more are angels able to produce something
specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7) that God Himself
"breathed into the face of man the breath of life."

_I answer that,_ Some have held that angels, acting by the power of
God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is
against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot
be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the
first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of
anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived
from the first cause, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 3): and every
agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change
therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change,
whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational
soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced,
save immediately by God.

Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce
their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher
things lead forward the inferior--all these things are effected
through a certain transmutation.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 4]

Whether the Human Soul Was Produced Before the Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul was made before the
body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and
adornment, as shown above (Q. 66, A. 1; Q. 70, A. 1). But the soul
was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the
work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.

Obj. 2: Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels
than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies,
or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body
of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made.
Therefore the soul of man was created before the body.

Obj. 3: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in
the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was
created before the body.

_On the contrary,_ The proper act is produced in its proper
potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body,
the soul was produced in the body.

_I answer that,_ Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the
soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at
the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought
that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in
their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of
them--namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies--are united to
bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free
from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken (Q. 47, A. 2);
and so we need say nothing about it here.

Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the
first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the
body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man,
during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but
only as to some "causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul,
because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or
spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue.
Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six
days, when all things were made, was created, together with the
angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the
service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as
his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): "We may believe,
if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the
sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal
virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already
created."

Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of
itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to
the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is
united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human
nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear
that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as
their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has
its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would
have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.

Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the
six days (Q. 74, A. 2), we may say that the human soul preceded in
the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as
it has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself
created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints,
both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of
the six days.

Reply Obj. 1: If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so
that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that
the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is
naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not
separately, but in the body.

Reply Obj. 2: The same observation applies to the second objection.
For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still
more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it
belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.

Reply Obj. 3: That the soul remains after the body, is due to a
defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the
soul was first created.
_______________________

QUESTION 91

THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under
this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The matter from which it was produced;

(2) The author by whom it was produced;

(3) The disposition it received in its production;

(4) The mode and order of its production.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 1]

Whether the Body of the First Man Was Made of the Slime of the Earth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the body of the first man was not made
of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make
something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is
farther off from actual existence than "being in potentiality." But
since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was
fitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should
be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the
slime of the earth, but out of nothing.

Obj. 2: Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies.
But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected
by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should
not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.

Obj. 3: Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is
clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most
noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the
slime of the earth.

Obj. 4: Further, the human body is composed of the four elements.
Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four
elements.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7): "God made man of the
slime of the earth."

_I answer that,_ As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed
perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works
are perfect" (Deut. 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact
that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts,
but as "united in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v);
in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause,
according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the
angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature
through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this
perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a
natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed
of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus
of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is
removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the
elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that
the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power;
for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and
where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements
abound in man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements
would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which
have the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of
man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because
earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is
called "a little world," because all creatures of the world are in a
way to be found in him.

Reply Obj. 1: The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man's
body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting
that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man
might have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being
something between spiritual and corporeal substances.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the
earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body
is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of
truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot
be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that
something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition
of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united
to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is
false--that light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something
to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to
be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible;
wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies,
except as in the effects of its power.

Reply Obj. 3: If fire and air, whose action is of greater power,
predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely
draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the
mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the
sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the
organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries
of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either
in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole genus of such
contraries--thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without
color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is
not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very
elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense--or so
that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as much needs be
the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to
the extremes.

Reply Obj. 4: In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding
the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no
mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we
have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention
is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of
uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately
addressed.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 2]

Whether the Human Body Was Immediately Produced by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human body was not produced by God
immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal
things are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was
made of corporeal matter, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it
was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately
by God.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not
necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be
produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain
animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a
heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat
and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the
human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some
material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of
a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the
human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a
heavenly body had part in its production.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's
body was made during the work of the six days, according to the
causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that
afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the
corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by
some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some
created power, and not immediately by God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): "God created man out
of the earth."

_I answer that,_ The first formation of the human body could not be
by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from
God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal
matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher
refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot
be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have
explained (Q. 65, A. 4); and because the agent must be like its
effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter,
should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made
by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter
can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as
composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely
immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation:
wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of
any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot
transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a
seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no
pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same
species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity
made immediately by God.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the angels are the ministers of God, as
regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies
beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or
giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of
the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels
could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man,
in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by
collecting the dust.

Reply Obj. 2: Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by
the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the
power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of
natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), "man and
the sun beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of moderate
temperature is required for the production of man and other animals.
But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some
imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that
more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect
thing.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but
not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the
Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the
blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime
of the earth.

Reply Obj. 4: An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal
virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in
passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of
pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can
produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out
of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense,
according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous
work in their causal virtues.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 3]

Whether the Body of Man Was Given an Apt Disposition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt
disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought
to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in
sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker
movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter
flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.

Obj. 2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body
lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided
with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking.
Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.

Obj. 3: Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the
brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in
stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right."

_I answer that,_ All natural things were produced by the Divine art,
and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to
give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but
the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some
defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes
himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which
is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it
of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very
beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God
gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so,
but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says
(Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for
each one's substance."

Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its
operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments
are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned
the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to
such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the
disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect
arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions
required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to
the soul and its operations.

Reply Obj. 1: The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the
other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and
for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all
animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior
sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 78, A.
4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals
in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least
sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the
body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers
required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (Q.
84, A. 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may
modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for
him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason
of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires
dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals
have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on
account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the
perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to
explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since
this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the
human temperament.

Reply Obj. 2: Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals,
and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the
clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly
element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the
human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of
man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make
himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite
variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8),
"the organ of organs." Moreover this was more becoming to the
rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of
things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments.

Reply Obj. 3: An upright stature was becoming to man for four
reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the
purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed
on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence,
whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses
only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the
beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses
are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned
to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and
procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that
by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and
penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely
survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so
as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the
greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain,
wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down,
but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if
man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands
as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease.
Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he
used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his
food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with
thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from
being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover,
such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper
operation.

Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For
man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of
the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior
world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general
situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards
the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their
inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a
middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by
which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids
itself of the surplus.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 4]

Whether the Production of the Human Body Is Fittingly Described in
Scripture?

Objection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is
not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made
by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other
works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and it was made."
Therefore the same should have been said of man.

Obj. 2: Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as
explained above (A. 2). Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let us
make man."

Obj. 3: Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which
is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man of the
slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed into
him the breath of life."

Obj. 4: Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the
whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly
said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life."

Obj. 5: Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while
the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore
having said: "To His image He made them," he should not have added,
"male and female He created them."

_On the contrary,_ Is the authority of Scripture.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man
surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man,
as though He did not make other things; since it is written (Ps.
101:26), "The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere (Ps.
94:5), "His hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is
made to God's image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture
uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made
for man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation
and care what we have chiefly in mind.

Reply Obj. 2: We must not imagine that when God said "Let us make
man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think.
But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person,
Whose image is more clearly expressed in man.

Reply Obj. 3: Some have thought that man's body was formed first in
priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the
formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the
production of things, that God should have made either the body
without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part
of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body,
for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.

To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made
man," must be understood of the production of the body with the soul;
and that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the
breath of life," should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord
breathed on His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (John
20:22). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii,
24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther
on, "And man was made a living soul"; which words the Apostle (1 Cor.
15:45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore,
by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, "He
breathed into his face the breath of life," are a sort of exposition
of what goes before; for the soul is the form of the body.

Reply Obj. 4: Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's
face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore
Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face.

Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works
of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him
man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not
made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the
first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But
other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man
were actually made.
_______________________

QUESTION 92

THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN
(In Four Articles)

We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production
of things?

(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?

(3) Whether of man's rib?

(4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 1]

Whether the Woman Should Have Been Made in the First Production of
Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made
in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De
Gener. ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing
misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of
things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first
production.

Obj. 2: Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for
to the woman was it said after sin (Gen. 3:16): "Thou shalt be under
the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin,
there is no inequality." But woman is naturally of less strength and
dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the
patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman
should not have been made in the first production of things before
sin.

Obj. 3: Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw
that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He
should not have made woman.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:18): "It is not good for man
to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."

_I answer that,_ It was necessary for woman to be made, as the
Scripture says, as a _helper_ to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in
other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped
by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of
generation. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of
generation carried out in various living things. Some living things
do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are
generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and
animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting
matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive
generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated
from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation.
Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation
invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the
active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive
power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation
nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed;
therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the
female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that
we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in
plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them
preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered
to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation.
Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two
forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from
the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore
directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall
be two in one flesh" (Gen. 2:24).

Reply Obj. 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is defective
and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the
production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the
production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from
some material indisposition, or even from some external influence;
such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher
observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards
human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included
in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the
general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal
Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not
only the male but also the female.

Reply Obj. 2: Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of
which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and
this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of
subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior
makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this
kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have
been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others
wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is
naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason
predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of
innocence, as we shall prove (Q. 96, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: If God had deprived the world of all those things which
proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect.
Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that
individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful
that He can direct any evil to a good end.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 2]

Whether Woman Should Have Been Made from Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from
man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals
the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it
have been so with man.

Obj. 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same matter.
But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was
made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the
same, and not from man.

Obj. 3: Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work
of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that
office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is
written (Lev. 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from
man.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): "He created of him,"
that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman.

_I answer that,_ When all things were first formed, it was more
suitable for the woman to be made from man than (for the female to
be from the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the
first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the
principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to
God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says
that "God made the whole human race from one" (Acts 17:26). Secondly,
that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more
closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is
written (Gen. 2:23, 24): "She was taken out of man, wherefore a man
shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." This
was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and
female live together for life; which is not the case with other
animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12),
the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as
with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in
which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is
the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be
made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a
sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church
takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32):
"This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

Reply Obj. 1 is clear from the foregoing.

Reply Obj. 2: Matter is that from which something is made. Now
created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is
determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of
proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something
in a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being
infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter,
such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of
man.

Reply Obj. 3: A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and
this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced
from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone.
Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this
argument does not prove.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 3]

Whether the Woman Was Fittingly Made from the Rib of Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed
from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's
body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made
only--either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been
described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the
rib itself)--or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
lit. x): "A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction." But
the woman's body is not more rarefied than man's--at least, not in
the proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed
from a rib of Adam.

Obj. 2: Further, in those things which were first created there was
nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the
integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained
imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.

Obj. 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But
there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib
to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:22): "God built the rib,
which He took from Adam, into a woman."

_I answer that,_ It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of
man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the
woman should neither "use authority over man," and so she was not
made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's
contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet.
Secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of
Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed--namely, blood
and water--on which the Church was established.

Reply Obj. 1: Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material
increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord
multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an
increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance
of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change
of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in
itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence,
and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and
size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore
multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the
matter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless
it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is
for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher
says (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged,
without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories--viz. the
definition with the absence of the thing defined.

Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of
matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or
which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
xxiv in Joan.) that "Christ filled five thousand men with five
loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest
of corn"--that is, by transformation of the nourishment.
Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or
that woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to
the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib.

Reply Obj. 2: The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam,
not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as
the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released
by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it
possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be
produced from the man's rib.

From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 4]

Whether the Woman Was Formed Immediately by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately
by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another
individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is
of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal
things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body
was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the
ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God.

Obj. 3: Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to
their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and
not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its
causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to
Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman
from the man's rib."

_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 2, ad 2), the natural
generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the
matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or
woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human
species cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of
nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary
course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man
from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument is verified when an individual is
begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the
same species.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not
know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the
woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by
the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of
the woman formed by them from the man's rib.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The first
creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it
made it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the
woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things
first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a
potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the
Creator.
_______________________

QUESTION 93

THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN
(In Nine Articles)

We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is
said to be made "to the image and likeness of God." There are under
this head nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the image of God is in man?

(2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?

(3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?

(4) Whether the image of God is in every man?

(5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence,
or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?

(6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?

(7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and
acts?

(8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every
object?

(9) Of the difference between "image" and "likeness."
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 1]

Whether the Image of God Is in Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it
is written (Isa. 40:18): "To whom have you likened God? or what image
will you make for Him?"

Obj. 2: Further, to be the image of God is the property of the
First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 1:15): "Who is the
image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature."
Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man.

Obj. 3: Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can]. Synod.
Ancyr.) that "an image is of the same species as that which it
represents"; and he also says that "an image is the undivided and
united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But
there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a
comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no
image of God in man.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): "Let Us make man to Our
own image and likeness."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image
exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness,
there is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness
is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to
likeness--namely, that it is copied from something else. For an
"image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of
something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like
and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg,
because it is not copied from it.

But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is
not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in
a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a
perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which
it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness
to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not
one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy.
Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect
likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says
that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to"
signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.

Reply Obj. 1: The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man.
Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But
God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.

Reply Obj. 2: The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of
God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is
said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to
be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by
reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to
God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists
in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is
of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an
alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as
Augustine says explains in _De decem Chordis_ (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De
Tempore).

Reply Obj. 3: As unity means absence of division, a species is said
to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not
only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to
a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with
God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which
adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect
image.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 2]

Whether the Image of God Is to Be Found in Irrational Creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in
irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are
contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of
rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of
God is to be found in irrational creatures.

Obj. 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it
approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine
goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God.

Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more
it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness
than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things
together are called "very good" (Gen. 1:31). Therefore the whole
universe is to the image of God, and not only man.

Obj. 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the
world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore the
whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational
creature.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's
excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by
giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of
the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's
image.

_I answer that,_ Not every likeness, not even what is copied from
something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be
only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does
not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a
worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image,
merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white
like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing;
for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature
of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king
exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and
chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper.
Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species."

Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate
difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly
because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because
they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83,
qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all
creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." It is clear, therefore, that
intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's
image.

Reply Obj. 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what is
perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image,
so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in
some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects
are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they
happen (_contingit_) to be so, but not absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as
regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is
involved in the idea of an image.

Reply Obj. 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the
intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but
intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is
found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for
the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly
divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore,
when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of
God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's
image, but that the other parts are excluded.

Reply Obj. 4: Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the
likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species
in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the
exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using
the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in
nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the
First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent,
like to the Supreme Wisdom.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 3]

Whether the Angels Are More to the Image of God Than Man Is?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not more to the image
of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon _de Imagine_ xliii
(de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature
besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that
the angels are more than man to the image of God.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so
much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between
Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a
creature is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore
the angels are not more to the image of God than man.

Obj. 3: Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it
is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not
admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing,
since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the
image of God than man.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is
called a "seal of resemblance" (Ezech. 28:12) because in him the
resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression.

_I answer that,_ We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we
may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is,
the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the
angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more
perfect, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, A.
8). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its
accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation
of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God
from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the
whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the
whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more
perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of
themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we
presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature;
otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as
in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God
than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are
more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man
is more like to God.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of
reason from the image of God; but not the angels.

Reply Obj. 2: As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of
bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than
another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human
soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had
said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in
likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." Wherefore this does
not mean that the angels are not more to God's image.

Reply Obj. 3: When we say that substance does not admit of more or
less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more
perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not
participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another;
nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different
individuals in a greater or lesser degree.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 4]

Whether the Image of God Is Found in Every Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in every
man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman is
the image [Vulg. glory] of man" (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is
an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual
is not an image of God.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): "Whom God foreknew, He
also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son." But
all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the
conformity of image.

Obj. 3: Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as
above explained (A. 1). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore
he loses the image of God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 38:7): "Surely man passeth as
an image."

_I answer that,_ Since man is said to be the image of God by reason
of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God
according to that in which he can best imitate God in his
intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly
in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see
that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man
possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and
this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is
common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually
knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in
the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God
perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory.
Wherefore on the words, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is
signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image
of "creation," of "re-creation," and of "likeness." The first is
found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the
blessed.

Reply Obj. 1: The image of God, in its principal signification,
namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman.
Hence after the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is
added, "Male and female He created them" (Gen. 1:27). Moreover it is
said "them" in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22)
remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one
individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in
man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as
God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle
had said that "man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the
glory of man," he adds his reason for saying this: "For man is not of
woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman
for man."

Reply Obj. 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in
the conformity of grace and glory.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 5]

Whether the Image of God Is in Man According to the Trinity of
Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man
as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide
ad Petrum i): "One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and
one is the image to which man was made." And Hilary (De Trin. v) says:
"Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity."
Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of
the Trinity of Persons.

Obj. 2: Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God
in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as "an
intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement." Gregory
of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture
says that "man was made to the image of God, it means that human
nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the
fulness of goodness." Now all these things belong more to the unity
of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the
image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the
unity of the Essence.

Obj. 3: Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it
is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to
the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural
reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the
Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above
(Q. 32, A. 1).

Obj. 4: Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the
Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi,
2) that "the Son alone is the image of the Father." Therefore, if in
man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not
be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The plurality of the
Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been
made to the image of God."

_I answer that,_ as we have seen (Q. 40, A. 2), the distinction of
the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations
of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but
in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being
produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way,
and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction
of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore
to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not
exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine
Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore,
say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the
Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God
Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons.

Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument would avail if the image of God in man
represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within
ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: "We
see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas
we believe rather than see that God is Trinity."

Reply Obj. 4: Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son
only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First,
because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it
would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son,
that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if
man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have
said, "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness"; but "to Thy
image." When, therefore, it is written, "He made him to the image of
God," the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the
Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine
Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it
is said that God "made man to His image," this can be understood in
two ways: first, so that this preposition "to" points to the term of
the making, and then the sense is, "Let Us make man in such a way
that Our image may be in him." Secondly, this preposition 'to' may
point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, "This book is made
(like) to that one." Thus the image of God is the very Essence of
God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put
for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an
image because thereby one Person imitates another.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 6]

Whether the Image of God Is in Man As Regards the Mind Only?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not only in
man's mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:7) that "the man is the
image . . . of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image
of God is to be observed not only in his mind.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Gen. 1:27): "God created man to His
own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He
created them." But the distinction of male and female is in the body.
Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the
mind.

Obj. 3: Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of
a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God
is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.

Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24)
there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or
imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual
vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by
reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like
reason there must be another trinity in the others.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24): "Be renewed in
the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given
to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new
man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): "Putting on the
new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to
the image of Him that created him," where the renewal which consists
in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore
to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only.

_I answer that,_ While in all creatures there is some kind of
likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness
of "image" as we have explained above (AA. 1,2); whereas in other
creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect
or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures;
wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational
creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the
rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a
"trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts,
the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the
reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the
way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents
something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace"
represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause
in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For
imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called
"traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the
land a trace of a hostile army.

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures
and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the
Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of
the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature,
rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the
representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only
in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A.
2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in
them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we
consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is
distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of
Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q. 28, A. 3); so we may say
that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word
in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there
exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation
of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the
principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a
certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced
them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite
nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species
points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a
house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the
maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end;
as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So
we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind;
but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace."

Reply Obj. 1: Man is called to the image of God; not that he is
essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his
mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the
king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as
existing in every part of man.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought
that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally.
They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those
born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a
third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded
from man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly
absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the
principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's
offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one
Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have
mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the
offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said,
"to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He
created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the
distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes,
since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction.
Wherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after saying, "According to the
image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male
nor female" [*these words are in reality from Gal. 3:28] (Vulg.
"neither Gentile nor Jew").

Reply Obj. 3: Although the image of God in man is not to be found in
his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among
terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is
adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say
that it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies
of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is
not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body;
but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the
image of God in the soul by way of a trace.

Reply Obj. 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we
may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in
corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body;
secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the
sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the
intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what
is seen.

Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in
the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the
penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination,
informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the
will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short
of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is
extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the
memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and
thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the
connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal
vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external
body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer;
in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is
preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these
reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not
suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the
two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or
spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from
the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 7]

Whether the Image of God Is to Be Found in the Acts of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in the
acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man
was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist,
and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify
an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's
acts.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in
the soul to these three things--mind, knowledge, and love. But mind
does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the
intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the
acts of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the
Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these
three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the
Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the
powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Obj. 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul.
But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does
not extend to the acts.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the
trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual
vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity
in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be
referred to actual vision.

_I answer that,_ As above explained (A. 2), a certain representation
of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image
of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it
where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the
species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct
from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the
Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul
word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De
Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity
is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the
knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal
word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of
acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in
its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of
the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still
more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.

Reply Obj. 1: Our being bears the image of God so far as it is proper
to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so
far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the
same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which
consists in mind, knowledge, and love.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in
the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a
certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself--namely, as
being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as
Augustine subsequently proves--De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though
knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things
in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory,
understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing;
and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as
though the first assignation were in part deficient.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said
to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we
actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they
are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our
memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual
retention of knowledge and love [*Cf. Q. 79, A. 7, ad 1]. "But
since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought
(for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that
interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly
consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And
by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual
thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites
this child with its parent." From which it is clear that he places
the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and
will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the
memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the
soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is
clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as
stated in the Sentences.

Reply Obj. 4: Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's
statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself,
ever understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean
that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he
excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think
of itself as actually distinct from other things." Thus it is clear
that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but
habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it
understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is
not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must
say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever
exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore,
Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to
the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and
intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was
in the soul from the beginning of its existence."
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 8]

Whether the Image of the Divine Trinity Is in the Soul Only by
Comparison with God As Its Object?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in
the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image
of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (A.
7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love
from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object.
Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards
any object.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek
trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without
separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the
consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of the Trinity
is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.

Obj. 3: Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If,
therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of
the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not
in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.

Obj. 4: Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to
the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2
Cor. 3:18): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory
to glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision.
Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal
things.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of
God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself,
loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also
remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less,
therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other
objects.

_I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 2, 7), image means a
likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a
representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image
of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of
species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a
creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated (AA. 6, 7), are
distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word
from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the
Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love
proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that
diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in
the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from
that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is
specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the
verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived
therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as
the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn
to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly
and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when
anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be
turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), that
"the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If
we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but,
nevertheless, rightly called the image of God." But this is due to
the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that
thereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority
quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).

Reply Obj. 1: For the notion of an image it is not enough that
something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe
what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of
God proceeds from knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 2: In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity,
not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the
contemplation of eternal things, "any third thing should be required
to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that
part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although
a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there,"
as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things
is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal
things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are
actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they
begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which
comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life
faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith.

Reply Obj. 3: The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be
in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love
as seen above (Q. 12, A. 12; Q. 56, A. 3; Q. 60, A. 5).
This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can
make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image
of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be so
obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in
those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured and disfigured," as
in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine
says (De Trin. xiv, 6).

Reply Obj. 4: By the vision of glory temporal things will be
seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong
to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6),
when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully
adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the
Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures.
_______________________

NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 9]

Whether "Likeness" Is Properly Distinguished from "Image"?

Objection 1: It would seem that "likeness" is not properly
distinguished from "image." For genus is not properly distinguished
from species. Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species:
because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not
conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness"
is not properly to be distinguished from "image."

Obj. 2: Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the
representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation
of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and
indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the
essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is
in other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi).

Obj. 3: Further, the image of God in man is threefold--the image of
nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (A. 4). But
innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is
incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is taken from the
memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from
innocence and righteousness."

Obj. 4: Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and
love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image.
Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image
consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of
virtue."

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider
that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and
"likeness," since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed."

_I answer that,_ Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality
causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15).
Now, since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and
adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true.
Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both
as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some
perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of
comparison between "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble
to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good
is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he
is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness
may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it
is something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1):
and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as
it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image
is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation
is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from
image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things,
and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than
the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be
seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit"
(namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. "But
the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties,
or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's
likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the
likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for
corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings.
But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the
expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being,
endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a
likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the
same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for
there is no virtue without love of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general
notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so far
as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects
the idea of "image."

Reply Obj. 2: The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as
representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the
intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to
general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.

Reply Obj. 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least,
in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural
"likeness" exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term
"image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness."

Reply Obj. 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to
the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as
virtue itself belongs to likeness.
_______________________

QUESTION 94

OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT
(In Four Articles)

We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as
regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first
there are two things to be considered:

(1) The condition of man as to his intellect;

(2) the condition of man as to his will.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?

(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?

(3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?

(4) Whether he could err or be deceived?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 1]

Whether the First Man Saw God Through His Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man saw God through His
Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine
Essence. But the first man, "while established in paradise, led a
life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If
man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have
been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" Therefore the
first man in paradise saw God through His Essence.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that
"the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." But
our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine
Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence.

Obj. 3: Further, the vision of God in His Essence is whereby God is
seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence
"saw God immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent.
iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies
obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity
resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God
through His Essence.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not
first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God
through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the
primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His
Essence.

_I answer that,_ The first man did not see God through His Essence if
we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be
said that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon
Adam" (Gen. 2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence
is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine
Essence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now
it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude,
since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness.
Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away
from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His
Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for
eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear
that he did not see God through His Essence.

Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now.
Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the
present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see
God through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the
vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the
vision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is,
and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it;
for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his
image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more
perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those
which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is
impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible
creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible
things. Now, it is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right." And
man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers
were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not
to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by
exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the
intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first
truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps God used to speak
to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a
ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the
experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the
Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God,
man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now.

Reply Obj. 1: Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect
happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of
the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of
happiness in a certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi,
18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the
first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in
the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward.

Reply Obj. 3: A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which,
and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example,
a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another
kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of
something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was
seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first
kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the
knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we
need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in
the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must
remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be
of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure
when compared with the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam
saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect:
secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is
impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being
preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God
in an enigma.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 2]

Whether Adam in the State of Innocence Saw the Angels Through Their
Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw
the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1):
"In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by
purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the
good angels."

Obj. 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the
knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body
which "is a load upon the soul," as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore
the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained
(Q. 89, A. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his
soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to
see separate substances.

Obj. 3: Further, one separate substance knows another separate
substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the
first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.

_On the contrary,_ The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours.
But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore
neither could Adam's soul.

_I answer that,_ The state of the human soul may be distinguished in
two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence;
and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished
from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of
the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption,
the state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state
of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's
soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern
the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a
"living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body--namely animal
life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the
body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we
have said above (A. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already
said (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1; Q. 89, A. 1) that since the soul is
adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is
fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by
turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was
becoming to the soul of the first man also.

Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees
of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first
is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its
powers on itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be
associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the
third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good,"
that is, to God.

In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to
itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the
intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external
things, as we have said above (Q. 87, A. 3): and so by the knowledge
thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act
through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself,
the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its
proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect
knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to
phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above
(Q. 55, A. 2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the
soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of
an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect
knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know
themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine
Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul
of the first man could not see the angels in their essence.
Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the
angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things
within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was
on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he
enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits."

This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply Obj. 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of the
knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact
that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural
object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in
our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.

Reply Obj. 3: The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at
knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as
we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others
in its own measure.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 3]

Whether the First Man Knew All Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man did not know all
things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired
species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not,
however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired
by experience, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1; and the first man had not
then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural species,
because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as
Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which
nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by infused species, it
would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from
things themselves.

Obj. 2: Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of
arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning,
knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time
according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all
things when he was first created.

Obj. 3: Further, the present state of life is given to man in order
that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul
seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have
advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge.
Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things.

_On the contrary,_ Man named the animals (Gen. 2:20). But names
should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the
animals' natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the
knowledge of all other things.

_I answer that,_ In the natural order, perfection comes before
imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in
potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God
created things not only for their own existence, but also that they
might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in
their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man
can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the
body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man
was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work
of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to
instruct and govern others.

Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the
first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge
of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are
whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles,
that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in
order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not
only those things which can be naturally known, but also things
surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a
supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of
faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was
endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was
necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those
things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not
necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first
man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some
individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream;
and the like.

Reply Obj. 1: The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely
infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as
the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different
from those given by nature.

Reply Obj. 2: To Adam, as being the first man, was due a degree of
perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is
above explained.

Reply Obj. 3: Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in
the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because
what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by
experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have
advanced as regards the number of things known, by further
revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover
there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in
merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another,
although he can be to another a principle of knowledge.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 4]

Whether Man in His First State Could Be Deceived?

Objection 1: It would seem that man in his primitive state could have
been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14) that "the woman
being seduced was in the transgression."

Obj. 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the woman
was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that
he had received the faculty of speech from God." But this was untrue.
Therefore before sin the woman was deceived.

Obj. 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from
us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not
changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state
of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of
what he saw, just as he is deceived now.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep
the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things
themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and
consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been
deceived, adhering to images as to realities.

Obj. 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other
men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above
(A. 3). So if anyone had told him what was false about these things,
he would have been deceived.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard
what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a
punishment of man condemned."

_I answer that,_ in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things;
namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as
though it were true, but without the assent of belief--or it may mean
a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of
these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended;
but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might
have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term
for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with
the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion
in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is
not to be blamed.

Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of
the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and
while it remained so, no evil could exist." Now it is clear that as
truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of
innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to
assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such
as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man,
though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect
the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.

This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by
virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower
faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment
to their action. And from what has preceded (Q. 85, A. 6), it is
clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true;
and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception
occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the
imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of
judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it
is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the
rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of
the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in
deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride.
For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not
have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already
acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of
self-conceit."

Reply Obj. 2: The woman thought that the serpent had received this
faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of
some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master
of the Sentences in this point.

Reply Obj. 3: Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of
the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would
not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to
judge the truth.

Reply Obj. 4: A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep;
as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's
proper action.

Reply Obj. 5: If anyone had said something untrue as regards future
contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive
state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed
that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to
entertain a false opinion.

It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from
above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge
did not extend.

If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted,
though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had
already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to
the Divine aid.
_______________________

QUESTION 95

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL--NAMELY, GRACE AND
RIGHTEOUSNESS
(In Four Articles)

We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning
which there are two points of treatment:

(1) the grace and righteousness of the first man;

(2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the first man was created in grace?

(2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?

(3) Whether he had all virtues?

(4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 1]

Whether the First Man Was Created in Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in
grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says
(1 Cor. 15:45): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last
Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace.
Therefore Christ alone was made in grace.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123)
[*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever
possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in
grace.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so
ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they
could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by
the discernment of righteousness." God thus first created men and
angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards
bestowed grace on them.

Obj. 4: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was
created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to
advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the
first man was not created in grace.

Obj. 5: Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the
recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place
between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence.
Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his
creation.

Obj. 6: Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from
glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes
glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.

_On the contrary,_ Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the
angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9):
"God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with
grace." Therefore man also was created in grace.

_I answer that,_ Some say that man was not created in grace; but that
it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of
the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.

But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was
endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created
in grace, according to Eccles. 7:30, "God made man right." For this
rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower
powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection
was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was
subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as
Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.
i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul
and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it
would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural
gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence
it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which
reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a
supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the
effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the
Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their
nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as
though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience."
Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the
soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the
soul through grace existing therein.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle in these words means to show that there
is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the
spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn
of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the
Apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no
spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as
regards the body.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not
disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted
with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the
faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness
directly after death.

Reply Obj. 3: This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels
or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed
grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before
being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being
so confirmed.

Reply Obj. 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion of
those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state
of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet
it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he
could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.

Reply Obj. 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there is
nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the
first moment of his existence.

Reply Obj. 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit
grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 2]

Whether Passions Existed in the Soul of the First Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions.
For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit"
(Gal. 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence.
Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the
soul.

Obj. 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body
was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.

Obj. 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral
virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the
passions were entirely excluded from him.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our
first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions
of the soul.

_I answer that,_ The passions of the soul are in the sensual
appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some
passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy;
others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the
primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any
good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion
with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither
had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed
then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard
present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had
at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed
in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in
ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is
not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall
and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's
judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some
extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was
wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the
soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of
the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of
innocence.

Reply Obj. 2: The human body was impassible in the state of innocence
as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as
will be explained later on (Q. 97, A. 2); likewise the soul was
impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of
reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away
the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he
ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in _Ethic._
iii, 11.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 3]

Whether Adam Had All the Virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For
some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate
concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by
fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed
in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.

Obj. 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which
have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with
fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as
stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.

Obj. 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed.
Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state
of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither
did those virtues exist.

Obj. 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not;
as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every
virtue.

Obj. 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state
of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to
be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra
Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the
slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty,
restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness."

_I answer that,_ in the state of innocence man in a certain sense
possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes.
For it was shown above (A. 1) that such was the rectitude of the
primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers
to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby
reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according
to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the
Virtues (I-II, Q. 63, A. 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the
primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every
virtue.

It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do
not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these
virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit
and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply
imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If
such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive
state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which
is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed.
For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the
Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final
beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state,
both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies
imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state,
could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for
instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which
is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and
unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive
state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but
not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if
there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his
neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in
accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards what
is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally;
as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong" (Ethic.
iv, 9).

Reply Obj. 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue
superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which
happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are
_per se_ competent to moderate the passions.

Reply Obj. 2: Passions which have evil for their object were
incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil
be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But
passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with
the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could
hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the
virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive
state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions
which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions
only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in
habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other
virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but
to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but
also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also
to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the
primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner,
fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating
sorrow and fear.

Reply Obj. 3: appears from what has been said above.

Reply Obj. 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as
a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice
of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In
another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a
certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did
not possess perseverance.

Reply Obj. 5: appears from what has been said above.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 4]

Whether the Actions of the First Man Were Less Meritorious Than Ours
Are?

Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were
less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the
mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are
more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence.
Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace
is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious.

Obj. 2: Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for
it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive
lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of
virtue is the difficult and the good." But there is more strife and
difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.

Obj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would
not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now,
when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in
the primitive state.

_On the contrary,_ if such were the case, man would be better off
after sinning.

_I answer that,_ Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways.
First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured
corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the
enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions
proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree
of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree
is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two
mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree
than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate
degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in
proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit
corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for
created good.

We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were
more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the
degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more
copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like
manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because,
as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater
works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason
for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a
small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with
difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.

Reply Obj. 1: After sin man requires grace for more things than
before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even
before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief
reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also
for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.

Reply Obj. 2: Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit
according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above
explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after
what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is
caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person
performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an
arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to
him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the
deed to satisfy for sin.

Reply Obj. 3: The first man would not have gained merit in resisting
temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not
possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not
grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the
primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our
present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist
temptation even without grace.
_______________________

QUESTION 96

OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE
(In Four Articles)

We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of
innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?

(2) Whether he was master over all creatures?

(3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?

(4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 1]

Whether Adam in the State of Innocence Had Mastership Over the
Animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had
no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix,
14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of
the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not
have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals.
Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the
animals.

Obj. 2: Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another
should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are
hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all
animals were not brought under the mastership of man.

Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St.
Jerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as
quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Gen. 1:26]: "God gave man
mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of
them: for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to
man." Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to
make use of his mastership.

Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command
is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no
mastership over the irrational animals.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): "Let him have dominion
over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts
of the earth" [Vulg."and the whole earth"].

_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 95, A. 1) for his disobedience
to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which
should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before
man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject
to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be
proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for
just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of
procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the
sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect),
so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the
imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of
the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and
man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping
with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals.
Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild
animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural
right. Secondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence
which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as
man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these
are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, this is proved from a
property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a
certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to
certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence
as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is
subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection
of other animals to man is proved to be natural.

Reply Obj. 1: A higher power can do many things that an inferior
power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is
naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to
animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for
instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals.

Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some, those animals which now are
fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not
only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this
is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by
man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of
others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor
does Bede's gloss on Gen. 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given
as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have
been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not,
however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of
man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the
mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this
Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in
regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to
the trained falcon.

Reply Obj. 3: In the state of innocence man would not have had any
bodily need of animals--neither for clothing, since then they were
naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of
concupiscence--nor for food, since they fed on the trees of
paradise--nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for
that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental
knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God
led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of
their respective natures.

Reply Obj. 4: All animals by their natural instinct have a certain
participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact
that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all
animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present
state some domestic animals obey him.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 2]

Whether Man Had Mastership Over All Other Creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would
not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel
naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 8), "corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy
angels." Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state
of innocence.

Obj. 2: Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are
nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these do not naturally
obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore,
since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership,
it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over
plants.

Obj. 3: Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But
man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for
this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii).
Therefore man had no dominion over them.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): "That he may have
dominion over . . . every creature."

_I answer that,_ Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so
according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way
he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four
things in man: his _reason,_ which makes him like to the angels; his
_sensitive powers,_ whereby he is like the animals; his _natural
forces,_ which liken him to the plants; and _the body itself,_ wherein
he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of
a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over
the angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all creatures," we
must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over
the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey
reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in
the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by
commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is
master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of
innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted
not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them
without hindrance.

The answers to the objections appear from the above.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 3]

Whether Men Were Equal in the State of Innocence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence all would
have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): "Where there is no
sin, there is no inequality." But in the state of innocence there
was no sin. Therefore all were equal.

Obj. 2: Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love,
according to Ecclus. 13:19, "Every beast loveth its like; so also
every man him that is nearest to himself." Now in that state there
was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace.
Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence.

Obj. 3: Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the
cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of
God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on
the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of
nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which
would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 13:1): "The things which are
of God, are well ordered" [Vulg."Those that are, are ordained of
God"]. But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Order disposes things equal and unequal in
their proper place." Therefore in the primitive state, which was
most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed.

_I answer that,_ We must needs admit that in the primitive state there
would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because
generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age;
for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have
been sterile.

Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to
righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of
his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or
less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a
greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others.

There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was
not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from
exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was
dependent on food wherewith to sustain life.

So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the
stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and
also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so
that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been
no defect or fault either in soul or body.

Reply Obj. 1: By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality
as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some
are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.

Reply Obj. 2: Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet
between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than
between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father
naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother;
although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by
him.

Reply Obj. 3: The cause of inequality could be on the part of God;
not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He
would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the
more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part
of nature as above described, without any defect of nature.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 4]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Master Over Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would
not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
15): "God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His
image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men,
but over cattle."

Obj. 2: Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would
not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject
to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Gen.
3:16): "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power." Therefore in the
state of innocence man would not have been subject to man.

Obj. 3: Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one
of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state
of innocence, "where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could
desire," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man would
not have been master over man in the state of innocence.

_On the contrary,_ The condition of man in the state of innocence was
not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the
angels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of
"Dominations." Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state
of innocence that one man should be subject to another.

_I answer that,_ Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed
to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is
subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a
general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who
has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a
master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of
men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is
founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that
the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning
of the _Metaphysics,_ whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that
one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one
whose master he is, to his own--namely the master's use. And since
every man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it
is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be
one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain
inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence
such a mastership could not have existed between man and man.

But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either
towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of
mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man
and man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social
being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social
life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless
under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many,
as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore
the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the _Politics,_ that
wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at
the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in
knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these
gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. 4:10,
"As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to
another." Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): "Just men
command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of
counsel": and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "The natural order of things
requires this; and thus did God make man."

From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on
the first-mentioned mode of mastership.
_______________________

QUESTION 97

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE
(In Four Articles)

We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man:
first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as
regards the preservation of the species.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?

(2) Whether he was impassible?

(3) Whether he stood in need of food?

(4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Immortal?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not
immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But
if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined.
Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.

Obj. 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically
distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there
can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first
man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present
state.

Obj. 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence,
this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature,
for since nature does not change within the same species, he would
also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to
grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to
Wis. 10:2: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have
regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore
man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

Obj. 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward,
according to Apoc. 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not
created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward.
Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:12): "By sin death came into
the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin.

_I answer that,_ A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First,
on the part of matter--that is to say, either because it possesses
no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in
potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things
as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is
incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible,
yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from
corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as
Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul of such a
powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds
to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption."
Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient
cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state
of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19
[*Work of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that
he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was
indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but
by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby
it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it
remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for
since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter,
as above explained (Q. 76, A. 1), it was most properly endowed at
the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner
surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter.

Reply Obj. 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural
incorruptibility and immortality.

Reply Obj. 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural to
the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace
as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not
recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this
was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature
was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further
on (III, Q. 14, A. 4, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 4: The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs
from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of
innocence.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 2]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Passible?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was
passible. For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of
innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been
passible.

Obj. 2: Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the
state of innocence, according to Gen. 2:21, "God cast a deep sleep
upon Adam." Therefore he would have been passible.

Obj. 3: Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a rib
out of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the
cutting out of part of his body.

Obj. 4: Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally
passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in
contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have
suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible.

_On the contrary,_ Had man been passible, he would have been also
corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive
suffering wastes the very substance."

_I answer that,_ "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its
proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from
its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in
nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one
thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly,
"passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change,
even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus
understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second
sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive
both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both
in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his
passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.

Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since
sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition,
but are ordered to his natural welfare.

Reply Obj. 3: As already explained (Q. 92, A. 3, ad 2), the rib was
in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who
is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any
natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the
separation of the rib.

Reply Obj. 4: Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved
from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his
reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by
Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful
nature could come upon him unawares.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 3]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Had Need of Food?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not
require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has
lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible.
Therefore he had no need of food.

Obj. 2: Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment
involves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it does
not appear how food could be needful to him.

Obj. 3: Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam
could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would
not have died. Therefore he did not require food.

Obj. 4: Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the
surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore
it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:16): "Of every tree in
paradise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat."

_I answer that,_ In the state of innocence man had an animal life
requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual
life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe
that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul
by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls--that is,
as giving life to the body; whence it is written (Gen. 2:7): "Man was
made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body.
But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to
itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual
immaterial power.

Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the
body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called
"animal" [*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 seqq.], through
having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in
these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is
the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food,
generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the
state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection,
the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what
properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone,
impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be
called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require
food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19
[*Works of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine): "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained
by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." For
we have explained (A. 1) that the immortality of the primitive state
was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any
intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the
body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the
entire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food.

Reply Obj. 2: A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on
the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing
nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible,
but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion
conduced to the perfection of the nature.

Reply Obj. 3: If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he
also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the
same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil,
and to eat of every other tree of Paradise.

Reply Obj. 4: Some say that in the state of innocence man would not
have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been
nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as
implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there
was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be
decorous and suitable to the state.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 4]

Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Acquired Immortality
by the Tree of Life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the
cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as
an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was
corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is
changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree
of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality.

Obj. 2: Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other
natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused
immortality, this would have been natural immortality.

Obj. 3: Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable,
that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the
Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4).

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 3:22): "Lest perhaps he put
forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for
ever." Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work
of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.
Augustine): "A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the
body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he
been allowed to eat of the tree of life."

_I answer that,_ The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of
immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe
that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of
life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the
lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the
soul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with
food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided
with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect,
as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that
the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the
humor already existing, lessens the specific active power: as water
added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is
added, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes
watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force
of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of
the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what
suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not
suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in
old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body
declines, and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect
man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was
to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting
from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to
slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of
old age"; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous
author], among the supposititious works of St. Augustine) "The tree of
life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption."

Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the
soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life,
nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to
immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from
the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree
of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of
living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is
manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect;
therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life
was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and
when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a
spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.

From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first
proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality;
while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off
corruption, according to the explanation above given.
_______________________

QUESTION 98

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES
(In Two Articles)

We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and,
first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under
the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been
generation?

(2) Whether generation would have been through coition?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [Q. 98, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Generation Existed?

Objection 1: It would seem there would have been no generation in the
state of innocence. For, as stated in _Phys._ v, 5, "corruption is
contrary to generation." But contraries affect the same subject: also
there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence.
Therefore neither would there have been generation.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the
species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore
there is no generation in those individual things which last for
ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever.
Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no
generation.

Obj. 3: Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the
multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid
confusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the
animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights
when the human race increased by generation. This is against the
natural law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore
says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in
the state of innocence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:28): "Increase and multiply,
and fill the earth." But this increase could not come about save by
generation, since the original number of mankind was two only.
Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence.

_I answer that,_ In the state of innocence there would have been
generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race;
otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great
blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by
his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and
incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while
his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's
purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and
incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of
nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a
time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were,
subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist,
nature's purpose would become void.

Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and
permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of
nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which
natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible
substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the
individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief
purpose of nature.

Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the
naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is
incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should
be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature,
Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for
the multiplication of the human race, He established the begetting of
offspring even in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence the human body was in itself
corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul.
Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was
not to be deprived thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: Although generation in the state of innocence might not
have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would
have been required for the multiplication of the individual.

Reply Obj. 3: In our present state a division of possessions is
necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as
community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher
says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will
of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife
they would have used in common, according to each one's need, those
things of which they were masters--a state of things to be observed
even now among many good men.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 98, Art. 2]

Whether in the State of Innocence There Would Have Been Generation by
Coition?

Objection 1: It would seem that generation by coition would not have
existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was
"like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, when men
will be like the angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as
is written Matt. 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would there have
been generation by coition.

Obj. 2: Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect
development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before
sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which
was not the case according to Scripture (Gen. 4:1).

Obj. 3: Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time,
man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which
he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man
refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason
of sin, according to Ps. 48:13: "Man, when he was in honor, did not
understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to
them." Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such
intercourse of man and woman.

Obj. 4: Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no
corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse.
Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of
innocence.

_On the contrary,_ God made man and woman before sin (Gen. 1, 2). But
nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned,
there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of
sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a
help to man (Gen. 2:18, 20). But she is not fitted to help man except
in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective
help in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation
also in the state of innocence.

_I answer that,_ Some of the earlier doctors, considering the
nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state,
concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have
been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom.
Opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been
multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied without
coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made
man male and female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of
generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But
this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired
nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is
natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even
before sin, as above explained (Q. 97, A. 3), just as it is natural
to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So
we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use,
as other members had, before sin.

Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present
state of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from
nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation
there is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever
there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the
passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose
of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The
second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive
concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have
existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason.
Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from
supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence.
All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will,
without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body."

Reply Obj. 1: In paradise man would have been like an angel in his
spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the
resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and
body. Wherefore there is no parallel.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first
parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin
they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the
woman; or because, having received the general Divine command
relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to
time.

Reply Obj. 3: Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as
it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate
concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would
have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight
of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight
have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature
and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of
concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such
pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen
sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from
cleaving to it immoderately. By "immoderately" I mean going beyond
the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure
in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence
lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the
words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the
state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind.
Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of
innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not
because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate
desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust.

Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state
"intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity;
this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just
as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of
pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the
union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action."
_______________________

QUESTION 99

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY
(In Two Articles)

We must now consider the condition of the offspring--first, as
regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full
powers of the body immediately after birth?

(2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 99, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Had Perfect
Strength of Body As to the Use of Its Members Immediately After Birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its
members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit.
et Remiss. i, 38): "This weakness of the body befits their weakness
of mind." But in the state of innocence there would have been no
weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of
body in infants.

Obj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to
use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore
much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at
birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not
that strength.

Obj. 3: Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes
affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their
limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something
pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted,
which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of
innocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their
limbs.

Obj. 4: Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that
of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no
weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such
weakness in infancy.

_On the contrary,_ Everything generated is first imperfect. But in
the state of innocence children would have been begotten by
generation. Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect
in bodily size and power.

_I answer that,_ By faith alone do we hold truths which are above
nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making
any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in
those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by
Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is
befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not
have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after
birth. Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a
larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable
humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are
instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On
the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by
Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth.

Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that "God made man right"
(Eccles. 7:30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As,
therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the
human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it
impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands.
Now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are
befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every
season of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not
have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the
purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts
befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe
in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of
infancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that "even when close
to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to
suckle."

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs
immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more
perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain,
and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that
a small amount of strength suffices them.

Reply Obj. 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that
they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and
only what was befitting to their state of life.

Reply Obj. 4: In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet
not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have
been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not
senile defects leading to corruption.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 99, Art. 2]

Whether, in the Primitive State, Women Would Have Been Born?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the primitive state woman would
not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii,
3) that woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product
outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have
been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women
would not have been born.

Obj. 2: Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by
insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot
burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male.
Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was
not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the
woman, it seems that males would always have been born.

Obj. 3: Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to
the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been
sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact
that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of
innocence, there was no need for women to be born.

_On the contrary,_ Nature's process in generation would have been in
harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But God
established male and female in human nature, as it is written (Gen.
1, 2). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would
have been born.

_I answer that,_ Nothing belonging to the completeness of human
nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as
different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also
diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore
in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten.

Reply Obj. 1: Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a
product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual
case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above
explained (Q. 92, A. 1, ad 2).

Reply Obj. 2: The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a
defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection
proposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the
Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): "The northern wind
favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of
females": sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the
parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the
child). Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when
the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of
the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified.

Reply Obj. 3: The offspring would have been begotten to an animal
life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that
all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it
seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal
number.
_______________________

QUESTION 100

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS
(In Two Articles)

We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to
righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?

(2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 100, Art. 1]

Whether Men Would Have Been Born in a State of Righteousness?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence men would
not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St.
Victor says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have
begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's
righteousness."

Obj. 2: Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle
says (Rom. 5:16, 21). Now grace is not transfused from one to
another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone.
Therefore children would not have been born righteous.

Obj. 3: Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not
transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness
have been transmitted from parents, to the children.

_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man
did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with
righteousness together with the rational soul."

_I answer that,_ Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself.
Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the
species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in
its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of
innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in
parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man
was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species,
not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift
conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the
fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is
opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature,
wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for
this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their
parents as regards original righteousness.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring,
not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act
thereof.

Reply Obj. 2: Some say that children would have been born, not with
the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with
original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness,
which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made,
consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which
subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q. 95,
A. 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original
righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have
said above that the first man was created in grace (Q. 95, A. 1).
This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not
have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been
conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the
same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent,
is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.

From this the reply to the third objection is clear.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 100, Art. 2]

Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born
Confirmed in Righteousness?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says
(Moral. iv) on the words of Job 3:13: "For now I should have been
asleep, etc.": "If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent,
he would not have begotten 'children of hell'; no children would have
been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the
Redeemer." Therefore all would have been born confirmed in
righteousness.

Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first
parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have
been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have
been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children would have been
born confirmed in righteousness.

Obj. 3: Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the
first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin.
Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his
descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving
righteousness.

Obj. 4: Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the
others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable
henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been
confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten
children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born
confirmed in righteousness.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would
have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first
parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their
descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which
they would have been condemned." From which words we gather that even
if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might
have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed
in righteousness.

_I answer that,_ It does not seem possible that in the state of
innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.
For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater
perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the
parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed
in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in
righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God;
and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the
essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is
desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to
the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special
privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God.
And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in
His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his
animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation.
Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in
righteousness.

Reply Obj. 1: If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten
"children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin
which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will
they could have become "children of hell." If, however, they did not
become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have
been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine
Providence preserving them free from sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only
as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows:
"It seems that if they had lived, etc."

Reply Obj. 3: This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to
have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted.
For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have
been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the
case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have
transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which
is only in the blessed.

Reply Obj. 4: There is no comparison between man and the angels; for
man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas
the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of
the angels (Q. 64, A. 2).
_______________________

QUESTION 101

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE
(In Two Articles)

We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge.
Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born
with perfect knowledge?

(2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment
of birth?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 101, Art. 1]

Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born with
Perfect Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have
begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect
knowledge (Q. 94, A. 3). Therefore children would have been born
of him with perfect knowledge.

Obj. 2: Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf.
I-II, Q. 85, A. 3). But ignorance is privation of knowledge.
Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as
soon as they were born.

Obj. 3: Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness
from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it
directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with
knowledge.

_On the contrary,_ The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet
on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been
in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have
been without knowledge at birth.

_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 99, A. 1), as regards belief in
matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so,
when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course
of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the
senses, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6); and for this
reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its
proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed
at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We
must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would
not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they
would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or
learning.

Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident
of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and
instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like
himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were
natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some
particular time; and this would not have been in children from their
birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at
that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only
nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in
the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii).

Reply Obj. 3: Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct
them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal
principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been
much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise
their knowledge of other universal principles.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 101, Art. 2]

Whether Children Would Have Had Perfect Use of Reason at Birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that children would have had perfect use
of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason
in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the
body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written,
"The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15).
Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom,
children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth.

Obj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural
powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more,
therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use
of reason at birth.

_On the contrary,_ In all things produced by generation nature
proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would
not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.

_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 84, A. 7), the use of reason
depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers;
wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive
powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in
those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are
situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are
hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and
likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered
in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain;
wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of
reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have
had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on
in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have
now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained
above regarding the use of their limbs (Q. 99, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1: The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because
it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to
man at all ages.

Reply Obj. 2: Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use
of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the
fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be
observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in
man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Q. 99, A.
1).
_______________________

QUESTION 102

OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE
(In Four Articles)

We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there
are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?

(2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?

(3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?

(4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 1]

Whether Paradise Is a Corporeal Place?

Objection 1: It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place.
For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on Gen. 2:8] says that "paradise reaches to
the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description,
both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised
up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which
would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise
(Gen. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources
elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore
paradise is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 3: Further, although men have explored the entire habitable
world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore
apparently it is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 4: Further, the tree of life is described as growing in
paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is
written of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold
on her" (Prov. 3:18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but
a spiritual place.

Obj. 5: Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of
paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal
trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees
of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore
paradise was not a corporeal place.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three
general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place
merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others,
whose opinion, I confess, pleases me, hold that paradise was both
corporeal and spiritual."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing
prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise;
so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having
there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set
down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this
method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a
foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so
paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the
east, its name being the Greek for garden." It was fitting that it
should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated
in the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right
hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and
the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God
should place the earthly paradise in the east.

Reply Obj. 1: Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious
sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to
the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says
(Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually even
temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies,
which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made of
the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly
bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to
the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to
be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the
moon--that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind,
and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on
such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human
dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the
human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of
the earth.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable
that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose
sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground,
and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the
case with some other streams?"

Reply Obj. 3: The situation of paradise is shut off from the
habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which
cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography
make no mention of it.

Reply Obj. 4: The tree of life is a material tree, and so called
because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above
stated (Q. 97, A. 4). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the
rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified
Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was
a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after
eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent
punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil
of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the
free-will as some say.

Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3),
the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their
seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants,
both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to
other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually
produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what
is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the
six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation.
Whence our text reads: "The Lord God had planted a paradise of
pleasure from the beginning" (Gen. 2:8).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 2]

Whether Paradise Was a Place Adapted to Be the Abode of Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to
be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to
beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence
were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed--that is, the empyrean
heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been
there also.

Obj. 2: Further, if some definite place were required for man's
abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of
the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven,
which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of
heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no
need for any other place than the one provided for other animals.
Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man.

Obj. 3: Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after
sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted
as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no
purpose.

Obj. 4: Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place
for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an
even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator--a
situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes
vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was
not a fit dwelling-place for man.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise
was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to
God's image."

_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 97, A. 1), Man was incorruptible
and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to
incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power
preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be
corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is
corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above
explained (Q. 97, A. 4), and man was able to ward off such corruption
by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the
chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such
corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In
paradise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was permeated with the all pervading
brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked
with ever-flowering plants." Whence it is clear that paradise was
most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his
original state of immortality.

Reply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places,
and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two
conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as
Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through
spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature
should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding
over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state
of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability.
Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the
angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's
nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal
creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his
beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the
empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the
state of his final beatitude.

Reply Obj. 2: It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place
is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some
particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual
substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as
regards both his body and his soul--that is, inasmuch as in his soul
was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This
could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says
(De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise";
although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither
by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the
complicity of the devil.

Reply Obj. 3: Paradise did not become useless through being
unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred
on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's
kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that
Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.

Reply Obj. 4: Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line
are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of
the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold
there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot,
because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants,
it does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle
distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable
on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even
those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are
extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But
whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was
situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or
elsewhere.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 3]

Whether Man Was Placed in Paradise to Dress It and Keep It?

Objection 1: It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to
dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin
would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the
cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gen. 3:17).
Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear
of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of
trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep
paradise.

Obj. 3: Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it,
man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not
contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in
paradise to dress and keep it.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2: 15): "The Lord God took man
and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it."

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these
words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense
that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and
keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once
relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases
to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly,
that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have
involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on
account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor
would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have
striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin.
All of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to
man's benefit, and not conversely.

Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 4]

Whether Man Was Created in Paradise?

Objection 1: It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the
angel was created in his dwelling-place--namely, the empyrean heaven.
But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it
seems that man was created in paradise.

Obj. 2: Further, other animals remain in the place where they are
produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth
from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise
after he was created (Q. 97, A. 4). Therefore he was created in
paradise.

Obj. 3: Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than
woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:15): "God took man and
placed him in paradise."

_I answer that,_ Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the
incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility
was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God.
Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human
nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him
there to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having
attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven.

Reply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels
as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there.

In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places
befit those animals in their nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own
dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which
her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been
born in paradise, where their parents were already.
_______________________

TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ. 103-119)
_______________________

QUESTION 103

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL
(In Eight Articles)

Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we
now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the
government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of
this government. Under the first head there are eight points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether the world is governed by someone?

(2) What is the end of this government?

(3) Whether the world is governed by one?

(4) Of the effects of this government?

(5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?

(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

(7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?

(8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 1]

Whether the World Is Governed by Anyone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone.
For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for
an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world
do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their
end. Therefore the world is not governed.

Obj. 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved towards
an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has
stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.

Obj. 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature
to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of
government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain
necessity determined to something particular in their actions and
movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, O Father,
governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De
Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal."

_I answer that,_ Certain ancient philosophers denied the government
of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an
opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by
observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature
things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not
be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards
good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we
observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if
we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of
him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii),
quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a
consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (Q.
44, A. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), was the cause of the production of things in
existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is
not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things
without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate
perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it
belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence,
so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two
ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational
creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the
means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an
end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow
directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the
arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end
shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the
unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows
clearly that the world is governed by some reason.

Reply Obj. 2: In all created things there is a stable element,
at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under
movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both:
because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing,
would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand,
as will be explained later (Q. 104, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: The natural necessity inherent in those beings
which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression
from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an
arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression
from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference,
inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature,
while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their
nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the
movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural
necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 2]

Whether the End of the Government of the World Is Something Outside
the World?

Objection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the
world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the
government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought.
But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself;
thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in
him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not
outside, but within the things themselves.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are
an operation; some are a work"--i.e. produced by an operation. But
nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and
operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the
end of the government of things.

Obj. 3: Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order,
and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of
things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the
peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the
government of the world is not an extrinsic good.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made
all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the
universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to
them.

_I answer that,_ As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning,
it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know
their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is
something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what
has been expounded above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2), that we must conclude
that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved
by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end;
wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular
good; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good;
Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very
essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by
participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe
there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore
that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good
outside the universe.

Reply Obj. 1: We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form
existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something
done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house;
thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer
of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore
nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to
which it is directed.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various
arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as
the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other
arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not
the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that
something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as
possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say
that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him.
Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the
end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and
represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to
an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.

Reply Obj. 3: A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of
the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate
end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the
order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in _Metaph._
xii, Did. xi, 10.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 3]

Whether the World Is Governed by One?

Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For
we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the
universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but
some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways.
Therefore the world is not governed by one.

Obj. 2: Further, things which are governed by one do not act against
each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler;
which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and
act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries.
Therefore the world is not governed by one.

Obj. 3: Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it
"is better that two should be together than one" (Eccles. 4:9).
Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.

_On the contrary,_ We confess our belief in one God and one Lord,
according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 8:6): "To us there is
but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain
to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the
name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (Q. 13,
A. 8). Therefore the world is governed by one.

_I answer that,_ We must of necessity say that the world is governed
by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that
which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government
of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best
government is the government by one. The reason of this is that
government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the
end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of
goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as
all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which they
would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence
we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the
dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the
intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the
proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be
the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united.
Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause
of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better
governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the
government of the world, being the best form of government, must be
by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi,
10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of
authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."

Reply Obj. 1: Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the
mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity
of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of
the universe (Q. 47, AA. 1,2; Q. 48, A. 2), and not by a diversity of
governors.

Reply Obj. 2: Although contraries do not agree with each other in
their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so
far as they are included in the one order of the universe.

Reply Obj. 3: If we consider individual goods, then two are better
than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is
possible.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 4]

Whether the Effect of Government Is One or Many?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one effect of the
government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is
that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the
good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an
army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.

Obj. 2: Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the
world is governed by one as we have proved (A. 3). Therefore also the
effect of this government is but one.

Obj. 3: Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of
the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many
things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore
we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all
and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government
belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of
the Divine government.

_I answer that,_ The effect of any action may be judged from its end;
because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected.
Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to
the participation and similarity of which all things tend.
Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken
in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way
there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good.
Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered
on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made
like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the
government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things;
first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature
becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this,
that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature
becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two
effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness,
and the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the
individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this
way they are without number.

Reply Obj. 1: The order of the universe includes both the
preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards
these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better
than another; and one is moved by another.

From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other
two objections.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 5]

Whether All Things Are Subject to the Divine Government?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all things are subject to the
Divine government. For it is written (Eccles. 9:11): "I saw that
under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the
strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor
to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to
the Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things
which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God hath no care
for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs.
Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

Obj. 3: Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by
another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is
master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by
another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore
all things are not subject to the Divine government.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only
heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the
lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant,
the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of
their nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government.

_I answer that,_ For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He
is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection;
and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only
of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being,
as proved above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing
which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not
subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of
the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those
things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the
Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown (A. 2).
Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine
goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 44,
A. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), so it is impossible for anything to escape from
the Divine government.

Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the
corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human
affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are
represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth" (Ezech. 9:9).

Reply Obj. 1: These things are said to be under the sun which are
generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such
things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in
such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And
the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things
proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless
corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend
to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of
knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes
the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance
and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say
absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and
chance," that is to say, that defects may be found in these things
according to some order of time.

Reply Obj. 2: Government implies a certain change effected by the
governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a
movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down
_Phys._ iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is
an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously,
even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one
art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed
according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of
themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are
governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God
Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they
are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and
prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which
do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence,
when the Apostle says that "God hath no care for oxen," he does not
wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards
the way in which rational creatures are governed.

Reply Obj. 3: The rational creature governs itself by its intellect
and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the
Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby
the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it
requires to be governed by God.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 6]

Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that all things are governed by God
immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves
the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The
first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly
things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to
the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over
generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to
certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions.
Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.

Obj. 2: Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if
possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But
God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause.
Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.

Obj. 3: Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it
seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus
an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything
himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time,
requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all
things immediately.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower
and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of
greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational
spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the
good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself."

_I answer that,_ In government there are two things to be considered;
the design of government, which is providence itself; and the
execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs
all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some
things by means of others.

The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness,
so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of
goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order,
design or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists
in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not
the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but
who can consider the least details; and so on in other things.
Therefore we must say that God has the design of the government of
all things, even of the very least.

But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection
by government, this government will be so much the better in the
degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a
greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the
cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself.
Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be
causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts
knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching
others.

Reply Obj. 1: Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that
God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of
government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence,
which is the design of government, into three parts.

Reply Obj. 2: If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the
perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would
not be accomplished by one.

Reply Obj. 3: That an earthly king should have ministers to execute
his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his
dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is
brought into greater evidence.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 7]

Whether Anything Can Happen Outside the Order of the Divine
Government?

Objection 1: It would seem possible that something may occur outside
the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol.
iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens
outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no
evil exists.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing that is in accordance with the
pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing
occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that
there is nothing fortuitous and casual.

Obj. 3: Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and
unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design.
Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine
government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and
nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for
something to occur outside the order of the Divine government.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Esther 13:9): "O Lord, Lord,
almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that
can resist Thy will."

_I answer that,_ It is possible for an effect to result outside the
order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the
universal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside
the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding
cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first
universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the
nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the
food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on
till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the
first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in
general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of
the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of
view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence
considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily
come back to that order as regards some other cause.

Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is
ever founded on good, as shown above (Q. 48, A. 3). Therefore
something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of
some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the
Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.

Reply Obj. 2: Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some
particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the
order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance,"
as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).

Reply Obj. 3: Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared
to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not
as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine
government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of
some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to
the Divine government.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 8]

Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?

Objection 1: It would seem possible that some resistance can be made
to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Isa. 3:8):
"Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."

Obj. 2: Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel
against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's
commands, no one would be justly punished by God.

Obj. 3: Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine
government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things
rebel against the order of the Divine government.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing
that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this
sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all
sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.

_I answer that,_ We may consider the order of Divine providence in
two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing
cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some
particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.

Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the
Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the
fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to
good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good
only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 3;
A. 5, ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or
voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover;
as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but
an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether
natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of
its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things
sweetly."

Reply Obj. 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act against
God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government;
for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but
because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their
nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.

Reply Obj. 2 is clear from the above.

Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that one thing opposes another, it
follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular
cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all
things.
_______________________

QUESTION 104

THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT
(In Four Articles)

We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular;
concerning which four points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?

(2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?

(3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?

(4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 1]

Whether Creatures Need to Be Kept in Being by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in
being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in
being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept
from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot
not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God.
The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the
nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary
cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and
cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself,
because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But
some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels
(Q. 50, AA. 2, 5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same
reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality
to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (Q. 66, A.
2). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be
necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to
not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter
existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in
potentiality to any other form.

Obj. 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a
created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be
preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the
builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time
after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God
cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create
it.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some
active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and
violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be.
Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some
active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature
that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances
and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to
not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.

Obj. 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by
some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be
efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the
preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But
this is not so; because this action does not give being to the
creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does
it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not
keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually
adding something new to the creature; either of which is
unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 1:3): "Upholding all things by
the word of His power."

_I answer that,_ Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures
are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a
thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and
accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing
the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a
child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God
preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such
a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary
to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve
another _per se_ and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends
on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In
this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being
of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it
subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by
the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).

This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so
far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the
cause of the _becoming_ of its effect, but not directly of its
_being._ This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings:
for the builder causes the house in its _becoming,_ but he is not the
direct cause of its _being._ For it is clear that the _being_ of the
house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together
and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural
qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying
the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by
making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put
together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the _being_
of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its
_becoming_ depends on the action of the builder. The same principle
applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form
as such, neither will it be directly the cause of _being_ which
results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in
its _becoming_ only.

Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot
directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the
cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of
the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is
in matter--in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter"
receives _this form._ And this is to be the cause of _becoming,_ as
when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural
effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active
cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause,
then the _becoming_ of the effect, but not its _being,_ depends on
the agent.

Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the
impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent:
as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect
of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the
generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such
an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as
existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of
_becoming_ but also the cause of _being._

Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action
of the agent ceases which causes the _becoming_ of the effect: so
neither can the _being_ of a thing continue after that action of the
agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in
_becoming_ but also in _being._ This is why hot water retains heat
after the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary, the
air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun
ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the
fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it
were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that
form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and
inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the
imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand,
air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it
exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since
it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the
sun.

Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun
which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and
as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is
Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His
existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that
its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen.
ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His
creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would
collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: "As the
air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by
the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness."

Reply Obj. 1: _Being_ naturally results from the form of a creature,
given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from
the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun.
Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and
heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His
influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.

Reply Obj. 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being
after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make
it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature
needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect
depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison
with an agent that is not the cause of _being_ but only of _becoming._

Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation
which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not
need to be preserved thus, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 4: The preservation of things by God is a continuation of
that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without
either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air
is by the continual influence of the sun.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 2]

Whether God Preserves Every Creature Immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature
immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action,
as above stated (A. 1, ad 4). But God created all things immediately.
Therefore He preserves all things immediately.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it
cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore
can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God
preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.

Obj. 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of
its _becoming,_ but also of its being. But all created causes do not
seem to cause their effects except in their _becoming,_ for they
cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. 45, A. 3). Therefore they
do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.

_On the contrary,_ A thing is kept in being by that which gives it
being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes.
Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in
being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or
hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and
_per se,_ by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as
the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a
created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in
corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of
corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just
as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many
other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as
to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one
another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first
and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way
on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal
cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the
middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle
cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.

For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and
continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the
diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated;
whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of
diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner
astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those
things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps
certain things in being, by means of certain causes.

Reply Obj. 1: God created all things immediately, but in the
creation itself He established an order among things, so that some
depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He
remains the principal cause of their preservation.

Reply Obj. 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause
on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can
only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the
power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving
another.

Reply Obj. 3: No created nature can be the cause of another,
as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by
virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something
presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect,
without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form
or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow
some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light
is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the
source of light.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 3]

Whether God Can Annihilate Anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything
tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to
annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.

Obj. 2: Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist,
since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because God is
good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot
cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to
annihilate anything.

Obj. 3: Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by
His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is
existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term
in something generated; for when one thing is generated another
undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord,
but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to
nothing."

_I answer that,_ Some have held that God, in giving existence to
creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could
not annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we
have said above (Q. 19, A. 4), such an opinion is entirely false, and
absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God
created things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6:
"Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done." Therefore that God gives
existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve
things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out
existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before
things existed, God was free not to give them existence, and not to
make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their
existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to
annihilate them.

Reply Obj. 1: Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a
cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as
such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a
thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency
of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can
be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing
His action therefrom.

Reply Obj. 2: God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by
natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on
creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to
His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so,
without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in
existence.

Reply Obj. 3: If God were to annihilate anything, this would not
imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 4]

Whether Anything Is Annihilated?

Objection 1: It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end
corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing
but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall
be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.

Obj. 2: Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite
power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time."
Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at
some time it will be reduced to nothing.

Obj. 3: Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of
themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are
reduced to nothing.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that
all the works that God hath made continue for ever."

_I answer that,_ Some of those things which God does in creatures
occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen
miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will
be explained (Q. 105, A. 6). Now whatever God wills to do according
to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but
those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the
manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To each one is
given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" (1 Cor. 12:7);
and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.

Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated.
For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality
to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to
exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the
subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of
things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather
the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of
things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely
that anything at all will be annihilated.

Reply Obj. 1: That things are brought into existence from a state of
non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that
they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation,
since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all
things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things
by the word of His power" (Heb. 1:3).

Reply Obj. 2: A creature's potentiality to existence is merely
receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom
existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a
consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things,
however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time,
so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving
the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot
resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which
have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to
exist for ever.

Reply Obj. 3: Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they
do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for
it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their
mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to
nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain
in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.
_______________________

QUESTION 105

OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD
(In Eight Articles)

We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the
change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God;
secondly, the change of one creature by another.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?

(2) Whether He can immediately move a body?

(3) Whether He can move the intellect?

(4) Whether He can move the will?

(5) Whether God works in every worker?

(6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?

(7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?

(8) Of the diversity of miracles.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 1]

Whether God Can Move the Matter Immediately to the Form?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately
to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did.
vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except
that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is
not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.

Obj. 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce
none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some
other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a
general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some
particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause
of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form,
except by means of a particular agent.

Obj. 3: As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so
determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we
have seen above (Q. 104, A. 2). But the determinate being of a
particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things
are produced by God, only by means of particular causes.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7): "God formed man of the
slime of the earth."

_I answer that,_ God can move matter immediately to form; because
whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the
active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since
the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be
reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by
matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the
act of matter.

Reply Obj. 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two
ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by
man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the
cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause:
thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are
like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way
the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which
the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both
matter and form; as we have said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 44, A. 2);
wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by
way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite
generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite
generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing
like itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in
matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance
extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible
matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of
corporeal seeds.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument would hold if God were to act of natural
necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows
the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it
follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to
determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other
causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by
Himself without any other cause.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 2]

Whether God Can Move a Body Immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately.
For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the
Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some
contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact
between God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is
no contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

Obj. 2: Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the
desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object
of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the
intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore
God cannot move a body immediately.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an
infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body
to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between
opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the
same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved
immediately by an infinite power. But God's power is infinite, as we
have explained (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore God cannot move a body
immediately.

_On the contrary,_ God produced the works of the six days immediately
among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen.
1:9 "Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore
God alone can move a body immediately.

_I answer that,_ It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself
produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created
cause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created
causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any
bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated (A.
1). For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a
form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form
which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the
generator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating
tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to
imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement
which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but
it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint
form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body
whatever in respect of any movement whatever.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when
two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of
sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first
kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is
touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by
moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no
creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the
words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself
be touched.

Reply Obj. 2: God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but
it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and
apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by
Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to
prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first
mover _of bulk,_ by the following argument. The power of the first
mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover
can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power
_of bulk,_ would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the
infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not
measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved
without time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason
is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by
the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of
all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the
mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a
finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite
power does not move in any time; for between one time and any other
time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not
in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its
effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it
cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not
follow that it moves without time.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 3]

Whether God Moves the Created Intellect Immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not immediately move the
created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its
own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated
in _Metaph._ ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by
another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover.
Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently
God cannot move the created intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle
of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the
intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say
that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which
is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding.
Therefore it is not moved by another.

Obj. 3: Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the
intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible
to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God
cannot move our intellect.

_On the contrary,_ The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught.
But it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God "teaches man knowledge."
Therefore God moves the human intellect.

_I answer that,_ As in corporeal movement that is called the mover
which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is
said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is
the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of
the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual
operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual
power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in
potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual
understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the
one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect,
whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding;
or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.

Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First
immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality,
it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in
each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must
conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like
manner, since He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in
Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly
in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible
types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived from
Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand;
so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore
God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the
intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on
the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and
preserves both power and species in existence.

Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual operation is performed by the
intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds
from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand
is given to the one who understands.

Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness of
the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but
it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.

Reply Obj. 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so
far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of
which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses
which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to
enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence,
as we have seen above (Q. 12, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 3). Hence He moves the
created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we
have explained (Q. 12, A. 4).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 4]

Whether God Can Move the Created Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For
whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be
forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot
be moved by God.

Obj. 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at
the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be
voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another.
Therefore God cannot move the will.

Obj. 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to
the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but
to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that
voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But
this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God who worketh
in us [Vulgate--'you'] both to will and to accomplish."

_I answer that,_ As the intellect is moved by the object and by the
Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the
will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the
power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object,
but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move
a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover
surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable.
Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for
its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect
is the universal being. But every created good is some particular
good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the
capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In
like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will
is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which
is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs
to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just
as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs
the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both
ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second
way by an interior inclination of the will.

Reply Obj. 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its
natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the
proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is
made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not
forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it,
because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

Reply Obj. 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within,
that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be
caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is
not repugnant to being moved by another.

Reply Obj. 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be
moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed
for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not
prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2),
it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 5]

Whether God Works in Every Agent?

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For
we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works
in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be
superfluous for the created agent to work at all.

Obj. 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from
two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two
movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God
operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from
the creature; and so no creature works at all.

Obj. 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing
made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is
the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be
inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the
beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not
operate any further in the operating creature.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast
wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."

_I answer that,_ Some have understood God to work in every agent in
such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that
God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance,
that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so
forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and
effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply
lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the
cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because
the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be
bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through
them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be
purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the
purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is
always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the
matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first
act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and
thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore
understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have
their proper operation.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few
kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the
subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the
end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a
certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which
moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of
that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts
through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art.
For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing
wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the
axe which cuts through its being sharp.

Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three
things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake
of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or
apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the
Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause
of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where
there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue
of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus
all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the
cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not
only moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and
powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who
nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also
gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being.
Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which
is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause
of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the
forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause
of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves
the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a
thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer
to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God
Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost
in all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately.
For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are
attributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11:
"Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together
with bones and sinews."

Reply Obj. 1: God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it
does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is
superfluous.

Reply Obj. 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of the same
order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a
primary and a secondary agent.

Reply Obj. 3: God not only gives things their form, but He also
preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover
the end of every action, as above explained.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 6]

Whether God Can Do Anything Outside the Established Order of Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the
established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3)
says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against
nature." But that which is outside the natural order seems to be
against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural
order.

Obj. 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order
of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice;
for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do
anything outside the order of nature.

Obj. 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it
God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He
is changeable; which cannot be said.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God
sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of
nature."

_I answer that,_ From each cause there results a certain order to its
effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the
multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders,
subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore
a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but
conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the
father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is
contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the
ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king,
by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.

If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first
cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so,
He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness.
But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary
cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not
subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this
order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural
necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have
created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something
outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by
producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by
producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts against the wonted
course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme
law; because He does not act against Himself."

Reply Obj. 1: In natural things something may happen outside this
natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent
which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example,
when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its
natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against
nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the
natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is
clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature;
although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward
direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on
which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore
since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does
anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore
Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each
thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and
order in nature."

Reply Obj. 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the First
Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do
nothing against such order.

Reply Obj. 3: God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that
at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do
otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this
order, He does not change.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 7]

Whether Whatever God Does Outside the Natural Order Is Miraculous?

Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside
the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the
world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are
done by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by
the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called
miracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural
order is a miracle.

Obj. 2: Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom
occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our
hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate
credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of nature are not
arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and
healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they
happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be
healed by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the
faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they
beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead,
which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore
not all things are outside the course of nature are miraculous.

Obj. 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now
admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes
things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to
the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without
studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs
outside the order of nature is miraculous.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where
God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are
accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."

_I answer that,_ The word miracle is derived from admiration, which
arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as
when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the
Philosopher says in the beginning of his _Metaphysics._ Now the cause
of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others.
Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others:
as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle
is so called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely
hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which
God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.

Reply Obj. 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous,
though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles,
because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so
they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not
belong to that order.

Reply Obj. 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of
the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it
surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual,
not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the
usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be
above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of
the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which
it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of
nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith,
whereby we believe in the future resurrection.

Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in
itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown
to be wonderful.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 8]

Whether One Miracle Is Greater Than Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than
another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In
miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the
doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore
one miracle is not greater than another.

Obj. 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite
exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more
reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another.
Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.

_On the contrary,_ The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (John
14:12): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than
these shall he do."

_I answer that,_ Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the
Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the
power of God, according to Isa. 40:15: "Behold the Gentiles are as a
drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a
balance." But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the
power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature
is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is
surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for
instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes
backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is
absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among
miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the
deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and
giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life,
but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles.
Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in
which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without
treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is
suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural
cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold
the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has
various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power
of nature is surpassed.

From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do
from the Divine power.
_______________________

QUESTION 106

HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER
(In Four Articles)

We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration
will be threefold:

(1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures;

(2) How bodies move;

(3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal
nature.

Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered:

(1) How an angel acts on an angel;

(2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature;

(3) How an angel acts on man.

The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and
speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the
good and of the bad angels.

Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?

(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?

(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?

(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that
he knows himself?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 1]

Whether One Angel Enlightens Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another.
For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain.
But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34:
"They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his
brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.

Obj. 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of
grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of
nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in
the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God.
Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.

Obj. 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational
mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not
enlighten the mind of another.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels
of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by
the angels of the first hierarchy."

_I answer that,_ One angel enlightens another. To make this clear,
we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a
manifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: "All that is made
manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to
communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according
to the Apostle (Eph. 3:8): "To me the least of all the saints is
given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what
is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from
eternity in God." Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by
manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. vii): "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the
heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds."

Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we
have said (Q. 105, A. 3), namely, the intellectual power, and the
likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can
notify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his
intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is
strengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body--for
instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is
hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened
by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for
one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal
things. Secondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards
the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives
the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive
which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for
it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner.
Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which
he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior
angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us
that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into
many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This
is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual
substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform
knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its
inferiors upwards by analogy."

Reply Obj. 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the
Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach
another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he
adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know
the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the
greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in
God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends
Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types,
the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more
about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and
concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by
the types of existing things."

Reply Obj. 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the
light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural
light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of
nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either
as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image
of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for
the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it
adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment
that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to
this ultimate form.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 2]

Whether one angel moves another angel's will?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel's
will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (A. 1), as one
angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But
cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former
seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to
be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will.
Therefore an angel can move another angel's will.

Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of
the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are so
called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love
which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's
will.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the
higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior
angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the
superior angel can change the will of another angel.

_On the contrary,_ To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it
belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness
of the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel
cannot change another angel's will.

_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 105, A. 4), the will is
changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of
the power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is
the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the
appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one
who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (Q. 105,
A. 4), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing
sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God.
And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed,
Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show
thee all good" (Ex. 33:18, 19). Therefore an angel does not move the
will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But
he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some
created good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the
will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.

But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by
God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the
willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination,
Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent
alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to
which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the
creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the
intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's
will.

Reply Obj. 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according
to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing
the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect
and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But
the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as
explained above (A. 1); therefore an angel is to be understood as
cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as
perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the
knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in
the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an
enlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect
knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is
cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of
light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the
colored object.

Reply Obj. 2: One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion
as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite
which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it
belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior
appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to
the angels.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 3]

Whether an Inferior Angel Can Enlighten a Superior Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a
superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and
represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is
called "our mother" (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are
enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
14:31): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all
may be exhorted." Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the
superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.

Obj. 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the
will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as
was said above (Q. 105, A. 6), God sometimes acts outside the order
of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the
order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise
than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors
enlightened by God can enlighten superiors.

Obj. 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as
was above explained (A. 1). But since this turning to another is
voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the
others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the
latter can enlighten his superiors.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says that "this is the Divine
unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior"
(Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v).

_I answer that,_ The inferior angels never enlighten the superior,
but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above
explained (Q. 105, A. 6), one order is under another, as cause is
under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to
order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is
done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the
superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is
passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God
works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men
may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the
order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the
ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made
known to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order
which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so
that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not
conversely.

Reply Obj. 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in
some degree, but not by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly
hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its
nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more
sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account
the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the
ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God
in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for
science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail
in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.

Reply Obj. 2: As above explained, there is no similarity between what
God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual
nature. Hence the argument does not hold.

Reply Obj. 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel,
but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made
the order in the angels.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 4]

Whether the Superior Angel Enlightens the Inferior As Regards All He
Himself Knows?

Objection 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten
the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal
knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual
knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than
under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior
angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being
enlightened by the former.

Obj. 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that
the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation,
whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was
accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as
it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who
knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory," as
Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the
superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know
themselves. Therefore they do not do so.

Obj. 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about
all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown
to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could
communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to
objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in
all things.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf.
Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though
there are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually."
And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the
inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as
quoted above (A. 1).

_I answer that,_ Every creature participates in the Divine goodness,
so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the
nature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal
agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more
an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much
the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far
as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace
share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received
grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the
manifold grace of God" (1 Pet. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy
angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine
goodness, impart the same to those below them.

Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior
as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in
a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master
understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.

Reply Obj. 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more
universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: The Master's words are not to be understood as if the
inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the
Incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior
angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards
when the Mystery was accomplished.

Reply Obj. 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being
revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the
world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is
always something for the superior angels to make known to the
inferior.
_______________________

QUESTION 107

THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS
(In Five Articles)

We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points
of inquiry:

(1) Whether one angel speaks to another?

(2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?

(3) Whether an angel speaks to God?

(4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?

(5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 1]

Whether One Angel Speaks to Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another.
For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection
"each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less,
therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech
manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not
necessary that one angel should speak to another.

Obj. 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to
oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior
speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or
some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot
apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

Obj. 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he
says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to
listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore
one angel does not speak to another.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): "If I speak with
the tongues of men and of angels."

_I answer that,_ The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory
says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the
properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and
unknown methods of interior speech."

To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that,
as we explained above (Q. 82, A. 4), when treating of the actions and
powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation.
Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways;
first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,
6, 7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as
related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible
object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of
the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur,
"which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible
object passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by
the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as,
for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made
known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual
consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to
himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior word."
And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be
made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept
of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel
speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known
the mental concept to another.

Reply Obj. 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The
first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or
can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of
another, according to 1 Cor. 2:11: "What man knoweth the things of a
man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle
whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge,
comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will
directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at
once make known to another; but some sensible sign must be used.
Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes
we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and
when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the
door of the tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under
no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at
once.

Reply Obj. 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for
us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an
angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not
only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being
ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel
is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his
mental concept.

Reply Obj. 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the good
angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as
one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself.
But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and
even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the
intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is
affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by
the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to
attention by some intelligible power.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 2]

Whether the Inferior Angel Speaks to the Superior?

Objection 1: It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to
the superior. For on the text (1 Cor. 13:1), "If I speak with the
tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the
angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the
inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was
above explained (Q. 106, A. 3). Therefore neither do the inferior
speak to the superior.

Obj. 2: Further, as was said above (Q. 106, A. 1), to enlighten means
merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is
to speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the
same conclusion follows.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels
by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and
invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever
God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an
enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a
superior angel.

_On the contrary,_ According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel.
Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this
King of Glory?"

_I answer that,_ The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To
make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is
an angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an
enlightening; because, as we have said (A. 1), for one angel to speak
to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he
directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to
the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold
principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will
of the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything.
But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is
the rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the
mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and
enlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was
created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however,
of what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be
called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one
says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that."
The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of
truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes
from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know
what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the
perfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality.

Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by
comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment,
which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the
superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the
principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the
manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by
the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to
the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior.

From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second
   objections.

Reply Obj. 3: Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening;
because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the
perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what
God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as
was explained above.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel Speaks to God?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For
speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make
known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does
not speak to God.

Obj. 2: Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference
to another, as was shown above (A. 1). But an angel ever orders his
mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks
to God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel
sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel
never speaks to God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Zech. 1:12): "The angel of the Lord
answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy
on Jerusalem." Therefore an angel speaks to God.

_I answer that,_ As was said above (AA. 1, 2), the angel speaks by
ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is
ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of
giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is
ordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to
the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God
either of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the
created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth
and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered to another to
receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the
agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and in this
way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of
what ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he
can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels
speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they
rise to emotions of admiration."

Reply Obj. 1: Speech is not always for the purpose of making
something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the
purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the
disciples ask instruction from the master.

Reply Obj. 2: The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of
praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by
consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to
perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 4]

Whether Local Distance Influences the Angelic Speech?

Objection 1: It would seem that local distance affects the angelic
speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works
where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an
angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is
limited by the bounds of that place.

Obj. 2: Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of
the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one to
another" (Isa. 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance
has some effect.

_On the contrary,_ It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to
Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (Luke 16:24). Much less
therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to
another.

_I answer that,_ The angelic speech consists in an intellectual
operation, as explained above (AA. 1, 2, 3). And the intellectual
operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our
own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the "here
and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do
not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted
from "here and now," neither difference of time nor local distance has
any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is
no impediment.

Reply Obj. 1: The angelic speech, as above explained (A. 1, ad 2), is
interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it
exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is
who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing
another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is
ordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his
speech.

Reply Obj. 2: The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by
reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude
of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what
Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less one cries
out."
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 5]

Whether All the Angels Know What One Speaks to Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks
to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do
not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech
local distance has no effect, as above explained (A. 4). Therefore
all the angels know what one speaks to another.

Obj. 2: Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in
common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known
by one, it is for the same reason known by all.

Obj. 3: Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the
enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels,
because, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the
heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore
the speech of one angel to another extends to all.

_On the contrary,_ One man can speak to another alone; much more can
this be the case among the angels.

_I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 1, 2), the mental concept of
one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses
the concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be
ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another;
consequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not
by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one
angel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of
local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained
above.

From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.

Reply Obj. 3: Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the
first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels;
and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may
be of something ordered to the principle of the created will, which
is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that
these speeches should be common to all.
_______________________

QUESTION 108

OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS
(In Eight Articles)

We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and
orders; for it was said above (Q. 106, A. 3), that the superior
angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.

Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?

(2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?

(3) Whether in one order there are many angels?

(4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?

(5) Of the names and properties of each order.

(6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.

(7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?

(8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 1]

Whether All the Angels Are of One Hierarchy?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels belong to one
hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is
evident that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of
a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the
Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4).
Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it
seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is
order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one order
towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are
ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

Obj. 3: Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be
found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy.
Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three
hierarchies of angels.

_I answer that,_ Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above
explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself
and the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there
is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and
all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels,
but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of
sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There
are two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and
men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality on
the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality
is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude can be subject in
_one_ way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be
governed in the same way by a prince belong to different
principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities,
which are governed by different laws and administrators. Now it is
evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same
way as do the angels; for the angels receive them in their
intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs,
as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a
distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same
manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown
above (Q. 55, A. 3), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the
superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the
inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the
angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are
enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as
preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of
knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with
God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius
says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on
the universal created causes which in some way are already
multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly,
forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as
depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest
hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of
the orders (A. 6). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on
the part of the multitude of subjects.

Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of
Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it
the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there
exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order,
for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is
so directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and
that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from
us to apply to the Divine Persons.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection considers principality on the part of
the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as
the Philosopher asserts in those passages.

Reply Obj. 2: As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one
way--that is, in His essence--there is no hierarchical distinction
among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the
types of created things, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3: All men are of one species, and have one connatural
mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and
hence the same argument does not apply to both.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Several Orders in One Hierarchy?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not
several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined
is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one
hierarchy only, but many.

Obj. 2: Further, different orders are different grades, and grades
among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among
the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is
possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not
different orders of angels.

Obj. 3: Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are
distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing,"
"enlightening," and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is
"cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops
"perfecting," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the
angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no
distinction of orders among the angels.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that "God has set
the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and
dominion": which are the various orders of the angels, and some of
them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained (A. 6).

_I answer that,_ As explained above, one hierarchy is one
principality--that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the
rule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but
confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of
a hierarchy requires diversity of orders.

This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and
actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders
according to the different actions; for there is one order of those
who judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who
labor in the fields, and so forth.

But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be
reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order
of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others
are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between
these, as the middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the same way we
find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to
their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to
three--namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in
every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).

Reply Obj. 1: Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order
comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy
is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and
in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called.

Reply Obj. 2: All things are possessed in common by the angelic
society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some
than by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who
can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the
hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is
unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can communicate a
gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect
grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this
similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the
angels, according to their different offices and actions.

Reply Obj. 3: The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of
our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the
kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"--namely, John the Baptist,
than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of
women" (Matt. 11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly
hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and
in a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the
heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by
reason of other different acts.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 3]

Whether There Are Many Angels in One Order?

Objection 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order.
For it was shown above (Q. 50, A. 4), that all the angels are
unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many
angels in one order.

Obj. 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many,
which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one
angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more
sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the
sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If,
therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated
above (A. 2), several angels in one order would be superfluous.

Obj. 3: Further, it was said above (Obj. 1) that all the angels are
unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four),
are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more
akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of
his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with
the latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels
of one order.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another"
(Isa. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the
Seraphim.

_I answer that,_ Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to
distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest
details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only
distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points.
Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their
orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order,
inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals
in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to
distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and
in each of the other orders.

Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and
orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But
if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we
should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own
order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be
hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a
common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but
absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who
are first, middle, and last.

Reply Obj. 2: That special distinction of orders and offices wherein
each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.

Reply Obj. 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly black,
the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as
regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less
akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders
are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to
the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for
similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 4]

Whether the Distinction of Hierarchies and Orders Comes from the
Angelic Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of
orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a
sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it
"approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel. Hier. iii).
But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not
by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the
angels is by grace, and not by nature.

Obj. 2: Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which comes
not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts
by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5): "which is said not
only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but
from grace.

Obj. 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the
heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the
gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop,
and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the
angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.

_On the contrary,_ The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order
is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by
some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of
natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels
is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.

_I answer that,_ The order of government, which is the order of a
multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of
the angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the
faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural
knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the
orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly,
the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above
their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine
Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which
end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the
orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of
grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels
are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural
gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q. 62, A.
6). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the
gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.

From the above the replies to the objections are evident.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 5]

Whether the Orders of the Angels Are Properly Named?

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not
properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and
heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to
individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are
ineptly named.

Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the
words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one
order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations."

Obj. 3: Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and
likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore these
three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.

Obj. 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore
this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the
"Principalities."

Obj. 5: Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which
pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But
charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore
they ought not to be names of any particular orders.

Obj. 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows
and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it.
Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the
"Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the orders of
angels are not properly styled.

On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are
so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in Isa. 6:2; the name
"Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in Col. 1:16;
"Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are
mentioned in Eph. 1:21; the name "Archangels" in the canonical
epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many
places of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of
the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of
each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of
each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something
may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of
excess, and by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another
by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its
nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is
attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have
stated (Q. 13, A. 2) concerning all the names which are attributed to
God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something
not fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by
participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name
designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it
participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess,
but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we
wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational
substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter is the
proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an
angel as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him
a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because
sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a
more excellent way than to other animals.

So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual
perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more
excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as
in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs
to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the
inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection
belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by
way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the
superior perfection.

So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the
orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they
signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom.
xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for
he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and
the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought;
by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities
preside over the good spirits themselves."

Reply Obj. 1: Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits,
so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But
the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this
manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The
lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common
manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation
only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the
lowest order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that
the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels,"
forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.

"Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the
medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all
the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly
essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and
thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says
(Coel. Hier. viii) that the "name 'virtues' signifies a certain
virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine
operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine
gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine
behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.

Reply Obj. 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is
attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the
Divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of
Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the
Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that
the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free from
servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians,
and from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great.
Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy
which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act of those who
are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies "the
desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God."
Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what
belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of
the Divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the rest.

Reply Obj. 3: The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality"
belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only
to prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in
Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are
subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name
"Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle
says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God"
(Rom. 13:2). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name
"Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception
of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by
superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above.
Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to
be done by those who are subject to them. To preside [principari] as
Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as
being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so
Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities"
signifies "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead
others, being first among them, are properly called "princes,"
according to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers"
(Ps. 67:26).

Reply Obj. 4: The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier.
ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium
compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the
nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and
hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel
princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the "Angels," and
angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory (Hom.
xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over
the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing greater things:
and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the
heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine commands.

Reply Obj. 5: The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only,
but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire.
Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim"
according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat.
Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which
is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are borne
inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat,"
which is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain
sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to
the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor;
whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised powerfully
upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor,
and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly we consider in fire
the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these
angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they
also perfectly enlighten others.

In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of
knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," which
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the
perfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their
contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard
to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth
copiously upon others.

Reply Obj. 6: The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders
as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works;
whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the
"Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent
attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones"
does not include the other two; and so the order of the "Thrones" is
distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the "Seraphim."
For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the
inferior is contained in the superior, but not conversely. But
Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its
relation to material seats, in which we may consider four things.
First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to
the angels who are called "Thrones" are raised up to the immediate
knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in
material seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits
firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels
themselves are made firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives
him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the
angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to
the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is
open on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels
promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 6]

Whether the Grades of the Orders Are Properly Assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the grades of the orders are not
properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the
names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves
imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be supreme.

Obj. 2: Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But
the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer
to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is
the highest.

Obj. 3: Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher
than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher than
the "Seraphim."

Obj. 4: Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the
"Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed
immediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest
hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle,
the "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the
"Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the
"Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first,
then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels."

_I answer that,_ The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by
Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree
as regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For
Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above
the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the
"Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities" between
the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the
"Powers" and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim
authority from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21)
enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that
"God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the heavenly places
above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he
places "Virtues" between "Powers" and "Dominations," according to the
placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16),
numbering the same orders from the highest, he says: "Whether
Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things
were created by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities"
between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory.

Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius,
in which we see, that, as said above (A. 1), the highest hierarchy
contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the
universal causes; and third in their application to particular
effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic
ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first
hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal
disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the
application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying
out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in
every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering the properties of
the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy
those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to God,
the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle
hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common
government or disposition--the "Dominations," "Virtues," and
"Powers"; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names
denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels," and
"Archangels."

As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we
consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end;
thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an
addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because
God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as
the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar
order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the
dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader;
others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others
above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this
similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the
first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the
familiar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing
immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the
whole of the first hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets
supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme
excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in
such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the
"Thrones"; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits
together, they are all called "Angels."

As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first
of which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this
belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of
carrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the "Virtues"; the
third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done
can be carried out by others, which belongs to the "Powers."

The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing
Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners
and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and
officers; this belongs to the "Principalities." There are others who
simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others
hold a middle place; and these are the "Archangels," as above
explained.

This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the
highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the
higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the
first order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the
Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the
first hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of
love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the
"Thrones," who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for
the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called
"because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are
enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening
of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the
Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers" is akin to the order
of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose
order on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once
in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government
of peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place
in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof;
"for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man"
(Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of the kingdom of
the Persians resisted me" (Dan. 10:13).

The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also
reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order what belongs
to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged
according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine
ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii),
"bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior;
and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the
good spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called
that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then the
"Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced
by earthly powers, as it is written (Rom. 13:3,4). After these come
the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working
of miracles; after these are the "Angels" and the "Archangels," who
announce to men either great things above reason, or small things
within the purview of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The angels' subjection to God is greater than their
presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the
former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are
not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name
from their nearness and relation to God.

Reply Obj. 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the
"Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a
more excellent way, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3: As above explained (Q. 27, A. 3), knowledge takes place
accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the
lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a
nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things
are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves.
Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to
love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them.

Reply Obj. 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no
difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders
according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name
"Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also
agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a
certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the
execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory,
the "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius.
For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine
ministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the
announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels."
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 7]

Whether the Orders Will Outlast the Day of Judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast
the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ
will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have
delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father," and this will be in
the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will
be abolished in that state.

Obj. 2: Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to
cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one
angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they
will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders
would remain for no purpose.

Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. 1:14), that
"they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall
receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence it appears that the
angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to
salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the
Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not
outlast the Day of Judgment.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Judges 5:20): "Stars remaining in
their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore
the angels will ever remain in their orders.

_I answer that,_ In the angelic orders we may consider two things;
the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The
distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the
difference of grace and nature, as above explained (A. 4); and these
differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of
natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be
corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them
according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution
of the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the
Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease
accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to
their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the
attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have
different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.

Reply Obj. 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end in
that final consummation as regards their office of leading others
to their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer
necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of
the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God
and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful to the
enjoyment of God Himself.

Reply Obj. 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are to be
considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions.
In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered
according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually
arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest
that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding
middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also
as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is
that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can
have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he
is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior angels
know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior
angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels
not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards
the preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the
Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of
some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by
the superior angels.

Reply Obj. 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led
any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who
are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 8]

Whether Men Are Taken Up into the Angelic Orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders
of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest
heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the
middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are
never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are
men transferred to the angelic orders.

Obj. 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels,
as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like;
which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore
they are not transferred to the angelic orders.

Obj. 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons
to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men
are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in
Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will
be transferred to the orders of angels.

_On the contrary,_ The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as
the angels of God" (Matt. 22:30). _I answer that,_ As above explained
(AA. 4,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to
the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace.
Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be
assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will
always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men
can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this
is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying
that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in
heaven (Luke 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material
part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which
depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature.
Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree
as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this
implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some,
however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic
orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will
constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole
society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies of men and
angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to
God alone."

Reply Obj. 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their
natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above
explained (A. 4; Q. 62, A. 6). So, as the inferior angels cannot be
transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be
transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to
the grade of grace, but not of nature.

Reply Obj. 2: The angels according to the order of nature are between
us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human
affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But
holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves;
and hence according to the common law they do not administer human
affairs, "nor do they interfere in the things of the living," as
Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain
special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to
exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons,
or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro
mortuis xvi).

Reply Obj. 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to
the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons
are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom
rejects.
_______________________

QUESTION 109

THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS
(In Four Articles)

We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there
are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are orders among the demons?

(2) Whether among them there is precedence?

(3) Whether one enlightens another?

(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 1]

Whether There Are Orders Among the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons.
For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine
says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to
evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore
in the bad angels there are no orders.

Obj. 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy.
But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy
principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the
demons there are no orders.

Obj. 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic
orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said
to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem
necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. But we
never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or
"Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed
in any other order.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling . . .
is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world
of this darkness."

_I answer that,_ As explained above (Q. 108, AA. 4, 7, 8), order in
the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and
according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the
imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of
consummate glory.

If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the
perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders,
and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect
grace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of
angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above
(Q. 62, A. 3), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we
consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in
those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Reply Obj. 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist
without good (Q. 49, A. 3); so there is order in the demons, as
possessing a good nature.

Reply Obj. 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part
of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for
Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred
thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.

Reply Obj. 3: The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity;
and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name
"Dominations" imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to
sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 2]

Whether among the demons there is precedence?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no precedence among the
demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice.
But the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no
precedence among them.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no precedence where obedience and
subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which
is not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among
the proud there are always contentions" (Prov. 13:10). Therefore
there is no precedence among the demons.

Obj. 3: If there be precedence among them it is either according to
nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not
according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come
from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin
or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have
sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior.
Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.

_On the contrary,_ On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: "While the world
lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over
demons."

_I answer that,_ Since action follows the nature of a thing, where
natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each
other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by
natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and
movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly
bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said (A. 1), that the
demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions
are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we
mean by precedence--that the action of the subject should be under
the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the
demons requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees
too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which
"reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly"
(Wis. 8:1).

Reply Obj. 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on
their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.

Reply Obj. 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey
others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common
wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For
it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom
they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.

Reply Obj. 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among
them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with
men, who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the
superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their
detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to
unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 3]

Whether There Is Enlightenment in the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For
enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can
manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural
knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

Obj. 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body
deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior
demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it
seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

_On the contrary,_ Enlightenment is not without cleansing and
perfecting, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 1). But to cleanse does
not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean
by the unclean?" (Ecclus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.

_I answer that,_ There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among
the demons. For, as above explained (Q. 107, A. 2), enlightenment
properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to
God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of
the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to
another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another
to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one
demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental
concept to another by way of speech.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is
enlightenment, but only that which is above described.

Reply Obj. 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there
is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or
in the demons, because, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 58, A. 2;
Q. 79, A. 2), they know from the first all that belongs to their
natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the
superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 4]

Whether the Good Angels Have Precedence Over the Bad Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence
over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially
connected with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are
not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not
rule over the bad.

Obj. 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence
for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil.
Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that
negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be
admitted.

Obj. 3: Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of
nature, as above explained (A. 2). But if the demons fell from every
order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many
good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no
precedence over all the bad angels.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the
treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational,
pious, and just spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that
"the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile
powers."

_I answer that,_ The whole order of precedence is first and
originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they
are the nearer to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect
and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest
perfection and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the
creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the
demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence
over the bad, and these are ruled by them.

Reply Obj. 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known
by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice
requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or
for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors
make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if
compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment,
forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on
the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the
fulfilment of their own wickedness.

Reply Obj. 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom.
Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels
or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good
angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.

Reply Obj. 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides
over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the
power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger
than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, "the
spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15), and the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and
measure of all human acts."
_______________________

QUESTION 110

HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES
(In Four Articles)

We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?

(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?

(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies
locally?

(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 1]

Whether the Corporeal Creature Is Governed by the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not
governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of
action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we
require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal
things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed
upon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels.

Obj. 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But
some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior.
Therefore they need not be governed by the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished
by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the
angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species
of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there
are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (Q.
108, A. 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by
angels.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies
are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial.
iv, 6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the
agency of the invisible creature."

_I answer that,_ It is generally found both in human affairs and in
natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by
the universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed
by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above
(Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 108, A. 1), the superior angels who preside over the
inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that
the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of
any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form
individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now";
whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as
the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by
the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This
is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all
philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.

Reply Obj. 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they
exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it
belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature
must be moved by a spiritual creature.

Reply Obj. 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of
Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are
moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to
assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly
bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances
with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human
souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations
were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for
which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we
assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the
natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly
bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert
that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the
heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.

Reply Obj. 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about
immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances
were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more
universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances
preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over
different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are
not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more
universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate
presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the
heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed
with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside
immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as
Plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are
derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato
because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all
inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence."

The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual
substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ.
83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power
placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): "The devil
was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial
order"; and Origen says on the text, "When the ass saw the angel"
(Num. 22:23), that "the world has need of angels who preside over
beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and
over the increase of all other things" (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason
of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature
to preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even
the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of
corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine
wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does
it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as
above expounded (Q. 108, A. 2), the orders are distinguished by their
general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose
proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of
the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem
to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their
ministration miracles are sometimes performed.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 2]

Whether Corporeal Matter Obeys the Mere Will of an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will
of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul.
But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of
man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold,
and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much
more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be
done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to
corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform
corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much
more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal
matter.

Obj. 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic
administration, as appears above (A. 1), and thus it appears that
bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is
essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is
due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due
to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the
principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the
force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul:
but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the
soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it
assumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the
[joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the
principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic
power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this
visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."

_I answer that,_ The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii,
p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by
immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are
participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this
opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in
matter proceed from the concept of the _intellect;_ and that
corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to
have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be
something made _per se,_ so that it would be the effect of a formal
principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8),
what is made, properly speaking, is the _composite:_ for this
properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is
called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something
is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for
that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to
existence.

Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch
as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has
a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself,
as when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both
matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone.
Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God,
or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.

Reply Obj. 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it
is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's
concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which
is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the
command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection
with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior
power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for
example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way
than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a
more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the
corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.

Reply Obj. 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking
place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would
not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as
neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating
the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish
that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce
matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power
of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 3]

Whether Bodies Obey the Angels As Regards Local Motion?

Objection 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local
motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms.
But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated
above (A. 2). Therefore neither can they cause in them local
motion.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local
motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause
other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither
can they cause local motion.

Obj. 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul
as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of
life. In natural bodies, however, there is no vital principle.
Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels
use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do
this without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in
local motion.

_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom
has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second."
Hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in
conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the
spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect
is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The
reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in
potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something
extrinsic--that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a
natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as
regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme
bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see
that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion.

Reply Obj. 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides those
which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the
sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from
the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result
from the power of spiritual substances.

Reply Obj. 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first
motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing
corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire
to soften iron.

Reply Obj. 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power
of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the
body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move
other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence
it can move locally bodies not joined to it.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 4]

Whether Angels Can Work Miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For
Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues
by whom signs and miracles are usually done."

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work
miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, bad
Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work
miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere
in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the
supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work
miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi,
Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]
that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen
may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our
atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside
the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for
instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of
nature. Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.

Obj. 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an
inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel.
Therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents;
which is to work miracles.

_On the contrary,_ It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): "Who alone doth
great wonders."

_I answer that,_ A miracle properly so called is when something is
done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle
if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for
otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards,
as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a
miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created
nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any
other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of
created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can
work miracles.

Reply Obj. 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either because
God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are
said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in
the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the
general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.

Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those
things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature.
But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows
that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a
power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So
when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things
are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to
ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the
demons; and these are said to be done by "private contracts,"
forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be
compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a
magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it
were by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in
the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good
Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said
to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the
"signs of public justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by
making use of other sacred signs.

Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in
this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the angels can do something which is outside
the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside
the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above
explained.
_______________________

QUESTION 111

THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN
(In Four Articles)

We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire:

(1) How far they can change them by their own natural power;

(2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men;

(3) How they guard and protect men.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?

(2) Whether he can change man's will?

(3) Whether he can change man's imagination?

(4) Whether he can change man's senses?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 1]

Whether an Angel Can Enlighten Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For
man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii)
attributes enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But
faith is immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you
are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the
gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but
immediately by God.

Obj. 2: Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" (Rom.
1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for
the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them
by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from
God--that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God
enlightens man immediately.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being
enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.
Therefore he is not enlightened by them.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the
revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the
angels. But such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated
(Q. 106, A. 1; Q. 107, A. 2). Therefore men are enlightened by the
angels.

_I answer that,_ Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that
lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above
(Q. 109, A. 2); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the
superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by
them.

The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way
alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Q. 106, A.
1), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has
two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is
strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according
as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are
proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes
place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal
concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel,
as explained above (Q. 106, A. 1).

The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself
unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to
the phantasms, as above explained (Q. 84, A. 7). So the angels
propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of
sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i),
that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise
than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils." On the other hand,
the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of
the angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an
angel.

Reply Obj. 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first,
the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will
tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of
faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will;
hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this
respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that
what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is
accomplished by man, according to Rom. 10:17, "Faith cometh by
hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things
are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the
enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels
not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what
is to be done.

Reply Obj. 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be
strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the
human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth
can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is
assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more
perfect knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be
understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood;
thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands
or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to
him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not
follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is,
which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner
not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is
enlightened by him.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 3]

Whether the Angels Can Change the Will of Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of
man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His
ministers a flame of fire" (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that "they are
fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices."
This could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore
the angels can change the will.

Obj. 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil
does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however,
says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious
act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men"
(De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce
and kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the
will. Therefore the will is changed by them.

Obj. 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human
intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which
serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive
appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a
corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can
he change the will.

_On the contrary,_ To change the will belongs to God alone, according
to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord,
whithersoever He will He shall turn it."

_I answer that,_ The will can be changed in two ways. First, from
within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but
the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus
change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to
the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God
alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from
God alone, Who causes the will.

Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this
can be only in one way--by the good apprehended by the intellect.
Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended
as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also
God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move
the will by way of persuasion, as above explained (Q. 106, A. 2).

In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in
another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive
appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will
something. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these
passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will
ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion.

Reply Obj. 1: Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels,
are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of
persuasion.

Reply Obj. 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing
them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject
to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of
thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the
things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions.
Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is
accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher
principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry
of the angels.

Reply Obj. 3: The human intellect in its present state can understand
only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will
something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of
the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel Can Change Man's Imagination?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man's
imagination. For the phantasy, as is said _De Anima_ iii, is "a motion
caused by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an
angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is
contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the
imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.

Obj. 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual,
they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an
angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (Q. 110, A. 2).
Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he
cannot change it.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit
by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the
other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands
it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other." But it does
not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor
that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore
it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.

Obj. 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the
similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this
there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of
deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by
changing the imagination.

_On the contrary,_ Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by
imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as
appears from Matt. 1:20; 2:13, 19 in regard to the angel who appeared
to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.

_I answer that,_ Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural
power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as
follows. For it was said above (Q. 110, A. 3), that corporeal nature
obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be
caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural
power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions
are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits
and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis
iii], when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that "when an
animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive
principle, and movements descend with it," that is, the impressions
left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and
move the sensitive principle"; so that a certain appearance ensues,
as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external
objects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors
may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are
awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by
a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will
of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so
also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel,
sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without
such alienation.

Reply Obj. 1: The first principle of the imagination is from the
sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by
the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot
imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in
such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the
impressions preserved within.

Reply Obj. 2: An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the
impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from
the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but
by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human
imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect
which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that
he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows.

Reply Obj. 4: An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes
enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what
these images signify; and then there is no deception. But sometimes
by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the
imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but
by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus
neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to
the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 4]

Whether an Angel Can Change the Human Senses?

Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses.
For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an
operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the
sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.

Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the
nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other
natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.

Obj. 3: Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible
objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (Q. 110, A.
4). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are
changed always by the sensible object.

_On the contrary,_ The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the
people of Sodom with blindness or _aorasia_, so that they could not
find the door" (Gen. 19:11). [*It is worth noting that these are the
only two passages in the Greek version where the word _aorasia_
appears. It expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of
Sodom--namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the
Latin "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily imply.] The same is
recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kings 6:18).

_I answer that,_ The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from
without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within,
for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors
are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with
choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the
other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change
in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible
object from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as
when he assumes a body, as we have said above (Q. 51, A. 2). Likewise
he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked,
whereby the senses are changed in various ways.

Reply Obj. 1: The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be
without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this
interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior
principle, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 2: By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an
angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive
power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any
other power using a corporeal organ.

Reply Obj. 3: An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of
creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since
he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel
can work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature.
_______________________

QUESTION 112

THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS
(In Four Articles)

We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise
four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?

(2) Whether all are sent?

(3) Whether those who are sent, assist?

(4) From what orders they are sent.
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 1]

Whether the Angels Are Sent on Works of Ministry?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of
ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But
intellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect
abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic
actions are intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to
perform their own actions.

Obj. 2: Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the
angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it
seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is
unseemly.

Obj. 3: Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of
wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive
wisdom" (Ecclus. 38:25). So if some angels are sent on external
ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation.
But the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of
God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which
is unfitting.

Obj. 4: Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is
written (Luke 22:27): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at
table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the
angels are naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent
to administer to us.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 23:20): "Behold I will send My
angels who shall go before thee."

_I answer that,_ From what has been said above (Q. 108, A. 6), it may
be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we
have already stated (Q. 43, A. 1), in treating of the mission of the
Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from
another so as to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another
way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to
be sent as proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in
a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before by
the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present
everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, His power
reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (Q. 8, A. 1).
An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to
the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to
reach another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be
"there." But it is clear from what was above stated (Q. 110, A. 1),
that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence,
whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal
creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power;
and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this takes place
by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.

Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God
as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the
angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is
what is meant by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent
instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action
is ordered to another. Hence angels' actions are called "ministries";
and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.

Reply Obj. 1: An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one
way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an
operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine
says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting
something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action
is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by
some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently
have sometimes a determinate place.

Reply Obj. 2: The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by
way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body
should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above
bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean
heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of
his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his dignity when
not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his dignity.

Reply Obj. 3: In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by
exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through the
sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the
action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary,
regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence
it follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his
contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule
and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other.
Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels do not go abroad
in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation."

Reply Obj. 4: In their external actions the angels chiefly minister
to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them,
absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by
cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior
to every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): "Esteeming
others better than themselves."
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 2]

Whether All the Angels Are Sent in Ministry?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry.
For the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14): "All are ministering spirits, sent
to minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?'].

Obj. 2: Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the
Seraphim, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 6). But a Seraph was sent to
purify the lips of the prophet (Isa. 6:6, 7). Therefore much more are
the inferior orders sent.

Obj. 3: Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic
orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more are even
the highest angels sent.

Obj. 4: Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external
ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the
Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the
angels are unequal, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 4), each angel has an
angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the
last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words,
"Thousands of thousands ministered to Him" (Dan. 7:10).

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the
statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks
fulfil no exterior service."

_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (Q. 106, A.
3; Q. 110, A. 1), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not
only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior
things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation,
however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal
things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is
suitable for the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was
enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished
immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies.
Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these
bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of
the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. Nor can
anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without
the help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior.
From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law
the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet that
sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.

It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is
greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law;
in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old
law. Hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides
those who were sent to give the law.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel
who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior
order; but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an
equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet.
It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own
proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of
the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as
purifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so
immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as
the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means
of someone else.

Reply Obj. 3: The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are
said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been
said (Q. 43, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 4: A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence
there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent
immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior
are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior
ministries.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 3]

Whether All the Angels Who Are Sent, Assist?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist.
For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "So the angels are sent, and
assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme
Spirit, God, is not limited."

Obj. 2: Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he
said, "I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the
Lord" (Tob. 12:15). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.

Obj. 3: Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet
Satan assisted God, according to Job 1:6: "When the sons of God came
to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them."
Therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.

Obj. 4: Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is
because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, but
through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine
enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all.
Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to
the text of Dan. 7:10: "Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood
before Him." Therefore the angels who are sent also assist.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says, on Job 25:3: "Is there any numbering
of His soldiers?" (Moral. xvii): "Those powers assist, who do not go
forth as messengers to men." Therefore those who are sent in ministry
do not assist.

_I answer that,_ The angels are spoken of as "assisting" and
"administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king;
some of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately;
while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by
those who are in attendance--for instance, those who are placed at
the head of the administration of various cities; these are said to
administer, not to assist.

We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine
Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister,
are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who
are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist
and see the face of the Father." Yet not all the angels can perceive
the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the
Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the
inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to
the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative
it is to be enlightened immediately by God.

From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second
objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.

Reply Obj. 3: Satan is not described as having assisted, but as
present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii),
"though he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to
the angels."

Reply Obj. 4: All the assistants see some things immediately in the
glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the
prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately
enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than is
seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among
those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than
another.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 4]

Whether All the Angels of the Second Hierarchy Are Sent?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels of the second
hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister,
according to Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do
not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first
hierarchy, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the
angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.

Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who
minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the angels
of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the
angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the
"Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies
subjection. Therefore the dominations are not sent to minister.

_I answer that,_ As above stated (A. 1), to be sent to external
ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine
command in respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the
execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are
manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and
therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry
whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name
"dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only
disposition and command in administering. On the other hand, the
names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels"
and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; the "Virtues" and
"Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that
the "Prince," according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.),
"be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders
to be sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders.

Reply Obj. 1: The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering
angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to
be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the
production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are
to do.

Reply Obj. 2: A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number
of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those
who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he
takes the words (Dan. 7:10) "thousands of thousands ministered to
Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands
out of thousands"; thus the number of those who minister is
indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is
finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred
thousand assisted Him." This explanation rests on the opinion of the
Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first
principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is
to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified
as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist.

Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of
angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the
superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable
degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal
natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and
more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the
ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way,
the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication,
to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because ten times a
hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand"
it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but
since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are
given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than
the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise
number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it
exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the
multiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a
hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.
_______________________

QUESTION 113

OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS
(In Eight Articles)

We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and
their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight
points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?

(2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?

(3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of
angels?

(4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?

(5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?

(6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?

(7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?

(8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their
guardianship?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 1]

Whether Men Are Guarded by the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels.
For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how,
or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But
man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his
natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an
angel.

Obj. 2: Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But
men are guarded by God, according to Ps. 120:4: "He shall neither
slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need
to be guarded by an angel.

Obj. 3: Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence
of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep this man;
and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" (3 Kings
20:39). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the
angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some
such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are
given to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore
the angels are not the guardians of men.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 90:11): "He hath given His
angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways."

_I answer that,_ According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find
that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated
by the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable
spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which
are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as
regards conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the
principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover
manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and
affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was
necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men,
in order to regulate them and move them to good.

Reply Obj. 1: By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree,
but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in
affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the
soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by
nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but
not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the
universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be
deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): "The
thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain."
Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.

Reply Obj. 2: Two things are required for a good action; first, that
the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the
habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the
proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this the
Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first,
God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as
regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose
precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q.
111, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good by
reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the
instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they
enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is
not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice
of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the
ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as
likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 2]

Whether Each Man Is Guarded by an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel.
For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard
many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.

Obj. 2: Further, the lower things are brought to God through the
medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But
as all the angels are unequal (Q. 50, A. 4), there is only one angel
between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one
angel who immediately keeps men.

Obj. 3: Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater
offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than
another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all
the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different
angels.

_On the contrary,_ On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (Matt.
8:10), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to
have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."

_I answer that,_ Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him.
This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to
the execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's
providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other
corruptible creatures, for they are related differently to
incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common
species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are
the rational souls, which cannot be said of other incorruptible
things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly
exercised towards what remains for ever; whereas as regards things
which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their
existence to the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of
God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of
things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.),
the different orders are deputed to the different genera of things,
for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to
work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable that the
different species are presided over by different angels of the same
order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels
are appointed to the guardianship of different men.

Reply Obj. 1: A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons:
first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one
guardian is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one.
Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man
is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to
provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community,
such as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to
others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards
invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in
his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard
individual men.

Reply Obj. 2: As above stated (Q. 112, A. 3, ad 4), all the angels of
the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God
directly; but as to other things, only the superior are directly
enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the
same also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is
enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other
respects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is possible that
some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels
beneath him whom he enlightens.

Reply Obj. 3: Although men are equal in nature, still inequality
exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the
greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Ecclus. 33:11,
12: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified
their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of
them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to
guard one man than another.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 3]

Whether to Guard Men Belongs Only to the Lowest Order of Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the guardianship of men does not
belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says
that the text (Matt. 18:10), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be
understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the
superior angels guard men.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to
minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"
(Heb. 1:14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is
directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in
external ministry (Q. 112, A. 4). Therefore all the angels of the
five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.

Obj. 3: Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially
necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the
Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work
miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are
also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest
order.

_On the contrary,_ In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is
attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according
to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. v, ix).

_I answer that,_ As above stated (A. 2), man is guarded in two ways;
in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an
angel is appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the
lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory,
to announce the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the
angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one
man. The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied
according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent
is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs
to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels,"
whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an
archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (Dan. 10:13). Moreover
all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise
the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits by the
"Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).

Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the
lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in
each order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however,
probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by
God for the higher degree of glory.

Reply Obj. 2: Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of
individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship,
greater or less, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 3: Even inferior angels exercise the office of the
superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the
superiors' power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order
can coerce the demons, and work miracles.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 4]

Whether Angels Are Appointed to the Guardianship of All Men?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels are not appointed to the
guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that
"He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If
therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ
also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for
Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels are not
appointed to the guardianship of all men.

Obj. 2: Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not
fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state
of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore
angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

Obj. 3: Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men,
that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life,
encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults
of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain
to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good
works, do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention:
for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps.
31). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the
working of Satan," as it is written (2 Thess. 2:9). Therefore angels
are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.

_On the contrary,_ is the authority of Jerome quoted above (A. 2),
for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it."

_I answer that,_ Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on
a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is
threatened by many dangers both from within and from without,
according to Ps. 159:4: "In this way wherein I walked, they have
hidden a snare for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for
men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is
assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, however, he
arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in
the kingdom he will have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon
to punish him.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of
God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards
His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible
body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right that He
should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a
ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Matt.
4:11) that "angels came and ministered to Him."

Reply Obj. 2: In the state of innocence man was not threatened
by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as
we have said above (Q. 95, AA. 1, 3). But peril threatened from
without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the
event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even
Antichrist, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason;
so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to
the whole human race--namely the guardianship of the angels. And
although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in
their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless
conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt
both themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the
good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner
Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 5]

Whether an Angel Is Appointed to Guard a Man from His Birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard
a man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who
shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says
(Heb. 1:14). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation,
when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a
man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.

Obj. 2: Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels
enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of
instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of
reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as
soon as they are born.

Obj. 3: Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before
birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is
appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then
admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not
appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (_vide_ A. 4) that "each soul has an
angel appointed to guard it from its birth."

_I answer that,_ as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there
are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel
guardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is
appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves
(loc. cit.), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred
by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as
receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred
by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth,
for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter
benefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said
above (AA. 1, 4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man
has an angel guardian appointed to him.

Reply Obj. 1: Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously
indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if
we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the
realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic
ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so
efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless,
they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.

Reply Obj. 2: Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by
instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it
has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to
ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.

Reply Obj. 3: As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not
entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still
part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of
the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of
probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child
while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from
the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above
quoted, says.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 6]

Whether the Angel Guardian Ever Forsakes a Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes
the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in
the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not
healed: let us forsake her." And (Isa. 5:5) it is written: "I will
take away the hedge"--that is, "the guardianship of the angels"
[gloss]--"and it shall be wasted."

Obj. 2: Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But
God forsakes man at times, according to Ps. 21:2: "O God, my God,
look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does
an angel guardian forsake man.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When
the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes
they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.

_On the contrary,_ The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1
Pet. 5:8: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about,
seeking whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good angels
ever guard us.

_I answer that,_ As appears above (A. 2), the guardianship of the
angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is
evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn
from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates
being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all
being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering
of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some
defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that
the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he
leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him
from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin,
according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon
and the House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels,
because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject
to tribulation.

From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.

Reply Obj. 3: Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally,
he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his
guardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is
happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he
can be with man in an instant.
_______________________

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 7]

Whether Angels Grieve for the Ills of Those Whom They Guard?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those
whom they guard. For it is written (Isa. 33:7): "The angels of peace
shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow.
Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15),
"sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the
loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's
will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.

Obj. 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary
to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are
told, Luke 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls
into sin.

Obj. 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: "Whatsoever first-fruits they
offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to
judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or
through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve
for the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels
grieve for men's sins.

_On the contrary,_ Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not
perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 21:4): "Death shall
be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are
perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.

_I answer that,_ Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the
pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine
(De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our
will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the
angels and the other blessed, because their will cleaves entirely to
the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world
save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore
simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the
blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called
simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a
particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although
universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the
sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea,
considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the
threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is
voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage.
Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will
sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the
fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in
respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall
into sin.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels,
i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of
Rabsaces, as related Isa. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal
sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are
the apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins. If according to
the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels,
then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally
speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense
we attribute passions to God and the angels.

The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one
reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of
the Divine Providence.

Reply Obj. 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of
men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.
_______________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 8]

Whether There Can Be Strife or Discord Among the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be [no] strife or discord among
the angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): "Who maketh peace in His
high places." But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high
angels there is no strife.

Obj. 2: Further, where there is perfect charity and just
authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the
angels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they
guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the
opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in
the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder
of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good
angels.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dan. 10:13): "The prince of the
kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this
prince of the Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of
the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the
others; and thus there is strife among them.

_I answer that,_ The raising of this question is occasioned by this
passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the
kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of
the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being
offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been
caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in
Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the
prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.

But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of
Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom.
To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must
note that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and
various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the
angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in
various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits,
so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what
is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot
know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult
Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult the
Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are
said to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition,
since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine
decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in
opposition.

From this the answers to the objections are clear.
_______________________

QUESTION 114

OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS
(In Five Articles)

We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are
five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?

(2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?

(3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or
temptations of the demons?

(4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading
men astray?

(5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from
making further assaults?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 1]

Whether Men Are Assailed by the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons.
For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by
God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is
the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail
man.

Obj. 2: Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set
against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are
weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not
therefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men
should be assailed by demons.

Obj. 3: Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are
enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed
that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be
assailed by the demons.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling is
not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers,
against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits
of wickedness in the high places."

_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the assault of the
demons--the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault
itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor
to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of
Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the
angels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation.
But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make
orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in
regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering
thereof are to be referred to God as their first author.

Reply Obj. 1: The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by
instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail
us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just
judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and
thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish
Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings 22:20. For punishment
is referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who
are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which
they are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are
sent by God on account of His justice.

Reply Obj. 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not
unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be
gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the
guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to
his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them."

Reply Obj. 3: The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice
for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the
demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men.
But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 2]

Whether to Tempt Is Proper to the Devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil.
For God is said to tempt, according to Gen. 22:1, "God tempted
Abraham." Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again,
man is said to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not
proper to the devil to tempt.

Obj. 2: Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know
what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.

Obj. 3: Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the
will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears
from what has been said above (Q. 111, A. 2), it seems that it is not
in their province to tempt.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): "Lest perhaps he
that tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds,
"that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt."

_I answer that,_ To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of
something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something
about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But
sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired
through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires
to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or
virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge
is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.

From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in
various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for
the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to
tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an
experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help,
sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in
order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be
his proper office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he
does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may
know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to
know. Hence it is written (Deut. 13:3): "The Lord your God trieth
you, that it may appear whether you love him."

The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or
matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man
someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the
flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity:
of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.

Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but
the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher of
spirits" (Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more
prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order
to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him
to that vice to which he is most prone.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated
above (Q. 111, A. 3), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a
certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it
can nevertheless be inclined.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 3]

Whether All Sins Are Due to the Temptation of the Devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of
the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude of
demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others."
And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all malice and all
uncleanness have been devised by the devil."

Obj. 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of
the Jews (John 8:44): "You are of your father the devil." But this
was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation.
Therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation.

Obj. 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are
deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the
suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne
to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the
instigation of the devil.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): "Not all
our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they
arise from the movement of our free-will."

_I answer that,_ One thing can be the cause of another in two ways;
directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of
a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional
and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he
who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we
must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it
was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there
resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this
sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.

But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its
action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the
cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's
instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of
the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were
no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like
pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those
desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the
corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to
curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need
for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins
which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the
same blandishments as were our first parents," as Isidore says (De
Summo Bono ii).

Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: When man commits sin without being thereto instigated
by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby,
in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot
advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man
by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part
in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the
demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is
not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 4]

Whether Demons Can Lead Men Astray by Means of Real Miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by
means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show
itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says
(2 Thess. 2:9), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in
all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at
other times do the demons perform lying wonders.

Obj. 2: Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change.
But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body
can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power."
Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.

Obj. 3: Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If
therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of
what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the
faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (Mk. 16:20): "The Lord
working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed."

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Q. 83) [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4,
among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]: "Often by means of
the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by
the servants of God."

_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said above (Q. 110,
A. 4), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot
work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the
strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the
entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is
contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for
whatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can
work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by
reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of
knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and
knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so
that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.

It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which
appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes
nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the
demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. And "when fire came
down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep;
when the storm struck down his house and with it his children--these
were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
xx, 19).

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says in the same place, the works of
Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will
deceive men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really
do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies,
they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him."

Reply Obj. 2: As we have said above (Q. 110, A. 2), corporeal matter
does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons
be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another;
but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the
world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin.
iii, 8, 9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation
of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers,
to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be
produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these
seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or
frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those
transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature,
cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for
instance, that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or
that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something
of this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is
not real but a mere semblance of reality.

Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a
demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses,
so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (Q.
111, AA. 3,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by
the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as he
can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so
as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can clothe any
corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein.
This is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "Man's
imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of
an innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as
it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be
understood as though the imagination itself or the images formed
therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the
senses of another man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a
man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's
senses.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do
what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different
right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the
glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter by
the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is
subject."
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 5]

Whether a Demon Who Is Overcome by Man, Is for This Reason Hindered
from Making Further Assaults?

Objection 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is
not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ
overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon
assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is
not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.

Obj. 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted
in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not
befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not
prevented from further assaults.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 4:11): "Then the devil left
Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame.

_I answer that,_ Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he
can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any
other sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same
man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so
for a certain definite time: wherefore (Luke 4:13) it is written:
"All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time."
There are two reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency;
for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus
Imperfectum, among his supposititious works], "the devil does not
tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God
allows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He
orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken
from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Luke
4:13: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from
frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return
to the assault, is apparent from Matt. 12:44: "I will return into my
house from whence I came out."

From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.
_______________________

QUESTION 115

OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE
(In Six Articles)

We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and
fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal
actions there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a body can be active?

(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?

(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here
by the inferior bodies?

(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?

(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?

(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things
which are subject to their influence?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 1]

Whether a Body Can Be Active?

Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but
do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted
upon; this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon;
these are the spiritual substances."

Obj. 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its
work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance
below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the
latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings.
Therefore corporeal substance is not active.

Obj. 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity.
But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it
surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from
receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in
quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore
no corporeal substance is active.

Obj. 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to
its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most
composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most
simple. Therefore no bodies are active.

Obj. 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is
either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a
substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any
principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident;
and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the
cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is
it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its
subject," as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are
active.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other
qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action
and power on that of which it lays hold."

_I answer that,_ It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are
active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three
errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of
Avicebron in his book on _The Fount of Life,_ where, by the arguments
mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that
all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the
actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that,
according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power
which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be
derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in
corporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited
thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were
universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes
of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which
is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by
quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and
imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to
be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the
spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by
quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else.

But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but
that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is
participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is
proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is
the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else
than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act
as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the
fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to
quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and
universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it
owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form
of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a
fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is
in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes
from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the
contact of two bodies.

But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For
Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred
accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the
small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others
considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both
Plato and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that
corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing
matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection
attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an
immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the
action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of
the creation (Q. 45, A. 8).

The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes
place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while
passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the
passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,
9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole,
and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its
action; which things are manifestly untrue.

We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on
a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the
whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, which thus has no
nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature
acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created.
Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in
potentiality to that which the other has in act.

From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must
be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not
moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand,
there exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is
to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure
potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of
potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.

Reply Obj. 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form
from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent,
forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject
to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the
purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight;
as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that
weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the
greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto.
Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as
Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to
act.

Reply Obj. 4: A body is not that which is most distant from God; for
it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being,
forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is
primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure
potentiality.

Reply Obj. 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental form
and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat,
although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the
substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can
terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument
of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh.
But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the
nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to
surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an
accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient;
thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Any Seminal Virtues in Corporeal Matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in
corporeal matter. For virtue (_ratio_) implies something of a
spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually,
but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which
it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that demons
produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain
seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues,
can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to
say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active
principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter
is not competent to act (A. 1, ad 2, 4). Therefore there are no
seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Obj. 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues"
(Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the
production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for
miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal
virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal
virtues in corporeal matter.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the
things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion,
certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."

_I answer that,_ It is customary to name things after what is more
perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole
corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the
word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural
things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation
of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living
things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a
tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united,
consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of
movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the
active and passive principles of the generation of living things are
the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine
fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to
all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of
natural generation and movement.

These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders.
For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they
are principally and originally in the Word of God, as _typal ideas._
Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were
produced altogether at the beginning, as in _universal causes._
Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time,
are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in
that animal, as in _particular causes._ Fourthly, they are in the
_seeds_ produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared
to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to
the first effects produced.

Reply Obj. 1: These active and passive virtues of natural things,
though not called "virtues" (rationes) by reason of their being in
corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their
origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes
ideales].

Reply Obj. 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain parts
of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement
for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as
employing seeds.

Reply Obj. 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the
generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the
female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed"
covers both active and passive principles.

Reply Obj. 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these
seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal
virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii,
9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is
the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things."
Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but
not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a
separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the
scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought
outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the
creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God
commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of
the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are
ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we
say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 3]

Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of What Is Produced in
Bodies Here Below?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause
of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide
Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"--namely, the heavenly bodies--"are
not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of
storms and atmospheric changes."

Obj. 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter
suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there
are contrary agents--heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the
production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe
causality to the heavenly bodies.

Obj. 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be
observed that everything which is produced here below is produced
through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other
such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the
heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more
corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a
sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one
may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not
the cause of things produced in bodies here below.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a
grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of
a more subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says
that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible
bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and
perfection."

_I answer that,_ Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since
what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is
moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the
whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore
the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of
those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of
all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally.
Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and
multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies,
as to their cause.

Reply Obj. 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as
denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation
and corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held
that the heavenly bodies are gods.

Reply Obj. 2: The active principles of bodies here below are only the
active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like.
If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not
diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles
of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the
"dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these
inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act.
But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those
accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the
substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself
sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some
active principle above these material dispositions.

This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate
species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their
substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate
species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have
the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in
the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly
false.

Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10),
to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or
absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior
bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates
here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument
of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man
and the sun generate man."

Reply Obj. 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the
bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of
their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is
contained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like
God.

Reply Obj. 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received
in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter.
Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is
not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes
into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an
argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the
stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various
dispositions of matter.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 4]

Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of Human Actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of
human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
substances, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 3), they act by virtue
thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are
superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause
impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.

Obj. 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle.
But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that
they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to
their principles.

Obj. 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the
outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and
will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the
heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions.
Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."

_I answer that,_ The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves
act on bodies, as stated above (A. 3). They can act directly indeed
on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs,
but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be
hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot
see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to
corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not
differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly
bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow
that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other
animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed
to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the
action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore
follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate
actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false,
and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that
indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can
reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and
will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to
corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently
situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior
apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or
memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of
necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of
necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for
although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a
certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains
the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the
impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior
powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the
proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.

To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human
actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ
from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of
men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on"
(Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect
and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that
heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.

Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly
bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly
bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by
enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will,
as stated above (Q. 111, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is
reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause:
so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the
will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect
and will.

Reply Obj. 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are
movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the
heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist
these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the
truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not
in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions
by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to
say that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy,
Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 5]

Whether Heavenly Bodies Can Act on the Demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons.
For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass
men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Matt.
4:24 and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the
heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.

Obj. 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order
to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the
heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are
subject to them.

Obj. 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior
bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies,
namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words,
forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ.
Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action
of heavenly bodies.

_On the contrary,_ The demons are superior in the order of nature, to
the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not
subject to the action of heavenly bodies.

_I answer that,_ There have been three opinions about the demons. In
the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and
held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the
necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies.
This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been
held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain powers
useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion
is manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are
done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no
way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should
speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no
previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move,
and other like things.

For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are
"animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says,
quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of
the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said
that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have
said man is subject thereto (A. 4). But this opinion is proved to be
false from what we have said above (Q. 51, A. 1): for we hold that
demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is
clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither
essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.

Reply Obj. 1: That demons harass men, according to certain phases
of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to
"defame God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv,
24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because as
they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural
forces, as stated above (Q. 114, A. 4, ad 2) they take into account
the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest
that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as
Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De
Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action
of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it
is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore
the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's
imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.

Reply Obj. 2: Demons when summoned through certain constellations,
come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error
of believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly,
because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal
matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are
enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals,
songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by
signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them
in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 6]

Whether Heavenly Bodies Impose Necessity on Things Subject to Their
Action?

Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on
things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient
cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their
movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their
effects follow of necessity.

Obj. 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter,
when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to
itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject
to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than
theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity
received in corporeal matter.

Obj. 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow
of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal
cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must
of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the
heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below.
Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it
follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below
happens of necessity.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De
Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs
observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and
wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of
heavenly bodies take place of necessity.

_I answer that,_ This question is partly solved by what was said
above (A. 4); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown
that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain
inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of
necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of
the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which
human action extends.

But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with
freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by
heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least,
everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some
of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause;
and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded
that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by
Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.

For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,
the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered
to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the
majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But
that such causes do fail in the minority of cases is due to some
hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems
not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of
necessity.

Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is
a being _per se,_ has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a
cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one.
For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is)
"musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has
not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it
is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so
ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases,
clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of
these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause.
Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be
reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of
necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the
higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some
heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some
combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that
the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is
not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not
all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.

Reply Obj. 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take
place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes,
which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.

Reply Obj. 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore
it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local
distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect.
Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body
(for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in
Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or
other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of another
cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless
the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the
causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
_______________________

ON FATE
(In Four Articles)

We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are
four points of inquiry:

(1) Is there such a thing as fate?

(2) Where is it?

(3) Is it unchangeable?

(4) Are all things subject to fate?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 1]

Whether There Be Such a Thing As Fate?

Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a
homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the hearts
of the faithful to think that fate is anything real."

Obj. 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said
to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to
happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If
therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance
in the world.

_On the contrary,_ What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius
(De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its
proper order."

_I answer that,_ In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or
chance-like as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some
higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are
sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two
servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the
master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.

So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the
existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De
Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about
Providence (Q. 22, A. 2).

On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes
place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or
in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the
heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a
disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born"
[*Cf. St. Augustine , loc. cit., v, 1, 8, 9]. But this will not hold.
First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (Q. 115, A.
4) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly
bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate,
since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of
necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place.
Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been
said (Q. 115, A. 6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking
neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates
in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is
accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No
natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man
intending to dig a grave finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a
acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects
in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active
power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident
here below, whether by luck or by chance.

We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining
cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which
happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect:
otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger
of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend
this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place
where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of
this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what
happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some
ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine
intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q. 105,
A. 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of
which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.

So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were
"fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy
doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted
its application to a certain force in the position of the stars.
Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human
affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him
keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue." For this reason Gregory
denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's
solution is manifest.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by
chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to
Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world,"
as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 2]

Whether Fate Is in Created Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but
in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.

Obj. 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as
their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below,
is God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and
not in creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or
an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to
the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing
only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a
disposition inherent to changeable things."

_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been stated above (Q. 22,
A. 3; Q. 103, A. 6), Divine Providence produces effects through
mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects
in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering
of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering
as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of
certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what
Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine
Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by
all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements
of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of
the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is
forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above (A. 1; Q. 104,
A. 2; Q. 110, A. 1; Q. 113; Q. 114). It is therefore manifest that
fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the
production of their effects.

Reply Obj. 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine
(De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature
of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or
will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially
fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second
causes.

Reply Obj. 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the
second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.

Reply Obj. 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition
which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies
order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be
considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is
one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the
mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote:
"Thy fate draws thee."
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 3]

Whether Fate Is Unchangeable?

Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is
to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so
is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of
Providence."

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be
moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent
to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore
fate is changeable.

Obj. 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate
happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate
seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no
contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an
unchangeable disposition.

_I answer that,_ The disposition of second causes which we call fate,
can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second
causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to
the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some,
therefore, have held that the series itself o[f] dispositions of
causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of
necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a
cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as
proved above (Q. 115, A. 6).

Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as
dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that
fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says
(Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the
reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.

We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second
causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it
derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of
conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is
true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will
happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is
fickle, shortly afterwards adds--"which, since it is derived from an
unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable."

From this the answers to the objections are clear.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 4]

Whether All Things Are Subject to Fate?

Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For
Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven
and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them
by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born
into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of
offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from
the domain of fate.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is
something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the
Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says
(De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.

Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a
disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are
changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above
(Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things
subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of
second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is
subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is
done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes,
neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification
of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says
(De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a
state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence
it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the
more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it
is bound up with second causes.

Reply Obj. 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by
God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in
the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as
stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as
to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever
is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as
already stated.

Reply Obj. 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet
some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And
these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
_______________________

QUESTION 117

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN
(In Four Articles)

We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of
man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In
the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and
secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the
first, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his
knowledge?

(2) Whether man can teach an angel?

(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?

(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local
movement?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 1]

Whether One Man Can Teach Another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the
Lord says (Matt. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss
of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God."
Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it
belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is
proper to God.

Obj. 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as
he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the
other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his
like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an
active quality just as heat is.

Obj. 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the
species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of
these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause
knowledge in another man.

Obj. 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple
save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by
words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to
cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are
signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know.
If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is
already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from
the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can
learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to
a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore
in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): "Whereunto I am
appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles
in faith and truth."

_I answer that,_ On this question there have been various opinions.
For Averroes, commenting on _De Anima_ iii, maintains that all men
have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).
From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all
men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have
a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he
communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving
him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be
rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true
so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we
consider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective
truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all
men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible
species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is
false, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).

Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that
our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through
the participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q. 84, AA. 3,
4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body,
from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According
to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his
master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to
learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they
held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms,
which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But
against this we have proved above (Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 3) that the
passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to
intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).

We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the
teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from
potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In
order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding
from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle
alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone:
whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle,
sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick
man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art,
sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the
force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed.
First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals
a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused
the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior
principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the
principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the
interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with
instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use
in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and
employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended
end.

Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as
is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from
an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by
instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of
knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which
certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally
understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone
applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the
memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by
his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains
knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches,
leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge
of things previously unknown to him; according to what the
Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning
proceed from previous knowledge."

Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of
the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him
certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use
for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him
certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the
disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose
to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of
opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the
learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown.
Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed,
by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q.
106, A. 1; Q. 111, A. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all
human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch
as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to
conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power
to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the
Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism
that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer
to know.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help
as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the
principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the
intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are
from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy
diseases" (Ps. 102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man
knowledge" (Ps. 93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is
signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown
to us.

Reply Obj. 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause
knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause.
Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the
principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the
principle by which one is directed in working.

Reply Obj. 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light in the
disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he
moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of
his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are
proposed to him from without.

Reply Obj. 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of
things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in
detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by
himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own
master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is
required in a master.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 2]

Whether Man Can Teach the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says
(Eph. 3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the
principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church."
But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things
are made known to angels through men.

Obj. 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately
concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as
stated above (Q. 116, A. 1; Q. 112, A. 3). But some men are
instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God;
as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1, 2: "Last of
all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore
some men have been able to teach the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior.
But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up
to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom.
xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be
instructed by men concerning Divine things.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine
enlightenment is borne to men by the ministry of the angels.
Therefore angels are not instructed by men concerning Divine things.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 107, A. 2), the inferior angels
can indeed speak to the superior angels, by making their thoughts
known to them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never
enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same
way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men
are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's
words (Matt. 11:11): "There hath not risen among them that are born
of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in
the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." Therefore angels are never
enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of
speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it
belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this
passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the
least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all
men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which
hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the
multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and
powers in the heavenly places--that is, through the Church." As
though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from
the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and
powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because
the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this
Church composed of men will be gathered together."

It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by
the angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place
and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v,
19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled
by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became
apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this
way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad
Eph.)--that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned
certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the
apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus
by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which
mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.

Reply Obj. 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of
God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His
human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply Obj. 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater than
certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have
such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude
than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say
that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree,
though actually it is much smaller.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 3]

Whether Man by the Power of His Soul Can Change Corporeal Matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can
change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints
work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus
Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof
delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working
of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men,
by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.

Obj. 2: Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): "Who hath bewitched you,
that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have
blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially
children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could
change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by
the power of his soul.

Obj. 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies.
But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed
to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed
this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death.
Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal
matter.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal
matter obeys God alone at will."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 2), corporeal matter is
not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent
composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter
and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both.
Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (Q. 110, A. 2) that they
cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by
employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects.
Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change
corporeal matter, except by means of bodies.

Reply Obj. 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power of
grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the
same place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says--what
wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?"

Reply Obj. 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact
that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual
substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the
soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This
he says is the cause of the "evil eye."

But it has been shown above (Q. 110, A. 2) that corporeal matter
does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone.
Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the
(corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed,
which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to
which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air
which is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way
as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a
"menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; [*De Insomniis
ii]).

Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs
mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the
countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who
have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that
by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons
co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.

Reply Obj. 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and the
sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as
stated above (Q. 81, A. 3), it is the act of a corporeal organ.
Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive
appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal
operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice
to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in
the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 4]

Whether the Separate Human Soul Can Move Bodies at Least Locally?

Objection 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at
least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to
local motion, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 5). But the separate
soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies
by its command.

Obj. 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the
narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained
power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through
this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been
without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the
separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.

_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul
cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.

_I answer that,_ The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a
body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the
body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that
if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as
to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by
the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power
the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by
the power of God, it can exceed those limits.

Reply Obj. 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are
not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are
naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey
them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance
is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will
not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower
degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven
cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its
nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it
cannot by its natural power move any other body.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom.
xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the
dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is
therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who
pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
_______________________

QUESTION 118

OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL
(In Three Articles)

We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the
soul; secondly, as to the body.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?

(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?

(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 1]

Whether the Sensitive Soul Is Transmitted with the Semen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted
with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not
composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence
not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save
from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise
it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is
not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by
generation but by creation.

Obj. 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is the
generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the
vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now
nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot
be caused by the animal's generating power.

Obj. 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of
the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But
neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in
the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in
some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a
particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body
which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore
the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.

Obj. 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of
the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is
begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it
would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal;
which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between
begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct
therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above
(Q. 76, A. 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle,
which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does
not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent
would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the
sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.

_On the contrary,_ The power in the semen is to the animal seminally
generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals
produced from these elements--for instance by putrefaction. But in
the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power,
according to Gen. 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping
creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally
generated are produced by the seminal power.

_I answer that,_ Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals
are created by God (Q. 65, A. 4). This opinion would hold if the
sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself.
For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would
needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot
be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul
would arrive at existence by creation.

But this principle is false--namely, that being and operation are
proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q. 75,
A. 3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since,
therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is
that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as
proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the
subsistent composites exist through them.

Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator
is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the
sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into
existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from
potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are
possessed.

Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for
instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its
heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the
lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some
medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But
living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their
like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium--in the work
of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium--in the
act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives
a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the
instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent.
And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the
instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter
whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul
of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.

Reply Obj. 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent
substance. We have said enough (Q. 25, A. 3) on this point, nor need
we repeat it here.

Reply Obj. 2: The generating power begets not only by its own virtue
but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the
generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal
begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more
perfect effect is its generating power ordained.

Reply Obj. 3: This active force which is in the semen, and which is
derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain
movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the
soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the
axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is
no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is
based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is
attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a
certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue
of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the
species as stated above (Q. 115, A. 3, ad 2). And since in this
(vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of
a heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun generate
man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the
soul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii,
4).

Reply Obj. 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active
force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In
this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not
as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul
is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract
nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore
is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until
it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the
force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for
thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical;
moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than
generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by
the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in
one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that
the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the
perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the
active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the
semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is
there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the
principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an
instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 2]

Whether the Intellectual Soul Is Produced from the Semen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced
from the semen. For it is written (Gen. 46:26): "All the souls that
came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from
the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual
soul is produced from the semen.

Obj. 2: Further, as shown above (Q. 76, A. 3), the intellectual,
sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man.
But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in
other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii,
3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but
first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore
also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.

Obj. 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is
directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and
the form there would not result something simply one. But the
intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced
by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is
produced by the power of the semen.

Obj. 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the human
species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational
soul is from the begetter.

Obj. 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if
the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the
sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit
intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the
rational soul is not engendered by coition."

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for an active power existing in
matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial
effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man
transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no
part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to
produce the intellectual principle.

Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter
according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making
use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever
to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the
intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen.
Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows
that the intellect alone comes from without."

Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of
the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q. 75, A. 2): therefore
to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an
immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only
through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul
is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to
be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is
therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted
with the semen.

Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the
whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.

Reply Obj. 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in the
embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or
from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are
false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth
cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said
that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the
beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.

Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which
existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in
addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus
there would be in man three souls of which one would be in
potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Q. 76,
A. 3).

Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely
vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power,
becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes
intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by
the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from
without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect
comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no
substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of
greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition
of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not
possible for the same identical form to belong to different species.
Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal
would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the
imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because
it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not
generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in
act. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter
of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection;
this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of
the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of
generation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that which is
caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must
needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was
non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those
who held the existence of several souls in the body--or else it is
not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from
this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with
the body, which cannot be admitted.

There is again another explanation, according to those who held that
all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved
above (Q. 76, A. 2).

We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the
corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and
in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous
form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the
perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in
this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at
the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This
indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from
putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is
created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at
the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being
corrupted.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not
ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to
one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from
reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior
agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the
generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but
the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what
has been said above (Q. 105, A. 5; Q. 110, A. 1) that the whole of
corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power,
especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the
body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul
is from God alone.

Reply Obj. 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power
the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.

Reply Obj. 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is
good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is
evil; in this God does not concur.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 3]

Whether Human Souls Were Created Together at the Beginning of the
World?

Objection 1: It would seem that human souls were created together at
the beginning of the world. For it is written (Gen. 2:2): "God rested
Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He
created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the
same time.

Obj. 2: Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the
perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the
bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to
the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the
universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Gen. 2:2,
where it is said that "God ended" all "His work."

Obj. 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But
the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it
began to exist before the body.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the
soul is created together with the body."

_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that it is accidental to the
intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul
is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not
united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were
created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement
is false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if
it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would
follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident;
or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Q. 75, A.
4). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the
angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown
above (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 85, A. 1): for man understands through
receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above
(Q. 84, AA. 6, 7; Q. 85, A. 1). For this reason the soul needs to be
united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the
sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if
it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural
to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is
deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God
should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did
not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a
man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.

But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to
the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the
reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other
reason. If because the soul willed it--this seems incongruous. First,
because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to
the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would
be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not fail in
what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why,
having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should,
after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a
spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly
revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united
to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills
would have to concur--to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of
the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural
on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent
cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting
nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that
souls were embodied in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these
opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not
created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are
infused into them.

Reply Obj. 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from
all work, since we read (John 5:17): "My Father worketh until now";
but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not
have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls
which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the
species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's
soul.

Reply Obj. 2: Something can be added every day to the perfection of
the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the
number of species.

Reply Obj. 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to the
corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it
was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from
the beginning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not
death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to
them."
_______________________

QUESTION 119

OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY
(In Two Articles)

We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning
this there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?

(2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation,
is produced from the surplus food?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 119, Art. 1]

Whether Some Part of the Food Is Changed into True Human Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true
human nature. For it is written (Matt. 15:17): "Whatsoever entereth
into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy."
But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature.
Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh
belonging to the species from flesh belonging to "matter"; and says
that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes
and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to
matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature
belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true
human nature.

Obj. 3: Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality
of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according
to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed
into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.

Obj. 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature,
whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due
only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking
food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.

Obj. 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there
is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is
generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If
therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end
nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the
beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man
throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same,
identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore
the food is not changed into true human nature.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily
food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into
the texture of the members." But the texture of the members belongs
to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality
of human nature.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The
relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being."
Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters
into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in
two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as
in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong
to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate
matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true
nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body
belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human
nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.

Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one
individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the
matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that
the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which,
they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man.
So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by
posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human
nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.

But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject
of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the
multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man.
According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we
take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action
of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the "radical humor";
just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed
by fire.

But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to
the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it
can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can
be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that
the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which
is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible.
Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that
something else be changed into true human nature. Secondly, because
in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual
there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case
with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one
individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of
matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of
quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter
increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the
matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it
cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the
addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result
from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to
matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into
it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by
rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some
other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or
lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of
matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the
body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of
a child. Nor does it occur by creation of fresh matter: for,
according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things were created
together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific
form." Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be
the result of the food being changed into the true human nature.
Fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants
in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of
animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment
into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication.
Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot
naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does
anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change
of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of
generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would
be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.

Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to
exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in
general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the
individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter,
on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual,
so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of
the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the
true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the
requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the
change of food into the substance of the individual partaking
thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required.
And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human
nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the
individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further
is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature,
properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because
this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in
which, although there be a power of generating their like in species,
there is not the power of generating their like in the individual;
which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing,
therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power,
if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly,
because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from
the soul of the begetter, as stated above (Q. 118, A. 1). Hence it
cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is
derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly
assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the
nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food
which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for
growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer;
but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat.
But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food,
took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was
there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that
which is formed from the food.

Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is
really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming
the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what
the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as
it is potentially flesh."

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters
into the mouth, but "all"--because something from every kind of food
is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is
generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast
aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.

Reply Obj. 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood
that which first receives the human species, which is derived from
the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does.
By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated
from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it
comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For
he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in
matter"--for instance, wood or stone--"so in flesh, there is
something belonging to the species, and something belonging to
matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in
inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished.
Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing
with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the
Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and
that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they
are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no
reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the
other remains.

It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is
not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered
from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according
to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein,
thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains
together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh
according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually
destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of
fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter
is substituted in its place.

Reply Obj. 3: The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the
virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot
be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the
"nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the
specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and
the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species
remains in its root, which is not destroyed.

Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by
continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore
the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to
transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also
for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of
what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this;
and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether,
the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water
added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to
become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example
(De Gener. i, 5).

Reply Obj. 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a
certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said
to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire
already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the
entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter
transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if,
while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on
until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire
will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into
what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by
means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural
heat.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 119, Art. 2]

Whether the Semen Is Produced from Surplus Food?

Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the
surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature,
producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is
begotten." But that which is generated is produced from the semen.
Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.

Obj. 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which
he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is
generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive
nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never
existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or
ancestors, than to any other men.

Obj. 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of
cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from
surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to
the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.

Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in
Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of
the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from
surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener.
Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."

_I answer that,_ This question depends in some way on what has been
stated above (A. 1; Q. 118, A. 1). For if human nature has a virtue
for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in
another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which
at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form
communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing
should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things
generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is
afterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the
proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see
that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first,
then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a
certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which
virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part.

Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what
is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this
solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken
from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would
be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have
the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that
nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from,
then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not
have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature,
but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the
solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains
the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in
act; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as
mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after
being cut in two: which is inadmissible.

It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something
separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the
whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of
the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (A. 1; Q.
108, A. 1). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that
which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the
substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In
this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power:
because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as
semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the
Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food,
have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and
generate seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter in
animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the
form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the
substance.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on
account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that
generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his
grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter
should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a
virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father.
In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in
relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.

Reply Obj. 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood as
though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from
which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that
both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter,
which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal
substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active
seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue
(in the production) of this man.

But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal
substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter
from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin
Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not
derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal
virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For "such a
birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary,
O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.






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