initial commit of ebook 17611HEADmain

2 files changed, 54300 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/old/17611.txt b/old/17611.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1467dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/old/17611.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,54300 @@
+Project Gutenberg's Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars), by Thomas Aquinas
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars)
+       From the Complete American Edition
+
+Author: Thomas Aquinas
+
+Translator: Fathers of the English Dominican Province
+
+Release Date: January 26, 2006 [EBook #17611]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PART I ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and
+supplementation by David McClamrock
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
+
+SUMMA THEOLOGICA
+
+PART I ("Prima Pars")
+
+Translated by
+Fathers of the English Dominican Province
+
+BENZIGER BROTHERS
+NEW YORK
+_______________________
+
+DEDICATION
+
+To the Blessed Virgin
+Mary Immaculate
+Seat of Wisdom
+_______________________
+
+NOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION
+
+The text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra
+K. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian
+Classics Ethereal Library <http://www.ccel.org>. I have eliminated
+unnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in
+transcription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,
+Prologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they
+appeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.
+Each article is now designated by part, question number, and article
+number in brackets, like this:
+
+> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]
+
+> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?
+
+In a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger
+Brothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text
+of the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in
+brackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first
+sentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: "Not only is it
+impossible that anything should be created by God...." By reference
+to the Latin, "non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari"
+(emphasis added), this has been corrected to "Not only is it [not]
+impossible that anything should be created by God...."
+
+This electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers
+edition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the
+original page numbers and headers):
+
+* The repetitive expression "We proceed thus to the [next] Article"
+does not appear directly below the title of each article.
+
+* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,
+_like this._ Quotations and other "quotable" matter, however, are
+ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this
+edition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they
+were set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers
+edition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear
+in the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in
+parentheses.
+
+* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated
+by colons, like this: "Dan. 7:10"--not like this: "Dan. vii. 10."
+Small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in
+citations to books other than the Bible.
+
+* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers
+edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the
+footnote mark appeared.
+
+* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.
+
+* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.
+
+* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and
+at certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line
+for each topic.
+
+* Titles of questions are in all caps.
+
+Anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to
+the content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a
+defect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).
+
+_______________________
+
+CONTENTS
+
+PROLOGUE
+
+FIRST PART (QQ. 1-119)
+
+Question
+
+1.   The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine
+2.   The Existence of God
+3.   On the Simplicity of God
+4.   The Perfection of God
+5.   Of Goodness in General
+6.   The Goodness of God
+7.   The Infinity of God
+8.   The Existence of God in Things
+9.   The Immutability of God
+10.  The Eternity of God
+11.  The Unity of God
+12.  How God Is Known by Us
+13.  The Names of God
+14.  Of God's Knowledge
+15.  Of Ideas
+16.  Of Truth
+17.  Concerning Falsity
+18.  The Life of God
+19.  The Will of God
+20.  God's Love
+21.  The Justice and Mercy of God
+22.  The Providence of God
+23.  Of Predestination
+24.  The Book of Life
+25.  The Power of God
+26.  Of the Divine Beatitude
+27.  The Procession of the Divine Persons
+28.  The Divine Relations
+29.  The Divine Persons
+30.  The Plurality of Persons in God
+31.  Of What Belongs to the Unity or Plurality in God
+32.  The Knowledge of the Divine Persons
+33.  Of the Person of the Father
+34.  Of the Person of the Son
+35.  Of the Image
+36.  Of the Person of the Holy Ghost
+37.  Of the Name of the Holy Ghost--Love
+38.  Of the Name of the Holy Ghost, as Gift
+39.  Of the Persons in Relation to the Essence
+40.  Of the Persons as Compared to the Relations or Properties
+41.  Of the Persons in Reference to the Notional Acts
+42.  Of Equality and Likeness Among the Divine Persons
+43.  The Mission of the Divine Persons
+
+TREATISE ON THE CREATION
+
+44.  The Procession of Creatures from God, and of the First Cause
+       of All Things
+45.  The Mode of Emanation of Things from the First Principle
+46.  Of the Beginning of the Duration of Creatures
+47.  Of the Distinction of Things in General
+48.  The Distinction of Things in Particular
+49.  The Cause of Evil
+
+TREATISE ON THE ANGELS
+
+50.  Of the Substance of the Angels Absolutely Considered
+51.  Of the Angels in Comparison with Bodies
+52.  Of the Angels in Relation to Place
+53.  Of the Local Movement of the Angels
+54.  Of the Knowledge of the Angels
+55.  Of the Medium of the Angelic Knowledge
+56.  Of the Angels' Knowledge of Immaterial Things
+57.  Of the Angels' Knowledge of Material Things
+58.  Of the Mode of the Angelic Knowledge
+59.  The Will of the Angels
+60.  Of the Love or Dilection of the Angels
+61.  Of the Production of the Angels in the Order of Natural Being
+62.  Of the Perfection of the Angels in the Order of Grace and of
+       Glory
+63.  The Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin
+64.  The Punishment of the Demons
+
+TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS
+
+65.  The Work of Creation of Corporeal Creatures
+66.  On the Order of Creation Towards Distinction
+67.  On the Work of Distinction in Itself
+68.  On the Work of the Second Day
+69.  On the Work of the Third Day
+70.  On the Work of Adornment, as Regards the Fourth Day
+71.  On the Work of the Fifth Day
+72.  On the Work of the Sixth Day
+73.  On the Things That Belong to the Seventh Day
+74.  On All the Seven Days in Common
+
+TREATISE ON MAN
+
+75.  Of Man Who Is Composed of a Spiritual and a Corporeal Substance:
+       and in the First Place, Concerning What Belongs to the Essence
+       of the Soul
+76.  Of the Union of Body and Soul
+77.  Of Those Things Which Belong to the Powers of the Soul in General
+78.  Of the Specific Powers of the Soul
+79.  Of the Intellectual Powers
+80.  Of the Appetitive Powers in General
+81.  Of the Power of Sensuality
+82.  Of the Will
+83.  Of Free-Will
+84.  How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal
+       Things Beneath It
+85.  Of the Mode and Order of Understanding
+86.  What Our Intellect Knows in Material Things
+87.  How the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself and All Within Itself
+88.  How the Human Soul Knows What Is Above Itself
+89.  Of the Knowledge of the Separated Soul
+90.  Of the First Production of Man's Soul
+91.  The Production of the First Man's Body
+92.  The Production of the Woman
+93.  The End or Term of the Production of Man
+94.  Of the State and Condition of the First Man as Regards His
+       Intellect
+95.  Of Things Pertaining to the First Man's Will--Namely, Grace
+       and Righteousness
+96.  Of the Mastership Belonging to Man in the State of Innocence
+97.  Of the Preservation of the Individual in the Primitive State
+98.  Of the Preservation of the Species
+99.  Of the Condition of the Offspring As to the Body
+100. Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Righteousness
+101. Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Knowledge
+102. Of Man's Abode, Which Is Paradise
+
+TREATISE ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT
+
+103. Of the Government of Things in General
+104. The Special Effects of the Divine Government
+105. Of the Change of Creatures by God
+106. How One Creature Moves Another
+107. The Speech of the Angels
+108. Of the Angelic Degrees of Hierarchies and Orders
+109. The Ordering of the Bad Angels
+110. How Angels Act on Bodies
+111. The Action of the Angels on Man
+112. The Mission of the Angels
+113. Of the Guardianship of the Good Angels
+114. Of the Assaults of the Demons
+115. Of the Action of the Corporeal Creature
+116. On Fate
+117. Of Things Pertaining to the Action of Man
+118. Of the Production of Man from Man As to the Soul
+119. Of the Propagation of Man As to the Body
+_______________________
+
+PROLOGUE
+
+Because the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach the
+proficient, but also to instruct beginners (according to the Apostle:
+As Unto Little Ones in Christ, I Gave You Milk to Drink, Not Meat--
+1 Cor. iii. 1, 2)--we purpose in this book to treat of whatever
+belongs to the Christian Religion, in such a way as may tend to the
+instruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this
+Science have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written
+by other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless
+questions, articles, and arguments; partly also because those things
+that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the
+order of the subject-matter, but according as the plan of the book
+might require, or the occasion of the argument offer; partly, too,
+because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the
+minds of the readers.
+
+Endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by
+God's help, to set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science
+as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow.
+_______________________
+
+SUMMA THEOLOGICA
+
+FIRST PART
+["I," "Prima Pars"]
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 1
+
+THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE
+(in Ten Articles)
+
+To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to
+investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning
+this there are ten points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is necessary?
+
+(2) Whether it is a science?
+
+(3) Whether it is one or many?
+
+(4) Whether it is speculative or practical?
+
+(5) How it is compared with other sciences?
+
+(6) Whether it is the same as wisdom?
+
+(7) Whether God is its subject-matter?
+
+(8) Whether it is a matter of argument?
+
+(9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes?
+
+(10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded
+in different senses?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]
+
+Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no
+need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is
+above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee"
+(Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of
+in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides
+philosophical science is superfluous.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for
+nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But
+everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science--even God
+Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the
+divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore,
+besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further
+knowledge.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): "All Scripture inspired
+of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in
+justice." Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical
+science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is
+useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other
+knowledge, i.e. inspired of God.
+
+_I answer that,_ It was necessary for man's salvation that there should
+be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up
+by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as
+to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not
+seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them
+that wait for Thee" (Isa. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men
+who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was
+necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed
+human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as
+regards those truths about God which human reason could have
+discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine
+revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover,
+would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the
+admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in
+God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order
+that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more
+surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by
+divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides
+philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred
+science learned through revelation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although those things which are beyond man's
+knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason,
+nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by
+faith. Hence the sacred text continues, "For many things are shown to
+thee above the understanding of man" (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this, the
+sacred science consists.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the
+various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer
+and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth,
+for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e.
+abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself.
+Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from
+philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason,
+may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall
+within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs
+in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Science?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every
+science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine
+proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since
+their truth is not admitted by all: "For all men have not faith" (2
+Thess. 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this
+sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of
+Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is
+not a science.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science
+alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished,
+protected and strengthened." But this can be said of no science except
+sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.
+
+_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that
+there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a
+principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as
+arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed
+from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the
+science of perspective proceeds from principles established by
+geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it
+is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from
+principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the
+science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on
+authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred
+science is established on principles revealed by God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The principles of any science are either in
+themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher
+science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred
+doctrine.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Individual facts are treated of in sacred
+doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they
+are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as
+in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those
+men through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture
+or doctrine is based, has come down to us.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Sacred Doctrine Is One Science?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for
+according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) "that science is one which
+treats only of one class of subjects." But the creator and the
+creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be
+grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred
+doctrine is not one science.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal
+creatures and human morality. But these belong to separate
+philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one
+science.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: "Wisdom
+gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things" (Wis. 10:10).
+
+_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty
+or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material
+aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an
+object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise
+formality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight.
+Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under
+the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely
+revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this
+science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one
+science.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and
+creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far
+as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the
+unity of this science is not impaired.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits
+from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher
+faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards
+the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the
+_common sense_ is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore,
+whatever is visible or audible. Hence the _common sense,_ although one
+faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly,
+objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical
+sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under
+one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So
+that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the
+divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Sacred Doctrine Is a Practical Science?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for
+a practical science is that which ends in action according to the
+Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action:
+"Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James 1:22).
+Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the
+New Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical science.
+Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Every practical science is concerned with human
+operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and
+architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned
+with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a
+practical but a speculative science.
+
+_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which
+belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in
+each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known
+through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical
+sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred
+doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows
+both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than
+practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with
+human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man
+is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists
+eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Sacred Doctrine Is Nobler than Other Sciences?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other
+sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it
+establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be
+doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its
+principles--namely, articles of faith--can be doubted. Therefore
+other sciences seem to be nobler.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon
+a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in
+a sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in
+his Epistle to Magnus, that "the ancient doctors so enriched their
+books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou
+knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or
+their scriptural learning." Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to
+other sciences.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this
+one: "Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower" (Prov. 9:3).
+
+_I answer that,_ Since this science is partly speculative and partly
+practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one
+speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by
+reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of
+its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses
+other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because
+other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human
+reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the
+light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the
+higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly
+of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while
+other sciences consider only those things which are within reason's
+grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained
+to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military
+science; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the
+State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical,
+is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every
+practical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every
+standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It may well happen that what is in itself the
+more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the
+weakness of our intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest
+objects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun"
+(Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about
+articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths,
+but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest
+knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable
+than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said
+in _de Animalibus_ xi.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This science can in a sense depend upon the
+philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but
+only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its
+principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by
+revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon
+the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as
+handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that
+supply their materials, as political of military science. That it thus
+uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the
+defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known
+through natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that
+which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 6]
+
+Whether This Doctrine Is the Same as Wisdom?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.
+For no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of
+wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph.
+i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science
+is not wisdom.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles
+of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is
+clear in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of
+other sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas
+wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among
+the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isa. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is
+not the same as wisdom.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and
+understanding in the sight of nations."
+
+_I answer that,_ This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not
+merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a
+wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be
+judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in
+any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus
+in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called
+wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim
+the wood and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid
+the foundation" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life,
+the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a
+fitting end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore
+he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe,
+namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the
+knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But
+sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest
+cause--not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as
+philosophers knew Him--"That which is known of God is manifest in
+them" (Rom. 1:19)--but also as far as He is known to Himself alone
+and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called
+wisdom.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from
+any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as
+through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The principles of other sciences either are
+evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through
+some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes
+through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no
+concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge
+of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth
+of this science must be condemned as false: "Destroying counsels and
+every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God" (2
+Cor. 10:4, 5).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold
+manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one
+way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges
+rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards
+it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and
+rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man
+learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous
+acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine
+things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the
+Holy Ghost: "The spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15). And
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Hierotheus is taught not by mere
+learning, but by experience of divine things." The second manner of
+judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though
+its principles are obtained by revelation.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 7]
+
+Whether God Is the Object of This Science?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For
+in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this
+science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De
+Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to define the essence of God."
+Therefore God is not the object of this science.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science
+must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ
+we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many
+other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is
+not the object of this science.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The object of the science is that of which it
+principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about
+God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is
+the object of this science.
+
+_I answer that,_ God is the object of this science. The relation between
+a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or
+faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty
+or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are
+referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to
+the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things
+are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things are
+treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God
+Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence
+it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This
+is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the
+articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the
+principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole
+science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however,
+looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect
+under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to
+be something other than God--that is, either things and signs; or the
+works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of
+all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as
+they have reference to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the
+essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His
+effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in
+regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even
+as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a
+cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition
+of the cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this
+sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or
+accidents but as in some way related to Him.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Matter of Argument?
+
+Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For
+Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought."
+But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things
+are written that you may believe" (John 20:31). Therefore sacred
+doctrine is not a matter of argument.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is
+either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it
+seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the
+weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting
+its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit
+in those things of which human reason brings its own experience."
+Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that
+faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to
+exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).
+
+_I answer that,_ As other sciences do not argue in proof of their
+principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other
+truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of
+its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes
+on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of
+Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15).
+However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical
+sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles
+nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher
+science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute
+with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make
+some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute
+with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture,
+since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies
+its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths
+obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics
+from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of
+faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of
+divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the
+articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his
+objections--if he has any--against faith. Since faith rests upon
+infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be
+demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith
+cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot
+avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this
+doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments
+from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation:
+thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the
+revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of
+this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human
+reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine
+revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of
+human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of
+faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are
+put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy
+nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the
+natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says:
+"Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of
+Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the
+authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able
+to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of
+Aratus: "As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His
+offspring" (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of
+these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly
+uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible
+proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may
+properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the
+revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical
+books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to
+other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only
+those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to
+hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any
+way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem
+everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their
+having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness
+and learning."
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Holy Scripture Should Use Metaphors?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors.
+For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this
+science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the
+aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least
+of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science
+should make use of such similitudes.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth
+clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They that
+explain me shall have life everlasting" (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such
+similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths
+by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they
+approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to
+represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the
+higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in
+Scriptures.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Osee 12:10): "I have multiplied
+visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets."
+But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use
+metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and
+spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God
+provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now
+it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible
+objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in
+Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of
+material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We
+cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within
+the covering of many sacred veils." It is also befitting Holy Writ,
+which is proposed to all without distinction of persons--"To the wise
+and to the unwise I am a debtor" (Rom. 1:14)--that spiritual truths
+be expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order
+that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp
+intellectual things may be able to understand it.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a
+representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with
+representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both
+necessary and useful.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished
+by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says
+(Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow
+the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in
+the metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through
+those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive
+instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught
+metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught
+more openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the
+exercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of
+the impious, according to the words "Give not that which is holy to
+dogs" (Matt. 7:6).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more
+fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of
+less noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly,
+because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For
+then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of
+divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been
+expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who
+could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is
+more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For
+what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes
+drawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer
+estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him.
+Thirdly, because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the
+unworthy.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 10]
+
+Whether in Holy Scripture a Word may have Several Senses?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several
+senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and
+anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion
+and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument,
+but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of
+propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth
+without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to
+a word.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the
+Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy
+and allegory." Now these four seem altogether different from the four
+divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem
+fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four
+different senses mentioned above.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical,
+which is not one of these four.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner
+of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same
+sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery."
+
+_I answer that,_ The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to
+signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also
+by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are
+signified by words, this science has the property, that the things
+signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore
+that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the
+first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby
+things signified by words have themselves also a signification is
+called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and
+presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For
+as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New
+Law, and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a
+figure of future glory." Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has
+done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things
+of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the
+allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as
+the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do,
+there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to
+eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense
+is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is
+God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not
+unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the
+literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not
+produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that
+these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several
+things, but because the things signified by the words can be
+themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion
+results, for all the senses are founded on one--the literal--from
+which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in
+allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy
+Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to
+faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere
+put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: These three--history, etiology, analogy--are
+grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as
+Augustine expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it
+is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave
+the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives--namely, on
+account of the hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever
+the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the
+truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three
+spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.)
+includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three
+senses only--the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the
+literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively.
+Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal
+sense. When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not
+that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member,
+namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever
+underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 2
+
+THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
+(In Three Articles)
+
+Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of
+God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of
+things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is
+clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to
+expound this science, we shall treat:
+
+(1) Of God;
+
+(2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God;
+
+(3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.
+
+In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall
+consider:
+
+(1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence;
+
+(2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons;
+
+(3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.
+
+Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider:
+
+(1) Whether God exists?
+
+(2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is _not_ the
+manner of His existence;
+
+(3) Whatever concerns His operations--namely, His knowledge, will,
+power.
+
+Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?
+
+(2) Whether it is demonstrable?
+
+(3) Whether God exists?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Existence of God Is Self-Evident?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now
+those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which
+is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first
+principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the
+knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the
+existence of God is self-evident.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which
+are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1
+Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration.
+Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once
+recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as
+the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen
+that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which
+nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and
+mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore,
+since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it
+also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God
+exists" is self-evident.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For
+whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not
+exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does
+not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be
+truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the
+life" (John 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.
+
+_On the contrary,_ No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is
+self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states
+concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of
+the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in
+his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is
+not self-evident.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on
+the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,
+self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident
+because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as
+"Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If,
+therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all,
+the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard
+to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are
+common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being,
+whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the
+essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will
+be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the
+meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it
+happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether
+all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts
+self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are
+not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of
+itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject,
+because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Q. 3,
+Art. 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition
+is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that
+are more known to us, though less known in their nature--namely, by
+effects.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To know that God exists in a general and
+confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's
+beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally
+desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not
+to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is
+approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even
+though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine
+that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and
+others in pleasures, and others in something else.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God"
+understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be
+thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted
+that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified
+something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it
+does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word
+signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can
+it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there
+actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought;
+and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not
+exist.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The existence of truth in general is
+self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident
+to us.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Can Be Demonstrated That God Exists?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be
+demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what
+is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces
+scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1).
+Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration.
+But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what
+it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore
+we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this
+could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
+to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between
+the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a
+cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it
+seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
+clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
+1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be
+demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we
+must know of anything is whether it exists.
+
+_I answer that,_ Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through
+the cause, and is called _a priori,_ and this is to argue from what is
+prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
+demonstration _a posteriori_; this is to argue from what is prior
+relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
+cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And
+from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
+demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because
+since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
+cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is
+not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects
+which are known to us.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The existence of God and other like truths about
+God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,
+but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural
+knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
+something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to
+prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of
+faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
+known and demonstrated.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated
+from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the
+cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case
+in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of
+anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of
+the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows
+on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are
+derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence
+of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning
+of the word "God".
+
+Reply Obj. 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no
+perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect
+the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
+demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
+cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Exists?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two
+contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But
+the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
+existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the
+world. Therefore God does not exist.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be
+accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
+seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by
+other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things
+can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary
+things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will.
+Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex.
+3:14)
+
+_I answer that,_ The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
+
+The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is
+certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are
+in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for
+nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards
+which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
+For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
+potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from
+potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of
+actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which
+is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes
+it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in
+actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different
+respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be
+potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is
+therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a
+thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.
+Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If
+that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this
+also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another
+again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be
+no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that
+subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the
+first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by
+the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in
+motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
+
+The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world
+of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no
+case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found
+to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to
+itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not
+possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes
+following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause,
+and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the
+intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause
+is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause
+among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any
+intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on
+to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will
+there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes;
+all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a
+first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
+
+The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.
+We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since
+they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they
+are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these
+always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is
+not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time
+there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true,
+even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does
+not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.
+Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been
+impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now
+nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all
+beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the
+existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has
+its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on
+to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by
+another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.
+Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having
+of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but
+rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as
+God.
+
+The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things.
+Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and
+the like. But _more_ and _less_ are predicated of different things,
+according as they resemble in their different ways something which is
+the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more
+nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something
+which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,
+something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest
+in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in _Metaph._ ii. Now
+the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire,
+which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore
+there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their
+being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
+
+The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that
+things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an
+end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always,
+in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain
+that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now
+whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be
+directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the
+arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent
+being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and
+this being we call God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God
+is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His
+works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good
+even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that
+He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under
+the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs
+be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done
+voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than
+human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things
+that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an
+immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body
+of the Article.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 3
+
+OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the
+further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may
+know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather
+what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but
+rather how He is not.
+
+Therefore, we must consider:
+
+(1) How He is not;
+
+(2) How He is known by us;
+
+(3) How He is named.
+
+Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed
+to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore
+
+(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in
+Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect
+and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection;
+(3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.
+
+Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether God is a body?
+
+(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?
+
+(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence
+or nature, and subject?
+
+(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?
+
+(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?
+
+(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?
+
+(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?
+
+(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 1]
+
+Whether God Is a Body?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has
+the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three
+dimensions to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and
+what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The
+measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" (Job
+11:8, 9). Therefore God is a body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since
+figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it
+is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" (Gen. 1:26).
+Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the
+brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the image, "of His
+substance" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now
+Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like
+God?" (Job 40:4); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Ps.
+33:16); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" (Ps.
+117:16). Therefore God is a body.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something
+which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the
+Lord sitting" (Isa. 6:1), and "He standeth up to judge" (Isa. 3:13).
+Therefore God is a body.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local
+term _wherefrom_ or _whereto._ But in the Scriptures God is spoken of
+as a local term _whereto,_ according to the words, "Come ye to Him and
+be enlightened" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term _wherefrom_: "All they that
+depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" (Jer. 17:13).
+Therefore God is a body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Gospel of St. John (John 4:24):
+"God is a spirit."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this
+can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
+it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been
+already proved (Q. 2, A. 3), that God is the First Mover, and is
+Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.
+Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in
+no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes
+from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to
+the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior
+to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into
+actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already
+proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
+God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in
+potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to
+infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body.
+Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible
+for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either
+animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than
+any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as
+body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation
+depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation
+on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be
+nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a
+body.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 1, A. 9), Holy Writ
+puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of
+corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three
+dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His
+virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing
+hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by
+length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for
+all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is
+meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the
+procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading
+all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as
+regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.
+Hence, when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness",
+it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea"
+(Gen. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence;
+hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are
+incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in
+Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain
+parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye
+attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not
+sensibly; and so on with the other parts.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only
+attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as
+sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as
+standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands
+Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since
+He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the
+actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near
+to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the
+metaphor of local motion.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Is Composed of Matter and Form?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For
+whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is
+the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it
+is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: "But My just man
+liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My
+soul." Therefore God is composed of matter and form.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the
+composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was
+exceeding angry with His people" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is
+composed of matter and form.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization.
+But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.
+Therefore He is composed of matter and form.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body;
+for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not
+a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not
+composed of matter and form.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is impossible that matter should exist in God.
+First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Q. 2, A. 3)
+that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is
+impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly,
+because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and
+goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch
+as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the
+best--viz. God--is not a participated good, because the essential
+good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that
+God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every
+agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is
+the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily
+and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now
+God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is
+therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts
+resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our
+soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His
+soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on
+account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly
+the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of
+as His anger.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Forms which can be received in matter are
+individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject
+since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself,
+unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that
+form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is
+individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject;
+and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in
+God.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God is the Same as His Essence or Nature?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or
+nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of
+God--i.e. the Godhead--is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that
+God is not the same as His essence or nature.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for
+every agent produces its like. But in created things the _suppositum_
+is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his
+humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said of God that He is life itself, and not
+only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the
+life" (John 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same
+as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His
+very Godhead.
+
+_I answer that,_ God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand
+this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the
+nature or essence must differ from the _suppositum,_ because the
+essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of
+the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the
+definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this
+that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now
+individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not
+included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh,
+these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in
+the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the
+accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not
+included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is
+man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has
+humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical;
+but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the
+principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal
+constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other
+hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which
+individualization is not due to individual matter--that is to say, to
+_this_ matter--the very forms being individualized of themselves--it
+is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting _supposita._
+Therefore _suppositum_ and nature in them are identified. Since God
+then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead,
+His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We can speak of simple things only as though
+they were like the composite things from which we derive our
+knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to
+signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist
+which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His
+simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are
+in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect
+understands, but not that there is any composition in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly,
+but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective,
+precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by
+divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and
+therefore, in them _suppositum_ is not the same as nature.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Essence and Existence Are the Same in God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in
+God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it.
+Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is
+predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in
+general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For
+men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21).
+Therefore God's existence is not His essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, we can know _whether_ God exists as said above
+(Q. 2, A. 2); but we cannot know _what_ He is. Therefore God's
+existence is not the same as His essence--that is, as His quiddity or
+nature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an
+accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in
+God is His existence.
+
+_I answer that,_ God is not only His own essence, as shown in the
+preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in
+several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be
+caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a
+property that necessarily accompanies the species--as the faculty of
+laughing is proper to a man--and is caused by the constituent
+principles of the species), or by some exterior agent--as heat is
+caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing
+differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some
+exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible
+for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent
+principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own
+existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose
+existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by
+another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first
+efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence
+should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which
+makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are
+spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.
+Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a
+distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in
+God there is no potentiality, as shown above (A. 1), it follows
+that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His
+essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has
+fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that
+which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation.
+But God is His own essence, as shown above (A. 3); if, therefore, He
+is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated
+being. He will not therefore be the first being--which is absurd.
+Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of
+two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for
+example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without
+reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it,
+inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added
+to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of
+the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to
+lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the
+first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the
+second sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: "To be" can mean either of two things. It may
+mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a
+proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.
+Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's
+existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that
+this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is
+true; and this we know from His effects (Q. 2, A. 2).
+______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 5]
+
+Whether God Is Contained in a Genus?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a
+substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially
+true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its
+own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But
+God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows
+(Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But
+nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is
+not in any genus.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either
+absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as
+being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a
+point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its
+principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to
+the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He
+cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First,
+because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that
+from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is
+always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality
+is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive
+nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a
+sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from
+intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an
+intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as
+actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other
+things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it
+is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly,
+since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus,
+He would be the genus _being,_ because, since genus is predicated as
+an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher
+has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus
+has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference
+can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference.
+It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in
+one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is
+predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their
+existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as
+also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus,
+existence and quiddity--i.e. essence--must differ. But in God they
+do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is
+plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it
+is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be
+any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration
+of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of
+a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as
+reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle
+reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point
+is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of
+discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being.
+Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The word substance signifies not only what
+exists of itself--for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown
+in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has
+the property of existing in this way--namely, of existing of itself;
+this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God
+is not in the genus of substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure
+which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a
+measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of
+all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as
+it resembles Him.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 6]
+
+Whether in God There Are Any Accidents?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance
+cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that
+which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus
+it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because
+it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like,
+which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God
+there are accidents.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But
+there are many genera of accidents. If, therefore, the primal
+members of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal
+beings other than God--which is absurd.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a
+subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De
+Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.
+
+_I answer that,_ From all we have said, it is clear there can be no
+accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents
+as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made
+actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as
+was shown (Q. 2, A. 3). Secondly, because God is His own
+existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may
+have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being:
+thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to
+it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else
+than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is
+accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in
+Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents
+(as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man),
+because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the
+subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first
+cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and
+of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in
+God as there are in us.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the
+principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the
+substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if
+contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all
+being, outside of every genus.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 7]
+
+Whether God Is Altogether Simple?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever
+is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all
+beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which
+God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God
+altogether simple.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But
+with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;
+thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals
+than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God
+is altogether simple.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and
+absolutely simple."
+
+_I answer that,_ The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many
+ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is
+neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a
+body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ
+from His _suppositum_; nor His essence from His existence; neither is
+there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and
+accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is
+altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to
+its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first
+being, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Thirdly, because every
+composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite
+unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown
+above (Q. 2, A. 3), since He is the first efficient cause.
+Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and
+actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts
+actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the
+whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any
+single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of
+dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts
+of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although
+something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part
+(as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water),
+nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot
+be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume
+of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every
+composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this
+could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which
+is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does
+not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself,
+there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form,
+or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary
+implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is
+strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is
+light, composed of things that are dim."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused
+things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to
+be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from
+its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (Q. 4, A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: With us composite things are better than simple
+things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in
+one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine
+goodness is found in one simple thing (QQ. 4, A. 1, and 6, A. 2).
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 8]
+
+Whether God Enters into the Composition of Other Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other
+things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things
+is that which is above being--the Godhead." But the being of all
+things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters
+into the composition of other things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb.
+Dom. [Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an
+uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is
+part of some compound.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from
+each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no
+way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same.
+But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also
+does God. Proof of the minor--whatever things differ, they differ by
+some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary
+matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each
+other.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
+touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling
+part with part."
+
+Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
+them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).
+
+_I answer that,_ On this point there have been three errors. Some have
+affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
+Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those
+who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others
+have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was
+the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of
+Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all
+these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to
+enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a
+material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause.
+Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of
+the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But
+primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical
+with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the
+latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient
+cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which
+enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and
+essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not
+act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God
+cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound
+can be absolutely primal among beings--not even matter, nor form,
+though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is
+merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to
+actuality, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 1): while a
+form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that
+which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so
+likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is
+posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved
+that God is absolutely primal being (Q. 2, A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things,
+as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form
+that is part of a compound.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Simple things do not differ by added
+differences--for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and
+horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which
+differences, however, do not differ from each other by other
+differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that
+they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the
+Philosopher (Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely
+distinct, but things which are different differ by something."
+Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ,
+but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they
+are the same.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 4
+
+THE PERFECTION OF GOD
+(In Three Articles)
+
+Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's
+perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is
+called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly
+of the divine goodness.
+
+Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether God is perfect?
+
+(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the
+perfections of all things?
+
+(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 1]
+
+Whether God is Perfect?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we
+say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit
+God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the
+beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of
+animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), God's essence
+is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most
+universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is
+imperfect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly
+Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48).
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient
+philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not
+predicate "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason
+was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material
+principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since
+matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must
+be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first
+principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which
+must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely
+potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the
+first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most
+perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of
+actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the
+mode of its perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our
+lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that
+which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because
+created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they
+are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is
+not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The material principle which with us is found to
+be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by
+something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life
+reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from
+which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be
+that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into
+act by some being already actual.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for
+it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual;
+for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence
+is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is
+not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but
+rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the
+existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered
+a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which
+exists.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Perfections of All Things Are in God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in
+God. For God is simple, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7); whereas the
+perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections
+of all things are not in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of
+things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its
+specific difference. But the differences by which genera are
+divided, and species constituted, are opposed to each other.
+Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it
+seems that the perfections of all things are not in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely
+exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore
+life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the
+essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the
+perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one
+existence prepossesses all things."
+
+_I answer that,_ All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken
+of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,
+_Metaph._ v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may
+be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection
+exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the
+same formality, if it is a univocal agent--as when man reproduces man;
+or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent--thus in the
+sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it
+is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause:
+and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to
+pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect,
+and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the
+efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more
+perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of
+things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more
+eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of
+God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He
+is all, as the cause of all." Secondly, from what has been already
+proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (Q. 3, A. 4).
+Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of
+being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole
+perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its
+full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the
+virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is
+subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be
+wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the
+perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they
+have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection
+of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is
+implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists not
+in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely,
+without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is the
+very existence to subsisting things."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div.
+Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within
+itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many
+and diverse qualities; _a fortiori_ should all things in a kind of
+natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things
+diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as
+one, without injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to
+the Second Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that,
+although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if
+they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living
+thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things
+also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although
+therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that
+which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of
+existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and
+wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to
+Him who is subsisting being itself.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Any Creature Can Be Like God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is
+written (Ps. 85:8): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O
+Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are
+called by participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be
+said to be like God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no
+comparison between things in a different genus. Therefore neither
+can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like
+whiteness. But no creature is in the same genus as God: since God is
+no genus, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore no creature is
+like God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in
+form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,
+essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to
+God.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for
+like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will
+be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To
+whom have you likened God?" (Isa. 40:18).
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "Let us make man to our image and
+likeness" (Gen. 1:26), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to
+Him" (1 John 3:2).
+
+_I answer that,_ Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication
+in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in
+form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same
+form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode;
+and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness;
+as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and
+this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things
+as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality,
+though not according to the same measure, but according to more or
+less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more
+white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are
+said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according
+to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since
+every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything
+acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way
+resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in
+the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form
+between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same
+formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the
+agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will
+be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species;
+as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as
+like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its
+specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is
+an agent not contained in any genus, its effect will still more
+distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to
+participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same
+specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of
+analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created
+things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and
+universal principle of all being.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ
+declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all
+likeness to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God:
+like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not
+perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall
+short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, as that
+which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but
+because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God is not related to creatures as though
+belonging to a different genus, but as transcending every genus,
+and as the principle of all genera.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on
+account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same
+genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is
+essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are
+in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like
+creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual
+likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not
+between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue
+is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of
+as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 5
+
+OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the
+goodness of God.
+
+Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?
+
+(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?
+
+(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?
+
+(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?
+
+(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?
+
+(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the
+pleasant?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Goodness Differs Really from Being?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For
+Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that
+things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore
+goodness and being really differ.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called
+good which has the form of being," according to the commentary on _De
+Causis._ Therefore goodness differs really from being.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot
+be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,
+"inasmuch as we exist we are good."
+
+_I answer that,_ Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only
+in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of
+goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is
+clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for
+all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as
+it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as
+it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is
+clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 4; Q. 4, A. 1). Hence it is
+clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness
+presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although goodness and being are the same really,
+nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of
+a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies
+that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to
+potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being,
+accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only
+in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being.
+Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being
+simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being
+relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white
+does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a
+thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But
+goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of
+ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said
+to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it
+ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some
+perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but
+only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e.
+substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good
+relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete
+actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply.
+Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebdom.), "I perceive that in nature
+the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,"
+is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being
+simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply
+exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply--in
+such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good,
+and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness
+signifies complete actuality.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less
+according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to
+knowledge or virtue.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Goodness Is Prior in Idea to Being?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For
+names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things
+signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the
+first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather
+than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in
+idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius
+notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and
+non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone."
+Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But
+goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the
+aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for
+it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been
+born" (Matt. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life,
+knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence
+is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible.
+Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first
+of created things is being."
+
+_I answer that,_ In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning
+signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of
+the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that
+is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the
+first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is
+knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the
+proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
+sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is
+prior to goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom.
+i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as
+he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness,
+since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final
+cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent
+does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to
+its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness,
+as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore
+among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes
+being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not
+distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was
+non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for
+primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek
+their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed
+to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to
+non-existence" (Div. Nom. v).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The same solution is applied to this objection.
+Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing
+things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it
+can cause them--if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply
+those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and
+not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only
+actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even
+those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being
+implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or
+exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which
+are actual.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only
+relatively--i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only
+be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil
+cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of
+some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only
+relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one
+cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as
+relatively good.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only
+so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of
+being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and
+consequently nothing is good except being.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Every Being Is Good?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is
+something superadded to being, as is clear from A. 1. But whatever is
+added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc.
+Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good
+and good evil" (Isa. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore
+not every being is good.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary
+matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires.
+Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness.
+Therefore not every being is good.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in
+mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities;
+otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not
+every being is good.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now
+every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest
+good. Therefore every being is good.
+
+_I answer that,_ Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as
+being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act
+implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability
+and goodness, as is clear from A. 1. Hence it follows that every being
+as such is good.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything
+included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or
+nature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being
+beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper
+to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not
+limit being.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as
+being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be
+evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,
+because it lacks the power to see well.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so
+it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,
+primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the
+privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a
+certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for,
+goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to
+desire.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as
+realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted;
+but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted
+from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,
+which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant
+that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form
+of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness,
+as was said in the preceding article.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Goodness Has the Aspect of a Final Cause?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final
+cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.
+Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect
+of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal
+cause.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says
+(Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and
+are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.
+Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that
+"we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as the
+efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient
+cause.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be
+considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of
+which something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final
+cause.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since goodness is that which all things desire, and
+since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies
+the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes
+the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see
+that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g.
+heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the
+heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing,
+goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act;
+secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes
+the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take
+place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being;
+secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect
+in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as
+the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the
+formality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical
+fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the
+form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ
+logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness
+being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an
+end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the
+other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful
+things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due
+proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in
+what is after their own kind--because even sense is a sort of reason,
+just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by
+assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs
+to the nature of a formal cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the
+sense that an end is said to move.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as
+he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever
+powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good
+understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end
+as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is
+good" has reference to the final cause.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Essence of Goodness Consists in Mode, Species and Order?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in
+mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But
+mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it
+is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and
+weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode
+and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the
+mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it
+rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not
+consist in mode, species and order.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good.
+Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and
+order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The
+same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and
+order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the
+essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness
+cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species
+and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,
+species and order.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight,
+number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But
+not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says
+(Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created
+in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does
+not consist in mode, species and order.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These
+three--mode, species and order--as common good things, are in
+everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are
+very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they
+do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be
+unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the
+essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.
+
+_I answer that,_ Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;
+for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above, AA. 1, 3). Now
+a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the
+mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form
+(and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form
+certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect
+and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and
+follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or
+commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and
+this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks
+the mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for
+everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is
+said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like
+numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added
+to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added
+to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the
+form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something
+of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends
+towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to
+weight and order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists
+in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it
+is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and
+to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but
+because it is through them that other things are both beings and good.
+Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for
+they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by
+something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus
+whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything
+else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an
+object that is white.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence,
+according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus,
+a man has a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned
+and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil
+deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of
+that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species
+and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every
+mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and
+order). "But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being
+less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they
+ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out
+of place and incongruous."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being
+without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison
+with corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all
+corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first
+body that causes change, i.e. the heavens.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Goodness Is Rightly Divided into the Virtuous*, the Useful
+and the Pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered
+as fitting. Cf. II-II, Q. 141, A. 3; Q. 145.]
+
+Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the
+virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the
+ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the
+virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under one
+predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these
+three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and
+no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the
+division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful
+would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore
+this division is incorrect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there
+is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it
+is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided
+against the pleasant and the virtuous.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De
+Offic. i, 9)
+
+_I answer that,_ This division properly concerns human goodness. But if
+we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal
+point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns
+goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable,
+and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose
+movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural
+body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end
+absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the
+end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of
+movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the
+ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the
+thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state
+of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the
+thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively,
+as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the
+useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating
+the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own
+sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is
+that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the
+movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is
+called the pleasant.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being,
+is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it
+according to its proper formality.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by
+opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no
+other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant,
+being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful
+applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are
+desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter
+medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in
+themselves.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as
+something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as
+something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority
+and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then
+of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 6
+
+THE GOODNESS OF GOD
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether goodness belongs to God?
+
+(2) Whether God is the supreme good?
+
+(3) Whether He alone is essentially good?
+
+(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 1]
+
+Whether God is good?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For
+goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to
+belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything
+else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all
+things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and
+nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not
+belong to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lam. 3:25): "The Lord is good to them
+that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him."
+
+_I answer that,_ To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is
+good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its
+own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a
+certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and
+hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For
+the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its
+likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all
+things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness
+belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to
+God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good
+"as by Whom all things subsist."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To have mode, species and order belongs to the
+essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence
+it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others;
+wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection,
+desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so
+many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said
+above (Q. 4, A. 3). And so of those things which desire God, some
+know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational
+creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this
+belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire
+without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher
+intelligence.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Is the Supreme Good?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the
+supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to
+every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a
+compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is
+supremely simple; as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore God
+is not the supreme good.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the
+end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This
+appears also from what is said (Luke 18:19): "None is good but God
+alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g.
+supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God
+cannot be called the supreme good.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in
+the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly
+greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same
+genus as other good things, as appears above (QQ. 3, A. 5;
+4, A. 3) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in
+relation to others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the
+divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds."
+
+_I answer that,_ God is the supreme good simply, and not only as
+existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to
+God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired
+perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not,
+however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above
+(Q. 4, A. 2); but as from an agent which does not agree with its
+effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in
+the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it
+is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently
+than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but
+not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most
+excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The supreme good does not add to good any
+absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to
+creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in
+God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation
+to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge
+depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be
+composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are
+deficient in comparison with it.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is
+not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all;
+but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is
+said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood of
+essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way
+comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now
+we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not
+that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the
+principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess,
+and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I. Q. 6, Art. 3]
+
+Whether to Be Essentially Good Belongs to God Alone?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to
+God alone. For as _one_ is convertible with _being,_ so is _good;_ as
+we said above (Q. 5, A. 1). But every being is one essentially, as
+appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is
+good essentially.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being
+itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good.
+But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good
+essentially.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness.
+Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is
+necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore
+its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by
+some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also;
+therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness
+which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first
+supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God
+are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially.
+
+_I answer that,_ God alone is good essentially. For everything is called
+good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is
+threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being;
+secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its
+perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to
+something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of
+fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
+substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness
+and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own
+place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own
+essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence;
+in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others
+accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and
+the like, as appears from what is stated above (Q. 3, A. 6); and
+He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the
+last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every
+kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is
+good essentially.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: "One" does not include the idea of perfection,
+but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its
+own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both
+actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided
+only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but
+not good essentially, as was shown above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although everything is good in that it has
+being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore
+it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very
+essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some
+added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself
+thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it
+called being because by it something has being, not because it itself
+has being through something else: hence for this reason is it called
+good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has
+some other goodness whereby it is good.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 4]
+
+Whether All Things Are Good by the Divine Goodness?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness.
+For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take away
+this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt
+see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good." But
+everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by
+that very good which is God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are
+called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by
+reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the
+divine goodness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But
+they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their
+own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness,
+but by their own goodness.
+
+_I answer that,_ As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic
+denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and
+"measured" from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions
+differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (Q. 84, A. 4)
+of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as
+participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is
+called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid
+down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and
+absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of "being" and
+of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and
+by participation of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and
+what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme
+good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he
+called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by
+way of participation.
+
+Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate
+ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves--as Aristotle
+argues in many ways--still, it is absolutely true that there is first
+something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we
+call God, as appears from what is shown above (Q. 2, A. 3), and
+Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially
+such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as
+it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far
+removed and defective; as appears from the above (Q. 4, A. 3).
+
+Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from
+the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness.
+Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of
+the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own
+goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there
+is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.
+
+This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 7
+
+THE INFINITY OF GOD
+(In Four Articles)
+
+After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine
+infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in
+all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.
+
+Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether God is infinite?
+
+(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?
+
+(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?
+
+(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 1]
+
+Whether God Is Infinite?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything
+infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts
+and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect;
+therefore He is not infinite.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite
+and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for
+He is not a body, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 1). Therefore it
+does not belong to Him to be infinite.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be
+elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a
+thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to
+substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or
+wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is
+infinite and eternal, and boundless."
+
+_I answer that,_ All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to
+the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they
+considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle.
+But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle,
+as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as
+they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they
+attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect
+that some infinite body was the first principle of things.
+
+We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it
+is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the
+form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as
+matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms;
+but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is
+made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is
+common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to
+this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by
+which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter,
+has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless
+matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but
+rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on
+the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of
+something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as
+appears from what is shown above (Q. 4, A. 1, Obj. 3). Since
+therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He
+is His own subsistent being as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), it is
+clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
+
+From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be
+seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated,
+is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the
+infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to
+God; as was said above, in this article.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting,
+not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him
+to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be
+apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a
+self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in
+anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness
+existing in a subject.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Anything but God Can Be Essentially Infinite?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be
+essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its
+essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be
+infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the
+extent of a power is known by its effect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite
+essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it
+apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of
+singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is
+infinite.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as
+was shown above (Q. 3, A. 8). But primary matter is infinite.
+Therefore something besides God can be infinite.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in
+Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first
+principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.
+
+_I answer that,_ Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but
+not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to
+matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a
+form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter,
+considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in
+potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can
+be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to
+its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is
+in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of
+the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things,
+the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way
+infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter,
+but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these
+will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not
+terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form
+thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows
+that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature.
+Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is against the nature of a made thing for its
+essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created
+being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely
+infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot
+make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two
+contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make
+anything to be absolutely infinite.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The fact that the power of the intellect extends
+itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form
+not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the
+angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the
+act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Primary matter does not exist by itself in
+nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it
+is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary
+matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but
+relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 3]
+
+Whether an Actually Infinite Magnitude Can Exist?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in
+magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no
+lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But
+mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in
+his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is
+not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can
+agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of
+magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be
+properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some
+magnitude to be infinite.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the
+continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear
+from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same
+thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase
+opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to
+infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity
+derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in
+Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be
+infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular
+movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it
+against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Every body has a surface. But every body which has a
+surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body.
+Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and
+to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another
+to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite
+in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in
+essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its
+form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from
+these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still
+remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.
+
+We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude,
+can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its
+quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.
+
+Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite.
+For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since
+therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is
+necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate
+form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has
+a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for
+a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because
+every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body
+could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing
+moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place;
+and this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy
+every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own
+place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion
+requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a
+place occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards
+an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre,
+the farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from
+each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be
+infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy
+the place belonging to any other.
+
+The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a
+mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some
+form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the
+form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure,
+and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line
+actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he
+subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature
+of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species
+of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or
+tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now
+what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence
+there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude
+is infinite.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above,
+belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter,
+forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we
+approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the
+infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but
+successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But
+magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity
+refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude;
+yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper
+to matter to be in potentiality.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 4]
+
+Whether an Infinite Multitude Can Exist?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible.
+For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But
+number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an
+infinite multitude actually to exist.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species
+to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore
+an infinite number of actual figures is possible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct
+each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can
+still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not
+impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to
+infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in
+measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21).
+
+_I answer that,_ A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as
+Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually
+infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally
+infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be
+infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that
+something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail
+something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its
+generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass
+through an infinite medium.
+
+A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as
+such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example,
+in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude;
+namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and
+supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the
+carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would
+depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers,
+inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental
+multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and
+it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite
+number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way
+they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.
+
+This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must
+belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to
+be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is
+infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is
+impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either
+absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and
+everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the
+Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be
+comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an
+actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a
+potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of
+multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a
+thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the
+infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous,
+because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding
+article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially
+in the addition of multitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to
+its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively,
+and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to
+act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be
+succeeded by another multitude to infinity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of
+number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral,
+quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is
+not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of
+figures.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the supposition of some things does not
+preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an
+infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence
+it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 8
+
+THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere,
+and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and
+concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether God is in all things?
+
+(2) Whether God is everywhere?
+
+(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?
+
+(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 1]
+
+Whether God Is in All Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above
+all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to
+the Psalm (Ps. 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc.
+Therefore God is not in all things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now
+God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them.
+Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence
+Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are,
+rather than He is in any place."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended
+is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore
+His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is
+it necessary that He should be in all things.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the
+demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor.
+6:14). Therefore God is not in all things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in
+all things, according to Isa. 26:12, "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all
+our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.
+
+_I answer that,_ God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their
+essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon
+which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts
+immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii
+that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since
+God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper
+effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this
+effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as
+they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun
+as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing
+has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being.
+But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent
+in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a
+thing, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Hence it must be that God
+is in all things, and innermostly.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God is above all things by the excellence of His
+nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of
+all things; as was shown above in this article.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although corporeal things are said to be in
+another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things
+contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body.
+Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a
+certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are
+in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: No action of an agent, however powerful it may
+be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the
+great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence
+nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself.
+But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in
+nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own
+nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In the demons there is their nature which is
+from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him;
+therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the
+demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But
+in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that
+God is.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Is Everywhere?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere
+means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong
+to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for
+"incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a
+place." Therefore God is not everywhere.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same
+as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of
+action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither
+can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every
+place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore
+God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part
+elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has
+no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not
+everywhere.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (Jer.
+   23:24).
+
+_I answer that,_ Since place is a thing, to be in place can be
+understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things--i.e. as
+one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the
+accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and
+thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some
+way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He
+is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in
+every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things
+placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every
+place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place
+inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by
+God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed,
+by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every
+place, He Himself fills every place.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact
+of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of
+the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in
+succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things,
+forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of
+place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or
+movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or
+action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the
+indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in
+this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called
+indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the
+continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence,
+according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small
+thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,
+and in a small or large place.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A whole is so called with reference to its
+parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form
+and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and
+difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity
+into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any
+place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place,
+because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the
+quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity
+without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate
+to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is
+whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of
+it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental
+quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the
+surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to
+the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of
+the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity
+which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the
+surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality
+either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the
+perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every
+part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Is Everywhere by Essence, Presence and Power?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things
+is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For
+what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not
+essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of
+anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by
+essence, presence and power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent
+from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His
+essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence
+of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing.
+Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by
+His essence, presence and power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all
+things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it
+is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore
+neither is He present by His power.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance
+of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if
+God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it
+seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special
+mode of God's existence in things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,
+"God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and
+substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by
+grace." [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].
+
+_I answer that,_ God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way
+after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
+created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of
+operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of
+the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and
+the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is
+especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually
+or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this
+prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Q. 12). He is said
+to be thus in the saints by grace.
+
+But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from
+human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom
+by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is
+said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its
+inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who
+nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.
+Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that
+place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the
+Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject
+to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were
+subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these
+it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.
+
+But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the
+divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to
+these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He
+walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our
+things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]"
+(Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all
+things by His presence.
+
+Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's
+providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but
+that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the
+others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things
+by His essence.
+
+Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things
+are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all
+things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His
+essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not
+indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their
+essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to
+all things as the cause of their being.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A thing can be said to be present to another,
+when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as
+was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are
+necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known
+should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who
+wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than
+God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence
+by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus
+by power an agent may be said to be present to another.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to
+substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and
+loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's
+existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's
+existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place
+(Part III).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 4]
+
+Whether to Be Everywhere Belongs to God Alone?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God
+alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is
+everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all
+bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from
+what is said above (Q. 3). Therefore to be everywhere does not
+belong to God alone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole
+universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom
+(Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole
+universe, and is thus everywhere.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body"
+(Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because
+there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not
+belong to God alone.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist
+outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be
+everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is
+"whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts."
+Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be
+everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels
+where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But
+the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it
+comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore
+the soul is everywhere.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to
+call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and
+always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"
+
+_I answer that,_ To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to
+God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole
+self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its
+parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere,
+forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not
+belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness
+belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is
+everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere
+accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of
+millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It
+belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any
+supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God
+alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite
+number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary
+that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by
+Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to
+God and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be
+supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of
+Him, but as to His very self.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The universal, and also primary matter are
+indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of
+itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but
+only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not
+follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere,
+but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but
+according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely,
+because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would
+not be in them.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be
+everywhere; but according to its parts.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be
+everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere,
+this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere"
+determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this
+sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the
+heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not
+follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to
+exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another
+sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act
+of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that
+where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives
+according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that
+it is everywhere.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 9
+
+THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His
+immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?
+
+(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 9, Art. 1]
+
+Whether God is altogether immutable?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For
+whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says
+(Gen. ad lit, viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by
+time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile
+than all things active [Vulg. 'mobilior']" (Wis. 7:24). But God is
+wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But
+these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw
+nigh to you" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not"
+(Malachi 3:6).
+
+_I answer that,_ From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether
+immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first
+being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act,
+without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that,
+absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is
+in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is
+evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
+Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in
+part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to
+blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which
+is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has
+been shown above (Q. 3, A. 7) that in God there is no composition,
+for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be
+moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something
+by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously.
+But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude
+of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend
+Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence
+movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients,
+constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first
+principle was immovable.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to
+Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every
+operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing,
+and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands
+and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself,
+not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in
+potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude,
+according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things;
+for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by
+way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal
+principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist.
+And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine
+wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate
+more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of
+it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and
+movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun
+proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth.
+In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every
+procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement
+of the Father of light.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These things are said of God in Scripture
+metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out,
+according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to
+us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,
+or decline from Him.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I. Q. 9, Art. 2]
+
+Whether to Be Immutable Belongs to God Alone?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God
+alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in
+everything which is moved." But, according to some, certain created
+substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be
+immutable does not belong to God alone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What
+therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But
+some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the
+blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But
+forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is
+essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does
+not belong to God alone to be immutable.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is
+immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are
+mutable."
+
+_I answer that,_ God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every
+creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable
+thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a
+power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed,
+were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal,
+but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into
+existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends
+on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things
+should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by
+ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from
+them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from
+Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's
+power to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise
+it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring
+them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of
+another--namely, of God--they are mutable, inasmuch as they are
+producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from
+existence to non-existence.
+
+If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also
+in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a
+twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which
+enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in
+attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered
+according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not
+mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is
+consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is
+mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter
+can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as
+regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with
+privation of accident; as, for example, this subject _man_ can exist
+with _not-whiteness_ and can therefore be changed from white to
+not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the
+essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an
+accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be
+changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot
+be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent
+with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole
+potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as
+to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is
+consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand
+incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with
+respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not
+consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is
+consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form.
+Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so
+these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards
+their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
+"intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from
+every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances."
+Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards
+their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a
+mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says
+(De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their
+finite power they attain to certain fresh places--which cannot be
+said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above
+(Q. 8, A. 2).
+
+Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as
+regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as
+regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as
+regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to
+divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all
+creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose
+power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none
+of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether
+immutable.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as
+regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of
+such movement.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment
+of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine
+power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they
+cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation
+because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they
+vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though
+they were the subject of being, but because through them something has
+being.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 10
+
+THE ETERNITY OF GOD
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is eternity?
+
+(2) Whether God is eternal?
+
+(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?
+
+(4) Whether eternity differs from time?
+
+(5) The difference of aeviternity and of time.
+
+(6) Whether there is only one aeviternity, as there is one time, and
+one eternity?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 1]
+
+Whether This Is a Good Definition of Eternity, "The Simultaneously-
+Whole and Perfect Possession of Interminable Life"?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by
+Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the
+simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For
+the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs
+to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore
+in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be
+found.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration.
+But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word
+"life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather
+the word "existence."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to
+eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be
+"whole."
+
+Obj. 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist
+all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it
+is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of
+eternity" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, "According to the
+revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (Rom. 16:25).
+Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing.
+Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously
+described as "perfect."
+
+Obj. 6: Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity
+is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
+
+_I answer that,_ As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way
+of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by
+means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by
+_before_ and _after._ For since succession occurs in every movement,
+and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and
+after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but
+the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of
+movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As
+therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and
+after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity
+of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.
+
+Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a
+beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved
+there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly
+immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.
+
+Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is
+eternal is interminable--that is, has no beginning nor end (that is,
+no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession,
+being simultaneously whole.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of negation;
+as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken
+as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our
+intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to
+the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also
+living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being.
+Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather
+than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but
+because it is wanting in nothing.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture
+metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously
+whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Two things are to be considered in time: time itself,
+which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence
+the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of
+time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly;
+therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity,
+we use the word "possession."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God is Eternal?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be
+predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that
+flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and
+Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of
+eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is
+not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is
+before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the
+Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and
+ever']" (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured
+belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future,
+since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding
+article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied
+to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal,
+the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."
+
+_I answer that,_ The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea
+of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article.
+Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to
+be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity;
+whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own
+being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own
+essence, so He is His own eternity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity
+according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused
+in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the
+apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the
+"now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of
+eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God
+communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates
+His immutability.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: From this appears the answer to the Second Objection.
+For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by
+immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that
+"intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of Exodus, "The
+Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age,
+as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign
+beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e. beyond
+every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of
+each thing, as is said in the book _De Coelo_ i. Or to reign beyond
+eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived
+to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some
+philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His
+reign is simultaneously whole.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is
+not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea
+of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our
+mind alone.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Words denoting different times are applied to God,
+because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were
+altered through present, past and future.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 3]
+
+Whether to Be Eternal Belongs to God Alone?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be
+eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice,"
+shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all
+eternity']" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could
+not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal
+[Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (Matt. 25:41). Therefore God is not the
+only eternal.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are
+many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of
+demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is
+not the only eternal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum, xv) that "God is the
+only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not
+eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.
+
+_I answer that,_ Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone,
+because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
+article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above
+(Q. 9, A. 1). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability
+from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
+from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is
+said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" (Eccl. 1:4). Again, some
+things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their
+duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the
+hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal
+hills." (Deut. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the
+nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either
+in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the
+blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the
+Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De
+Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life;
+according to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee
+the only true God," etc. (John 17:3).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as
+many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it
+never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost,
+according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy
+waters" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but
+rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be
+for ever" (Ps. 80:16).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth,
+according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore
+in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in
+the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does
+not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
+______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 10, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Eternity Differs from Time?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two
+measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the
+other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together;
+nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,
+considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur
+together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since
+therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity
+exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of
+eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now"
+of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of
+eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the
+whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the
+"now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore
+eternity is not substantially different from time.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the
+measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that
+the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is
+the measure of the first being--that is, of the divine being.
+Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of
+things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either
+eternity or is a part of eternity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a
+"before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same
+thing.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same.
+Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has
+neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end.
+This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute
+difference because, granted that time always was and always will be,
+according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens
+goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity
+and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that
+eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for
+eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure
+of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be
+considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the
+measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is
+measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the
+movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its
+measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is
+not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its
+revolution which has beginning and end in time.
+
+Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in
+themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as
+potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it
+is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by
+considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a
+day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these
+differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that
+eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity
+were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case
+when we consider those things of which the respective measures are
+time and eternity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in
+the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as
+time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is
+movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time,
+but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is
+movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is
+time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and
+aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being,
+so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as
+any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change,
+it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being
+of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by
+eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually
+changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures
+movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is
+naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 5]
+
+The Difference of Aeviternity and Time
+
+Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For
+Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23), that "God moves the
+spiritual through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of
+spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and
+"after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole,
+as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not
+eternity; for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is
+before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before"
+and "after"; and thus it is the same as time.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in
+aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no
+difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it
+is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that
+it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false,
+since God can reduce them to nothing.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is
+infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously
+whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is
+impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time
+to be separate from aeviternity."
+
+_I answer that,_ Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as
+the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to
+consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end,
+aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end.
+This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown
+above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had
+always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they
+might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even
+granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity,
+and from time.
+
+Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the
+fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has
+both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity
+has "before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This
+theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears
+if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For
+since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if
+aeviternity has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the
+receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of
+aeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in
+aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to
+the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a
+thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a
+changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing
+measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure, as is
+clear from _Physic._ iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing
+is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its
+changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain
+"before" and "after." We say then that since eternity is the measure
+of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence
+of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from
+permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or
+consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all
+movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others
+recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being
+neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change;
+nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or
+potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial
+being of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they
+have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who
+have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with
+changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness
+of intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree.
+Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between
+eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not
+changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has
+"before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and
+"after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has
+neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections
+and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says
+(Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23) that to be moved through time, is
+to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are
+measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they
+have a share of eternity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not
+eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the very being of an angel considered absolutely,
+there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards
+accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be,
+is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of
+our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison
+with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or
+was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not
+subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do
+not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and
+non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the
+divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but
+He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after
+he has been.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as
+it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying
+that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other
+creature.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 10, Art. 6]
+
+Whether There Is Only One Aeviternity?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it
+is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power of
+ages are with Thee, O Lord."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, different genera have different measures. But
+some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly
+bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels.
+Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where
+there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all
+aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after
+others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore
+there is not only one aeviternity.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem
+to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for
+all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in
+some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not
+depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel.
+Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is
+nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is
+aeviternity one only.
+
+_I answer that,_ A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say
+there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many
+aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the
+cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the
+knowledge of spiritual things.
+
+Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things,
+forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a
+number, according to the Philosopher (Physic. iv). This, however,
+is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted
+from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered;
+otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are
+continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing
+numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the
+same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others
+assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is
+the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that
+view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of
+the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the
+first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as
+the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement,
+the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is
+sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in
+subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but
+accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be
+found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most
+simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred
+to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but
+also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it.
+Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to
+the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude,
+because by one separate measure many things can be measured.
+
+This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed
+concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God
+in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least
+many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual
+substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and
+Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that
+among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the
+last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion,
+it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many
+aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second
+opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity
+only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element
+of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things
+should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing,
+which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore
+because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later
+(Q. 47, A. 2); we concede at present that there is only one
+aeviternity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a
+space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when
+we mean ages.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things
+differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a
+changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All temporal things did not begin together;
+nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the
+first measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one
+aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary
+that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple
+than the rest.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 11
+
+THE UNITY OF GOD
+(In Four Articles)
+
+After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?
+
+(2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?
+
+(3) Whether God is one?
+
+(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 1]
+
+Whether "One" Adds Anything to "Being"?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For
+everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which
+penetrates all _genera._ But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is
+the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore
+"one" adds something to "being."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an
+addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many."
+Therefore "one" is an addition to "being."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one"
+and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to
+call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so
+to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" is an addition
+to "being."
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which
+exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an
+addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is
+not an addition to "being."
+
+_I answer that,_ "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only
+a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is the
+very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is
+either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both
+actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being
+whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it.
+Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in
+undivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it
+guards its being.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being"
+is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were
+divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the
+"one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being,"
+but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the
+same applied to the "one" which is the principle of number. And
+because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were
+the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary,
+considering that "one" which is the principle of number, added a
+reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities
+would not be a species of quantity), thought that the "one"
+convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings;
+as "white" to "man." This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as
+each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by
+anything else but by its substance, since this again would be "one,"
+supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven
+on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement;
+therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with
+"being," does not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is
+the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging to
+the genus of quantity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is
+divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in
+number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is
+in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is
+absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what
+belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is
+outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many
+accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided
+potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts;
+in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many"
+accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and
+divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in
+idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and "one"
+accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or
+"one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by "one" and
+by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally.
+For multitude itself would not be contained under "being," unless it
+were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div.
+Nom., cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of multitude that is not in
+a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole;
+and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many
+in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one
+in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say
+"being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 2]
+
+Whether "One" and "Many" Are Opposed to Each Other?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed.
+For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every
+_multitude_ is in a certain way _one,_ as appears from the preceding
+article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its
+opposite. But _multitude_ is constituted by _one._ Therefore it is not
+opposed to "multitude."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few"
+is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many."
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is
+opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it
+as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because
+it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," and is defined by
+it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence
+there would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is
+inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves
+opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in
+indivisibility; and the idea of "multitude" contains division.
+Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other.
+
+_I answer that,_ "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The
+_one_ which is the principle of number is opposed to _multitude_ which
+is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies
+the idea of a primary measure; and number is _multitude_ measured by
+_one,_ as is clear from _Metaph._ x. But the _one_ which is convertible
+with _being_ is opposed to _multitude_ by way of privation; as the
+undivided is to the thing divided.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing,
+inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to
+the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes
+away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the
+privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case
+in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the
+like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good,
+which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is
+founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in
+some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing;
+and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being.
+Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as
+one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative
+being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or
+what is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being
+relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is
+relatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is
+absolutely _one_ is relatively _many,_ and vice versa.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A _whole_ is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous,
+composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous,
+composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the
+whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for
+instance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution
+of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous
+whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the
+whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any
+part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole.
+Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the
+latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses;
+not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are
+undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so far as
+they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by
+the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not
+houses.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that
+sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind
+of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first
+sense two are many but not in the second sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the
+idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to
+unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of
+apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and
+hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning
+of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on "one"; because we
+do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude
+except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one"
+is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" is not
+placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be
+understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to
+mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus
+we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of
+one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Is One?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For
+there be many gods and many lords" (1 Cor. 8:5).
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be
+predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise,
+neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of
+God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an
+imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is
+one Lord" (Deut. 6:4).
+
+_I answer that,_ It can be shown from these three sources that God is
+one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why
+any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be
+communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be
+communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is
+only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what
+makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates,
+so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God
+alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above
+(Q. 3, A. 3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He
+is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.
+
+Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it
+was shown above (Q. 4, A. 2) that God comprehends in Himself the
+whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would
+necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong
+to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation,
+one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one
+of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to
+exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by
+truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise
+that there was only one such principle.
+
+Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things
+that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve
+others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same
+order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced
+into one order by one better than by many: because one is the _per se_
+cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch
+as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most
+perfect, and is so _per se_ and not accidentally, it must be that the
+first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this
+one is God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who
+worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and
+other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world.
+Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: "One" which is the principle of number is not
+predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the
+principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematics, which are
+material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one"
+which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not
+depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no
+privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is
+known to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no
+reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of
+God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the
+same way it is said of God that He is one.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 4]
+
+Whether God Is Supremely One?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely _one._ For "one" is so
+called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater
+or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are
+called "one."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what
+is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity.
+But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible.
+Therefore God is not more _one_ than unity is _one_ and a point is
+_one._
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good.
+Therefore what is essentially _one_ is supremely _one._ But every
+being is essentially _one,_ as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv).
+Therefore every being is supremely _one;_ and therefore God is not
+_one_ more than any other being is _one._
+
+_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called
+one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since _one_ is an undivided being, if anything is
+supremely _one_ it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided.
+Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch
+as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined;
+since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He
+is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor
+potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple,
+as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is
+_one_ in the supreme degree.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although privation considered in itself is not
+susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is
+subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in
+the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more
+divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it
+is called more, or less, or supremely, _one._
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A point and unity which is the principle of number, are
+not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some
+subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely _one._ For as a
+subject cannot be supremely _one,_ because of the difference within
+it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although every being is _one_ by its substance, still
+every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the
+substance of some things is compound and of others simple.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 12
+
+HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US
+(In Thirteen Articles)
+
+As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on
+to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures;
+concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?
+
+(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any
+created image?
+
+(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?
+
+(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its
+own natural powers to see the essence of God?
+
+(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order
+to see the essence of God?
+
+(6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than
+another?
+
+(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?
+
+(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows
+all things in it?
+
+(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?
+
+(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?
+
+(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of
+God?
+
+(12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?
+
+(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace
+above the knowledge of natural reason?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Any Created Intellect Can See the Essence of God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of
+God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on John 1:18, "No
+man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither
+angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what
+is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God:
+"Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor
+knowledge of Him."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But
+God is infinite, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore in
+Himself He is unknown.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things.
+For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is
+being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather
+super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is
+not intelligible; but above all intellect.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower
+and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no
+proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is
+an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect
+cannot see the essence of God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 John
+2:2).
+
+_I answer that,_ Since everything is knowable according as it is actual,
+God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
+Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself,
+may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the
+excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for
+example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the
+bat by reason of its excess of light.
+
+Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can
+see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as
+the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest
+function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that
+the created intellect could never see God, it would either never
+attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else
+beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of
+the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of
+its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its
+principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there
+resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect
+which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect
+of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause
+of things, the natural desire would remain void.
+
+Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence
+of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of
+comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words
+cited, "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom
+likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most
+certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration
+and comprehension as the Father has of the Son."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is
+unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas
+the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself
+supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first
+way: as appears from what was said above (Q. 7, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did not
+exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch
+as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot
+be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which
+means that He is not comprehended.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain
+relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and
+equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of
+one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there
+can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related
+to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act;
+and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Essence of God Is Seen by the Created Intellect Through an
+Image?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image
+by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when He
+shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall
+see Him as He is" (1 John 3:2).
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God,
+some likeness of God is made in us."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible;
+as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch
+as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the
+intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God
+is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by
+some similitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle
+says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark
+manner']," "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are
+signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God." But to
+see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision,
+but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine
+essence is not seen through a similitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things are required both for sensible and for
+intellectual vision--viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen
+with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is
+in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that
+the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its
+likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the
+vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not
+there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen
+were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer
+would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from
+that one same thing.
+
+Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellectual
+power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the
+intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it
+follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him who is
+the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the
+creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from
+the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or
+of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in
+order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of
+the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing
+God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be
+united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created
+similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), "by the
+similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no
+way be known;" as by the likeness of a body the essence of an
+incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the
+essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secondly,
+because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown
+above (Q. 3, A. 4), which cannot be said of any created form; and so
+no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God
+to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed,
+and contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or
+understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be
+represented by any created likeness; for every created form is
+determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of
+being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by
+some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at
+all; which is false.
+
+Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is
+required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of
+glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in
+the Psalm (35:10), "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of
+God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing
+the divine essence itself as it really is.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That authority speaks of the similitude which is
+caused by participation of the light of glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as
+other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united
+to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself
+is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the
+created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the
+intellect in act by and of itself.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Essence of God Can Be Seen with the Bodily Eye?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the
+corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): "In my flesh I shall see
+. . . God," and (Job 42:5), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard
+Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those
+eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power of
+sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of
+serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed
+by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see
+even incorporeal things." Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can
+be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the
+imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a
+throne," etc. (Isa. 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from
+sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can
+be seen by a vision of sense.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one
+has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic
+life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of
+sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For
+every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be
+shown later (Q. 78). Now act is proportional to the nature which
+possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal
+things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 1).
+Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by
+the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do
+not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that
+man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God.
+Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood of
+the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit
+of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart"
+may be "enlightened" (Eph. 1:17, 18).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally.
+This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have
+an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they
+shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains this,
+saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies
+of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God
+everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see
+the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as
+when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the
+functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it."
+Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our
+eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal
+eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the
+sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with
+sense, by some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is
+known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through,
+corporeal things, happens from two causes--viz. from the perspicuity
+of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused
+into the body after its renovation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the
+imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God
+according to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture
+divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible
+things.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Any Created Intellect by Its Natural Powers Can See the Divine
+Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine
+essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):
+"An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to
+say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection is seen, the
+original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power
+understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he
+understands the Divine essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to
+us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But
+the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is
+supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is
+supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other
+intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he
+understand God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand
+incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see
+the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it
+follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of
+God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above (A.
+1). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to
+see the Divine essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting"
+(Rom. 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine
+essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that they may
+know Thee the only true God," etc. (John 17:3). Therefore to see the
+essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not
+by nature.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created intellect to see the
+essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated
+according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is
+in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge
+of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the
+mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must
+result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the
+knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things
+have being only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But
+others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which,
+however, are not their own existence, but receive it; and these are
+the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong
+to be His own subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in
+individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we
+know, is the form of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two
+cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally
+knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the
+singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul,
+called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ.
+Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in
+individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but
+according as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of
+the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can
+understand these objects as universal; and this is beyond the power of
+the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are
+not in matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our
+soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It
+follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the
+divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natural power of any
+created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as
+its existence is participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot
+see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the
+created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an
+angel--namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel
+himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the
+essence of God, as was shown above (A. 2). Hence it does not follow
+that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be
+taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it
+ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense
+every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it
+does not possess the excellence which is in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material,
+cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the
+angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own
+nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by
+grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly
+what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature
+except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able
+to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it
+knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves
+the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form
+separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel,
+although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is
+able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that
+the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since
+therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending
+the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a
+kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know
+separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Created Intellect Needs Any Created Light in Order to See the
+Essence of God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any
+created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of
+itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in
+order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things.
+Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of
+any created light.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen
+in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a
+medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature.
+Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light,
+such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus,
+that creature would not need any other light to see God; which is
+impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should
+require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" (Ps.
+35:10).
+
+_I answer that,_ Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its
+nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for
+example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by
+some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees
+the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible
+form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural
+disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be
+raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural
+power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the
+essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary
+that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now
+this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of
+the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the
+name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the
+Apocalypse (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God hath enlightened
+it"--viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the
+blessed are made "deiform"--i.e. like to God, according to the
+saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.:
+'because'] we shall see Him as He is" (1 John 2:2).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The created light is necessary to see the
+essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible,
+which is of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect
+to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act.
+Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight,
+inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible
+of color.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This light is required to see the divine
+essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection
+of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be
+said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God
+is seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not
+take away the immediate vision of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be
+natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory
+cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine
+nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature
+is made deiform, as is said in this article.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 12, Art. 6]
+
+Whether of Those Who See the Essence of God, One Sees More Perfectly Than
+Another?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one
+does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 John
+3:2): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way.
+Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He
+will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii):
+"One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than
+another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine
+essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was
+shown above (A. 3). Therefore of those who see the divine essence,
+one does not see more clearly than another.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another
+can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or
+on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the
+object, it may so happen because the object is received more
+perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection
+of the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question,
+for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of
+similitude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him
+more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference
+of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose
+intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this
+is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as
+their beatitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according
+to John 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only
+true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in
+eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by
+the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" (1 Cor. 15:41).
+
+_I answer that,_ Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more
+perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one
+had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision
+will not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because
+one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than
+another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the
+created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory,
+which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears
+from what is said above, in the preceding article.
+
+Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God
+the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the
+light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the
+greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain
+degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object
+desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the
+more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the words, "We shall see Him as He is," the
+conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the
+object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is,
+because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does
+not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if
+the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is
+the perfect mode of God's existence.
+
+Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said
+that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better
+than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing
+understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is,
+does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of
+understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the
+understanding of another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of
+the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all--viz.
+the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation
+of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the
+part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the
+natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Those Who See the Essence of God Comprehend Him?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence,
+comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "But I follow
+after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the
+Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): "I . . . so
+run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the
+same way, others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: "So run
+that you may comprehend."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That
+is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is
+hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen
+whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is
+simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not
+"wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either to
+the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who
+sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing
+seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise,
+he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the
+intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore
+all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they
+comprehend Him.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful,
+the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible
+in thought" (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created intellect to
+comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is
+great beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxxviii).
+
+In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is
+perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as
+it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific
+demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof,
+it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by
+scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two
+right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it
+as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot
+be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to
+that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable.
+But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the
+knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable.
+Which thus appears--Everything is knowable according to its
+actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above
+(Q. 7), is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know
+God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence
+more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or
+lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory
+received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly
+impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite
+degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken
+strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one
+comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by
+intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and
+cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can
+contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this
+sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension"
+is taken more largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who
+attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him.
+And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to
+the words, "I held him, and I will not let him go" (Cant. 3:4); in
+this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the
+Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension" is
+one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as
+vision responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even
+among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch
+as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our
+power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we
+possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such
+things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and
+quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because
+they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the
+power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the
+ultimate fulfilment of desire.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God is called incomprehensible not because anything of
+Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is
+capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is
+known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it
+is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition;
+but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being
+known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the
+whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of
+it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely
+viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be
+completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not
+that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the
+mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he
+who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is
+infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend
+to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person
+can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable,
+although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Those Who See the Essence of God See All in God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all
+things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see,
+who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore
+those who see God see all things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in
+the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in
+a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees
+God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand
+the least, as is said in _De Anima_ iii. But all that God does, or can
+do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can
+understand all that God does, or can do.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know
+all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things,
+its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it
+will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees
+God knows all things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not
+know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the
+inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels."
+Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret
+thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever
+sees the essence of God, does not know all things.
+
+_I answer that,_ The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence,
+does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest
+that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things
+are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all
+things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is
+clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects
+can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as
+one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge
+of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for
+he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect
+can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects
+in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no
+created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above
+(A. 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all
+that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power;
+but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the
+more perfectly it sees God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient,
+namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all
+things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all
+things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should
+see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the
+mirror itself.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all things
+else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are
+known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but
+the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in
+this article that the more things are known in God according as He is
+seen more or less perfectly.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to know
+everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely,
+the species and the genera of things and their types, and these
+everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know
+other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to
+the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire
+go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things
+that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God
+alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of
+all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that
+nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely
+beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who
+knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) "and knoweth not Thee! but
+happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso
+knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee
+alone."
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 9]
+
+Whether What Is Seen in God by Those Who See the Divine Essence, Is Seen
+Through Any Similitude?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the
+Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of
+knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object
+known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible,
+and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is
+informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude
+of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine
+essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their
+similitudes.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul,
+seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see
+the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34),
+remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he
+said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to
+utter" (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain
+similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the
+same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain
+similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one
+likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.
+Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own
+essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or
+ideas.
+
+_I answer that,_ Those who see the divine essence see what they see in
+God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to
+their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is
+in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things
+which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the
+cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two
+ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is
+directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in
+itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles
+the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in
+itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man
+in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to
+know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know
+them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by
+their similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now
+there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence,
+according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see
+the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other
+similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect;
+by which also God Himself is seen.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is
+assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the
+Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from
+those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived
+images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden
+mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and
+difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the
+similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the
+original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God,
+by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the
+similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in
+Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this
+kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus
+conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 10]
+
+Whether Those Who See the Essence of God See All They See in It at the
+Same Time?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see
+all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the
+Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known,
+but only one is understood." But what is seen in God, is understood;
+for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not
+see all in Him at the same time.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22, 23), "God
+moves the spiritual creature according to time"--i.e. by intelligence
+and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God.
+Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively;
+for time means succession.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not
+be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall
+see all we know at one glance."
+
+_I answer that,_ What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but
+at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many
+things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of
+many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many
+diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one
+body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many
+things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same
+time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all
+at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas
+if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are
+understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in
+God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by
+the one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not
+successively.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We understand one thing only when we understand by one
+idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood
+simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and
+"rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the
+roof.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know
+things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things
+simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding
+according to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all
+at the same time.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 11]
+
+Whether Anyone in This Life Can See the Essence of God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine
+essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gen. 32:30).
+But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the
+words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to
+face" (1 Cor. 13:12).
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to
+mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the
+Lord" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it
+is possible to see the essence of God in this life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby
+we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we
+know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we
+both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say
+is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in
+me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our
+minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all
+things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it
+is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to
+the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the
+mind could not be incommutable." Therefore even in this life we see
+God Himself.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25),
+those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by
+intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible
+things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also
+says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24, 25). Therefore since God is in our soul
+by His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" (Ex.
+32:20), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be
+seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own
+nature."
+
+_I answer that,_ God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human
+being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is
+because, as was said above (A. 4), the mode of knowledge follows
+the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live
+in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it
+knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a
+form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known
+through the nature of material things. For it was shown above
+(AA. 2, 9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created
+similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible
+for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can
+be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from
+corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract
+intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily
+senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived
+the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this
+mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible
+objects, i.e. to the divine essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said
+in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
+formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude
+representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I have seen
+God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some
+figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode
+of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary
+vision; as will later be explained (II-II, Q. 174) in treating of the
+degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to
+designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary
+state.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He
+does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds
+of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the
+vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,
+27, 28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher
+of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of
+rapture (II-II, Q. 175).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all things
+are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know
+and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a
+participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and
+judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence
+Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons of instruction can only
+be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As therefore in
+order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the
+substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible
+object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the
+soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.
+And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our
+soul, but by presence, essence and power.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 12]
+
+Whether God Can Be Known in This Life by Natural Reason?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in
+this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not
+grasp simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown
+above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know
+Him.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason
+without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination
+of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural
+knowledge.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both
+good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the
+knowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De
+Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that
+excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore
+God cannot be known by natural reason.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:19), "That which is known of
+God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest
+in them."
+
+_I answer that,_ Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our
+natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.
+But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of
+God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God
+as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole
+power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.
+But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be
+led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to
+know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of
+all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.
+
+Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the
+cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He
+is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures
+are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but
+because He superexceeds them all.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to
+know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the
+images of His effects.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it
+belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason
+can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract.
+i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said
+in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.'
+For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many
+truths," i.e. by natural reason.
+_______________________
+
+THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 13]
+
+Whether by Grace a Higher Knowledge of God Can Be Obtained Than by
+Natural Reason?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not
+obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.
+i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to
+Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who
+nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred
+by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is,"
+comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to
+us by grace than by natural reason.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by
+natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to
+the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that
+"it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as
+screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we
+cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith.
+But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi
+in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of
+knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent
+knowledge of God by grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His
+spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10),
+namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.
+
+_I answer that,_ We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than
+by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have
+by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the
+sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to
+abstract from them intelligible conceptions.
+
+Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of
+grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the
+infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the
+human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things
+better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as
+appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even
+voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the
+Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice
+of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Matt. 3:17).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life we
+cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one
+unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more
+excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we
+attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which
+natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and
+One.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: From the images either received from sense in the
+natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much
+the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the
+intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given
+by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the
+divine light.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect
+is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this
+determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the
+believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as
+faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which
+belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one
+object by the vision and understanding of first principles.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 13
+
+THE NAMES OF GOD
+(In Twelve Articles)
+
+After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine
+knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names.
+For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.
+
+Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether God can be named by us?
+
+(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him
+substantially?
+
+(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or
+are all to be taken metaphorically?
+
+(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?
+
+(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally
+or equivocally?
+
+(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are
+applied first to God or to creatures?
+
+(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?
+
+(8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?
+
+(9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?
+
+(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God,
+by nature, by participation, and by opinion?
+
+(11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name
+of God?
+
+(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 1]
+
+Whether a Name Can Be Given to God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius
+says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be
+found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the
+name of His Son, if thou knowest?" (Prov. 30:4).
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But
+concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do
+abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any
+perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality;
+verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same
+with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to
+God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He
+cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by
+relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned
+before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore
+God cannot in any way be named by us.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 15:3): "The Lord is a man of war,
+Almighty is His name."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),
+words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is
+evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through
+the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that
+we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now
+it was shown above (Q. 12, AA. 11, 12) that in this life we cannot
+see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their
+principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way
+therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the
+name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus
+the name "man" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it
+signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the
+idea expressed by the name is the definition.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be
+above being named, is because His essence is above all that we
+understand about God, and signify in word.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the
+names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures,
+of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of
+this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their
+form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a
+thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a
+complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable
+to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms,
+signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as,
+for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And
+as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names
+to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance
+and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His
+mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this
+life as He is.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify the
+_suppositum_ with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.
+Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify
+His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God
+signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles
+which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes
+all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences
+only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express
+simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect
+has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But
+demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is
+understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far
+as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and
+demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be
+signified by relative pronouns.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God Substantially?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God
+substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything
+said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what
+He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His
+nature or operation."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a
+chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly
+and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God."
+Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are
+distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what
+expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.
+Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we
+understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His
+substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied
+substantially to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is
+the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of
+that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all
+names of this kind signify the divine substance.
+
+_I answer that,_ Negative names applied to God, or signifying His
+relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance,
+but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His
+relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to
+Himself.
+
+But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good,"
+"wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For
+some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God
+affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express
+some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists
+positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives,
+we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like
+manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.
+Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship
+towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is
+the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other
+names.
+
+Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons.
+First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some
+names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the
+cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things;
+therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is
+the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is
+a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He
+is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary
+matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to
+God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense,
+as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies
+only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called
+healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who
+speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more
+than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from
+inanimate bodies.
+
+Therefore we must hold a different doctrine--viz. that these names
+signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God,
+although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is
+proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects
+know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows
+Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above
+(Q. 4, A. 2) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections
+of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence
+every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses
+some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same
+species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the
+effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness
+thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of
+the sun. This was explained above (Q. 4, A. 3), in treating of the
+divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine
+substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it
+imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God
+is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is,
+"Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a
+more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is
+good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He
+causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what
+Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we
+are."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify what God
+is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what
+He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as
+creatures represent Him imperfectly.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the significance of names, that from which the name
+is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to
+signify, as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from
+the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed
+to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain
+kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a
+stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word _lapis,_ which
+has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine
+names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to
+the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the
+representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise
+our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of
+procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify
+the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense
+were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the principle itself
+of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it
+pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or
+signified.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He
+really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is
+represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names
+imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God in Its Literal Sense?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For
+all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was
+explained above (A. 1). But the names of creatures are applied to
+God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the
+like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it
+should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such
+names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from
+God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
+ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal
+sense.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical
+sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some
+kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time
+and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these
+names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are
+which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which
+express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are
+which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude."
+Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense,
+but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the preceding article, our knowledge of
+God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures,
+which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures.
+Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it
+apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names
+applied to God--viz. the perfections which they signify, such as
+goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As
+regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God,
+and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied
+primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do
+not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of
+signification applies to creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There are some names which signify these perfections
+flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in
+which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very
+signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a material
+being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a
+metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections
+absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of
+their signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the
+like, and such names can be literally applied to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of
+God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to
+Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent
+way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and
+all life.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These names which are applied to God literally imply
+corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their
+mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God
+metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing
+signified.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Names Applied to God Are Synonymous?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous
+names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But
+these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for
+the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.
+Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same
+thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea
+to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these
+ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these
+ideas are vain notions.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more
+one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is
+supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and
+many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify
+different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
+
+_On the contrary,_ All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as
+when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God
+are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet
+it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts
+is Thy name" (Jer. 32:18).
+
+_I answer that,_ These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This
+would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to
+remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it
+would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse
+things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even
+according to what was said above (A. 2), that these names signify
+the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also
+clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2) that they have diverse
+meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the
+intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since
+it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms
+conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to
+creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply,
+whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As
+therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there
+corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections
+of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various
+and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one
+altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions,
+imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to God
+signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and
+different aspects, they are not synonymous.
+
+Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous
+terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify
+different aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and
+absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing
+through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and
+vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality
+represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are
+manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and
+unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet
+multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold
+manner, as things represent Him.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 5]
+
+Whether What Is Said of God and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated
+of Them?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures
+are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as
+many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of
+the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some
+univocally--viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to
+infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their
+effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are
+some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat,
+although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems
+that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an
+univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is
+predicated univocally.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things.
+Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to
+the word of Genesis (Gen. 1:26), "Let us make man to our image and
+likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures
+univocally.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured.
+But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is
+homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally
+to God and to creatures.
+
+_On the contrary,_ whatever is predicated of various things under the
+same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no
+name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures;
+for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a
+different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the
+definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever
+is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
+
+Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are
+from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal
+predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which
+are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be
+predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal
+predication can be applied to them.
+
+_I answer that,_ Univocal predication is impossible between God and
+creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an
+adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the
+similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that
+falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects
+resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example
+the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various
+forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the
+preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and
+multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing
+perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection
+distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term
+"wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a
+man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all
+similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to
+signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence.
+Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes
+and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when
+it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as
+incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence
+it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to
+God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is
+predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
+
+Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in
+a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so,
+it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated
+about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the
+fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who
+proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says:
+"The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the
+things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that
+these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e.
+according to proportion.
+
+Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things
+are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of
+medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body,
+of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or
+according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is
+said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in
+the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and
+creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely
+univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (A. 1). Thus
+whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the
+relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all
+perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of
+community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple
+univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals,
+one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but
+a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various
+proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine
+signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine
+signifies the cause of the same health.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced to
+univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the
+univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of
+the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the
+generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the
+universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be
+the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a
+particular cause of this individual which it places under the species
+by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole
+species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes
+before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is
+not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it
+could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an
+analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one
+first non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for
+it does not represent one and the same generic thing (Q. 4, A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things measured;
+hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the
+same genus.
+
+The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these
+names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do
+not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Names Predicated of God Are Predicated Primarily of Creatures?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures
+rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it,
+since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we
+know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us
+are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from
+creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said
+primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the
+like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied
+primarily to creatures rather than to God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures,
+are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says
+(De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its
+cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily
+predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of
+health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather
+than of God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our
+Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"
+(Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God
+and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God
+rather than to creatures.
+
+_I answer that,_ In names predicated of many in an analogical sense,
+all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and
+this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And
+since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the
+Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily
+to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and
+secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less
+to that first. Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes
+into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called
+healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the
+definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called
+healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all
+names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures
+primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only
+similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field
+means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the
+beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of
+"lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His
+works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the
+signification of names can be defined only from what is said of
+creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical
+sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the
+cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is
+good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the creature's
+goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its
+meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily
+to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above (A. 2), these
+names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially.
+For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is
+the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a
+more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these
+names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because
+these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the
+imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to
+creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of
+signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and
+to other names, as said above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This objection would be valid if these names were
+applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for
+instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of
+God Temporally?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures
+are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the
+divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (De
+Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the
+divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is
+His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal.
+Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but
+eternally.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be
+described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to
+make does not apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of
+God temporally.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as
+implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all
+things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of
+God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from
+eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I
+have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also
+other names implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator,"
+are applied to God from eternity.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that
+relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it
+cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case
+God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in
+creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the
+relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be
+in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied
+to God temporally.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for
+instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if
+the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it
+follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in
+nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can
+exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic.
+v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not
+simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God
+to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus
+these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from eternity,
+and not temporally.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative
+appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally.
+
+_I answer that,_ The names which import relation to creatures are
+applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.
+
+To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a
+reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from
+the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and
+habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has
+two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or
+logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when
+mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the
+apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself."
+For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it
+apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same
+applies to relations between _being_ and _non-being_ formed by reason,
+apprehending _non-being_ as an extreme. The same is true of relations
+that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.
+
+Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both
+extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things
+according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all
+relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and
+half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same
+applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive
+power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.
+
+Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in
+the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two
+extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively
+to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they
+are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible
+and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real
+relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or
+to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in
+themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real
+relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the
+intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and
+sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called
+relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as
+others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is
+not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the
+right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the
+animal.
+
+Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all
+creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that
+creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is
+no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch
+as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent
+these names which import relation to the creature from being
+predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but
+by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right
+of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the
+relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father,"
+and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental
+[secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from
+which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the
+head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives
+are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same
+two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude
+itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine
+substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the
+divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine
+substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and
+consequently the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and
+suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence.
+Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a
+habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the
+essence, either directly or indirectly.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only
+in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God
+only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say,
+"Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is
+in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon
+the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity;
+whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our
+mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as
+"Saviour," "Creator," and the like.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Relations signified by these names which are
+applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite
+relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should
+be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so
+that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at
+the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the
+creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the
+Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable
+relatively because knowledge relates to it.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Since God is related to the creature for the
+reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of
+subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in
+idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the
+manner in which the creature is subject to Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by
+nature or otherwise, it is not necessary [to consider the order] of
+things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations
+themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa,
+then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and
+son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not
+vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to
+science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a
+potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the
+knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science,
+but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous
+with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it
+is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the
+signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa,
+these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by
+nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to
+Himself.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 8]
+
+Whether This Name "God" Is a Name of the Nature?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the
+nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God (_Theos_) is so
+called from _theein_ which means to take care of, and to cherish all
+things; or from _aithein_ that is, to burn, for our God is a fire
+consuming all malice; or from _theasthai,_ which means to consider all
+things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name
+"God" signifies His operation and not His nature.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the
+divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not
+signify the divine nature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the
+nature.
+
+_I answer that,_ Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies
+are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its
+properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its
+operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from
+its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but
+still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the
+stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in
+themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named
+from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the
+name and its source are the same.
+
+Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made
+known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as
+said in A. 1; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as
+relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from
+His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God
+intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius
+says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect
+providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name
+"God" is imposed to signify the divine nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is
+the source of the signification of the name "God."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have
+of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can
+know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone"
+signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the
+definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which
+the name signifies is the definition, as is said in _Metaph._ iv. Now
+from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself,
+so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of
+causality, and of negation as stated above (Q. 12, A. 12). Thus the
+name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to
+signify something existing above all things, the principle of all
+things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to
+signify all this.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 9]
+
+Whether This Name "God" Is Communicable?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For
+whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name
+itself. But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is
+communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us
+great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we
+[Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet.
+1:4). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to others.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this
+name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears
+from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have
+said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name "God" is
+communicable.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained.
+But other names given to God from His operations or effects are
+communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name
+"God" is communicable.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to
+wood and stones" (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name.
+Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable.
+
+_I answer that,_ A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by
+similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole
+signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable
+according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance
+this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same
+nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who
+participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or
+strength, and those who thus participate are called lions
+metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly
+communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the
+singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many
+either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in
+reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to
+many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be
+understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the
+mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the
+singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside
+the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a
+species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular,
+from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others.
+Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is
+incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this
+individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no
+name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many,
+but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called
+"Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of
+the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms
+which are individualized not by any _suppositum,_ but by and of
+themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in
+themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea;
+but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals.
+Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms
+as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms
+in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them
+concrete names signifying a nature existing in some _suppositum._
+Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we
+impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to
+us to signify simple subsisting natures.
+
+Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as
+stated above (A. 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied
+as shown above (Q. 11, A. 3), it follows that this name "God" is
+incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the
+same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the
+opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is
+written: "You served them who by nature are not gods," (Gal. 4:8),
+and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion."
+Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole
+signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that
+those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to
+the text, "I have said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6).
+
+But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as
+to His _suppositum,_ accordingly as He is considered as "this
+something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for
+instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is
+like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The divine nature is only communicable according to the
+participation of some similitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a
+proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor;
+although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular.
+For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon
+the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable
+according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the
+name "sun."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed
+from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do
+not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections
+themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable
+to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper
+operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine
+nature.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 10]
+
+Whether This Name "God" Is Applied to God Univocally by Nature,
+by Participation, and According to Opinion?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that this name "God" is applied to God
+univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For
+where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of
+affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But
+a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who
+says: "An idol is God." Therefore "God" in both senses is spoken of
+univocally.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth,
+so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion,
+and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to
+this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also
+this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also
+in opinion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one
+idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by
+the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while
+the heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God."
+Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is
+in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied
+to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore
+this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is
+applied equivocally.
+
+Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen
+does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he
+does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, a Catholic
+signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore
+this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true
+God, and to God according to opinion.
+
+_I answer that,_ This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations
+is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is
+apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same
+thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical
+terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the
+definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance,
+"being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition of
+being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is
+placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine.
+For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the
+cause of health.
+
+The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as
+signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to
+denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god
+by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of
+the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we
+understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is
+manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is
+comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said
+analogically.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the
+predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name
+"man," of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is
+predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name
+"man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one
+meant to signify by this name "man" what man really is, and another
+meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence
+it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God
+contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them
+uses this name "God" to signify the true God. For when the pagan says
+an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion,
+for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use
+the name in that sense, as in the Psalm, "All the gods of the
+Gentiles are demons" (Ps. 95:5).
+
+The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these
+reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not
+from its various significations.
+
+Reply Obj. 4 ["On the contrary," par. 1]: The term "animal" applied
+to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the
+Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including
+analogous names; because also being, which is predicated
+analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of
+different predicaments.
+
+Reply Obj. 5 ["On the contrary," par. 2] : Neither a Catholic nor a
+pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one
+knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or
+remotion (Q. 12, A. 12). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the
+same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying
+an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God
+altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
+names the meaning of which we know not.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 11]
+
+Whether This Name, HE WHO IS, Is the Most Proper Name of God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper
+name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But this
+name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE
+WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of
+good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it
+especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things.
+Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, and not this
+name HE WHO IS.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to
+creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this
+name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name
+HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should
+say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord
+answered him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to
+you" (Ex. 3:13, 14). Therefore this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs
+to God.
+
+_I answer that,_ This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God,
+for three reasons:
+
+First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but
+simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His
+essence itself, which can be said of no other (Q. 3, A. 4), it is
+clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for
+everything is denominated by its form.
+
+Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are
+either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above
+it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine
+it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this
+life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining
+what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God
+is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
+more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are
+applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, "HE WHO
+IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending
+all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and
+indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of
+substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no
+mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it
+denominates the "infinite ocean of substance."
+
+Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present
+existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence
+knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly
+than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and
+as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said
+above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name
+"God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature;
+and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the
+substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,
+singular.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far
+as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered
+absolutely comes before the idea of cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names should
+import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed
+from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the
+first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 12]
+
+Whether Affirmative Propositions Can Be Formed About God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed
+about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about
+God are true; but affirmations are vague."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form
+cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as
+shown (Q. 3): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about
+ which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject.
+Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a
+thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any
+composition as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore since every
+affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows
+that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.
+
+_On the contrary,_ What is of faith cannot be false. But some
+affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One;
+and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can
+be formed about God.
+
+_I answer that,_ True affirmative propositions can be formed about God.
+To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition
+the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in
+reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case
+both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those
+which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and
+"white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea
+of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same
+applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the same thing which is
+man is truly animal; for in the same _suppositum_ there is sensible
+nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature
+by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and
+subject are the same as to _suppositum,_ but different as to idea. But
+in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same
+rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the
+_suppositum_ what it places in the subject; and what it places in the
+predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the
+_suppositum_; according to the saying that "predicates are to be taken
+formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea
+corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the
+intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition
+itself.
+
+God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple,
+yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot
+see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him
+under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple
+object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of
+predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the
+intellect represents the unity by composition.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about God
+are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous,"
+inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of
+signification.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting
+forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as
+compound things in which there is something taken as subject and
+something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form
+as a subject, and attributes something else to it.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything
+otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses,
+accordingly as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word
+"understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part
+of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing
+understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any
+intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is,
+is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our
+intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that
+He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the
+one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the
+intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in
+its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands
+material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it
+understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of
+understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple
+things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode,
+which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to
+be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming
+composition in its ideas concerning God.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 14
+
+OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE
+(In Sixteen Articles)
+
+Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now
+to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation is
+immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior
+effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding
+abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills);
+and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine
+operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to
+understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge,
+we consider the divine life. And as knowledge concerns truth, we
+consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the
+knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God
+are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the
+treatment of ideas.
+
+Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there is knowledge in God?
+
+(2) Whether God understands Himself?
+
+(3) Whether He comprehends Himself?
+
+(4) Whether His understanding is His substance?
+
+(5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?
+
+(6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?
+
+(7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?
+
+(8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?
+
+(9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?
+
+(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?
+
+(11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?
+
+(12) Whether He knows the infinite?
+
+(13) Whether He knows future contingent things?
+
+(14) Whether He knows enunciable things?
+
+(15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?
+
+(16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Knowledge [*Scientia] in God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For
+knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is
+the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in
+God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of
+knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of
+principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in
+God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God
+there is no universal or particular (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore in God
+there is not knowledge.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the
+wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (Rom. 11:33).
+
+_I answer that,_ In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To
+prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished
+from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own
+form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also
+the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in
+the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent
+being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of
+intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore
+the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is in a sense all
+things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence,
+as we have said above (Q. 7, A. 1) forms according as they are the
+more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore
+it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is
+cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of
+knowledge. Hence it is said in _De Anima_ ii that plants do not know,
+because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it
+can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still
+further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and
+unmixed, as said in _De Anima_ iii. Since therefore God is in the
+highest degree of immateriality as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1), it
+follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist
+in a higher state in God Himself (Q. 4, A. 2), whenever a name taken
+from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be
+separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that
+imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality
+of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists
+in God simply and unitedly (Q. 13, A. 4). Now man has different kinds
+of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He
+has _intelligence_ as regards the knowledge of principles; he has
+_science_ as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has _wisdom,_
+according as he knows the highest cause; he has _counsel_ or
+_prudence,_ according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows
+all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (A. 7).
+Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in
+such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so
+far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of
+imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be
+retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength,
+He hath counsel and understanding" (Job 12:13).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who
+knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of
+the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than
+that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the
+mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or
+habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Understands Himself?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is
+said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his own
+essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go
+out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot
+return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement,
+as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind
+of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the
+perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made
+perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing
+its own likeness." Therefore God does not understand Himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect,
+because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen.
+ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it
+understands other things, as is said in _De Anima_ iii. Therefore God
+understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other
+things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The things that are of God no man
+knoweth, but the Spirit of God" (1 Cor. 2:11).
+
+_I answer that,_ God understands Himself through Himself. In proof
+whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an
+external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the
+term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that
+remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation,
+resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the
+operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that
+"the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is
+intellect in act." For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing
+is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible
+or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that
+sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible
+object, since both are in potentiality.
+
+Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure
+act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He
+neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our
+intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible
+species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it
+differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the
+intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus
+God understands Himself through Himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Return to its own essence means only that a thing
+subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by
+giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it
+returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore
+those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts
+of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the
+senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know
+themselves; hence it is said in _De Causis_ that, "whoever knows his
+essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God to be
+self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He
+supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according
+as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as
+stated in _De Anima_ iii. For to understand is not a movement that is
+an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is
+an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise
+that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is
+assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in
+potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of
+potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and
+assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the
+likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected
+thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the
+divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected
+by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its
+own perfection, and its own intelligible object.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter,
+which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now
+our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects
+as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as
+regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural
+things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning
+intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the
+intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands
+itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things:
+for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it
+understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows
+the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of
+existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He
+understands Himself through Himself.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Comprehends Himself?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For
+Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends
+itself is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite.
+Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.
+
+Obj. 2: If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to
+Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is
+truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but
+infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is
+against what was laid down above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore God does
+not comprehend Himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that
+"Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God
+understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.
+
+_I answer that,_ God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus
+proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the
+knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known
+as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable
+proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however,
+when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God
+knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything
+is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing
+is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it
+is in actuality, as said in _Metaph._ ix. Now the power of God in
+knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from
+the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality,
+that God is cognitive, as shown above (AA. 1, 2). Whence it is
+manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that
+reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that
+one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything
+comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another.
+But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as
+if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held
+and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by
+way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He
+is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be
+comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden
+from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole
+is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing
+of it is hidden from the seer."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to
+be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion,
+because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as
+anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not
+to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood
+Himself to be something finite.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Act of God's Intellect Is His Substance?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His
+substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation
+signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of
+God's intellect is not His substance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to
+understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood,
+but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of
+understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand
+our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not
+be something great.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every act of understanding means understanding
+something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is
+not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He
+understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's
+intellect is not His substance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is
+the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to
+understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to
+understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above
+(Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.
+
+_I answer that,_ It must be said that the act of God's intellect is
+His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His
+substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
+xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to
+which the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to
+act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding
+is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now
+consider how this is. As was laid down above (A. 2), to understand is
+not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the
+operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the
+perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the
+form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible
+species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than
+His existence, as shown above (Q. 3). Hence as His essence itself is
+also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of
+understanding must be His essence and His existence.
+
+Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and
+the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of
+understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said
+to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His
+substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the
+operator, but remaining in him.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When that act of understanding which is not subsistent
+is understood, something not great is understood; as when we
+understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to
+the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.
+
+Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine
+understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is
+not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 5]
+
+Whether God Knows Things Other Than Himself?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things besides Himself.
+For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says
+(Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out
+of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one
+who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides
+Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be
+nobler than He; which is impossible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the act of understanding is specified by the
+intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence
+the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object
+understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God
+understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified
+by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not
+understand things other than Himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "All things are naked and open to His
+eyes" (Heb. 4:13).
+
+_I answer that,_ God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For
+it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His
+existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of
+understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of
+necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of
+anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power
+extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by
+the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as
+is clear from the aforesaid (Q. 2, A. 3), God must necessarily know
+things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we
+add that the very existence of the first effective cause--viz.
+God--is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects
+pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of
+understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an
+intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it
+according to the mode of that in which it is.
+
+Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must
+consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another.
+A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species
+adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through
+the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of
+that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the
+image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in
+the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in
+another.
+
+So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself
+through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but
+in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things
+other than Himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God
+"sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as
+if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is
+outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The object understood is a perfection of the one
+understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to
+which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said
+in _De Anima_ iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image."
+Now those things which are other than God are understood by God,
+inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above
+explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in
+the divine intellect other than the divine essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The intellectual act is not specified by what is
+understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which
+other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by
+its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the
+intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form
+which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the
+intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which
+makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal
+thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which
+all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that
+the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by
+anything else than the divine essence itself.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 6]
+
+Whether God Knows Things Other Than Himself by Proper Knowledge?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things other than
+Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (A. 5), God knows
+things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But
+other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and
+are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to
+know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God
+knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine
+essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence.
+But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as
+said above (Q. 12, A. 2). Therefore neither can the created essence
+be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His
+essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its
+essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper
+knowledge of it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through
+its proper ratio [i.e., concept]. But as God knows all things by His
+essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper
+ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse
+things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a
+general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper
+ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them
+not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God
+knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even
+to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the
+marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart;
+neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Heb. 4:12,13).
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows
+things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings.
+For as fire, if it knew itself as the principle of heat, would know
+the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so
+God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the
+nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.
+
+But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in
+particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect,
+when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a
+universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in
+particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is
+clear from _Phys._ i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things
+other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow
+that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore
+neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said
+above (Q. 4, A. 1). We must therefore hold that God knows things
+other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as
+being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from
+the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show
+that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as,
+for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines
+that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know
+all colors.
+
+Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as
+regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect,
+that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal
+principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction,
+but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity
+of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different
+disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise,
+the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position.
+Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known
+in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In
+God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (Q. 4, A. 2)
+that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and
+is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is
+common to creatures--viz. being--belongs to their perfection, but
+also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and
+understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished
+from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent.
+Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own
+species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not
+only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what
+distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains
+all perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all
+other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is
+to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines;
+but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to
+animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained
+under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can
+be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for
+example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and
+whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper
+knowledge.
+
+As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection
+contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can
+know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature
+proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the
+divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly
+unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared
+by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,
+unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows
+all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each
+other.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be
+understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode
+of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is
+false. For the knower does not always know the object known according
+to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a
+stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image
+of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according
+to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge
+of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in
+the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode
+of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone
+according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect,
+inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows
+what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be
+understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the
+knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge
+of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly
+the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of
+knowledge.
+
+We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in
+Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their
+own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is
+in Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The created essence is compared to the essence of God
+as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence
+cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence,
+but rather the converse.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as
+the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all
+creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ratio of each thing
+according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate
+in, and imitate it.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Knowledge of God Is Discursive?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the
+knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now
+the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard
+many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing
+at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as
+shown above (AA. 2, 5), it seems that He does not understand all at
+once, but discourses from one to another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through
+its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is
+known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know
+it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go
+discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that
+the same applies to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all
+things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately
+here and there; but He sees all things together at once."
+
+_I answer that,_ In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the
+proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold
+discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have
+actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand
+something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to
+causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of
+conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For
+many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered
+in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one
+thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see
+different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing),
+which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not
+successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be
+applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion
+presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to
+conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to
+discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it
+is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still
+unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the
+first. Now the term of discursive reasoning is attained when the
+second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their
+causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects
+in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although there is only one act of understanding in
+itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),
+as shown above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God does not know by their cause, known, as it were
+previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause;
+and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God sees the effects of created causes in the causes
+themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner
+that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge
+of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His
+knowledge is not discursive.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Knowledge of God Is the Cause of Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of
+things. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also
+justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as
+future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God,
+before it exists."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the
+knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is
+the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is
+its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is
+posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge
+of God is not the cause of things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are,
+does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He
+knows them, therefore they are."
+
+_I answer that,_ The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the
+knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the
+artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the
+artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact
+that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the
+intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of
+heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a
+form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a
+principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an
+effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a
+principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands
+unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which
+inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a
+relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to
+opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were
+determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says
+(Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His
+intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His
+knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined
+to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually
+called the "knowledge of approbation."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge
+to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is
+joined to it, as is said above.
+
+But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because
+they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of
+consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things
+are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the
+futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is the cause of things according
+as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was
+not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is
+eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God
+and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of
+which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural
+objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure,
+so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the
+measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the
+knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one
+who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 9]
+
+Whether God Has Knowledge of Things That Are Not?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are
+not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and
+"being" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
+of things that are not.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and
+the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any
+likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be
+known by God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known
+by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a
+thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of
+things that are not.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things
+that are not as those that are" (Rom. 4:17).
+
+_I answer that,_ God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are.
+Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a
+certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas
+things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or
+of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power
+of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning
+whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the
+creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God,
+although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has
+knowledge even of things that are not.
+
+Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those
+things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act
+now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all
+these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of
+understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since
+eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present
+glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in
+any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in
+God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will
+be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not
+of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the
+things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as
+they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in
+potentiality; and as such they are known by God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it
+participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far
+as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by
+God, although they are not in act.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause
+of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or
+was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills
+to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not
+that they be, but that they be possible.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 10]
+
+Whether God Knows Evil Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the
+Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in
+potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of
+good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the
+intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is
+clear from the foregoing (A. 2), it seems that God does not know evil
+things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing
+known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause
+of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil
+things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness,
+or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His
+essence, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 5). Now the divine
+essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it;
+for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De
+Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, what is known through another and not through
+itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the
+thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through
+another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly;
+which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore
+God does not know evil things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 15:11), "Hell and destruction
+are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']."
+
+_I answer that,_ Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that
+can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which
+corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good
+things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is
+knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the
+essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that
+God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is
+known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through
+Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing
+darkness except through light."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as
+meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not
+know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what
+he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are
+known by privation of division. This is because simple and
+indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only
+potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not
+be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by
+separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation
+existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is
+the cause of the good whereby evil is known.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence,
+which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of
+God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the
+opposite evils.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to
+imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is
+not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means
+the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor
+known except by good.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 11]
+
+Whether God Knows Singular Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the
+divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the
+human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular
+things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do
+with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not
+know singular things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which
+receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in
+God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality.
+Therefore God does not know singular things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some
+likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are
+singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of
+singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is
+altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know
+singular things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 16:2), "All the ways of a man
+are open to His eyes."
+
+_I answer that,_ God knows singular things. For all perfections found
+in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
+foregoing (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to know singular things is part of our
+perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher
+considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown
+to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and _Metaph._
+iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now
+the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply
+and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the
+universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material
+things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.
+
+Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows
+singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any
+singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They
+give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal
+movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that
+are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from
+universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however
+they may be joined together, are not individualized except by
+individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or
+because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that
+kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence
+according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in
+their singularity.
+
+On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by
+the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this
+will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless
+he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the
+reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of
+singular things.
+
+Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of
+things by His knowledge, as stated above (A. 8), His knowledge
+extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of
+God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality,
+but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Q. 44, A. 2), the
+knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are
+individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than
+Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their
+active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of
+knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in
+the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer,
+if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from
+the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our
+intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on
+that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the
+intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of
+God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the
+principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of
+things, whether principles of the species or principles of the
+individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also
+singular things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although as regards the species in the divine intellect
+its being has no material conditions like the images received in the
+imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and
+material things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes
+from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this
+wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 12]
+
+Whether God Can Know Infinite Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the
+infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to
+those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured,"
+as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De
+Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded
+by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no
+boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of
+God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are
+finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the
+essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite
+that it is traversable, as said in _Phys._ iii. But the infinite is
+not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved
+in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite,
+nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in
+God's knowledge, which is infinite.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is
+known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be
+measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot
+number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose
+knowledge has no bounds."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since God knows not only things actual but also
+things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above (A.
+9), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows
+infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation
+only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite
+things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor
+that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals
+be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we
+must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of
+vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts,
+which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for
+ever.
+
+The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of
+every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the
+principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the
+likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of
+only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is
+the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is
+participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the
+intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not
+however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the
+nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible
+species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the
+individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On
+the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect
+understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can
+be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards
+the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows
+that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as
+distinct from each other.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the
+Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the
+order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode
+of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the
+infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken,
+there will always remain something else outside. But God does not
+know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
+part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively,
+as said above (A. 7). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from
+knowing infinite things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and
+hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor
+by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because
+that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the
+comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be
+comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can
+be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as
+if it were traversable.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not
+quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of
+measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things.
+For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which
+it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees
+with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of
+things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in
+continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients
+held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and
+finite being, because their being would be limited to some
+determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the
+knowledge of God.
+_______________________
+
+THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 13]
+
+Whether the Knowledge of God Is of Future Contingent Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future
+contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary
+effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said
+above (A. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He
+knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of
+contingent things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the
+antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary
+consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are
+to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary
+conclusion can follow, as is proved in _Poster._ i. But this is a true
+conditional proposition, "If God knew that this thing will be, it will
+be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the
+antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is
+eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent
+is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is
+necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be,
+because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of
+course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no
+future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent
+future thing is known by God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 32:15), "He Who hath made the
+hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e.
+of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free
+will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since as was shown above (A. 9), God knows all
+things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and
+creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it
+follows that God knows future contingent things.
+
+In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be
+considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in
+act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as
+present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference)
+to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this
+it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to
+the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
+another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its
+cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a
+contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent
+cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent
+thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a
+contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural
+knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they
+are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in
+itself. And although contingent things become actual successively,
+nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they
+are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is
+because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being;
+and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said
+above (Q. 10, A. 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to
+God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things
+present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried
+from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.
+Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by
+God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their
+presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to
+their own causes.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may
+be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as
+the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate
+contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first
+cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent
+on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God,
+which is the first cause, is necessary.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this
+contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because,
+although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This
+however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had
+relation to the future, must have had it, although the future
+sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this
+antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and
+contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man."
+But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this
+contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter
+of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its
+contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or
+contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it
+may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said
+Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and
+contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely
+necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is
+absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of
+the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause.
+But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were
+its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a
+contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the
+grass will grow."
+
+Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains
+anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be
+taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the
+existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a
+thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul
+understands is immaterial," this is to be understood that it is
+immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself.
+Likewise if I say, "If God knew anything, it will be," the consequent
+must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as
+it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the
+antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily
+be," as the Philosopher says in _Peri Herm._ i.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us
+successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is
+above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know
+future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God
+alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who
+goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas
+he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling
+by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it
+is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be
+known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according
+to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as
+already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes.
+Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must
+necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the
+thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and
+false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary."
+If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense
+is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."
+
+Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good
+with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I
+said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as
+applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing
+which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, "a white thing
+is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from
+the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,
+"A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to
+be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by
+God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these
+words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the
+subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be
+attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be
+known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under
+actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in
+itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 14]
+
+Whether God Knows Enunciable Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to
+know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and
+divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition.
+Therefore God does not know enunciable things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some
+likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since
+He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable
+things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men"
+(Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of
+men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since it is in the power of our intellect to form
+enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in
+that of creatures, as said above (A. 9), it follows of necessity
+that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.
+
+Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite
+things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the
+manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were
+composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by
+simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if
+we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand
+all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in
+our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch
+as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not
+to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not
+forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we
+understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this
+account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one
+by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the
+species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to
+represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows
+the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to
+them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This objection would avail if God knew enunciable
+things after the manner of enunciable things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a
+thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the
+similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 15]
+
+Whether the Knowledge of God Is Variable?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For
+knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports
+relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies
+according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of
+God is variable according to the variation of creatures.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can
+make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows.
+Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does
+not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be
+born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once
+knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said, that in God "there is no change nor
+shadow of alteration" (James 1:17).
+
+_I answer that,_ Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is
+clear from the foregoing (A. 4), just as His substance is altogether
+immutable, as shown above (Q. 9, A. 1), so His knowledge likewise
+must be altogether invariable.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to
+creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of
+God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God;
+because everything is actually understood according as it is in the
+one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable
+manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that
+"Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent upon
+the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures
+themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are
+attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures.
+But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import relations consequent
+upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these
+are predicated of God in an invariable manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God knows also what He can make, and does not make.
+Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not
+follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred
+to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know
+those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the
+fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some
+things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge
+is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If,
+however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and
+afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could
+not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by
+God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in
+some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from
+eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than
+He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did
+not know, and then afterwards knew.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing
+to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because
+the same thing is signified by these three--viz. the nativity of
+Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He
+knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same
+thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false;
+both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a
+diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a
+proposition which is true once would be always true; which is
+contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he
+says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when he is sitting,
+and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this
+proposition is not true, "Whatever God knew He knows," if referred to
+enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that
+the knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in
+the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime
+to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the
+divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime
+true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be
+variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by
+composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our
+knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if
+when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a
+thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as
+regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was
+sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of
+which can be in God.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 16]
+
+Whether God Has a Speculative Knowledge of Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of
+things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown
+above (A. 8). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the
+things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from
+things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the
+knowledge of God is not speculative.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to
+God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical
+knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics.
+Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical
+only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof
+whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative
+in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not
+operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or
+divine thing[s]. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing--as, for
+instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and
+considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider
+operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically
+operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and
+not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal
+principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect
+differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De
+Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the
+operation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the
+consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house
+can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to
+know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations
+as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore
+knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is
+merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode
+or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when
+it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.
+
+In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of
+Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable.
+But of all other things He has both speculative and practical
+knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for
+whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God
+knows all this much more perfectly.
+
+Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has
+not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical
+from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in
+some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are
+not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like
+good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as
+also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician,
+inasmuch as he cures them by his art.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of
+Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that
+is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is
+virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make,
+and which nevertheless are never made.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The fact that knowledge is derived from things known
+does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only
+accidentally in so far as it is human.
+
+In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that
+perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are
+known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge
+of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him,
+formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative.
+Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative
+knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in
+Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative
+knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical
+knowledge of all other things.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 15
+
+OF IDEAS
+(In Three Articles)
+
+After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas.
+And about this there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there are ideas?
+
+(2) Whether they are many, or one only?
+
+(3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Are Ideas?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says
+(Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas
+are for nothing else except that things may be known through them.
+Therefore there are no ideas.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been
+already said (Q. 14, A. 5). But He does not know Himself through
+an idea; neither therefore other things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of
+knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient
+principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore
+necessary to suppose ideas.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),
+"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless
+they are understood."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind.
+For the Greek word _Idea_ is in Latin _Forma._ Hence by ideas are
+understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things
+themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing
+itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of
+which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge
+of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be
+in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is
+clear for the following reason:
+
+In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of
+any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of
+the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the
+agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the
+thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in
+those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire
+generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be
+made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that
+act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in
+the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the
+house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form
+conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but
+by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (Q. 46, A. 1),
+there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which
+the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God does not understand things according to an idea
+existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the
+opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not
+in the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although God knows Himself and all else by His own
+essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things,
+except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with
+respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God is the similitude of all things according to His
+essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Ideas Are Many?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is
+His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only
+one idea.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and
+operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several
+arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to
+their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the
+contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are
+many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of
+the eternal.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures only,
+or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from
+eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas
+are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are
+real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other
+than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of
+Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,
+except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore
+are not many.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),
+"Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types
+of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal,
+and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the
+divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come
+into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them
+everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually
+does so."
+
+_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In
+proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the
+ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the
+order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the
+highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the
+universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in _Metaph._ xii.
+Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and
+is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been
+supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first
+creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so
+on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to
+this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing
+alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by
+Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the
+order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole,
+unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is
+made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he
+has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in
+the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence
+Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was
+created by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it
+follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be
+seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we
+consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as
+that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he
+understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the
+form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood
+by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now,
+it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it
+understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its
+simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of
+images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things
+understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own
+essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it
+can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as
+it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of
+likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to
+which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine
+essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of
+such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type
+and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other
+creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types
+of things and these are many ideas.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as
+it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type
+of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as
+many types are understood through the self-same essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God
+understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one
+understands many things, and that not only according to what they are
+in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is
+to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an
+architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form
+of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as
+devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he
+understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house.
+Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He
+also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And
+this means that He understands the several types of things; or that
+many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are
+caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect
+comparing its own essence with these things.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created
+things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those
+whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by
+God.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Are Ideas of All Things That God Knows?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things
+that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
+follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God.
+Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be,
+nor have been, as has been said above (A. 9). But of such things
+there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of
+the divine will are the determining and effective types of things."
+Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be
+no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but
+also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of
+these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as
+Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are
+not ideas in God of all things known by Him.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is
+clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the
+proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas
+of all things known by Him.
+
+_I answer that,_ As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the
+knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
+office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the
+principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and
+belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of
+knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to
+speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect
+to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a
+principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even
+though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows
+according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in
+a speculative manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type, but
+through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God,
+neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of
+things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with
+respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies
+an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not
+created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a
+concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by
+God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not
+apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can
+neither exist, nor be known.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species,
+in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist
+except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents
+that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being
+along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the
+subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through
+the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
+whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such
+as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other
+form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea
+than that of species; both because particular things are
+individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated
+and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature
+regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the
+species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not
+merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (Q. 22,
+A. 3).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 16
+
+OF TRUTH
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration
+of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this
+there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?
+
+(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
+
+(3) On the comparison of the true to being.
+
+(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.
+
+(5) Whether God is truth?
+
+(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?
+
+(7) On the eternity of truth.
+
+(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the
+intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5)
+condemns this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since
+it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not
+be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following,
+"That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and
+able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,
+unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That
+is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and
+not in the intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If,
+then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in
+so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient
+philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so.
+Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by
+different persons at the same time.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself
+more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is
+from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is
+true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore
+truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the
+false reside not in things, but in the intellect."
+
+_I answer that,_ As the good denotes that towards which the appetite
+tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now
+there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or
+any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing
+known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer
+tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely
+good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,
+namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing
+so far as that thing is related to the appetite--and hence the aspect
+of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so
+far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since
+the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the
+object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the
+intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood
+is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect.
+Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either
+essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect
+on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an
+intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is
+related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but
+accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.
+
+Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by
+what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true
+absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it
+depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as
+being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that
+expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words
+are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the
+intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so
+far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine
+mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to
+a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus,
+then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in
+things according as they are related to the intellect as their
+principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth.
+Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made
+manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth
+makes being clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as
+it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they
+are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera
+Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to
+a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is
+rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; for that is right which is
+in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph.
+viii, 6), "The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which
+is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the
+equation of thought and thing" is applicable to it under either
+aspect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and
+excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect;
+for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of
+natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced
+by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect,
+they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to
+our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible,
+and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not
+follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation
+to the divine intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the
+thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily,
+any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather
+than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health,
+is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the
+same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of
+truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or
+a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is
+true."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect Composing and Dividing?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect
+composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that
+as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible
+objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now
+composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the
+intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside
+only in the intellect composing and dividing.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Isaac says in his book _On Definitions_ that truth
+is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with
+regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard
+to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing
+as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect
+composing and dividing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to
+simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the
+intellect nor in things."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect,
+in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the
+form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing,
+must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this
+being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the
+conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity
+is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although
+sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the
+comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself
+apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own
+conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it
+by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that
+a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing,
+then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and
+dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes
+from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the
+predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing,
+as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does
+not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with
+complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or
+in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is
+true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by
+the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as
+known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect
+composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect
+knowing "what a thing is."
+
+And thus the Objections given are solved.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the True and Being Are Convertible Terms?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible
+terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
+(A. 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not
+convertible.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not
+convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
+for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not.
+Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of
+priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
+appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except
+under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not
+convertible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the
+same disposition of things in being and in truth.
+
+_I answer that,_ As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth
+is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so
+far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in _De Anima_ iii that "the
+soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the
+intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the
+true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true
+adds relation to the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as
+said before (A. 1). But the true that is in things is convertible
+with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect
+is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested;
+for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (A.
+1). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the
+intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the
+intellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because
+truth and being differ in idea.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be
+known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it
+knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is
+a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except
+under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In
+the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the
+idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In
+the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless
+the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the
+true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended
+also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is
+the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being
+cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be
+understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly,
+being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by
+understanding being.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Good Is Logically Prior to the True?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For
+what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from _Phys._
+i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a
+kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is
+logically prior to the true.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect
+composing and dividing as said above (A. 2). But that which is in
+things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is
+logically prior to the true.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from
+_Ethic._ iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine
+says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind.
+Therefore the good is prior to the true.
+
+_On the contrary,_ What is in more things is prior logically. But the
+true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in
+mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.
+
+_I answer that,_ Although the good and the true are convertible with
+being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner
+the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two
+reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than
+is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately;
+while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some
+way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from
+the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the
+true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true
+must be prior in idea to the good.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one
+another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills
+the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the
+object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the
+intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable,
+good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas
+in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case. From the
+fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good
+is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior
+absolutely.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to
+the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself;
+secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it
+apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first,
+that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in
+things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in
+general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows
+himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to
+"life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in
+his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it
+has been said that truth exists in other things (A. 1). Whereas the
+truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his
+neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these
+particular truths to truth in general.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 5]
+
+Whether God Is Truth?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the
+intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition
+and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi)
+is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness to
+a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the
+first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all
+being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is
+truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone
+sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the
+Life" (John 14:6).
+
+_I answer that,_ As said above (A. 1), truth is found in the
+intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things
+according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to
+the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed
+to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act
+of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of
+every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of
+understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but
+that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither
+composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He
+judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is
+truth in His intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its
+conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from
+which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to
+their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect.
+Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless
+perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a
+principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot
+understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the
+negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because He is
+not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a
+"likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence is not
+dissimilar to His intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves,
+but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension
+of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the
+statement--"that a person commits fornication is true"--is entirely
+from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is
+from God", is a fallacy of Accident.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 6]
+
+Whether There Is Only One Truth, According to Which All Things Are True?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which
+all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1),
+"nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is
+greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of
+truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and
+not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth.
+Therefore there is no other truth but God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the
+relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true
+things." But there is only one time for all temporal things.
+Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.
+
+_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
+among the children of men."
+
+_I answer that,_ In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is
+one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must
+consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally,
+it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal
+is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of
+many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to
+its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
+healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not
+that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal,
+medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health,
+and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And
+although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either
+there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates
+health. Now we have said (A. 1) that truth resides primarily in
+the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are
+related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it
+exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are
+there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the
+same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a
+gloss on Ps. 11:2, "Truths are decayed from among the children of
+men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a
+mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But
+if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by
+one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its
+own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are
+many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to
+which all things are said to be true.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind
+of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is
+reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first
+principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the
+primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth,
+which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply,
+but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as
+science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that
+nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are
+said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Created Truth Is Eternal?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine
+says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature
+of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of
+these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals
+are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore
+is truth, which is the most universal.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present
+was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding
+the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding
+the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal.
+But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if
+their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true
+that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that
+truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that
+truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be,
+for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is
+eternal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ God alone is eternal, as laid down before
+(Q. 10, Art. 3).
+
+_I answer that,_ The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of
+the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
+speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of
+itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable
+truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on
+account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a
+subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it
+but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it
+has been already said that things are called true from the truth of
+the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be
+eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone
+truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else
+but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God
+Himself, as shown already (A. 5).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three
+make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be
+understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of
+extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be
+everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself
+determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be
+one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all
+distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be
+everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of
+place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are
+eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually)
+was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the
+cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the
+first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was
+always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future
+being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the
+truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but
+it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not
+true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the
+divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now
+to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by
+reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason
+of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being;
+and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our
+intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not
+exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Truth Is Immutable?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De
+Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals,
+otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as
+primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after
+all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for
+after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not.
+Therefore truth is immutable.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes
+mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change.
+For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain
+rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the
+divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits",
+receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does
+sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.
+Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same
+effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three
+propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of
+each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one.
+Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for
+the same reason that of any other.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 11:2), "Truths are decayed from
+among the children of men."
+
+_I answer that,_ Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the
+intellect, as said before (A. 1); but things are called true in
+virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of
+truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the
+truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now
+this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness,
+through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth
+varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of
+opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in
+another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in
+either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there
+is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and
+the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth.
+Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
+before (Q. 14, A. 15). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is
+immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it
+is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect
+changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable.
+Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which
+natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as
+being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in
+so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in
+_Phys._ i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but
+because that truth does not remain which was before.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things are
+said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which
+is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it is said
+to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth
+of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect
+with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes,
+and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this
+proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both
+with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is
+significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it
+signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth
+remains, but the second is changed.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the
+truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning
+when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the
+truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these
+propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not
+follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same
+truth remains invariable.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 17
+
+CONCERNING FALSITY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:
+
+(1) Whether falsity exists in things?
+
+(2) Whether it exists in the sense?
+
+(3) Whether it exists in the intellect?
+
+(4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Falsity Exists in Things?
+
+Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For
+Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it
+will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may
+appear to the contrary."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, false is derived from _fallere_ (to deceive). But
+things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33),
+they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not
+found in things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to
+the divine intellect, as stated above (Q. 16). But everything, in so
+far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without
+admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a
+true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being
+unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of
+it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites
+stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where
+primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in
+things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the
+intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs
+to it _per se,_ but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it
+accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared
+with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared
+_per se_ but may be called false relatively as directed to another
+intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things
+depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human.
+Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in
+themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art;
+whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short
+of the proper operation of his art.
+
+In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as
+they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes
+place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless
+perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their
+power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein
+consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and
+lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do
+you love vanity, and seek after lying?" (Ps. 4:3): as on the other
+hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient
+to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth
+truth, cometh to the light" (John 3:21).
+
+But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared
+thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively;
+and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and
+thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by
+word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to
+be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should
+say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher
+says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The
+true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything
+can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In
+another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause--and thus a
+thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And
+whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances,
+since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and
+naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external
+accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be
+false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and
+tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We
+call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the
+true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called
+false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what
+they are not." In this way a man is called false as delighting in
+false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in
+this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as
+stated in _Metaph._ v, 34.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true
+in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not.
+Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq.
+ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain
+non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by
+accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they
+bear to things which they actually are not.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared with the
+divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as
+compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.
+
+To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective
+representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far
+as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always
+said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when
+the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not
+in any one case, but in the majority of instances.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Is Falsity in the Senses?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine
+says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they are
+affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it
+seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that
+falsity is not in them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity
+is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor
+false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do
+not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the
+senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes."
+
+_I answer that,_ Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as
+truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the
+senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things
+truly, as said above (Q. 16, A. 2), and this takes place through
+the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that
+falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging
+things to be otherwise than they really are.
+
+The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the
+existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing
+can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and
+of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of
+other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature,
+though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape,
+size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense.
+Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as
+in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as
+it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.
+
+Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except
+accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it
+does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive
+subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the
+impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on
+account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person.
+But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a
+rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, because it is
+referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence
+of being directed to other things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence,
+from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that
+we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we
+experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected
+erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports
+erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about
+the object, but not about the fact of sensation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense
+is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation
+it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never
+false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents
+the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone
+perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself,
+falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason the
+Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams
+are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things
+that are not present in substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument proves that the false is not in the
+sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Falsity Is in the Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For
+Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived,
+understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to
+exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore
+falsity does not exist in the intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the
+intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the
+intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said in _De Anima_ iii, 21, 22 that "where
+there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and
+falsehood." But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth
+and falsehood exist in the intellect.
+
+_I answer that,_ Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the
+knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known.
+Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs
+to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent
+qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail
+to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of
+the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
+with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental
+thereto. For it has been said (A. 2) that sight is not deceived in
+its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent
+to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the
+sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so
+is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the
+intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither
+the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the
+intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it
+understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it,
+or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as
+regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common,
+or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference,
+as before mentioned regarding truth (Q. 16, A. 2), that falsity can
+exist in the intellect not only because the knowledge of the
+intellect is false, but because the intellect is conscious of that
+knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does
+not exist as known, as stated above (A. 2).
+
+But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only
+with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also
+accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the
+essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is
+mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the
+intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as
+that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is
+false of another. In another way, by composing a definition of parts
+which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only
+false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as "a
+reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the
+intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some
+reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this
+reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple
+essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at all.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of
+the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we
+reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in
+demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense
+Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived,
+understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not in the sense
+that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The intellect is always right as regards first
+principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason
+that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known
+principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood,
+from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of
+the subject.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 4]
+
+Whether True and False Are Contraries?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true
+and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for
+"truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But
+that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries.
+Therefore true and false are not contrary things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But
+falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10),
+"A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true
+tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is
+contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in
+Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" (Jer. 8:5), that is
+to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not
+contraries.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false
+opinion is contrary to a true one.
+
+_I answer that,_ True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as
+some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must
+be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines
+any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for
+instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing,
+whereas it determines its subject, for it is "negation in a subject,"
+as stated in _Metaph._ iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of
+one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert
+something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of
+color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the
+Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or
+seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is.
+For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity
+implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are
+contraries.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what
+is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth
+primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as
+apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety;
+for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this
+statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary
+to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to
+it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either,
+because true and good are universals, and convertible with being.
+Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being,
+so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some
+truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation,
+are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is
+nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect
+to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be
+nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for
+the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols
+are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false
+opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine
+unity.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 18
+
+THE LIFE OF GOD
+(In Four Articles)
+
+Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the
+divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life.
+About this, four points of inquiry arise:
+
+(1) To whom does it belong to live?
+
+(2) What is life?
+
+(3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?
+
+(4) Whether all things in God are life?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 1]
+
+Whether to Live Belongs to All Natural Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For
+the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind of
+life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural
+things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake
+of life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they have in
+themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local
+movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of
+growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56, 57).
+Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of
+local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less
+perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living
+waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last
+echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that
+their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are
+inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.
+
+_I answer that,_ We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what
+it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life
+manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in _De Vegetab._ i [*De
+Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore,
+distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by
+reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life
+is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal
+begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such
+movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When
+it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another
+power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead.
+Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that
+move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement
+properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing
+in potentiality, is called movement; or movement in a more general
+sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding
+and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be
+alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind:
+whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be
+called living, unless by a similitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words of the Philosopher may be understood either
+of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of
+the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called
+the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude,
+and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the
+heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of
+the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also
+every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain
+similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal
+universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an
+"intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that case
+movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not
+belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural
+conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in
+the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest.
+Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in
+accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by
+approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they
+recede from such movement, so far do they recede from their natural
+disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force,
+either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles
+from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living
+bodies.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Waters are called living that have a continuous
+current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a
+continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and
+ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are
+seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is
+not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is
+not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same
+is the case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Life Is an Operation?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is
+divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by
+certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
+13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment,
+sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an
+operation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the active life is said to be different from the
+contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the
+active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life,
+as is clear from the words of John 18:3, "Now this is eternal life,
+that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an
+operation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living
+things, to live is to be."
+
+_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said (Q. 17, A. 3),
+our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as
+its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper
+objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we
+come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a
+thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what
+has already been said (Q. 13, A. 1), so from external properties
+names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are
+sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the
+signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and
+less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are
+imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus
+of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and
+is sometimes taken to denote the dimensions themselves; in which
+sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said
+of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance,
+namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather
+a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to
+any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is
+nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies
+this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running" denotes "to
+run" in the abstract.
+
+Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate.
+Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from
+which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9)
+that to live is principally to sense or to understand.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an
+operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and
+intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations,
+sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says
+(Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand--in other
+words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus,
+then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in
+this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the
+nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment,
+and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in
+addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other
+animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from
+place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and
+so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By vital operations are meant those whose principles
+are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces
+such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not
+merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their
+natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits
+inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of
+operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus,
+as by a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so
+that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life
+ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence
+some are said to lead a life of self-indulgence, others a life of
+virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the
+active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.
+
+Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Life Is Properly Attributed to God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God.
+For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as
+previously stated (A. 2). But movement does not belong to God.
+Neither therefore does life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some
+principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
+4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But
+God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things that
+exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in
+corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal
+things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 83:3): "My heart and my flesh have
+rejoiced in the living God."
+
+_I answer that,_ Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In
+proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to
+live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another,
+the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect
+is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a
+threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the
+agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form,
+and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue
+not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more
+than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move
+themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in
+them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form
+by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined
+for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move
+themselves according to their inherent nature, with regard only to
+executing the movements of growth and decay.
+
+Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only
+with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the
+form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of
+themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of
+movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through
+sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is
+their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as
+shellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and
+thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as
+have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only
+connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move
+themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals
+of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the
+principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves
+propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for
+this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct
+they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense.
+Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they
+themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by
+reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion
+between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them.
+Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligent beings;
+for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the
+fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the
+sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of
+movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e.
+the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in
+its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the
+material for the ship.
+
+But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are
+supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt;
+and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with
+respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other
+things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of
+understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally
+possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most
+perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life.
+From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing
+God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal,
+since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Metaph._ ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions
+of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst
+actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to
+sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the
+former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of
+the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the
+agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement,
+the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is
+called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act
+of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent,
+although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in
+potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that
+is to say, of what is in act as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 28. In the
+sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which
+understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that
+Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which
+movement is an act of the imperfect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As God is His own very existence and understanding, so
+is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has no
+principle of life.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible
+nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and
+nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not
+found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold
+good with incorruptible natures.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 4]
+
+Whether All Things Are Life in God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is
+said (Acts 17:28), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all
+things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But
+things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all
+things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life
+in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living
+substance is better than a substance that does not live. If,
+therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God,
+it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this
+appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in
+God potentially.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are
+known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but
+that never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God,
+inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things
+that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this
+appears inadmissible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ (John 1:3, 4), it is said, "What was made, in Him
+was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things
+are life in God.
+
+_I answer that,_ In God to live is to understand, as before stated
+(A. 3). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of
+understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as
+understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since
+all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood,
+it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In
+one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the
+divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in
+us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in
+their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the
+Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, and be"; since our
+being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another
+sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in
+which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God
+are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in
+God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and
+not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner
+are not movement, but life.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The thing modelled must be like the model according to
+the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of
+another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing
+modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect
+immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists
+outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of
+things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine
+mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural
+things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in
+the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which
+reason, in fact, Plato held that the _separate_ man was the true man;
+and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation.
+But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say
+that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly
+than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated
+being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular
+being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its
+own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human
+nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is
+not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in
+matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the
+one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter
+only potential.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being
+comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by
+Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are
+known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be
+said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in
+time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding
+only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far
+as life implies a principle of operation.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 19
+
+THE WILL OF GOD
+(In Twelve Articles)
+
+After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we
+consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is
+about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly
+to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in
+relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there is will in God?
+
+(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
+
+(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?
+
+(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
+
+(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
+
+(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?
+
+(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?
+
+(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
+
+(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?
+
+(10) Whether God has free will?
+
+(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?
+
+(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the
+divine will?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Will in God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of
+will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.
+Therefore there is not will in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it
+is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which
+cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54),
+the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,
+and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there
+is not will in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 12:2): "That you may prove
+what is the will of God."
+
+_I answer that,_ There is will in God, as there is intellect: since
+will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual
+existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by
+its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its
+natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when
+it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural
+perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
+without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also
+intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its
+intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not
+possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will.
+Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every
+sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in
+God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own
+existence, so is His will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He
+Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this
+by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (Q. 6,
+A. 3): for the end has the aspect of good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,
+although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking
+what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in
+what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as
+having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is
+not distinct from His essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A will of which the principal object is a good outside
+itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will
+is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God
+is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself
+alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be
+movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover
+moves itself.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Wills Things Apart from Himself?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from
+Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not
+other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than
+Himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the
+appetite, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills
+anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which
+is impossible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks
+nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely
+satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
+Himself.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the
+number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things
+apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold,
+and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is
+impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): "This is the will of
+God, your sanctification."
+
+_I answer that,_ God wills not only Himself, but other things apart
+from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
+(A. 1). For natural things have a natural inclination not only
+towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and,
+if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own
+good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every
+agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It
+pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far
+as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this
+pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in
+some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they
+are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it
+appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good
+to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to
+be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things
+as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness
+that other things should be partakers therein.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The divine will is God's own existence essentially,
+yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of
+understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has
+already been said (Q. 13, A. 4). For when we say that God exists, no
+relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say
+that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from
+Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole
+reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the
+will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of
+the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills
+nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is
+different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone
+may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own
+sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for
+the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow
+that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
+understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own
+essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own
+goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine
+will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but
+rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus,
+too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very
+knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other
+things.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only
+in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as
+willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own
+goodness.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Whatever God Wills He Wills Necessarily?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily.
+For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills
+from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore
+whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He
+wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.
+Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary,
+for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all
+necessity, as above shown (Q. 2, A. 3). But it belongs to His nature
+to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and
+above His nature as stated in _Metaph._ v, 6. Therefore whatever He
+wills, He wills necessarily.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is
+possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God
+does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for
+Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He
+does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the
+other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is
+imperfect and mutable.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or
+the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to
+one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes]
+says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with
+regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes
+from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the
+divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore
+whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): "Who worketh all things
+according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to
+the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God
+does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
+
+_I answer that,_ There are two ways in which a thing is said to be
+necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to
+be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the
+predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is
+absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the
+subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is
+absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it
+is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary
+absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he
+is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting.
+Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills
+something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He
+wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine
+goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own
+goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily,
+and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and
+principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to
+it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so
+far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in
+willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it,
+unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as,
+we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to
+cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the
+end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on
+foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to
+other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can
+exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him
+from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is
+not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
+supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as
+His will cannot change.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He
+wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by
+supposition.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He
+does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness;
+for it can exist without other things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those other
+things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural
+or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary
+relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not
+in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation
+to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the
+solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the
+cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of
+the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine
+will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed,
+namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such
+defect accompanies all created good.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act
+by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
+necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
+necessary relation.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the
+divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a
+necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the
+thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as
+they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they
+exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary
+existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so
+as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in
+themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills,
+but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Will of God Is the Cause of Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things.
+For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason nor
+by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can
+participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours
+the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary
+agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by
+will; and so His will is not the cause of things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially
+so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is
+fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by
+His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not
+by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being
+_such_ a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is
+the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the
+cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De
+Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God
+is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the [cause of]
+created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (Q. 14, A. 8).
+Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 11:26), "How could anything endure,
+if Thou wouldst not?"
+
+_I answer that,_ We must hold that the will of God is the cause of
+things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed,
+by a necessity of His nature.
+
+This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of
+active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as
+proved in _Phys._ ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the
+necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the
+end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the
+archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the
+agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of
+agents, He must act by intellect and will.
+
+This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of
+which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature
+operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is
+because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent;
+and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in
+accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate
+being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in
+Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a
+necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something
+undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has
+been already shown (Q. 7, A. 2). He does not, therefore, act by a
+necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own
+infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and
+intellect.
+
+Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For
+effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they
+pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now
+effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause.
+Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects
+pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed
+from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him
+after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His
+intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of
+God is the cause of things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude
+election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far,
+that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain
+things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and will,
+from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts
+after the mode of intellect and will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore,
+"Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is
+the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A. 2, ad
+2).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is
+knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived,
+and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect
+only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except
+by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to
+operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it
+denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God all these
+things are one.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Any Cause Can Be Assigned to the Divine Will?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine
+will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say
+that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what
+is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the
+will of God has some cause.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and
+whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
+except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause
+of all things, as has been already shown (A. 4). If, then, there is
+no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause,
+except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain,
+since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems
+inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine
+will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause,
+depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no
+cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and
+have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient
+cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than
+the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.
+
+_I answer that,_ In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of
+which we must consider that, since the will follows from the
+intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the
+same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that
+understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the
+premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other,
+the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is
+known. If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss
+itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in
+this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by
+understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause;
+and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the
+premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the
+will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the
+means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to
+the understanding.
+
+Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means
+to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the
+means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and
+means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say
+that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by
+one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills
+all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause
+is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands
+the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause
+of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to
+the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not
+will this on account of that.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is
+to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be
+on account of another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite
+causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not
+unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It
+would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as
+primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense
+Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have
+thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being
+utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others,
+the will of God."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all
+effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the
+will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect
+depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that
+God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work,
+and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he
+might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
+cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things
+depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of
+other causes.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Will of God Is Always Fulfilled?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled.
+For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved,
+and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen.
+Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that
+of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all
+good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might
+exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does
+not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may
+be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the
+motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore
+the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the
+secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 113:11): "God hath done all things,
+whatsoever He would."
+
+_I answer that,_ The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In
+proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to
+the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active
+causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although
+a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of
+the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a
+man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the
+same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the
+order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the
+universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and
+if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the
+hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the
+order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly
+escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this
+is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from
+producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal
+things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred
+through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first
+heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all
+things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its
+effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one
+order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by
+sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls
+back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be
+saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted
+application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De
+praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved
+that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish
+saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
+will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
+individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case
+they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be
+saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not
+all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide
+Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not
+of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as
+applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing
+antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.
+
+To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it
+is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
+absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some
+additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent
+consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should
+live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely
+considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a
+murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live
+is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he
+wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be
+hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved,
+but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor
+do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in
+a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in
+themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular
+qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it
+when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is
+meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge
+wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he
+would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a
+qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute
+will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place;
+although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the
+thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is
+directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have
+the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does
+not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but
+does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom
+all good virtually exists.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by
+deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first
+cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could
+in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as
+said above.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Will of God Is Changeable?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is changeable. For the Lord
+says (Gen. 6:7): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever
+repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has
+a changeable will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak
+against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull
+down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil,
+I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them"
+(Jer. 18:7, 8). Therefore God has a changeable will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does
+not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to
+be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a
+changeable will.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as
+said before (A. 3). Therefore He can both will and not will the
+same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is
+changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not
+in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as
+regards His will.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie,
+nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (Num. 23:19).
+
+_I answer that,_ The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this
+point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will
+that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to
+will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for
+the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be
+changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed;
+or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen,
+unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the
+disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will
+regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way
+when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take
+place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it
+becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In
+another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for
+him, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in order
+to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both
+the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (QQ.
+9, A. 1; 14, A. 15). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood
+metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when
+we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so
+without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the
+same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to
+have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so
+far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
+He had made.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal
+cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to
+produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are
+inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the
+divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order
+of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one
+who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
+rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said:
+"Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the
+order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the
+order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will
+conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a
+thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior
+causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not
+being in the designs of the divine and higher cause. Thus He foretold
+to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not
+live" (Isa. 38:1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it
+was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is
+unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of
+God changes, but not His counsel"--that is to say, the counsel of His
+will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be
+understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not
+fulfill what they have threatened.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It does not follow from this argument that God has a
+will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
+change.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute
+necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the
+unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above (A. 3).
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Will of God Imposes Necessity on the Things Willed?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the
+things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
+except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to
+will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its
+effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84)
+"Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder
+it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says
+(Rom. 9:19): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God
+imposes necessity on the things willed.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is
+necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die,
+being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are
+related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they
+have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God
+wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement
+is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
+necessary absolutely.
+
+_On the contrary,_ All good things that exist God wills to be. If
+therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that
+all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will,
+counsel, and all other such things.
+
+_I answer that,_ The divine will imposes necessity on some things
+willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign
+to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary
+causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes
+contingent.
+
+This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
+First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of
+the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause
+is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is
+hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause
+can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if
+the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
+referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the
+divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better
+therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the
+divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect
+follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to
+its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power
+in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in
+accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the
+divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things
+are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in
+the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done
+necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for
+the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has
+attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible
+and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it
+is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects
+willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent
+causes for them, it being His will that they should happen
+contingently.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a
+necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but
+conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a
+thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the divine
+will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills
+to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently
+according to His will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents
+according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by
+the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to
+have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore,
+are absolute necessities.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 8]
+
+Whether God Wills Evils?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that
+exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For
+Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is
+evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should
+exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would
+conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And
+Augustine says (Enchiridion 10, 11): "Out of all things is built up
+the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is
+called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more
+evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when
+contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the
+perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires
+above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
+contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
+exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
+always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the
+cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in
+wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse;
+and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will
+it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it
+is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not
+evil things.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since the ratio of good is the ratio of
+appetibility, as said before (Q. 5, A. 1), and since evil is opposed
+to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought
+for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the
+intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be
+sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in
+each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
+corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some
+other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the
+corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is
+food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means.
+Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the
+deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that
+accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never
+therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless
+the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of
+which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He
+wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another.
+Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of
+right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or
+of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils
+are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
+willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things
+to be naturally corrupted.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some have said that although God does not will evil,
+yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil
+is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This
+they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good
+end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that
+evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil
+is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside
+the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his
+sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of
+the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot
+therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the
+statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done,
+since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it
+accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty
+of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore
+Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the
+universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists
+not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone
+wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so
+opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills
+evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit
+evil to be done; and this is a good.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 10]
+
+Whether God Has Free-Will?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in
+a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He
+who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having
+free-will, can be inclined to either side."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by
+which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has
+been said (A. 9). Therefore there is not free-will in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit
+divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free
+choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."
+
+_I answer that,_ We have free-will with respect to what we will not of
+necessity, nor by natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not
+appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals,
+that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by
+free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but
+other things not necessarily, as shown above (A. 3), He has free
+will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but
+only as regards the inclination to sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the
+divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown, it is
+manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can
+make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing
+to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can
+will to sit down, and not will to sit down.
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 11]
+
+Whether the Will of Expression Is to Be Distinguished in God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be
+distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things,
+so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine
+wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine
+will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the
+mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the
+expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with
+that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are
+superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine
+will.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The will of God is one, since it is the very
+essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the
+words of Ps. 110:2: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out
+according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be
+taken for the will.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some things are said of God in their strict sense;
+others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before
+(Q. 13, A. 3). When certain human passions are predicated of the
+Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the
+effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is
+signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus
+with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment
+becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is
+signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the
+same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes
+metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a
+precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a
+divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in
+the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (Matt.
+6:10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that
+anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary
+meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him
+properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper
+sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper
+sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically
+taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will
+is called will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done,
+unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know,
+unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to
+knowledge, but to will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as
+being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the
+usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus
+punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called
+anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in
+ourselves.
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 12]
+
+Whether Five Expressions of Will Are Rightly Assigned to the Divine
+Will?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that five expressions of will--namely,
+prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission--are not
+rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God
+bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in
+us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes
+permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the
+Scripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct
+from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be
+comprehended in the will of expression.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures
+in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in
+them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational
+creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one
+division, not being of one order.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good
+happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by
+the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It
+is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of
+evil--namely, prohibition--and two--namely, counsel and precept--in
+the case of good.
+
+_I answer that,_ By these signs we name the expression of will by
+which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may
+show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of
+another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either
+directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when
+he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is
+his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing
+of a thing; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental
+mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He
+declares his will by means of another when he orders another to
+perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept,
+and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of
+counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the
+same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will,
+as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and
+prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of
+Matt. 6:10: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That
+permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from
+Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the
+Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually
+doing it."
+
+Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time,
+permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good.
+Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept
+to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of
+supererogation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will
+about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that
+mean the same thing. Hence there is no reason why the same thing
+should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of
+prohibition or permission.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His
+will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said
+to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing
+to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good
+pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the
+same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not;
+both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the
+future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will;
+the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and
+for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are
+assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to
+act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved
+by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are
+concerned with these.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees
+in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to
+evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the
+other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness,
+since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the
+fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and
+there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these
+are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not
+only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the
+avoiding of lesser evils.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 20
+
+GOD'S LOVE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of
+God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves
+both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the
+habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like.
+Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His
+justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether love exists in God?
+
+(2) Whether He loves all things?
+
+(3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?
+
+(4) Whether He loves more the better things?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Love Exists in God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God
+there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not
+in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually
+divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed
+to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to
+Him.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting
+and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is
+simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "God is love" (John 4:16).
+
+_I answer that,_ We must needs assert that in God there is love:
+because love is the first movement of the will and of every
+appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every
+appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper
+objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of
+the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object
+secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the
+acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be
+prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to
+sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior
+to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is
+naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first
+directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular
+and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and
+appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy and
+delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope
+regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good
+universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the
+first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other
+appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For
+nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good
+that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to
+the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other
+things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first
+principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there
+must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is
+also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (Q. 19, A.
+1), and hence we must attribute love to Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except through the
+medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal
+reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated
+in _De Anima_ iii, 58, 75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite,
+or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the
+sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the
+proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore
+always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change
+affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De
+part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals.
+Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have
+annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts
+of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight
+are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective
+appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they
+are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by
+an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He
+loves without passion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be
+distinguished a certain material element--namely, the bodily
+change--and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the
+appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,
+63, 64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the
+heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards
+the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is
+implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in
+sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger,
+which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and
+joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be
+attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1);
+neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection
+be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of
+effects, as already show (Q. 3, A. 2, ad 2; Q. 19, A. 11). Whereas,
+those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be
+properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to
+Him, as said before (Q. 19, A. 11).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An act of love always tends towards two things; to the
+good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since
+to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we
+love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible,
+union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in
+God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for
+Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as
+above shown (Q. 6, AA. 1, 3). And by the fact that anyone loves
+another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it
+were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as
+done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates
+another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again
+the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to
+others; yet it implies no composition in God.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Loves All Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For
+according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover
+outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object
+of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed
+outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is
+inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from
+God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love
+anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it
+is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other
+than Himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, love is twofold--the love, namely, of desire, and
+the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures
+with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself.
+Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship
+with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2).
+Therefore God does not love all things.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the
+workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and
+loved. Therefore God does not love all things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things
+that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."
+
+_I answer that,_ God loves all existing things. For all existing
+things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a
+thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it
+possesses. Now it has been shown above (Q. 19, A. 4) that God's will
+is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing
+has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by
+God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since
+to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it
+is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we
+love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of
+things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we
+will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but
+conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our
+love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and
+receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our
+actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass
+into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the
+beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works
+for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of
+the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the
+cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed
+outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although creatures have not existed from eternity,
+except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God
+has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason
+has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know
+things existing in themselves.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational
+creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one
+with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or
+ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to
+them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational
+creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the
+intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking,
+therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of
+friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He
+orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is
+not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His
+goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a
+thing for others as well as for ourselves.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved
+under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners
+in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and
+have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not
+existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from
+God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Loves All Things Equally?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is
+said: "He hath equally care of all" (Wis. 6:8). But God's providence
+over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He
+loves all things equally.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence
+does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does
+not therefore love some things more than others.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His
+knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things
+more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither
+therefore does He love some things more than others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all
+things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and
+of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son
+Himself."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a
+twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the
+part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In
+this way God does not love some things more than others, because He
+loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and
+always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a
+person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that
+one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our
+will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God
+loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause
+of goodness in things, as has been said (A. 2), no one thing would be
+better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than
+for another.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God is said to have equally care of all, not because by
+His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers
+all things with a like wisdom and goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love on the
+part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the
+good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence.
+Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do
+not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God
+may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with
+respect to God's love.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 4]
+
+Whether God Always Loves More the Better Things?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better
+things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human
+race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He
+loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but
+delivered Him up for us all" (Rom. 8:32). Therefore God does not
+always love more the better things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of
+man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (Ps. 8:6).
+But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said:
+"Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham
+He taketh hold" (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love more
+the better things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ
+more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying:
+"Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ
+loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says,
+commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By
+this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not
+that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest."
+Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since
+repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after
+shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since
+He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that
+there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance,
+more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (Luke 15:7).
+Therefore God does not always love more the better things.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the
+predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since
+He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not
+always love more the better things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Everything loves what is like it, as appears from
+(Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing
+is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more
+loved by God.
+
+_I answer that,_ It must needs be, according to what has been said
+before, that God loves more the better things. For it has been shown
+(AA. 2, 3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing
+else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's
+will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some
+things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater
+good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole
+human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe:
+because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that
+is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything
+of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the
+salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious
+conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," according
+to Isa. 9:6.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God
+in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that
+nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the
+Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it
+with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and
+of glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of
+an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are
+found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But
+as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore
+did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely
+speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as
+the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick
+servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in
+various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the
+active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the
+contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious
+of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently
+desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves
+more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it
+does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.
+
+Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore
+was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care
+of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was
+loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his
+care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more
+with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved
+more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter
+is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and
+fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain
+marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others,
+on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved
+Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more,
+from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the
+better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better,
+and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass
+judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the
+weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding
+and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better
+and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal,
+innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to
+rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often
+penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence
+Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
+battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and
+bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has
+never done a brave deed."
+
+Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are
+more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as
+conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a
+hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a
+king.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things,
+the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according
+to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness.
+According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the
+divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is
+better; although according to some other time he is the worse;
+because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 21
+
+THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (In Four Articles)
+
+After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and
+mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there is justice in God?
+
+(2) Whether His justice can be called truth?
+
+(3) Whether there is mercy in God?
+
+(4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Justice in God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is
+divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God:
+neither therefore does justice.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does
+not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh
+all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).
+Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But
+God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice
+cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards
+the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to
+God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 10:8): "The Lord is just, and hath
+loved justice."
+
+_I answer that,_ There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in
+mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds
+of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls
+commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of
+business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says:
+"Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Rom.
+11:35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive
+justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank
+deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any
+kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the
+order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in
+effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says
+(Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in
+seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the
+condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and
+with the powers that properly belong to it."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the
+passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and
+daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only
+metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (Q. 20,
+A. 1), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which
+is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those
+virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with
+works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and
+magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in
+the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these
+virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as
+are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,
+8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of
+the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His
+wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in
+accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does
+according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do
+according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power,
+God is a law unto Himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is
+directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the
+servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause.
+In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or
+necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order
+has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is
+directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to
+substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby
+all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations
+debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to
+creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God
+that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom
+require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's
+justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself
+what is due to Himself. It is also due to a created thing that it
+should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have
+hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God
+exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by
+its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the
+former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it
+according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays
+each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not
+directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice,
+therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment
+of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on
+either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): "When Thou dost punish the
+wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou
+dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its
+being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of
+a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always
+regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to
+act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason
+it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the
+general to the special.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Justice of God Is Truth?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For
+justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13),
+it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect,
+as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore
+justice does not appertain to truth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),
+truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not
+appertain to the idea of justice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ it is said (Ps. 84:11): "Mercy and truth have met
+each other": where truth stands for justice.
+
+_I answer that,_ Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as
+said above (Q. 16, A. 1). Now the mind, that is the cause of the
+thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse
+is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things.
+When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth
+consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in
+ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our
+words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or
+measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the
+mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in
+accordance with his art.
+
+Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice
+related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice,
+which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His
+wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth.
+Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the
+reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are
+governed according to the law, it resides in the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this
+passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed
+such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign
+with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its
+cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Mercy Can Be Attributed to God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For
+mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14).
+But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot
+remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13):
+"If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself."
+But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His
+words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ it is said (Ps. 110:4): "He is a merciful and
+gracious Lord."
+
+_I answer that,_ Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen
+in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which
+it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful
+[misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum
+cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though
+it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the
+misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of
+mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to
+God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery,
+whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not
+removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the
+primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). It
+must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains
+not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality,
+and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of
+perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown
+above (Q. 6, AA. 1, 4); in so far as perfections are given to things
+in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been
+already said (A. 1); in so far as God does not bestow them for His
+own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to
+liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God expel
+defects, it belongs to mercy.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an
+affection of passion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His
+justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who
+pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one
+hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or
+mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence
+committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a
+gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one
+another, as Christ has forgiven you" (Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear
+that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness
+thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy exalteth itself above judgement"
+(James 2:13).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 4]
+
+Whether in Every Work of God There Are Mercy and Justice?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and
+justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the
+justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation
+of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that
+hath not done mercy" (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work of God
+do mercy and justice appear.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to
+justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rom. 15).
+Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which
+is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of
+mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose
+something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing.
+Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 24:10): "All the ways of the Lord
+are mercy and truth."
+
+_I answer that,_ Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's
+works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect.
+Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only
+defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is
+opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because
+since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to
+God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking
+in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord
+with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have
+said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him
+in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion
+wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all
+God's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the
+work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to
+creatures, except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown.
+Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of
+something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we
+must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine
+will--which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to
+possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his
+rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is
+on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at
+its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the
+power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as
+the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second
+causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness
+bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is
+proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for
+preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers;
+because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no
+proportion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain
+others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in
+others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen,
+which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in
+punishing short of what is deserved.
+
+In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits
+sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that
+love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she
+hath loved much" (Luke 7:47).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion
+of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in
+the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the
+Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises
+made to the fathers.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just
+in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in
+them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God.
+As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils that press on us
+in this world force us to go to God."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe;
+yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way
+too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production
+of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and
+goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of
+creatures from non-existence to existence.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 22
+
+THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD
+(In Four Articles)
+
+Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must
+now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect
+and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things;
+predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these
+acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation.
+For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves,
+comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem
+to belong. Concerning God's providence there are four points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?
+
+(2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?
+
+(3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all
+things?
+
+(4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things
+foreseen?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Providence Can Suitably Be Attributed to God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For
+providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of
+prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
+vi, 5, 9, 18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never
+has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence
+cannot belong to God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is
+not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that
+are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29).
+Therefore there is no providence in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence
+seems to be something composite, because it includes both the
+intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, Father,
+governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O
+Father, governeth it.']."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For
+all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as
+was shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). In created things good is found not
+only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order
+towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said
+above, is the divine goodness (Q. 21, A. 4). This good of order
+existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however,
+God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves
+that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear
+from what has gone before (Q. 19, A. 4), it is necessary that the
+type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the
+divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is,
+properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence,
+to which two other parts are directed--namely, remembrance of the
+past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the
+remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present,
+we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things
+towards an end whether in regard to oneself--as for instance, a man
+is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of
+life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city or
+kingdom; in which sense it is said (Matt. 24:45), "a faithful and wise
+servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way
+prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God
+Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the
+last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in
+God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that
+"Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler;
+which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to
+the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the
+order of parts in the whole.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9, 10),
+"Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has
+rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. I-II, Q. 57,
+A. 6]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from
+the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful,
+nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards
+an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God,
+according to Ps. 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass
+away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God.
+Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of
+things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any
+inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to
+which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: "Who
+worketh all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Two things pertain to the care of providence--namely,
+the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition;
+and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the
+first is eternal, and the second is temporal.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes
+the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done
+for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the
+moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed
+towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do
+with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the
+divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one
+and the same thing, as we have said above (Q. 19).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Everything Is Subject to the Providence of God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine
+providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then
+everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And
+thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far
+as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils
+existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not
+omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require
+providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.
+vi, 5, 9, 10, 11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent
+concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, then, many
+things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to
+providence.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to
+the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God
+in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and
+left him in the hand of his own counsel" (Ecclus. 15:14). And
+particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to
+the desires of their heart" (Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore,
+cannot be subject to divine providence.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God doth not care
+for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the
+same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under
+the care of divine providence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from
+end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).
+
+_I answer that,_ Certain persons totally denied the existence of
+providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the
+world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things
+only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their
+individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this
+respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job
+22:14): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our
+things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses,
+however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on
+account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in
+reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the
+opinion of the others.
+
+We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine
+providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual
+selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an
+end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the
+causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the
+effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference
+towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than,
+and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who
+is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent
+principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles;
+not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible.
+Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily
+directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things
+that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg. 'Those powers that are, are
+ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas
+often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt,
+ordinata sunt.']" (Rom. 13:1). Since, therefore, as the providence of
+God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an
+end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things,
+inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject
+to divine providence. It has also been shown (Q. 14, AA. 6, 11) that
+God knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His
+knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge
+of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under
+His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the
+ordering of that art.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is a difference between universal and particular
+causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not
+the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a
+particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of
+some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented
+from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular
+causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that
+any effect should take place outside the range of that universal
+cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular
+cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that
+cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no
+effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the
+meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance
+circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has
+purposely sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the
+one knows not about the other.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular
+thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular
+provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far
+as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little
+defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered.
+Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be
+contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the
+plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields
+to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the
+corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it
+is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides
+universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit
+certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the
+universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much
+good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live,
+if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience
+of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine
+says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to
+exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to
+produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account
+of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were
+persuaded to consider corruptible things--e.g. casual and evil
+things--as removed from the care of divine providence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural
+things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human
+providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from
+necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the
+author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those
+who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence,
+attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and
+others of the ancients.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: When it is said that God left man to himself, this does
+not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that
+he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one
+effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon
+as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of
+themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like
+rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which
+these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is
+significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since the
+very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily
+follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must
+be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included
+under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause.
+God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more
+excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything
+happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that
+love God, all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). But from
+the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin,
+He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His
+providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they
+were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the
+reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of
+divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Since a rational creature has, through its free will,
+control over its actions, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 10), it is
+subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something
+is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it
+accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way,
+the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that
+individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence;
+as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Has Immediate Providence Over Everything?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God has not immediate providence over all
+things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be
+attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he
+should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his
+subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence
+over all things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an
+end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it
+appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore
+every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If
+therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all
+secondary causes would be withdrawn.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better
+to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile
+things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But
+whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not
+immediate providence over bad and vile things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Job 34:13): "What other hath He
+appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He
+made?" On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He
+ruleth the world which He Himself hath made."
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things belong to providence--namely, the type of
+the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of
+this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these,
+God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His
+intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever
+causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to
+produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the
+type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain
+intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs things inferior by
+superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of
+the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is
+imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by
+Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a
+threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity,
+Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus
+over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes.
+The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can
+be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who
+circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which
+move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence,
+over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic
+philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De
+Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who
+execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of
+those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in
+himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it
+considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God's immediate provision over everything does not
+exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of
+His order, as was said above (Q. 19, AA. 5, 8).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is better for us not to know low and vile things,
+because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and
+higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because
+the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This
+does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one
+glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Providence Imposes Any Necessity on Things Foreseen?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon
+things foreseen. For every effect that has a _per se_ cause, either
+present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity;
+as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God,
+since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of
+necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore
+divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he
+can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He
+assigns the stability of necessity to things provided.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the
+immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes
+by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that
+providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt
+nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some
+things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose
+any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.
+
+_I answer that,_ Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things;
+not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs
+to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which
+is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things
+themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were
+not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine
+providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared
+for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity;
+for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency,
+according to the nature of their proximate causes.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The effect of divine providence is not only that
+things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by
+necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence
+ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and
+of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of
+divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The order of divine providence is unchangeable and
+certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been
+foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That indissolubility and unchangeableness of
+which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which
+fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but
+they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember
+that properly speaking "necessary" and "contingent" are consequent
+upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of
+contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally
+for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for
+some particular order of things.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 23
+
+OF PREDESTINATION
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of
+predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there
+are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?
+
+(2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the
+predestined?
+
+(3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?
+
+(4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is
+to say, the predestined are chosen?
+
+(5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or
+reprobation, or election?
+
+(6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will
+infallibly be saved?
+
+(7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?
+
+(8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the
+saints?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Men Are Predestined by God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by God, for
+Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that
+God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows
+all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But human merit
+and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts
+by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not
+predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done away.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine
+providence, as was said above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). But other creatures
+are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men.
+But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there
+never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine
+says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose to take pity
+[miserendi]" [*See Q. 22, A. 3]. Therefore men are not predestined.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by
+the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1
+Cor. 2:12): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but
+the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given
+us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since
+predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be
+made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 8:30): "Whom He predestined,
+them He also called."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is fitting that God should predestine men. For
+all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Q. 22,
+A. 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their
+end, as was also said (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). The end towards which
+created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all
+proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life
+eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of
+every creature, as shown above (Q. 12, A. 4). The other end, however,
+is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can
+attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot
+attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed
+thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards
+a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of
+eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The
+reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of
+the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be
+providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be
+done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done.
+Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature
+towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to
+destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination,
+as regards its objects, is a part of providence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition of
+necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined
+towards one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will
+malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not
+excluded by Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which
+exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly
+said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in
+respect of any other end.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to
+men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not
+take its species from the term _wherefrom_ but from the term
+_whereto._ Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of
+making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow
+or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of
+predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the
+state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring
+of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown
+previously (Q. 21, AA. 3, 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Even if by a special privilege their predestination
+were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed
+to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would
+despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Predestination Places Anything in the Predestined?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that predestination does place something in the
+predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore
+predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the
+predestined.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined,"
+etc. (Rom. 1:4): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination,
+of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is
+predestination but the destination of one who is?" Therefore
+predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places
+something in the predestined.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But
+predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine
+says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something
+in the predestined.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of
+eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the
+definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation
+of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore
+predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is
+in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that
+"predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But
+foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who
+foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who
+predestines, and not in the predestined.
+
+_I answer that,_ Predestination is not anything in the predestined;
+but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that
+predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not
+anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the
+provider, as was proved above (Q. 22, A. 1). But the execution of
+providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the
+thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is
+clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some
+persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The
+execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the
+predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is
+the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:30):
+"Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He
+also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Actions passing out to external matter imply of
+themselves passion--for example, the actions of warming and cutting;
+but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and
+willing, as said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 18, A. 3, ad 1).
+Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does
+not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes
+out to external things, has an effect in them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone
+to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone
+actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a
+mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we
+are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In
+this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not to do any
+unlawful things for the love of life" (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus
+destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination,
+however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be
+attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever
+way destination is accepted.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to
+passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to
+action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is
+predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare
+itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to
+be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination,
+conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Grace does not come into the definition of
+predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch
+as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect,
+and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that
+predestination is anything temporal.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Reprobates Any Man?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody
+reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wis.
+11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the
+things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for
+reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as
+predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the
+cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will
+likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false.
+For it is said (Osee 13:9): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy
+help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate any man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot
+avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is
+said (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can
+correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to
+any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not
+reprobate anyone.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Malachi 1:2,3): "I have loved Jacob, but
+have hated Esau."
+
+_I answer that,_ God does reprobate some. For it was said above (A.
+1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence,
+however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which
+are subject to providence, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2). Thus, as
+men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it
+likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from
+that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a
+part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation,
+so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn
+aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only
+foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was
+said above (Q. 22, A. 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the
+will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will
+to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of
+damnation on account of that sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He
+wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them
+all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular
+good--namely, eternal life--He is said to hate or reprobated them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Reprobation differs in its causality from
+predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in
+the future life by the predestined--namely, glory--and of what is
+received in this life--namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not
+the cause of what is in the present--namely, sin; but it is the cause
+of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned
+in the future--namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from
+the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace.
+In this way, the word of the prophet is true--namely, "Destruction is
+thy own, O Israel."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the
+power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the
+reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as
+implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility:
+as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), that the predestined must
+necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do
+away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated
+by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or
+that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is
+rightly imputed to him as guilt.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Predestined Are Chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his
+rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the
+goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through
+a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any
+selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to
+predestination.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination
+from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore,
+some are predestined without election.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills
+all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination which
+ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Eph. 1:4): "He chose us in Him before
+the foundation of the world."
+
+_I answer that,_ Predestination presupposes election in the order of
+reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that
+predestination, as stated above (A. 1), is a part of providence. Now
+providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect
+directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved
+above (Q. 22, A. 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless
+the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of
+some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that
+God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and
+love:--love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of
+eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated
+above (Q. 20, AA. 2 ,3):--election, inasmuch as He wills this good to
+some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated
+above (A. 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in
+God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not
+cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already
+exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in
+us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will,
+by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that
+good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that
+love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes
+predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election
+and love.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general
+be considered, God communicates His goodness without election;
+inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His
+goodness, as we said above (Q. 6, A. 4). But if we consider the
+communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it
+without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He
+does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory
+election is implied.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make
+a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the
+choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens
+in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Q. 20, A.
+2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are
+chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will,
+which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent
+will, which is to will simply.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Foreknowledge of Merits Is the Cause of Predestination?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of
+predestination. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew,
+He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 9:15: "I will
+have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to
+him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart." Therefore
+it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will,
+which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the
+purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17).
+But there can be no other reason for predestination than the
+foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of
+predestination.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "There is no injustice in God" (Rom. 9:14). Now
+it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all
+men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality
+in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore
+God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and
+reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and
+demerits.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): "Not by works of
+justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us."
+But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved.
+Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of
+predestination.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since predestination includes will, as was said
+above (A. 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the
+same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above
+(Q. 19, A. 5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on
+the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part
+of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of
+something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that
+merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the
+predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the
+effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same
+thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of
+predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
+
+Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of
+predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing
+merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought
+that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to
+the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them
+in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts
+this opinion where he says (Rom. 9:11,12): "For when they were not
+yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of
+Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the
+younger."
+
+Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and
+cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that
+the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from
+God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was
+granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning
+by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the
+saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that "we are not sufficient to
+think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of
+action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it
+cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the
+effect of predestination.
+
+And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination
+are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God
+gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because
+He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a
+king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make
+good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between
+that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as
+if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that
+what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be
+considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in
+the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the
+reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of
+predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from
+free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction
+between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For
+the providence of God produces effects through the operation of
+secondary causes, as was above shown (Q. 22, A. 3). Wherefore,
+that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must
+say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in
+a twofold light--in one way, in particular; and thus there is no
+reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or
+cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous
+effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason
+of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the
+disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to
+give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace
+to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be
+considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the
+effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming
+from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation,
+is all included under the effect of predestination; even the
+preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by
+divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): "convert
+us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination
+has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its
+reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed
+as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving
+principle.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of
+conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was
+explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of
+God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular
+effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already
+stated.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and
+reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus
+He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the
+divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary
+that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be
+manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in
+themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for
+the completion of the universe there are required different grades of
+being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe.
+That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God
+allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was
+said above (Q. 22, A. 2). Let us then consider the whole of the
+human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest
+His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means
+of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he
+reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the
+reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle
+refers, saying (Rom. 9:22, 23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath
+[that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known,
+endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath,
+fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on
+the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Tim.
+2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and
+silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor,
+but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and
+reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence
+Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another
+He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus
+too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary
+matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God
+from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of
+earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature.
+Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form,
+and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from
+the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part
+of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some
+stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on
+this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares
+unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary
+to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted
+as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given
+gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases
+(provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of
+justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is
+thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?"
+(Matt. 20:14,15).
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Predestination Is Certain?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because
+on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy
+crown," (Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another
+will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown
+which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost.
+Therefore predestination cannot be certain.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible
+follows. But it is possible that one predestined--e.g. Peter--may
+sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that
+the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not
+impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do
+now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined.
+Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore
+predestination is not certain.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also
+predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and
+preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will
+most certainly be freed."
+
+_I answer that,_ Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes
+effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its
+effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above (A.
+1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things
+subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from
+contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which
+divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of
+providence is infallible, as was shown above (Q. 22, A. 4). So also
+the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not
+destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency.
+Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will
+(Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 19, A. 4) must also be taken into consideration;
+since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they
+themselves are most certain and infallible.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in two
+ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his
+crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a
+certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal
+sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he
+takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall,
+without raising others; according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in
+pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their
+stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels;
+and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for
+another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen
+in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has
+done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by
+himself or by others.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although it is possible for one who is predestinated
+considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible,
+supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence
+it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as stated
+above (A. 4): and the fact that God wills any created thing is
+necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the
+immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so
+the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to
+say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has
+predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely
+speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty
+of predestination is not destroyed.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Number of the Predestined Is Certain?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not
+certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain.
+But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it
+seems; for it is written (Deut. 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number
+many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who
+belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not
+certain.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to
+salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged
+by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained
+by God cannot be certain.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of
+nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of
+things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the
+saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more
+saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Matt. 7:13,14: "For
+wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and
+many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait
+is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!"
+Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not
+certain.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number
+of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor
+diminished."
+
+_I answer that,_ The number of the predestined is certain. Some have
+said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were
+to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be
+saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the
+certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above (A. 6).
+Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is
+certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be
+observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to
+God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows
+how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain
+and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His
+deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which
+we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as
+is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite
+(Q. 7, AA. 2 ,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in
+his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts,
+which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the
+whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but
+only on account of something else, he does not select any definite
+number _per se_; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are
+necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder
+thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite
+number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite
+measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a
+definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are
+sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we
+consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His
+effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the
+universe, and what number would befit the essential parts of that
+universe--that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in
+perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and
+how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are
+not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a
+secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved
+through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of
+individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not
+pre-ordained by God _per se_; but divine providence produces just so
+many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all
+creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of
+the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who
+attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the
+ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God;
+not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal
+pre-ordination.
+
+It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the
+reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of
+the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rom.
+8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so
+many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were
+angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God.
+It is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number
+for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of
+the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to
+those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present
+righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not
+the number of the predestined.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must be
+judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the
+reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things,
+or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the
+principal parts to the good of the whole universe.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The good that is proportionate to the common state of
+nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the
+minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be
+found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is
+clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the
+guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to
+be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound
+knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect
+to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision
+of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far
+as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin,
+those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however,
+appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation,
+from which very many in accordance with the common course and
+tendency of nature fall short.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Predestination Can Be Furthered by the Prayers of the Saints?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the
+prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything
+temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making
+something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore,
+since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as
+to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not
+furthered by the prayers of the saints.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of
+defective knowledge, so there is no need of help except through
+defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when
+He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the Spirit of the
+Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath
+been His counsellor?" (Rom. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot
+be furthered by the prayers of the saints.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered.
+But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it
+cannot be furthered by anything.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his
+wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to
+conceive" (Gen. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and
+he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if
+he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by
+the prayers of the saints.
+
+_I answer that,_ Concerning this question, there were different
+errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said
+that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain
+salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the
+predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal
+salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy
+Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.
+
+Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through
+prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who
+thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be
+frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the
+authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel
+will not spare and will not be moved to repentance" (1 Kings 15:29);
+and that "the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance"
+(Rom. 11:29).
+
+Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are
+to be considered--namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As
+regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered
+by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that
+anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is
+said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good
+works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not
+do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order
+of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural
+effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are
+directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those
+effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined
+by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards
+salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's
+own prayers or those of another; or other good works, and such like,
+without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the
+predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through
+these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this
+reason it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure
+your calling and election" (2 Pet. 1:10).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument shows that predestination is not
+furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one
+way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus
+belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are
+to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" In another
+way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out
+his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by
+us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "We
+are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the
+power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order
+that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also
+that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first
+universal cause, as has been said above (Q. 19, A. 6), indeed, they
+execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by
+creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 24
+
+THE BOOK OF LIFE
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is the book of life?
+
+(2) Of what life is it the book?
+
+(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Book of Life Is the Same As Predestination?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as
+predestination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life"
+(Ecclus. 4:32)--i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss.
+This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is
+not predestination.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book
+of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each
+one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy
+belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power.
+Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the
+book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a
+book of death, as there is a book of life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, "Let them be
+blotted out of the book of the living," "This book is the knowledge
+of God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew."
+
+_I answer that,_ The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical
+sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual
+among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed
+in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly
+were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding
+(Q. 23, A. 4) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess
+eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined is
+called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written
+upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory,
+according to Prov. 3:3: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My
+commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy
+heart." For things are written down in material books to help the
+memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers
+that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of
+life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done,
+so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be
+brought to eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: "The sure
+foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth
+who are His."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses. In
+one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we
+now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of
+those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life;
+and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus
+the Old and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things
+already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to
+each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the
+book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether
+it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service;
+or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.
+
+Hence the solution of the Second Objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are
+rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death
+corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Predestination and the book of life are different
+aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of
+predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Book of Life Regards Only the Life of Glory of the
+Predestined?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard
+the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the
+knowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other
+life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine
+life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does
+the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory
+is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life
+of nature be so called.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not
+chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: "Have
+not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" (John 6:71). But
+the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated
+above (A. 1). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The book of life is the knowledge of
+predestination, as stated above (ibid.). But predestination does not
+regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory;
+for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain
+glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the
+life of glory.
+
+_I answer that,_ The book of life, as stated above (A. 1), implies a
+conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is
+chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and
+again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a
+soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to
+fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is
+directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as
+said above (Q. 23, A. 1). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of
+life regards the life of glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is
+natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in
+consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen
+to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are
+consequent on nature.
+
+From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is
+no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of
+something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen
+to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed
+to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain
+glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise
+they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but
+relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and
+knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life,
+according to their participation in grace.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Anyone May Be Blotted Out of the Book of Life?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of
+life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge,
+which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be
+taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.
+Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the
+disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal
+and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not
+in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But
+nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither
+therefore can he be blotted out.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book
+of the living" (Ps. 68:29).
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have said that none could be blotted out of the
+book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For
+it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when
+it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of
+life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of
+the present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes
+evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen
+from that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted
+out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted out
+of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the
+book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the
+text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white
+garments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life" (Apoc.
+3:5) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the
+opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and
+not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the
+opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life
+is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is
+directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which
+direction never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this
+very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails
+sometimes; because some are directed by possessing grace, to obtain
+eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore
+those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine
+predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because
+they are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are
+never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are
+ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but
+through grace, are said to be written in the book of life not simply,
+but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life
+in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said
+to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be
+referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it
+not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first
+ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls
+from grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of
+life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any
+change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves
+they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of
+the book of life refers.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the
+book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew;
+either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have
+relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included
+in the knowledge of God, although not anew.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 25
+
+THE POWER OF GOD
+(In Six Articles)
+
+After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things
+pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God.
+About this are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there is power in God?
+
+(2) Whether His power is infinite?
+
+(3) Whether He is almighty?
+
+(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?
+
+(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?
+
+(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Power in God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter
+is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary
+matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the
+first agent--namely, God--is devoid of power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19),
+better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter;
+and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is
+better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as
+was shown above (Q. 3, A. 3). Therefore, there is no power in
+God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine
+power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and
+of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no
+power in God.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it was shown above (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4) that
+God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and
+principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to
+assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth
+is round about Thee" (Ps. 88:9).
+
+_I answer that,_ Power is twofold--namely, passive, which exists not
+at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
+degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act
+and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas
+everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now
+it was shown above (Q. 3, A. 2; Q. 4, AA. 1, 2), that God is pure
+act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection
+find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active
+principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand,
+the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For
+active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas
+passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else,
+as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that
+in God there is active power in the highest degree.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded
+upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive
+power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is
+potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active
+power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler
+than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for both
+are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His
+essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in
+God nobler than His power.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of
+action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is
+retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however,
+as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence
+itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding,
+inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all
+perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either
+under the notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is
+understood under the notion of _suppositum_ possessing nature, and
+under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in
+God in so far as it is the principle of an effect.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Power is predicated of God not as something really
+distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them
+logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting
+into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,
+which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the
+knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle,
+has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of
+the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His
+power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Power of God Is Infinite?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For
+everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher
+(Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore
+it is not infinite.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise
+it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it
+could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the
+power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause
+instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous
+movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal
+creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20, 22,
+23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is
+immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is
+immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), active power exists in God
+according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is
+infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it,
+as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of
+the divine essence (Q. 7, A. 1). Wherefore, it is necessary that
+the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it
+found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts
+the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
+greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite
+power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the
+divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown
+above (Q. 7, A. 1) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in
+regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs
+to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above
+(Q. 7, A. 1); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow,
+therefore, that it is imperfect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in
+its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to
+do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does
+not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for
+example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the
+production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear
+that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either
+in species or in genus, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 5; Q. 4, A. 3).
+Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It
+is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be
+manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were
+to produce no effect, the power of God would not be ineffectual;
+because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to
+which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered toward
+its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect
+produced by it.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body
+had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he
+shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it
+can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his
+reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would
+move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover.
+The reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal
+agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made
+known in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving
+body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that
+if its power were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster,
+and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is
+not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of
+its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time;
+and especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of
+its will.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Is Omnipotent?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and
+passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God,
+for He is immovable, as was said above (Q. 2, A. 3). Therefore He
+is not omnipotent.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin,
+nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is
+not omnipotent.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence
+"especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after
+Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power
+is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however,
+than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world,
+and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of
+this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of
+this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those
+things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it
+would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in
+reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges
+them; but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were
+omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore
+impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also
+the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to
+exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in
+things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility.
+Therefore God is not omnipotent.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God"
+(Luke 1:37).
+
+_I answer that,_ All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems
+difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for
+there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we
+say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter
+aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this
+phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that
+God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is
+said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v,
+17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to
+some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be
+possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in
+which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be
+omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to
+created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If,
+however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all
+things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle
+in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying
+nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He
+is able to do.
+
+It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do
+all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of
+saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or
+impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very
+terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not
+incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely
+impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the
+subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.
+
+It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an
+effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing
+possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on
+which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving
+warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of
+being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of
+power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus
+of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being.
+Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered
+among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is
+called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except
+non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the
+same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,
+within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under
+the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,
+but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
+Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is
+numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is
+called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not
+come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have
+the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things
+cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to
+the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God."
+For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no
+intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active
+power, not to passive power, as was shown above (A. 1). Whence the
+fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His
+omnipotence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to
+be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is
+repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin,
+because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says
+(Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this
+must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is
+impossible--as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil
+things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional
+proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and
+consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a
+donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God
+can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He
+did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the
+common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like
+Jupiter or Mercury.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and
+having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has
+supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one
+who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
+will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them
+on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate
+effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (Q. 21, A.
+4), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the
+divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of
+something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the
+divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it
+pertains the first foundation of all good things.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The absolute possible is not so called in reference
+either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to
+itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible
+in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it
+belongs to God alone to do immediately--as, for example, to create,
+to justify, and the like--are said to be possible in reference to a
+higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be
+done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those
+inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the
+proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was
+shown above (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the
+world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it
+judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence
+of God does not take away from things their impossibility and
+necessity.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 4]
+
+Whether God Can Make the Past Not to Have Been?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been.
+For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that
+which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is
+impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the
+dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible
+accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible
+accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally
+impossible, from the fact that his running is a thing of the past.
+Therefore God can make the past not to have been.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is
+not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that
+he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that
+he did not run.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity.
+But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost
+virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should
+not have been corrupt.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.): "Although God can
+do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been
+corrupted." Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that
+anything else which is past should not have been.
+
+_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 7, A. 2), there does not
+fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a
+contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a
+contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates
+is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did
+not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the
+past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen.
+Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the
+scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says
+(Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him
+make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to
+say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very
+fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
+2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived--namely, to make undone
+the things that have been done."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not
+to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for
+instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is
+considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not
+only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction.
+Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which
+there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible
+in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for
+such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine
+power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His
+power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we
+regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do,
+He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature
+of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short
+of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God
+said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be
+done.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from
+a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot
+be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having
+sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 5]
+
+Whether God Can Do What He Does Not?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For
+God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would
+do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything
+except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is
+right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is
+it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do
+except what He does.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and
+befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting
+them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except
+what He does.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My
+Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of
+angels?" (Matt. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His
+Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He
+does not.
+
+_I answer that,_ In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some
+laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as
+from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually
+takes place--as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come,
+and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation
+there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than
+that which now is. But we showed above (Q. 19, A. 3) that God
+does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of
+all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity
+determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present
+course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other
+things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power
+is restricted to this present course of events through the order of
+the divine wisdom and justice without which God does nothing. But
+since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His
+wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the
+divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the
+divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the
+order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion
+of His justice consists, as said above (Q. 21, A. 2), is not so
+adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be
+restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the
+whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is
+taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things
+made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some
+definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all
+proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so
+restricted to any particular order that no other course of events
+could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other
+things than those He has done.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct
+from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will
+from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the
+just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence,
+will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence,
+there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His
+just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will
+cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things,
+except upon supposition, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), neither are
+the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as
+was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the
+divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the
+order which He has place in things. Again, because power is
+considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect
+and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered
+in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His
+absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of
+being, as was said above (A. 3). What is, however, attributed to the
+divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a
+just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In
+this manner, we must say that God can do other things by His absolute
+power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But
+it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not
+foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His
+actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination,
+though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things
+because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come
+from His will, but from His nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is
+said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by
+this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself,
+and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood in
+two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they
+would be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern
+His power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense
+is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If,
+however, they be joined directly with the verb "can" (which has the
+effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the
+present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The
+sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything
+except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although this order of things be restricted to what now
+exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence,
+although no other order would be suitable and good to the things
+which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them
+another order.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 6]
+
+Whether God Can Do Better Than What He Does?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For
+whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a
+thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely
+done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8):
+"If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have
+been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better
+things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have
+been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes
+everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better
+than He does.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be
+bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine
+says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and,
+taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists
+the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the
+universe could not be made better by God.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has
+the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created
+happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be
+better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of
+angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore
+make all things better than He has made them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Eph. 3:20): "God is able to do all
+things more abundantly than we desire or understand."
+
+_I answer that,_ The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of
+the essence of it--thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the
+essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better
+than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it;
+even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if
+it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For
+the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the
+manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another
+kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus,
+the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of
+goodness, God can make better the things He has made. Absolutely
+speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing
+made by Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that God can make a thing better than
+He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is
+true. For He can always make something else better than each
+individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better
+than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If,
+however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the
+making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it,
+because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it
+implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better;
+because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of
+existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the
+substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to
+his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of
+anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God.
+Hence the comparison fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The universe, the present creation being supposed,
+cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to
+things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any
+one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed;
+as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody
+of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or
+add something to the present creation; and then there would be
+another and a better universe.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united
+to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the
+fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the
+mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite
+good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything
+better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 26
+
+OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine
+essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this,
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?
+
+(2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act
+of intellect?
+
+(3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?
+
+(4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Beatitude Belongs to God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For
+beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made
+perfect by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of
+goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude
+does not belong to God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue,
+according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply
+to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall
+show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and
+Lord of Lords." (1 Tim. 6:15).
+
+_I answer that,_ Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner.
+For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than
+the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of
+knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to
+which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can
+control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most
+excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess
+intelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of
+composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures
+is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (Q. 4, A. 2; Q. 13,
+A. 4), in simplicity and unity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to
+be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even
+as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so
+far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being,
+though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by
+merit.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Is Called Blessed in Respect of His Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to
+His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to
+be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to
+being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De
+Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to
+His essence, and not to His intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is
+the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is
+said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference
+to His intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory,
+Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be
+in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we
+enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole
+of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem
+that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect. it
+would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His
+intellect.
+
+_I answer that,_ Beatitude, as stated above (A. 1), is the perfect
+good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires
+the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to
+be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is
+the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps
+everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists
+in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the
+same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them.
+Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His
+intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blessed [beati] by
+reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not
+that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His
+essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the
+will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power.
+Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the
+act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of
+the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the
+intellect.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Is the Beatitude of Each of the Blessed?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the
+blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (Q. 6, AA. 2,
+4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme
+goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (Q. 11, A. 3).
+Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be
+the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God
+Himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational
+nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to
+God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The beatitude of one is greater than that of
+another, according to 1 Cor. 15:41: "Star differeth from star in
+glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is
+something different from God.
+
+_I answer that,_ The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in
+an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely,
+the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act
+itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on
+the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is
+blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance
+with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who
+knoweth Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of
+understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures;
+but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good
+absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is
+their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a
+creature can participate.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: End is twofold, namely, _objective_ and _subjective,_
+as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing
+itself" and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its
+acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational
+creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as
+the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 4]
+
+Whether All Other Beatitude Is Included in the Beatitude of God?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all
+other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing
+false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace
+all other beatitudes.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists
+in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none
+of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His
+beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine
+perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above
+(Q. 4, A. 2). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other
+beatitudes.
+
+_I answer that,_ Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether
+true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the
+divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a
+continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things
+else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the
+whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight,
+riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.
+iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His
+delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency,
+which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence;
+for dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He
+possesses the admiration of all creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it
+falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God.
+But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the
+whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal
+manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.
+
+We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of
+the divine essence.
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ. 27-43)
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 27
+
+THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS
+(In Five Articles)
+
+Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it
+remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God.
+And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other
+according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads
+us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession;
+secondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.
+
+Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there is procession in God?
+
+(2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?
+
+(3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides
+generation?
+
+(4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?
+
+(5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Procession in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God.
+For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing
+mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession
+in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence
+it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme
+simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the
+nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as
+shown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Therefore in God there is no procession.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Our Lord says, "From God I proceeded" (John 8:42).
+
+_I answer that,_ Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which
+signify procession. This procession has been differently understood.
+Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its
+cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father
+as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
+Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the
+Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what
+is said of the Son, "That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is
+true God" (1 John 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, "Know you
+not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?" (1 Cor.
+6:19). Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this
+procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it,
+or impressing its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood
+by Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming
+flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost
+in sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words
+of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, "The
+Son cannot of Himself do anything" (John 5:19); while many other
+passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the
+Son. Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take
+procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms
+procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession
+always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession
+corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be
+an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the
+agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of
+which remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by
+the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us,
+which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing
+from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that
+object. This conception is signified by the spoken word; and it is
+called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice.
+
+As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God,
+not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but
+from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual
+substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short
+in the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not
+to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local
+movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect,
+as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot.
+Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for
+example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet
+remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands
+procession as existing in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This objection comes from the idea of procession in the
+sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, or
+to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not exist in
+God, as we have explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is
+necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas,
+whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not
+necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the
+more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is
+clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the
+intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent;
+since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with
+the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very
+supreme perfection of God (Q. 14, A. 2), the divine Word is of
+necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without
+any kind of diversity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be something
+outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the
+idea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform procession
+by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first
+principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house,
+in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and it
+would be included in the idea of the first principle were the builder
+the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first principle of
+all things, may be compared to things created as the architect is to
+things designed.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Any Procession in God Can Be Called Generation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called
+generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence,
+and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both.
+Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist
+in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an
+intelligible mode, as above explained (A. 1). But such a process is
+not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called
+in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, anything that is generated derives existence from
+its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But
+no derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the
+divine existence is self-subsisting (Q. 3, A. 4), it follows that no
+generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is
+no generation in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 2:7): "This day have I begotten
+Thee."
+
+_I answer that,_ The procession of the Word in God is called
+generation. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a
+twofold meaning: one common to everything subject to generation and
+corruption; in which sense generation is nothing but change from
+non-existence to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs
+to living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living
+being from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called
+birth. Not everything of that kind, however, is called begotten; but,
+strictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a
+hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship, but only that has
+which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice;
+for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of
+generation and sonship, although it has a generic similitude; for
+this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by
+way of similitude in the same specific nature; as a man proceeds from
+a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed
+from potential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation
+includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is a being
+whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if
+found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of
+generation; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs
+to living things. So in this manner the procession of the Word in God
+is generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which
+is a vital operation:--from a conjoined principle (as above
+described):--by way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the
+intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:--and exists in the
+same nature, because in God the act of understanding and His
+existence are the same, as shown above (Q. 14, A. 4). Hence the
+procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word
+Himself proceeding is called the Son.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This objection is based on the idea of generation in
+the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to
+act; in which sense it is not found in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the
+substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds
+within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the
+source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be
+properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence
+is the very substance itself of the one who understands (Q. 14, A.
+4). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same
+nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture
+employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to
+signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and
+birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths
+were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was
+brought forth." (Prov. 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the
+word "conception" in order to signify that in the word of our
+intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although
+there be no identity of nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Not everything derived from another has existence in
+another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance
+of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could
+receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God
+receives its existence from the generator, not as though that
+existence were received into matter or into a subject (which would
+conflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His
+existence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine
+existence from another; not, however, as if He were other from the
+divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the divine existence
+are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle
+of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection (Q. 4, A. 2).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Any Other Procession Exists in God Besides That of the Word?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no other procession exists in God
+besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we
+admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and
+so on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the
+first, and hold that there exists only one procession in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of
+self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity
+from their terms. But procession in God is only by way of
+communication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one
+divine nature (Q. 11, A. 4), it follows that only one procession
+exists in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if any other procession but the intelligible
+procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the
+procession of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a
+procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the
+intellect, inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect
+(Q. 19, A. 1). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the
+procession of the Word.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (John
+15:26); and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, "I
+will ask My Father, and He will give you another Paraclete" (John
+14:16). Therefore in God another procession exists besides the
+procession of the Word.
+
+_I answer that,_ There are two processions in God; the procession of the
+Word, and another.
+
+In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God,
+only according to an action which does not tend to anything external,
+but remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual
+nature is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of
+the Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the
+will within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love,
+whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the
+word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent.
+Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him
+another procession called the procession of love.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine
+processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the
+agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the
+will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All that exists in God, is God (Q. 3, AA. 3, 4);
+whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine
+nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward, and
+this does not apply to other natures.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Though will and intellect are not diverse in God,
+nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the
+processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order.
+For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the
+procession of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless
+it is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order
+of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the
+substance of the intellect and its concept are the same; so, although
+in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as
+love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the
+concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the
+procession of love and the procession of the Word in God.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Procession of Love in God Is Generation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is
+generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among
+living things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in
+God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it
+would be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external
+procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds
+as generated and born.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does
+it belong to love. Hence it is said, that "every beast loves its
+like" (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by
+way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of
+generation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So
+if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some
+special name besides this common name of procession. But no other
+name is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love
+in God is generation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost
+Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the
+statement of Athanasius: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the
+Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding."
+
+_I answer that,_ The procession of love in God ought not to be called
+generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect
+and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual
+by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the
+intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of
+the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination
+to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of
+similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets
+its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of
+similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an
+object.
+
+So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten,
+or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a
+certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described
+as moved or impelled by love to perform an action.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All that exists in God is one with the divine nature.
+Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one
+procession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of
+this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must be
+taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is
+derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each
+procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and
+intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really
+is; and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives the
+divine nature, but is not said to be born.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to
+love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object
+understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator;
+but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness,
+but because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not
+follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the
+principle of love.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: We can name God only from creatures (Q. 13, A. 1). As
+in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of
+nature, procession in God has no proper or special name, except that
+of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has
+remained without a special name; but it can be called spiration, as
+it is the procession of the Spirit.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 5]
+
+Whether There Are More Than Two Processions in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions
+in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power.
+Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will,
+it seems that there must also be a third procession of power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of
+procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there
+must be a procession of goodness in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than
+in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but
+there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also
+from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more
+than two processions.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In God there are not more than two who
+proceed--the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him
+but two processions.
+
+_I answer that,_ The divine processions can be derived only from
+the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is
+intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the
+acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also
+appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the
+intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from
+the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected
+by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no
+other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word,
+and of Love.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on
+another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the
+divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but
+is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to
+the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the
+object of the will.
+
+Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain
+actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to
+goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love,
+according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and
+goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As above explained (Q. 14, A. 5; Q. 19, A. 5), God
+understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He
+wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of
+Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one
+perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His
+perfect fecundity.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 28
+
+THE DIVINE RELATIONS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there are real relations in God?
+
+(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are
+extrinsic to it?
+
+(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from
+each other?
+
+(4) The number of these relations.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Are Real Relations in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God.
+For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), "All possible predicaments used as
+regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be
+predicated relatively." But whatever really exists in God can be
+predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "Relation in the
+Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is
+the relation of the same to the same." But a relation of this kind is
+only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in
+reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real
+relations, but are formed only by the mind.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a
+principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not
+import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity
+in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same
+reason to the other relations in God.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an
+intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of
+the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and
+filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical
+relations.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Father is denominated only from paternity;
+and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or
+filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really
+Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is
+the Sabellian heresy.
+
+_I answer that,_ relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we
+may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only
+in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any
+other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in
+their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a
+subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what
+refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the
+nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature
+are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such
+relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found
+an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the
+heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same
+applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another,
+signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of
+reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation
+only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the
+species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of
+the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of
+procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real
+relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in
+the identity of the same nature, as above explained (Q. 27, AA. 2,
+4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are
+necessarily real relations.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according to its
+proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper
+meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but
+only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not
+wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was
+not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in
+Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of
+relation to another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is a
+logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing;
+because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by
+reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some
+two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are
+called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically.
+Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity,
+not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance
+is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation
+of identity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of
+nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any
+relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not
+produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect
+and will, as is above explained (Q. 14, AA. 3, 4; Q. 19, A. 8).
+Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas
+in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are
+contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails
+dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in
+one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Relations which result from the mental operation alone
+in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as
+reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the
+mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the
+intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding
+and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only,
+but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are
+real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them
+intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds
+from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations
+in God.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Relation in God Is the Same As His Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as
+the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that "not all that
+is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things
+relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not
+refer to the substance." Therefore the relation is not the divine
+essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, "every relative
+expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is
+a man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in God,
+there must be something else besides relation in God. This can only
+be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to
+another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the
+divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially
+itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the
+perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and
+self-subsisting (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore relation is not the divine
+essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Everything which is not the divine essence is a
+creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the
+divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of
+latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the
+distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on
+this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims.
+For he said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally
+affixed.
+
+To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of
+the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is
+the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident;
+which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for
+the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is
+the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart
+from that of _relation,_ as in quantity and quality, even the true
+idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for
+quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the
+disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken
+from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to
+something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations
+formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and
+not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect
+which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something
+else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in
+a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree
+considered relation in the former mode only.
+
+Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered
+as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no
+accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as
+relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really
+existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way
+distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to
+something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to
+its opposite term.
+
+Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the
+same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility;
+as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not
+expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God
+relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and
+the same.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or
+any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same
+as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode
+of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a
+relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since
+other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken,
+both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that
+exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of
+whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by
+reason of God's supreme simplicity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the relation which exists in creatures involves not
+only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same
+applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the
+creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of
+relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God
+there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is
+not perfectly expressed by the word "relation," as if it were
+comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above
+explained (Q. 13, A. 2), in treating of the divine names, that more
+is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be
+signified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in
+God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various
+names imposed by us.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is
+signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect,
+being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing
+more were contained in it than what is signified by the word
+"wisdom," it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the
+perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included in
+any name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other name
+applied to God signify something imperfect, that the divine essence
+is in any way imperfect; for the divine essence comprehends within
+itself the perfection of every genus (Q. 4, A. 2).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Relations in God Are Really Distinguished from Each Other?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really
+distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with
+the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God
+is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are
+not really distinguished from each other.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished
+from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this
+kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine
+goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real
+distinction of paternity and filiation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of
+origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another.
+Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God "the substance
+contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity." Therefore,
+if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there
+would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is
+the error of Sabellius.
+
+_I answer that,_ The attributing of anything to another involves the
+attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when "man" is
+attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him.
+The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to
+another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in
+God there is a real relation (A. 1), there must also be a real
+opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes
+distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not,
+indeed, according to that which is absolute--namely, essence, wherein
+there is supreme unity and simplicity--but according to that which is
+relative.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument
+holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are
+identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as,
+for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ
+logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is
+the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow
+that action and passion are the same; because action implies
+reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing
+moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is
+from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is
+really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in
+their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence
+they are distinguished from each other.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition in
+their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or
+proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed
+according to the procession of one from another.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 3]
+
+Whether in God There Are Only Four Real Relations--Paternity,
+Filiation, Spiration, and Procession?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real
+relations--paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it
+must be observed that in God there exist the relations of the
+intelligent agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to
+the object willed; which are real relations not comprised under those
+above specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in
+God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming
+from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible
+relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore
+in God there exists an infinite series of real relations.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal (Q. 15, A. 1); and are only
+distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things, as
+above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal relations.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations:
+and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations
+are eternal in God than the above named.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are
+fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to the
+Philosopher (Phys. iii text 24), "It is the same way from Athens to
+Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens." By the same way of reasoning there
+is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity,
+and from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are
+not four relations in God.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every
+relation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on
+action and passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son,
+the master and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity
+in God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin.
+i, 1) it follows that a real relation in God can be based only on
+action. Such relations are not based on the actions of God according
+to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to
+creatures are not real in Him (Q. 13, A. 7). Hence, it follows that
+real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those
+actions according to which there are internal, and not external,
+processions in God. These processions are two only, as above
+explained (Q. 27, A. 5), one derived from the action of the
+intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action
+of the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these
+processions two opposite relations arise; one of which is the
+relation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is
+the relation of the principle Himself. The procession of the Word is
+called generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is
+applied to living things. Now the relation of the principle of
+generation in perfect living beings is called paternity; and the
+relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called
+filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own
+(Q. 27, A. 4); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper
+name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession
+is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is
+called procession: although these two names belong to the processions
+or origins themselves, and not to the relations.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In those things in which there is a difference between
+the intellect and its object, and the will and its object, there can
+be a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the willer
+to the object willed. In God, however, the intellect and its object
+are one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God
+understands all other things; and the same applies to His will and
+the object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds of
+relations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to
+itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real relation;
+because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible
+action; and not as a thing understood. For when we understand a
+stone; that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood,
+is called the word.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely
+multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act, and by
+another act understands that he understands the stone, and again by
+another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of
+understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the
+relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He
+understands all things by one act alone.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it
+does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in
+God; but that God knows these many relations.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real relations;
+but are only logical relations (Q. 42, A. 3, ad 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The way from one term to another and conversely is the
+same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we
+cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the
+same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of
+something absolute, if there were such between them.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 29
+
+THE DIVINE PERSONS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the
+processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the
+persons.
+
+First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then
+comparatively as regards each other. We must consider the persons
+absolutely first in common; and then singly.
+
+The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four
+points:
+
+(1) The signification of this word "person";
+
+(2) the number of the persons;
+
+(3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto;
+as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and
+
+(4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons.
+
+Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:
+
+(1) The definition of "person."
+
+(2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.
+
+(3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?
+
+(4) What does it signify in Him?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 1]
+
+The Definition of "Person"
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by
+Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient--that is, "a person is an
+individual substance of a rational nature." For nothing singular can
+be subject to definition. But "person" signifies something singular.
+Therefore person is improperly defined.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of
+person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the
+former, the word "individual" is superfluous, because first substance
+is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word
+"individual" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since
+second substances are the genera or species. Therefore this
+definition is incorrect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the
+definition of a thing. For to define a man as "a species of animal"
+would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing,
+and species is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is
+the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational
+nature), the word "individual" which is an intentional name comes
+improperly into the definition.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, "Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in
+those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally," as
+Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as
+in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word "nature" ought not to
+enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be
+"essence."
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of
+the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not
+properly defined as above.
+
+_I answer that,_ Although the universal and particular exist in every
+genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs
+to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself;
+whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the
+substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because
+it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the
+individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their
+own; for they are called "hypostases," or first substances.
+
+Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and
+the individual are found in the rational substances which have
+dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act,
+like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to
+singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have
+a special name even among other substances; and this name is "person."
+
+Thus the term "individual substance" is placed in the definition of
+person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the
+term "rational nature" is added, as signifying the singular in
+rational substances.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although this or that singular may not be definable,
+yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined;
+and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a
+definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines
+person.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some, the term "substance" in the
+definition of person stands for first substance, which is the
+hypostasis; nor is the term "individual" superfluously added,
+forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of
+universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in
+general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a
+part. But where "individual" is added, the idea of assumptibility is
+excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person,
+since it is assumed by a greater--that is, by the Word of God. It is,
+however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general
+sense, as divided into first and second, and when "individual" is
+added, it is restricted to first substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at
+least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental
+differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say
+that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are
+the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise,
+terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if
+used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term
+"individual" is placed in the definition of person to signify the
+mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the word
+"nature" was first used to signify the generation of living things,
+which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes
+from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the
+intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines
+"nature" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either
+formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature.
+And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the
+essence of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called
+nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says
+(De Duab. Nat.) that, "nature is the specific difference giving its
+form to each thing," for the specific difference completes the
+definition, and is derived from the special form of a thing. So in
+the definition of "person," which means the singular in a determined
+genus, it is more correct to use the term "nature" than "essence,"
+because the latter is taken from being, which is most common.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and so,
+although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains
+its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance,
+which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand
+nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name
+of person belongs to it.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 2]
+
+Whether "Person" Is the Same As Hypostasis, Subsistence, and Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that "person" is the same as "hypostasis,"
+"subsistence," and "essence." For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that
+"the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by
+the name hypostasis." But this with us signifies "person." Therefore
+"person" is altogether the same as "hypostasis."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we say
+there are three subsistences in God; which implies that "person" and
+"subsistence" have the same meaning. Therefore "person" and
+"subsistence" mean the same.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek _ousia,_
+which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and form.
+Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual
+substance called "hypostasis" and "person." Therefore all the
+aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning.
+
+Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that genera
+and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only
+subsistent, but also substand. But subsistences are so called from
+subsisting, as substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding.
+Therefore, since genera and species are not hypostases or persons,
+these are not the same as subsistences.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that matter is called
+hypostasis, and form is called _ousiosis_--that is, subsistence. But
+neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person
+differs from the others.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance
+is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified
+by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the
+substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the
+Greeks _ousia,_ what we may call "essence." In another sense
+substance means a subject or _suppositum,_ which subsists in the
+genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be
+applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called
+_suppositum._ It is also called by three names signifying a
+reality--that is, "a thing of nature," "subsistence," and
+"hypostasis," according to a threefold consideration of the substance
+thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is
+called "subsistence"; as we say that those things subsist which exist
+in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common
+nature, it is called "a thing of nature"; as, for instance, this
+particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the
+accidents, it is called "hypostasis," or "substance." What these
+three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this
+name "person" signifies in the genus of rational substances.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Among the Greeks the term "hypostasis," taken in the
+strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the
+genus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the
+individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of
+that nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As we say "three persons" plurally in God, and "three
+subsistences," so the Greeks say "three hypostases." But because the
+word "substance," which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to
+"hypostasis," is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it
+sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to
+avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use
+"subsistence" for hypostasis, rather than "substance."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by
+the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the
+species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed
+of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only
+the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as
+the principles of the species. But what is composed of this matter
+and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For soul,
+flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this
+flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore
+hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of
+essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed
+of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine
+simplicity (Q. 3, A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch
+as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact
+that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament
+of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves
+subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the
+species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To
+substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation
+to the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The individual composed of matter and form substands in
+relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius
+says (De Trin.): "A simple form cannot be a subject." Its
+self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does
+not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to
+the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account,
+therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and _ousiosis,_ or
+subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of
+substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Word "Person" Should Be Said of God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the name "person" should not be said
+of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): "No one should ever dare to
+say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity,
+beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles." But the
+name "person" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament.
+Therefore "person" is not to be applied to God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "The word person
+seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies
+and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando],
+since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the
+mask. These "persons" or masks the Greeks called _prosopa,_ as they
+were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes."
+This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense.
+Therefore the word "person" is only applied to God metaphorically.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word
+"hypostasis" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab.
+Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not
+exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, "in this word
+hypostasis, poison lurks in honey." Therefore the word "person"
+should not be said of God.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing
+defined is also denied of it. But the definition of "person," as
+given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a
+discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above
+(Q. 14, A. 12); and thus God cannot be said to have "a rational
+nature." And also because God cannot be called an individual
+substance, since the principle of individuation is matter; while God
+is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called
+a substance. Therefore the word "person" ought not to be attributed
+to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In the Creed of Athanasius we say: "One is the person
+of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost."
+
+_I answer that,_ "Person" signifies what is most perfect in all
+nature--that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence,
+since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch
+as His essence contains every perfection, this name "person" is
+fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures,
+but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving
+them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when
+treating of the names of God (Q. 13, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the word "person" is not found applied to God
+in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what
+the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of
+Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the
+most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in
+the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one
+could speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or
+New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to
+find new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a
+kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for
+it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle
+warns us to avoid "profane novelties of words" (1 Tim. 6:20).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although this name "person" may not belong to God as
+regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs
+to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented
+in comedies and tragedies, the name "person" was given to signify
+those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the
+Church came to be called "persons." Thence by some the definition of
+person is given as "hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity." And
+because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity,
+therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a
+"person." Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other
+dignity; and thus the name "person" pre-eminently belongs to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The word "hypostasis" does not apply to God as regards
+its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it
+applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify
+the subsistence. Jerome said that "poison lurks in this word,"
+forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the
+heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess
+many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the
+word "substance," which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is
+commonly taken amongst us to mean essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It may be said that God has a rational _nature,_ if
+reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general
+sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an
+"individual" in the sense that His individuality comes from matter;
+but only in the sense which implies incommunicability. "Substance"
+can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence.
+There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius,
+quoted above (A. 1), is not a definition of person in the sense we
+use when speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor
+amends this definition by adding that "Person" in God is "the
+incommunicable existence of the divine nature."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 4]
+
+Whether This Word "Person" Signifies Relation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God,
+does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin.
+vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing
+else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to
+Himself, and not in regard to the Son."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to essence. But, as
+Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness in
+heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked,
+Three what? the answer is, Three persons." Therefore person signifies
+essence.
+
+Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a
+word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: "The
+individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated.
+Therefore "person" signifies substance.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation,
+but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation,
+it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that
+refers to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to
+person more strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore
+this word "person" signifies relation.
+
+_I answer that,_ A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this
+word "person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally
+of the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the
+essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words
+which express relation.
+
+Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses
+absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and this word
+"Wise"; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by
+conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and
+especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing
+adjective; as when we say, "Three persons," or, "one is the person of
+the Father, another of the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular,
+it may be either absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a
+satisfactory explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its
+own signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that
+forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from the heretics
+being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this,
+others maintained that this word "person" in God signifies both the
+essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies
+directly the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as "person"
+means as it were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to
+the essence. And what is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for
+the Father is understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct
+from the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it
+signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in
+the definition of "person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly;
+and these come nearer to the truth.
+
+To determine the question, we must consider that something may be
+included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included
+in the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of
+"man," and not in the meaning of "animal." So that it is one thing to
+ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning
+when the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the
+meaning of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the
+meaning of "person" as applied to God. For "person" in general
+signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The
+individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others.
+Therefore "person" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that
+nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and
+this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which,
+though not belonging to "person" in general, nevertheless do belong to
+the meaning of a particular human person.
+
+Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above
+(Q. 28, AA. 2, 3), while relation in God is not as an accident in
+a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent,
+for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so
+the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person.
+Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this
+is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a
+hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that
+which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus
+it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly,
+and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as
+expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly
+the essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is
+the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed
+as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into
+the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this
+signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it
+was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as
+any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express
+relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word
+"person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the
+first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This word "person" is said in respect to itself, not to
+another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way
+of a substance--which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says
+that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same
+as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are
+the same.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature
+expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we
+answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the
+_suppositum,_ as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A
+fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In God the individual--i.e. distinct and incommunicable
+substance--includes the idea of relation, as above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The different sense of the less common term does not
+produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass
+have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally
+in animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both.
+So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the
+signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a
+human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though
+neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said
+univocally of God and creatures (Q. 13, A. 5).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 30
+
+THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there are several persons in God?
+
+(2) How many are they?
+
+(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?
+
+(4) The community of the term "person."
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Are Several Persons in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God.
+For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature." If then
+there are several persons in God, there must be several substances;
+which appears to be heretical.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a
+distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less
+therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God
+there is no plurality but of relations (Q. 28, A. 3). Therefore
+there cannot be several persons in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is
+truly one which has no number." But plurality implies number.
+Therefore there are not several persons in God.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus,
+if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and
+part in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father,
+another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost." Therefore the Father,
+and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.
+
+_I answer that,_ It follows from what precedes that there are several
+persons in God. For it was shown above (Q. 29, A. 4) that this
+word "person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine
+nature. It was also established (Q. 28, A. 1) that there are
+several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are
+also several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means
+that there are several persons in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The definition of "person" includes "substance," not as
+meaning the essence, but the _suppositum_ which is made clear by the
+addition of the term "individual." To signify the substance thus
+understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis." So, as we say,
+"Three persons," they say "Three hypostases." We are not, however,
+accustomed to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean
+three essences or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification
+of the term.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness and
+wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they really
+distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist,
+nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities--that is,
+several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not
+subsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as
+whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties
+in God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other (Q. 28,
+A. 3). Hence the plurality of persons in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every
+kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations.
+Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations
+do not import composition in that of which they are predicated, as
+Boethius teaches in the same book.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and three
+and four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men and
+two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly,
+there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him, and
+thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding; forasmuch as
+number regarded apart from things numbered exists only in the
+intellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things numbered, in
+that sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of
+three, as one man is part of two men, and two of three; but this does
+not apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the
+whole Trinity, as we shall show further on (Q. 42, AA. 1, 4).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Are More Than Three Persons in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in
+God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of
+the relative properties as stated above (A. 1). But there are four
+relations in God as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), paternity, filiation,
+common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four persons in
+God.
+
+Obj. 2: The nature of God does not differ from His will more than
+from His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, as
+love; and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another
+proceeds from His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds
+from His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not
+only three persons in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior
+operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond other
+animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God
+not only is there a person proceeding from the will, and another from
+the intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore
+there are an infinite number of persons in God.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that
+He communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine
+person. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore
+the Holy Ghost produces a divine person; and that person another; and
+so to infinity.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is measured,
+for number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense, as we
+say in the Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son is
+immense, the Holy Ghost is immense." Therefore the persons are not
+contained within the number three.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said: "There are three who bear witness in
+heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" (1 John 5:7). To
+those who ask, "Three what?" we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii,
+4), "Three persons." Therefore there are but three persons in God.
+
+_I answer that,_ As was explained above, there can be only three
+persons in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are
+the several subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But
+a real distinction between the divine relations can come only from
+relative opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs
+refer to two persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must
+needs belong to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation
+are opposite relations, they belong necessarily to two persons.
+Therefore the subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and
+the subsisting filiation is the person of the Son. The other two
+relations are not opposed to each other; therefore these two cannot
+belong to one person: hence either one of them must belong to both of
+the aforesaid persons; or one must belong to one person, and the
+other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to the Father and
+the Son, or to either of them; for thus it would follows that the
+procession of the intellect, which in God is generation, wherefrom
+paternity and filiation are derived, would issue from the procession
+of love, whence spiration and procession are derived, if the person
+generating and the person generated proceeded from the person
+spirating; and this is against what was laid down above (Q. 27, AA.
+3, 4). We must consequently admit that spiration belongs to the
+person of the Father, and to the person of the Son, forasmuch as it
+has no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and
+consequently that procession belongs to the other person who is
+called the person of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as
+above explained. Therefore only three persons exist in God, the
+Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of them,
+spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the
+Son, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not
+called a property, because it does not belong to only one person; nor
+is it a personal relation--i.e. constituting a person. The three
+relations--paternity, filiation, and procession--are called personal
+properties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the
+person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession
+is the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word,
+proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way
+of nature; thus, as above explained (Q. 27, A. 3), the procession of
+the divine Word is the very same as generation by way of nature. But
+love, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it
+proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being divine; and
+therefore the procession of love is not called generation in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more
+intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is
+something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more
+simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no
+imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one
+real operation--that is, His essence. How there are in Him two
+processions was above explained (Q. 27, AA. 1, 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed
+another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for then if
+the Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost
+also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and the
+same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by
+the personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as
+derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle
+of its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not
+allow the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation
+of principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds
+from the other persons who are in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple number,
+existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a
+number of things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of
+measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three persons is
+the same (Q. 42, AA. 1, 4), and the same is not measured by the same.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Numeral Terms Denote Anything Real in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something
+real in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every
+number is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God
+signifies the essence; and therefore it denotes something real in
+God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to
+God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral terms
+denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in
+God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as
+plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality;
+it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and
+obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be
+said that the numeral terms denote something real in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit
+companionship"--that is, plurality--"we exclude the idea of oneness
+and of solitude;" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God,
+unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God."
+Hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove
+something; and not to denote anything positive.
+
+_I answer that,_ The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral
+terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative
+meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.
+
+In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a
+consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and
+is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a
+species of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material
+things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called
+formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of
+division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but
+is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by
+many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things.
+
+Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete
+quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God,
+asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God,
+but remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of
+multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the
+strict sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God
+there is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the
+proper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is
+quantity.
+
+But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from
+number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only
+a metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as
+length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude
+in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to
+the many of which it is predicated, as "one" convertible with "being"
+is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to
+being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the
+divine unity (Q. 11, A. 1); for "one" signifies undivided being.
+So, of whatever we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus,
+for instance, "one" applied to man signifies the undivided nature or
+substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things,
+multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each
+undivided in itself.
+
+But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident
+added to being; as also does "one" which is the principle of that
+number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which
+they are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated
+(Sent. i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D,
+24). So when we say, the essence is one, the term "one" signifies the
+essence undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the
+person undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify
+those persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is of the
+very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more
+general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude;
+hence in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to
+the context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a
+negation of division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained
+above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures,
+is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God:
+unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those
+of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable to
+God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: "One" does not exclude multitude, but division, which
+logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity,
+but division from each of the individuals which compose the
+multitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity (Q.
+11, A. 2).
+
+It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not
+sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude
+is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does
+not follow that these terms express this signification alone. For
+blackness is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness
+does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 4]
+
+Whether This Term "Person" Can Be Common to the Three Persons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to
+the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the
+essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly.
+Therefore it is not common to all three.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable.
+But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as
+appears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (Q. 29, A.
+3, ad 4). Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three
+persons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it is
+common either really, or logically. But it is not so really;
+otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so
+logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is
+neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we
+proved above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore this term 'person' is not common
+to the three.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask,
+"Three what?" we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is
+common to them.
+
+_I answer that,_ The very mode of expression itself shows that this
+term "person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for
+when we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three.
+Now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one
+essence were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one
+person of the three, as also one essence.
+
+What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by
+those who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community
+of exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the
+word "incommunicable." Others thought it to be a community of
+intention, as the definition of person contains the word "individual";
+as we say that to be a species is common to horse and ox. Both of
+these explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is
+not a name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality.
+We must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name
+"person" is common by a community of idea, not as genus or species,
+but as a vague individual thing. The names of genera and species, as
+man or animal, are given to signify the common natures themselves, but
+not the intentions of those common natures, signified by the terms
+genus or species. The vague individual thing, as "some man,"
+signifies the common nature with the determinate mode of existence of
+singular things--that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from
+others. But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that
+which distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates
+signifies this flesh and this bone. But there is this
+difference--that the term "some man" signifies the nature, or the
+individual on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of
+singular things; while this name "person" is not given to signify the
+individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in
+that nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine persons, that
+each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature.
+Thus this name "person" is common in idea to the three divine persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument is founded on a real community.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself
+of incommunicable existence can be common to many.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although this community is logical and not real, yet it
+does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or
+genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the
+community of person the same as community of genus or species; and
+because the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species
+and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in
+being.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 31
+
+OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which
+gives rise to four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Concerning the word "Trinity";
+
+(2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?
+
+(3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can
+be joined to an essential name in God?
+
+(4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Trinity in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name
+in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does
+not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each
+one of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not
+express a name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is
+not to be applied to God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since it
+signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the
+unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God
+there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word
+"trinity" does not apply to God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not
+triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore
+neither is there trinity in God.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the
+divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity
+exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus
+in God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is
+predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the
+Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would
+be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore
+the word trinity is not to be applied to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in
+Unity is to be revered."
+
+_I answer that,_ The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate
+number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires
+that we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately
+signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate
+manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity" seems to
+signify the one essence of the three persons, according as trinity
+may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it rather
+signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this account
+we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three
+persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the
+Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and
+hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to
+another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality
+of the _supposita,_ and a unity of some kind of order. For "people"
+is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the
+first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective words; but
+in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine
+Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is
+unity of essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it
+signifies the threefold number of persons. "Triplicity" signifies a
+proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion,
+according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not
+triplicity, but Trinity.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number
+and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we do
+not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three
+times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature;
+as the _supposita_ of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On
+the other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity"; meaning that the nature is
+in its _supposita._
+
+Reply Obj. 5: When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the
+number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by
+itself; since the word trine imports a distinction in the _supposita_
+of which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity
+is trine; otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there
+would be three _supposita_ of the Trinity; as when we say, "God is
+trine," it follows that there are three _supposita_ of the Godhead.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Son Is Other Than the Father?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father.
+For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If,
+then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the
+Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that
+when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in
+some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the
+Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against
+what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one
+in Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them,
+nor any diversity."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the term alien is taken from _alius_ (other).
+But the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin.
+vii) that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing
+alien, nothing separable." Therefore the Son is not other than the
+Father.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius et
+aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son
+is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing
+apart from the Father.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says:
+"There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which
+the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost
+another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the
+Holy Ghost another."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii.], a
+heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we
+must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as
+Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the
+quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful." Now, in treating of
+the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed
+cautiously between them--namely, the error of Arius, who placed a
+Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of
+Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.
+
+Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms
+diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of
+essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the
+relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or
+"difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of
+"diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction." But lest
+the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the
+terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a
+whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the
+use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid
+the terms "alien" and "discrepant." For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that
+"in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead":
+and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing
+alien, nothing separable."
+
+To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity,"
+lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence
+Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father
+and the Son are separate in Godhead." We must avoid the adjective
+"only" (unici) lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary
+says in the same book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or
+uniqueness." Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is
+no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity
+is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away
+from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De
+Fide i): "What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity
+where there is no difference." The word "solitary" is also to be
+avoided, lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as
+Hilary says (De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a
+diverse God."
+
+This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only
+a distinction of _suppositum_; and hence we can properly say that "the
+Son is other than the Father," because He is another _suppositum_ of
+the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: "Other," being like the name of a particular thing,
+refers to the _suppositum_; and so, there is sufficient reason for
+using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of
+hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in
+the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from
+the Father, although He is another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: "Difference" implies distinction of form. There is one
+form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the form
+of God" (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not
+properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet,
+Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the
+divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by
+way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from
+each other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But
+"difference" is taken for "distinction," as above stated.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The term "alien" means what is extraneous and
+dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and
+therefore we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not
+that He is anything "alien."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is
+formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence is
+properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the
+masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the
+common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this
+man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the _suppositum_;
+whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal
+animal. So, because in God distinction is by the persons, and not by
+the essence, we say that the Father is other than the Son, but not
+something else; while conversely we say that they are one thing, but
+not one person.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Exclusive Word "Alone" Should Be Added to the Essential
+Term in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is
+not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the
+Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another."
+But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we
+cannot say that God is alone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can
+be predicated of every person _per se,_ and of all the persons
+together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say
+the Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But
+Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that
+the Father is not true God alone." Therefore God cannot be said to be
+alone.
+
+Obj. 3: Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an essential
+term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate
+or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is
+false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father; nor,
+again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying
+were true, "God alone creates," it would follow that the "Father
+alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father;
+and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this
+expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal,
+invisible, the only God" (1 Tim. 1:17).
+
+_I answer that,_ This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical
+term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one
+which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given _suppositum_; as, for
+instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." If the term
+"alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any
+term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is
+joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is
+above stated (A. 2). A syncategorematical term imports the order
+of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or
+"no one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other
+_suppositum_ from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone
+writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no
+companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way
+nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term
+in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we
+said "God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints are
+always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist
+in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by
+association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone
+is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are
+with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary,
+though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons
+were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls
+does not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it
+remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not
+affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the
+_suppositum,_ as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it
+qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied
+either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"--that
+is, no one else--"runs: and Socrates runs only"--that is, he does
+nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God
+alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be
+assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who
+alone is God." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is
+that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the
+predicate, and not to the _suppositum._ So, when Augustine says that
+the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he
+speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of
+ages, invisible, the only God," as applying not to the Father, but to
+the Trinity alone.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an
+essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean
+two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the
+Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can
+signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the
+relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a
+univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor,
+does it follow, "therefore the Father alone creates," because, as
+logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is
+joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said
+exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for instance,
+from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot
+conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 4]
+
+Whether an Exclusive Diction Can Be Joined to the Personal Term?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to
+the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord
+speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true
+God" (John 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father" (Matt.
+11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know
+the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion
+follows.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters
+into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not
+exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if
+we say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not
+white," or that "man is not white." But one person is in the
+concept of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and
+conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do
+not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of
+speaking is true.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus
+Christ."
+
+_On the contrary,_ This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes
+two assertions--namely, that the Father is God, and that no other
+besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for
+the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is
+false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.
+
+_I answer that,_ When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a
+proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude
+in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in
+a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways.
+For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is
+true, the sense being "the Father alone is God"--that is, "He who
+with no other is the Father, is God." In this way Augustine expounds
+when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because
+He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they
+are not the Father together with Him." This, however, is not the usual
+way of speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though
+we said "He who alone is called the Father is God." But in the strict
+sense the exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is
+false if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it
+excludes it in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person
+than the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to the
+Holy Ghost. But because this diction "alone," properly speaking,
+refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person rather than
+other things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too
+literally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in
+an authentic work.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not
+understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the
+whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if
+understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not
+excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word
+"only" excludes another thing, as above explained.
+
+The same Reply can be given to Obj. 2. For an essential term applied
+to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of
+the unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted
+the term "no one" [*Nemo = non-homo, i.e. no man] is not the same as
+"no man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person
+of the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the
+usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational
+nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into
+the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not
+differ in _suppositum,_ as part and universal. But the Son differs in
+_suppositum_ from the Father; and so there is no parity.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most
+High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the
+glory of God the Father."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 32
+
+THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons;
+and this involves four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
+
+(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?
+
+(3) The number of the notions?
+
+(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these
+notions?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Trinity of the Divine Persons Can Be Known by Natural
+Reason?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can
+be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of
+God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said
+many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo
+et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"--namely, three--"we bring
+ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all
+things created." And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in
+their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various
+reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with
+God, and the Word was God," and so on; in which passage the
+distinction of persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on
+Rom. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third
+sign--that is, as regards knowledge of a third person--i.e. of the
+Holy Ghost--and thus it is clear that they knew at least two
+persons. Likewise Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and
+reflected upon itself its own heat." By which words the generation of
+the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated.
+Therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural
+reason.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I believe
+without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found
+for any explanation of the truth." So even to prove the Trinity some
+have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who
+communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine
+persons; while some are moved by the consideration that "no good
+thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership." Augustine
+proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11, 12) to prove the trinity of persons
+by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; and we
+have followed him in this (Q. 27, AA. 1, 3). Therefore the trinity of
+persons can be known by natural reason.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be
+known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine
+tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of
+persons can be known by natural reason.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to
+reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind." And Ambrose
+says (De Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of
+generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent." But the trinity of
+the divine persons is distinguished by origin of generation and
+procession (Q. 30, A. 2). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with
+his understanding grasp that for which no necessary reason can be
+given, it follows that the trinity of persons cannot be known by
+reason.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the
+Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained (Q. 12, AA. 4,
+12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason except
+from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as
+effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know
+of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the principle
+of things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in treating
+of God as above (Q. 12, A. 12). Now, the creative power of God is
+common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the
+essence, and not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by
+natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence,
+but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons. Whoever,
+then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason,
+derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of
+faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible
+things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that
+"faith is of things that appear not" (Heb. 11:1), and the same
+Apostle says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the
+wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak
+the wisdom of God in a mystery which is hidden" (1 Cor. 2:6, 7).
+Secondly, as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For
+when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons
+which are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers:
+since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we
+believe on such grounds.
+
+Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by
+authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards
+others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.
+Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists
+the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the
+truth of the word"--i.e. "the sacred word, we too follow this rule."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the
+trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as
+paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's
+words, "We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the
+world"--i.e. the philosophers--"knew" (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless,
+they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the
+persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the
+Holy Ghost; as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, "By this
+number," etc., we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold
+number in God, but that he wished to say that the ancients used the
+threefold number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some
+perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic books also
+we find, "In the beginning was the word," not as meaning the Person
+begotten in God, but as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all
+things, and which is appropriated to the Son. And although they knew
+these were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said to
+have failed in the third sign--that is, in the knowledge of the third
+person, because they deviated from the goodness appropriated to the
+Holy Ghost, in that knowing God "they did not glorify Him as God"
+(Rom. 1); or, because the Platonists asserted the existence of one
+Primal Being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe,
+they consequently maintained the existence of another substance
+beneath him, which they called "mind" or the "paternal intellect,"
+containing the idea of all things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip.
+iv). They did not, however, assert the existence of a third separate
+substance which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not
+assert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which was the
+error of Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists. When
+Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad," etc., this does not refer to
+the generation of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy Ghost, but
+to the production of the world. For one God produced one world by
+reason of His love for Himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a
+point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of
+some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be
+brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform
+velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a
+sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already
+established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in
+astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as
+established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly
+movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were
+sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In the
+first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. In the second
+way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as, when assumed to be true,
+such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity
+of persons is adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident
+when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of God is
+manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an
+act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His
+infinite goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should
+proceed from God: but that according to its own mode and capacity it
+should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that
+joyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds in the
+case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some
+other's good, in order to have the goodness of complete happiness.
+Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God,
+forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally.
+Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we
+arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There are two reasons why the knowledge of the divine
+persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of
+creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word
+excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by
+necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we
+show that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor
+because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of
+His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, "In the beginning God
+created heaven and earth," subjoined, "God said, Let there be light,"
+to manifest the divine Word; and then said, "God saw the light that
+it was good," to show proof of the divine love. The same is also
+found in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly,
+that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race,
+accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Are Notions in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say anything of God
+but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture." But Holy Scripture
+does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in
+God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the
+essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern
+the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither
+can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for
+instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can
+what belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not
+say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore
+there do not exist notions in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions
+as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: for
+they are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely
+simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): "We
+recognize difference of hypostases [i.e. of persons], in the three
+properties; i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional."
+Therefore we must admit properties and notions in God.
+
+_I answer that,_ Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the
+persons, said that in God there were no properties or notions, and
+wherever there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the
+concrete. For as we are accustomed to say, "I beseech your
+kindness"--i.e. you who are kind--so when we speak of paternity in
+God, we mean God the Father.
+
+But, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 3, ad 1), the use of concrete and
+abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine
+simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it.
+Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the
+divine essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human
+intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own
+mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, whence
+its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to
+signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete
+terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by
+abstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their
+subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.
+
+But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in
+the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but
+the same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity
+and Father.
+
+Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the
+obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son, and
+the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask:
+"Whereby are They one God? and whereby are They three persons?" as we
+answer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be
+some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are
+distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an
+abstract term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine
+essence is signified as "What"; and the person as "Who"; and the
+property as "Whereby."
+
+The second motive is because one person in God is related to two
+persons--namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son
+and the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one
+relation; otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy
+Ghost would be related to the Father by one and the same relation.
+Thus, since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow
+that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it
+be said with Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to
+creatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the
+Father is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost;
+whereas these two persons are related to the Father by two relations.
+For, since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to
+another, it must be said that two relations are not specifically
+different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For the
+relation of lord and father must differ according to the difference of
+filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His
+creatures by one specific relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are
+not related to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence
+there is no parity.
+
+Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the
+creature (Q. 28, A. 1, 3); while there is no reason against our
+admitting in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there
+must be a real relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence,
+corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,
+whereby they are related to the Father, we must understand two
+relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to the
+Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is
+necessary that the relations should be separately signified in the
+abstract; and these are what we mean by properties and notions.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy
+Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of
+notions, as the abstract is contained in the concrete.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In God the notions have their significance not after
+the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the
+persons are known; although in God these notions or relations are
+real, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1). Therefore whatever has order to
+any essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions;
+forasmuch as this is against their mode of signification. Hence we
+cannot say that paternity begets, or creates, or is wise, or is
+intelligent. The essentials, however, which are not ordered to any
+act, but simply remove created conditions from God, can be predicated
+of the notions; for we can say that paternity is eternal, or immense,
+or such like. So also on account of the real identity, substantive
+terms, whether personal or essential, can be predicated of the
+notions; for we can say that paternity is God, and that paternity is
+the Father.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the persons are simple, still without
+prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be
+abstractedly signified, as above explained.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Are Five Notions?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are not five notions. For the
+notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are
+distinguished from each other. But the relations in God are only four
+(Q. 28, A. 4). Therefore the notions are only four in number.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called
+one God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called the
+Trine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be
+called quinary; which cannot be allowed.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if there are five notions for the three persons in
+God, there must be in some one person two or more notions, as in the
+person of the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common
+spiration. Either these three notions really differ, or not. If they
+really differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed
+of several things. But if they differ only logically, it follows that
+one of them can be predicated of another, so that we can say that as
+the divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the
+common reality, so common spiration is paternity; which is not to be
+admitted. Therefore there are not five notions.
+
+Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It seems that there are more; because as
+the Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion of
+innascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And
+in this respect there ought to be a sixth notion.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin of
+the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost to
+proceed from the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the
+Father and the Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son
+and to the Holy Ghost.
+
+_I answer that,_ A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine
+Person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their
+origin: and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another
+comes, and of someone that comes from another, and by these two modes
+a person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be
+known by the fact that He is from another; but by the fact that He is
+from no one; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called
+"innascibility." As the source of another, He can be known in two
+ways, because as the Son is from Him, the Father is known by the
+notion of "paternity"; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known
+by the notion of "common spiration." The Son can be known as begotten
+by another, and thus He is known by "filiation"; and also by another
+person proceeding from Him, the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in
+the same way as the Father is known, by "common spiration." The Holy
+Ghost can be known by the fact that He is from another, or from
+others; thus He is known by "procession"; but not by the fact that
+another is from Him, as no divine person proceeds from Him.
+
+Therefore, there are Five notions in God: "innascibility,"
+"paternity," "filiation," "common spiration," and "procession." Of
+these only four are relations, for "innascibility" is not a relation,
+except by reduction, as will appear later (Q. 33, A. 4, ad 3).
+Four only are properties. For "common spiration" is not a property;
+because it belongs to two persons. Three are personal notions--i.e.
+constituting persons, "paternity," "filiation," and "procession."
+"Common spiration" and "innascibility" are called notions of Persons,
+but not personal notions, as we shall explain further on (Q. 40, A. 1,
+ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Besides the four relations, another notion must be
+admitted, as above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The divine essence is signified as a reality; and
+likewise the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions
+are signified as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God
+is one by unity of essence, and trine by trinity of persons,
+nevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since the real plurality in God is founded only on
+relative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they
+are not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor
+again are they predicated of each other, because they are different
+ideas of the persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is
+the attribute of knowledge, although we do say that knowledge is
+power.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Since Person implies dignity, as stated above (Q. 19,
+A. 3), we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact
+that no person is from Him. For this does not belong to His dignity,
+as it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from no one.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special
+mode of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and the Son
+agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the
+principle on which a notion is based must be something special; thus
+no parity of reasoning exists.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Lawful to Have Various Contrary Opinions of Notions?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to have various
+contrary opinions of the notions. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3):
+"No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity": to which
+mystery the notions assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in
+some way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary
+opinions of the notions.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the persons are known by the notions. But no
+contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated. Therefore
+neither can there be about the notions.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The notions are not articles of faith. Therefore
+different opinions of the notions are permissible.
+
+_I answer that,_ Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any
+truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and
+unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning
+these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if
+it be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial
+of it involves as a consequence something against faith; as for
+instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for it
+follows that the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such
+things anyone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy,
+before the matter has been considered or settled as involving
+consequences against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown;
+whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided
+that consequences follow against faith, then the error cannot be free
+from heresy. For this reason many things are now considered as
+heretical which were formerly not so considered, as their consequences
+are now more manifest.
+
+So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about
+the notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with
+faith. If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the
+notions, knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would
+follow, he would lapse into heresy.
+
+By what has been said all the objections may be solved.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 33
+
+OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the
+Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the Father is the Principle?
+
+(2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this
+name "Father"?
+
+(3) Whether "Father" in God is said personally before it is said
+essentially?
+
+(4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Belongs to the Father to Be the Principle?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Father cannot be called the
+principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause
+are the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not
+say that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say
+that He is the principle of the Son.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing
+principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows
+that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which
+appears false.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in
+God there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore
+in speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), "The Father is
+the Principle of the whole Deity."
+
+_I answer that,_ The word "principle" signifies only that whence
+another proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way
+we call a principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one
+whence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Greeks use the words "cause" and "principle"
+indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not
+use the word "cause," but only "principle." The reason is because
+"principle" is a wider term than "cause"; as "cause" is more common
+than "element." For the first term of a thing, as also the first
+part, is called the principle, but not the cause. Now the wider a
+term is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God (Q. 13, A.
+11), because the more special terms are, the more they determine the
+mode adapted to the creature. Hence this term "cause" seems to mean
+diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is
+not implied in the word "principle." For in all kinds of causes there
+is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of
+perfection or of power: whereas we use the term "principle" even in
+things which have no such difference, but have only a certain order
+to each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a
+line; or also when we say that the first part of a line is the
+principle of a line.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son
+and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom
+with our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father
+something of authority by reason of His being the principle, still we
+do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or
+to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this way,
+Hilary says (De Trin. ix): "By authority of the Giver, the Father is
+the greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of
+nature is give."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although this word principle, as regards its
+derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not
+signify priority, but origin. For what a term signifies, and the
+reason why it was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above
+(Q. 13, A. 8).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 2]
+
+Whether This Name "Father" Is Properly the Name of a Divine Person?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not properly
+the name of a divine person. For the name "Father" signifies
+relation. Moreover "person" is an individual substance. Therefore
+this name "Father" is not properly a name signifying a Person.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every
+father begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is
+more properly applied to God, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 11).
+Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and
+genitor than Father.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of
+anyone. But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or
+offspring; and consequently, he of whom is the word, is
+metaphorically called father. Therefore the principle of the Word in
+God is not properly called Father.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of
+God first before creatures. But generation appears to apply to
+creatures before God; because generation seems to be truer when the
+one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not
+only by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name "Father"
+taken from generation does not seem to be the proper name of any
+divine person.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 88:27): "He shall cry out to me:
+Thou art my Father."
+
+_I answer that,_ The proper name of any person signifies that whereby
+the person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and
+soul belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular
+man belong this particular soul and this particular body; and by these
+is this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is
+paternity which distinguishes the person of the Father from all other
+persons. Hence this name "Father," whereby paternity is signified, is
+the proper name of the person of the Father.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So this
+name "father" among us does not signify a person, but the relation of
+a person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for
+in God the relation signified by the name "Father" is a subsisting
+person. Hence, as above explained (Q. 29, A. 4), this name "person"
+in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 49), a
+thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now
+generation signifies something in process of being made, whereas
+paternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the
+name "Father" is more expressive as regards the divine person than
+genitor or begettor.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and
+hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is
+something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly
+and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The terms "generation" and "paternity" like the other
+terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as
+regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of
+signification. Hence also the Apostle says, "I bend my knee to the
+Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and
+on earth is named" (Eph. 3:14). This is explained thus. It is
+manifest that generation receives its species from the term which is
+the form of the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of
+the generator, the truer and more perfect is the generation; as
+univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs
+to the essence of a generator to generate what is like itself in
+form. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of
+the Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in
+creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same,
+shows that generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God
+before creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction
+exists of the Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only,
+belongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 3]
+
+Whether This Name "Father" Is Applied to God, Firstly As a Personal
+Name?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that this name "Father" is not applied to
+God, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common
+precedes the particular. But this name "Father" as a personal name,
+belongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential sense
+it is common to the whole Trinity; for we say "Our Father" to the
+whole Trinity. Therefore "Father" comes first as an essential name
+before its personal sense.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is
+no priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem to be of
+the same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son,
+and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's; since,
+according to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the
+creature and to the Son. Therefore "Father" in God is not taken as an
+essential name before it is taken personally.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not
+a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by reason
+of filiation or generation, according to Col. 1:15: "Who is the image
+of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature." Therefore
+paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same
+concept as, paternity taken essentially.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is
+the Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the
+creature in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal
+sense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the
+creature.
+
+_I answer that,_ A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly
+contained its whole signification, before it is applied to that which
+only partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of
+a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the
+signification of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from
+perfect things. Hence this name "lion" is applied first to the animal
+containing the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so
+called, before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's
+nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of whom it is said
+by way of similitude.
+
+Now it is manifest from the foregoing (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 28, A. 4),
+that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in
+God the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the nature and
+glory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is
+found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator
+and the creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain
+likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach to the
+true idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of some
+creatures, by reason only of a trace, for instance of irrational
+creatures, according to Job 38:28: "Who is the father of the rain? or
+who begot the drops of dew?" Of some, namely, the rational creature
+(He is the Father), by reason of the likeness of His image, according
+to Deut. 32:6: "Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and
+created thee?" And of others He is the Father by similitude of grace,
+and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage
+of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received,
+according to Rom. 8:16, 17: "The Spirit Himself gives testimony to
+our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also."
+Lastly, He is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch
+as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according
+to Rom. 5:2: "We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God."
+Therefore it is plain that "paternity" is applied to God first, as
+importing regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports
+the regard of God to creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our
+intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included in
+the understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the
+concept of the person of the Father, God is understood; but not
+conversely. But common terms which import relation to the creature
+come after proper terms which import personal relations; because the
+person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production
+of creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is
+first understood to proceed from the artist before the thing
+designed, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the
+artist's mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father before the
+creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it
+participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the words
+of Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made
+conformable to the image of His Son."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To "receive" is said to be common to the creature and
+to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote
+similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence
+the authority quoted subjoins: "That He may be the First Born among
+many brethren," after saying that some were conformed to the image of
+the Son of God. But the Son of God possesses a position of
+singularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as
+Basil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only
+begotten (John 1:18): "The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the
+Father, He hath declared unto us."
+
+From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 4]
+
+Whether It Is Proper to the Father to Be Unbegotten?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be
+unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it
+is the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the Father; it
+only removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of
+the Father.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in
+a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not
+begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten;
+neither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also
+to the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be
+taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies imperfection
+in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that the
+Person of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify relation,
+for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance;
+therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son,
+Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance.
+Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since,
+then, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there
+is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another.
+Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, as the Father is the principle of the person
+begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his
+opposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be
+unbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to be
+unproceeding.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "One is from one--that
+is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten--namely, by the property in
+each one respectively of innascibility and origin."
+
+_I answer that,_ As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary
+principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before
+or after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the
+Father; and the principle from a principle, Who is the Son.
+
+Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one
+way as the first _principle,_ by reason of its having a relation to
+what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a _first_
+principle by reason of its not being from another. Thus therefore the
+Father is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards
+the persons proceeding from Himself. But as the principle, not from a
+principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another; and
+this belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word
+"begotten."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some there are who say that innascibility, signified by
+the word "unbegotten," as a property of the Father, is not a negative
+term only, but either that it means both these things
+together--namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the
+principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also
+His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem
+true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct
+from paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is
+included in the common. For source and authority signify in God
+nothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with
+Augustine (De Trin. v, 7) that "unbegotten" imports the negation of
+passive generation. For he says that "unbegotten" has the same
+meaning as "not a son." Nor does it follow that "unbegotten" is not
+the proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are
+notified by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as what
+has no part.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: "Unbegotten" is taken sometimes in a negative sense
+only, and in that sense Jerome says that "the Holy Ghost is
+unbegotten," that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise "unbegotten" may
+be taken in a kind of privative sense, but not as implying any
+imperfection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way
+when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another, even
+though it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a
+stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally
+belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so
+called when something has not what naturally belongs to some members
+of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third
+sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in
+which sense, privation imports an imperfection. In this sense,
+"unbegotten" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it
+may be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain
+person of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the
+same nature is begotten. In this sense the term "unbegotten" can be
+applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper
+to the Father alone, it must be further understood that the name
+"unbegotten" belongs to a divine person as the principle of another
+person; so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of
+principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in the
+term "unbegotten" that He is not in any way derived from another; and
+not only that He is not from another by way only of generation. In
+this sense the term "unbegotten" does not belong at all to the Holy
+Ghost, Who is from another by procession, as a subsisting person; nor
+does it belong to the divine essence, of which it may be said that it
+is in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from another--namely, from the
+Father.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9),
+"unbegotten" in one sense signifies the same as "uncreated"; and thus
+it applies to the substance, for thereby does the created substance
+differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not
+begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation
+is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not man" is reduced to
+the genus of substance, and "not white" to the genus of quality.
+Hence, since "begotten" implies relation in God, "unbegotten" belongs
+also to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father unbegotten
+is substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by
+relation; that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In every genus there must be something first; so in the
+divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from
+another, and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two innascibles is
+to suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Hence
+Hilary says (De Synod.): "As there is one God, so there cannot be two
+innascibles." And this especially because, did two innascibles exist,
+one would not be from the other, and they would not be distinguished
+by relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from
+each other by diversity of nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The property of the Father, whereby He is not from
+another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of
+the Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost;
+both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as
+stated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3), and because also in the order of
+nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being
+denied of the Father that He is begotten, although He is the
+principle of generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does
+not proceed by the procession of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy
+Ghost is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the
+person begotten.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 34
+
+OF THE PERSON OF THE SON
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to
+the Son--namely, "Son," "Word," and "Image." The idea of Son is
+gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider
+Word and Image.
+
+Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term?
+
+(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son?
+
+(3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 34, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Word in God Is a Personal Name?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name.
+For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and
+Son. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on
+(John 1:1), "In the beginning was the Word." Therefore Word is not a
+personal name in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), "The Word
+is knowledge with love;" and according to Anselm (Monol. lx), "To
+speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought." But
+knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God.
+Therefore Word is not a personal term in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according
+to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son is
+intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father speaks,
+the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of
+them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term
+in God, and not in a personal sense.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is
+something made. For it is said, "Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms
+which do His Word" (Ps. 148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal
+name in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "As the Son is
+related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is."
+But the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore
+so also is Word.
+
+_I answer that,_ The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense,
+is a personal name, and in no way an essential name.
+
+To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its
+proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense it is
+taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense
+is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds
+from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior
+word--that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the
+sound. For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound
+signifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds
+from the signification or the imagination, as stated in _De Anima_ ii,
+text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called
+a word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the
+fact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it
+follows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is
+called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the
+interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the
+vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of
+words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that "word" is called "the natural
+movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and
+thinks, as light and splendor;" which is the first kind. "Again," he
+says, "the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is
+uttered in the heart;" which is the third kind. "Again," also, "the
+word is the angel"--that is, the messenger "of intelligence;" which
+is the second kind. Word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for
+that which is signified or effected by a word; thus we are wont to
+say, "this is the word I have said," or "which the king has
+commanded," alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way
+of assertion or of command.
+
+Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the
+intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): "Whoever can
+understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before
+thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some
+likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the
+Word." The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to
+proceed from something other than itself--namely, from the knowledge
+of the one conceiving. Hence "Word," according as we use the term
+strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which
+belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine
+persons are distinguished by origin (Q. 27, AA. 3, 4, 5). Hence the
+term "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be
+taken as said not essentially, but personally.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the
+Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored to
+maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to
+be understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word proceeding
+should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same
+substance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a
+manner from the one who pronounces it, as to remain within him. But
+supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit
+Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word
+metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation;
+either it makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by
+a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it
+is manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly
+manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except
+in as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which
+anyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word
+may be sometimes said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must
+also admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to
+God personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that
+which emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its
+conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is
+made actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely;
+likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect
+what existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding
+does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an
+act remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is
+knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing
+intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the
+intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin.
+vii, 1) that the Word is "begotten wisdom;" for it is nothing but the
+concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called
+"begotten knowledge." Thus can also be explained how "to speak" is in
+God "to see by thought," forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the
+gaze of the divine thought. Still the term "thought" does not
+properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
+16): "Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of the
+Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something
+unstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form
+and remaining latent and as it were formless." For thought consists
+properly in the search after the truth, and this has no place in God.
+But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does not
+think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx)
+takes "thought" in an improper sense for "contemplation."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally,
+and not essentially, so likewise is to "speak." Hence, as the Word is
+not common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that
+the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says
+(De Trin. vii, 1): "He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is
+understood as not alone in God, but as being with that very Word,
+without which, forsooth, He would not be speaking." On the other
+hand, "to be spoken" belongs to each Person, for not only is the word
+spoken, but also the thing understood or signified by the word.
+Therefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to
+be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in the way
+whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs
+to each Person to be spoken. For the Father, by understanding
+Himself, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and all other things comprised
+in this knowledge, conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity
+is "spoken" in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the
+intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of
+understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term "speak"
+improperly for the act of understanding; whereas they really differ
+from each other; for "to understand" means only the habitude of the
+intelligent agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace
+of origin is conveyed, but only a certain information of our
+intellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of
+the thing understood. In God, however, it means complete identity,
+because in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether
+the same, as was proved above (Q. 14, AA. 4, 5). Whereas to "speak"
+means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for "to speak" is
+nothing but to utter a word. But by means of the word it imports a
+habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is
+manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who
+utters the Word is "speaker" in God, although each Person understands
+and is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The term "word" is there taken figuratively, as the
+thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus
+creatures are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect,
+whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine
+wisdom; as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the
+work to which he is appointed by the king's word.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 34, Art. 2]
+
+Whether "Word" Is the Son's Proper Name?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that "Word" is not the proper name of the
+Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not
+signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word
+cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered.
+Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from the
+Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine;
+as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every proper name of a person signifies some
+property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper
+name, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be
+several more properties in God than those above mentioned.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act of
+understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs
+to the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3): "Bearing all
+things by the word of His power;" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom.
+v, 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is
+not proper to the Son.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): "By Word we
+understand the Son alone."
+
+_I answer that,_ "Word," said of God in its proper sense, is used
+personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it
+signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds
+in God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and
+this procession is called generation, as we have shown above (Q. 27,
+A. 2). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in
+God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: "To be" and "to understand" are not the same in us.
+Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our
+nature. But in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and the same:
+hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of His;
+but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be
+something subsistent; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists;
+and so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that "the Word of God is
+substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own]
+are activities if the soul."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the Arians
+pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being
+uttered, as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the
+different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from
+Augustine (De Haeres. xi).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the term "Word" the same property is comprised as in
+the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): "Word and Son
+express the same." For the Son's nativity, which is His personal
+property, is signified by different names, which are attributed to
+the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is
+of the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son; to show that
+He is co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that He is
+altogether like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten
+immaterially, He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be
+expressed by only one name.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way
+as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God
+essentially, as stated above (Q. 14, AA. 2, 4). Now the Son is God
+begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as
+producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the
+Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but
+is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: When it is said of the Son, "Bearing all things by the
+word of His power"; "word" is taken figuratively for the effect of
+the Word. Hence a gloss says that "word" is here taken to mean
+command; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things
+are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word
+things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely and figuratively
+in applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that
+everything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so
+in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, because He
+manifests the Son.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 34, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Name "Word" Imports Relation to Creatures?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import
+relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in
+creatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said
+essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation
+to creatures.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of
+God in time; as "Lord" and "Creator." But Word is said of God from
+eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it
+proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it
+follows that the Word proceeds from the creature.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various
+relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to
+creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but
+many.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can
+only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know
+beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are
+implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be false.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that "the
+name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also
+relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His
+operative power."
+
+_I answer that,_ Word implies relation to creatures. For God by
+knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the
+mind is representative of everything that is actually understood.
+Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things
+which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself
+and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the
+Father, but of all creatures.
+
+And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas
+as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word
+of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both
+expressive and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps.
+32:9): "He spake, and they were made;" because in the Word is implied
+the operative idea of what God makes.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The nature is also included indirectly in the name of
+the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational
+nature. Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the
+personal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is
+implied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to
+prevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is
+included in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be
+the Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the
+Creator begotten; and in this way the name Word imports relation to
+creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since the relations result from actions, some names
+import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on
+the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to
+create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But
+others import a relation which follows from an action which does not
+pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent--as to know and
+to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of
+relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it
+true that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are
+applied to Him in time; but only those names are applied in time
+which import relation following on the action of God passing into
+exterior effect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived
+from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is
+not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although
+the Word is expressive of creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation
+to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God;
+and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed
+chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to
+creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands
+every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and that is a
+personal one.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about
+non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less
+than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14).
+Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is
+expressive and manifestive of non-beings.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 35
+
+OF THE IMAGE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether Image in God is said personally?
+
+(2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 35, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Image in God Is Said Personally?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that image is not said personally of God.
+For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, "The Godhead
+of the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one."
+Therefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): "An image is a like
+species of that which it represents." But species or form is said
+of God essentially. Therefore so also is Image.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies
+"before" and "after." But in the divine persons there is no "before"
+and "after." Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "What is more
+absurd than to say that an image is referred to itself?" Therefore
+the Image in God is a relation, and is thus a personal name.
+
+_I answer that,_ Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not
+any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only
+similitude of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal
+things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we see
+that the species of different animals are of different figures; but
+not of different colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on
+a wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise
+depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or of figure is
+enough for an image, which requires also the idea of origin; because,
+as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74): "One egg is not the image of
+another, because it is not derived from it." Therefore for a true
+image it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in
+species, or at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports procession
+or origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name "Image" is a
+personal name.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth
+in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything
+proceeds, is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly
+called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the name
+of Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the
+Holy Trinity is the Image to whom man was made.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: species, as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of
+image, means the form derived from one thing to another. In this
+sense image is said to be the species of anything, as that which is
+assimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has a like
+form.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but
+only assimilation.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 35, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Name of Image Is Proper to the Son?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the
+Son; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), "The Holy Ghost
+is the Image of the Son." Therefore Image does not belong to the Son
+alone.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an
+image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs to
+the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude.
+Therefore the Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image does not
+belong to the Son alone.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man is also called the image of God, according to 1
+Cor. 11:7, "The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image
+and the glory of God." Therefore Image is not proper to the Son.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): "The Son alone is
+the Image of the Father."
+
+_I answer that,_ The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost
+is the Image of both the Father and of the Son; but the Latin Doctors
+attribute the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the
+canonical Scripture except as applied to the Son; as in the words,
+"Who is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures"
+(Col. 1:15) and again: "Who being the brightness of His glory, and
+the figure of His substance." (Heb. 1:3).
+
+Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not
+in nature only, but also in the notion of principle: whereas the Holy
+Ghost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion.
+This, however, does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by
+reason of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality
+in God, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6), so neither (by reason
+thereof do we consider) that similitude which is essential to image.
+Hence others say that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the
+Son, because there cannot be an image of an image; nor of the Father,
+because again the image must be immediately related to that which it
+is the image; and the Holy Ghost is related to the Father through the
+Son; nor again is He the Image of the Father and the Son, because then
+there would be one image of two; which is impossible. Hence it follows
+that the Holy Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for
+the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, as we
+shall explain further on (Q. 36, A. 4). Hence there is nothing
+to prevent there being one Image of the Father and of the Son,
+inasmuch as they are one; since even man is one image of the whole
+Trinity.
+
+Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the
+Holy Ghost, although by His procession He receives the nature of the
+Father, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be
+"born"; so, although He receives the likeness of the Father, He is
+not called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is
+essential to word to be like species with that whence it proceeds;
+whereas this does not essentially belong to love, although it may
+belong to that love which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the
+divine love.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly employ
+the term image as meaning a perfect similitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and the
+Son, still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above
+explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The image of a thing may be found in something in two
+ways. In one way it is found in something of the same specific
+nature; as the image of the king is found in his son. In another way
+it is found in something of a different nature, as the king's image
+on the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father;
+in the second sense man is called the image of God; and therefore in
+order to express the imperfect character of the divine image in man,
+man is not simply called the image, but "to the image," whereby is
+expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot
+be said that the Son of God is "to the image," because He is the
+perfect Image of the Father.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 36
+
+OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost,
+Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of
+God. Concerning the name "Holy Ghost" there are four points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether this name, "Holy Ghost," is the proper name of one divine
+Person?
+
+(2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds
+from the Father and the Son?
+
+(3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son?
+
+(4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy
+Ghost?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 1]
+
+Whether This Name "Holy Ghost" Is the Proper Name of One Divine Person?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the
+proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the
+three persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of
+'Holy Ghost' [*It should be borne in mind that the word "ghost" is the
+old English equivalent for the Latin "spiritus,"] whether in the sense
+of "breath" or "blast," or in the sense of "spirit," as an immaterial
+substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x, 7),
+"The Gost of Storms" [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter
+"Trubled gost is sacrifice of God" (Prose Psalter, A.D. 1325), and
+"Oure wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the
+ayre" (More, "Comfort against Tribulation"); and in our modern
+expression of "giving up the ghost." As applied to God, and not
+specially to the third Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder,
+"Jhesu Criste was the worde and the goste of Good." (See Oxford
+Dictionary).) is common to the three persons; for Hilary (De Trin.
+viii) shows that the "Spirit of God" sometimes means the Father, as in
+the words of Isa. 61:1: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me;" and
+sometimes the Son, as when the Son says: "In the Spirit of God I cast
+out devils" (Matt. 12:28), showing that He cast out devils by His own
+natural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in the
+words of Joel 2:28: "I will pour out of My Spirit over all flesh."
+Therefore this name 'Holy Ghost' is not the proper name of a divine
+person.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the names of the divine persons are relative terms,
+as Boethius says (De Trin.). But this name "Holy Ghost" is not a
+relative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine
+Person.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He
+cannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is spoken
+of as of this or that man, as appears in the words, "The Lord said to
+Moses, I will take of thy spirit and will give to them" (Num. 11:17)
+and also "The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus" (4 Kings 2:15).
+Therefore "Holy Ghost" does not seem to be the proper name of a
+divine Person.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (1 John 5:7): "There are three who bear
+witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." As
+Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4): "When we ask, Three what? we say,
+Three persons." Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine
+person.
+
+_I answer that,_ While there are two processions in God, one of
+these, the procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as
+stated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3). Hence the relations also which
+follow from this procession are without a name (Q. 28, A. 4): for
+which reason the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper
+name. But as some names are accommodated by the usual mode of
+speaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we use the names
+of procession and spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly
+signify the notional acts than the relations; so to signify the
+divine Person, Who proceeds by way of love, this name "Holy Ghost" is
+by the use of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The
+appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from
+the fact that the person who is called "Holy Ghost" has something in
+common with the other Persons. For, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
+17; v, 11), "Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is
+called that properly which both are called in common. For the Father
+also is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is holy,
+and the Son is holy." Secondly, from the proper signification of the
+name. For the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify
+impulse and motion; for we call the breath and the wind by the term
+spirit. Now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of
+the lover towards the object loved. Further, holiness is attributed
+to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the divine person
+proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved, that person is most
+properly named "The Holy Ghost."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is
+applicable to the whole Trinity: because by 'spirit' the
+immateriality of the divine substance is signified; for corporeal
+spirit is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this
+term to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the
+word "holy" we signify the purity of divine goodness. But if Holy
+Spirit be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the
+usage of the Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three
+persons, the one who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above
+explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although this name "Holy Ghost" does not indicate a
+relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it
+is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by
+relation only. Yet this name may be understood as including a
+relation, if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed
+[spiratus].
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the name Son we understand that relation only which
+is of something from a principle, in regard to that principle: but in
+the name "Father" we understand the relation of principle; and
+likewise in the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power.
+But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a
+divine person; but rather the reverse. Therefore we can say "our
+Father," and "our Spirit"; but we cannot say "our Son."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Holy Ghost Proceeds from the Son?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
+the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We must not dare to say
+anything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been
+divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles." But in the Sacred
+Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son;
+but only that He proceeds from the Father, as appears from John 15:26:
+"The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the Father." Therefore the
+Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople (Can.
+vii) we read: "We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver,
+who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son to be
+adored and glorified." Therefore it should not be added in our Creed
+that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added such a
+thing appear to be worthy of anathema.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): "We say that the
+Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of the
+Father; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we
+name Him the Spirit of the Son." Therefore the Holy Ghost does not
+proceed from the Son.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the
+Holy Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of St.
+Andrew: "Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the
+Father, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one
+Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son."
+Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath
+[spiritus] does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word.
+Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father.
+Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the Son.
+
+Obj. 7: Further "the actual and the possible do not differ in things
+perpetual" (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But it is
+possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if
+He did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir.
+Sancti, ii): "The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the
+Father; but each in a different way; one by Birth, the other by
+Procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another." And
+further on he says: "For even if for no other reason were the Son and
+the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice." Therefore the
+Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says: "The Holy Ghost is from the Father
+and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding."
+
+_I answer that,_ It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son.
+For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally
+distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above (Q.
+28, A. 3; Q. 30, A. 2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons
+are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would
+follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons:
+since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs
+to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine
+persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now
+the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they
+are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father
+has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by
+the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations,
+and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the
+one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost
+there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to
+the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as
+neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to
+them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that
+the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two
+relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is
+heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the
+Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite
+relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each
+other, except relations of origin, as proved above (Q. 28, A. 4). And
+opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a
+"principle," and of what is "from the principle." Therefore we must
+conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the
+Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the
+Son, as we confess.
+
+Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this
+conclusion. For it was said above (Q. 27, AA. 2, 4; Q. 28, A. 4),
+that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and the
+Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a
+word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental
+conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost
+proceeds from the Son.
+
+We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature
+itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one
+without order except in those which differ only by their matter; as
+for instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other
+materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which
+there is not only a material distinction we always find that some
+order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of
+creatures produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So
+if from the one Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the Son and
+the Holy Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any
+other be assigned except the order of their nature, whereby one is
+from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy
+Ghost proceed from the Father in such a way as that neither of them
+proceeds from the other, unless we admit in them a material
+distinction; which is impossible.
+
+Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the
+Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy
+Ghost is the Spirit "of the Son"; and that He is from the Father
+"through the Son." Some of them are said also to concede that "He is
+from the Son"; or that "He flows from the Son," but not that He
+proceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just
+consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word
+procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin
+of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; as
+when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a
+stream from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, granted
+that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can
+conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We ought not to say about God anything which is not
+found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But although
+we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy
+Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of
+Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost,
+"He will glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine" (John 16:14).
+It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of the
+Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive
+term; except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations,
+whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For
+when the Lord says, "No one knoweth the Son, but the Father," the
+idea of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we
+say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be
+added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not
+thereby be at all excluded; because as regards being the principle of
+the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed to each other,
+but only as regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is
+the Son.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has
+been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council
+at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as
+making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in
+the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against
+rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of Chalcedon it
+is declared that those who were congregated together in the council
+of Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not
+implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their
+predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what
+those fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the
+time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the
+Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not
+necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas,
+later on, when certain errors rose up, another council [*Council of
+Rome, under Pope Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was
+explicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose
+authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed.
+Nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that
+the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error
+that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a
+Nestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was
+embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him,
+among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is
+not to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by some that
+while Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son,
+neither do those words of his express a denial thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in the
+Son, it does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the Son
+also is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the
+Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of
+the lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature
+of Christ, by reason of what is written: "On whom thou shalt see the
+Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes" (John
+1:33).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of
+the vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for it
+would then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the
+mental word, whence proceeds love.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
+Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds
+from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one
+power belongs to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from
+the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property
+of filiation; for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from
+the Father.
+
+Reply Obj. 7: The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch
+as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other;
+but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son
+is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father
+and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished
+from each other, as explained above, and in Q. 27.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Holy Ghost Proceeds from the Father Through the Son?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
+the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through
+another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost
+proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed
+immediately; which seems to be unfitting.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through
+the Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account of the
+Father. But "whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so."
+Therefore He proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if
+the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that
+the Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds;
+and thus the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is
+heretical.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be
+said conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the
+bailiff, so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through
+the king. But we can never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost
+through the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father
+spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. xii): "Keep me, I pray, in
+this expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the
+Father--namely Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee:
+and that I may deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only
+Begotten."
+
+_I answer that,_ Whenever one is said to act through another, this
+preposition "through" points out, in what is covered by it, some cause
+or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent
+and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition
+"through" is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent;
+and in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be
+a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It
+is a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works
+through love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works
+through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works
+through the command of another. Sometimes, however, that which is
+covered by this preposition "through" is the cause of the action
+regarded as terminated in the thing done; as, for instance, when we
+say, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that
+the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause
+why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even
+this effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that
+this preposition "through" sometimes denotes direct authority, as when
+we say, the king works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect
+authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through the king.
+
+Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy
+Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the
+Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the
+Father through the Son, which has the same meaning.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In every action two things are to be considered, the
+_suppositum_ acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for instance,
+fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son
+the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no mean, for
+this is one and the same power. But if we consider the persons
+themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the
+Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father
+immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He
+is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did Abel
+proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and
+mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although,
+indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the
+immaterial procession of the divine persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If the Son received from the Father a numerically
+distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow
+that He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the
+Holy Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son;
+whereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the
+Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally
+from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or
+properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the
+Father.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the
+begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the
+Son), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His
+principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost
+proceeded; but each of the operations is eternal.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: When anyone is said to work through anything, the
+converse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the
+mallet works through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the
+bailiff acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place to
+act, since he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's
+place to act, but only to be made to act, and hence it is used only
+as an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through the
+king, although this preposition "through" denotes a medium, for the
+more a _suppositum_ is prior in action, so much the more is its power
+immediate as regards the effect, inasmuch as the power of the first
+cause joins the second cause to its effect. Hence also first
+principles are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences.
+Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order
+of the subject's acting, the king is said to work through the
+bailiff; but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is said to
+act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king gives the
+bailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order of power between
+Father and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence we say that
+the Father spirates through the Son; and not conversely.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Father and the Son Are One Principle of the Holy Ghost?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one
+principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from
+the Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature,
+for the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is
+one in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any
+one property, for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two
+subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the
+Son as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are
+not one principle of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in this proposition "the Father and the Son are one
+principle of the Holy Ghost," we do not designate personal unity,
+because in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor
+again do we designate the unity of property, because if one property
+were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the
+Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father
+would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, which
+cannot be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one
+principle of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the
+Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle
+as regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father
+and the Son.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the
+Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father.
+But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is
+the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and if the one is
+not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father.
+Therefore we cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle
+of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the
+Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one
+principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems
+to be false; for this word "principle" stands either for the person
+of the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it
+is false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father
+and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father
+and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows that
+they are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we
+cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle of the
+Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 7: Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one
+Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the
+Father and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert;
+and this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "the
+Holy Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as
+authors." Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of
+the Holy Ghost.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and
+the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost.
+
+_I answer that,_ The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever
+there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since
+there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the
+Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of
+the Holy Ghost.
+
+Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: "The Father
+and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," because, they
+declare, since the word "principle" in the singular number does not
+signify "person," but "property," it must be taken as an adjective;
+and forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective,
+it cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one
+principle of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that
+the meaning should be: They are one principle--that is, in one and
+the same way. But then it might be equally right to say that the
+Father is two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost--namely, in
+two ways. Therefore, we must say that, although this word "principle"
+signifies a property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as
+do the words "father" and "son" even in things created. Hence it takes
+its number from the form it signifies, like other substantives.
+Therefore, as the Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the
+unity of the form that is signified by this word "God"; so they are
+one principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of the property
+that is signified in this word "principle."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost
+proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative
+power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property,
+as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one
+property being in two _supposita_ that possess one common nature. But
+if we consider the _supposita_ of the spiration, then we may say that
+the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct; for
+He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the proposition "the Father and the Son are one
+principle of the Holy Ghost," one property is designated which is the
+form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by reason
+of the several properties the Father can be called several
+principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is not by reason of relative properties that we
+speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the
+essence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is
+to the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father
+than is the Holy Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: These two propositions, "The Father and the Son are one
+principle which is the Father," or, "one principle which is not the
+Father," are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not
+necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father
+and the Son are one principle, this word "principle" has not
+determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for two
+persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of "figure of speech" as
+the argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: This proposition is also true:--The one principle of
+the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word
+"principle" does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for
+the two persons as above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: There is no reason against saying that the Father and
+the Son are the same principle, because the word "principle" stands
+confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together.
+
+Reply Obj. 7: Some say that although the Father and the Son are one
+principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of
+the distinction of _supposita,_ as also there are two spirating,
+because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the
+name "Creator"; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and
+the Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the
+creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but
+as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because
+spirating is an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say
+that the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the
+plurality of the _supposita_ but not two spirators by reason of the
+one spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the
+_supposita_ but substantives from themselves, according to the form
+signified. As to what Hilary says, that "the Holy Ghost is from the
+Father and the Son as His authors," this is to be explained in the
+sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 37
+
+OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST--LOVE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We now inquire concerning the name "Love," on which arise two points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
+
+(2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 37, Art. 2]
+
+Whether "Love" Is the Proper Name of the Holy Ghost?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that "Love" is not the proper name of the
+Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): "As the Father, Son
+and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one;
+I know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not be called
+Charity, and all together one Charity." But no name which is
+predicated in the singular of each person and of all together, is a
+proper name of a person. Therefore this name, "Love," is not the
+proper name of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love is
+not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action passing
+from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name
+of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius
+says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a unitive force." But a bond is a
+medium between what it joins together, not something proceeding from
+them. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and
+the Son, as was shown above (Q. 36, A. 2), it seems that He is not
+the Love or bond of the Father and the Son.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost is a
+lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, He must
+be love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): "The Holy
+Ghost Himself is Love."
+
+_I answer that,_ The name Love in God can be taken essentially and
+personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy
+Ghost; as Word is the proper name of the Son.
+
+To see this we must know that since as shown above (Q. 27, AA. 2, 3,
+4, 5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect,
+which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will,
+which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more
+known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to
+express our various considerations as regards that procession, but
+not as regards the procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to
+employ circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the
+relations following from this procession which are called
+"procession" and "spiration," as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3),
+and yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict
+sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of
+each procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone,
+there results in the one who understands a conception of the object
+understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an
+object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved
+in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is
+said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one
+who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he
+is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object
+understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in
+the lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found
+to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object
+understood, as appears in the word "to understand"; and other words
+are used to express the procession of the intellectual
+conception--namely, "to speak," and "word." Hence in God, "to
+understand" is applied only to the essence; because it does not
+import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas "Word" is said
+personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term "to
+speak" is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle
+of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other hand, on the part of
+the will, with the exception of the words "dilection" and "love,"
+which express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there
+are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the
+impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by
+fact that he loves--to the principle of that impression, or "vice
+versa." And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary,
+we express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just
+as if we were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom
+begotten."
+
+It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to
+the object loved, "love" and "to love" are said of the essence, as
+"understanding" and "to understand"; but, on the other hand, so far as
+these words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what
+proceeds by way of love, and "vice versa," so that by "love" is
+understood the "love proceeding," and by "to love" is understood "the
+spiration of the love proceeding," in that sense "love" is the name of
+the person and "to love" is a notional term, as "to speak" and "to
+beget."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the
+divine essence, as was said above (here and Q. 24, A. 2, ad 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although to understand, and to will, and to love
+signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are
+actions that remain in the agents, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 4),
+yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain
+relation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves is something
+that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something
+abiding in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed by
+word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there
+is more than this; because both Word and Love are subsistent.
+Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father
+for the Son, or for something else; we do not mean anything that
+passes into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as
+also in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to the thing
+expressed by the Word.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the Father and
+Son, inasmuch as He is Love; because, since the Father loves Himself
+and the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the
+Holy Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and
+conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact
+that the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it necessarily
+follows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As
+regards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the
+third person in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid
+relation He is the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from
+both.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As it does not belong to the Son, though He
+understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand
+as the word proceeding; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost
+loves, taking Love as an essential term, still it does not belong to
+Him to spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term;
+because He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as the one
+whence love proceeds.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 37, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Father and the Son Love Each Other by the Holy Ghost?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love
+each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves
+that the Father is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is
+Wisdom begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as
+explained above (Q. 27, A. 3). Therefore the Father and the Son do
+not love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in the proposition, "The Father and the Son love
+each other by the Holy Ghost," this word "love" is to be taken either
+essentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken
+essentially, because in the same way we might say that "the Father
+understands by the Son"; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for
+then, in like manner, it might be said that "the Father and the Son
+spirate by the Holy Ghost," or that "the Father generates by the
+Son." Therefore in no way is this proposition true: "The Father and
+the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and
+Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy
+Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the
+act; since it cannot be said that the "Father begets Himself," or
+that "He spirates Himself." Therefore, neither can it be said that
+"He loves Himself by the Holy Ghost," if "to love" is taken in a
+notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy
+Ghost; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs
+to the essence. Therefore this also is false: "The Father loves the
+Son by the Holy Ghost."
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): "The Holy Ghost
+is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves
+His Begetter."
+
+_I answer that,_ A difficulty about this question is objected to the
+effect that when we say, "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost,"
+since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean
+that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the
+Son; which cannot be admitted.
+
+In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that "the
+Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost"; and they add
+that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to
+the effect that "the Father is wise by the Wisdom begotten." Others
+say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as
+that "the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost"--that is, "by His
+essential Love," which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others
+further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a
+sign, so that it means, "the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father
+loves the Son"; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as
+Love. Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as
+importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the
+love whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others,
+again, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a
+formal effect; and these approach nearer to the truth.
+
+To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is
+commonly denominated from its forms, as "white" from whiteness, and
+"man" from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in
+this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form.
+So when I say, "this man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is
+to be construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the
+garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be
+denominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is
+from its action, but also as from the term itself of the action--that
+is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the
+action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not
+the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding
+from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with the flower,
+although the flower is not the tree's form, but is the effect
+proceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we must say that
+since in God "to love" is taken in two ways, essentially and
+notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and
+the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence.
+Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): "Who dares to say that the
+Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except
+by the Holy Ghost?" The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this
+sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means
+nothing else than "to spirate love"; just as to speak is to produce a
+word, and to flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a
+tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word
+or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and
+the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love
+proceeding.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in
+God; therefore we cannot say that "the Father is wise or intelligent
+by the Son." But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a
+notional sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the
+Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When the idea of an action includes a determined
+effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the
+action, and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree
+flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea
+of an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case,
+the principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect,
+but only from the action. For we do not say that the tree produces
+the flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So
+when we say, "spirates" or "begets," this imports only a notional
+act. Hence we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost,
+or begets by the Son. But we can say that the Father speaks by the
+Word, as by the Person proceeding, "and speaks by the speaking," as
+by a notional act; forasmuch as "to speak" imports a determinate
+person proceeding; since "to speak" means to produce a word. Likewise
+to love, taken in a notional sense, means to produce love; and so it
+can be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by
+the person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and
+us, by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to love, taken in
+a notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person,
+but also the person produced, by way of love, which has relation to
+the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every
+creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the Word "begotten"
+adequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves
+Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy
+Ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father
+loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to
+the creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love,
+as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and
+goodness are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 38
+
+OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT
+(In Two Articles)
+
+There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which
+there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether "Gift" can be a personal name?
+
+(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 38, Art. 1]
+
+Whether "Gift" Is a Personal Name?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that "Gift" is not a personal name. For
+every personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of
+"Gift" does not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De
+Trin. xv, 19): that "the Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift, that He
+also gives Himself as God." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But
+the divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son, as
+Hilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there
+is no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift implies
+a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards
+him by whom it is given. Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, "Gift" imports relation to the creature, and it thus
+seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said of God
+from eternity; as "Father," and "Son." Therefore "Gift" is not a
+personal name.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): "As the body of
+flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing
+but the Holy Ghost." But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also
+therefore is "Gift."
+
+_I answer that,_ The word "gift" imports an aptitude for being given.
+And what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to
+that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless
+it was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine
+person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son
+belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to
+possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in this way
+a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature
+united to God. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not,
+however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and
+to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain
+thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the
+Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God
+rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine
+person. Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner,
+its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from above;
+for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source.
+Thus a divine person can "be given," and can be a "gift."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The name "Gift" imports a personal distinction, in so
+far as gift imports something belonging to another through its
+origin. Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is
+His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man
+belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix):
+"What is more yours than yourself?" Or we might say, and more
+fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the
+phrase, "this is this one's," can be understood in several senses. In
+one way it means identity, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix);
+and in that sense "gift" is the same as "the giver," but not the same
+as the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in that
+sense. In another sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as
+a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the
+giver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third
+sense "this is this one's" through its origin only; and in this sense
+the Son is the Father's; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both.
+Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the
+giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a
+personal name.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The divine essence is the Father's gift in the first
+sense, as being the Father's by way of identity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Gift as a personal name in God does not imply
+subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the
+one to whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as
+above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Gift is not so called from being actually given, but
+from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift
+from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that
+it is an essential name because it imports relation to the creature;
+but that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the
+essence is included in the idea of person, as stated above (Q. 34, A.
+3).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 38, Art. 2]
+
+Whether "Gift" Is the Proper Name of the Holy Ghost?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the
+Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Isaiah
+says (9:16): "A Son is given to us." Therefore to be Gift belongs to
+the Son, as well as to the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property.
+But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost.
+Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man,
+whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but "God's Gift"
+only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "As 'to be born'
+is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, 'to be
+the Gift of God' is to proceed from Father and Son." But the Holy
+Ghost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from
+Father and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.
+
+_I answer that,_ Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of
+the Holy Ghost.
+
+In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable
+giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)--i.e. a thing which is not
+given with the intention of a return--and it thus contains the idea
+of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being
+gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone
+gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him
+is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love
+has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are
+given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above (Q.
+27, A. 4; Q. 37, A. 1), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence
+Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): "By the gift, which is the Holy
+Ghost, many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of
+Christ."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the Son is properly called the Image because He
+proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of
+its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so
+also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is
+properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the
+Son is given is from the Father's love, according to the words, "God
+so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son" (John 3:16).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the
+Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the
+origin of the Holy Ghost--that is, His procession.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver;
+but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore,
+because "Gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called
+a gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been
+given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 39
+
+OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely,
+we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence,
+to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of
+these with each other.
+
+As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?
+
+(2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?
+
+(3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in
+the plural, or in the singular?
+
+(4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be
+predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?
+
+(5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in
+the abstract?
+
+(6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete
+essential names?
+
+(7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?
+
+(8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 1]
+
+Whether in God the Essence Is the Same As the Person?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as
+person. For whenever essence is the same as person or _suppositum,_
+there can be only one _suppositum_ of one nature, as is clear in the
+case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really
+one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But
+in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what
+is above expounded (Q. 28, A. 3; Q. 30, A. 2). Therefore essence is
+not the same as person.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same
+things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and
+negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct,
+whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is
+subject to essence; whence it is called _suppositum_ or "hypostasis."
+Therefore person is not the same as essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): "When we say the
+person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the
+Father."
+
+_I answer that,_ The truth of this question is quite clear if we
+consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Q. 3, A. 3)
+that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same
+as _suppositum,_ which in intellectual substances is nothing else
+than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while
+the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains
+its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), "relation
+multiplies the Trinity of persons," some have thought that in God
+essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be
+"adjacent"; considering only in the relations the idea of "reference
+to another," and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown
+above (Q. 28, A. 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in
+God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God
+essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons
+are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated
+(Q. 29, A. 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature.
+But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom
+really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an
+opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that
+opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There cannot be a distinction of _suppositum_ in
+creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles;
+because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God
+relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between
+them they distinguish the _supposita_; and yet the essence is not
+distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished
+from each other so far as they are identified with the essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way
+of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and
+affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need
+not suppose the other.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of
+created things, as above explained (Q. 13, AA. 1, 3). And since
+created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of
+the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called
+"subjects," _supposita,_ or "hypostases." So the divine persons are
+named _supposita_ or "hypostases," but not as if there really existed
+any real "supposition" or "subjection."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Must Be Said That the Three Persons Are of One Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are
+of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and
+Holy Ghost "are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony." But
+the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are
+not of one essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be
+confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius
+(Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy
+Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence.
+It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the
+essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it
+does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one
+essence.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say
+that the three persons are "from one essence [ex una essentia]," lest
+we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the
+persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the
+oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three
+persons are "of one essence [unius essentiae]."
+
+Obj. 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion
+of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or
+substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De
+Synod.): "One substance predicated of the Father and the Son
+signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one
+substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior
+substance taken and assumed by the other two." Therefore it must not
+be said that the three persons are of one substance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word
+_homoousion,_ which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians,
+means that the three persons are of one essence.
+
+_I answer that,_ As above explained (Q. 13, AA. 1, 2), divine things
+are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for
+in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things
+created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect
+derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by
+the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is
+the _suppositum_ of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as
+the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification.
+Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is
+the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we
+do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form,
+unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: "That woman
+is of a handsome figure," or: "This man is of perfect virtue." In like
+manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not
+multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three
+persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be
+understood as designating the form.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and not
+for the essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so
+many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we
+find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, "I and the
+Father are one (John 10:30)," and "I am in the Father, and the Father
+in Me (John 10:38)"; and there are many other texts of the same
+import.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Because "nature" designates the principle of action
+while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be
+of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give
+heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence" which
+have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying
+that the three persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are
+"of one nature."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated
+as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the virtue
+of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be
+designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or
+designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one
+signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of
+the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of great virtue
+[magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the force of two,
+as, for instance, "he is a man of blood"--that is, he is a man who
+sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence
+signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that
+the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless
+we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the
+Father is a person of the "divine essence"; or, the three persons are
+"of one essence."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The preposition "from" or "out of" does not designate
+the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an
+efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases
+distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For
+nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a
+thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So,
+when we say, "three persons of one essence," taking essence as having
+the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from
+person, which we should mean if we said, "three persons from the same
+essence."
+
+Reply Obj. 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): "It would be prejudicial to
+holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not
+think them holy. So if some misunderstand _homoousion,_ what is that
+to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does
+not result from division, or from union or from community of
+possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Essential Names Should Be Predicated in the Singular of the
+Three Persons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that essential names, as the name "God,"
+should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in
+the plural. For as "man" signifies "one that has humanity," so God
+signifies "one that has Godhead." But the three persons are three who
+have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are "three Gods."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gen. 1:1, where it is said, "In the beginning God
+created heaven and earth," the Hebrew original has "Elohim," which may
+be rendered "Gods" or "Judges": and this word is used on account of
+the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are "several
+Gods," and not "one" God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, this word "thing" when it is said absolutely,
+seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three
+persons in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5):
+"The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father,
+Son and Holy Ghost." Therefore other essential names can be
+predicated in the plural of the three persons.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, as this word "God" signifies "a being who has
+Deity," so also this word "person" signifies a being subsisting in
+an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for
+the same reason we can say there are "three Gods."
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Deut. 6:4): "Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy
+God is one God."
+
+_I answer that,_ Some essential names signify the essence after the
+manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of
+adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of
+the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those
+which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three
+persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives
+signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify
+something by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as
+substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or
+multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive
+name depends upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents
+have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality
+from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of
+adjectives depends upon their _supposita._ In creatures, one form
+does not exist in several _supposita_ except by unity of order, as
+the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a
+form are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular,
+but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a
+college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are
+collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a
+form, as above explained (A. 2), which, indeed, is simple and
+supremely one, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7; Q. 11, A. 4). So, names
+which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are
+predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the
+plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and
+Cicero are "three men"; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and
+Holy Ghost are "three Gods," but "one God"; forasmuch as in the three
+_supposita_ of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in
+the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the
+other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner
+are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the
+plurality of _supposita._ For we say there are three "existent" or
+three "wise" beings, or three "eternal," "uncreated," and "immense"
+beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if
+taken in a substantive sense, we say "one uncreated, immense, eternal
+being," as Athanasius declares.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Though the name "God" signifies a being having Godhead,
+nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name
+"God" is used substantively; whereas "having Godhead" is used
+adjectively. Consequently, although there are "three having Godhead,"
+it does not follow that there are three Gods.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So
+as by reason of the plurality of _supposita_ the Greeks said "three
+hypostases," so also in Hebrew "Elohim" is in the plural. We,
+however, do not apply the plural either to "God" or to "substance,"
+lest plurality be referred to the substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This word "thing" is one of the transcendentals.
+Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God
+in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it
+is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage
+quoted, that "the same Trinity is a thing supreme."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The form signified by the word "person" is not essence
+or nature, but personality. So, as there are three
+personalities--that is, three personal properties in the Father, Son
+and Holy Ghost--it is predicated of the three, not in the singular,
+but in the plural.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Concrete Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot
+stand for the person, so that we can truly say "God begot God." For,
+as the logicians say, "a singular term signifies what it stands for."
+But this name "God" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be
+predicated in the plural, as above explained (A. 3). Therefore, since
+it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in
+the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense
+signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name
+"God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot," this term
+"God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father
+generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget,"
+because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets,
+and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there
+are two Gods.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is
+Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself;
+for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself."
+Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore
+it is false to say, "God begot God."
+
+Obj. 5: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the
+Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then
+God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there
+is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it
+cannot be said that "God begot God."
+
+_On the contrary,_ In the Creed it is said, "God of God."
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have said that this name "God" and the like,
+properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by
+reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This
+opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which
+requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be
+the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name
+God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of
+expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no
+less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the
+divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man"
+signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this
+word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense,
+stand for person, as does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes
+stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this
+predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form
+signified--that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person,
+either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when
+we say, "God spirates"; or for three, as when it is said: "To the King
+of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God," etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although this name "God" agrees with singular terms as
+regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it
+agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be
+found in several _supposita._ So it need not always stand for the
+essence it signifies.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This holds good against those who say that the word
+"God" does not naturally stand for person.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The word "God" stands for the person in a different way
+from that in which this word "man" does; for since the form signified
+by this word "man"--that is, humanity--is really divided among its
+different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there
+is no adjunct determining it to the person--that is, to a distinct
+subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not
+a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this
+term "man" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is
+required by some adjunct, as when we say, "man is a species"; whereas
+the form signified by the name "God"--that is, the divine essence--is
+really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature,
+but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the
+person. So, when we say, "God generates," by reason of the notional
+act this name "God" stands for the person of the Father. But when we
+say, "God does not generate," there is no adjunct to determine this
+name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that
+generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something
+be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for
+instance, "God begotten does not beget," is true. Consequently, it
+does not follow that there exists a "God generator," and a "God not
+generator"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as,
+for instance, if we were to say, "the Father is God the generator"
+and the "Son is God the non-generator" and so it does not follow that
+there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was
+said above (A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: This is false, "the Father begot God, that is Himself,"
+because the word "Himself," as a reciprocal term, refers to the same
+_suppositum._ Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi
+ad Maxim.) that "God the Father begot another self [alterum se],"
+forasmuch as the word "se" is either in the ablative case, and then
+it means "He begot another from Himself," or it indicates a single
+relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however,
+either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would
+really mean, "He begot another most like to Himself." Likewise also
+it is false to say, "He begot another God," because although the Son
+is another than the Father, as above explained (Q. 31, A. 2),
+nevertheless it cannot be said that He is "another God"; forasmuch as
+this adjective "another" would be understood to apply to the
+substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a
+distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition "He begot another God"
+is tolerated by some, provided that "another" be taken as a
+substantive, and the word "God" be construed in apposition with it.
+This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for
+fear of giving occasion to error.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: To say, "God begot God Who is God the Father," is
+wrong, because since the word "Father" is construed in apposition to
+"God," the word "God" is restricted to the person of the Father; so
+that it would mean, "He begot God, Who is Himself the Father"; and
+then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false.
+Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, "He begot God Who
+is not God the Father." If however, we understand these words not to
+be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the
+contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is
+false; so that the meaning would be, "He begot God Who is God Who is
+the Father." Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that
+it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false,
+and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the
+negative and affirmative are false, because this relative "Who" in
+the affirmative proposition can be referred to the _suppositum_;
+whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the
+_suppositum._ Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that "to be God
+the Father" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the
+negative sense is that "to be God the Father," is to be removed from
+the Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however,
+appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri
+Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Abstract Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand
+for the person, so that this proposition is true, "Essence begets
+essence." For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): "The Father and
+the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken
+singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies
+generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is
+generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it
+seems that the divine essence is generated.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear
+from what is above explained (Q. 3, A. 3). But, as was shown, it is
+true to say that "God begets God." Therefore this is also true:
+"Essence begets essence."
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is
+predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence
+can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the essence is "a thing begetting," because the
+essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is
+not begetting, the essence will be "a thing begetting," and "not
+begetting": which cannot be.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "The Father is the
+principle of the whole Godhead." But He is principle only by
+begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the
+Godhead.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): "Nothing begets
+itself." But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only,
+since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence.
+Therefore the essence does not beget essence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in
+asserting that as we can say "God begot God," so we can say "Essence
+begot essence": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity
+God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong,
+because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into
+account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of
+its signification as above stated (A. 4). Now although "God" is
+really the same as "Godhead," nevertheless the mode of signification
+is not in each case the same. For since this word "God" signifies the
+divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of
+signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the
+things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of
+this word, "God," as, for instance, we can say "God is begotten" or
+is "Begetter," as above explained (A. 4). The word "essence,"
+however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person,
+because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently,
+what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished
+from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would
+imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there
+exists distinction in the _supposita._
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy
+Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis
+than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of
+enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus,
+for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names,
+or even by personal names; as when we find "essence from essence"; or
+"wisdom from wisdom"; we should take the sense to be, _the Son_ who
+is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom.
+Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should
+be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly
+allied to the persons because actions belong to _supposita._ So
+"nature from nature," and "wisdom from wisdom" are less inexact than
+"essence from essence."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature
+numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically
+distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and
+ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted
+accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as
+the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either
+directly or accidentally.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although God and the divine essence are really the
+same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of
+signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode
+of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not
+follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification
+being different. This objection would hold good as regards things
+which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names
+consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them,
+whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the
+substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is
+considered in the light of _suppositum,_ whereas the adjective
+indicates something added to the _suppositum._ Therefore substantive
+personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are
+really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a
+distinct essence; but it belongs to the _suppositum_ implied in the
+substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be
+predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot
+say that the "essence is begetting"; yet we can say that the "essence
+is a thing begetting," or that it is "God begetting," if "thing" and
+God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently
+there exists no contradiction in saying that "essence is a thing
+begetting," and "a thing not begetting"; because in the first case
+"thing" stands for person, and in the second it stands for the
+essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: So far as Godhead is one in several _supposita,_ it
+agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So
+when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the
+term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as
+it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow
+that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the
+ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say
+that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or
+spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Persons Can Be Predicated of the Essential Terms?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of
+the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, "God is
+three persons"; or "God is the Trinity." For it is false to say, "man
+is every man," because it cannot be verified as regards any particular
+subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every
+man. In the same way this proposition, "God is the Trinity," cannot be
+verified of any one of the _supposita_ of the divine nature. For the
+Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So
+to say, "God is the Trinity," is false.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except
+by accidental predication; as when I say, "animal is man"; for it is
+accidental to animal to be man. But this name "God" as regards the
+three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene
+says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of
+the persons cannot be predicated of this name "God," except in an
+accidental sense.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii,
+in coena Domini], "We believe that one God is one divinely named
+Trinity."
+
+_I answer that,_ As above explained (A. 5), although adjectival
+terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the
+essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to
+the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not
+only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the
+three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be
+predicated of the essence as if we were to say, "The essence is the
+Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost." And because this word "God"
+can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (A. 4, ad 3),
+hence, as it is true to say, "The essence is the three persons"; so
+likewise it is true to say, "God is the three persons."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As above explained this term "man" can of itself stand
+for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the
+universal human nature. So it is false to say, "Man is every man";
+because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the
+contrary, this word "God" can of itself be taken for the divine
+essence. So, although to say of any of the _supposita_ of the divine
+nature, "God is the Trinity," is untrue, nevertheless it is true of
+the divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not
+take note of this distinction.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When we say, "God," or "the divine essence is the
+Father," the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in
+regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and
+singular. Hence, as this proposition, "The Father is God" is of
+itself true, so this proposition "God is the Father" is true of
+itself, and by no means accidentally.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Essential Names Should Be Appropriated to the Persons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be
+appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in
+faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as
+Jerome says, "careless words involve risk of heresy" [*In substance
+Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are
+common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may
+be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they
+are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than
+to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be
+appropriated to the persons.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract
+signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another;
+since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is
+the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when
+expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property
+is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential
+attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as
+what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential
+attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.
+
+_On the contrary,_ the Apostle says: "Christ the power of God and the
+wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24).
+
+_I answer that,_ For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting
+that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons.
+For although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by
+demonstration, as was above expounded (Q. 32, A. 1), nevertheless it
+is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us.
+Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the
+standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can
+derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures
+which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain
+regarding the personal properties, as was above explained (Q. 32, A.
+1). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image
+found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so
+also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes.
+And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the
+essential attributes is called "appropriation."
+
+The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the
+essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things
+which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who
+proceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by
+dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine
+says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble;
+lest anything of the kind be imagined of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to the
+persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make
+the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above
+explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation
+of the truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to the
+persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would
+follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which
+Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the
+Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son
+were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be
+called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is
+called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father
+Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both
+together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom
+begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper
+concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding;
+nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to
+prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is
+appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body,
+but is naturally prior to "white body," considered as white.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Essential Attributes Are Appropriated to the Persons in
+a Fitting Manner by the Holy Doctors?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are
+appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For
+Hilary says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father, the species in
+the Image; and use is in the Gift." In which words he designates
+three names proper to the persons: the name of the "Father," the name
+"Image" proper to the Son (Q. 35, A. 2), and the name "Bounty" or
+"Gift," which is proper to the Holy Ghost (Q. 38, A. 2). He also
+designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates "eternity"
+to the Father, species to the Son, and "use" to the Holy Ghost.
+This he does apparently without reason. For "eternity" imports
+duration of existence; species, the principle of existence; and
+'use' belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not
+found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are
+not fittingly appropriated to the persons.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): "Unity is
+in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the
+concord of equality and unity." This does not, however, seem fitting;
+because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is
+appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom
+begotten, as above explained (Q. 37, A. 2, ad 1). But, as he
+subjoins, "All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by
+the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost." The above, therefore, are
+not fittingly appropriated to the Persons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed
+"power," to the Son "wisdom," to the Holy Ghost "goodness." Nor does
+this seem fitting; for "strength" is part of power, whereas strength
+is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text,
+"Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is
+likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words,
+"strength [*Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all" (Luke
+6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.
+
+Obj. 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "What the Apostle
+says, "From Him, and by Him, and in Him," is not to be taken in a
+confused sense." And (Contra Maxim. ii) "'from Him' refers to the
+Father, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost." This,
+however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words "in Him" seem to
+imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes.
+Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the
+Father, Who is "the principle from no principle."
+
+Obj. 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to John
+14:6, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life"; and likewise "the book
+of life," according to Ps. 39:9, "In the beginning of the book it is
+written of Me," where a gloss observes, "that is, with the Father Who
+is My head," also this word "Who is"; because on the text of Isaias,
+"Behold I go to the Gentiles" (65:1), a gloss adds, "The Son speaks
+Who said to Moses, I am Who am." These appear to belong to the Son,
+and are not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De
+Vera Relig. 36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without
+any dissimilitude." So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son,
+Who has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son,
+as signifying "a thing from another"; for every book is written by
+someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son;
+because if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who am," the Trinity
+spoke, then Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy
+Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have said
+further, "He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent
+me to you," pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false;
+because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot
+be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.
+
+_I answer that,_ Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God
+from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from
+creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves
+to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is
+considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its
+intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth
+point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence
+this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.
+
+According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider
+God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary
+applies, according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father,
+species to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For "eternity" as
+meaning a "being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property
+of the Father, Who is "a principle without a principle." Species or
+beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes
+three conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things
+which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion" or
+"harmony"; and lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are
+called beautiful which have a bright color.
+
+The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch
+as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the
+Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin.
+vi, 10): "Where--that is, in the Son--there is supreme and primal
+life," etc.
+
+The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the
+express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be
+beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is
+indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), "Where there
+exists wondrous proportion and primal equality," etc.
+
+The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is
+the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide
+Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin.
+vi, 10): "As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to
+speak, the art of the omnipotent God," etc.
+
+"Use" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the
+"use" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of "to
+enjoy"; according as "to use" is to employ something at the beck of
+the will, and "to enjoy" means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De
+Trin. x, 11). So "use," whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each
+other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is
+what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): "That love, that delectation,
+that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him" (Hilary). But the
+"use" by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy
+Ghost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin.
+vi, 10): "In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the
+Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His
+immense bounty and wealth." Thus it is clear how "eternity,"
+species, and "use" are attributed or appropriated to the persons,
+but not essence or operation; because, being common, there is nothing
+in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons.
+
+The second consideration of God regards Him as "one." In that view
+Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates "unity" to the Father,
+"equality" to the Son, "concord" or "union" to the Holy Ghost. It is
+manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For
+"unity" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else;
+and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any
+other person is not presupposed since He is the "principle without
+principle." "Equality" implies unity as regards another; for that is
+equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is
+appropriated to the Son, Who is the "principle from a principle."
+"Union" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the
+Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can
+understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5)
+that "The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by
+reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost." For it
+is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first:
+just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul,
+because therein we find the first trace of life. Now "unity" is
+perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an
+impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other
+persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons
+be removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as
+soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son,
+not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but
+that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be
+called equal; because His equality is considered firstly in regard to
+the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from
+the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be
+excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the
+Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost;
+because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son
+are said to be united.
+
+According to the third consideration, which brings before us the
+adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be
+a third kind of appropriation, of "power," "wisdom," and "goodness."
+This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as
+regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of
+dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For "power" has
+the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly
+Father, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly
+father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. "Wisdom" has
+likeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but
+the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by
+reason of lack of years. "Goodness," as the nature and object of love,
+has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly
+spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to
+Isa. 25:4: "The spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the
+wall." "Strength" is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost,
+not as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to
+express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that the
+strong work done by an agent is its strength.
+
+According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His
+effects, there arise[s] appropriation of the expression "from Whom, by
+Whom, and in Whom." For this preposition "from" [ex] sometimes implies
+a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God;
+and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which
+can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is
+appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition
+"by" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say
+that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is not always
+appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly,
+according to the text, "All things were made by Him" (John 1:3); not
+that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a
+principle." Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form "by" which
+an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence,
+as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the
+expression "by Whom." The preposition "in" strictly denotes the
+habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in
+one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as
+existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him"
+should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are
+contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and
+governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the
+expression "in Him" is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is
+"goodness." Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first
+of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle
+without a principle": because the divine persons, of Whom the Father
+is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since
+each of Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural
+procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural
+power.
+
+Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth"
+belongs to the intellect, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), it is
+appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His.
+For truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing
+itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are
+referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be
+said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth
+as appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means
+knowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained
+(Q. 24, A. 1), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to
+possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son;
+although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain
+kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of
+the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence
+of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work
+produced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an
+appropriation to a person. The expression "Who is" is appropriated to
+the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an
+adjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the
+delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as
+the word "Who" is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate
+to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken
+personally; as, for instance, were we to say, "The Son is the
+begotten 'Who is,'" inasmuch as "God begotten is personal." But
+taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun
+"this" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person,
+nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically
+treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person;
+as we may say, "this stone," and "this ass." So, speaking in a
+grammatical sense, so far as the word "God" signifies and stands for
+the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun
+"this," according to Ex. 15:2: "This is my God, and I will glorify
+Him."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 40
+
+OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or
+properties; and there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether relation is the same as person?
+
+(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?
+
+(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons
+leaves the hypostases distinct?
+
+(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding,
+presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Relation Is the Same As Person?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in God relation is not the same as
+person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others
+are multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in
+the person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration.
+Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the
+Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 24),
+nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor
+can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for
+otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation,
+or property, is not the same as person in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, when several things are identical, what is
+predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is
+predicated of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say
+that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting.
+Therefore property is not the same as person in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same,
+according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by
+paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the
+persons.
+
+_I answer that,_ Different opinions have been held on this point. Some
+have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons;
+and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the
+relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in" something, but
+rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the
+relations "assistant," as above explained (Q. 28, A. 2). But
+since relation, considered as really existing in God, is the divine
+essence Itself, and the essence is the same as person, as appears from
+what was said above (Q. 39, A. 1), relation must necessarily be
+the same as person.
+
+Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties
+were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said,
+there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as
+stated above (Q. 32, A. 2). We must, however, say that there are
+properties in God; as we have shown (Q. 32, A. 2). These are
+designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons.
+So, since the nature of a form requires it to be "in" that of which it
+is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and
+yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God,
+and yet is God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Person and property are really the same, but differ in
+concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied,
+the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in
+God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity
+exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the
+divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it
+follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as
+"Godhead" and "God." And as the divine simplicity excludes the
+composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is
+attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power
+are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence.
+According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same as
+person. For personal properties are the same as the persons because
+the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the
+subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself,
+and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the
+non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the
+other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is
+His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of
+the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one
+self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two
+persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above
+explained (Q. 30, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The properties are said to be in the essence, only by
+mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity,
+not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the
+form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and
+distinguish the persons, but not the essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the notional
+acts: and acts belong to a _suppositum._ Now, properties are not
+designated as _supposita,_ but as forms of _supposita._ And so their
+mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being
+predicated of the properties.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Persons Are Distinguished by the Relations?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by
+the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the
+persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by
+themselves, and not by the relation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its
+genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But
+"hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance.
+Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But
+the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction.
+Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first
+principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which
+comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is
+towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God
+cannot be relation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone
+multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons."
+
+_I answer that,_ In whatever multitude of things is to be found
+something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of
+distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence,
+we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are
+several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the
+divine persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although these
+do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification;
+for "origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and
+"relation" by way of the form, as "paternity."
+
+Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that
+the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say
+that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former
+begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the
+properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons
+as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest
+the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the
+material principles.
+
+This opinion, however, cannot stand--for two reasons. Firstly,
+because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their
+distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic
+to both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their
+form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but
+means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies
+the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator.
+Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator
+should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and
+in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be
+distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to
+presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the
+persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons
+are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because
+the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if
+what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence
+remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must
+constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the
+properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons,
+inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity
+is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract
+and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin
+that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an
+active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it
+presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as
+"nativity," signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet
+constituting the person.
+
+It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are
+distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in
+both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of
+understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations;
+whence this name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the
+hypostasis; whereas this term "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies
+property only; forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation
+which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term
+"Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive
+and constitutive of the hypostasis.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The persons are the subsisting relations themselves.
+Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them
+to be distinguished by the relations.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as regards
+being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as
+regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their
+distinction.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it
+approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible
+distinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by that which
+distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects,
+when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does
+not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said
+that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word "another"
+signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the
+order of nature.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Hypostases Remain If the Relations Are Mentally Abstracted
+from the Persons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the hypostases remain if the
+properties or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For
+that to which something is added, may be understood when the addition
+is taken away; as man is something added to animal which can be
+understood if rational be taken away. But person is something added to
+hypostasis; for person is "a hypostasis distinguished by a property of
+dignity." Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a
+person, the hypostasis remains.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is someone,
+are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by paternity,
+supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that the Son,
+in Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone." So when
+paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains
+"someone"--that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed
+from person, the hypostasis remains.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is not
+the same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son,
+nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten." But if He had not
+begotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if
+paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the
+Father as unbegotten.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing
+else than birth." But He is Son by "birth." Therefore, if filiation
+be removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds
+as regards the other persons.
+
+_I answer that,_ Abstraction by the intellect is twofold--when the
+universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from
+man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a
+circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The
+difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in
+the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which
+the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of
+rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the
+intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the
+form from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the
+intellect; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from
+brass, there remains in our intellect separately the understanding
+both of a circle, and of brass. Now, although there is no universal
+nor particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless,
+as regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of
+these things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6)
+that "substance is common and hypostasis is particular." So, if we
+speak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular, the
+common universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties
+are removed; but not the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it
+were, a particular.
+
+But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the
+non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases
+and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's
+being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father,
+the Father's hypostasis or person remains.
+
+If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of
+the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not
+to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added
+to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own
+_supposita,_ inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus
+paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something
+distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So,
+as relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above
+explained (A. 2), it follows that if the personal relations are
+mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however,
+think, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not
+distinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father
+is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as
+from another by generation. And that the consequent relations which
+are to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of
+a person, and are thus called "personal properties." Hence, if these
+relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the
+persons, remain.
+
+But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations
+distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above (A. 2);
+secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person,
+as appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that,
+"person is the individual substance of a rational nature." Hence, to
+have hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the
+rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing
+property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all
+of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing
+property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood as
+subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing
+property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer
+remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature
+removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual substances.
+Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially
+to both.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a
+person, and is "someone," or a hypostasis. It does not follow,
+however, that the Son is not "someone" or a hypostasis; just as it
+does not follow that He is not a person.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of
+the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity were removed,
+as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of
+the Father; for this would be impossible, since "being unbegotten"
+says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But
+he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not every unbegotten being
+is the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the hypostasis of the
+Father does not remain in God, as distinguished from the other
+persons, but only as distinguished from creatures; as the Jews
+understand it.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are understood
+before the properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. i,
+D, xxvii) that "the Father always is, because He is ever begetting the
+Son." So it seems that generation precedes paternity in the order of
+intelligence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in the order of intelligence every relation
+presupposes that on which it is founded; as equality presupposes
+quantity. But paternity is a relation founded on the action of
+generation. Therefore paternity presupposes generation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, active generation is to paternity as nativity is
+to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity; for the Son is so
+called because He is born. Therefore paternity also presupposes
+generation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Generation is the operation of the person of the
+Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore
+in the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the opinion that the properties do not
+distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest
+them as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that
+the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional
+acts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that "because
+He begets, He is the Father." A distinction, however, is needed if we
+suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the divine
+hypostases. For origin has in God an active and passive
+signification--active, as generation is attributed to the Father, and
+spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and
+the Son; passive, as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession
+to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in the
+passive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the person
+proceeding; because origin, as passively understood, signifies the way
+to a person constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified
+actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal
+relation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration
+precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative property
+common to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father
+can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus
+again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act,
+for relation, as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as
+it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the
+relation, as an action presupposes a person acting.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When the Master says that "because He begets, He is
+Father," the term "Father" is taken as meaning relation only, but not
+as signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary
+to say conversely that because He is Father He begets.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This objection avails of paternity as a relation, but
+not as constituting a person.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and so,
+in the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as
+constituting the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a
+proceeding from the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes
+the personal property of the Father.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 41
+
+OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts,
+concerning which six points of inquiry arise:
+
+(1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?
+
+(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?
+
+(3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or
+from something?
+
+(4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?
+
+(5) What this power means?
+
+(6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Notional Acts Are to Be Attributed to the Persons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be
+attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever
+is predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine
+substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action is one
+of the ten genera. Therefore any action attributed to God belongs
+to His essence, and not to a notion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, "everything
+which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance,
+or relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by
+the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by
+the names of the persons, or by the names of the properties.
+Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be
+attributed to the persons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion.
+But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional
+acts to be placed in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says:
+"It is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional
+acts are to be placed in God.
+
+_I answer that,_ In the divine persons distinction is founded on
+origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts.
+Wherefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we
+must attribute notional acts to the persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a
+twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from
+Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions
+which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures
+from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God
+regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts
+which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because
+the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons,
+as is clear from what was above explained (Q. 32, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of the
+persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are
+altogether the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and
+nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D,
+xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing
+from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be
+changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some
+cause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement;
+for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called
+"passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another
+and terminating in what is moved, is called "action." Hence, if we
+take away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin,
+in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is
+from that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists,
+the personal action of the one producing a person is only the
+habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle;
+which habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we
+cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the
+manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and
+wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ
+from the relations which result from action and passion, and
+therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons
+separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner
+of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same,
+differing only in their mode of signification.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Action, so far as it means origin of movement,
+naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not
+attributed to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a
+grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of
+speaking, as we attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son
+"to be begotten."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Notional Acts Are Voluntary?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For
+Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led
+to beget the Son."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom
+of the Son of His love" (Col. 1:13). But love belongs to the will.
+Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy
+Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He
+proceeds voluntarily.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the
+Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore
+the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the
+Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He
+begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad
+Orosium qu. vii).
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father
+begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."
+
+_I answer that,_ When anything is said to be, or to be made by the
+will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the
+ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man
+by my will--that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be
+said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by
+will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the
+other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it
+is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the
+principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the God
+the Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the
+creature by His will. Whence in the book _De Synod.,_ it is said: "If
+anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is
+said to be made, let him be anathema." The reason of this is that
+will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way
+that nature is determined to one, while the will is not determined to
+one; and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the
+agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing
+there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as
+it is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the will
+acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas
+understood. Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on
+the quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and understanding.
+So the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or
+that way; whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the
+principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is
+far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a
+created being; because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a
+creature is made from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the
+Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will,
+taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must
+assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature.
+Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of God gave to all
+creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son a nature
+derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things created
+are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God, subsists
+in the perfect likeness of God."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This saying is directed against those who did not admit
+even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the
+Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by
+nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves
+suffer many things against our will from natural necessity--as, for
+instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what
+precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus
+we read: "Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He
+were led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God,
+inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if
+love were the principle of the Son's generation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills something
+naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise
+God naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things
+other than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in
+itself, as above explained (Q. 19, A. 3). Now, the Holy Ghost
+proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He
+proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of will.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the
+mind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally
+understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the
+conception of the divine Word is natural.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and "by
+reason of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold
+meaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus
+necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause,
+when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far
+as without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well
+attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation
+necessary; because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject
+to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of itself" which
+cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in
+the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Notional Acts Proceed from Something?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from
+anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will
+be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else,
+since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it
+follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son,
+and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that,
+"In them nothing diverse or different exists." If the Father begets
+the Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if
+it be something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated
+therefrom just as we say, "The man is white," since the man remains,
+when not from white he is made white--it follows that either the
+Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father
+is the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the
+Son from something, but from nothing.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle
+regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from
+His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of
+the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a material
+principle, because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it
+is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the principle
+of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates,
+which was disproved above (Q. 39, A. 5).
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three
+persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not
+another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another
+thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the
+Father's essence.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture
+the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus. 24:5), in the
+person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most
+High, the first-born before all creatures": and further on (Ecclus.
+24:14) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning,
+and before the world was I created." Therefore the Son was not
+begotten from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object
+concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (Zech. 12:1):
+"Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the
+foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him";
+and (Amos 4:13) according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "I
+Who form the earth, and create the spirit."
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says:
+"God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal
+to Himself."
+
+_I answer that,_ The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the
+Father's substance. For it was explained above (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 33,
+AA. 2 ,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly
+exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true "generation,"
+whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and "making," that the
+maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a
+bench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a
+created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out
+of nothing, as will be shown later on (Q. 45, A. 1), not as if this
+nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because
+the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him without anything
+else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the
+Father as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what
+the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of
+filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if
+the Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not
+be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated
+(1 John 5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ."
+Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made,
+but begotten.
+
+That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of
+God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain
+likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is
+the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the "only
+begotten," according to John 1:18, "The only begotten Son, Who is in
+the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are
+entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the
+"first begotten," according to Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew He also
+predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He
+might be the first born of many brethren." Therefore the Son of God is
+begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as
+man is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation
+passes into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine
+nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father
+in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but
+communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin
+remaining as explained above (Q. 40, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the
+preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle,
+but not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter,
+is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the
+divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the
+Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this
+denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he
+expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"--that
+is, of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv,
+13): "When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I
+said more explicitly, of the essence of the Father."
+
+This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the
+words. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence;
+but not that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them
+otherwise, by observing that the preposition "of" [de] always denotes
+consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the
+builder, since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say,
+however, that something is "of" another, if this is its
+consubstantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether it
+be an active principle, as the son is said to be "of" the father, or
+a material principle, as a knife is "of" iron; or a formal principle,
+but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not
+accidental to another, for we can say that an angel is "of" an
+intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is
+begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of
+the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of
+the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we
+say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is
+nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the
+preposition, so there is no parity of argument.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be
+understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created
+wisdom given by God to creatures: for it is said, "He created her
+[namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all
+His works" (Ecclus. 1:9, 10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in
+one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for
+wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom.
+The saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the
+Son, so that the sense be, "From the beginning and before the world
+was I made"--that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or
+the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into
+our minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what
+is generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains
+to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but
+the creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is
+called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of
+creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from
+generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way
+Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The
+other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the
+created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the
+breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible
+substance.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 4]
+
+Whether in God There Is a Power in Respect of the Notional Acts?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect
+of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or
+passive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God
+nothing which we call passive power, as above explained (Q. 25, A.
+1); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another,
+since the divine persons were not made, as stated above (A. 3).
+Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the
+divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary.
+Therefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons
+proceed, there cannot be power in God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept
+of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs
+to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as
+regards intellect and will, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). Therefore,
+in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the
+Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of
+God the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional
+acts.
+
+_I answer that,_ As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be
+also a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the
+principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of
+generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of
+spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father,
+and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power
+of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every
+generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we
+must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power
+of spirating.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not
+proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts
+has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the
+person as proceeding.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a
+consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence,
+in God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only
+in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in
+this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to
+be, so also is it possible that the Son should be generated.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies
+distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must
+observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real
+distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real
+distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of
+which He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct
+from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God
+the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise
+action would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to
+those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are
+distinct from God, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe
+power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to
+God the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting
+and of spirating. But "to understand" and "to will" are not such
+actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from
+God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to
+these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but
+only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we
+designate by different terms the intellect and the act of
+understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His
+very essence which has no principle.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Power of Begetting Signifies a Relation, and Not the
+Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of
+spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power
+signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active
+power is the principle of action, as we find in _Metaph._ v, text 17.
+But in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally.
+Therefore, in God, power does not signify essence but relation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are
+not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore,
+the same applies to the power of begetting.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to
+the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the
+three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not
+signify the essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He
+wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence.
+Therefore, also, the power to beget.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have said that the power to beget signifies
+relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is
+properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that
+produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as
+to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his
+begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the
+power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power
+of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter.
+
+Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine
+nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power
+of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): "The birth of God
+cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot
+subsist other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God."
+
+We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies
+principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii),
+and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as
+identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For
+although paternity is signified as the form of the Father,
+nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person
+of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature.
+Now the individual form in things created constitutes the person
+begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise
+Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood
+as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person of
+the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by
+which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like
+to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that
+generation is the "work of nature," not of nature generating, but of
+nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore
+the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the
+relation indirectly.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a
+principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it
+signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in
+which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that
+by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it
+makes, and the generator from that which it generates: but that by
+which the generator generates is common to generated and generator,
+and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since,
+therefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the
+Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of
+identity, and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore,
+from the fact that we say that the divine essence "is the principle
+by which the Begetter begets," it does not follow that the divine
+essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we
+were to say that the divine essence begets.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the
+act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the
+act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of
+reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When I speak of the "power of begetting," power is
+signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say,
+the "essence of the Father." Wherefore in respect of the essence,
+which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three
+persons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper
+to the person of the Father.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Several Persons Can Be the Term of One Notional Act?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to
+several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or
+spirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But
+the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He
+cannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore
+there can be several Sons in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): "The Son
+did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved
+Him not."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than
+has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God
+can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished
+after begetting the Son.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In God "that which is possible," and "that which is"
+do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be
+several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be
+more than three Persons in God; which is heretical.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Athanasius says, in God there is only "one Father,
+one Son, one Holy Ghost." For this four reasons may be given.
+
+The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are
+the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations
+themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or
+several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or
+more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible
+except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species
+are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God.
+Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as
+there could be but one subsistent whiteness.
+
+The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God
+understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there
+can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which
+person is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of
+love, which person is the Holy Ghost.
+
+The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons
+proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said
+(A. 2), and nature is determined to one.
+
+The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons.
+For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation
+is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is
+similar in regard to the other persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the
+same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the
+power "generandi" [of begetting] thus taking "generandi" as the
+gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son
+has the "power to beget." Just as, although Father and Son have the
+same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason
+of the notional term added. But if the word "generandi" [of being
+begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power
+"generandi" is in the Son--that is, the power of being begotten. The
+same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal
+verb, so that the sense be "the power of generation"--that is, a
+power by which it is generated by some person.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the
+Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He
+could not, as we shall see later on (Q. 42, A. 6, ad 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in
+God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have
+explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to
+any lack of begetting power in the Father.\
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 42
+
+OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another:
+firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard
+to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.
+
+(1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?
+
+(2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He
+proceeds in eternity?
+
+(3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?
+
+(4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?
+
+(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?
+
+(6) Whether they are equal in power?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Equality in God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the
+divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one
+in quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the
+divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic
+quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity,
+which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of
+discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore
+equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have
+said (Q. 39, A. 2). Now essence is signified by way of form. But
+agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal.
+Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not
+of equality.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are
+equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine
+persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine
+says (De Trin. vi, 10): "If an image answers perfectly to that
+whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that
+which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image." But the
+Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the
+Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to
+the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the
+relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says that "the three persons are
+co-eternal and co-equal to one another."
+
+_I answer that,_ We must needs admit equality among the divine persons.
+For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15, 16, 17),
+equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot
+admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius
+says (De Trin. i): "They must needs admit a difference [namely, of
+Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do,
+who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus
+involving a plurality." Now the reason of this is that unequal things
+cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else
+than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any
+inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same
+essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is
+impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of "bulk" or
+dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things,
+and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of
+"virtue," which is measured according to the perfection of some
+nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of
+something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or
+less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly
+by its source--that is, by the perfection of that form or nature:
+such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great
+heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine
+says (De Trin. vi, 18) that "in things which are great, but not in
+bulk, to be greater is to be better," for the more perfect a thing is
+the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the
+effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for
+everything has being by reason of its form. The second effect is
+operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently
+virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to
+action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect
+nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as
+things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as
+Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: "We understand
+equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one
+of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or
+surpasses in power."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity,
+equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes
+excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be
+alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as
+the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said
+to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than
+another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and
+Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not
+only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the
+error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude
+the error of Arius.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two
+ways--namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns,
+equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the
+Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because
+the divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's.
+Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is
+therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the
+Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to
+creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "Equality and likeness are
+not mutual." For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch
+as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the
+form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.
+
+But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not
+in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son
+receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the
+Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is
+equalled to the Father, but not conversely.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to
+consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations
+in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both--namely,
+distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to
+itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons
+equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and
+essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is
+not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another
+by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to
+filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity
+and filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied
+indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons
+is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in
+its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the
+persons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says
+(Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these "it is only the terms that are
+relative."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Person Proceeding Is Co-eternal with His Principle, As
+the Son with the Father?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not
+co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius
+gives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of
+a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The
+second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent
+equality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a
+seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The
+fourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also
+consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an
+accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The
+sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives
+the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of
+spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by
+knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is
+transformation, as an image is made of brass; which transformation is
+material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have
+effect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but
+this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the
+Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an
+idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind.
+The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which
+implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that
+equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one
+thing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say
+that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a principle.
+But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not
+eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence
+everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is
+existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He
+begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is
+always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is
+begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process
+of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive
+things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion,
+it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be
+admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of
+the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Athanasius declares that "all the three persons are
+co-eternal with each other."
+
+_I answer that,_ We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the
+Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which
+proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due
+to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the
+part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently
+as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account
+of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it
+gives to the effect, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 2), so it can choose
+the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however,
+the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural
+power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as,
+for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first.
+Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle
+cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is
+successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to
+act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the
+instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to
+what has been said (Q. 41, A. 2), that the Father does not beget the
+Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was
+perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father
+produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be
+successively generated, and this generation would be material, and
+accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we
+conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus
+the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is
+co-eternal with both.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode
+of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine
+generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of
+these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied
+from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let
+Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the
+Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the
+name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the
+procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly;
+the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an
+intellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said
+of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not
+the principle of origin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts
+begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however,
+is not changed, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 2). Hence the Son is ever
+being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In time there is something indivisible--namely, the
+instant; and there is something else which endures--namely, time. But
+in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said
+above (Q. 10, A. 2, ad 1; A. 4, ad 2). But the generation of the Son
+is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to
+express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that
+"He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as
+Gregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is
+better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence
+of eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus,
+therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when
+He was not," as Arius said.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 3]
+
+Whether in the Divine Persons There Exists an Order of Nature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does
+not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the
+essence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not
+signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore
+there is no order of nature in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes
+before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in
+the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as
+declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no
+order of nature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists.
+But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is
+not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But
+there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there
+of nature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Where plurality exists without order, confusion
+exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius
+says. Therefore in God order exists.
+
+_I answer that,_ Order always has reference to some principle.
+Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle--namely, according
+to site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of
+demonstration; and according to each individual cause--so are there
+many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without
+priority, exists in God as we have stated (Q. 33, A. 1): so there
+must likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and
+this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine
+(Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby
+one is from another."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in
+general, not a special kind of origin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In things created, even when what is derived from a
+principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle
+still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally
+considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of
+cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding
+therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in
+the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the
+definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the
+persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the
+nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to
+another, not even in the order of nature and reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The order of nature means not the ordering of nature
+itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to
+natural origin.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a
+principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more
+correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Son Is Equal to the Father in Greatness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in
+greatness. For He Himself said (John 14:28): "The Father is greater
+than I"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:28): "The Son Himself shall
+be subject to Him that put all things under Him."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But
+paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not
+possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness
+to the Father.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts
+are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more
+than two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a
+part; for under relation or notion, several notions are included.
+Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the
+Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Phil. 2:6): "He thought it not robbery
+to be equal with God."
+
+_I answer that,_ The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in
+greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of
+His nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and
+filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession
+of the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same
+way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a
+certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to
+act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who
+begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a
+defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise.
+From what precedes (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 33, AA. 2 ,3), it is evident that
+in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say
+that the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that
+the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by
+change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the
+Father in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): "Remove
+bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and
+all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural
+nativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words are to be understood of Christ's human
+nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but
+in His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by
+Athanasius, "Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the Father
+in humanity": and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): "By the fact of giving,
+the Father is greater; but He is not less to Whom the same being is
+given"; and (De Synod.): "The Son subjects Himself by His inborn
+piety"--that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas
+"creatures are subject by their created weakness."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness
+signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (A. 1, ad 1),
+and belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have
+reference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or
+dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations.
+Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), "The question of
+origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what
+kind, or how great, is he?" Therefore, paternity is the Father's
+dignity, as also the Father's essence: since dignity is something
+absolute, and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same
+essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation,
+so the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is
+filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever
+dignity the Father has; but we cannot argue--"the Father has
+paternity, therefore the Son has paternity," for there is a
+transition from substance to relation. For the Father and the Son
+have the same essence and dignity, which exist in the Father by the
+relation of giver, and in the Son by relation of receiver.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In God relation is not a universal whole, although it
+is predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are
+one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of
+universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being. Person
+likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above (Q. 30,
+A. 4). Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only
+one; nor are all the persons something greater than only one; because
+the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Son Is in the Father, and Conversely?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each
+other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes of
+one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son
+in the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each
+mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing that has come out from another is within.
+But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to Mic.
+5:2: "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of
+eternity." Therefore the Son is not in the Father.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the
+Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be in
+the other.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 14:10): "I am in the Father, and
+the Father is in Me."
+
+_I answer that,_ There are three points of consideration as regards
+the Father and the Son; the essence, the relation and the origin; and
+according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The
+Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His
+own essence and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change
+on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's essence is in the
+Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His
+own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is
+His essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), "The
+unchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an
+unchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature of God to
+subsist in Him, for He is God in God." It is also manifest that as
+regards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the
+concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the
+procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect,
+inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is
+uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the
+Holy Ghost.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently
+represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes
+enumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each
+other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be
+found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle,
+except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which
+proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the
+interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and
+remains therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the
+distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not
+essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in
+the other.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Son Is Equal to the Father in Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father
+in power. For it is said (John 5:19): "The Son cannot do anything of
+Himself but what He seeth the Father doing." But the Father can act
+of Himself. Therefore the Father's power is greater than the Son's.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches
+than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son
+according to John 14:31: "As the Father gave Me commandment so do I."
+The Father also teaches the Son: "The Father loveth the Son, and
+showeth Him all things that Himself doth" (John 5:20). Also, the Son
+hears: "As I hear, so I judge" (John 5:30). Therefore the Father has
+greater power than the Son.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able to
+beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii,
+7), "Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the
+omnipotence of God the Father?" But the Son cannot beget a Son, as
+proved above (Q. 41, A. 6). Therefore the Son cannot do all that
+belongs to the Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him
+power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 5:19): "Whatsoever things the
+Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner."
+
+_I answer that,_ The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power.
+Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In
+creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the
+greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above (A. 4) that
+the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that
+the Son should be the Father's equal in greatness--that is, in
+perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the
+Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation
+to both.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The words, "the Son cannot of Himself do anything," do
+not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it
+is immediately added, "Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son
+doth in like manner"; but their meaning is to show that the Son
+derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature.
+Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), "The unity of the divine nature
+implies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does not
+act by Himself [a se]."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Father's "showing" and the Son's "hearing" are to
+be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the
+Son, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be
+explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge
+and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be
+referred to Christ in His human nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and
+filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the
+Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the
+Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to
+argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for
+generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the same
+omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father
+possessing power as "giving" signified when we say that He is able to
+beget; while the Son possesses the power of "receiving," signified by
+saying that He can be begotten.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 43
+
+THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which
+there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent?
+
+(2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?
+
+(3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent?
+
+(4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent?
+
+(5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent?
+
+(6) To whom the invisible mission is directed?
+
+(7) Of the visible mission.
+
+(8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 1]
+
+Whether a Divine Person Can Be Properly Sent?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly
+sent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine
+person is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by
+another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence
+Jerome says, commenting on Ezech. 16:53: "What is joined and tied in
+one body cannot be sent." But in the divine persons there is nothing
+that is separable, as Hilary says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one
+person is not sent by another.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes
+anew into another. But this does not apply to a divine person, Who is
+everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be
+sent.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 8:16): "I am not alone, but I and
+the Father that sent Me."
+
+_I answer that,_ the notion of mission includes two things: the
+habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to
+the end whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind
+of procession of the one sent from the sender: either according to
+command, as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as
+an adviser may be said to send the king to battle; or according to
+origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term
+to which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to
+be present there: either because in no way was he present before in
+the place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in
+some way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a
+divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the
+procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of
+existing in another; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father
+into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by
+taking our nature; whereas "He was" previously "in the world" (John
+1:1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it
+means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel;
+forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is
+the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which
+is according to equality, as explained above (Q. 42, AA. 4, 6).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously
+it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it is
+necessarily separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no
+place in the mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent
+neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases
+to exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without a
+separation, having only distinction of origin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This objection rests on the idea of mission according
+to local motion, which is not in God.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Mission Is Eternal, or Only Temporal?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that mission can be eternal. For Gregory
+says (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), "The Son is sent as He is begotten." But
+the Son's generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something
+temporally. But a divine person is not changed. Therefore the
+mission of a divine person is not temporal, but eternal.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of
+the divine persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gal. 4:4): "When the fullness of the
+time was come, God sent His Son."
+
+_I answer that,_ A certain difference is to be observed in all the
+words that express the origin of the divine persons. For some express
+only relation to the principle, as "procession" and "going forth."
+Others express the term of procession together with the relation to
+the principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as
+"generation" and "spiration"; for generation is the procession of the
+divine person into the divine nature, and passive spiration is the
+procession of the subsisting love. Others express the temporal term
+with the relation to the principle, as "mission" and "giving." For a
+thing is sent that it may be in something else, and is given that it
+may be possessed; but that a divine person be possessed by any
+creature, or exist in it in a new mode, is temporal.
+
+Hence "mission" and "giving" have only a temporal significance in
+God; but "generation" and "spiration" are exclusively eternal;
+whereas "procession" and "giving," in God, have both an eternal and a
+temporal signification: for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but
+temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or
+likewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible mission.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son,
+not from the Father, but from His mother; or it may be taken to mean
+that He could be sent because eternally begotten.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That a divine person may newly exist in anyone, or be
+possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the divine
+person, but from change in the creature; as God Himself is called
+Lord temporally by change of the creature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Mission signifies not only procession from the
+principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession.
+Hence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the
+eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the
+relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence
+the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal,
+not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double
+term, temporal and eternal.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Invisible Mission of the Divine Person Is Only According
+to the Gift of Sanctifying Grace?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission of the divine
+person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For the
+sending of a divine person means that He is given. Hence if the divine
+person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the
+divine person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and this
+is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is not given, but
+that His gifts are given.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, this preposition, "according to," denotes the
+habitude of some cause. But the divine person is the cause why the
+gift of sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according
+to Rom. 5:5, "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the
+Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." Therefore it is improperly said that
+the divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "the Son, when
+temporally perceived by the mind, is sent." But the Son is known not
+only by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith
+and knowledge. Therefore the divine person is not sent only according
+to the gift of sanctifying grace.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the
+apostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a gift of
+sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine
+person is not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the Holy
+Ghost proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification." But
+mission is a temporal procession. Since then the creature's
+sanctification is by sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission
+of the divine person is only by sanctifying grace.
+
+_I answer that,_ The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that
+He exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone;
+and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace.
+
+For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according
+to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which
+participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode,
+however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature
+wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the
+knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature
+by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself,
+according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the
+rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So
+no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is
+in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace.
+Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only
+according to sanctifying grace.
+
+Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy:
+and to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be
+according to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed
+by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying
+grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature
+is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift
+itself, but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the
+invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying
+grace; and yet the divine person Himself is given.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the
+divine person; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy
+Ghost is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift
+itself of grace is from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the words,
+"the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the Son can be known by us according to other
+effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us
+according to those effects.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as
+also does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces. Hence
+gratuitous grace is called the "manifestation of the Spirit" (1 Cor.
+12:7). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for the
+working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given to them with
+the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to
+them without the grace itself, it would not be simply said that the
+Holy Ghost was given, except with some qualifying term; just as we
+read of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy, or
+of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying
+or of working miracles.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Father Can Be Fittingly Sent?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is fitting also that the Father
+should be sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given.
+But the Father gives Himself since He can only be possessed by His
+giving Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father sends
+Himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the divine person is sent according to the
+indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us
+according to John 14:23: "We will come to him and make Our abode with
+him." Therefore each one of the divine persons is sent.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs to them all,
+except the notions and persons. But mission does not signify any
+person; nor even a notion, since there are only five notions, as
+stated above (Q. 32, A. 3). Therefore every divine person can be sent.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), "The Father alone
+is never described as being sent."
+
+_I answer that,_ The very idea of mission means procession from
+another, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above
+expounded. Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it
+fitting for Him to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and
+to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the sense of "giving" as a free bestowal of
+something, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to
+be enjoyed by the creature. But as implying the authority of the
+giver as regards what is given, "to be given" only applies in God to
+the Person Who is from another; and the same as regards "being sent."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although the effect of grace is also from the Father,
+Who dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost, still
+He is not described as being sent, for He is not from another. Thus
+Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Father, when known by
+anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He
+is, or from whom He proceeds."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Mission, meaning procession from the sender, includes
+the signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in
+general; thus "to be from another" is common to two of the notions.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 5]
+
+Whether It Is Fitting for the Son to Be Sent Invisibly?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be
+sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the divine person is
+according to the gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the
+Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:11: "One and the same Spirit
+worketh all things." Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the mission of the divine person is according to
+sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of the
+intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held
+without the gift of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I should
+have prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and
+if I should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and have
+not charity, I am nothing." Therefore, since the Son proceeds as the
+word of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent
+invisibly.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the mission of the divine person is a procession, as
+expounded above (AA. 1, 4). But the procession of the Son and of the
+Holy Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct
+missions if both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous,
+since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said of divine Wisdom (Wis. 9:10): "Send her
+from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness."
+
+_I answer that,_ The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying
+grace, according to John 14:23: "We will come to him, and will make Our
+abode with him." But that a divine person be sent to anyone by
+invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way
+within him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both
+to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by
+grace, and to be from another, it therefore belongs to both of them to
+be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace,
+still it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently
+He is not sent.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although all the gifts, considered as such, are
+attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the
+first Gift, since He is Love, as stated above (Q. 38, A. 1), some
+gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are
+appropriated in a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong
+to the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of
+the Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Son is sent
+to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a
+divine person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a
+likening of the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift
+of grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to
+the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy
+Ghost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas the Son is the
+Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. Hence
+Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): "The Word we speak of is knowledge
+with love." Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any
+kind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual
+illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love, as is
+said (John 6:45): "Everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath
+learned, cometh to Me," and (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire
+shall flame forth." Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20):
+"The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone." Now
+perception implies a certain experimental knowledge; and this is
+properly called wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge
+[sapida scientia], according to Ecclus. 6:23: "The wisdom of doctrine
+is according to her name."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since mission implies the origin of the person Who is
+sent, and His indwelling by grace, as above explained (A. 1), if we
+speak of mission according to origin, in this sense the Son's mission
+is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost, as generation is
+distinguished from procession. If we consider mission as regards the
+effect of grace, in this sense the two missions are united in the
+root which is grace, but are distinguished in the effects of grace,
+which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling
+of the affection. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be
+without the other, because neither takes place without sanctifying
+grace, nor is one person separated from the other.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Invisible Mission Is to All Who Participate Grace?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission is not to all
+who participate grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their
+share of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission; for it is
+said (John 7:39): "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was
+not yet glorified." Therefore the invisible mission is not to all
+partakers in grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the
+invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue; because
+progress in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or
+decreases; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the
+invisible mission is not to all who share in grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace.
+But mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas
+Christ, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God.
+Therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and
+it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore
+the invisible mission is not to all that have grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27),
+the invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every
+creature that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission
+is to every such creature.
+
+_I answer that,_ As above stated (AA. 3, 4 ,5), mission in its very
+meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he
+was not before, as occurs to creatures; or begins to exist where he
+was before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to
+the divine persons. Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is
+sent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain
+renewal by grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom
+are to be found these two conditions.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament
+Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that
+the invisible mission of the Son "is in man and with men. This was
+done in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets." Thus the
+words, "the Spirit was not yet given," are to be applied to that
+giving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day
+of Pentecost.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The invisible mission takes place also as regards
+progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De
+Trin. iv, 20), that "the Son is sent to each one when He is known
+and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived
+according to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards
+God, or united perfectly to Him." Such invisible mission, however,
+chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of
+a new act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace; as, for
+example, the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or of
+prophecy, or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself
+to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his possessions, or to
+undertake any arduous work.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the
+very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made to
+them subsequently, not by "intensity" of grace, but by the further
+revelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such
+an increase is by the "extension" of grace, because it extends to a
+greater number of objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent
+at the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards, since from
+the beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and
+grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the
+New Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments
+of the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent
+to the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to
+its term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the
+sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the sacraments.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 7]
+
+Whether It Is Fitting for the Holy Ghost to Be Sent Visibly?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent
+in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is said
+to be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be
+less than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent
+in a visible manner.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union to
+a visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. But
+the Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it
+cannot be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in
+others, unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the
+sacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost
+is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes
+place in all these things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth
+the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason
+of those visible creatures more than any other person.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest
+kind of creature--namely, the human nature. Therefore if the Holy
+Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational
+creatures.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the
+ministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So
+visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the
+angels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner
+is only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as
+invisible things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the
+invisible mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible
+mission; and to all who received the invisible mission, whether in
+the New or in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise
+to be sent; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is
+not sent visibly.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Matt. 3:16) that, when our Lord was
+baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove.
+
+_I answer that,_ God provides for all things according to the nature of
+each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the
+invisible by visible things, as explained above (Q. 12, A. 12).
+Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by
+the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has
+demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible
+creatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the
+invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest
+by some visible creatures.
+
+This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and
+to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as
+Love, to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of
+the Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus
+the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the
+Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He
+appeared, into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said
+of that creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of
+the nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the
+Holy Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared,
+into the unity of His person; so that what is said of it cannot be
+predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the Father by
+reason of any visible creature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not apply to
+the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as Augustine
+says (De Trin. ii, 6): "The prophetic vision is not displayed to
+corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the
+spiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire,
+saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost the same
+relation to these images that the Son has to the rock, because it is
+said, 'The rock was Christ' (1 Cor. 10:4). For that rock was already
+created, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it
+typified; whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify
+only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame
+of the burning bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people
+followed in the desert, and to the lightning and thunder issuing
+forth when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the
+bodily appearances of those things was that they might signify, and
+then pass away." Thus the visible mission is neither displayed by
+prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the
+body, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament,
+wherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify
+something. But the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as
+He showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made
+for that purpose.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still
+they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that
+person. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by
+diverse names, so also can They each one be signified by different
+things; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the
+author of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible
+mission of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational
+nature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of
+sanctification; whereas any other creature could be the sign of
+sanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a
+purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His
+person, since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action,
+but only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not
+required to last beyond what its use required.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of
+the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify the
+Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those
+visible creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that account
+the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: It is not necessary that the invisible mission should
+always be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as is
+said (1 Cor. 12:7)--"the manifestation of the Spirit is given to
+every man unto profit"--that is, of the Church. This utility consists
+in the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible
+signs. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles,
+according to Heb. 2:3, "which having begun to be declared by the
+Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard."
+
+Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to
+Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints on whom the
+Church was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the
+visible mission made to Christ should show forth the invisible mission
+made to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of
+His conception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the time
+of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show
+forth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual
+regeneration; hence the Father's voice spoke, "This is My beloved Son"
+(Matt. 3:17), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the
+only Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance
+of a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it
+was said, "Hear ye Him" (Matt. 17:5). To the apostles the mission was
+directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their
+ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said,
+"Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven" (John 20:23): and
+again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of
+teaching; whence it is said that, "they began to speak with divers
+tongues" (Acts 2:4). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was
+fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the
+visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the
+Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son
+manifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine persons were,
+however, given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed,
+cannot be called visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De
+Trin. ii, 17), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the
+divine person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 8]
+
+Whether a Divine Person Is Sent Only by the Person Whence He Proceeds
+Eternally?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the
+one whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin. iv),
+"The Father is sent by no one because He is from no one." Therefore if
+a divine person is sent by another, He must be from that other.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But
+there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from
+origin. Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one
+sending.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He does
+not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although He
+proceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De
+Trin. xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence
+He proceeds.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to Isa.
+48:16, "Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit." But the Son is
+not from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent by one from
+Whom He does not proceed.
+
+_I answer that,_ There are different opinions on this point. Some say
+that the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds
+eternally; and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the
+Holy Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature, by
+reason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine,
+however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent by Himself, and by
+the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the Son;
+so that to be sent in God does not apply to each person, but only to
+the person proceeding from another, whereas to send belongs to each
+person.
+
+There is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person
+is described as being sent, the person Himself existing from another
+is designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the
+mission of the divine person. Thus if the sender be designated as the
+principle of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but
+that person only Who is the principle of that person who is sent; and
+thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by the
+Father and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as
+the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the
+whole Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a
+man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect
+of grace.
+
+The answers to the objections appear from the above.
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ. 44-49)
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 44
+
+THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL
+THINGS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must
+consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration
+will be threefold:
+
+(1) of the production of creatures;
+
+(2) of the distinction between them;
+
+(3) of their preservation and government.
+
+Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered:
+
+(1) the first cause of beings;
+
+(2) the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause;
+
+(3) the principle of the duration of things.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?
+
+(2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent
+coordinate principle with Him?
+
+(3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there
+are other exemplar causes?
+
+(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Is Necessary That Every Being Be Created by God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being
+be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
+without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be
+found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its
+cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can
+be understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and
+therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by
+God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to
+exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an
+efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because
+whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are
+many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are
+from God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated
+by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the
+efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text
+3); therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient
+cause.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Rom. 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and
+in Him are all things."
+
+_I answer that,_ It must be said that every being in any way existing
+is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must
+be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron
+becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Q. 3, A. 4)
+when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially
+self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (Q. 11, AA. 3, 4) that
+subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting,
+it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients.
+Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are
+beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which
+are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be
+more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses
+being most perfectly.
+
+Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude;
+and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in
+being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every
+truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all
+heat.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of the
+definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on
+what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has
+being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a
+being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without
+having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not
+enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for
+us to find a being uncaused.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This objection has led some to say that what is
+necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly
+false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are
+the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says
+(Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have
+a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is
+required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but
+because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this
+conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and
+consequent be possible or impossible.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as though
+it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in
+reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient
+cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of
+mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause
+is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the
+mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from
+its efficient cause.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Primary Matter Is Created by God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God.
+For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else
+(Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore
+primary matter cannot have been made by God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a
+division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first
+passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two
+principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the
+other.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since
+every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
+everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only
+in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is
+against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast
+Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"--viz. angels--"the other
+nigh unto nothing"--viz. primary matter.
+
+_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were
+step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of
+grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except
+sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not
+consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in
+relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation.
+And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was
+uncreated, they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes,
+as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that
+kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a
+distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter
+they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation
+to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such
+transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as
+the oblique circle [*The zodiac, according to Aristotle (De Gener.
+ii)], or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into
+consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate
+species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is
+contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being;
+for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore,
+considered "being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or
+as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to
+things. Then others there were who arose to the consideration of
+"being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as
+"these," or as "such," but as "beings."
+
+Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must
+be the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by
+accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial
+forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in
+any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is
+created by the universal cause of things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of
+"becoming" in particular--that is, from form to form, either
+accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things
+according to their emanation from the universal principle of being;
+from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is
+excluded from the former mode of being made.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable
+that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first
+active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one
+perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
+says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is not
+created, but that it is not created without form; for though
+everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is
+necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all
+that belongs to its being is created.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Exemplar Cause Is Anything Besides God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something
+besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures
+are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar
+cause.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something
+self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated above
+(A. 1). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by
+participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all
+sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but
+also individuating principles added to the principles of the species.
+Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for
+instance, a _per se_ man, and a _per se_ horse, and the like, which
+are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species
+themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there
+is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are
+some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular
+things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion
+follows as above.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div.
+Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life,
+and before self-subsisting wisdom.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas,
+according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which
+are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of
+things are not outside God.
+
+_I answer that,_ God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In
+proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything
+an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive
+a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in
+matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the
+exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in
+the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive
+determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the
+divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the
+order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things.
+And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of
+all things, which types we have called ideas--i.e. exemplar forms
+existing in the divine mind (Q. 15, A. 1). And these ideas, though
+multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart
+from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence
+can be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore
+God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things
+created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of
+its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some
+kind of imitation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness
+to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like
+to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him,
+forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is
+like to the house in the architect's mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man
+without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man
+is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to
+anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior
+species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other
+sensible things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although every science and definition is concerned only
+with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the
+same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding.
+For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from
+the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the
+universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their
+exemplars.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing
+life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself,
+sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any
+self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 4]
+
+Whether God Is the Final Cause of All Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all
+things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God
+needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing
+generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),
+because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But
+God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the
+final cause of all things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not
+desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the
+end of all things.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If,
+therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it
+follows that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has made all
+things for Himself."
+
+_I answer that,_ Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would
+not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it
+were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered
+as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the
+impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient
+intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are
+both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents,
+and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition
+of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent
+only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to
+communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every
+creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness
+of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness
+is the end of all things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent,
+which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not
+belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal
+giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His
+own goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of
+generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the
+generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise
+the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the
+generator, since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All things desire God as their end, when they desire
+some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or
+natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and
+desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final
+cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows
+that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this
+does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him,
+some of which come into our mind before others.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 45
+
+THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from
+the First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) What is creation?
+
+(2) Whether God can create anything?
+
+(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?
+
+(4) To what things it belongs to be created?
+
+(5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
+
+(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any
+one Person?
+
+(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?
+
+(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature
+and of the will?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 1]
+
+Whether to Create Is to Make Something from Nothing?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything
+from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To
+make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make
+something by bringing forth something from what was already."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered
+from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and
+from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation
+appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions.
+Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being
+to being.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of some
+cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a
+statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of
+being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make
+something from nothing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ On the text of Gen. 1, "In the beginning God
+created," etc., the gloss has, "To create is to make something from
+nothing."
+
+_I answer that,_ As said above (Q. 44, A. 2), we must consider not
+only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but
+also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is
+God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now
+what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that
+emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is
+made from "not-man," and white from "not-white." Hence if the
+emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be
+considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed
+before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore
+as the generation of a man is from the "not-being" which is
+"not-man," so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from
+the "not-being" which is "nothing."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense,
+according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when
+we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of
+creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term
+_wherefrom,_ but from the term _whereto._ Therefore a change is more
+perfect and excellent when the term _whereto_ of the change is more
+noble and excellent, although the term _wherefrom,_ corresponding to
+the term _whereto,_ may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply
+nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial
+form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the
+substantial form, which is the term _wherefrom_ in generation, is
+more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term _wherefrom_ in
+alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than
+generation and alteration, because the term _whereto_ is the whole
+substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term
+_wherefrom_ is simply not-being.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing, this
+preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only
+order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i.e. after
+morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition
+"from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word
+"nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense,
+then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now
+and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the
+preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It is made
+from nothing--i.e. it is not made from anything"--as if we were to
+say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does not speak of anything.
+And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is
+made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition "from" [ex]
+implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense,
+it imports the material cause, which is denied.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Can Create Anything?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because,
+according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient
+philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing
+is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the
+contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make
+the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation
+are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything
+from nothing, or create.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to
+be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
+creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as
+appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of
+what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to
+be made out of nothing by God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been
+becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same
+time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what
+is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it
+would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time.
+Therefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having
+been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which
+the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything
+should be made from nothing.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite
+distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not
+happen that something is made from nothing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
+created heaven and earth."
+
+_I answer that,_ Not only is it [not] impossible that anything should
+be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were
+created by God, as appears from what has been said (Q. 44, A. 1). For
+when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from
+which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by
+his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or
+brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action
+of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards
+their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act
+from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing
+presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above
+(Q. 44, AA. 1, 2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is
+the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that
+God brings things into being from nothing.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above (Q. 44, A. 2),
+considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular
+causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action;
+whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from nothing."
+But this has no place in the first emanation from the universal
+principle of things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Creation is not change, except according to a mode of
+understanding. For change means that the same something should be
+different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the
+same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in
+motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is
+the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the
+subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole
+substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as
+different now and before only according to our way of understanding,
+so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and
+afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the
+substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations
+(Phys. iii, text 20, 21), it must follow that when motion is
+withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the
+creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of
+understanding as was said above (Q. 13, A. 1), creation is signified
+by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is
+to make something from nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made"
+are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be
+changed," because "to make" and "to be made" import a relation of
+cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change
+only as a consequence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In things which are made without movement, to become
+and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the
+term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated
+and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of
+movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the
+same time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak
+of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not
+previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is
+being created and is already created at the same time.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if
+there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is
+plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken
+to signify a change existing between two forms.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Creation Is Anything in the Creature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that creation is not anything in the
+creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to
+the creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to
+the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the
+Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be
+something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything
+in the creature.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the
+creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:
+since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the
+creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same
+reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to
+infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if creation is anything besides the created
+substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident
+is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of
+creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term
+of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the
+accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the
+action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action
+and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is greater for a thing to be made according to
+its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or
+accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby
+anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form,
+is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation,
+whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something
+in the thing created.
+
+_I answer that,_ Creation places something in the thing created
+according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by
+movement, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is
+made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the
+particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the
+production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is
+God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when
+movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as
+was said above (A. 2, ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a
+certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even
+as in passion, which implies movement, is implied a relation to the
+principle of motion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Creation signified actively means the divine action,
+which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God
+relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation
+of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real
+relation, as was said above (Q. 13, A. 7) in treating of the divine
+names.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Because creation is signified as a change, as was said
+above (A. 2, ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover
+and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium
+between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation
+is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further
+creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature
+being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations,
+but by themselves; as was also shown above (Q. 42, A. 1, ad 4), in
+treating of the equality of the Persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The creature is the term of creation as signifying a
+change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and
+is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident.
+Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of
+the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the
+creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it
+should be created; because creation imports a relation of the
+creature to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 4]
+
+Whether to Be Created Belongs to Composite and Subsisting Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to
+composite and subsisting things. For in the book, _De Causis_ (prop.
+iv) it is said, "The first of creatures is being." But the being of a
+thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking
+does not belong to subsisting and composite things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite
+things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
+component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is
+properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
+natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the
+thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter,
+and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
+created heaven and earth." But heaven and earth are subsisting
+composite things. Therefore creation belongs to them.
+
+_I answer that,_ To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was
+shown above (Q. 44, A. 2, ad 2, 3). Now, to be made is directed to the
+being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong
+to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to
+subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of
+separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material
+substances. For being belongs to that which has being--that is, to
+what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like
+are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because
+something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its
+subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.
+vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a
+being." Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting
+things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought
+to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas,
+properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the proposition "the first of created things is
+being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation,
+but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created
+thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is
+"this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the
+Universal Being, as was said above (A. 1). We use a similar way of
+speaking when we say that "the first visible thing is color,"
+although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Creation does not mean the building up of a composite
+thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite"
+is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all
+its principles.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This reason does not prove that matter alone is
+created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for
+creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 5]
+
+Whether It Belongs to God Alone to Create?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to
+create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34),
+what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures
+are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make
+their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man.
+Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself.
+But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no
+matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the
+thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But
+a "contrary" resists more than "nothing." Therefore it requires more
+power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a
+creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more
+therefore can a creature do this.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the power of the maker is considered according to
+the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we
+proved above when treating of the infinity of God (Q. 7, AA. 2, 3,
+4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by
+creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of
+a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good
+nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other
+creatures.
+
+_I answer that,_ It sufficiently appears at the first glance,
+according to what precedes (A. 1), that to create can be the action
+of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the
+more universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most
+universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of
+the first and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is
+said (De Causis prop., iii) that "neither intelligence nor the soul
+gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation." Now
+to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to
+creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God
+alone.
+
+It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of
+another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts
+by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of
+fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper
+act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the
+power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that
+the first separate substance created by God created another after
+itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the
+substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in
+the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can
+communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter
+can create ministerially, not by its own power.
+
+But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause
+does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch
+as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect
+of the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to
+what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be
+any need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that
+a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form,
+produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the
+principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is
+presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence
+nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect,
+since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed
+by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible
+for any creature to create, either by its own power or
+instrumentally--that is, ministerially.
+
+And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no
+body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its
+action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which
+is contrary to the very idea of creation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a
+likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by
+applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the
+cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause
+of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man
+begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter
+whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man
+participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to
+speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own being, as we
+have said above (Q. 7, AA. 1, 2). Therefore no created being can
+produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in
+"this": and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is
+this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But
+in an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything
+whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form,
+whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an
+immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like
+to itself as regards its being, but only as regards some added
+perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an
+inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x). In this way even in
+heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (Eph. 3:15): "From
+whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named." From which
+evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless
+something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i,
+text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. And
+so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the
+potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire
+intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but
+is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the
+potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act;
+and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is
+required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much
+greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality
+pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much
+greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the
+substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being
+made; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore
+although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power,
+yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which
+appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is
+required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the
+potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which
+produces something from no presupposed potentiality is infinite,
+because there is no proportion between "no potentiality" and the
+potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural agent, as there is
+no proportion between "not being" and "being." And because no
+creature has simply an infinite power, any more than it has an
+infinite being, as was proved above (Q. 7, A. 2), it follows that no
+creature can create.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 6]
+
+Whether to Create Is Proper to Any Person?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that to create is proper to some Person.
+For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is
+perfect is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the
+divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and is more
+perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of
+its principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude.
+Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the
+processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each
+other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever
+difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them
+according to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the
+causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons;
+for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that "He is the Creator
+of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by
+Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that
+He is "Lord and Life-giver." Therefore the causation of creatures
+belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature
+flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person,
+this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect
+is caused by every essential attribute--viz. by power, goodness and
+wisdom--and thus does not belong to one more than to another.
+Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed
+to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in
+creating according to relations and processions.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things
+caused are the common work of the whole Godhead.
+
+_I answer that,_ To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce
+the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the
+principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action;
+for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create
+belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is
+common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one
+Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.
+
+Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their
+procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For
+as was said above (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4), when treating of the
+knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His
+intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made
+by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in
+his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object.
+Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which
+is His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so
+the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of
+creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes,
+knowledge and will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of
+creation, as above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the divine nature, although common to the three
+Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the
+Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost
+from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to
+the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son
+receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to
+be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not
+receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said
+(John 1:3), "Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has
+the same power, but from another; for this preposition "through"
+usually denotes a mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle."
+But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is
+attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created
+by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for this particular
+appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the
+appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (Q.
+39, A. 8, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly
+shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to be the
+Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the
+intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: "Through Whom all
+things were made." And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to
+which belong both government, which brings things to their proper
+end, and the giving of life--for life consists in a certain interior
+movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although every effect of God proceeds from each
+attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is
+naturally connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom,"
+and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" poured
+out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the
+very substance of a thing, is reduced to "power."
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 7]
+
+Whether in Creatures Is Necessarily Found a Trace of the Trinity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily
+found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its
+traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the
+creatures, as was above stated (Q. 32, A. 1). Therefore there is no
+trace of the Trinity in creatures.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if
+the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of
+their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the
+Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each
+of these (properties): and so on to infinitude.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the
+causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the
+relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered.
+Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity
+but of the unity of essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that "the trace
+of the Trinity appears in creatures."
+
+_I answer that,_ Every effect in some degree represents its cause,
+but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the
+cause, but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a
+representation is called a "trace": for a trace shows that someone
+has passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as
+regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents fire
+generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is
+called the representation of "image." Now the processions of the
+divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was
+said above (Q. 27). For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect;
+and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in
+rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the
+representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is
+found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.
+
+But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch
+as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily
+reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature
+subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to
+a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a
+created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in
+that manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the "principle
+from no principle." According as it has a form and species, it
+represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the
+conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it
+represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order
+of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And
+therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the
+Trinity is found in every creature, according "as it is one
+individual," and according "as it is formed by a species," and
+according as it "has a certain relation of order." And to these also
+are reduced those three, "number," "weight," and "measure," mentioned
+in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For "measure" refers to the substance of
+the thing limited by its principles, "number" refers to the species,
+"weight" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the other
+three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), "mode," species,
+and "order," and also those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): "that which
+exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees." For a thing
+exists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and agrees by its
+order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The representation of the trace is to be referred to
+the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a
+knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we
+have said (Q. 32, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A creature properly speaking is a thing
+self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to
+be found. Nor is it necessary that these three things should be found
+in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being is
+the trace ascribed in regard to those three things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The processions of the persons are also in some way the
+cause and type of creation; as appears from the above (A. 6).
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Creation Is Mingled with Works of Nature and Art?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that creation is mingled in works of
+nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is
+produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no
+part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every
+operation of nature and art there is creation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But
+in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which is an
+active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not
+produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be
+produced by creation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are
+found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident in
+animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these
+is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to
+other things.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore
+in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow that
+nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes
+the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of
+creation.
+
+_I answer that,_ The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which,
+some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but
+previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent.
+This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how
+to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms
+pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they asserted that they
+pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or
+caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that
+to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this opinion arose
+from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the
+form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a
+thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong
+properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown above (A. 4), it
+does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be
+"concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is
+the "composite," which is made from matter.
+
+Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is
+presupposed to the work of nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are
+made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The active qualities in nature act by virtue of
+substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces
+its like according to quality, but according to species.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal
+agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to
+which they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind
+of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created
+by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals
+the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is required,
+in the shape of a univocal generator.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The operation of nature takes place only on the
+presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature
+are called creatures.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 46
+
+OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES
+(In Three Articles)
+
+Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures,
+about which there are three points for treatment:
+
+(1) Whether creatures always existed?
+
+(2) Whether that they began to exist is an article of Faith?
+
+(3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the
+beginning?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Universe of Creatures Always Existed?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the
+world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything
+which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise
+it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began
+to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But
+possible being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence,
+which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from
+privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must
+have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist without form:
+while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore
+the world existed before it began to exist: which is impossible.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is
+and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing extends
+so long it exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be
+always; for its power does not extend to any determinate time.
+Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not:
+but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and at some
+time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But
+there are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial
+bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not
+begin to exist.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the
+Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and
+also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten.
+Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there
+might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body
+where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there,
+otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world
+there was a vacuum; which is impossible.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through
+either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was
+before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved.
+Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement.
+Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved
+always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But
+neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For
+nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change
+precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing,
+there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not
+there before. And the will, without itself being changed, puts off
+doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined
+change, at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a
+house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be
+tomorrow, but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass,
+and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because
+time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before
+every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so the same
+conclusion follows as before.
+
+Obj. 7: Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in
+its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is not in
+its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is
+in its beginning and end, because there is no time except "now" which
+is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore
+time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can movement, the
+measure of what is time.
+
+Obj. 8: Further, God is before the world either in the order of
+nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only,
+therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if
+God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior in
+duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the
+world, which is impossible.
+
+Obj. 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect;
+for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause,
+requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the
+sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of
+His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the
+efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above (Q.
+44, AA. 2, 3, 4). Since therefore God is eternal, the world is also
+eternal.
+
+Obj. 10: Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But
+the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the
+world is eternal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 17:5), "Glorify Me, O Father,
+with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was"; and
+(Prov. 8:22), "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways,
+before He made anything from the beginning."
+
+_I answer that,_ Nothing except God can be eternal. And this
+statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown
+above (Q. 19, A. 4) that the will of God is the cause of things.
+Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God
+to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the
+necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above
+(Q. 19, A. 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that
+God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore
+necessary for God to will that the world should always exist; but the
+world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of
+the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not
+therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot
+be proved by demonstration.
+
+Nor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively,
+demonstrative--viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the
+ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite
+impossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both
+in _Phys._ viii and in _De Coelo_ i, text 101, he premises some
+opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings
+forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks
+of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is
+not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is
+probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that
+there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say
+from reason, as, "whether the world is eternal."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Before the world existed it was possible for the world
+to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, but
+according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing
+is called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from
+the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other;
+in which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears from the
+Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of
+having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but
+before it received that power, it did not exist.
+
+Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120)
+does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist;
+but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things
+generated and corruptible begin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is
+unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to
+derive its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves
+that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from
+which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows
+either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by
+generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that
+matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears
+above (Q. 44, A. 1, ad 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The notion of a vacuum is not only "in which is
+nothing," but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in
+which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text
+60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the
+world was.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The first mover was always in the same state: but the
+first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas
+hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by
+creation, which is not change, as said above (Q. 45, A. 2, ad 2).
+Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys.
+viii), is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal
+movable things, but not eternal movement, as appears from the
+opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the
+moment that movable things began to exist movement also existed.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He
+had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce
+an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be
+presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take
+into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that
+presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal
+agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the
+form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it
+introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it
+is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and
+not into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But
+it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter
+together: whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces
+matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent
+presupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly
+described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before,"
+according to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the
+universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not
+correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an
+imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were
+presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time
+to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what
+was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more
+evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was
+not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was
+not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest
+of what always was.
+
+Reply Obj. 7: As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after"
+belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning
+and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now,
+granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given
+moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need
+not be if movement be a beginning. The same applies to the "now" of
+time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant "now," as being
+always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of
+time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys.
+viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but
+denied the eternity of movement.
+
+Reply Obj. 8: God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But
+the word "prior" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or
+we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not
+of time really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there is
+nothing, the word "above" signifies only an imaginary place,
+according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those
+of the heavenly body.
+
+Reply Obj. 9: As the effect follows from the cause that acts by
+nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows
+from the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and
+determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (Q. 19,
+A. 4; Q. 41, A. 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity the
+sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was
+produced by Him, except as preordained by His will--that is, that it
+should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to
+declare its author.
+
+Reply Obj. 10: Given the action, the effect follows according to the
+requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in
+agents acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be
+taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from
+the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such
+an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not
+being.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Is an Article of Faith That the World Began?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a
+demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that
+is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved
+demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed
+this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can
+be demonstratively proved that the world began.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by
+God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something.
+But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world
+would have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of
+Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated.
+Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and
+thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everything which works by intellect works from some
+principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by
+intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore,
+which is His effect, did not always exist.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have
+developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some
+fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been
+always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But
+if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration.
+Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that
+infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass
+through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at
+this present day; which is manifestly false.
+
+Obj. 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was
+eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite
+series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii,
+text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite
+series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).
+
+Obj. 8: Further, if the world and generation always were, there have
+been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: therefore
+an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is
+impossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world
+began, and not only is it known by faith.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The articles of faith cannot be proved
+demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (Heb.
+11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world
+began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in one God,"
+etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses
+prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God created heaven
+and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated.
+Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and
+therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
+
+_I answer that,_ By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration
+can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said
+above of the mystery of the Trinity (Q. 32, A. 1). The reason of this
+is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part
+of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the
+essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is
+abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence it is said that universals
+are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man,
+or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be
+demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will.
+For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as
+regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He
+wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Q. 19,
+A. 3). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which
+faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of
+faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to
+consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of
+faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to
+give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds
+we believe things that are of faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of
+philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For
+some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is
+an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are
+cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made
+by God. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time,
+but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was
+always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei
+x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity,
+there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by
+him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker
+always existed." To understand this we must consider that the
+efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its
+effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action,
+and every agent must be the principle of action. But if the action is
+instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker
+to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of
+illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if
+God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the
+world in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world,
+is not a successive change, as was said above (Q. 45, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those who would say that the world was eternal, would
+say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made
+after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation,
+but that it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do
+not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix,
+text 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys.
+viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion,
+except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out
+what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human
+intellect, but not the divine intellect (Q. 14, AA. 7, 12).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that
+some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being
+uninhabitable to being inhabitable and "vice versa," and likewise
+they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and
+accidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay.
+Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such
+particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole
+world.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it would not
+be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6);
+because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without
+succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Passage is always understood as being from term to
+term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there
+is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection
+is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite
+number of mean terms.
+
+Reply Obj. 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to
+infinity _per se_--thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes
+that are _per se_ required for a certain effect; for instance, that a
+stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to
+infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity
+_accidentally_ as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the
+causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one
+cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by
+means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may
+be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer
+acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to
+this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for
+he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men
+generating hold one grade in efficient causes--viz. the grade of a
+particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be
+generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible
+if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an
+elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
+
+Reply Obj. 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this
+reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to
+be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of
+Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But
+this was disproved above (Q. 7, A. 4). Some say that the soul is
+corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will
+remain. But others, as Augustine says [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4, 5; De
+Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a
+circuit of souls--viz. that souls separated from their bodies return
+again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which
+matters will be given later (Q. 75, A. 2; Q. 118, A. 6). But be it
+noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one
+might say that the world was eternal, or at least some creature, as
+an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in
+general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Creation of Things Was in the Beginning of Time?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the creation of things was not in the
+beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of
+time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation
+the substance of things was brought into being; and time does not
+measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things.
+Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that
+everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies
+a "before" and "after." But in the beginning of time, since it is
+indivisible, there is no "before" and "after." Therefore, since to be
+created is a kind of "being made," it appears that things were not
+created in the beginning of time.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be
+created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the
+beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things
+was not in the beginning of time.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
+created heaven and earth."
+
+_I answer that,_ The words of Genesis, "In the beginning God created
+heaven and earth," are expounded in a threefold sense in order to
+exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and
+that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words "In the
+beginning" are expounded--viz. "of time." And some said that there
+are two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of
+evil things, against which "In the beginning" is expounded--"in the
+Son." For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by
+reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son
+by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), "Thou
+hast made all things in wisdom," it may be understood that God made
+all things in the beginning--that is, in the Son; according to the
+word of the Apostle (Col. 1:16), "In Him"--viz. the Son--"were
+created all things." But others said that corporeal things were
+created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to
+exclude this it is expounded thus: "In the beginning"--i.e. before
+all things--"God created heaven and earth." For four things are
+stated to be created together--viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal
+matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Things are said to be created in the beginning of time,
+not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but
+because together with time heaven and earth were created.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This saying of the Philosopher is understood "of being
+made" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because,
+since in every movement there is "before" and "after," before any one
+point in a given movement--that is, whilst anything is in the process
+of being moved and made, there is a "before" and also an "after,"
+because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not
+in "being moved." But creation is neither movement nor the term of
+movement, as was said above (Q. 45, AA. 2, 3). Hence a thing is
+created in such a way that it was not being created before.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists
+of time except "now." Hence time cannot be made except according to
+some "now"; not because in the first "now" is time, but because from
+it time begins.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 47
+
+OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL
+(In Three Articles)
+
+After considering the production of creatures, we come to the
+consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be
+threefold--first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly,
+of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of
+the spiritual and corporeal creature.
+
+Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) The multitude or distinction of things.
+
+(2) Their inequality.
+
+(3) The unity of the world.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Multitude and Distinction of Things Come from God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of
+things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one.
+But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Q. 11, A.
+4). Therefore He produces but one effect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar.
+But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (Q.
+44, A. 3). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not
+diverse.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end
+of the creation is one--viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above
+(Q. 44, A. 4). Therefore the effect of God is but one.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:4, 7) that God "divided the
+light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore
+the distinction and multitude of things is from God.
+
+_I answer that,_ The distinction of things has been ascribed to many
+causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by
+itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the
+ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter,
+attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction
+of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter.
+Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of
+things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the
+intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in
+matter.
+
+But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown
+above (Q. 44, A. 2), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we
+must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause.
+Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the
+form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their
+proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account
+of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is
+formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms.
+
+Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents,
+as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced
+the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own
+being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as
+will appear later (Q. 50, A. 3). And so the first intelligence,
+inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second
+intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality
+it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as
+it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the
+heavens.
+
+But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it
+was shown above (Q. 45, A. 5) that to create belongs to God alone,
+and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God
+alone--viz. all those things which are not subject to generation and
+corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the
+universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the
+first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such
+an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore,
+the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of
+things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible.
+
+Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come
+from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought
+things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to
+creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could
+not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many
+and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the
+representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another.
+For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is
+manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together
+participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it
+better than any single creature whatever.
+
+And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of
+things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word
+of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read
+in Gen. 1:3, 4: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the
+light from the darkness."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The natural agent acts by the form which makes
+it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its
+effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was
+shown above (Q. 19, A. 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since,
+therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand
+many things, as was shown above (Q. 15, A. 2), it follows that,
+although He is one, He can make many things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This reason would apply to the representation
+which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by
+reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is
+only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly,
+which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by
+many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the
+plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of
+things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In speculative things the medium of
+demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one
+only; whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when
+operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the
+end, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to
+its end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is
+necessary.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Inequality of Things Is from God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the inequality of things is not from
+God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things
+that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs
+to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text
+20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal
+things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no
+inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives
+being to things, it seems that He has made all things equal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ecclus. 33:7): "Why does one day excel
+another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun
+another sun? [Vulg.: 'when all come of the sun']. By the knowledge of
+the Lord they were distinguished."
+
+_I answer that,_ When Origen wished to refute those who said that the
+distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and
+evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by
+God. For he asserted that God first created only the rational
+creatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from
+free-will, some being turned to God more and some less, and others
+turned more and others less away from God. And so those rational
+creatures which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the
+order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those who
+were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the
+diversity of their sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation
+and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, it would
+follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the
+effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it
+would be for the sake of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to
+what is said: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were
+very good" (Gen. 1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 3):
+"What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect
+provided this one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its
+beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened
+through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned,
+there would be a hundred suns in the world?"
+
+Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of
+the distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the cause of their
+inequality. This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction
+is found in things; one is a formal distinction as regards things
+differing specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards
+things differing numerically only. And as the matter is on account
+of the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal
+distinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only
+one individual of each species, forasmuch as the species is
+sufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in things generated and
+corruptible there are many individuals of one species for the
+preservation of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction
+is of greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinction
+always requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says (Metaph.
+viii, 10), the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary
+by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species
+seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect
+than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants,
+and men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more
+perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of
+the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the
+universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not
+be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which
+is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every
+part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the
+whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be
+taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus,
+therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole,
+according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each
+single creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we
+find it said of each creature, "God saw the light that it was good"
+(Gen. 1:4); and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all
+together it is said, "God saw all the things that He had made, and
+they were very good" (Gen. 1:31).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The first effect of unity is equality; and then comes
+multiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to
+Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son
+proceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the
+creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless
+even creatures share in a certain equality--namely, of proportion.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but it
+holds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of
+which is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things
+there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality,
+either of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality
+comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears also in works
+done by art; for the roof of a house differs from the foundation, not
+because it is made of other material; but in order that the house may
+be made perfect of different parts, the artificer seeks different
+material; indeed, he would make such material if he could.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Is Only One World?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is not only one world, but many.
+Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to say
+that God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason
+He created one, He could create many, since His power is not limited
+to the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown
+above (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore God has produced many worlds.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nature does what is best and much more does God.
+But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many
+good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been
+made by God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everything which has a form in matter can be
+multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because
+multiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form
+in matter. Thus as when I say "man" I mean the form, and when I say
+"this man," I mean the form in matter; so when we say "world," the
+form is signified, and when we say "this world," the form in the
+matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the
+existence of many worlds.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 1:10): "The world was made by
+Him," where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.
+
+_I answer that,_ The very order of things created by God shows the
+unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of
+order, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things
+come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God
+Himself, as shown above (Q. 11, A. 3; Q. 21, A. 1). Hence it must be
+that all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can
+assert that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining
+wisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that
+this world, besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made
+from a casual concourse of atoms.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This reason proves that the world is one because all
+things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from
+the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52)
+the unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of
+the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: No agent intends material plurality as the end
+forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself
+tends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end.
+Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this has
+reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the
+intention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it
+might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if
+He had made three; and so on to infinite.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For
+it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since
+every earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever
+it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are part of the
+world.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 48
+
+THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and
+firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of
+the spiritual and corporeal creatures.
+
+Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.
+
+Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:
+
+(1) Whether evil is a nature?
+
+(2) Whether evil is found in things?
+
+(3) Whether good is the subject of evil?
+
+(4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?
+
+(5) The division of evil into pain and fault.
+
+(6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Evil Is a Nature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is
+a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x)
+that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other
+things." Therefore evil is a nature.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a
+nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality;
+for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality
+from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil
+and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries,
+as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good
+and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to
+good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it
+corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe
+except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the
+perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir.
+10, 11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all
+things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its
+place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore evil
+is a nature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither
+a being nor a good."
+
+_I answer that,_ One opposite is known through the other, as darkness
+is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the
+nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything
+appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its
+own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection
+of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being,
+or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil
+is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying
+that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such,
+is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of
+Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and
+therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil.
+For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward
+examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some
+philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says
+(Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and
+privation," as being verified in all contraries; since one contrary
+is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to
+white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil
+are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries;
+because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as
+such, has the nature of evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Good and evil are not constitutive differences except
+in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the
+object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has
+the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific
+differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence
+of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself
+constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end;
+just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in
+natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore,
+the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain
+good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by
+the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but
+the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a
+constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is
+annexed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks
+there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between
+good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something
+rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but
+also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
+i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not evil." And from this evil
+in morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of
+evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although
+blindness is an evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one
+way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that
+sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good,
+forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In
+another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter
+makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final
+cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause.
+But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that
+is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For
+every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as
+an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
+iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some
+good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside
+the scope of our will and intention."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe are
+ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and
+according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was
+said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good.
+Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor
+does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that
+is, by reason of some good joined to it.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Evil Is Found in Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not found in things. For
+whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of
+something, that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
+that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from
+non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore
+evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is
+contrary to what has been said (A. 1).
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as
+the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed
+with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best,
+much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is
+no evil.
+
+_On the contrary,_ On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and
+penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.
+
+_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 47, AA. 1, 2), the perfection
+of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things,
+so that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of
+goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of
+goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this
+grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are
+which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while
+some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.
+
+As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there
+should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings;
+so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some
+which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they
+do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact
+that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found
+in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an
+evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple
+"not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a
+privation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is
+twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a
+thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it
+is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and
+neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the
+truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by
+a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense being is what
+answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of
+blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way
+even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this
+distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil
+is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in
+itself.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God and nature and any other agent make what is best in
+the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order
+to the whole, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 2). And the whole itself,
+which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more
+perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes
+fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because "it
+belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature," as
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may
+fail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says
+(Enchir. 11), "God is so powerful that He can even make good out of
+evil." Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no
+evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not
+corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass
+were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a
+sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Evil Is in Good As in Its Subject?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject.
+For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv,
+4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists."
+Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But
+"non-being" does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither
+does evil require good as its subject.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good
+and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its
+subject.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore
+also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as
+in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said
+(Isa. 5:20): "Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!"
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that "evil exists
+only in good."
+
+_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), evil imports the absence
+of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good
+can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good,
+taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what
+does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil,
+through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance,
+a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the
+strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative
+sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called
+blindness.
+
+Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same--viz.
+being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality,
+as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and
+of privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative
+potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent
+body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however,
+manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and
+a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every
+potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For
+as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality.
+Therefore, the subject of evil is good.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as
+a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: "Not-being," understood negatively, does not require a
+subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher
+says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such "not-being" is an evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its
+subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not
+"sight," but "animal." Yet, it appears, as Augustine says
+(Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is
+laid down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be
+taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference
+to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and
+bitter, and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in
+a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus;
+whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with
+the privation of another good.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as
+such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is
+clear from the explanation given.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Evil Corrupts the Whole Good?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For
+one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are
+contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil hurts
+inasmuch as it takes away good." But good is all of a piece and
+uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away
+good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at
+some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of
+any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that "evil cannot
+wholly consume good."
+
+_I answer that,_ Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must
+consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed
+by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly
+destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is
+neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good
+which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air
+is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished
+by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude
+of a subject to some actuality.
+
+The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered
+by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of
+remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission
+likewise of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity.
+For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions
+whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are
+multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its
+perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission
+by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the
+matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the
+potentiality remitted as regards the actuality.
+
+Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and
+intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the
+aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in
+the active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and
+humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is
+diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the
+contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid
+aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless,
+it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is
+the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed
+to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to
+light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be
+wholly removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is
+transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude,
+whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened;
+and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and
+God, according to Isa. 59:2: "Our sins have divided between us and
+God." Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away,
+for it belongs to its very nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away;
+but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and
+act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where
+it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although
+good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different
+things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of
+good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the
+continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an
+ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a
+third), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not
+avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we
+continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than
+half of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the
+above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance
+either equally or more.
+
+Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite
+thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not _per se,_ but
+accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also
+increased infinitely, as explained above.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Evil Is Adequately Divided into Pain* and Fault?
+
+[*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification,
+being derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain of death, Pain
+of loss, Pain of sense."--Ed.]
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into
+pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all
+creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own
+existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore
+evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor
+pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are
+evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for
+"temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion
+for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not
+is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain
+follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into
+pain and fault.
+
+Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It would seem that this division is
+superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil
+"because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil
+comes under pain.
+
+_I answer that,_ Evil, as was said above (A. 3), is the privation of
+good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act,
+however, is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and
+integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil
+also is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form,
+or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness
+is an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the
+body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due
+operation, either because it does not exist, or because it has not its
+due mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the
+will, evil, which is the privation of good, is found in a special way
+in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which
+comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has
+the nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition that all
+things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown
+above (Q. 22, A. 2); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be
+against the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of
+the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for
+this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect
+action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in
+voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere
+negation, as was said above (A. 3), therefore not every defect of
+good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due.
+For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil
+in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So,
+likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in
+existence by itself, because existence and conservation come from one
+and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as
+regards a creature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely
+considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always
+an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not,
+properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change
+is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of the
+agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the
+tempter he falls into fault.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said
+that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent
+in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to
+the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as
+including the idea of injury.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Pain Has the Nature of Evil More Than Fault Has?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For
+fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good
+than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault
+has.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the
+greater good. But pain, as was said above (A. 5), is opposed to
+the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the
+action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it
+seems that pain is worse than fault.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in
+forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation
+of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to
+prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole
+body. But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore
+fault is a greater evil than pain.
+
+_I answer that,_ Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not
+only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal
+goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any
+kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to
+include privation of grace or glory.
+
+There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil
+by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says
+(Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to
+be made worthy of punishment." And this because, since good absolutely
+considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate
+act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that
+the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use
+of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will.
+Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is
+called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a
+bad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his
+own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself
+consists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in
+the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in
+it than pain has.
+
+The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of
+the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because
+the evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either
+something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something
+uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature
+forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed
+to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine
+will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself,
+and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that
+fault has more evil in it than pain has.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet
+fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the
+reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that
+the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the
+more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection,
+than the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order
+to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way,
+both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed
+from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch as
+this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due
+end.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 49
+
+THE CAUSE OF EVIL
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are
+three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?
+
+(2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
+
+(3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of
+all evils?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Good Can Be the Cause of Evil?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For
+it is said (Matt. 7:18): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But
+evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of
+evil.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient
+cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause, if it has
+one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the
+cause of evil can only be evil.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no
+cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): "There is no
+possible source of evil except good."
+
+_I answer that,_ It must be said that every evil in some way has a
+cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due
+to a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due
+disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper
+disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some
+impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some
+impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a
+cause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is
+good.
+
+And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the
+agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which
+belongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to
+good, has the nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by
+way of the material cause was shown above (Q. 48, A. 3). For it was
+shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause,
+rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final
+cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since
+not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which
+is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent,
+not directly, but accidentally.
+
+In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action
+otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason
+of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or
+the instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal
+may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the
+case of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the
+instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a
+thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the
+power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the
+agent or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or
+perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form
+intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance,
+when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of
+air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in
+strength, so much the more perfectly does it impress its own form, so
+also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil
+and corruption befall air and water comes from the perfection of the
+fire: but this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the
+privation of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own
+form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other.
+But if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire--as, for
+instance, that it fails to heat--this comes either by defect of the
+action, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above,
+or by the indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the
+action of the fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a
+deficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to
+act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental
+cause; and thus is good the cause of evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): "The Lord calls
+an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree." Now, a good
+will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good
+will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the
+movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature,
+which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to
+itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes
+evil to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act
+morally evil. And, as explained above (Q. 19, A. 9), this is by
+accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes
+another by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold
+heats (the body) through the concentration of the inward heat.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things
+otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the
+same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some
+exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it.
+Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil
+pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in
+voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will
+actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself
+to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault
+follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause,
+as was said above.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of
+evil. For it is said (Isa. 45:5,7): "I am the Lord, and there is no
+other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and
+creating evil." And Amos 3:6, "Shall there be evil in a city, which
+the Lord hath not done?"
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the
+first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (A. 1).
+Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above
+(Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, AA. 1, 4), it follows that also every evil is from
+God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30),
+the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God
+is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause
+of all perdition and of all evil.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, "God is not
+the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to
+not-being."
+
+_I answer that,_ As appears from what was said (A. 1), the evil which
+consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of
+the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection,
+as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 1). Hence, the evil which consists in
+defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not
+reduced to God as to its cause.
+
+But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is
+reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural
+things and voluntary things. For it was said (A. 1) that some agent
+inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows
+corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and
+defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in
+things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the
+order of the universe requires, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2, ad 2;
+Q. 48, A. 2), that there should be some things that can, and do
+sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the
+order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident,
+causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 Kings 2:6: "The Lord
+killeth and maketh alive." But when we read that "God hath not made
+death" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its
+own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of
+the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to
+sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but
+not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to
+the evil of fault.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced
+to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and
+perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as
+whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the
+motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not
+come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And,
+likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is
+reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not
+caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as
+the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of
+the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary
+for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Be One Supreme Evil Which Is the Cause of Every Evil?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is
+the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes.
+But contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: "Good
+is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner
+against a just man." Therefore there are many contrary principles,
+one of good, the other of evil.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But
+the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was
+shown above (Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, AA. 2, 4). Therefore, also, there is a
+supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil
+and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what
+is best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to
+some supreme evil.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is
+essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not
+essentially, but by participation. Therefore we must seek for
+some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is
+_per se._ But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we
+must suppose some supreme evil which is the _per se_ cause of evils.
+Nor can it be said that evil has no _per se_ cause, but only an
+accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist
+in the many, but only in the few.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the
+cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause,
+as was said above (AA. 1, 2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in
+this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause
+of every evil.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The supreme good is the cause of every being, as
+was shown above (Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, A. 4). Therefore there cannot be
+any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.
+
+_I answer that,_ It appears from what precedes that there is no one
+first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.
+
+First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially
+good, as was shown above (Q. 6, AA. 3, 4). But nothing can be
+essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such,
+is good (Q. 5, A. 3); and that evil can exist only in good as in
+its subject (Q. 48, A. 3).
+
+Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and
+perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above
+(Q. 6, A. 2). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was
+shown above (Q. 48, A. 4), although evil always lessens good, yet
+it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains,
+nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "if the wholly evil could be, it would
+destroy itself"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be
+for something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away,
+since its subject is good.
+
+Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a
+first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was
+shown above (A. 1), and because evil can be only an accidental
+cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental
+cause is subsequent to the direct cause.
+
+Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the
+other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also
+arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they
+failed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered
+only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account,
+if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own
+nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as,
+for instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil
+because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of
+the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any
+particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its
+order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly
+ordered place, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1).
+
+Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two
+contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these
+contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and
+therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first
+principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it
+is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own
+contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the
+elements exists the power of a heavenly body; and above all things
+that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being,
+as was shown above (Q. 2, A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree
+in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary
+particular causes, nevertheless we must come at last to one first
+common cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same
+subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as
+was said above (Q. 48, A. 3). Hence, since evil is privation of good,
+as appears from what was said above (Q. 48, AA. 1, 2, 3), it is
+opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the
+supreme good, who is pure act.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature
+of  a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a
+perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by
+approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from
+that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason
+of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be
+good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by
+privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it
+to any essential evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown
+above (A. 1). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is
+impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply
+false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone
+can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole
+universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the
+smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as in the greater
+number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good
+of man as man--that is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good
+in regard to the senses than good according to reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity,
+but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows
+accidentally.
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ. 50-64)
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 50
+
+OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED
+(In Five Articles)
+
+Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures:
+firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is
+called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the
+composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.
+
+Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their
+substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what
+belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.
+
+Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal
+things.
+
+Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether
+incorporeal?
+
+(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed
+of matter and form?
+
+(3) We ask concerning their number.
+
+(4) Of their difference from each other.
+
+(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 1]
+
+Whether an Angel Is Altogether Incorporeal?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal.
+For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation
+to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide
+Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as
+regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material.
+Therefore he is not simply incorporeal."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher
+says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that
+"an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance." Therefore an
+angel is a corporeal substance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every creature
+is limited within its own nature." But to be limited belongs to
+bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's
+creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His
+angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were
+made; He commanded, and they were created." Therefore angels are
+corporeal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels
+spirits."
+
+_I answer that,_ There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what
+is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this
+consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation
+of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the
+cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as
+heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and
+will (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4). Hence the perfection of the universe
+requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now
+intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal
+faculty; for every body is limited to "here" and "now." Hence the
+perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal
+creature.
+
+The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of
+intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense
+and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what
+could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies
+alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed
+except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57).
+Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit
+(Acts 23:8).
+
+But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof
+that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect
+alone.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal
+creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the
+other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold;
+and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and
+corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is
+applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an
+ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and
+not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we
+are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies
+only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all
+creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir.
+Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in
+corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their
+substance."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 2]
+
+Whether an Angel Is Composed of Matter and Form?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and
+form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of
+the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the
+species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from
+the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a
+genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of
+substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is
+matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand;
+whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that "a simple form cannot be a
+subject": and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore
+an angel is composed of matter and form.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But
+an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an
+angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So
+the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of
+an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the
+form of an angel is in matter.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first
+creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal."
+
+_I answer that,_ Some assert that the angels are composed of matter
+and form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book
+of the _Fount of Life._ For he supposes that whatever things are
+distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards
+incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which
+distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in
+common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes
+incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and
+whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something
+common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of
+spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be
+understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the
+matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity
+is impressed in the matter of corporeal things.
+
+But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of
+spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a
+spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part
+of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and
+spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the
+corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter,
+however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under
+quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle
+says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of
+spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it
+is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same
+matter.
+
+It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any
+kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according
+to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether
+immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act
+receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according
+to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are
+individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence
+it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.
+
+But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily
+distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend
+things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence
+material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect
+in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances,
+on the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect
+cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its
+own mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way
+also it apprehends God (Q. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is difference which constitutes the species. Now
+everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined
+to some special grade of being because "the species of things are
+like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as
+the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material things
+there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is
+the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the
+matter; and hence from the latter the genus is derived, and from
+the former the "difference." Whereas in immaterial things there is
+no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its
+own self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them
+genus and "difference" are not derived from different things, but
+from one and the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of
+conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as
+indeterminate, it derives the idea of their genus; and inasmuch
+as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their
+"difference."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This reason is given in the book on the _Fount of
+Life,_ and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of
+the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false.
+For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in
+some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But
+the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise
+the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to
+the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the
+intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of
+a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way
+of receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in
+an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made
+evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a
+twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby
+the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own
+existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is
+related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if
+there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists
+without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the
+form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a
+kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is
+what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby he is," and
+"what is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For
+"what is," is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is
+whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs.
+But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was
+explained above (Q. 3, A. 4). Hence God alone is pure act.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its
+existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature
+to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being
+considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on
+the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the
+matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are
+finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that
+their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say,
+for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards
+the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one
+subject; while its "being" is finite as determined to some one
+special nature.
+
+Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite
+from above," as receiving its being from above itself, and is
+"infinite from below," as not received in any matter.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Angels Exist in Any Great Number?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers.
+For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a
+continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are
+incorporeal, as was shown above (A. 1). Therefore the angels
+cannot exist in any great number.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the
+less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other
+created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God.
+Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the
+least possible number in the angelic nature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems
+to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the
+heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we
+can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than
+the movements of the heavenly bodies.
+
+Obj. 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and
+intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine
+goodness." But a ray is only multiplied according to the different
+things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is
+receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are
+immaterial, as was shown above (A. 2). Therefore it seems that the
+multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to
+the requirements of the first bodies--that is, of the heavenly ones,
+so that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be
+terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as
+before.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands
+ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood
+before Him."
+
+_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions with regard to the
+number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate
+substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to
+maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and
+according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number
+of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible
+things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31)
+because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible
+things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar
+species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures,
+which are higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless
+Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures
+bear relation to these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and
+therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances
+according to the number of the first movements.
+
+But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred
+Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony,
+held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial
+substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly
+movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he
+contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are
+styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which
+manifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the
+custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be
+designated as angels.
+
+Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are
+immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all
+material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv):
+"There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences,
+surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers."
+The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the
+universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more
+perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created
+by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their
+magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their
+multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed
+corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire
+sphere of things active and passive is something very small in
+comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to
+conclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably
+exceed material substances as to multitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete
+quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that
+which is caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is
+reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above (Q. 30, A. 3; Q. 11).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto
+God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not
+so as to be found in few subjects.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text
+44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were
+made for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances
+would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to
+appear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial
+substances exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is
+nobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii,
+text 44) that this is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He
+was forced to make use of this argument, since only through sensible
+things can we come to know intelligible ones.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as
+hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this
+was refuted above (Q. 47, A. 1). Accordingly, the multiplication
+of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to
+bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders
+of immaterial substances.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Angels Differ in Species?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species.
+For since the "difference" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things
+which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their
+ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according
+to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them--that is
+to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one
+species.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the
+angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and
+less--namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener
+intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually
+from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore
+are the angels.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more
+ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but
+one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of
+one species.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In things of one species there is no such thing as
+"first" and "second" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says
+(Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there
+are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x).
+Therefore the angels are not of the same species.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have said that all spiritual substances, even
+souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are
+of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the
+angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.
+
+But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ
+in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If,
+therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said
+above (A. 2), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to
+be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be
+several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses
+are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances.
+And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several
+angels of one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the
+principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according
+to the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according
+to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes
+diversity not merely of species, but of genus.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: "Difference" is nobler than genus, as the determined
+is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common,
+but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be
+necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that
+there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible
+soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the
+various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner
+all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of
+intellectual nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: More and less change the species, not according as they
+are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according
+as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we
+say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels
+are diversified according to more or less.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The good of the species preponderates over the good
+of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be
+multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in
+the one species.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out
+infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific
+multiplication, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 3). Hence the perfection
+of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not
+for the multiplying of individuals in one species.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Angels Are Incorruptible?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for
+Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he
+is "an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and
+not by nature."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose
+maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature,
+yet indissoluble because I so will it." But gods such as these can
+only be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are
+corruptible by their nature
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things would
+tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved
+them." But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore,
+since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are
+corruptible of their own nature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the
+intellectual substances "have unfailing life, being free from all
+corruption, death, matter, and generation."
+
+_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be maintained that the angels
+are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that
+nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the
+matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from
+what was said above (A. 2), it is impossible for its substance to
+be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can
+never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in
+relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else
+is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never
+be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a
+bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its
+circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for
+everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is
+an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter
+and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the
+matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the
+angels, as was said above (A. 2), it cannot lose its being.
+Therefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is
+incorruptible by its own nature.
+
+A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual
+operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the
+operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and
+nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an
+intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every
+intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which
+includes complete immutability; since "every change is a kind of
+death," as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain
+perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later (Q. 62).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the heavenly
+bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore
+dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in
+existence by the Divine will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 44, A. 1) there is a kind of
+necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not
+repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its
+existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that
+all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless
+preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is
+any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the
+angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be
+corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by
+withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some
+principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at
+least the potentiality of matter.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 51
+
+OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things;
+and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly,
+of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of
+their comparison with local movement.
+
+Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?
+
+(2) Whether they assume bodies?
+
+(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Angels Have Bodies Naturally United to Them?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united
+to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute
+alone--that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy
+Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist
+without any material substance and without any companionship of
+corporeal addition." Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.):
+"Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality,
+whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of
+anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear
+that every created spirit needs corporeal substance." Augustine also
+says (Gen. ad lit. iii): "The demons are called animals of the
+atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies."
+But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels
+have bodies naturally united to them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational
+animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore
+angels have bodies naturally united to them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls.
+But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore
+the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels
+are understood to be incorporeal."
+
+_I answer that,_ The angels have not bodies naturally united to
+them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found
+universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings,
+because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to
+every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor
+of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (Q. 75, A. 2), it
+follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an
+intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some
+intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it
+belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is
+imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual
+substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature,
+but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as
+will be explained later on (Q. 84, A. 6; Q. 89, A. 1). Now whenever
+we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something
+perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are
+some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire
+knowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual
+substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from
+bodies, and these we call angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As was said above (Q. 50, A. 1) it was the opinion of
+some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have
+thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as
+united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the
+soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this
+is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted
+above all things, according to Ps. 8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted
+beyond the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of
+God, followed the above opinion of others regarding the other
+substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points,
+by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's
+expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some
+bodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed
+for some purpose, as will be explained (A. 2). Augustine speaks,
+not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the
+Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals,
+which they termed demons.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal
+metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply
+speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kings 2:6): "The
+Lord killeth, and maketh alive." But to give life formally belongs to
+a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within
+itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual
+substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one
+which is united to a body.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Angels Assume Bodies?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there
+is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of
+the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the
+angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body,
+since his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does
+not assume a body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union;
+because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a
+body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated (A. 1); while
+in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said
+to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the
+angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water,
+or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise
+they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air,
+because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not
+assume bodies.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels
+appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the angels never assume
+bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of
+angels happened in prophetic vision--that is, according to
+imagination. But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for
+whatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder's
+imagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine
+Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be
+seen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were
+seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of
+Sodom; in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all
+present. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were
+beheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the
+person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a
+vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are
+not bodies, nor have they bodies naturally united with them, as is
+clear from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 50, A. 1), it follows that
+they sometimes assume bodies.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on
+our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give
+evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have
+with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies
+under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God
+would take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old
+Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared
+in the flesh.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as its
+form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the
+assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties
+of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things
+sensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so
+fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible
+properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel
+assuming a body.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction
+has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped
+and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume
+bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is
+needful for forming the assumed body.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Angels Exercise Functions of Life in the Bodies Assumed?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life
+in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But
+it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live
+and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions.
+Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without
+a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the
+senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by
+the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the
+angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special
+function of life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions
+of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels are
+manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said
+(Gen. 18:16) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had appeared
+to him, "bringing them on the way"; and when Tobias said to the angel
+(Tob. 5:7, 8): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of
+Medes?" he answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all
+the ways thereof." Therefore the angels often exercise functions of
+life in assumed bodies.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it
+is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed
+from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred
+Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their
+assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord
+after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having
+resumed life (Luke 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed
+bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having
+previously adored them as God (Gen. 18). Therefore the angels
+exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has
+befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related:
+"After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they
+brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of
+renown" (Gen. 6:4). Consequently the angels exercised vital
+functions in their assumed bodies.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was
+stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise
+functions of life through assumed bodies.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some functions of living subjects have something in
+common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of
+a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so
+far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far
+as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in
+assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such
+operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects;
+because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that
+which has the faculty has the action." Hence nothing can have a
+function of life except what has life, which is the potential
+principle of such action.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible
+things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since it
+is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things
+are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may
+be understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it
+is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their
+assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they are really
+not. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the
+spiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the
+properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be
+done if they were to assume true men; because the properties of such
+men would lead us to men, and not to angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it
+can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of
+their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for
+they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but
+to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the
+angels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power of the
+angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other
+members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper
+function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus
+moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved
+accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as
+movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be
+elsewhere, which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is
+not moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is
+everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the
+movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to
+the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as
+the movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not
+change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the
+world is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of
+the world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west,
+but according to a fixed quarter; because "the moving energy is
+always in the east," as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their
+assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as they
+fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat,
+because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the
+substance of the eater.
+
+Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the
+substance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing matter;
+nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could
+be changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by
+angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of
+such a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was
+not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what
+the angel said to Tobias: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat
+and to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink" (Tob. 12:19).
+
+Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom,
+nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the
+prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).
+
+Reply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): "Many persons
+affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as
+have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk
+call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have
+sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny
+it. But God's holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the
+deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of
+Seth, who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture
+designates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be
+wondered at that giants should be born of them; for they were not all
+giants, albeit there were many more before than after the deluge."
+Still if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from
+the seed of such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the
+seed of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first
+the form of a woman, and afterwards of a man; just as they take the
+seed of other things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says
+(De Trin. iii), so that the person born is not the child of a demon,
+but of a man.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 52
+
+OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are
+three subjects of inquiry:
+
+(1) Is the angel in a place?
+
+(2) Can he be in several places at once?
+
+(3) Can several angels be in the same place?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 1]
+
+Whether an Angel Is in a Place?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For
+Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "The common opinion of the learned is
+that things incorporeal are not in a place." And again, Aristotle
+observes (Phys. iv, text 48,57) that "it is not everything existing
+which is in a place, but only a movable body." But an angel is not
+a body, as was shown above (Q. 50). Therefore an angel is not in a
+place.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, place is a "quantity having position." But
+everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a
+position cannot befit an angel, since his substance is devoid of
+quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position.
+Therefore an angel is not in a place.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be
+contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys.
+iv, text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained
+by a place, because the container is more formal than the contained;
+as air with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an
+angel is not in a place.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline,
+Dominican Breviary]: "Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us
+in peace."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel
+and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A
+body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such
+place according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no
+such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently
+an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the
+angelic power in any manner whatever to any place.
+
+Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed
+commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the
+continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with
+dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this
+account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an
+incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes
+into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body
+as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is
+said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained,
+but as somehow containing it.
+
+And hereby we have the answers to the objections.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 2]
+
+Whether an Angel Can Be in Several Places at Once?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at
+once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But
+the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every
+part of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel
+can be in several places at once.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since
+the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is
+in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are
+various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "where the
+angel operates, there he is." But occasionally he operates in several
+places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom
+(Gen. 19:25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one
+time.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "while the
+angels are in heaven, they are not on earth."
+
+_I answer that,_ An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the
+Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things,
+is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things,
+and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since
+the angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to
+one determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be
+compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all
+being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one
+particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since
+the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place,
+it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in
+only one place.
+
+Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were
+unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the
+indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently
+they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point.
+But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something
+indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is
+indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation.
+Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one
+indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible
+or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own
+free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the
+entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one
+place to him.
+
+Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to
+be everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to
+what is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in
+which there is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east:
+hence the Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of
+the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly,
+because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves
+all the spheres immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.
+
+So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite
+differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a
+place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place.
+An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he
+is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a
+place in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither
+circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.
+
+From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because
+the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied,
+is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Several Angels Can Be at the Same Time in the Same Place?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that several angels can be at the same
+time in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time
+in the same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not
+fill a place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not
+empty, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58).
+Therefore several angels can be in the one place.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a
+body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body are at
+the one time in the one place: because there is no place which is not
+filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv, text. 58.
+Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to
+Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess
+souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon
+are at the one time in the same place; and consequently for the same
+reason all other spiritual substances.
+
+_On the contrary,_ There are not two souls in the same body.
+Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same
+place.
+
+_I answer that,_ There are not two angels in the same place. The
+reason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to
+be the causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident
+in every class of causes: for there is one proximate form of one
+thing, and there is one proximate mover, although there may be
+several remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several
+individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a perfect mover,
+because no one man's strength is sufficient for moving the boat;
+while all together are as one mover, in so far as their united
+strengths all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since the
+angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches
+the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said (A.
+1), there can be but one angel in one place.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Several angels are not hindered from being in the same
+place because of their filling the place; but for another reason, as
+has been said.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way;
+hence the conclusion does not follow.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body
+according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its
+form, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 53
+
+OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which
+heading there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.
+
+(2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through
+intervening space?
+
+(3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 53, Art. 1]
+
+Whether an Angel Can Be Moved Locally?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as
+the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32, 86) "nothing which is devoid
+of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term _wherefrom,_ it
+is not moved; nor while it is in the term _whereto,_ for it is then
+already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved,
+while it is being moved, is partly in the term _wherefrom_ and partly
+in the term _whereto._ But an angel is without parts. Therefore an
+angel cannot be moved locally.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as
+the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is
+not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy
+angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be
+moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be
+said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of
+faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified
+angel is moved locally.
+
+_I answer that,_ A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however,
+to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so
+likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as
+it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place.
+Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate
+with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the
+continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude;
+and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the
+Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place
+as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it
+is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be
+commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the
+exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is
+a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by
+virtual contact, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 1), it follows
+necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else
+than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at
+once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as
+was said above (Q. 52, A. 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts
+to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be
+found in such contacts. Because, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 1),
+there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an
+angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is
+assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body
+successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was
+before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so
+likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which
+he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all
+at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself
+to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be
+continuous.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold
+reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with
+what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place
+necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.
+
+Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which
+is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be
+said that a thing is moved where it is in the term _wherefrom,_ and
+while it is in the term _whereto_: because the very succession of
+"wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence,
+in whichever of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said
+to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because
+nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the
+line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing
+moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being
+moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore,
+according as the angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's
+demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's
+movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while
+an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term _wherefrom,_ and
+partly in the term _whereto_ (yet so that such partiality be not
+referred to the angel's substance, but to the place); because at the
+outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible
+place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in
+movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part
+of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can
+occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that
+he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does
+by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which
+is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to
+magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to
+something which is divisible.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the
+act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application
+of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the
+act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any
+need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our
+need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are
+all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to
+minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 53, Art. 2]
+
+Whether an Angel Passes Through Intermediate Space?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not pass through
+intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space
+first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing
+through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is
+indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes
+through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement:
+which is not possible.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul.
+But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another
+without going through the middle: for I can think of France and
+afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands
+between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one
+extreme to another without going through the middle.
+
+_On the contrary,_ If the angel be moved from one place to another,
+then, when he is in the term "whither," he is no longer in motion, but
+is changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change:
+consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he
+was not moved so long as he was in the term "whence." Therefore, he
+was moved while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him
+to pass through intervening space.
+
+_I answer that,_ As was observed above in the preceding article, the
+local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it
+be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another
+without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the
+Philosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), "The middle is that into
+which a thing which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the
+last into which it is moved"; because the order of first and last in
+continuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last
+in magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99).
+
+But if an angel's movement be not continuous, it is possible for him
+to pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle:
+which is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are
+infinite intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible
+or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which
+are indivisible; because between every two points that are infinite
+intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a
+middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of
+necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the
+continuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to
+place except in time. But in the whole time which measures the
+movement of a body, there are not two "nows" in which the body moved
+is not in one place and in another; for if it were in one and the same
+place in two "nows," it would follow that it would be at rest there;
+since to be at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now
+and previously. Therefore since there are infinite "nows" between the
+first and the last "now" of the time which measures the movement,
+there must be infinite places between the first from which the
+movement begins, and the last where the movement ceases. This again is
+made evident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm's
+length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it
+travels; it is evident that the first place from which the movement
+starts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the movement
+ends is that of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to
+move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second.
+According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are
+the intermediate places multiplied; because every distinct point in
+the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a
+distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the
+same. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the
+points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, it
+follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate
+places.
+
+Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate
+places by the continuity of its movement; because, as the
+intermediate places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must
+there be reckoned some infinitudes in movement which is continuous.
+Consequently, if the movement be not continuous, then all the parts
+of the movement will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable
+body be moved, but not by continuous movement, it follows, either
+that it does not pass through all the intermediate places, or else
+that it actually numbers infinite places: which is not possible.
+Accordingly, then, as the angel's movement is not continuous, he does
+not pass through all intermediate places.
+
+Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going
+through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's nature;
+but not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and
+contained under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of
+place in its movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to
+place as contained thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence
+it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills,
+either through or without the intervening place.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him
+according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the
+angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet
+even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said
+above: but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is
+evident from the foregoing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied
+to various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the
+things thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So
+there is no comparison.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In continuous movement the actual change is not a part
+of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede
+change. Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in
+movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is
+a part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even
+without the mid-space, constitutes such movement.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 53, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Movement of an Angel Is Instantaneous?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous.
+For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist
+the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel
+moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a
+body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the
+lessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other
+length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in
+time, an angel is moved in an instant.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily
+change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as
+illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated
+successively, as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does not
+reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is
+the angel's movement instantaneous.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it
+is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term
+_whereto_: but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in
+the place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term
+_wherefrom_; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the
+other, it follows that he is divisible; which is impossible.
+Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term
+_wherefrom._ Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest is to be
+in the same place now and previously, as was said (A. 2). Therefore
+it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In every change there is a before and after. Now
+the before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently
+every movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before
+and after in it.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the local movement of an
+angel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from
+place to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the
+term _wherefrom_; but in the last instant of such time he is in the
+term _whereto._ Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms,
+just as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But
+there is a mid-time between two "nows" of time: hence they say that a
+last "now" cannot be assigned in which it was in the term _wherefrom,_
+just as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire,
+there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or
+in which the matter was under the privation of the form of fire: but a
+last time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time
+there is light in the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so
+illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous
+movements.
+
+But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown
+thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not
+otherwise disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every
+"now" of time which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the
+same "where" in the first, in the middle, and in the last "now." On
+the other hand, it is of the very nature of movement for the subject
+moved to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in every
+"now" of time which measures movement, the movable subject is in
+various dispositions; hence in the last "now" it must have a
+different form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest
+during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in
+whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time. Hence it is
+not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the
+preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be
+in the other term. But this is possible in movement: because to be
+moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in
+every instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of
+the kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is
+the term of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of
+the local movement of the illuminating body. Now the local movement
+of an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is
+of itself, depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is
+impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and
+that in the last "now" he is in another place: but some "now" must be
+assigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there
+are many "nows" succeeding one another, there is necessarily time;
+since time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in
+movement. It remains, then, that the movement of an angel is in time.
+It is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in
+non-continuous time if his movement is non-continuous for, as was
+said (A. 1), his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity
+of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the Philosopher says
+(Phys. iv, text 99).
+
+But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as
+the time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all
+corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from
+the movement of the heavens; because the angel's movement does not
+depend upon the movement of the heavens.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If the time of the angel's movement be not continuous,
+but a kind of succession of 'nows,' it will have no proportion to the
+time which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is
+continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be
+continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the
+proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the
+proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides,
+the swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity
+of his power, but according to the determination of his will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an
+alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood
+to be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote.
+But the angel's movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term
+of movement; hence there is no comparison.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This objection is based on continuous time. But the
+same time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. So an angel
+can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next
+instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel's
+movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places
+throughout the whole time which precedes the last 'now'; as was
+already shown (A. 2). Nevertheless he is partly in one of the
+continuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance
+is susceptible of parts, but because his power is applied to a part
+of the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above
+(A. 2).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 54
+
+OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS
+(In Five Articles)
+
+After considering what belongs to the angel's substance, we now
+proceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In
+the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge:
+secondly, into his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects
+known: and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them.
+
+Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Is the angel's understanding his substance?
+
+(2) Is his being his understanding?
+
+(3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?
+
+(4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?
+
+(5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the
+intellect?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 1]
+
+Whether an Angel's Act of Understanding Is His Substance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is
+his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the
+active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect
+is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and
+from his Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more
+is the angel's substance his action--that is, his act of
+understanding.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that
+"the action of the intellect is life." But "since in living things to
+live is to be," as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life
+is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of
+an angel who understands.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not
+differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the
+middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood
+are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence.
+Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect
+and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who
+understands.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The action of anything differs more from its
+substance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its
+substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was
+said above (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore neither the action of an angel,
+nor of any other creature, is its substance.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of
+any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the
+actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a
+substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which
+is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to
+be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality.
+But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the
+same as His existence and His action.
+
+Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it
+would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of
+intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists.
+Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from
+God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in
+itself, nor from the substance of another angel.
+
+Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then
+be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes
+about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own action,
+such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since
+its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself,
+action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive intellect,
+for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The relation between "life" and "to live" is not the
+same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that
+between "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the
+abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow,
+if "to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence." Although life is
+sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x),
+"Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life": yet it
+is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that "the
+act of the intellect is life."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The action which is transient, passing to some
+extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the
+subject receiving the action. The action which remains within the
+agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but
+only according to the manner of expression; for it really follows the
+union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is
+brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who
+understands it, as an effect which differs from both.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 2]
+
+Whether in the Angel to Understand Is to Exist?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to
+exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says
+(De Anima ii, text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live"
+(De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to
+exist.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to
+effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form
+by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to
+understand is to exist.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The angel's act of understanding is his movement,
+as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not
+movement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.
+
+_I answer that,_ The action of the angel, as also the action of any
+creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text.
+16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to
+something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting;
+and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the
+agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing
+outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent.
+It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be
+the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence is signified
+as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from
+the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature
+has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple
+infinity, we have the act "to understand," of which the object is "the
+true"; and the act "to will," of which the object is "the good"; each
+of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will,
+of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its
+species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively
+infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does
+to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted
+to one in genus and species; God's being alone is simply infinite,
+comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
+Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its
+own act of will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living
+subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one
+whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher
+says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he
+distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the
+various functions of life.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire
+existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding,
+since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently
+in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the
+existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is
+compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely,
+truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the
+same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding
+according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow
+that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand.'
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 3]
+
+Whether an Angel's Power of Intelligence Is His Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of
+understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and
+"intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages
+of his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds."
+Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything
+besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which
+is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple
+form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an
+angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been
+previously said (Q. 50, A. 2).
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the
+angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh
+unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler
+nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter
+is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of
+intelligence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels
+are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore
+substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.
+
+_I answer that,_ Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power
+or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident
+thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the
+diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account
+it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in
+every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared
+to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been
+already said (Q. 44, A. 1). Now the act to which the operative
+power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not
+the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other
+created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is
+not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its
+power of operation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all
+his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is
+partly intellectual and partly sensitive.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject
+of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality
+is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking
+there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is
+compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of
+accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for
+such accident belongs to the form--whereas an accident which belongs
+to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species,
+results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And
+such a simple form is an angel.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to
+substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards
+accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 4]
+
+Whether There Is an Active and a Passive Intellect in an Angel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive
+intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17)
+that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something
+whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it
+can make all things." But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore
+there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to
+receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active
+intellect, as is made clear in _De Anima_ iii, text. 2, 3, 18. But an
+angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a
+lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive
+intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The distinction of active and passive intellect in
+us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive
+intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as
+colors to the light, as is clear from _De Anima_ iii, text. 18. But
+this is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive
+intellect in the angel.
+
+_I answer that,_ The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in
+us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in
+potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power,
+which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to
+intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when
+it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is
+the power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity
+for admitting an active intellect is due to this--that the natures of
+the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul,
+as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in
+potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is
+necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such
+natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the
+active intellect.
+
+But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are
+neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to
+such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their
+intelligible objects intelligible in potentiality, but they are
+actually such; for they first and principally understand immaterial
+things, as will appear later (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1). Therefore
+there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them, except
+equivocally.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher
+understands those two things to be in every nature in which there
+chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not
+generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is
+no need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is the function of the active intellect to
+enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible
+in potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be
+actually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in
+potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of
+being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one
+angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active
+intellect: neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the
+angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the
+knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone
+wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect, he
+will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we
+need trouble.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 5]
+
+Whether There Is Only Intellectual Knowledge in the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not
+exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that
+in the angels there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore
+there is a sensitive faculty in them as well.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have
+learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many
+remembrances, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1. Consequently they have
+likewise a power of memory.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort
+of "perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the
+imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the
+demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are
+of the same nature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man senses
+in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels."
+
+_I answer that,_ In our soul there are certain powers whose operations
+are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry
+parts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There
+are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed
+through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of
+any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined
+to them, as is manifest from what has been said already (Q. 51, A. 1).
+Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them.
+
+The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the
+separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in
+keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual
+creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul.
+For this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was
+said above (A. 3, ad 1).
+
+A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First,
+it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to
+the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have
+bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this
+opinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence
+he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that "such an inquiry does not call for
+much labor." Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the
+like are to be understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense
+has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common
+usage of speech, when we understand something for certain, to say
+that we "sense it." And hence it is that we use the word "sentence."
+Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness
+of the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing
+them. We have experience when we know single objects through the
+senses: the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show (Q.
+57, A. 2), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in
+the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind;
+although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the
+sensitive soul. In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is attributed
+to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the
+true good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy,
+whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things
+themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 55
+
+OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE
+(In Three Articles)
+
+Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic
+knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some
+species?
+
+(2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as
+they have derived from things?
+
+(3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the
+lower angels?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Angels Know All Things by Their Substance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their
+substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels,
+according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are
+happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence.
+Therefore the angel knows things by his essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51;
+_De Anima_ iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, the
+intellect is the same as the object understood." But the object
+understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that
+whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as
+the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very
+substance of the one understanding it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there
+according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an
+intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an
+intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower
+orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are
+in the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
+iv) that God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in all.
+Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are
+enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know by the forms
+of things, and not by their own substance.
+
+_I answer that,_ The medium through which the intellect understands,
+is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it
+is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may
+be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to
+which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is
+that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly
+complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of
+the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or
+that form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to
+understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is
+universal being or universal truth. The angel's essence, however,
+does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence
+restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine
+essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all
+things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His
+essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his
+intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that the angel knows things according
+to his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine the
+medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the
+thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the
+angel of his own nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated
+in _De Anima_ ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the
+sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one
+thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the
+intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that
+the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it
+understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is
+precisely the same thing to say "in things which are without matter,
+the intellect is the same thing as the object understood," as to say
+that "the intellect in act is the thing understood in act"; for a
+thing is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those which
+are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed
+perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality--because the
+angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own
+formality from other things--but according to some common formality.
+Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in
+God's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from
+which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore
+God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this
+the angel has not, but only a common knowledge.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Angels Understand by Species Drawn from Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn
+from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness
+within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing
+in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness
+is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is
+caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding
+must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by
+it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things;
+that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary
+for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived
+from things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the
+active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect
+abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of
+the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So
+there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands
+through species drawn from things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to
+what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from
+sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by
+species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to
+things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no
+purpose.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do
+not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible."
+
+_I answer that,_ The species whereby the angels understand are not
+drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that
+there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual
+substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The
+highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully
+perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of
+matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some
+agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower
+intellectual substances --that is to say, human souls--have a power
+of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively
+completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things.
+But in the higher spiritual substances--that is, the angels--the
+power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species,
+in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to
+understand all things which they can know naturally.
+
+The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances.
+The lower spiritual substances--that is, souls--have a nature akin to
+a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently
+from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their
+intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise
+they would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand,
+the higher substances--that is, the angels--are utterly free from
+bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible
+nature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection
+through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God
+the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature.
+Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): "The other things which
+are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive
+existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in
+their own nature."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not,
+indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of
+creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence
+Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type, according to
+which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the
+creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists
+first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very
+fashioning of the creature."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to
+pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination,
+which form is without matter but not without material conditions,
+stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and
+the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from
+matter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful
+the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms to an
+intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the
+nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no
+imagination, as was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Even granted that he
+could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he
+would not do so; because he would not need them, for he has
+connatural intelligible species.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what
+is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not
+purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the
+purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Higher Angels Understand by More Universal Species Than
+the Lower Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand
+by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal,
+seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not
+understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be
+said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less
+universal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known
+than what is known generically; because to know anything generically
+is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore,
+the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it
+follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the
+lower; which is not befitting.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if
+the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which
+the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the
+higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things.
+Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each;
+which seems unbecoming.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher
+angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in _De
+Causis_ it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.
+
+_I answer that,_ For this reason are some things of a more exalted
+nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which
+is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is
+contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by
+which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in
+created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it
+is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what
+God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the
+intellect is lower.
+
+Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be
+able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore
+his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were,
+extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be
+observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an
+intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and
+detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are
+others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from
+particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its
+knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not
+derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will
+not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing
+to them; either according to the order of causality, as the universal
+ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the order of
+nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two
+senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only
+the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is
+something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge
+of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the
+part of the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect
+to know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one
+universal medium can know each of the things which are properly
+contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of
+several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the
+proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a
+universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which
+can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which
+in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of
+wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of
+Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each
+thing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according to
+its proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in
+the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many
+things can be known through it with a proper knowledge.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 56
+
+OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the
+objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of
+immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first
+heading there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Does an angel know himself?
+
+(2) Does one angel know another?
+
+(3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art 1]
+
+Whether an Angel Knows Himself?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For
+Dionysius says that "the angels do not know their own powers" (Coel.
+Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known.
+Therefore an angel does not know his own essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would
+not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing single
+is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only knowledge
+which is intellectual, no angel can know himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object:
+because, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 4 understanding is a kind of
+passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears
+in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that "the angel
+knew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth."
+
+_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been previously said
+(Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2), the object is on a different footing in
+an immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient action the
+object or matter into which the action passes is something separate
+from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and
+the building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for the
+action to proceed, the object must be united with the agent; just as
+the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that
+sense may actually perceive. And the object which is united to a
+faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the
+form which is the principle of action in other agents: for, as heat
+is the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of
+the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.
+
+It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object
+exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then
+there is only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may
+be actual knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be
+actuated by the species. But if it always actually possesses the
+species, it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding
+change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the
+nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as
+knowing in potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the
+action, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something
+else, or self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the
+less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something
+else. So therefore, if in the order of intelligible beings there be
+any subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since
+an angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he
+is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself
+by his form, which is his substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That is the text of the old translation, which is
+amended in the new one, and runs thus: "furthermore they," that is
+to say the angels, "knew their own powers": instead of which the
+old translation read--"and furthermore they do not know their own
+powers." Although even the letter of the old translation might be
+kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own power
+perfectly; according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine
+Wisdom, Which to the angels is incomprehensible.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not
+because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which
+is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any
+single things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is
+nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as it is in
+potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not
+happen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that
+he understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is not of
+the same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes
+into some other matter.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art. 2]
+
+Whether One Angel Knows Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not know another. For
+the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 4), that if the human
+intellect were to have in itself any one of the sensible things, then
+such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending
+external things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored
+with some particular color, it could not see every color. But as the
+human intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is
+the angelic mind for understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since
+the angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate nature
+from the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot
+understand other natures.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is stated in _De Causis_ that "every intelligence
+knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and what is
+beneath it, in so far as it is its cause." But one angel is not the
+cause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the
+essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected by way
+of a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the
+essence of the angel known, except generically; as is clear from what
+has been said before (Q. 50, A. 4; Q. 55, A. 1, ad 3). Hence, it
+follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of
+another, but only a general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be
+said that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known;
+because that whereby the intellect understands is something within
+the intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind.
+Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species;
+because that species would not differ from the angel understood,
+since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one
+angel can understand another.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if one angel did understand another, this would be
+either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if God were
+now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the
+existing angels; or else he would have to be known by a species drawn
+from things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could not
+know the lower, from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way
+does it seem that one angel knows another.
+
+_On the contrary,_ We read in _De Causis_ that "every intelligence
+knows the things which are not corrupted."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. ii), such things
+as pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him
+in two ways: first, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to
+subsist in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in
+such a way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the
+things which He produced in their own natural being. Now in the Word
+of God from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal
+things, but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every
+one of these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both
+corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so
+that in every angel there was impressed the form of his own species
+according to both its natural and its intelligible condition, so that
+he should subsist in the nature of his species, and understand himself
+by it; while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were
+impressed in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that
+by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual
+creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished
+from one another in a certain order, as was already observed (Q. 50,
+A. 4, ad 1, 2). So the nature of an angel does not hinder him from
+knowing the other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower
+bear affinity to his nature, the only difference being according to
+their various degrees of perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel
+to know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause and
+effect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted
+in the angels, this will suffice for one to know another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: One angel knows another by the species of such angel
+existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose image
+it is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but according
+to natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself a
+subsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the
+intellect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only
+an intelligible existence. As the form of color on the wall has a
+natural existence; but, in the deferent medium, it has only
+intentional existence.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: God made every creature proportionate to the universe
+which He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to make more
+angels or more natures of things, He would have impressed more
+intelligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if he
+had intended to build a larger house, would have made larger
+foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the universe,
+means that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art. 3]
+
+Whether an Angel Knows God by His Own Natural Principles?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their
+natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by His
+incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds." Afterwards
+he adds that, "since He is above all substances, He is remote from all
+knowledge."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel.
+But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it appears
+that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a
+glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." From this it appears
+that there is a twofold knowledge of God; the one, whereby He is seen
+in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to
+face; the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was
+already shown (Q. 12, A. 4), an angel cannot have the former
+knowledge by his natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror
+belong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God
+from sensible things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii).
+Therefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet
+men can know God through their natural principles; according to Rom.
+1:19: "what is known of God is manifest in them." Therefore much more
+so can the angels.
+
+_I answer that,_ The angels can have some knowledge of God by their
+own principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a
+thing is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence
+in the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said
+that an angel knows himself--secondly, by the presence of its
+similitude in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye
+from its image being in the eye--thirdly, when the image of the
+object known is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from
+something else in which it is made to appear, as when we behold a man
+in a mirror.
+
+To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He
+is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue
+to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above
+(Q. 12, A. 4). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we
+know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in
+creatures, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are
+clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Hence,
+too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby
+according to his natural principles the angel knows God, stands midway
+between these two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is
+seen through the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is
+impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence, the angel
+knows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold
+God's essence; because no created likeness is sufficient to represent
+the Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the
+specular kind; because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror
+representing the Divine image.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of
+comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not
+known by any created intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely
+remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can he
+see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on
+that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: because, as
+God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God
+has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has
+of Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway
+between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more
+to one of them, as was said above.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 57
+
+OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS
+(In Five Articles)
+
+We next investigate the material objects which are known by the
+angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things?
+
+(2) Whether they know single things?
+
+(3) Whether they know the future?
+
+(4) Whether they know secret thoughts?
+
+(5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Angels Know Material Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material
+things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who
+understands it. But material things cannot be the perfections of
+angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not
+know material things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist
+within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On 2 Cor.
+12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the material
+things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into the
+angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision,
+but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are
+apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in
+themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in
+the angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know
+material things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but
+are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which does
+not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do
+likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is
+inferior to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much
+more can the mind of an angel.
+
+_I answer that,_ The established order of things is for the higher
+beings to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is
+contained deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower
+beings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain
+degree of fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest
+source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect
+of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among
+other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most;
+hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness,
+as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things
+pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in
+themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in
+God.
+
+Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the
+manner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of
+their own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His
+essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the
+angels by their intelligible species.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The thing understood is the perfection of the one who
+understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in
+his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the
+intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that
+intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but
+only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the
+imagination; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The
+intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said
+(De Anima iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is "what a
+thing is," regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense
+regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of
+material things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing
+understood is in him who understands, and not according to their real
+natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according
+to both natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material
+things from the material things themselves, he would require to make
+them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does
+not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves;
+he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species
+of things, which species are connatural to him; just as our intellect
+has, by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 2]
+
+Whether an Angel Knows Singulars?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the
+Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has for its object
+singulars, but the intellect, universals." Now, in the angels there is
+no power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident
+from what was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Consequently they do not
+know singulars.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of
+the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any
+assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so
+far as it is singular; because, as was observed above (Q. 50, A. 2),
+an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity.
+Therefore the angel cannot know singulars.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by
+singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species;
+because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of
+species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not
+the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because
+singular things are not known in the universal except potentially.
+Therefore the angel does not know singulars.
+
+_On the contrary,_ No one can guard what he does not know. But angels
+guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: "He hath given His
+angels charge over Thee." Consequently the angels know singulars.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of
+singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith,
+which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels,
+according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all ministering spirits." Now, if
+they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision
+over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals:
+and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: "Say not before the
+angel: There is no providence." Secondly, it is also contrary to the
+teachings of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to
+be the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to
+their knowledge and will.
+
+Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of
+singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular
+effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming
+eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This
+opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know
+a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as
+singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing
+from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to
+happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking
+place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and
+movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing.
+
+Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various
+powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending
+universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things
+singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his
+one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that
+the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power united and
+far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common
+sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one
+faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses,
+and some other things which no outer sense knows; for example, the
+difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in
+other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of
+nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his
+powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge,
+namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it
+ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be
+unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; _Metaph._ text. 15).
+
+The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered
+from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may
+subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that
+they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes
+forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature,
+but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of
+individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the
+thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He
+causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as
+was shown above (Q. 14, A. 8). Therefore as by His essence, by which
+He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows
+all things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to
+their singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the
+angels know things, not only as to their universal nature, but
+likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the
+manifold representations of that one simple essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which
+apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction
+from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal.
+Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of
+the angels, as was said above (Q. 55, A. 2, A. 3 ad 1), and
+consequently there is no comparison.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is not according to their nature that the angels
+are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by
+agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears
+resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way
+there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and
+form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever
+is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the
+angel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence,
+are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to
+their matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which
+nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and
+as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by
+the same species, has been already stated above (Q. 55, A. 3, ad 3).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Angels Know the Future?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For
+angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many
+future events. Therefore much more do the angels.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of time.
+But the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said in _De
+Causis,_ "an intelligence keeps pace with eternity," that is,
+aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future are not
+different, but he knows each indifferently.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the angel does not understand by species derived
+from things, but by innate universal species. But universal species
+refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears
+that the angels know indifferently things past, present, and future.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of
+time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are
+distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things
+distant according to future time.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity,
+does not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the
+exclusive sign of the Divinity, according to Isa. 41:23: "Show the
+things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are
+gods." Therefore the angels do not know future events.
+
+_I answer that,_ The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be
+known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily
+from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will
+rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their causes in the
+majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus
+the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of
+knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the more
+than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more
+universally and more perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply
+into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the
+future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their causes in
+the minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance
+events.
+
+In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the
+future in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely to know those
+events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but
+even casual and chance events; for God sees all things in His
+eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces
+all time. And therefore God's one glance is cast over all things
+which happen in all time as present before Him; and He beholds all
+things as they are in themselves, as was said before when dealing
+with God's knowledge (Q. 14, A. 13). But the mind of an angel, and
+every created intellect, fall far short of God's eternity; hence the
+future as it is in itself cannot be known by any created intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Men cannot know future things except in their causes,
+or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way,
+but much more distinctly.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although the angel's intellect is above that time
+according to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a
+time in his mind according to the succession of intelligible
+concepts; of which Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that "God moves
+the spiritual creature according to time." And thus, since there is
+succession in the angel's intellect, not all things that happen
+through all time, are present to the angelic mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the species in the intellect of an angel, in
+so far as they are species, refer equally to things present, past,
+and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future; nevertheless
+the present, past, and future do not bear the same relations to the
+species. Present things have a nature according to which they
+resemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they can be
+known thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nature
+whereby they are likened to such species; consequently, they cannot
+be known by those species.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Things distant according to place are already existing
+in nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the angel;
+whereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated.
+Consequently there is no comparison.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Angels Know Secret Thoughts?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For
+Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: "Gold or crystal cannot
+equal it," says that "then," namely in the bliss of those rising from
+the dead, "one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and
+when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same
+time be penetrated." But those who rise shall be like the angels, as
+is stated (Matt. 22:30). Therefore an angel can see what is in
+another's conscience.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the
+intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its shape
+is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the
+intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one
+angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the
+thoughts of both.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more
+than do the images in our imagination; because the former are
+actually understood, while the latter are understood only
+potentially. But the images in our imagination can be known by an
+angel as corporeal things are known: because the imagination is a
+corporeal faculty. Therefore it seems that an angel can know the
+thoughts of the intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ What is proper to God does not belong to the
+angels. But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts,
+according to Jer. 17:9: "The heart is perverse above all things, and
+unsearchable; who can know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart."
+Therefore angels do not know the secrets of hearts.
+
+_I answer that,_ A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in
+its effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also
+by man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect
+is the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by
+outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell
+some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more then can
+angels, or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those occult
+bodily modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that
+demons "sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions,
+not only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought,
+when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body"; although
+(Retract. ii, 30) he says "it cannot be asserted how this is done."
+
+In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and
+affections as they are in the will: and thus God alone can know the
+thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is,
+because the rational creature is subject to God only, and He alone
+can work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be
+developed later (Q. 63, A. 1; Q. 105, A. 5). Consequently all that is
+in the will, and all things that depend only on the will, are known
+to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will
+for anyone actually to consider anything; because a man who has a
+habit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will.
+Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11): "For what man knoweth the
+things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?"
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the present life one man's thought is not known
+by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the
+grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets.
+The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not
+exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in
+the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show
+forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of
+glory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although one angel sees the intelligible species of
+another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of
+these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it
+does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by
+actual consideration.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but
+follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause.
+Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their
+dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite
+or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of
+man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through following
+some bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in
+brutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the
+sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far
+as these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower
+part of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as
+is said in _Ethics_ iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the
+angel knows what is passing through man's sensitive appetite or
+imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the
+intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appetite or the
+imagination, but can make various uses of them.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Angels Know the Mysteries of Grace?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace.
+For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all
+mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine
+says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through the
+ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly
+places." And the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): "That great mystery of
+godliness appeared unto angels*." [*Vulg.: 'Great is the mystery of
+godliness, which . . . appeared unto angels.'] Therefore the angels
+know the mysteries of grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained
+in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom, which is
+His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is
+clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew
+mysteries of grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): "For the Lord God doth
+nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets."
+Therefore angels know the mysteries of grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the
+highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated
+(Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly
+essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of
+His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is
+evident in Isa. 63:1, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who
+cometh up from Edom?" Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice."
+Therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace.
+
+_I answer that,_ There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first
+is his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by
+his essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels
+cannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the
+pure will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of
+another angel, which depend upon the will of such angel, much less
+can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle
+reasons in this fashion (1 Cor. 2:11): "No one knoweth the things of
+a man [*Vulg.: 'What man knoweth the things of a man, but . . . ?'],
+but the spirit of a man that is in him." So, "the things also that
+are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God."
+
+There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it
+is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By
+such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor
+do they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by
+revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath
+revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels
+beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper
+mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to
+the lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they
+knew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught
+afterwards, as befits their ministrations.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the
+Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was
+revealed to all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason
+of this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all
+their duties are ordered. For "all are [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all.']
+ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the
+inheritance of salvation" (Heb. 1:14); and this is brought about by
+the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of
+them to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning.
+
+We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to
+its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on
+all points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these
+afterwards, as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom,
+yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to
+know everything hidden in it.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the
+mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the
+angels. And although God revealed in general to the prophets what He
+was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still
+the apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets
+did not know. Thus we read (Eph. 3:4, 5): "As you reading, may
+understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other
+generations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed
+to His holy apostles." Among the prophets also, the later ones knew
+what the former did not know; according to Ps. 118:100: "I have had
+understanding above ancients," and Gregory says: "The knowledge of
+Divine things increased as time went on" (Hom. xvi in Ezech.).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 58
+
+OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE
+(In Seven Articles)
+
+After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic
+knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the angel's intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and
+sometimes in act?
+
+(2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?
+
+(3) Whether the angel's knowledge is discursive?
+
+(4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?
+
+(5) Whether there can be error in the angel's intellect?
+
+(6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?
+
+(7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do
+they differ?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Angel's Intellect Is Sometimes in Potentiality, Sometimes
+in Act?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angel's intellect is sometimes in
+potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is
+in potentiality, as stated in _Phys._ iii, 6. But the angels' minds
+are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
+Therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but
+possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality
+thereto. But it is said (1 Pet. 1:12): "On Whom the angels desire to
+look." Therefore the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the book _De Causis_ it is stated that "an
+intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance."
+But the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality.
+Therefore it sometimes understands potentially.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): "Since the
+angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy
+and devout contemplation." Now a contemplating intellect is not in
+potentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not
+in potentiality.
+
+_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8;
+Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first,
+"as before learning or discovering," that is, before it has the habit
+of knowledge; secondly, as "when it possesses the habit of knowledge,
+but does not actually consider." In the first way an angel's
+intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which
+his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the
+heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not
+fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, the angels,
+have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by
+connatural intelligible species. But with regard to things divinely
+revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in
+potentiality: because even the heavenly bodies are at times in
+potentiality to being enlightened by the sun.
+
+In the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with
+regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always
+actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge.
+But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds
+in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is
+always actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the
+Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and
+beatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. i, 8).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Movement is taken there not as the act of something
+imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the
+act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this
+way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated in _De
+Anima_ iii, text. 28.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude
+the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire
+the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they
+receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the angel's substance there is no potentiality
+divested of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so
+in potentiality as to be without act.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 2]
+
+Whether an Angel Can Understand Many Things at the Same Time?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things
+at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that "it may
+happen that we know many things, but understand only one."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be
+informed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by
+shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore
+neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various
+intelligible things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement
+terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be
+understood altogether.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): "The
+spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at
+the same time all things that it wills."
+
+_I answer that,_ As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement,
+so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens
+that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts
+of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered
+severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by
+intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In
+another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they
+are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one
+operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as
+is stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect
+understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming
+parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together,
+according as they agree in one point of comparison. From this it is
+evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be
+understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised under one
+intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything
+is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect.
+All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are
+known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood
+simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are
+apprehended as different intelligible objects.
+
+Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through
+the Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which
+is the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know
+all things at once: just as in heaven "our thoughts will not be
+fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall
+survey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance," as Augustine
+says (De Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels
+know things by innate species, they can at one time know all things
+which can be comprised under one species; but not such as are under
+various species.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: To understand many things as one, is, so to
+speak, to understand one thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The intellect is informed by the intelligible
+species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many
+intelligible objects under one species; as one body can by one shape
+be likened to many bodies.
+
+To the third objection the answer is the same as the first.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 3]
+
+Whether an Angel's Knowledge Is Discursive?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is
+discursive. For the discursive movement of the mind comes from one
+thing being known through another. But the angels know one thing
+through another; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore
+the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do.
+But the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects;
+all of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the
+angel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with greater
+reason do this.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that "demons learn
+more things by experience." But experimental knowledge is discursive:
+for, "one experience comes of many remembrances, and one universal from
+many experiences," as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii; _Metaph._ vii).
+Therefore an angel's knowledge is discursive.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do
+not acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they
+led to something particular from something common."
+
+_I answer that,_ As has often been stated (A. 1; Q. 55, A. 1), the
+angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly
+bodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius calls them
+"heavenly minds" (loc. cit.). Now, the difference between heavenly
+and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last
+perfection by chance and movement: while the heavenly bodies have
+their last perfection at once from their very nature. So, likewise,
+the lower, namely, the human, intellects obtain their perfection in
+the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive
+intellectual operation; that is to say, as they advance from one
+known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known
+principle they were straightway to perceive as known all its
+consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at
+all. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which
+they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that
+can be known in them.
+
+Therefore they are called "intellectual beings": because even with
+ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said
+to be understood [intelligi]; hence "intellect" is defined as the
+habit of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of
+truth by the discursive method are called "rational"; and this comes
+of the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed
+the fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first
+aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range,
+by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all
+movement is from something before to something after. Hence
+discursive knowledge comes about according as from something
+previously known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards
+known, and which was previously unknown. But if in the thing
+perceived something else be seen at the same time, as an object and
+its image are seen simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive
+knowledge. And in this way the angels know things in the Word.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing a
+syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet
+they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by
+syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by
+way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are
+present, yet without any discursion withal.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Angels Understand by Composing and Dividing?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by composing and
+dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there
+is composition of the same, as is said in _De Anima_ iii, text. 21. But
+there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because
+angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at
+one time. Therefore there is composition and division in the angel's
+mind.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than
+any two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions is
+that of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant
+natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what
+was said (A. 2). Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by
+diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and
+dividing.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in speaking
+to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which are
+signs of composition and of division in the intellect; as is manifest
+from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the
+angel understands by composing and dividing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the
+intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear
+simplicity of divine concepts." But a simple intelligence is without
+composition and division. Therefore the angel understands without
+composition or division.
+
+_I answer that,_ As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion
+is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and
+dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our
+intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the
+principle, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In
+like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the
+subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed
+to, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by
+composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus it
+is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by
+discursion, and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first
+apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp
+all that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the
+weakness of the intellectual light within us, as has been said
+(A. 3). Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the
+angel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says
+(Div. Nom. iv), it follows that as the angel does not understand by
+reasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing.
+
+Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of
+enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: for
+he understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable
+immovably, and material things immaterially.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Not every multitude of things understood causes
+composition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of
+them is attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends
+the nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever can
+be either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a
+nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by
+composing and dividing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The various natures of things differ less as to their
+mode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the way
+in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something more
+in common; because directly the truth of an affirmation is known, the
+falsehood of the opposite negation is known also.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms
+of speech, shows that they know both composition and division: yet
+not that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply
+the nature of a thing.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 5]
+
+Whether There Can Be Falsehood in the Intellect of an Angel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's
+intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius
+says (Div. Nom. iv), there is "a perverted fancy" in the demons.
+Therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of
+the angels.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely. But,
+as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in the
+angels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom,
+and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its
+intellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons.
+Therefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that
+"the intelligence is always true." Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83,
+qu. 32) that "nothing but what is true can be the object of
+intelligence" Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood
+in the angel's knowledge.
+
+_I answer that,_ The truth of this question depends partly upon what
+has gone before. For it has been said (A. 4) that an angel
+understands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what
+a thing is. Now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing
+is, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in _De
+Anima_ iii, text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood creep
+in, when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of
+composition, and this happens either when we take the definition of
+one thing for another, or when the parts of a definition do not hang
+together, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature,
+"a four-footed flying beast," for there is no such animal. And this
+comes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn
+from diverse elements, one of which is as matter to the other. But
+there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is
+stated in _Metaph._ ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at
+all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known
+precisely as they exist.
+
+So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in
+the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; but very
+differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the
+quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by
+division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition.
+Such is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowledge of
+the) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said
+regarding it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can
+be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such
+thing, or excluded from it; but not of what may be dependent on God's
+supernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright will,
+from their knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form
+no judgments as to the nature of the qualities therein, save under the
+Divine ordinance; hence there can be no error or falsehood in them.
+But since the minds of demons are utterly perverted from the Divine
+wisdom, they at times form their opinions of things simply according
+to the natural conditions of the same. Nor are they ever deceived as
+to the natural properties of anything; but they can be misled with
+regard to supernatural matters; for example, on seeing a dead man,
+they may suppose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding Christ,
+they may judge Him not to be God.
+
+From all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the
+question are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes of their
+not being subject to the Divine wisdom; while nescience is in the
+angels as regards things knowable, not naturally but supernaturally.
+It is, furthermore, evident that their understanding of what a thing
+is, is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an
+undue manner, referred to some composition or division.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, A. 6]
+
+Whether There Is a "Morning" and an "Evening" Knowledge in the
+Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is neither an evening nor a
+morning knowledge in the angels; because evening and morning have an
+admixture of darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of
+an angel; since there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the
+angelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening
+knowledge.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes;
+while noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently, if
+there be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the
+same reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night
+knowledge.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, knowledge is diversified according to the difference
+of the objects known: hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text.
+38), "The sciences are divided just as things are." But there is a
+threefold existence of things: to wit, in the Word; in their own
+natures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad
+lit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning and an evening knowledge be
+admitted in the angels, because of the existence of things in the
+Word, and in their own nature, then there ought to be admitted a
+third class of knowledge, on account of the existence of things in
+the angelic mind.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22, 31; De Civ. Dei
+xii, 7, 20) divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and
+evening knowledge.
+
+_I answer that,_ The expression "morning" and "evening" knowledge was
+devised by Augustine; who interprets the six days wherein God made all
+things, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the
+sun was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely, the day
+of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the
+ordinary day, morning is the beginning, and evening the close of day,
+so, their knowledge of the primordial being of things is called
+morning knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word.
+But their knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it
+stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the
+being of things flows from the Word, as from a kind of primordial
+principle; and this flow is terminated in the being which they have in
+themselves.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge
+are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as
+compared to beginning and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine
+puts it (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent us
+from calling something light in comparison with one thing, and
+darkness with respect to another. In the same way the life of the
+faithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked,
+according to Eph. 5:8: "You were heretofore darkness; but now, light
+in the Lord": yet this very life of the faithful, when set in
+contrast to the life of glory, is termed darkness, according to 2
+Pet. 1:19: "You have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well
+to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place." So the
+angel's knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature, is
+day in comparison with ignorance or error; yet it is dark in
+comparison with the vision of the Word.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day,
+that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the
+darkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while
+knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn
+to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of
+God, in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things.
+Consequently after "evening" there is no night, but "morning"; so
+that morning is the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of
+the following, in so far as the angels refer to God's praise their
+knowledge of the preceding work. Noonday is comprised under the name
+of day, as the middle between the two extremes. Or else the noon can
+be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who has neither
+beginning nor end.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly
+the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under
+evening knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own
+nature.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Morning and Evening Knowledge Are One?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge
+are one. For it is said (Gen. 1:5): "There was evening and morning, one
+day." But by the expression "day" the knowledge of the angels is to be
+understood, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the
+morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two
+operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their
+morning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in
+God, according to Matt. 18:10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were
+different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening
+knowledge.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is
+perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away." But,
+if the evening knowledge be different from the morning, it is
+compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the
+evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): "There is a
+vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God,
+and as it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day,
+and the latter to the evening."
+
+_I answer that,_ As was observed (A. 6), the evening knowledge is
+that by which the angels know things in their proper nature. This
+cannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper
+nature of things, so that the preposition "in" denotes the form of a
+principle; because, as has been already stated (Q. 55, A. 2), the
+angels do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that
+when we say "in their proper nature" we refer to the aspect of the
+thing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge; that is to say,
+that the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the
+being of things which those things have in their own nature.
+
+Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas,
+or by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by beholding the
+Word, they know not merely the being of things as existing in the
+Word, but the being as possessed by the things themselves; as God by
+contemplating Himself sees that being which things have in their own
+nature. It, therefore, it be called evening knowledge, in so far as
+when the angels behold the Word, they know the being which things have
+in their proper nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are
+essentially one and the same, and only differ as to the things known.
+If it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas
+they know the being which things have in their own natures, then the
+morning and the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to
+understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken
+as the six classes of things known by the angels; so that the day's
+unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood; which,
+nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There can be two operations of the same faculty at the
+one time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident when
+the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end; and
+the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and
+conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired
+knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), the evening
+knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence
+there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the
+angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite
+imperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things that
+are not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection
+of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the
+morning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not
+opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is there any
+inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is
+more perfect and the other less perfect; just as we can have a
+demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion.
+In like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the
+uncreated Word, and through an innate idea.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 59
+
+THE WILL OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)
+
+In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of
+the angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself;
+secondly, of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there is will in the angels?
+
+(2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?
+
+(3) Is there free-will in the angels?
+
+(4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Will in the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For
+as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in the
+reason." But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher
+than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something
+higher than the will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is
+evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the
+appetite argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of
+something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no
+imperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it
+seems that there is no will in them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that
+the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible
+object understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are
+incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the
+image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory,
+understanding, and will. But God's image is found not only in the
+soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable
+of knowing God. Therefore there is will in the angels.
+
+_I answer that,_ We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In
+evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow
+from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by
+appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to
+good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and
+inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural
+appetite." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some
+knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they
+apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the
+sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this
+apprehension is called "a sensitive appetite." Other things, again,
+have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they
+perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This
+is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it
+were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like
+things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as
+things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards
+good in general. Such inclination is termed "will." Accordingly, since
+the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness,
+it is manifest that there is a will in them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in
+which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to
+the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular
+objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be
+one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite
+belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular
+good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason
+differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by
+simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from
+one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to
+know what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal.
+Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the
+part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in
+the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher
+than the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although the name of the appetitive part is derived
+from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part
+reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things;
+thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot
+[laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the
+same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger [ira];
+though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as
+hope, daring, and the rest.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The will is called a mover which is moved, according as
+to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there
+is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the
+angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated
+in _De Anima_ iii, text. 28.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 2]
+
+Whether in the Angels the Will Differs from the Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ
+from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple
+than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form
+towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the
+angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists,
+or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel
+inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an
+intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to
+the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his
+nature or his intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the
+object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ,
+not really but only logically [*Cf. Q. 16, A. 4]. Therefore will
+and intellect are not really different.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not
+differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives
+color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually
+related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to
+wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good,
+does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The will in the angels regards good things only,
+while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know
+both. Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their
+intellect.
+
+_I answer that,_ In the angels the will is a special faculty or power,
+which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not
+their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a
+thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to
+anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies
+that the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded
+to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before
+possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when
+once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic comes
+from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes
+from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make something
+like itself comes from the active qualities.
+
+Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there
+alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained
+within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills
+nothing beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot
+be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to
+the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the
+angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.
+
+In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect
+of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object
+known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself
+to what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside
+it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will
+goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination
+it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one
+faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to
+another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect
+and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is
+not so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, and the
+universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its
+substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by
+something additional, as has been said.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material
+difference of their objects, but according to their formal
+distinction, which is taken from the nature of the object as such.
+Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true
+suffices for the difference of intellect from will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Because the good and the true are really convertible,
+it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something
+true; while the true is desired by the will as something good.
+Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for
+diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Is Free-Will in the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels.
+For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice
+with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after
+taking counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in
+_Ethic._ iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of
+inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason.
+Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives.
+But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such
+indifference; because, as was observed already (Q. 58, A. 5),
+their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally
+intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their
+appetitive faculty can there be free-will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them
+according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels
+the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the
+free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will
+in them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the
+angels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will
+is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some things there are which act, not from any
+previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others;
+just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others
+act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as
+irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of
+judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a
+judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent
+endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in
+so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it
+can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever
+there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that
+just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and
+in a higher degree of perfection than in man.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man.
+As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in
+this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so
+need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the
+angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by
+the sudden acceptance of truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As was observed already (A. 2), knowledge is effected
+by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of
+imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should
+naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his
+nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he
+can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of
+this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the
+perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is
+inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore
+it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not
+determined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue
+imperfection in him, were he to be indeterminate to what is above him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher
+angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the
+intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of
+compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less
+degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor
+increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or
+through the addition of some qualification.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 4]
+
+Whether There Is an Irascible and a Concupiscible Appetite in the
+Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a
+concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
+iv) that in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild
+concupiscence." But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin
+has not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a
+concupiscible appetite in the angels.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger,
+hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred
+Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the
+wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible
+appetite in the angels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible
+appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance
+appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the
+irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is
+both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that
+the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does
+not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or
+concupiscible appetite in the angels.
+
+_I answer that,_ The intellective appetite is not divided into
+irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so
+divided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are
+distinguished from one another not according to the material but only
+by the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond
+an object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction
+of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things
+contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the
+power of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of
+sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white:
+whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white,
+then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the
+faculty of seeing black.
+
+Now it is quite evident from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1),
+that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the
+will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can
+there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the
+intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the
+distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite
+is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its
+common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly,
+since there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their
+appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but
+remains undivided; and it is called the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in
+the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;--on account of
+the resemblance in the effect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in
+the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple
+act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to
+love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to
+repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these
+things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine
+says (De Civ. Dei ix).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible
+appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible
+appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine
+goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind.
+For the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the
+irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible appetite is
+something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue
+of hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and
+divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with
+the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible
+faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside
+in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a
+human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the
+irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in
+them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring,
+to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is
+predicated of them according as in moderation they display their will
+in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed
+to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of
+this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible
+appetite.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 60
+
+OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS
+(In Five Articles)
+
+The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which
+is love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty
+comes of love.
+
+Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?
+
+(2) Whether there is in them love of choice?
+
+(3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love
+of choice?
+
+(4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves
+himself?
+
+(5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Is Natural Love or Dilection in an Angel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection
+in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from
+intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an
+angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted
+upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own
+nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves;
+because they possess free-will, as was shown above (Q. 59, A. 3).
+Consequently there is no natural love in them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now
+ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to
+wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is
+above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is
+no natural love in the angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved
+except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But
+there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also
+natural love.
+
+_I answer that,_ We must necessarily place natural love in the angels.
+In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is
+always sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before
+intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence.
+Consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in
+such subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to
+have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This
+inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in
+each according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature
+there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in
+the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a
+nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the
+nature to something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual
+nature, there must be a natural love in his will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that
+natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a
+nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or
+intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All things in the world are moved to act by something
+else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in
+no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the
+same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in
+so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author
+of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act
+himself, because he has free-will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love
+well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the
+inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural
+inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of
+nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the
+rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects
+the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and
+the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Is Love of Choice in the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the
+angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice
+follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3.
+Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to
+angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of
+choice in the angels.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such
+as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire
+the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything
+they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles,
+which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been
+already stated (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1). Consequently, besides their
+infused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore
+there is no love of choice in them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts.
+But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is
+love of choice in them.
+
+_I answer that,_ There exists in the angels a natural love, and a
+love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of
+choice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the
+nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in
+everything, what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.
+
+This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect
+and his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from
+such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are
+known by him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like
+manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle
+does in the intellect, as is laid down in _Phys._ ii, text. 89.
+Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man
+naturally wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this
+natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the
+end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as
+an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes of this, which
+is of something loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.
+
+There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the
+part of the will. Because, as was stated already (Q. 59, A. 2), the
+mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known
+within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual
+nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things
+capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is
+moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive
+faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards
+things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are
+appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to
+something else, and being appetible on account of something else.
+Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring,
+for him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else
+from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the
+intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not
+deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found
+in them both natural love and love of choice.
+
+In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which
+are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle
+thereof: but we shall speak of them later on (Q. 62).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Not all love of choice is rational love, according as
+rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love
+is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said
+above (Q. 59, A. 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice
+does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human
+choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
+
+The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Angel Loves Himself with Both Natural Love, and Love of
+Choice?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both
+with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (A. 2),
+natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the
+means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot
+be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the
+love of choice cannot have the same object.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a
+uniting and a binding power." But uniting and binding imply various
+things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement
+tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel
+cannot love himself with either natural or elective love.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for
+others comes of love for oneself."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since the object of love is good, and good is to be
+found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from _Ethic._ i,
+6, a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting
+good; and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved
+as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But
+that which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or
+inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to
+it but that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by
+the name "concupiscence" while the first is called "friendship."
+
+Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything
+naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to
+mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their
+own good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man
+naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires
+what is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the
+love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something
+which will benefit himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is not under the same but under quite different
+aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with
+elective love, as was observed above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As to be one is better than to be united, so there is
+more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which
+unites one to others. Dionysius used the terms "uniting" and
+"binding" in order to show the derivation of love from self to things
+outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As love is an action which remains within the agent, so
+also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not of
+necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back
+upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is
+reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 4]
+
+Whether an Angel Loves Another with Natural Love As He Loves Himself?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not love another with
+natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an
+angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows
+himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as
+was said above (Q. 56, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it seems that one angel
+does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and the
+principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes of
+love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one
+angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is
+unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love
+can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no
+love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another
+with natural love as he loves himself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ That seems to be a natural property which is found
+in all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, "every beast loves its
+like," as is said, Ecclus. 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves
+another as he loves himself.
+
+_I answer that,_ As was observed (A. 3), both angel and man naturally
+love self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself:
+consequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if this
+be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love; but
+if it be one with it by non-natural union, then it loves it with
+non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social
+love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so
+far as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.
+
+Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with
+another, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves
+another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in
+so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things
+devoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate
+its form to another thing, wherein consists this other thing's good;
+as it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne
+upwards.
+
+So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural
+affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an
+angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from
+him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The expression 'as himself' can in one way qualify the
+knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved: and
+thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other
+to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the expression
+can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and
+lover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself, because
+he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the other's
+essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves himself,
+because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love
+another by the other's will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The expression "as" does not denote equality, but
+likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the
+angel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he
+loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one
+only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a
+like love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he
+loves self in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing
+well to him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that
+end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one
+wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to
+oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked
+angels, without their still retaining a natural affection towards the
+good angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But
+they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to
+righteousness and unrighteousness.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 5]
+
+Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love God by
+natural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated (A. 4),
+natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far
+above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the
+angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, "That on account of which a thing is such, is yet
+more so." But every one loves another with natural love for his own
+sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore
+the angel does not love God more than self with natural love.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we
+behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But
+nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards
+anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does
+not love God more than himself from natural love.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self.
+But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it is
+poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to
+them," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels
+do not love God more than themselves by natural love.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the
+love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who
+sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two
+cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the
+earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made
+the heavenly city." Therefore it is not natural to love God more
+than self.
+
+_On the contrary,_ All the moral precepts of the law come of the law
+of nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral
+precept of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature.
+Consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself.
+
+_I answer that,_ There have been some who maintained that an angel
+loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of
+concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather
+than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in
+so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself;
+because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he
+wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the
+natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he
+naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.
+
+The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider
+whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because
+the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of
+the natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual
+nature. Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally
+belongs to another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that
+other to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural
+tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature:
+because "according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn
+aptitude to be thus moved," as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we
+observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard
+the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed
+to the blow for the whole body's safety. And since reason copies
+nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it
+behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death
+for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part of
+the city, then such inclination would be natural to him.
+
+Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good
+both man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every
+creature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it
+follows that from natural love angel and man alike love God before
+themselves and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them
+loved self more than God, it would follow that natural love would be
+perverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided
+whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the
+other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it
+does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is
+with the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and
+goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self;
+because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more
+than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the
+species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the
+good of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence
+everything in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in so
+far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far"
+denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God
+for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of
+love on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the
+nature of anyone to love God, except from this--that everything is
+dependent on that good which is God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as to
+certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for
+everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but
+likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural
+inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom
+every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love.
+So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with
+supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Since God's substance and universal goodness are one
+and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement
+of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other
+things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is
+naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is
+impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him.
+But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular
+effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way
+they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the
+universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than
+itself.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 61
+
+OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING
+(In Four Articles)
+
+After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will,
+it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a
+general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the
+first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence;
+secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly,
+how some of them became wicked.
+
+Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?
+
+(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?
+
+(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?
+
+(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Angels Have a Cause of Their Existence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their
+existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created
+by God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were
+not created by God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16) that
+if any substance be a form without matter, "straightway it has being
+and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity." But
+the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above (Q. 50, A. 2).
+Therefore they have no cause of their being.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very
+fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the
+angels are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent.
+Therefore the angels have no active cause.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 148:2): "Praise ye Him, all His
+angels"; and further on, verse 5: "For He spoke and they were made."
+
+_I answer that,_ It must be affirmed that angels and everything
+existing, except God, were made by God. God alone is His own
+existence; while in everything else the essence differs from the
+existence, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 4). From this it is clear
+that God alone exists of His own essence: while all other things have
+their existence by participation. Now whatever exists by participation
+is caused by what exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused
+by fire. Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the angels
+were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things,
+but are designated by the name "heavens" or of "light." And they were
+either passed over, or else designated by the names of corporeal
+things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as yet
+incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had been
+divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature,
+it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they
+were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard
+them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Substances that are subsisting forms have no 'formal'
+cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as produces
+its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality to
+actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire substance.
+
+From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Angel Was Produced by God from Eternity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from
+eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does
+not act through something besides His essence. But His being is
+eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at
+another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid
+down in the book _De Causis._ Therefore the angel is not at one time
+existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's
+incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as
+truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual
+nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but
+likewise eternal.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person of begotten
+Wisdom: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He
+made anything from the beginning." But, as was shown above (A. 1), the
+angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.
+
+_I answer that,_ God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from
+eternity. Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to
+the contrary must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced
+creatures that He made them "from nothing"; that is, after they had
+not been.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God's being is His will. So the fact that God produced
+the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude that He
+made them also by His will. But, as was shown above (Q. 19, A. 3; Q.
+46, A. 1), God's will does not act by necessity in producing
+creatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and when He
+willed.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure of the
+movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a
+corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the
+measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence,
+and which is also the measure of the succession which is in his
+operations. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that "God
+moves the spiritual creature according to time."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the
+very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth.
+But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed
+upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not follow
+that the angels existed from eternity.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Angels Were Created Before the Corporeal World?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the
+corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): "Six thousand
+years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the
+time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones,
+Dominations, and the other orders served God?" Damascene also says
+(De Fide Orth. ii): "Some say that the angels were begotten before
+all creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all
+devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the
+making thereof."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine
+and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity;
+while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was
+produced ere time was made, and after eternity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal
+nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal
+nature was made before another; hence the six days of the production
+of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more,
+therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
+created heaven and earth." Now, this would not be true if anything
+had been created previously. Consequently the angels were not created
+before corporeal nature.
+
+_I answer that,_ There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found
+in the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the
+angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the
+angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of
+themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting
+one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of
+creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures
+makes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate
+from the whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose "works
+are perfect," as it is said Deut. 32:4, should have created the
+angelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the
+contrary is not to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the
+opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, "whose authority in Christian doctrine
+is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his
+teaching, as is also the case with the doctrine of Athanasius," as
+Jerome says.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the
+Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have
+taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole
+universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the
+universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the
+universe. Hence the comparison does not hold.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the
+angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation
+of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the
+creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not
+involve creation of the universe.
+
+If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gen. 1, "In the
+beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the
+beginning," must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In the beginning
+of time": but not, "In the beginning, before which there was
+nothing," unless we say "Before which there was nothing of the
+nature of corporeal creatures."
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Angels Were Created in the Empyrean Heaven?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the
+empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a
+substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its
+existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation.
+Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that the
+angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the
+empyrean heaven.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest
+heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven,
+it would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And
+this is contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of
+the sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" (Isa. 14:13).
+
+_On the contrary,_ Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning
+God created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the
+visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or
+intellectual firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but
+from its splendor; and which was filled with angels directly it was
+made."
+
+_I answer that,_ As was observed (A. 3), the universe is made up of
+corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures
+were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal
+creature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was
+fitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place,
+as presiding over all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the
+empyrean heaven, or whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that
+the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage
+of Deut. 10:14: "Behold heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven
+of heaven."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not as
+if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their
+being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal
+creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal
+place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and
+that they are by their power in touch with bodies.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means
+the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of
+affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not
+speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the
+opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is
+nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an
+exalted and universal power over all corporeal things, were created
+in the highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other
+angels, as having more restricted powers, were created among the
+inferior bodies.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven,
+but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the sinning
+angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some manner
+to God, as will appear later on (Q. 63, A. 3).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 62
+
+OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY
+(In Nine Articles)
+
+In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the
+order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?
+
+(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?
+
+(3) Were they created in grace?
+
+(4) Did they merit their beatitude?
+
+(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?
+
+(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural
+capacities?
+
+(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge
+remain?
+
+(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?
+
+(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Angels Were Created in Beatitude?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude.
+For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue
+in the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature
+possess the excellence they have." Therefore the angels were created
+in beatitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal
+creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation
+was made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take
+precedence in time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
+lit. i, 15). Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature
+imperfect and incomplete. But its formation and perfection are
+derived from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was
+created in beatitude.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34; v, 5),
+the things which we read of as being made in the works of the six
+days, were made together at one time; and so all the six days must
+have existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according
+to his exposition, in those six days, "the morning" was the angelic
+knowledge, according to which they knew the Word and things in the
+Word. Therefore straightway from their creation they knew the Word,
+and things in the Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing
+the Word. Consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from
+the very beginning of their creation.
+
+_On the contrary,_ To be established or confirmed in good is of the
+nature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as
+soon as they were created; the fall of some of them shows this.
+Therefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.
+
+_I answer that,_ By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate
+perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that
+it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its
+ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of
+rational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can
+procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure called
+beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man's
+ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby
+in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and that is
+God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look
+forward to in the future, whereby "we shall see God as He is." This is
+beyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above
+(Q. 12, A. 4).
+
+So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first
+beatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was
+created already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such
+beatitude by any progressive action, as man does, but, as was
+observed above (Q. 58, AA. 3, 4), is straightway in possession
+thereof, owing to his natural dignity. But the angels did not have
+from the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is
+beyond the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of
+their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not to have it
+immediately from the beginning.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection
+which the angel had in the state of innocence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of
+its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by
+its operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v,
+4, 23; viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take
+place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating
+power of the plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the
+angelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection
+of its nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to
+come by its operation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word; the one
+which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a natural
+knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude thereof
+shining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he
+knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the
+angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge,
+and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first
+knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the
+outset of his creation; while the second was not, but only when the
+angels became blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly
+termed their morning knowledge.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 2]
+
+Whether an Angel Needs Grace in Order to Turn to God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in
+order to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can
+accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because
+he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 60,
+A. 5). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks. Now
+it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because
+there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had
+no need of grace in order to turn to God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for
+grace; hence it is said (Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me, and I will turn
+to you." But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare
+ourselves for grace: for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore
+the angel did not need grace to turn to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It was by turning to God that the angel reached to
+beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God,
+it would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess
+everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle
+(Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God is life everlasting."
+
+_I answer that,_ The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn
+to God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above
+(Q. 60, A. 2) the natural movement of the will is the principle
+of all things that we will. But the will's natural inclination is
+directed towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if
+there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined
+towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus
+it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and
+to generate fire; whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural
+power of fire; consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in
+so far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.
+
+Now it was shown above (Q. 12, AA. 4, 5), when we were treating of
+God's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate
+beatitude of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of
+every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have
+the movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be
+moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help
+of grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own
+will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the
+author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to
+God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A thing is "difficult" which is beyond a power; and
+this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the
+natural capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some
+help, it is said to be "difficult"; but if it can in no way be
+attained, then it is "impossible"; thus it is impossible for a man to
+fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to
+the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening
+hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order
+of the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered in
+itself, can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing
+by the weight of the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to
+mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult
+for man, both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a
+hindrance from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But
+it is difficult for an angel, only because it is supernatural.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a
+conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The
+first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature
+enjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion, consummate
+grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits
+beatitude; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is
+the principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man
+disposes himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual
+grace is required; but the operation of God, Who draws the soul
+towards Himself, according to Lament. 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to
+Thee, and we shall be converted." Hence it is clear that there is no
+need to go on to infinity.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Angels Were Created in Grace?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in grace.
+For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature was
+first made without form, and was called "heaven": but afterwards it
+received its form, and was then called "light." But such formation
+comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If,
+therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever
+have turned away from God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the
+angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems that
+they were not created in grace; but that they were first created in
+nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were
+beatified.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), "Who wrought
+the good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His
+will, that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the
+same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them?"
+
+_I answer that,_ Although there are conflicting opinions on this
+point, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural
+state, while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it
+seems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy
+men, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all
+things which, in the process of time, being created by the work of
+Divine Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were
+created in the first fashioning of things according to seedlike
+forms, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees,
+animals, and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears
+the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to
+the natural effect; hence (1 John 3:9) grace is called the "seed" of
+God. As, then, in Augustine's opinion it is contended that the
+seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creature
+when corporeally created, so straightway from the beginning the
+angels were created in grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be understood
+either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so the
+absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or else
+it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so it
+did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as
+Augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things
+(Gen. ad lit. i, 15).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the
+subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be
+inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the
+movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace
+can fail to make use of it, and can sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes midway
+between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in
+created nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory
+is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace
+stands not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but
+as the principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for
+grace to be given straightway with nature.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 4]
+
+Whether an Angel Merits His Beatitude?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude.
+For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the
+angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous
+action was not meritorious for him.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But it
+was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not
+thereby merit beatitude.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he did
+so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not
+before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before
+whereby to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he
+would be meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that
+case a lower angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher,
+and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is
+not admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the "measure of
+the angel" in that heavenly Jerusalem is "the measure of a man."
+Therefore the same is the case with the angel.
+
+_I answer that,_ Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because
+existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude,
+however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now
+everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation
+leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is
+not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing
+art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when
+such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it;
+wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. Now it is
+evident from what has gone before (AA. 1, 2; Q. 12, AA. 4, 5),
+ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It
+remains, then, that both man and angel merited their beatitude.
+
+And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no
+merit, there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited
+beatitude: as also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way
+before he had glory.
+
+But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then
+have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have
+grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which
+conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as
+some others have maintained, that the angels merit beatitude by their
+present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary,
+again, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means
+to an end; while what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking,
+be moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he
+already enjoys. Or else it will have to be said that one and the same
+act of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is
+meritorious; and so far as it attains the end, is the fruition of
+beatitude. Even this view will not stand, because free-will is not the
+sufficient cause of merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be
+meritorious as coming from free-will, except in so far as it is
+informed by grace; but it cannot at the same time be informed by
+imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by perfect
+grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it does not appear to
+be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude, and at the same time to
+merit it.
+
+Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was
+admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The angel's difficulty of working righteously does not
+come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but from
+the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natural movement
+towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of grace.
+
+The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Angel Obtained Beatitude Immediately After One Act of
+Merit?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude
+instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man
+to do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after
+one act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant, from
+the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to be
+moved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of a
+body could be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it
+would have movement in the first instant of its generation.
+Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will,
+he merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their
+beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the
+first instant.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, there must be many intervals between things which
+are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far
+remote from their natural condition: while merit comes midway
+between. Therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages
+of merit in order to reach beatitude.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for
+beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the
+saints. Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit
+deserving beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be
+some obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in
+his first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since
+there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by
+only one meritorious act.
+
+_I answer that,_ The angel was beatified instantly after the first
+act of charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is
+because grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature;
+as every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection,
+according to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to
+receive its natural perfection not by passing from one stage to
+another; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown above (A. 1;
+Q. 58, AA. 3, 4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to
+natural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence
+instantly after merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of
+beatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act; because
+man merits beatitude by every act informed by charity. Hence it
+remains that an angel was beatified straightway after one act of
+charity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection
+at once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to man than
+to the angel for securing beatitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The angel is above the time of corporeal things; hence
+the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except
+as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which
+merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of
+beatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect
+grace, and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains
+for different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel
+merited beatitude, and in another was beatified.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain
+the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one
+meritorious act is required; which act can so far be called an
+interval as through it the angel is brought to beatitude.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Angels Receive Grace and Glory According to the Degree of
+Their Natural Gifts?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and
+glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is
+bestowed of God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace
+depends on God's will, and not on the degree of their natural gifts.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with
+grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace.
+But grace does not come "of works," as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore
+much less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their
+natural gifts.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or
+grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of
+his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences
+(Sent. ii, D, 3) that "those angels who were created with more subtle
+natures and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed
+with greater gifts of grace."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and
+perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the
+degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from
+two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of
+His wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as
+the angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude,
+so likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for
+the various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the
+builder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he
+prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is
+clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the
+house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of
+grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.
+
+Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is
+not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the
+one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man,
+in whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or
+thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is
+nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy.
+So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher
+nature, were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same
+thing happens in men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed
+according to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it
+appears that the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the
+more grace and glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise does
+the nature of the angel: and as God's will ordained nature for grace,
+so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees
+of grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The acts of the rational creature are from the creature
+itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it seems
+rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than
+according to works.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels,
+who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another way
+in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on
+account of the end; while numerical difference is because of the
+matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or
+impede the movement of his intellective nature; but not in the
+angels. Consequently the argument is not the same for both.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Natural Knowledge and Love Remain in the Beatified Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not
+remain in the beatified angels. For it is said (1 Cor. 13:10): "When
+that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be
+done away." But natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison
+with beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural
+knowledge and love cease.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But the
+knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels.
+Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and
+love to remain.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts, as
+the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points.
+But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified
+knowledge and love; for, as is said _Ethic._ i, 8, happiness consists
+not in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural
+knowledge and love in the angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ So long as a nature endures, its operation
+remains. But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its
+perfection. Therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and
+love.
+
+_I answer that,_ Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For
+as principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations
+themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to
+second; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must
+ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved
+in beatitude: and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved
+in the act of beatitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The advent of a perfection removes the opposite
+imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the
+perfection of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the
+power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken
+away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In
+the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to
+the perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing hinders us from
+knowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at
+the one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative
+one. In like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this
+appertains to his knowledge of glory; and at the same time he can know
+God by his own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All things which make up beatitude are sufficient of
+themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the
+natural gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the
+uncreated beatitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at
+the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural
+knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory.
+Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love
+from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 8]
+
+Whether a Beatified Angel Can Sin?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as
+as said above (A. 7), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it
+is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore
+a beatified angel can sin.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as
+the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the
+angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is
+inclined towards good and evil.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be
+able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened
+in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there is
+in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin." Therefore the holy
+angels cannot sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for
+this is, because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His
+essence. Now, God's essence is the very essence of goodness.
+Consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the
+same way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of
+goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do
+anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn
+away from good precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can
+neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills
+or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel
+cannot sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Created good, considered in itself, can fail.
+But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the
+union of beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason
+already alleged.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites in
+the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the
+things whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred
+to opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known
+principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good,
+formally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to
+its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to
+opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have
+no tendency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom they see to
+be the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards
+God, which ever alternative they choose, that is not sinful.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end is
+disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident
+that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to
+different conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to
+proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the
+principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the
+perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose
+between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it
+comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning
+away from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is
+greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is
+in ourselves, who can sin.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Beatified Angels Advance in Beatitude?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in
+beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is
+perfect charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can
+merit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases.
+Therefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that "God
+makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same
+thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual
+ministrations"; since "they are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not
+all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who
+shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (Heb. 1:14). This would
+not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to
+advance to beatitude. It remains, then, that the beatified angels
+can merit, and can advance in beatitude.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying
+the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not
+in the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend
+higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in
+them; which is not admissible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Merit and progress belong to this present
+condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards
+beatitude, they are already in possession of beatitude. Consequently
+the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude.
+
+_I answer that,_ In every movement the mover's intention is centered
+upon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable
+subject; because intention looks to the end, to which infinite
+progress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature
+cannot of its own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in
+the vision of God, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. 12, A.
+4), that it needs to be moved by God towards its beatitude. Therefore
+there must be some one determined thing to which every rational
+creature is directed as to its last end.
+
+Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist
+precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all
+the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of
+vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of
+Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the
+rational creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it
+should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which
+is comprehension, for this belongs to God only; as is evident from
+what was said above (Q. 12, A. 7; Q. 14, A. 3). But since infinite
+efficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature's
+efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite being is
+in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pass that
+the rational creature understands God more or less clearly according
+to infinite degrees. And as beatitude consists in vision, so the
+degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.
+
+Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its
+beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a
+determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is
+once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its
+end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely
+passively, but also by working actively. If the end is within the
+power of the rational creature, then its action is said to procure
+the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be
+beyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the action
+will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the ultimate
+term is not said to be moved, but to have been moved. Consequently,
+to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life; whereas
+perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as
+in acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is productive
+of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is both
+perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity has
+no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the
+reward.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all,
+as being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is
+useful. Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall
+for a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the
+beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for
+to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what
+is perfect, considered as perfect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the
+highest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the
+highest degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the
+joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of
+such as are saved by their ministrations, according to Luke 15:10:
+"There is [Vulg.'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon one
+sinner doing penance." Such joy belongs to their accidental reward,
+which can be increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that
+they can merit as to their accidental reward. But it is better to say
+that the Blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time
+a wayfarer and a comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was such. For
+the Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude,
+rather than merit it.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 63
+
+THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN
+(In Nine Articles)
+
+In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of
+all with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil
+of punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for
+consideration:
+
+(1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?
+
+(2) What kind of sins can be in them?
+
+(3) What did the angel seek in sinning?
+
+(4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing,
+are any of them naturally evil?
+
+(5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil
+in the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will?
+
+(6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his
+creation and fall?
+
+(7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among
+the angels?
+
+(8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others
+sinning?
+
+(9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Evil of Fault Can Be in the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the
+angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in
+potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19),
+because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the
+angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting
+forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But
+philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies.
+Therefore neither can there be in the angels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it
+is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards
+God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving
+God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good.
+Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true
+good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at
+least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it
+truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good.
+Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Job 4:18): "In His angels He found
+wickedness."
+
+_I answer that,_ An angel or any other rational creature considered in
+his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to
+sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the
+condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing
+else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have;
+whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the
+rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of
+rectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he
+could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the
+rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving
+may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God's
+act, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created
+will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to
+the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every
+desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his
+superior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of
+his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no
+sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature;
+considering the condition of its nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural
+existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as
+regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this
+respect there can be evil in them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation.
+Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so
+neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But
+besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the
+angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the
+movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural
+being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural
+beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away
+by sinning.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will.
+First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing
+adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance
+or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The
+adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an
+inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the
+inclination of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in
+his universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect.
+In this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there are no
+passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest
+from what has been said above (Q. 59, A. 4); nor, again, could any
+habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin
+comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not
+according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces
+sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly
+regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to
+pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin
+does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of
+the things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel
+sinned, by seeking his own good, from his own free-will,
+insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Only the Sin of Pride and Envy Can Exist in an Angel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels
+besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any
+kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even
+in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
+3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth,
+avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit,
+just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there
+be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices
+spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is
+granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and
+envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other
+vices in them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil
+"is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort;
+yet he is proud and envious."
+
+_I answer that,_ Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all
+by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are
+in the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of
+all sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in the demons
+which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot
+be affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by
+such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is
+affected except with regard to something which is in some way suited
+to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good
+of the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the
+superior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride--not to be
+subject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first
+sin of the angel can be none other than pride.
+
+Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them,
+since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on
+its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines
+over the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his
+neighbor's good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good
+could not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked
+angel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which
+would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other.
+So, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the
+sinning angel, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the
+Divine excellence, according as against the devil's will God makes
+use of man for the Divine glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the
+sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal
+pleasures: it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all
+sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man's good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the
+immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human
+life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons
+are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures.
+Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if
+every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed
+avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in
+the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence;
+consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth
+is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual
+exercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to the
+demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual
+sins which can be found in demons; yet so that envy is not to be
+taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are
+comprised all other sins derived from them.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Devil Desired to Be As God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as
+God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under
+desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite,
+whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only
+in such desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall
+under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the
+finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite.
+Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin.
+But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature
+naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not
+by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby
+sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom
+than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the
+equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only
+things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation.
+Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said, in the person of the devil (Isa.
+14:13, 14), "I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most
+High." And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being
+"inflated with pride, he wished to be called God."
+
+_I answer that,_ Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as
+God. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality;
+secondly, by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first
+way; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible:
+and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any
+passion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was
+impossible by failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in
+ourselves. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against
+the natural desire; because there exists in everything the natural
+desire of preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved
+were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature
+of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as
+an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so upraised,
+it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us
+false; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy
+a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the
+destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of
+nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it
+is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in
+accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another.
+Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire
+equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with God.
+
+To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways.
+In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be
+likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike,
+he commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper
+order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin
+were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his
+own, and not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like
+unto God in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were
+to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which
+desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired
+to be as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to
+no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own
+'not-being'; since no creature can exist except by holding its
+existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this
+respect--by desiring, as his last end of beatitude, something which
+he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite
+away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God's grace.
+Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is
+bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own
+nature; and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering.
+This harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who says [*De casu diaboli,
+iv.] that "he sought that to which he would have come had he stood
+fast." These two views in a manner coincide; because according to
+both, he sought to have final beatitude of his own power, whereas
+this is proper to God alone.
+
+Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of
+another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have
+dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like
+unto God.
+
+From this we have the answer to all the objections.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Any Demons Are Naturally Wicked?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For
+Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There is
+a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and
+the souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore
+some demons are naturally wicked.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men.
+But some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Wis. 12:10):
+"Their malice is natural." Therefore some angels may be naturally
+wicked.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions
+by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally
+rapacious; yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the
+demons are God's creatures, they may be naturally wicked.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the demons
+are not naturally wicked."
+
+_I answer that,_ Everything which exists, so far as it exists and
+has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it
+comes from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to
+its principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil
+connected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it
+consumes other things: but with the universal good no evil can be
+connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined
+towards some particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil;
+not as evil, but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if
+anything of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its
+own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that
+every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which
+it can apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence, since
+the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a
+natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they
+cannot be naturally evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons
+are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not
+naturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held
+that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons
+are animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is
+inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may be
+connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to
+evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The malice of some men can be called natural, either
+because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the
+natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some
+inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful
+or lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their
+sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain
+evils are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural
+inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit.
+Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to
+him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes
+(De Div. Nom. iv).
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Devil Was Wicked by the Fault of His Own Will in the
+First Instant of His Creation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of
+his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of
+the devil (John 8:44): "He was a murderer from the beginning."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the
+lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order
+of time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad
+lit. ii, 8), the "heaven," which is said to have been created in the
+beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed:
+and when it is said that God said: "Be light made: and light was
+made," we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning
+to the Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and
+light was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light
+was made, it was made distinct from "darkness," whereby the angels who
+sinned are denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation
+some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual
+nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of
+Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could
+sin in the first instant of their creation.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the
+corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation
+in the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards
+in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also
+have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this
+operation was either ordinate or inordinate. If ordinate, then, since
+he had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the
+reward follows immediately upon merit; as was said above (Q. 62, A.
+5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would
+never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned
+by inordinate action in their first instant.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:31): "God saw all the things
+that He had made, and they were very good." But among them were also
+the demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the demons were wicked
+straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their
+nature, but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was
+made, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine
+says (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree
+with those Manichean heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil
+of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the
+authority of Scripture--for it is said of the devil under the figure
+of the prince of Babylon (Isa. 14:12): "How art thou fallen . . . O
+Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning!" and it is said to the devil
+in the person of the King of Tyre (Ezech. 28:13): "Thou wast in the
+pleasures of the paradise of God,"--consequently, this opinion was
+reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous.
+
+Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their
+creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is
+repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the
+other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one
+instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to
+his creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel's very
+being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems,
+then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first
+instant of his existence.
+
+This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in
+such movements as are measured by time, and take place successively;
+thus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the
+local movement cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the
+changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant
+there can be a term to the first and the second change; thus in the
+same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere
+is lit up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is
+instantaneous; so also is the movement of free-will in the angels;
+for, as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison
+or discursive reasoning (Q. 58, A. 3). Consequently, there is nothing
+to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the
+same instant.
+
+We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for
+the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of
+free-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant
+of its existence, nevertheless, that operation which begins with the
+existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as
+upward movement in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if
+there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause,
+which can be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first
+instant of its existence have a defective operation; just as the leg,
+which is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of
+generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which brought the
+angels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin.
+Consequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the
+first instant of his creation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is
+stated that "the devil sins from the beginning," "he is not to be
+thought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but
+from the beginning of sin": that is to say, because he never went
+back from his sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the
+sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken
+as according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.
+Dei xi, 15), that "He alone could discern light and darkness, Who
+also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All that is in merit is from God; and consequently an
+angel could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same
+reason does not hold good of sin; as has been said.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: God did not distinguish between the angels before the
+turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself,
+as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were
+created in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of
+them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby
+destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were
+deprived of the beatitude which they had merited.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 6]
+
+Whether There Was Any Interval Between the Creation and the Fall of
+the Angel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there was some interval between the
+angel's creation and his fall. For, it is said (Ezech. 28:15): "Thou
+didst walk perfect [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast walked in the midst of the
+stones of fire; thou wast perfect . . .'] in thy ways from the day of
+thy creation until iniquity was found in thee." But since walking is
+continuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore there was some
+interval between the devil's creation and his fall.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that "the serpent
+of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly"; which
+refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the
+first instant of his creation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and
+angel. But there was some delay between man's formation and his sin.
+Therefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the
+devil's formation and his sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was
+distinct from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a
+middle time between every two instants. Therefore there was an
+interval between his creation and his fall.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said of the devil (John 8:44): "He stood not
+in the truth": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), "we must
+understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not
+remain in it."
+
+_I answer that,_ There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the
+more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings
+of the Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first
+instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held that
+he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation,
+and that he was created in grace; as we have said (Q. 62, A. 3). For
+since the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said
+above (Q. 62, A. 5), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the
+first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that
+first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.
+
+If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace,
+or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant,
+then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed
+between his creation and fall.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous
+movements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured
+by time. In this way by "walking" we are to understand the movement
+of free-will tending towards good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Origen says, "The serpent of old did not from the first
+walk upon his breast and belly," because of the first instant in
+which he was not wicked.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An angel has an inflexible free-will after once
+choosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a
+natural movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to
+beatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with
+man; and therefore the argument does not hold good.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: It is true to say that there is a middle time between
+every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved
+_Phys._ vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the
+heavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time,
+time is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of
+their affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood to
+respond to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects
+itself by its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is
+mentioned, but not morning. This operation was good in them all. From
+such operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word
+by their morning knowledge while others, absorbed in themselves,
+became night, "swelling up with pride," as Augustine says (Gen. ad
+lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act was common to them all; but in
+their second they were separated. Consequently they were all of them
+good in the first instant; but in the second the good were set apart
+from the wicked.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Highest Angel Among Those Who Sinned Was the Highest of
+All?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who
+sinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezech. 28:14):
+"Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in
+the holy mountain of God." Now the order of the Cherubim is under
+the order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii).
+Therefore, the highest angel among those who sinned was not the
+highest of all.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it
+might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels
+sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the
+noblest creature which is unfitting.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so
+much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is,
+so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the
+less can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the
+angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower
+angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief
+angel who sinned, "being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed
+them in brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among
+them."
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the
+proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels
+we consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels
+were less likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene
+says (De Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set
+over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view
+of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6, 7; x,
+9, 10, 11). For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some
+of the demons were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods' the
+intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling
+by the name of "demons" the intellectual substances which are beneath
+it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion
+to be rejected as contrary to faith; because the whole corporeal
+creation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says (De
+Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from
+saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding
+over the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies; and the
+highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene says (De
+Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels;
+yet in that order some of them remained good.
+
+But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed
+in the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said
+(A. 2), the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is
+excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory
+says that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be
+the more probable view: because the angels' sin did not come of any
+proneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argument seems
+to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet
+this must not be prejudicial to the other view; because there might be
+some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower
+angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Cherubim is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," while
+"Seraphim" means "those who are on fire," or "who set on fire."
+Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible
+with mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity,
+which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who
+sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those
+who sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the end
+of both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His
+goodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual
+creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this
+unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual creature
+was so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its
+end.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: However great was the inclination towards good in the
+highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently
+it was in his power not to follow it.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Sin of the Highest Angel Was the Cause of the Others
+Sinning?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not
+the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect.
+But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at
+one time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others'
+sinning.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was
+shown above (A. 2). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more
+contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than
+to a superior; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by
+desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the
+sin of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if
+he had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear
+that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to
+another against God, than to wish to be over another against God;
+because there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of
+the foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that he
+induced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would
+have sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is contrary to a
+gloss on Ps. 103:26: "This dragon which Thou hast formed--He who was
+the more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in
+malice." Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of
+the others sinning.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the dragon "drew"
+with him "the third part of the stars of heaven."
+
+_I answer that,_ The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the
+others sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind
+of exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons
+are subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord's words:
+"Go [Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which
+was prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matt. 25:41). For the order
+of Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil
+suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to
+(2 Pet. 2:19): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the
+slave."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet
+the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel
+needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man,
+who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal
+speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it
+is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he
+takes thought; and in the last instant of speech, another who catches
+his meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially evident with
+regard to primary concepts, "which everyone accepts directly they are
+heard" [*Boethius, De Hebdom.].
+
+Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is
+required in us; in the same instant in which the highest angel
+expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for
+the others to consent thereto.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Other things being equal, the proud would rather be
+subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to
+be subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an
+advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior.
+Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to
+serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have
+him as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their
+ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers; especially because in
+the order of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 62, A. 6), an angel has
+nothing in him to retard his action, and with his whole might he is
+moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently
+since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower
+angels, he fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he
+became the greater in malice.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 9]
+
+Whether Those Who Sinned Were As Many As Those Who Remained Firm?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm.
+For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Evil is in many, but
+good is in few."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way
+in men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than
+good; according to Eccles. 1:15: "The number of fools is infinite."
+Therefore for the same reason it is so with the angels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the angels are distinguished according to
+persons and orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it
+would appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (4 Kings 6:16): "There are more with us
+than with them": which is expounded of the good angels who are with us
+to aid us, and the wicked spirits who are our foes.
+
+_I answer that,_ More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is
+contrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the
+natural order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its
+effects either always, or more often than not.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom
+evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are
+known to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason,
+which good is known to the few. In the angels there is only an
+intellectual nature; hence the argument does not hold.
+
+And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to those who hold that the chief devil
+belonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly
+affairs, it is evident that some of every order did not fall, but
+only those of the lowest order. According to those who maintain that
+the chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some
+fell of every order; just as men are taken up into every order to
+supply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free-will is
+more established; which in every degree of creature can be turned to
+evil. In the Sacred Scripture, however, the names of some orders, as
+of Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are
+derived from the ardor of love and from God's indwelling, which are
+not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of Cherubim, Powers,
+and Principalities are attributed to them; because these names are
+derived from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both
+good and bad.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 64
+
+THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons;
+under which heading there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Of their darkness of intellect;
+
+(2) Of their obstinacy of will;
+
+(3) Of their grief;
+
+(4) Of their place of punishment.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Demons' Intellect Is Darkened by Privation of the
+Knowledge of All Truth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened by
+being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For if they knew any
+truth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to
+know separated substances. But this is not in keeping with their
+unhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as
+that some writers have assigned as man's last happiness the knowledge
+of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all
+knowledge of truth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be
+specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the same
+is not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of
+our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes
+from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of
+the sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most manifest of
+Himself, because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because they
+are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore
+neither can they know other things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22), the
+proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and
+evening. But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do
+not see things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge,
+because this evening knowledge refers the things known to the
+Creator's praise (hence, after "evening" comes "morning" [Gen. 1]).
+Therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the
+kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei
+xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: "for if they had
+known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory," as is
+said 1 Cor. 2:8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of
+all other knowledge of truth.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either
+naturally, as we know first principles; or by deriving it from
+someone else, as we know by learning; or by long experience, as the
+things we learn by discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth
+by their own nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33),
+the good angels are separated from them as light is from darkness;
+and every manifestation is made through light, as is said Eph. 5:13.
+In like manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from
+the good angels: because "there is no fellowship of light with
+darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath . . . ?']" (2 Cor. 6:14). Nor
+can they learn by long experience: because experience comes of the
+senses. Consequently there is no knowledge of truth in them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain gifts
+were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at
+all, but remain entire and most brilliant." Now, the knowledge of
+truth stands among those natural gifts. Consequently there is some
+knowledge of truth in them.
+
+_I answer that,_ The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes
+of nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of
+grace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when
+Divine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other is effective,
+and produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the
+gift of wisdom.
+
+Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor
+lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very nature of the
+angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on
+account of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn
+from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural
+powers, as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or
+of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the
+natural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural
+knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however,
+which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been
+utterly taken away from them, but lessened; because, of these Divine
+secrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is
+done either by means of the angels, or "through some temporal workings
+of Divine power," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 21); but not in
+the same degree as to the holy angels, to whom many more things are
+revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third
+knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Happiness consists in self-application to something
+higher. The separated substances are above us in the order of nature;
+hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated
+substances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the
+first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one
+separate substance to know another; as it is natural for us to know
+sensible natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not consist in
+knowing sensible natures; so neither does the angel's happiness
+consist in knowing separated substances.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us
+by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely because
+our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine
+substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect,
+but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his
+own nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the perfection of
+his intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God
+than man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons.
+Although they do not possess the purity which comes with grace,
+nevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the
+knowledge of God which belongs to them from their nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The creature is darkness in comparison with the
+excellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature's
+knowledge in its own nature is called "evening" knowledge. For the
+evening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when
+the light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of
+things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of the
+Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the Divine
+light, and can be called evening knowledge; but if it be not referred
+to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but
+"nocturnal" knowledge. Accordingly we read in Gen. 1:5 that the
+darkness, which God separated from the light, "He called night."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: All the angels had some knowledge from the very
+beginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its
+completion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were
+beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never
+had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence
+the demons much less fully understood the mystery of the Incarnation,
+when Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei
+ix, 21), "It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels,
+who enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; but it was made known
+by some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them." For had
+they fully and certainly known that He was the Son of God and the
+effect of His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion
+of the Lord of glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The demons know a truth in three ways: first of all by
+the subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by
+privation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the
+light of their intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the
+holy angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will,
+they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual
+nature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by
+others: thirdly, they know by long experience; not as deriving it
+from the senses; but when the similitude of their innate intelligible
+species is completed in individual things, they know some things as
+present, which they previously did not know would come to pass, as we
+said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels (Q. 57, A. 3, ad
+3).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Will of the Demons Is Obstinate in Evil?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not
+obstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an
+intellectual being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said
+above (A. 1). But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained
+to good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons' will is not so
+obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than
+the demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the
+malice of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy.
+Therefore the demons can likewise return from their state of malice
+to the state of justice.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then
+their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they
+fell. But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the
+motive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore
+the demon is not obstinate in malice.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be reinstated
+by another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed
+already (Q. 63, A. 8), the lower demons fell through the highest one.
+Therefore their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they
+are not obstinate in malice.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any
+good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses
+the truth, saying to Christ: "I know Who Thou art, the holy one of
+God" (Mark 1:24). "The demons" also "believe and tremble" (James
+2:19). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that "they desire what
+is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand." Therefore
+they are not obstinate in malice.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
+hate Thee, ascendeth continually"; and this is understood of the
+demons. Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.
+
+_I answer that,_ It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that
+every will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to
+good and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of
+the union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of
+true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature
+of true beatitude; hence it is termed "life everlasting." It is also
+contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that
+demons and wicked men shall be sent "into everlasting punishment,"
+and the good brought "into everlasting life." Consequently such an
+opinion must be considered erroneous; while according to Catholic
+Faith, it must be held firmly both that the will of the good angels
+is confirmed in good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate
+in evil.
+
+We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of
+the sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as
+Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to men, what the fall is
+to the angels." Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave
+or less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they
+are without remission and endure for ever.
+
+To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind
+that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the
+apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For
+the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks
+the universal good, as was said above (Q. 59, A. 1); as also the
+sense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers
+universals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this
+respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we
+apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit
+of "intelligence"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably,
+passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by
+which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's
+will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it
+and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres
+fixedly and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its
+adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite
+(namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he
+has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that
+man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after
+choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before
+the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to
+justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are
+obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who
+are damned (Suppl., Q. 98, AA. 1, 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but
+according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been
+said.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But
+such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and
+are not delivered by the Divine mercy.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The devil's first sin still remains in him according to
+desire; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he
+desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder,
+and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him;
+nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would
+he had done it, or still would do it if he could.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The fact that man sinned from another's suggestion, is
+not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable. Consequently the
+argument does not hold good.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will;
+and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon's
+part is always wicked; because, although at times he does something
+good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth in order
+to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly,
+but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act is
+natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the
+goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Is Sorrow in the Demons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For
+since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the
+same subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing
+against the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: "The devil
+has power over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices
+over this sinister power." Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things
+cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are
+present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24,
+"Who was made to fear no one." Therefore there is no grief in the
+demons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the
+demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least
+for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man
+is punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin,
+according to Apoc. 18:7, "As much as she hath glorified herself, and
+lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her."
+Consequently much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow,
+because he especially glorified himself.
+
+_I answer that,_ Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are
+passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the
+sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According,
+however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the
+demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because
+sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the
+resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is
+evident that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are,
+and others to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish
+others to be damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said
+to exist in them: and especially because it is of the very notion of
+punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are
+deprived of happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked
+will is curbed in many respects.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but
+not about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man
+from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another; especially so
+far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will; because, not
+merely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there
+can be something that we will, and something that we will not.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so
+also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He was made
+to fear no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God which
+restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the devils
+believe and tremble" (James 2:19).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin
+bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin
+is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, or for the
+evil of sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the
+goodness of nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow for good lost by
+punishment, is the witness to a good nature." Consequently, since the
+demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil
+of sin.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Our Atmosphere Is the Demons' Place of Punishment?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons'
+place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a
+spiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no
+place of punishment for demons.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But
+man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the
+demons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome
+atmosphere.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire.
+But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the
+darksome atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the
+darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment
+day."
+
+_I answer that,_ The angels in their own nature stand midway between
+God and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it
+procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But
+man's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of
+all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil;
+and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way,
+indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against
+opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be
+brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be
+of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of
+punishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this
+is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the
+darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.
+
+Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment
+day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with
+demons endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to
+us here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial:
+although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they
+have led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy
+souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men
+and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting
+the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it:
+because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not
+agreeable to its will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of
+nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature;
+consequently there is no parallel.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons
+and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the beatitude
+of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this
+is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2 Cor.
+5:1): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have
+a house in heaven." Others, again, while not admitting the same of
+souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same
+judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on
+good souls and good angels.
+
+Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs
+to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their
+coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the
+same way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is
+not actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said,
+that although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of
+hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their
+punishment is none the less; because they know that such confinement
+is their due. Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3:6: "They carry
+fire of hell with them wherever they go." Nor is this contrary to what
+is said (Luke 8:31), "They besought the Lord not to cast them into the
+abyss"; for they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for
+them to be cast out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it
+is stated, "They [Vulg. 'He'] besought Him that He would not expel
+them [Vulg. 'him'] out of the country" (Mark 5:10).
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ. 65-74)
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 65
+
+THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES
+(In Four Articles)
+
+From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of
+corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture
+makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as
+given in the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth";
+the work of distinction as given in the words, "He divided the light
+from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from
+the waters that are under the firmament"; and the work of adornment,
+expressed thus, "Let there be lights in the firmament."
+
+First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the
+work of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the
+first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?
+
+(2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness?
+
+(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the
+angels?
+
+(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately
+from God.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Corporeal Creatures Are from God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God.
+For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works
+which God hath made, continue for ever." But visible bodies do not
+continue for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): "The things which are
+seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."
+Therefore God did not make visible bodies.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Gen. 1:31): "God saw all things that
+He had made, and they were very good." But corporeal creatures are
+evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in
+serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called
+evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore,
+are not from God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God,
+but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God.
+Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): "While we look not at the things
+which are seen." Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 145:6): "Who made heaven and
+earth, the sea, and all things that are in them."
+
+_I answer that,_ Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not
+created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof
+of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), "The god of this
+world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers." But this position is
+altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point,
+there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in
+nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different
+things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these
+different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as
+different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being
+is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different.
+There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things
+in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible
+and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the
+god of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings
+serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense,
+"Whose god is their belly" (Phil. 3:19).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All the creatures of God in some respects continue for
+ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be
+annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature
+approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For
+corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though
+they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible
+creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are
+mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly
+bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle's
+words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true even as
+regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as every
+visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to
+movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they
+are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these
+visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure
+for ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor. 4:17): "It worketh for us . .
+. an eternal weight of glory."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good,
+though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the
+consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities,
+though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who
+estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they
+themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to
+themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in
+some way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that
+even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but
+good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially
+evil and harmful.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God,
+but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly
+seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). If,
+then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use
+them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): "Creatures are turned
+into a snare to the feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they
+can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for
+they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements
+of some good that they have from Him.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Corporeal Things Were Made on Account of God's Goodness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made
+on account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God
+"created all things that they might be." Therefore all things were
+created for their own being's sake, and not on account of God's
+goodness.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the
+greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual
+creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to
+the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake
+of spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the
+unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God
+must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not
+created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all
+inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now,
+corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the
+former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on
+account of God's goodness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all
+things for Himself."
+
+_I answer that,_ Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal
+creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in
+punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that
+God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal
+nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God,
+and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given a
+higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others
+turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies
+according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is
+erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture,
+which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal
+creatures, subjoins, "God saw that it was good" (Gen. 1), as if to
+say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was
+good for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal
+creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but
+that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it
+would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal
+world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun's body was made
+what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin
+of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual
+creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the
+sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so
+of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible.
+Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the
+entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists
+of its parts.
+
+Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that
+whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the
+sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly,
+that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses
+for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all
+parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form,
+since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore,
+the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the
+fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also
+every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the
+less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than
+man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists
+for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire
+universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end,
+inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine
+goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in
+some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain
+to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is
+plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it
+represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that
+God created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude
+that He created them for His own goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end.
+Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the
+sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account
+of God's goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since
+equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But
+this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an
+architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in
+different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent
+difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection
+of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the
+different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning,
+to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of
+various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without
+injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Corporeal Creatures Were Produced by God Through the Medium
+of the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by
+God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed
+by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps.
+103:24: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But "it belongs to
+wisdom to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the _Metaphysics_
+(i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the
+higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii,
+4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the
+corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the
+higher.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes,
+since like always produces like. If then all creatures, both
+spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there
+would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further
+removed from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the
+Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are
+far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).
+
+Obj. 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite
+effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be,
+and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in
+suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is
+possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to
+that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
+created heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal
+creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from
+God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from
+Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until
+the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is
+untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by
+creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of
+coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and
+it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.
+
+In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause,
+the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the
+underlying principle in things is always more universal than that
+which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than
+living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely,
+then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing
+proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily
+all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause.
+Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is
+presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a
+higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire
+substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created.
+Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the
+first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created
+immediately by God, Moses said: "In the beginning God created heaven
+and earth."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the production of things an order exists, but not
+such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible;
+but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are
+constituted in creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and
+different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature,
+as has been shown above (Q. 15, A. 2); so that by His wisdom He is
+the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer,
+by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured not
+only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one
+and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another
+by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is
+presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as
+such, can belong to no creature.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Forms of Bodies Are from the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the
+angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without
+matter come the forms that are in matter." But forms that are without
+matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the
+forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual
+substances.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that
+which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms
+essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation.
+Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual
+substances.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation
+than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things
+here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and
+corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from
+spiritual substances.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not
+suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod,
+but rather that it obeys God thus." But corporeal matter may be said
+thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms,
+then, are not from the angels, but from God.
+
+_I answer that,_ It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms
+are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And
+there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that
+the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms
+immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held
+that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so
+forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see
+are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the
+impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of
+assimilation, or as he calls it, "participation" (Phaedo xlix). And,
+according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the
+order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a
+single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all
+horses, whilst above this is separate life, or _per se_ life, as they
+term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is
+that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being.
+Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms
+of corporeal things do not subsist _per se_ in matter, but in the
+intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the
+intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but
+"angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the
+form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the
+craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain
+heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things,
+but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it
+into species.
+
+But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in
+fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself
+brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26, 27,
+28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite."
+Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they
+exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or
+corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the
+"composite"; since even forms have not being, but composites have
+being through forms: for, according to a thing's mode of being, is
+the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is
+produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms
+in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this
+fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are
+caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter
+being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But
+since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created
+spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4, 5), it
+follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual
+substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their
+movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect,
+which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be
+referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of
+corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can
+have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies
+had when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding
+alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses
+prefaces each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or
+"that," to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God,
+from Whom, according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad
+lit. i. 4], is "all form and fitness and concord of parts."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of
+things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3): "By
+faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God;
+that from invisible things visible things might be made." But if by
+immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them
+come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to
+self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but
+either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which
+they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the
+Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in
+created things, that they may be able to be brought by movement
+into act.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement,
+not by emanation.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 66
+
+ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering
+of creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself.
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its
+formation?
+
+(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?
+
+(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with
+formless matter?
+
+(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 1]
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in
+time its formation. For it is said (Gen. 1:2): "The earth was void
+and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another
+version [*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of
+matter, as Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was
+formless until it received its form.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God,
+as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of
+nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in
+the Divine working.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part
+of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without
+substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore,
+cause matter to exist without form.
+
+_On the contrary,_ An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the
+agent. But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said
+of Him (Deut. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." Therefore the
+work of His creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation
+of corporeal creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But
+confusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. If,
+therefore, formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter,
+it follows that at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients
+chaos, existed in the corporeal creation.
+
+_I answer that,_ On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine
+for instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of
+matter was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or
+the order of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.),
+Ambrose (In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that
+formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. And although
+these opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but
+little; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different
+sense from the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form,
+and if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of
+matter was prior in time either to its formation or to its
+distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For if formless
+matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied
+by duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself
+is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to
+say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a
+contradiction in terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some
+common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that
+distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient
+natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some
+corporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate
+substance. Hence, it followed that to be made means merely to be
+changed; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial
+being, and made some particular thing to be, it would result that the
+supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but 'this'
+actual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus
+the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not
+generation, but alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter
+was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form,
+but under distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be
+taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself
+is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation
+or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in
+the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the
+whole. But the other holy writers understand by formlessness, not the
+exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness
+which are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say
+that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in
+duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine
+agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will be
+shown later (Q. 69, A. 1; Q. 74, A. 2).
+
+As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty
+was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to
+be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that
+transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that
+"darkness was upon the fact of the deep." And the earth lacked beauty
+in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil
+was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or
+"invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from
+view; secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and
+plants, for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to
+another reading [*Septuagint], "shapeless"--that is, unadorned. Thus
+after mention of two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the
+formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the words, "darkness was
+upon the face of the deep," since the air is included under heaven;
+and the formlessness of the earth, by the words, "the earth was void
+and empty."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The word earth is taken differently in this passage by
+Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the words
+"earth" and "water," in this passage, primary matter itself is
+signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the
+idea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under
+the similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of
+figures in speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only,
+lest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the
+same time it has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is
+susceptible of form, and to water in its adaptability to a variety
+of forms. In this respect, then, the earth is said to be "void and
+empty," or "invisible and shapeless," that matter is known by means
+of form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called "invisible" or
+"void," and its potentiality is completed by form; thus Plato says
+that matter is "place" [*Timaeus, quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv,
+text. 15]. But other holy writers understand by earth the element of
+earth, and we have said (A. 1) how, in this sense, the earth was,
+according to them, without form.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in
+potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature
+potentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form.
+But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore,
+produce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of
+His power.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act;
+whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence
+it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than
+for accident to be without subject.
+
+In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if,
+according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the
+informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's
+part, but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due
+order in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from
+imperfection.
+
+In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient
+natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction;
+except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct
+and without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy
+Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first
+being that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material
+distinction is expressed, as will be shown later (A. 3; Q. 68, A. 1).
+This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven
+and earth." The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements
+according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That
+air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the
+corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth
+and water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus
+xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words,
+"Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered
+that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be
+composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But
+Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says
+that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire
+does not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable
+to hold to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God"
+Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the
+waters," not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will
+may be said to move over the material to which he intends to give a
+form. The third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said
+to be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air,
+the subject of darkness, is described as being above the waters, in
+the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep." The remaining
+distinctions will appear from what follows (Q. 71).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Formless Matter of All Corporeal Things Is the Same?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal
+things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find
+two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he
+says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby,
+he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore
+the matter of all corporeal things is the same.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): "Things
+that are one in genus are one in matter." But all corporeal things
+are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is
+the same.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and
+the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the
+same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in
+potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter
+considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Things of which the matter is the same are
+mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said
+(De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act
+upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
+
+_I answer that,_ On this question the opinions of philosophers have
+differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies
+are of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four
+elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and
+corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the
+same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed
+by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the
+artificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies:
+"By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you
+are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that
+binds you together." But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5)
+disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the
+heavenly bodies have a natural movement, different from that of the
+elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For
+movement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not
+by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually
+opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the
+heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies
+have contrariety in their nature. And as generation and corruption are
+from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are
+corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of
+this difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicebron
+taught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of
+form. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the
+other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this
+argument would necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would
+inhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be
+incorruptible. But corruption would then be merely accidental through
+the disappearance of successive forms--that is to say, it would be
+corruption, not pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act
+would subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural
+philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual
+being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in
+corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and
+corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and
+incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself,
+is in potentiality to form.
+
+Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all
+those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is
+in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to
+all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more
+perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves.
+For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection
+and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in
+potentiality to a perfect form, and _vice versa._ Matter, therefore,
+whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in
+potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not
+actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of
+form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is
+privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore
+impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature
+incorruptible, should possess the same matter.
+
+Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines,
+that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven--being in
+potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its
+form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it
+is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it
+be act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside,
+then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with
+motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form--that
+is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form--it
+follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing
+is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not,
+being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly
+bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone
+which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to
+inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form
+perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no
+potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle
+[*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly
+bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so
+far as they agree in the character of potentiality.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato,
+who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter
+is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of
+corporeal creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense,
+corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on
+account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in
+_Metaph._ x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one
+genus of all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of
+corporeity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same
+in all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies
+are distinguished, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As potentiality is directed towards act,
+potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight
+is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of
+the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because
+the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental
+form.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Empyrean Heaven Was Created at the Same Time As Formless
+Matter?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created
+at the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is
+anything at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are
+movable, and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so,
+its movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible
+body, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not
+created contemporaneously with formless matter.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the lower
+bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order." If, therefore,
+the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily
+exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to
+be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for
+one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore
+the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place
+of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the
+contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "In so far as we mentally
+apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world"; from
+which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things
+of this world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of
+contemplation.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly
+transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven.
+There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the
+aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher
+heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the
+air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night.
+Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless
+matter.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Strabus says that in the passage, "In the
+beginning God created heaven and earth," heaven denotes not the
+visible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven.
+
+_I answer that,_ The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of
+Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect,
+namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede
+say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil
+[*Hom. ii. in Hexaem.] says: "Just as the lost are driven into the
+lowest darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the
+light beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of
+rest." But they differ in the reasons on which they base their
+statement. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven,
+because the firmament, which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is
+said to have been made, not in the beginning, but on the second day:
+whereas the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to
+have made darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert,
+when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These
+reasons, however, are not very cogent. For the question of the
+firmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one
+way by Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the
+question of the darkness is explained according to Augustine [*Gen. ad
+lit. i; vii.], by supposing that formlessness, signified by darkness,
+preceded form not by duration, but by origin. According to others,
+however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, it
+is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it created from nothing
+it produced first of all in an imperfect state, and afterwards brought
+them to perfection. But a better reason can be drawn from the state of
+glory itself. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked
+for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be
+glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the
+spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the
+blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the
+saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there
+should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal,
+free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change,
+and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the
+Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the
+empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness. It
+is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9, 27) says
+that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that
+the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But
+Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be
+fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal
+to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it,
+swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said
+to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean
+heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present
+state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is
+secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is
+finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must
+have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the
+empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does
+not influence inferior bodies of another order--those, namely, that
+are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable
+that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself
+motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [*Infra,
+Q. 112, A. 3], influence those of lower degree who act as messengers,
+though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel.
+Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of the
+empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved,
+produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of
+movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of
+conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to
+dignity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as
+necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond
+to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: "The
+ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual
+dwelling in light and joy."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): "It is certain that
+the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and
+sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it
+encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the
+light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region." But
+since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for
+that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can
+see the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that
+the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun
+does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of
+glory which differs from mere natural brightness.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Time Was Created Simultaneously with Formless Matter?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously
+with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find
+two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary
+corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. "Therefore time was not
+created with formless matter.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the
+beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when "God
+divided the light from the darkness." Therefore in the beginning
+time was not.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement;
+and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day.
+Therefore in the beginning time was not.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be
+reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created
+things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be
+reckoned among the things first created.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both
+spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of
+time."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is commonly said that the first things created
+were these four--the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless
+corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this
+is not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies
+only two things as first created--the angelic nature and corporeal
+matter--making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two,
+namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the
+formation, by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as
+they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time,
+therefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above
+given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness
+of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the
+existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there
+would be no such measure.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the
+angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in
+some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was
+in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished
+into day and night.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin
+immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the
+measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement
+of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of
+the firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement.
+But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been
+its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And
+it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was
+movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and
+affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be
+conceived, since time is nothing else than "the measure of priority
+and succession in movement."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned those
+which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among
+these time must be included, as having the nature of a common
+measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable
+subject.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven,
+this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has
+reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its
+totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its
+beginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of
+time save the "now."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 67
+
+ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the
+work of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly
+the work of the third day.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking
+of spiritual things?
+
+(2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?
+
+(3) Whether light is a quality?
+
+(4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Word "Light" Is Used in Its Proper Sense in Speaking of
+Spiritual Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that "light" is used in its proper sense
+in spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that
+"in spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is
+not called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the
+former is to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the
+intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper
+sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper
+sense in spiritual matters.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13): "All that is made
+manifest is light." But to be made manifest belongs more properly
+to spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that "Splendor" is
+among those things which are said of God metaphorically.
+
+_I answer that,_ Any word may be used in two ways--that is to say,
+either in its original application or in its more extended meaning.
+This is clearly shown in the word "sight," originally applied to the
+act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most
+trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge
+obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, "Seeing how it
+tastes," or "smells," or "burns." Further, sight is applied to
+knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those words: "Blessed
+are the clean of heart, for they shall see God" (Matt. 5:8). And thus
+it is with the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that
+which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended
+to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the
+word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be
+understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose
+says (De Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as
+applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to
+spiritual things.
+
+The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has
+been said.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Light Is a Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says
+(De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that "light takes the first place among
+bodies."Therefore light is a body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that "light is a
+species of fire." But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection,
+belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and
+its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div.
+Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they
+are bodies. Therefore light is a body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Two bodies cannot occupy the same place
+simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore
+light is not a body.
+
+_I answer that,_ Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons.
+First, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is
+different from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally
+speaking, for any two bodies of whatever nature, to exist
+simultaneously in the same place; since contiguity requires
+distinction of place.
+
+The second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its
+diffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no local movement
+of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one
+place to another must pass through the intervening space before
+reaching the end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor
+can it be argued that the time required is too short to be perceived;
+for though this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in
+distances so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet
+as soon as the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is
+illuminated from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part
+of movement that whereas all bodies have their natural determinate
+movement, that of light is indifferent as regards direction, working
+equally in a circle as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the
+diffusion of light is not the local movement of a body.
+
+The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were
+a body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the
+absence of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and
+its matter would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that
+darkness is a body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does
+it appear from what matter a body can be daily generated large enough
+to fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say
+that a body of so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the
+luminary. And should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but
+approaches and moves around with the sun, we may ask why it is that
+when a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the whole
+room is darkened? It is not that the light is condensed round the
+candle when this is done, since it burns no more brightly then than
+it burned before.
+
+Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but
+to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act--in
+other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its
+own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is "flame," or in
+earthly matter is "burning coal." Nor must too much attention be paid
+to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he
+merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various
+writers.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All these properties are assigned to light
+metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For
+because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order
+of movement as is proved _Phys._ viii, text. 55, we use terms
+belonging to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of
+all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea of
+remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said _Metaph._
+x, text. 13.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Light Is a Quality?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every
+quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the
+quality be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire.
+But light does not remain in the air when the source of light is
+withdrawn. Therefore light is not a quality.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is
+opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case
+with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light
+therefore is not a sensible quality.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the
+light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of
+earthly bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by
+making them actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality,
+but rather a substantial or spiritual form.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a
+species of quality.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some writers have said that the light in the air has
+not a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an
+intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this
+cannot be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name
+to the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color
+does not do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Secondly,
+because light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun
+bodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere
+intentions. Others have said that light is the sun's substantial form,
+but this also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because
+substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the
+object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said _De Anima_ iii,
+text. 26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place,
+because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one
+thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial
+forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the
+substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But
+light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air
+would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the
+substantial form of the sun.
+
+We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the
+substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on
+the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself
+luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays
+of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse
+natures of bodies.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Since quality is consequent upon substantial form, the
+mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode
+differs in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when
+matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the
+form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted
+into fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly,
+so as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than
+fully impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not
+permanent; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns
+in time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the
+transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a
+substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial
+form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its
+active cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary,
+forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause
+of change, which is itself removed from contrariety.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an
+instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does light
+act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards
+producing substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually
+visible, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Production of Light Is Fittingly Assigned to the First
+Day?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the production of light is not
+fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above (A.
+3), is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such should
+have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of
+light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day, and
+this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made on
+the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have been
+on the first day.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, night and day are brought about by the circular
+movement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an
+attribute of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made
+on the second day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night
+from day, ought not to be assigned to the first day.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken
+of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels
+the darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for
+even the demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown (Q. 63,
+A. 5). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to
+the first day.
+
+_On the contrary,_ That without which there could not be day, must
+have been made on the first day. But there can be no day without
+light. Therefore light must have been made on the first day.
+
+_I answer that,_ There are two opinions as to the production of light.
+Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not
+have fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature,
+and therefore when we read, "In the beginning God created heaven and
+earth," a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the
+word "heaven," and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the
+word "earth." And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of
+higher dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this
+spiritual nature is signified by the production of light, that is to
+say, of spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by
+the enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.
+
+Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was
+purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil [*Hom. i
+in Hexaem.] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning
+of time which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or
+angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand.
+
+Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Genes.] gives as a reason for the omission
+that Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things
+alone appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the
+service of idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry
+if he had spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler
+than all corporeal creatures; for they would have paid them Divine
+worship, since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon,
+and stars, which was forbidden them (Deut. 4).
+
+But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the
+corporeal creature. One is where we read that "the earth was void and
+empty," and another where it is said that "darkness was upon the face
+of the deep." Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the
+formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the
+production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of
+the first body, as was stated (A. 3), and thus by means of light
+it was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The
+second reason is because light is a common quality. For light is
+common to terrestrial and celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we
+proceed from general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For
+the living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before
+the man, as is shown in _De Gener. Anim._ ii, 3. It was fitting, then,
+as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of
+distinction the production of light should take first place, since
+light is a form of the primary body, and because it is more common
+quality.
+
+Basil [*Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all
+other things are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth,
+already touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless
+light exists, which was made therefore on the first day.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to the opinion of those who hold that the
+formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must be
+held to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms,
+afterwards receiving those that are accidental, among which light
+holds the first place.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a
+kind of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this
+returned to the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot
+well be maintained, as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture
+records the institution of that order of nature which henceforth is
+to endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that time
+afterwards ceased to exist.
+
+Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula continues in
+existence, but so closely attached to the sun as to be
+indistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that it is
+superfluous, whereas none of God's works have been made in vain. On
+this account it is held by some that the sun's body was made out of
+this nebula. This, too, is impossible to those at least who believe
+that the sun is different in its nature from the four elements, and
+naturally incorruptible. For in that case its matter cannot take on
+another form.
+
+I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that the light was the
+sun's light, formless as yet, being already the solar substance, and
+possessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was
+afterwards added the special and determinative power required to
+produce determinate effects. Thus, then, in the production of this
+light a triple distinction was made between light and darkness.
+First, as to the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we
+have the cause of light, and in the opaque nature of the earth the
+cause of darkness. Secondly, as to place, for in one hemisphere there
+was light, in the other darkness. Thirdly, as to time; because there
+was light for one and darkness for another in the same hemisphere;
+and this is signified by the words, "He called the light day, and the
+darkness night."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that day and night were
+then caused by expansion and contraction of light, rather than by
+movement. But Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that there
+was no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction since
+there were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time, for
+whose service this was required. Nor does the nature of a luminous
+body seem to admit of the withdrawal of light, so long as the body is
+actually present; though this might be effected by a miracle. As to
+this, however, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. i) that in the first
+founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles, but
+for what is in accordance with nature. We hold, then, that the
+movement of the heavens is twofold. Of these movements, one is common
+to the entire heaven, and is the cause of day and night. This, as it
+seems, had its beginning on the first day. The other varies in
+proportion as it affects various bodies, and by its variations is the
+cause of the succession of days, months, and years. Thus it is, that
+in the account of the first day the distinction between day and night
+alone is mentioned; this distinction being brought about by the
+common movement of the heavens. The further distinction into
+successive days, seasons, and years recorded as begun on the fourth
+day, in the words, "let them be for seasons, and for days, and years"
+is due to proper movements.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine teaches (Confess. xii; Gen. ad lit. 1,
+15), formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we must
+understand the production of light to signify the formation of
+spiritual creatures, not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in
+which they were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which
+they possessed from their creation as said above (Q. 62, A. 3). Thus
+the division of light from darkness will denote the distinction of
+the spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form.
+But if all created things received their form at the same time, the
+darkness must be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked,
+not as existing from the beginning but such as God foresaw would
+exist.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 68
+
+ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must next consider the work of the second day. Under this head
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day?
+
+(2) Whether there are waters above the firmament?
+
+(3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?
+
+(4) Whether there is more than one heaven?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Firmament Was Made on the Second Day?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament was not made on the
+second day. For it is said (Gen. 1:8): "God called the firmament
+heaven." But the heaven existed before days, as is clear from the
+words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore
+the firmament was not made on the second day.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably to
+the order of Divine wisdom. Now it would ill become the Divine wisdom
+to make afterwards that which is naturally first. But though the
+firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are
+mentioned before the formation of light, which was on the first day.
+Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out of
+matter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have been
+formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to
+generation and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on
+the second day.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:6): "God said: let there be
+a firmament," and further on (verse 8); "And the evening and morning
+were the second day."
+
+_I answer that,_ In discussing questions of this kind two rules are
+to be observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. i, 18). The first
+is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is
+that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of
+senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation, only in such
+measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty
+to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of
+unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing.
+
+We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as
+made on the second day can be understood in two senses. They may be
+understood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is
+necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some
+of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the
+opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the
+firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are,
+so to say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament
+to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of
+them, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of
+Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that
+the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a
+fifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of
+Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32).
+
+According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted
+that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day.
+For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the
+elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to
+give forms to the elements that pre-exist.
+
+But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on
+the second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to
+whom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element
+of fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at
+least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter
+preceded in time its formation, since the first form received by
+matter is the elemental.
+
+Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the
+firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle,
+seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas
+the firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not
+susceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of
+matter existing antecedently in time.
+
+Hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of
+creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second
+day, according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
+the light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and
+afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form.
+
+If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the
+natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not
+succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying,
+whilst holding any one of the opinions given above, that the
+substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day.
+
+Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that
+was made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but
+the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which
+has received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the
+air. "For a body is called firm," that is dense and solid, "thereby
+differing from a mathematical body" as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii
+in Hexaem.). If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these
+opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen.
+ad lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: "I consider this view of the
+question worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor
+difficult to be proved and believed."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses
+prefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively, in
+the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and then
+proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the same way as
+one might say: "This house was constructed by that builder," and then
+add: "First, he laid the foundations, then built the walls, and
+thirdly, put on the roof." In accepting this explanation we are,
+therefore, not bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in
+the words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and when
+we read that the firmament was made on the second day.
+
+We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning
+is not the same as that made on the second day; and there are several
+senses in which this may be understood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
+i, 9) that the heaven recorded as made on the first day is the
+formless spiritual nature, and that the heaven of the second day is
+the corporeal heaven. According to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the
+heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament made
+on the second day, the starry heaven. According to Damascene (De Fide
+Orth. ii) that of the first day was spherical in form and without
+stars, the same, in fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it
+the ninth sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with diurnal
+movement: while by the firmament made on the second day he understands
+the starry heaven. According to another theory, touched upon by
+Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 1] the heaven made on the first day was
+the starry heaven, and the firmament made on the second day was that
+region of the air where the clouds are collected, which is also called
+heaven, but equivocally. And to show that the word is here used in an
+equivocal sense, it is expressly said that "God called the firmament
+heaven"; just as in a preceding verse it said that "God called the
+light day" (since the word "day" is also used to denote a space of
+twenty-four hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as
+pointed out by Rabbi Moses.
+
+The second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has
+been already said.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Are Waters Above the Firmament?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are not waters above the
+firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend
+naturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there are not waters
+above the firmament.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest
+on a sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament is a
+sphere, there cannot be water above it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, water is an element, and appointed to the
+generation of composite bodies, according to the relation in which
+imperfect things stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature
+have their place upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that
+water would be useless there. But none of God's works are useless.
+Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:7): "(God) divided the
+waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the
+firmament."
+
+I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, "These words of
+Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect.
+Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of
+existence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there." As to
+the nature of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i in
+Gen.) that the waters that are above the firmament are "spiritual
+substances." Wherefore it is written (Ps. 148:4): "Let the waters that
+are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord," and (Dan. 3:60):
+"Ye waters that are above the heavens, bless the Lord."To this Basil
+answers (Hom. iii in Hexaem.) that these words do not mean that these
+waters are rational creatures, but that "the thoughtful contemplation
+of them by those who understand fulfils the glory of the Creator."
+Hence in the same context, fire, hail, and other like creatures, are
+invoked in the same way, though no one would attribute reason to
+these.
+
+We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact
+nature will be differently defined according as opinions on the
+firmament differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry
+heaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, for the same
+reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the
+same nature as the elemental waters. But if by the firmament we
+understand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of
+the four elements, then the waters above the firmament will not be of
+the same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according to
+Strabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on
+account of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aqueous
+solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven is above the
+starry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held to be of other nature
+than the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we
+understand by water not the element but formless matter. Augustine,
+in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides
+bodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters.
+
+If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in
+which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament
+must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised
+above a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to
+say, as some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4),
+that waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the starry
+heaven, is a mere absurdity. The solid nature of the firmament, the
+intervening region of fire, wherein all vapor must be consumed, the
+tendency in light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the
+vault of the moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not
+to rise even to the tops of the higher mountains, all to go to show
+the impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, in support of
+this opinion, that bodies may be rarefied infinitely, since natural
+bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied or divided, but up to a certain
+point only.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by
+supposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in
+its place above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad
+lit. ii, 1), however will not admit this solution, but says "It is our
+business here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His
+creatures, not how far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way
+of miracle." We leave this view, then, and answer that according to
+the last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution
+appears from what has been said. According to the first opinion, an
+order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by
+Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are
+of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer
+consistency, in proportion to the respective density of the earth
+and of the heaven.
+
+Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to
+be signified.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The solution is clear from what has been said,
+according to the last two opinions. But according to the first
+opinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers
+first, that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be
+rounded, or convex, above. Secondly, that the waters above the
+firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a
+mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to the third opinion given, the waters above
+the firmament have been raised in the form of vapors, and serve to
+give rain to the earth. But according to the second opinion, they
+are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This,
+according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily
+revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance of
+generation is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the
+zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are
+generated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars,
+and their various influences. But according to the first opinion
+these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial
+bodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says
+(Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to be proved by
+the extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the waters that
+are above the firmament.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Firmament Divides Waters from Waters?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters
+from waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have
+naturally one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (Topic.
+i, 6): "All water is the same species." Water therefore cannot be
+distinct from water by place.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, should it be said that the waters above the
+firmament differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be
+argued, on the contrary, that things distinct in species need nothing
+else to distinguish them. If then, these waters differ in species, it
+is not the firmament that distinguishes them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it would appear that what distinguishes waters from
+waters must be something which is in contact with them on either
+side, as a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident
+that the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore
+the firmament does not divide the waters from the waters.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:6): "Let there be a
+firmament made amidst the waters; and let it divide the waters from
+the waters."
+
+_I answer that,_ The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might
+lead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain
+philosophers of antiquity, who taught that water was a body infinite
+in dimension, and the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the
+words, "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the word "deep" might
+be taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as the
+principle of all other bodies. These philosophers also taught that not
+all corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our
+senses, but that a body of water, infinite in extent, exists above
+that heaven. On this view the firmament of heaven might be said to
+divide the waters without from those within--that is to say, from all
+bodies under the heaven, since they took water to be the principle of
+them all.
+
+As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it
+cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. It should rather be
+considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of
+condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as
+are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by
+their senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not
+evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been
+philosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled
+with air a vacuum.
+
+Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no
+express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant
+persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to
+express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in
+the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the existence of
+air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood
+from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body
+was extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is
+the air.
+
+Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or
+the cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the
+waters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless
+matter, or any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated
+under the name of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower
+transparent bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides
+that higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are
+generated, from the lower part, which is connected with the water
+and included under that name.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If by the firmament is understood the starry heaven,
+the waters above are not of the same species as those beneath. But
+if by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air, both
+these waters are of the same species, and two places are assigned to
+them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being the place of
+their begetting, the lower, the place of their repose.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If the waters are held to differ in species, the
+firmament cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of
+their destruction, but only as the boundary of each.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: On account of the air and other similar bodies being
+invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water,
+and thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the
+firmament, whatever be the sense in which the word is used.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 4]
+
+Whether There Is Only One Heaven?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one heaven. For the
+heaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, "In the beginning
+God created heaven and earth." But there is only one earth. Therefore
+there is only one heaven.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own
+matter, must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher
+proves (De Coel. i, text. 95). Therefore there is but one heaven.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally
+is predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there
+are more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if
+equivocally only, they could not properly be called many. If, then,
+they are many, there must be some common notion by reason of which
+each is called heaven, but this common notion cannot be assigned.
+Therefore there cannot be more than one heaven.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 148:4): "Praise Him, ye heavens
+of heavens."
+
+_I answer that,_ On this point there seems to be a diversity of
+opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is
+only one heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), and that the words 'heavens of
+heavens' are merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to
+which the word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there
+are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the other hand,
+Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.), whom Damascene follows (De Fide Orth.
+ii), says that there are many heavens. The difference, however, is
+more nominal than real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the
+whole body that is above the earth and the water, for which reason
+the birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven [*Ps. 8:9].
+But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil said
+that there are more heavens than one.
+
+In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be
+borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense.
+Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it
+denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially,
+and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the
+first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the
+aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called
+the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous,
+and divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the
+fixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens,
+are the spheres of the planets.
+
+In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that
+participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and
+luminosity, actual or potential. Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii)
+holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon's
+orb, calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three
+heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of
+which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself
+that he was "rapt to the third heaven."
+
+But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and
+in each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region
+Rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher
+region of fire he calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian
+heaven from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he
+calls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven; the lower, the
+aerial. When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three
+enumerated above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the
+opinion of Rabanus.
+
+Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this
+name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most
+High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words,
+"I will ascend into heaven"; whereby the evil spirit is represented as
+seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual
+blessings, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all
+good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so
+signified, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the
+words, "Your reward is very great in heaven" (Matt. 5:12).
+
+Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and
+intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, in reference to
+which Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) expounds Paul's rapture "to the
+third heaven."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the
+centre of a circle to its circumference. But as one center may have
+many circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be
+many heavens.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as
+it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it
+is one.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All the heavens have in common sublimity and some
+degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 69
+
+ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are
+two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) About the gathering together of the waters.
+
+(2) About the production of plants.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 69, Art. 1]
+
+Whether It Was Fitting That the Gathering Together of the Waters
+Should Take Place, As Recorded, on the Third Day?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering
+together of the waters should take place on the third day. For what
+was made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been
+"made" in the words, "God said: Be light made," and "Let there be a
+firmament made."But the third day is contradistinguished from the
+first and the second days. Therefore the work of the third day
+should have been described as a making not as a gathering together.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by
+the waters, wherefore it was described as "invisible" [* See Q. 66,
+A. 1, Obj. 1]. There was then no place on the earth to which the
+waters could be gathered together.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot
+occupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact,
+and therefore all were not gathered together into one place.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement.
+But the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea.
+In their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was
+unnecessary.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by
+the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore
+the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded
+without necessity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The authority of Scripture suffices.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is necessary to reply differently to this
+question according to the different interpretations given by
+Augustine and other holy writers. In all these works, according to
+Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv, 22, 34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i,
+5, 7), there is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature.
+He says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures
+were created first of all, and that the latter are at first indicated
+by the words "earth" and "water." Not that this formlessness preceded
+formation, in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation
+preceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature.
+Agreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highest or
+spiritual nature is recorded in the first place, where it is said
+that light was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is
+higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler than the
+lower. Hence the formation of the higher bodies is indicated in the
+second place, by the words, "Let there be made a firmament," by which
+is to be understood the impression of celestial forms on formless
+matter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only.
+But in the third place the impression of elemental forms on formless
+matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only. Therefore
+the words, "Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry land
+appear," mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the
+substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with
+the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance.
+
+According, however, to other holy writers [* See Q. 66, A. 1], an
+order of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is meant
+that the formlessness of matter precedes its formation, and one form
+another, in order of time. Nevertheless, they do not hold that the
+formlessness of matter implies the total absence of form, since
+heaven, earth, and water already existed, since these three are named
+as already clearly perceptible to the senses; rather they understand
+by formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect beauty,
+and in respect of these three Scripture mentions three kinds of
+formlessness. Heaven, the highest of them, was without form so long
+as "darkness" filled it, because it was the source of light. The
+formlessness of water, which holds the middle place, is called the
+"deep," because, as Augustine says (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this
+word signifies the mass of waters without order. Thirdly, the
+formless state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is said to
+be "void" or "invisible," because it was covered by the waters. Thus,
+then, the formation of the highest body took place on the first day.
+And since time results from the movement of the heaven, and is the
+numerical measure of the movement of the highest body, from this
+formation, resulted the distinction of time, namely, that of night
+and day. On the second day the intermediate body, water, was formed,
+receiving from the firmament a sort of distinction and order (so that
+water be understood as including certain other things, as explained
+above (Q. 68, A. 3)). On the third day the earth, the lowest body,
+received its form by the withdrawal of the waters, and there resulted
+the distinction in the lowest body, namely, of land and sea. Hence
+Scripture, having clearly expressed the formless state of the earth,
+by saying that it was "invisible" or "void," expresses the manner in
+which it received its form by the equally suitable words, "Let the
+dry land appear."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 7, 8; iii,
+20], Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it was
+made, as it says of those that precede, in order to show that higher
+and spiritual forms, such as the angels and the heavenly bodies, are
+perfect and stable in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect and
+mutable. Hence the impression of such forms is signified by the
+gathering of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For "water,"
+to use Augustine's words, "glides and flows away, the earth abides"
+(Gen. ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold that the work of the third
+day was perfected on that day only as regards movement from place to
+place, and that for this reason Scripture had no reason to speak of
+it as made.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument is easily solved, according to
+Augustine's opinion (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), because we need not
+suppose that the earth was first covered by the waters, and that
+these were afterwards gathered together, but that they were produced
+in this very gathering together. But according to the other writers
+there are three solutions, which Augustine gives (Gen. ad lit. i,
+12). The first supposes that the waters are heaped up to a greater
+height at the place where they were gathered together, for it has
+been proved in regard to the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than the
+land, as Basil remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the
+water that covered the earth as being rarefied or nebulous, which was
+afterwards condensed when the waters were gathered together. The
+third suggests the existence of hollows in the earth, to receive the
+confluence of waters. Of the above the first seems the most probable.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All the waters have the sea as their goal, into which
+they flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the reason
+why they are said to be gathered together into one place. Or, "one
+place" is to be understood not simply, but as contrasted with the
+place of the dry land, so that the sense would be, "Let the waters be
+gathered together in one place," that is, apart from the dry land.
+That the waters occupied more places than one seems to be implied by
+the words that follow, "The gathering together of the waters He
+called Seas."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The Divine command gives bodies their natural movement
+and by these natural movements they are said to "fulfill His word."
+Or we may say that it was according to the nature of water completely
+to cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds both water
+and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, namely, that
+plants and animals might be on the earth, it was necessary for the
+waters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth. Some philosophers
+attribute this uncovering of the earth's surface to the action of the
+sun lifting up the vapors and thus drying the land. Scripture,
+however, attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book of
+Genesis, but also Job 38:10 where in the person of the Lord it is
+said, "I set My bounds around the sea," and Jer. 5:22, where it is
+written: "Will you not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have set
+the sand a bound for the sea?"
+
+Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i),
+primary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned,
+but in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself.
+Again it may be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that the earth
+is mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature, but here
+in respect of its principal property, namely, dryness. Wherefore it
+is written: "He called the dry land, Earth." It may also be said with
+Rabbi Moses, that the expression, "He called," denotes throughout an
+equivocal use of the name imposed. Thus we find it said at first that
+"He called the light Day": for the reason that later on a period of
+twenty-four hours is also called day, where it is said that "there
+was evening and morning, one day." In like manner it is said that
+"the firmament," that is, the air, "He called heaven": for that which
+was first created was also called "heaven." And here, again, it is
+said that "the dry land," that is, the part from which the waters had
+withdrawn, "He called, Earth," as distinct from the sea; although the
+name earth is equally applied to that which is covered with waters or
+not. So by the expression "He called" we are to understand throughout
+that the nature or property He bestowed corresponded to the name He
+gave.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 69, Art. 2]
+
+Whether It Was Fitting That the Production of Plants Should Take Place
+on the Third Day?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the production
+of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as
+animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not
+of distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants,
+as also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded
+as taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of
+distinction.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have
+been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But
+the words of Gen. 3:17, "Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and
+thistles shall it bring forth to thee," show that by the production
+of certain plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of
+plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day,
+which is concerned with the work of formation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are
+stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the work
+of formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the
+third day.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:12): "The earth brought forth
+the green herb," after which there follows, "The evening and the
+morning were the third day."
+
+_I answer that,_ On the third day, as said (A. 1), the formless state
+of the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold.
+On the one hand, the earth was "invisible" or "void," being covered
+by the waters; on the other hand, it was "shapeless" or "empty," that
+is, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe
+it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either respect
+this formless state ends on the third day: first, when "the waters
+were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared";
+secondly, when "the earth brought forth the green herb." But
+concerning the production of plants, Augustine's opinion differs
+from that of others. For other commentators, in accordance with the
+surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced
+in act in their various species on this third day; whereas Augustine
+(Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then
+produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then
+the power to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of
+Scripture, for it is said (Gen. 2:4, 5): "These are the generations
+of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that
+. . . God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field
+before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before
+it grew." Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within
+the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface.
+And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first days God
+created all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He
+subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in
+the work of propagation, "He worketh until now." Now the production
+of plants from the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they
+were not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only.
+However, in accordance with other writers, it may be said that the
+first constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days,
+but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the government
+of the universe. And Scripture indicates this in the words, "before
+it sprung up in the earth," and "before it grew," that is, before
+like was produced from like; just as now happens in the natural
+course by the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly
+(Gen. 1:11): "Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as
+may seed," as indicating the production of perfect species, from
+which the seed of others should arise. Nor does the question where
+the seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect
+the argument.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and
+local movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly
+discernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth,
+their production is treated as a part of the earth's formation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles
+had been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were not
+produced in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled
+to gain his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence it is
+said: "Shall it bring forth _to thee."_
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Moses put before the people such things only as were
+manifest to their senses, as we have said (Q. 67, A. 4; Q. 68, A. 3).
+But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the
+earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth,
+and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he
+makes no mention of them.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 70
+
+OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by
+itself, secondly as to all seven days in general.
+
+In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day,
+secondly, that of the fifth day, thirdly, that of the sixth day, and
+fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day.
+
+Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) As to the production of the lights;
+
+(2) As to the end of their production;
+
+(3) Whether they are living beings?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 70, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Lights Ought to Have Been Produced on the Fourth Day?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the lights ought not to have been
+produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature
+incorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without
+their form. But as their matter was produced in the work of creation,
+before there was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows,
+then, that the lights were not produced on the fourth day.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light.
+But light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore,
+should have been made on the first day, not on the fourth.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants
+are fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says: "He set them in the
+firmament." But plants are described as produced when the earth, to
+which they are attached, received its form. The lights, therefore,
+should have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is
+to say, on the second day.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other
+heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature.
+The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth
+day, but on the third day.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, as astronomers say, there are many stars larger than
+the moon. Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly
+described as the "two great lights."
+
+_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says
+(Gen. 2:1): "So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the
+furniture of them," thereby indicating that the work was threefold.
+In the first work, that of "creation," the heaven and the earth were
+produced, but as yet without form. In the second, or work of
+"distinction," the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by
+adding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine holds (Gen.
+ad lit. ii, 11), or by giving them the order and beauty due to them,
+as other holy writers suppose. To these two works is added the work
+of adornment, which is distinct from perfect[ion]. For the perfection
+of the heaven and the earth regards, seemingly, those things that
+belong to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are
+extrinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper parts
+and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such like. Now just as
+distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local
+movement, as separating one from another; so the work of adornment is
+set forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens,
+and upon the earth. But it has been stated above (Q. 69, A. 1), that
+three things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water,
+and the earth; and these three received their form from the three
+days' work of distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first
+day; on the second day the waters were separated; and on the third
+day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land. So also is it in
+the work of adornment; on the first day of this work, which is the
+fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by
+their movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and
+fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate
+element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one;
+while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought
+forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be
+noted that Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production
+of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since
+he says that they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for
+the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has
+of producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: "Let the
+firmament produce lights," though it says: "Let the earth bring forth
+the green herb."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty here; for
+he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there
+was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form.
+Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the
+heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may
+be said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as
+animals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the
+heavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and
+naturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were
+substantially created at the beginning, but that their substance, at
+first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving not its
+substantial form, but a determination of power. As to the fact that
+the lights are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only
+as made on the fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) explains this
+by the need of guarding the people from the danger of idolatry: since
+the lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not
+from the beginning.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in holding
+the light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made on
+this day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first
+day is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to
+have been produced on that day merely as light in general; and that
+on the fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce
+determinate effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have
+one effect, those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speaking
+of such a determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that
+the sun's light which previously was without form, was formed on the
+fourth day.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not
+fixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the
+movement of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.)
+that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not because He
+fixed them there immovably, but because He bade them to be there,
+even as He placed man in Paradise, to be there. In the opinion of
+Aristotle, however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in
+reality have no other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our
+senses perceive the movement of the luminaries and not that of the
+spheres (De Coel. ii, text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious
+to sense, out of condescension to popular ignorance, as we have
+already said (Q. 67, A. 4; Q. 68, A. 3). The objection, however,
+falls to the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day
+as having a natural distinction from that in which the stars are
+placed, even though the distinction is not apparent to the senses,
+the testimony of which Moses follows, as stated above (De Coel. ii,
+text. 43). For although to the senses there appears but one
+firmament; if we admit a higher and a lower firmament, the lower will
+be that which was made on the second day, and on the fourth the stars
+were fixed in the higher firmament.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem.), plants were
+recorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry,
+since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that
+plants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom
+remarks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the
+work of production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates
+by his labor.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great,
+not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their influence and
+power. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the
+influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower
+world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent
+size is greater.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 70, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Cause Assigned for the Production of the Lights Is
+Reasonable?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production
+of the lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): "Be not
+afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear." Therefore the
+heavenly lights were not made to be signs.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the
+lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore
+they are not signs.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from the
+first day. Therefore the lights were not made "for seasons, and days,
+and years," that is, in order to distinguish them.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is
+inferior to itself, "since the end is better than the means" (Topic.
+iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were
+not made "to enlighten it."
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said "to rule the night." But
+such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from the
+new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made "to rule the night."
+
+_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 65, A. 2), a corporeal
+creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper
+act, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the
+glory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the
+usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order
+to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Deut. 4:19):
+"Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the
+moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou
+adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service
+of all nations." Now, he explains this service at the beginning of
+Genesis as threefold. First, the lights are of service to man, in
+regard to sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful
+for perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: "Let them shine
+in the firmament and give life to the earth." Secondly, as regards the
+changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and
+provide for the necessities of food; all of which things could not be
+secured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he
+says: "Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years." Thirdly, as
+regards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights
+are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable
+to various occupations. And in this respect he says: "Let them be for
+signs."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes
+effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which
+depend upon the free-will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden
+effects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence nothing
+prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says "signs,"
+rather than "causes," to guard against idolatry.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The general division of time into day and night took
+place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is
+common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on
+that first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons
+and years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season
+than another, and one year than another, are due to certain
+particular movements of the stars: which movements may have had their
+beginning on the fourth day.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Light was given to the earth for the service of man,
+who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies. Nor
+is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake
+of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of
+the universe.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in the
+evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and it
+was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding
+seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect
+is developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect
+must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad
+lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting
+that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 70, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Lights of Heaven Are Living Beings?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living
+beings. For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned.
+But a body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings,
+with fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of
+heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form.
+But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or
+animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all
+forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence
+Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: "Every living substance stands
+higher in the order of nature than one that has not life." The lights
+of heaven, therefore, are living beings.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun,
+moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in
+the case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life
+from the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the
+heavenly bodies a living soul.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies
+are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7, 8): and natural movement is from an
+intrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the heavenly
+bodies is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as the
+desirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36).
+Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the
+heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all
+things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is
+proved in _Phys._ viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself
+precedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living
+move themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore
+the heavenly bodies are living beings.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "Let no one
+esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for
+they have neither life nor sense."
+
+_I answer that,_ Philosophers have differed on this question.
+Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii,
+41), "was condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a
+fiery mass of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being." On
+the other hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have
+life. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the
+Church. It was the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that
+these bodies were alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense
+the words (Eccles. 1:6), "The spirit goeth forward, surveying all
+places round about." But Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem.) and Damascene
+(De Fide Orth. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate.
+Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself to
+either theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly
+bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the
+angelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).
+
+In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of
+opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of
+soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body;
+for the form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the
+form. Now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through
+its operation, which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of
+these operations, as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessary
+instrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls
+must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions. There
+are, however, operations of the soul, which are not exercised through
+the medium of the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to
+their production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the
+phantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus far is dependent
+on the body, although capable of existing apart from it. It is not,
+however, possible that the functions of nutrition, growth, and
+generation, through which the nutritive soul operates, can be
+exercised by the heavenly bodies, for such operations are
+incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible
+is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the
+heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense of touch,
+which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs of the senses
+require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements, whereas
+the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. It follows, then,
+that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be
+attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and
+moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual
+perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the
+intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as
+their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses.
+Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen,
+cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union
+of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the
+operations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider
+whether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the
+motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body,
+need be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of power, as
+a mover is united to that which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys.
+viii, text. 42, 43), after showing that the first mover is made up of
+two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of
+the union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by
+contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only,
+if one is a body and the other not. The Platonists explain the union
+of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with
+the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be
+living beings, this means nothing else but that substances of
+spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A
+proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and
+contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific
+gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one
+fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in
+the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved
+by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the same
+opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are
+ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. iii, 4).
+
+From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies
+are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and
+that if they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also
+be seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and
+those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of
+things but of words.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe
+by reason of their proper movement; and in this way the heavenly
+luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment, for they
+are moved by a living substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely, but
+not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that the
+souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals
+absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with
+regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their
+matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas
+a soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that
+moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the
+nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and
+therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body
+can impart life in virtue of that agent.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not
+on account of their active principle, but on account of their passive
+principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being
+moved by an intelligent power.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is
+compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the
+form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive
+power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may
+be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with
+respect to that active principle; just as we say that voluntary
+movement is natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 71
+
+ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY
+(In One Article)
+
+We must next consider the work of the fifth day.
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.
+For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to
+produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production
+of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are
+generated from seed. Therefore the words, "Let the waters bring forth
+the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the
+earth," do not fittingly describe this work.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only,
+but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, as is
+shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and
+rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly said that fishes and birds
+are produced from water.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If,
+then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be produced
+from the air, and not from the waters.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some,
+as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of
+fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, "Let the waters
+bring forth the creeping creature having life."
+
+Obj. 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes
+which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and
+generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings,
+whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has
+precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought
+not to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ As said above, (Q. 70, A. 1), the order of the work
+of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction.
+Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction,
+the middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of
+water, which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the
+work of adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to
+the adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds
+and fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light
+on the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the
+first day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this
+fifth day he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show
+that the fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be
+observed that Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion
+about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the
+production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were
+produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the
+waters produced them on that day potentially.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds
+can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally,
+without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to the fact
+that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and
+consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed
+cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then,
+rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that
+are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative
+power of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from
+putrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly
+bodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either
+kind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of
+the elements. But at the first beginning of the world the active
+principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material
+elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as
+Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or
+earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the water
+themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to
+the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of
+seed or the influence of the stars.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from
+two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be evident
+that the earthly element must predominate, since the element that is
+least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in
+quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body
+of the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move
+with certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity
+with the bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which
+their generation is described.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses, is not
+enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the water,
+because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery
+exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But
+birds move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly
+"beneath the firmament," even if the firmament be taken to mean the
+region of clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to the
+water.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through the
+medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type
+between the animals of the air and those of the water, having
+something in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to
+that class to which they are most allied, through the characters
+possessed in common with that class, rather than with the other. But
+in order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have
+special characters like to theirs, the words, "Let the waters bring
+forth the creeping creature having life," are followed by these: "God
+created great whales," etc.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The order in which the production of these animals is
+given has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set
+to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves.
+Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached through the
+less perfect.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 72
+
+ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY
+(In One Article)
+
+We must now consider the work of the sixth day.
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.
+For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals.
+But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the
+words, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature," should rather
+have been, "Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed
+creatures."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But
+beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to
+be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and
+species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said
+of his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been
+said about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is
+said "according to its genus" and "in its species."
+
+Obj. 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded
+to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes
+are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more
+reason, of the other animals as well.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction,
+which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the
+first founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have
+been produced at that time.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man.
+But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man
+sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at
+all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had
+sinned.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the
+water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so
+the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by
+the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence
+the earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says
+(Gen. ad lit. v) that the production was potential, and other holy
+writers that it was actual.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The different grades of life which are found in
+different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in
+which Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.).
+The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to
+discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said
+of their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in
+generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of
+nutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will
+be shown later on (Q. 78, A. 2). But amongst animals, those that
+live on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and
+fishes, not because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds
+(Hom. viii in Hexaem.) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but
+because their limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher
+order, (yet some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more
+intelligent in certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call
+fishes "living creatures," but "creeping creatures having life";
+whereas it does call land animals "living creatures" on account of
+their more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely
+bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from
+the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls
+with bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being the most
+perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other
+animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By "cattle," domestic animals are signified, which in
+any way are of service to man: but by "beasts," wild animals such as
+bears and lions are designated. By "creeping things" those animals
+are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth,
+as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to lift them far from
+the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals, as
+deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word
+"quadrupeds" is added. Or perhaps the word "quadruped" is used first
+as being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for
+even some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of
+genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it
+was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been
+said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals
+and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to
+signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas
+man is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by
+generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of
+the making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of
+the earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however,
+is repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children
+has a special relation to the number of the elect [*Cf. Augustine,
+Gen. ad lit. iii, 12], and to prevent anyone from saying that there
+was any sin whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants,
+since they experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation
+in generating, they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of
+another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things,
+that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should
+be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of
+inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But
+those generated from corruption of animals could not have been
+produced then otherwise than potentially.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich.
+i): "If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he
+sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use,
+and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary.
+Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself
+with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the
+things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use,
+laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with
+many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their
+existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house,
+these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe." And,
+since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world
+conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have
+injured him.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 73
+
+ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day.
+Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) About the completion of the works;
+
+(2) About the resting of God;
+
+(3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 73, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Completion of the Divine Works Ought to Be Ascribed to
+the Seventh Day?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works
+ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are
+done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation
+of the world will be at the end of the world (Matt. 13:39, 40).
+Moreover, the time of Christ's Incarnation is a time of completion,
+wherefore it is called "the time of fulness [*Vulg.: 'the fulness of
+time']" (Gal. 4:4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death,
+cried out, "It is consummated" (John 19:30). Hence the completion of
+the Divine works does not belong to the seventh day.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But we
+do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather that
+He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works
+does not belong to the seventh day.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many things
+are added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is called
+perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess. But
+many things were made after the seventh day, as the production of
+many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are
+frequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated
+from putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work
+of the Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22):
+"The Lord hath created a new thing upon the earth." Miracles also are
+new works, of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): "Renew thy signs, and
+work new miracles." Moreover, all things will be made new when the
+Saints are glorified, according to Apoc. 21:5: "And He that sat on
+the throne said: Behold I make all things new." Therefore the
+completion of the Divine works ought not to be attributed to the
+seventh day.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 2:2): "On the seventh day God
+ended His work which He had made."
+
+_I answer that,_ The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first
+perfection and the second perfection. The _first_ perfection is
+that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this
+perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the
+whole having its parts complete. But the _second_ perfection is the
+end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to
+play the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the
+end of the builder is the house that he makes by building. But the
+first perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the
+principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end
+of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the
+consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the
+completeness of the universe at its first founding, and this is what
+is ascribed to the seventh day.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The first perfection is the cause of the second, as
+above said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are
+required, nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection
+of beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation
+existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding
+of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, "Grace
+and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John 1:17). So, then, on the seventh
+day was the consummation of nature, in Christ's Incarnation the
+consummation of grace, and at the end of the world will be the
+consummation of glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new
+creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work
+proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the _second_
+perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the
+completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though
+according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either version,
+however, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the
+completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its
+completion as regards their operation, to the seventh. It may also be
+added that in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is
+possible, movement cannot be called completed till it comes to rest,
+for rest denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made
+many other creatures besides those which He made in the six days, and
+hence, by the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He
+is said on that day to have consummated His work.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but
+all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the
+work of the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience
+materially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed
+Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their
+causes, as those individual creatures that are now generated existed
+in the first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if any such
+appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals,
+and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction
+by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning.
+Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of
+individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the
+offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in
+their causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed
+beforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And the
+work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read
+(Phil. 2:7), The Son of God "was made in the likeness of men." And
+again, the glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by
+way of similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the
+empyrean. Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), "Nothing under the sun
+is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before
+us."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 73, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Rested on the Seventh Day from All His Work?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day
+from all His work. For it is said (John 5:17), "My Father worketh until
+now, and I work." God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all
+His work.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which
+movement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and
+without labor, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day
+from His work.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh day
+by causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that rest is
+set down in contradistinction to His work; now the words "God
+created" or "made" this thing or the other cannot be explained to
+mean that He made man create or make these things. Therefore the
+resting of God cannot be explained as His making man to rest.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 2:2): "God rested on the seventh
+day from all the work which He had done."
+
+_I answer that,_ Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and
+consequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although
+movement, strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is
+applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one
+hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine
+goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating
+itself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other
+hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to
+move towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense
+meaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire.
+Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day.
+First, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for,
+as said above (A. 1, ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not
+existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly,
+because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was
+happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He
+is not said to have rested "in" His works, as though needing them for
+His own happiness, but to have rested "from" them, as in fact resting
+in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And
+even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in
+Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest
+which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the
+meaning of God's resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God indeed "worketh until now" by preserving and
+providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of
+new ones.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement, but
+to the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an
+external object.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in the
+enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment
+of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His
+works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that God
+rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set
+down as the only one, and the other is the first and principal
+explanation.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 73, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Blessing and Sanctifying Are Due to the Seventh Day?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due
+to the seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for
+that some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided.
+But whether God works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is
+lost to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to
+the seventh day.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Latin "benedictio" [blessing] is derived from
+"bonitas" [goodness]. But it is the nature of good to spread and
+communicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days,
+therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather
+than the day on which He ceased producing them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as
+upon each work it was said, "God saw that it was good." Therefore it
+was not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day
+should be blessed.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:3), "God blessed the seventh
+day and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work."
+
+_I answer that,_ As said above (A. 2), God's rest on the seventh day
+is understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing
+new works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures
+He has made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in
+Himself. According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the
+seventh day, since, as we explained (Q. 72, ad 4), the blessing
+referred to the increase by multiplication; for which reason God said
+to the creatures which He blessed: "Increase and multiply." Now, this
+increase is effected through God's Providence over His creatures,
+securing the generation of like from like. And according to the
+second meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have been
+sanctified, since the special sanctification of every creature
+consists in resting in God. For this reason things dedicated to God
+are said to be sanctified.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because
+anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because
+something is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their
+resting in God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the first six days creatures were produced in their
+first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and
+preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the
+perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that
+in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its
+fruition.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to
+the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the
+seventh day, to its propagation.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 74
+
+ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) As to the sufficiency of these days;
+
+(2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?
+
+(3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating
+the works of the six days.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 74, Art. 1]
+
+Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that these days are not sufficiently
+enumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the
+works of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one
+another. But separate days are assigned to distinction and to
+adornment, and therefore separate days should be assigned to creation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and
+water. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and
+another to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought
+to be devoted to the distinction of fire and air.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ from
+the beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other animals
+than all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day is
+devoted to the production of fishes, and another to that of the beast
+of the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the
+production of birds and another to that of man.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of these
+days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the luminaries
+in the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is produced
+at the same time as the accident proper to it. The light and the
+luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different
+days.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting of
+the world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that day
+ought not to be enumerated with the others.
+
+_I answer that,_ The reason of the distinction of these days is made
+clear by what has been said above (Q. 70, A. 1), namely, that the
+parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part
+adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now
+the parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three,
+according to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or
+highest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest
+part. Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three
+things, the beginning, the middle, and the end. The first part, then,
+is distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the
+middle part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth,
+and the third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the
+sixth. But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the
+last three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him,
+spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the
+two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first these two
+days, and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the
+Divine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which
+is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is
+assigned to the forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of
+corporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation belongs
+to the production of formless matter, and of the formless spiritual
+nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says
+(Confess. xii, 12). Thus, then, the creation of either is set down
+before there was any day. But it may also be said, following other
+holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment imply
+certain changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas
+the work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the
+substance of beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore,
+every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place "in a
+day," but creation "in the beginning" which denotes something
+indivisible.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Fire and air, as not distinctly known by the
+unlettered, are not expressly named by Moses among the parts of the
+world, but reckoned with the intermediate part, or water, especially
+as regards the lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which
+the higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
+ii, 13).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The production of animals is recorded with reference to
+their adorning the various parts of the world, and therefore the days
+of their production are separated or united according as the animals
+adorn the same parts of the world, or different parts.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made
+on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day
+does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they
+then received a form that they had not before, as said above (Q. 70,
+[A. 1] ad 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15), after all
+that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something
+distinct is attributed to the seventh--namely, that on it God rested
+in Himself from His works: and for this reason it was right that the
+seventh day should be mentioned after the six. It may also be said,
+with the other writers, that the world entered on the seventh day
+upon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, and that
+therefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being
+devoted to cessation from work.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 74, Art. 2]
+
+Whether All These Days Are One Day?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all these days are one day. For it is
+written (Gen. 2:4, 5): "These are the generations of the heaven and
+the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord . . .
+made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field, before
+it sprung up in the earth." Therefore the day in which God made "the
+heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field," is one and the
+same day. But He made the heaven and the earth on the first day, or
+rather before there was any day, but the plant of the field He made
+on the third day. Therefore the first and third days are but one day,
+and for a like reason all the rest.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is said (Ecclus. 18:1): "He that liveth for ever,
+created all things together." But this would not be the case if the
+days of these works were more than one. Therefore they are not many
+but one only.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, on the seventh day God ceased from all new works.
+If, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows
+that He did not make that day; which is not admissible.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected in
+an instant, for with each work are the words (God) "said . . . . and
+it was . . . done." If, then, He had kept back His next work to
+another day, it would follow that for the remainder of a day He would
+have ceased from working and left it vacant, which would be
+superfluous. The day, therefore, of the preceding work is one with
+the day of the work that follows.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1), "The evening and the
+morning were the second day . . . the third day," and so on. But
+where there is a second and third there are more than one. There was
+not, therefore, only one day.
+
+_I answer that,_ On this question Augustine differs from other
+expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven,
+are one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22;
+De Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were
+seven distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as
+explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely
+different. For Augustine understands by the word "day," the knowledge
+in the mind of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day
+denotes their knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second
+day their knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest.
+Thus, then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one of
+these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe without
+impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind; which can know
+many things at the same time, especially in the Word, in Whom all
+angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of
+days denotes the natural order of the things known, and not a
+succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced.
+Moreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately called "day," since
+light, the cause of day, is to be found in spiritual things, as
+Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28). In the opinion of the
+others, however, the days signify a succession both in time, and in
+the things produced.
+
+If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the
+mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the
+diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown (Q. 67,
+A. 1; Q. 69, A. 1), between Augustine and other writers is taken into
+account. First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as
+first created, to signify matter totally without form; but the making
+of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of
+dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter.
+But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first
+created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing
+under the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort
+of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown
+(Q. 67, AA. 1, 4; Q. 69, A. 1). Secondly, some writers hold that
+plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six
+days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now the opinion
+of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is
+consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other
+writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter
+existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with
+him also that in the first instituting of the world animals and
+plants did not exist actually. There remains, however, a difference
+as to four points; since, according to the latter, there was a time,
+after the production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the
+firmament had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the
+waters, nor had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth
+difference; which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. In
+order, therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of
+either side.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: On the day on which God created the heaven and the
+earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed,
+actually, but "before it sprung up in the earth," that is,
+potentially. And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day,
+but other writers to the first instituting of the world.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God created all things together so far as regards their
+substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all things
+together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in
+distinction and adornment. Hence the word "creation" is significant.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: On the seventh day God ceased from making new things,
+but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work it
+belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: All things were not distinguished and adorned together,
+not from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in which to
+work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the
+world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to
+the different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to
+the world a fresh state of perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the
+natural order of the works attributed to the days.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 74, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Scripture Uses Suitable Words to Express the Work of the Six
+Days?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words
+to express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament,
+and other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the
+heaven and the earth. For "all things were made by Him" (John 1:3).
+Therefore in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works,
+mention should have been made of the Word of God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is
+not mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not
+sufficiently described.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is said (Gen. 1:31): "God saw all the things that
+He had made, and they were very good." It ought, then, to have been
+said of each work, "God saw that it was good." The omission,
+therefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the
+second day, is not fitting.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not
+befit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, "The
+Spirit of God moved over the waters," are unbecoming.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, what is already made is not made over again.
+Therefore to the words, "God said: Let the firmament be made . . .
+and it was so," it is superfluous to add, "God made the firmament."
+And the like is to be said of other works.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide the
+day, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, "The evening
+and morning were the second day" or, "the third day," are not
+suitable.
+
+Obj. 7: Further, "first," not "one," corresponds to "second" and
+"third." It should therefore have been said that, "The evening and
+the morning were the first day," rather than "one day."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the person
+of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and
+in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place.
+For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world
+receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by
+means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be
+called his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is
+by the word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction
+and adornment the Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is
+mentioned as the beginning, by the words, "In the beginning God
+created," since by creation is understood the production of formless
+matter. But according to those who hold that the elements were
+created from the first under their proper forms, another explanation
+must be given; and therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.)
+that the words, "God said," signify a Divine command. Such a command,
+however, could not have been given before creatures had been produced
+that could obey it.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the
+heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth,
+the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is
+omitted. But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), the heaven and
+the earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the intervening
+things being left to be understood, since all these move heavenwards,
+if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that under the
+word, "earth," Scripture is accustomed to include all the four
+elements as (Ps. 148:7,8) after the words, "Praise the Lord from the
+earth," is added, "fire, hail, snow, and ice."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the account of the creation there is found something
+to correspond to the words, "God saw that it was good," used in the
+work of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the
+consideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, "there are two
+things," says Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God's
+love of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. That
+they might then exist, and exist permanently, "the Spirit of God," it
+is said, "moved over the waters"--that is to say, over that formless
+matter, signified by water, even as the love of the artist moves over
+the materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work. And
+the words, "God saw that it was good," signify that the things that
+He had made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction
+taken by God in His works, as of an artist in his art: not as though
+He knew the creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to
+Him otherwise, than before He made it. Thus in either work, of
+creation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In
+creation the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator,
+the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and the
+Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that moved over the waters.
+But in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated by God
+that speaks, and the Person of the Son by the Word in which He
+speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with
+which God saw that what was made was good. And if the words, "God saw
+that it was good," are not said of the work of the second day, this
+is because the work of distinguishing the waters was only begun on
+that day, but perfected on the third. Hence these words, that are
+said of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it may be that
+Scripture does not use these words of approval of the second day's
+work, because this is concerned with the distinction of things not
+evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the firmament
+is simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is not one
+of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal
+divisions of the world. The above three reasons are given by Rabbi
+Moses [*Perplex. ii.], and to these may be added a mystical one
+derived from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom
+the work of the second day is not marked with approval because the
+second number is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection
+of unity.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the "Spirit of
+the Lord," the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says that it
+is so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which these
+things are throughout attributed to God. But according to the holy
+writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is said
+to "move over the water"--that is to say, over what Augustine holds
+to mean formless matter, lest it should be supposed that God loved of
+necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in need of
+them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the
+object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit
+moved over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that
+movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine
+says (Gen. ad lit. i, 7). It is the opinion, however, of Basil (Hom.
+ii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit moved over the element of water,
+"fostering and quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as
+the hen broods over her chickens." For water has especially a
+life-giving power, since many animals are generated in water, and the
+seed of all animals is liquid. Also the life of the soul is given by
+the water of baptism, according to John 3:5: "Unless a man be born
+again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom
+of God."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these three
+phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their being
+in the Word, denoted by the command "Let . . . be made"; secondly,
+their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, "It was . .
+. done"; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words,
+"He made." And because the formation of the angels is recorded on the
+first day, it was not necessary there to add, "He made." It may also
+be said, following other writers, that the words, "He said," and "Let
+. . . be made," denote God's command, and the words, "It was done,"
+the fulfilment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the sake
+of those especially who have asserted that all visible things were
+made by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in
+order to remove that error, that God Himself made them. Hence, in
+each work, after the words, "It was done," some act of God is
+expressed by some such words as, "He made," or, "He divided," or,
+"He called."
+
+Reply Obj. 6: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22, 30), by
+the "evening" and the "morning" are understood the evening and the
+morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained (Q. 58,
+A. 6, 7). But, according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire
+period takes its name, as is customary, from its more important part,
+the day. An instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, "The
+days of my pilgrimage," where night is not mentioned at all. But the
+evening and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day,
+since day begins with morning and ends with evening, or because
+evening denotes the beginning of night, and morning the beginning of
+day. It seems fitting, also, that where the first distinction of
+creatures is described, divisions of time should be denoted only by
+what marks their beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening
+first is that as the evening ends the day, which begins with the
+light, the termination of the light at evening precedes the
+termination of the darkness, which ends with the morning. But
+Chrysostom's explanation is that thereby it is intended to show that
+the natural day does not end with the evening, but with the morning
+(Hom. v in Gen.).
+
+Reply Obj. 7: The words "one day" are used when day is first
+instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours.
+Hence, by mentioning "one," the measure of a natural day is fixed.
+Another reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the
+return of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course.
+And yet another, because at the completion of a week of seven days,
+the first day returns which is one with the eighth day. The three
+reasons assigned above are those given by Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.).
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON MAN (QQ. 75-102)
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 75
+
+OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND
+IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL
+(In Seven Articles)
+
+Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now
+proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal
+substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of
+his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation
+to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the
+body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our
+consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi)
+says that three things are to be found in spiritual
+substances--essence, power, and operation--we shall treat first of
+what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to
+its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.
+
+Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is
+the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union
+of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven
+points of inquiry.
+
+(1) Whether the soul is a body?
+
+(2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?
+
+(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
+
+(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?
+
+(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
+
+(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?
+
+(7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Soul Is a Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is
+the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved.
+First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved,
+since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot
+does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves
+and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging
+movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to
+be the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul.
+Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body.
+Therefore the soul is a body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness.
+But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If,
+therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of
+corporeal things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, between the mover and the moved there must be
+contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the
+soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is
+simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy
+space by its bulk."
+
+_I answer that,_ To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that
+the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things
+which live: for we call living things "animate," [*i.e. having a
+soul] and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is
+shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The
+philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination,
+supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal:
+for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is
+not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is
+something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many
+ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, based on universal and
+certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.
+
+It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul,
+for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and
+the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but
+it is the _first_ principle of life, which we call the soul. Now,
+though a body may be a principle of life, as the heart is a principle
+of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first
+principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or
+to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if
+that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a
+principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing
+or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is
+actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its
+act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not
+a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of
+calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As everything which is in motion must be moved by
+something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we
+must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is
+to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has
+to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as
+is shown in _Phys._ viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether
+immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and
+such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however,
+another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved
+accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable
+movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again, another mover,
+which is moved essentially--namely, the body. And because the
+philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they
+maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved
+directly, and is a body.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity
+actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows
+potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing
+known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only
+potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but
+only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of
+corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but
+that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the
+ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and
+potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order
+to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the
+principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of
+"power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the
+latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves
+that body.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Human Soul Is Something Subsistent?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something
+subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular
+thing." Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of
+that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not
+something subsistent.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does
+not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to say
+that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul
+weaves or builds." Therefore the soul is not subsistent.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some
+operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the
+body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding
+does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from
+the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands
+that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a
+body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the
+soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things
+without which they are unable to think of any nature--i.e. imaginary
+pictures of corporeal things." Therefore the nature of the human
+intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that
+is, something subsistent.
+
+_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of
+intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both
+incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the
+intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever
+knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature;
+because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of
+anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated
+by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and
+everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual
+principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know
+all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore
+it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is
+likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ;
+since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of
+all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the
+pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase
+seems to be of that same color.
+
+Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the
+intellect has an operation _per se_ apart from the body. Now only that
+which subsists can have an operation _per se._ For nothing can operate
+but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts
+heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore,
+that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is
+something incorporeal and subsistent.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: "This particular thing" can be taken in two senses.
+Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists,
+and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the
+inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes
+also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this
+particular thing" in the first sense, but not in the second.
+Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed
+be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being
+something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what
+is composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own
+opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to
+be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to
+operate _per se_ belongs to what exists _per se._ But for a thing to
+exist _per se,_ it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an
+accident or a material form; even though it be part of something.
+Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist _per se,_ which is
+neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In
+this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist _per se_;
+nor can it for that reason be said to operate _per se._ Hence the
+operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole.
+For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and
+not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by
+its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may
+therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is
+more correct to say that man understands through the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The body is necessary for the action of the intellect,
+not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the
+phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither
+does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be
+non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is
+non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses
+in order to perform its act of perception.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Souls of Brute Animals Are Subsistent?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are
+subsistent. For man is of the same genus as other animals; and,
+as we have just shown (A. 2), the soul of man is subsistent.
+Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible
+objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to
+intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body,
+apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty,
+apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since
+the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are
+subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the
+body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute
+animals has an operation apart from the body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi,
+xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the
+souls of animals are not subsistent."
+
+_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers made no distinction between
+sense and intellect, and referred both to a corporeal principle, as
+has been said (A. 1). Plato, however, drew a distinction between
+intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal
+principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs
+to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of
+brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the
+operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a
+corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent
+operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with
+change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye
+is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses.
+Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no _per se_ operation
+of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to
+the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute
+animals have no _per se_ operations they are not subsistent. For the
+operation of anything follows the mode of its being.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although man is of the same genus as other animals, he
+is of a different species. Specific difference is derived from the
+difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily
+imply a diversity of genus.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible
+object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to
+the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its
+object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the
+impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in
+the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense;
+a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an
+intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is
+more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. If, however,
+in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this
+result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the
+operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive
+power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive
+soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a
+like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive
+power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for
+obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in
+moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an
+act of the sensitive soul without the body.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Soul Is Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2
+Cor. 4:16): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man
+is renewed day by day." But that which is within man is the soul.
+Therefore the soul is the inward man.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a
+universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore
+it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person.
+Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as
+holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul
+and body."
+
+_I answer that,_ The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two
+senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man,
+Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body.
+I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the
+species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species.
+This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the
+definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not
+signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural
+things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter,
+which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as
+it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this
+soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion
+of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs
+in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a
+given species, must belong to the substance of the species.
+
+It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man;
+and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the
+sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in
+that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong
+to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a
+thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of
+a man is man. But it has been shown above (A. 3) that sensation is
+not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an
+operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not
+a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through
+supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man
+to be a soul making use of the body.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing
+seems to be chiefly what is princip[al] in it; thus what the governor
+of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what
+is princip[al] in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the
+intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the
+"inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body is
+called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go
+beyond the senses. And this is called the "outward" man.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a
+person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence
+a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor,
+likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the
+human species.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Soul Is Composed of Matter and Form?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and
+form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever
+things are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God;
+by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are
+living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom.
+v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of
+the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter.
+Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality;
+which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially
+understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of
+primary matter, as part of itself.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there
+matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the
+soul--namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject
+to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge
+and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their
+existence, as the Philosopher says _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 6). But
+the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God.
+Therefore the soul has matter.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure
+act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the
+soul has matter.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that
+the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual
+matter.
+
+_I answer that,_ The soul has no matter. We may consider this question
+in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it
+belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either
+it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of
+some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it
+is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we
+understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act;
+and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since
+potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If,
+however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that
+part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the
+"primary animate."
+
+Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul
+inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is
+received into something is received according to the condition of the
+recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the
+knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature
+absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and
+therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal
+idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul
+itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and
+form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form,
+the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so
+it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the
+sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since
+matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows,
+therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual
+substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from
+composition of matter and form.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all acts;
+because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not
+as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as
+potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act.
+But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and
+are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one
+potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which
+all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive
+potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act.
+Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than
+the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the
+diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives
+individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms.
+Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul
+does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by
+reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality
+of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary
+matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection
+and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is
+changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in
+potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent;
+wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it
+by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however,
+does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a
+cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words
+quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of
+matter and form "there is no other cause but that which moves from
+potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are
+simply beings at once." [*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter sunt
+quod vere entia aliquid." The Parma edition of St. Thomas's
+Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim per se unum quiddam est . . .
+et ens quiddam."]
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Everything participated is compared to the participator
+as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per
+se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or
+anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius
+says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the
+capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own
+existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances
+there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of
+matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore
+some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that
+"which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Human Soul Is Incorruptible?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For
+those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a
+like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of
+animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is
+alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing
+more than the beast," as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as
+the same text concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the
+condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are
+corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to
+nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But
+as it is written (Wis. 2:2), "We are born of nothing"; which is true,
+not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is
+concluded in the same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had
+not been," even as to our soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the
+operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a
+phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands
+nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body
+as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot
+survive the dissolution of the body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe
+to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have
+"an incorruptible substantial life."
+
+_I answer that,_ We must assert that the intellectual principle which
+we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted
+in two ways--_per se,_ and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any
+substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the
+generation or corruption of something else. For generation and
+corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which
+is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever
+has existence _per se_ cannot be generated or corrupted except "per
+se"; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and
+material forms, acquire existence or lose it through the generation
+or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (AA. 2, 3)
+that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human
+soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies
+are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it
+were corrupted _per se._ This, indeed, is impossible, not only as
+regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that
+is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by
+virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a
+form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires
+actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so
+far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form
+to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a
+subsistent form to cease to exist.
+
+Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some
+pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is
+incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is
+contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and
+into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no
+matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no
+contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to
+the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are
+without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not
+themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge.
+Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be
+corruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that
+everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now,
+in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The
+senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of
+"here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends existence
+absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an
+intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire
+cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is
+incorruptible.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as
+expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying that man and
+animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for
+all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul.
+For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body;
+whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is
+written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth the living
+soul" (Gen. 1:24): while of man it is written (Gen. 2:7) that "He
+breathed into his face the breath of life." And so in the last
+chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: "(Before) the dust
+return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to
+God Who gave it." Again the process of life is alike as to the body,
+concerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): "All things breathe
+alike," and (Wis. 2:2), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But
+the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas
+animals are not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than
+beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to
+the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive
+potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who
+can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can
+be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality
+to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain
+existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in
+it a potentiality to non-existence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: To understand through a phantasm is the proper
+operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After
+separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding,
+similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear
+later on (Q. 89, A. 1).
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Soul Is of the Same Species As an Angel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an
+angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of
+its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the
+end of the soul is the same as that of an angel--namely, eternal
+happiness. Therefore they are of the same species.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest,
+because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing
+nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual
+nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate
+specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel
+except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the
+essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species.
+Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Things which have different natural operations are
+of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of
+an angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii),
+"Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering
+their knowledge of Divine things from visible things." Subsequently
+he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an
+angel are not of the same species.
+
+_I answer that,_ Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls
+and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed
+that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as
+resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above (Q. 47, A. 2).
+But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be
+diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of
+nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are
+subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a
+diversity of species. For a separate form cannot be understood
+otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate
+whiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness
+does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But
+diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of
+nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another;
+and the same applies to other species, because differences which
+divide a genus are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are
+compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the
+"principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof," as is
+written, _Metaph._ x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the
+aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. For if the
+matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that
+either the form is the principle of the distinction of matter--that
+is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to
+divers forms; and even then there would result a difference of
+species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle
+of the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from
+another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in
+these incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that
+it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same
+species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will
+be explained later (Q. 76, A. 2, ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural
+end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because
+it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler
+than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the
+noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of
+intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in
+the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one
+species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the
+soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that,
+properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the "composite," is the
+species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires
+the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a
+grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not
+united to a body.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 76
+
+OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning
+this there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its
+form?
+
+(2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically
+according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence for
+all men?
+
+(3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual
+principle, there is some other soul?
+
+(4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?
+
+(5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual
+principle is the form?
+
+(6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?
+
+(7) Whether by means of an accident?
+
+(8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Intellectual Principle Is United to the Body As Its Form?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to
+the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that
+the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body.
+Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every form is determined according to the nature
+of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would
+be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were
+united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate
+nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature;
+and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear
+from what has been said (Q. 75, A. 2); which is contrary to the
+nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to
+the body as its form.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body,
+receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must
+be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form
+of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially
+and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise
+the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and
+universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore
+the intellect is not united to the body as its form.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same
+subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is
+not the action of a body, as appears from above (Q. 75, A. 2).
+Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body.
+But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the
+essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither
+is the substance of the intellect the form of a body.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, whatever has _per se_ existence is not united to the
+body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: so
+that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by
+itself. But the intellectual principle has _per se_ existence and is
+subsistent, as was said above (Q. 75, A. 2). Therefore it is not
+united to the body as its form.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature
+exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form
+by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an
+accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form
+would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one.
+Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the
+intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above
+(Q. 75, A. 6), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution
+of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to
+the body as its form.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher, _Metaph._ viii (Did.
+vii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which
+constitutes man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of
+his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is
+the form of man.
+
+_I answer that,_ We must assert that the intellect which is the
+principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For
+that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which
+the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is
+primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily
+is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a
+form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as
+it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now
+it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul.
+And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of
+living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these
+vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of
+our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our
+understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily
+understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual
+soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by
+Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2).
+
+But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the
+body he must first explain how it is that this action of
+understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is
+conscious that it is himself who understands. Now an action may be
+attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher
+(Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of
+its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a
+part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as
+when we say that something that is white builds, because it is
+accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates
+or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him
+accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated
+of him essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates
+understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding
+that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part of
+Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 4),
+for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious
+both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense
+without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It
+follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is
+a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of
+Socrates.
+
+The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible
+species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and
+in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the
+intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of
+this or that particular man. But this link or union does not
+sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the
+act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the
+sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things
+relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the
+intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he
+says _De Anima_ iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of colors are in
+the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect.
+Now it is clear that because the colors, the images of which are in
+the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to
+the wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is
+seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in
+the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are
+the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are
+understood.
+
+Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the
+body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one
+thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the
+whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. First, because the
+intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the
+movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. The
+reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved
+by his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his
+intellect because he understands. Secondly, because since Socrates is
+an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form,
+if the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside
+the essence, and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor
+to the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent,
+and does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating.
+Therefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates
+for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the
+action of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to
+an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore if
+understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves
+him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument. This
+is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that
+understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima
+iii, 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be
+attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a
+man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps
+indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees.
+Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above
+manner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates.
+If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect
+with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be
+united to those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates
+is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely,
+for a thing is a being according as it is one.
+
+There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by
+Aristotle--namely, that this particular man understands, because the
+intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of
+the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is
+united to the body as its form.
+
+The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species.
+For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper
+operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses
+all other animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the
+ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly
+belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that
+which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything
+is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual
+principle is the proper form of man.
+
+But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above
+corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it
+excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the
+form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental
+qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the
+more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter;
+as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive
+soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and
+noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by
+the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal
+matter has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect.
+
+It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of
+matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the
+form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in
+potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the
+form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by
+virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we
+call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the "primary
+animate," as was said above (Q. 75, A. 5).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the ultimate
+natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is
+directed is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He proves this
+from the fact that "man and the sun generate man from matter." It is
+separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the
+intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power
+of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which
+cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But
+it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, to which this power
+belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation.
+And so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is
+separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ.
+
+From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections:
+since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by
+means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand
+immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the
+intellectual power be not the act of the body.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a
+form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore
+there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of
+the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The soul communicates that existence in which it
+subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual
+soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the
+whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the
+case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul
+retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas
+it is not so with other forms.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason
+of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be
+raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its
+proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for
+its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when
+separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination
+to be united to the body.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Intellectual Principle Is Multiplied According to the
+Number of Bodies?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not
+multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one
+intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied
+in number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial
+substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown
+above (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore there are not many human souls in
+one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but
+one intellect in all men.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also
+removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the
+number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number
+of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a
+single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the
+distinction of rewards and punishments.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my
+intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are
+things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever
+is received into anything must be received according to the condition
+of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received
+individually into my intellect, and also into yours: which is
+contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which
+understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what
+is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you;
+and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be
+only potentially something understood; so that the common intention
+will have to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse
+something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is
+contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would
+seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to
+follow that there is one intellect in all men.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the
+master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets
+knowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an
+active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems,
+therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master
+is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is
+one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the
+disciple and master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies
+to all men.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: "If I were
+to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself."
+But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect.
+Therefore there is one intellect of all men.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the
+relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of
+particular causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul,
+one in species, should belong to animals of different species.
+Therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul
+should belong to several individuals.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to
+belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the
+intellect itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are
+one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by
+something outside the essence of each. The distinction between
+Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a
+tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd.
+
+It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the
+opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the
+intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man.
+For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form,
+as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is
+the principle of existence.
+
+Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the
+manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is
+manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two
+instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but
+several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two
+hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the
+contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we
+might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if
+there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many
+drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and
+one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when
+the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one
+stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or
+coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all
+the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey
+the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two
+men to have several intellects and one sense--for instance, if two
+men had one eye--there would be several seers, but one sight. But if
+there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things
+of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it
+possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one
+understanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is
+the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the
+intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent
+and one action: that is to say that all men are but one
+"understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard,
+that is, of one intelligible object.
+
+However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action
+from yours by the distinction of the phantasms--that is to say, were
+there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you--if the
+phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a
+form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to
+divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of
+things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the
+phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the
+intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now
+in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only
+one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom
+there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only
+one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the
+intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of
+a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if
+there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which
+are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of
+intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows,
+therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to
+maintain that there exists one intellect for all men.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no
+matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain
+matter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the
+division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is
+quite impossible for many angels to be of one species.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Everything has unity in the same way that it has being;
+consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge
+of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue
+of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the
+dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being.
+In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the
+multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies,
+the souls retain their multiplied being.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the
+species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding
+of universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent
+substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand
+universals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species
+whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as
+every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent
+acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge
+is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows.
+Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by
+reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter.
+Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is
+material--that is, not abstracted from material conditions--its
+likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the
+distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of
+individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing
+in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from
+the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the
+nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied;
+thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter,
+as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many;
+because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an
+individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an
+individual species.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Whether the intellect be one or many, what is
+understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not
+according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the
+stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, _De
+Anima_ iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the
+likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on
+itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but
+only intelligible species. Now it happens that different things,
+according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And
+since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the
+knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen
+to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the
+senses; for several see the same color, according to different
+likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object
+understood. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of
+Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence--that a thing is
+perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has
+outside the soul--that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature
+of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode
+according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode
+according to which it is understood. For the common nature is
+understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such
+is not its mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the
+opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the
+same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed
+that the natures of things exist separate from matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the
+master. How it is caused will be shown later on (Q. 117, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would
+involve a plurality of species.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Besides the Intellectual Soul There Are in Man Other Souls
+Essentially Different from One Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there
+are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such
+as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and
+incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual
+soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and
+the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 6).
+Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive
+soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is
+incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ
+generically," says the Philosopher, _Metaph._ x (Did. ix, 10). But
+the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals,
+is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the
+sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same
+genus. Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul;
+and, therefore, "animal" will not be one genus common to man and
+other animals, which is absurd.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 2),
+that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the
+form. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is
+taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" by
+reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore
+the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a
+sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual
+soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but
+presupposes it as a material subject.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said in the book _De Ecclesiasticis
+Dogmatibus_ xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man,
+as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is
+animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual,
+which obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul
+in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and
+orders itself by its own reasoning."
+
+_I answer that,_ Plato held that there were several souls in one body,
+distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different
+vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the
+concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain.
+Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard
+to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this
+reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have
+been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as
+sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various
+principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and
+distributed in the various parts of the body. But with regard to the
+intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be "only
+logically" distinct from the other parts of the soul, "or also
+locally."
+
+The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was
+supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor.
+For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be
+moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to
+its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to
+the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially
+different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three
+different reasons.
+
+In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which
+there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one
+form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the
+same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are
+denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance,
+"a white man." If, therefore, man were _living_ by one form, the
+vegetative soul, and _animal_ by another form, the sensitive soul, and
+_man_ by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man
+is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii,
+6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the
+idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this
+reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the
+body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), "what contains them?"--that is, what
+makes them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one
+body; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one,
+than the reverse.
+
+Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one
+thing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from
+various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if
+the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that
+something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of
+essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the
+subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is
+presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is
+colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.)
+Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and
+another form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these
+two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally,
+supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another--or that
+one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of
+essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But
+both of these consequences are clearly false: because "animal" is
+predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not
+part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about.
+Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man;
+otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so
+that animal can be essentially predicated of man.
+
+Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one
+operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never
+be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one.
+
+We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the
+intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul.
+This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of
+species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things
+differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order
+of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and
+animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in
+each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason
+Aristotle, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things
+to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of
+unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the
+species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon
+contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains
+virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and
+to the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of
+a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by
+another--since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained
+in the pentagonal--so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and
+animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and
+man.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of
+its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When,
+therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with
+sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For
+although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot
+deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not forms, but composites, are classified either
+generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other
+animals. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which
+is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference
+between man and the other animals.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely
+sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more
+perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be
+shown further on (Q. 118, A. 2, ad 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: We must not consider the diversity of natural things as
+proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow
+from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one
+and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said,
+the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the
+sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately
+what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something
+imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is
+something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the
+notion of the genus; while that wherein the intellectual soul
+exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting;
+thence it gathers the "difference" of man.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 4]
+
+Whether in Man There Is Another Form Besides the Intellectual Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides
+the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that
+"the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially."
+Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body
+has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other
+substantial form in the body precedes the soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now
+everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one
+moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,
+5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part
+must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved
+(Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything
+that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there
+must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to
+primary matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to some
+beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial
+form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately
+to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most
+imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does
+not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere
+corruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a
+mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human
+body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Of one thing there is but one substantial being.
+But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one
+thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the
+substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be
+in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul.
+
+_I answer that,_ If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not
+united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the
+Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there
+is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its
+being as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be
+united to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above
+(A. 1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the
+intellectual soul to be found in man.
+
+In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial
+form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental
+form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat
+does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by
+the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or
+generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular
+condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a
+thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the
+substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing
+is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted
+simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that
+primary matter was some actual being--for instance, fire or air, or
+something of that sort--maintained that nothing is generated simply,
+or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an
+alteration," as we read, _Phys._ i, 4. Therefore, if besides the
+intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form
+by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would
+follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that
+it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there
+would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption,
+all of which is clearly false.
+
+Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in
+man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually
+contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually
+contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the
+imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the
+sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants,
+and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the
+imperfect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a
+body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life
+potentially"; and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul."
+Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul
+itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is
+hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were
+two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light.
+In like manner, the soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc.,
+because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life
+potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the
+second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality "does not
+reject"--that is, does not exclude--the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the
+form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which
+presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that
+the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate
+body is the part moved.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as
+existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is
+always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the
+first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form
+which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the
+most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the
+elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is
+made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an
+average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the
+elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the
+distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter
+cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be
+found except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same
+place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be
+distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture
+which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to
+sense, by the juxtaposition of particles.
+
+Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their
+imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms,
+and so can be "more" or "less"; and therefore in the mixture they are
+modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from
+them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial
+being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every
+addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated
+in _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for
+any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less
+impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident.
+
+Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener.
+i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not
+actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements
+remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary
+forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the
+substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone,
+or of any sort of soul.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Intellectual Soul Is Properly United to Such a Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly
+united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form.
+But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not
+properly united to a corruptible body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial
+form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does
+not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter.
+Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire,
+for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial
+body.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one
+form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual soul
+is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is
+composed of parts belonging to various species.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should
+itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect
+of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally
+provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes,
+and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided
+with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual
+soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as
+being deprived of the above means of protection.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the
+soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the
+matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the
+matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual
+soul, as we have seen above (Q. 55, A. 2) in the order of nature,
+holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it
+is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels
+are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the
+senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in
+necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed
+not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of
+feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a
+corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to
+be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.
+
+Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the
+organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot
+and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has
+the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries,
+and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is
+reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the
+touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its
+completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists
+more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
+Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be
+a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For
+this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among
+men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best
+intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are
+refined in body are well endowed in mind," as stated in _De Anima_ ii,
+9.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying
+that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does
+not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal
+not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its
+immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the
+immortality of the devil.
+
+Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two
+conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the
+matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of
+the first disposition. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the
+saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that
+the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of
+the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable
+complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If,
+however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the
+formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but
+what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
+lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy
+against death in the gift of grace.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by
+reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on
+account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable
+temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such
+a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which
+fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an
+equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament
+has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from
+contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand,
+flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the
+whole does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that
+these are of different species, but that they are of various
+dispositions. This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which,
+although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection,
+is manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it
+requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is
+united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety of
+parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater
+variety than in plants.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has
+a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by
+nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed
+means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other
+animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in
+regard to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man has by
+nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of organs" (De
+Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments
+of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Intellectual Soul Is United to the Body Through the Medium
+of Accidental Dispositions?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the
+body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form
+exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are
+accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter
+before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the
+soul is a substantial form.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, various forms of one species require various parts
+of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without
+division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose
+dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many
+belonging to one species.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is
+corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its
+power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by
+means of a power, which is an accident.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Accident is posterior to substance, both in the
+order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says,
+_Metaph._ vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any
+accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the
+substantial form.
+
+_I answer that,_ If the soul were united to the body, merely as a
+motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain
+dispositions mediating between the soul and the body; on the
+contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would
+be required the power to move the body; and on the part of the body,
+a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul.
+
+If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the
+substantial form, as we have already said above (A. 1), it is
+impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body
+and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its
+matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all
+manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the
+acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first among
+all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be
+apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But
+matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it
+to exist absolutely, as we have said above (A. 4). Wherefore it is
+impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter
+before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As appears from what has been already said (A. 4), the
+more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior
+forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter
+according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same
+essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an
+animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every genus follow its own
+proper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in
+its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so
+those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist
+before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter
+before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the
+subsequent effect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the
+corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once
+understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct
+in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according
+to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially
+the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection,
+as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different when
+brought under the observation of reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A spiritual substance which is united to a body as
+its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the
+intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a
+form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Soul Is United to the Animal Body by Means of a Body?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by
+means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that "the
+soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air,
+which is most akin to a spirit." But fire and air are bodies.
+Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing
+the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when
+breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the
+breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul
+and body.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things which are very distant from one another, are
+not united except by something between them. But the intellectual
+soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal,
+and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to
+the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some
+heavenly light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them
+together.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need
+not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and
+its shape are one." But the shape is united to the wax without a body
+intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body.
+
+_I answer that,_ If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united
+to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some
+other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any
+animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it
+by means of something nearer.
+
+If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have
+said (A. 1), it is impossible for it to be united by means of
+another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as
+it is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be
+actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give
+existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing
+composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by
+reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there
+any other cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be
+in act, as the Philosopher says, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 6).
+
+From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who
+maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and
+body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual
+soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it
+is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the
+corruptible body of man. Others said that the soul is united to the
+body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the
+body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature
+of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to
+the body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible
+soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the
+intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now
+all this is fictitious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and
+the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a
+mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly,
+because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to
+matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the
+body; whence he uses the word "administration." It is true that it
+moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And
+the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the
+Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of
+breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the
+removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such
+a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first
+instrument of motion.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we
+consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a
+separate existence, many means of connection would have to intervene.
+But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an
+existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own
+existence is united to the body immediately. This is the case with
+every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from
+matter, which is a being only in potentiality.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Soul Is in Each Part of the Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of
+the body; for the Philosopher says in _De causa motus animalium_ (De
+mot. animal. x): "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part
+of the body; it suffices that it be in some principle of the body
+causing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement
+of its own."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But
+it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in an
+organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body.
+Therefore the whole soul is not in each part.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1) that the
+relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the
+sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the
+soul to the whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the whole soul is
+in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an
+animal.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence
+of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the
+body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of
+the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye,
+and this is absurd.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each
+part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus one part
+would not depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than
+another; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each
+part of the body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that "in each
+body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire."
+
+_I answer that,_ As we have said, if the soul were united to the body
+merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the
+body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But
+since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily
+be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an
+accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the
+substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the
+whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which
+does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form
+consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and
+such a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and
+therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but
+also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do
+not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a
+painted animal or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the
+flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof of
+which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body
+retains its proper action; although that which retains its species,
+retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it
+actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each
+part thereof.
+
+That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this,
+that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are
+three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division.
+There is a whole which is divided into parts of quantity, as a whole
+line, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into
+logical and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the
+parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There
+is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into
+virtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to forms,
+except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have
+an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as
+whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to
+be in the whole surface and in each part of the surface; and,
+therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally
+divided. But a form which requires variety in the parts, such as a
+soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally
+related to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided
+accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative
+totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or
+accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on
+logical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs
+to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the
+principle of operation.
+
+Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole
+surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If
+we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then
+the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to
+be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the
+whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a
+small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence,
+then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface.
+
+Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither
+essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say
+that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of
+perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not
+in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with
+regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is
+in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the
+soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the
+same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is compared
+primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate
+perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are
+ordained to the whole.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power
+of the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its
+primary and proportionate perfectible.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a
+whole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate
+perfectible. Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not
+follow that a part of an animal is an animal.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as
+it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and
+the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the
+body. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of
+these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part
+of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: One part of the body is said to be nobler than another,
+on account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body are
+the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a
+nobler part of the body: as also is that part which serves the same
+power in a nobler manner.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 77
+
+OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the
+soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head
+there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?
+
+(2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?
+
+(3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?
+
+(4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;
+
+(5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?
+
+(6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?
+
+(7) Whether one power rises from another?
+
+(8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Essence of the Soul Is Its Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power.
+For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and love
+are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing,
+essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, and
+will are one life, one mind, one essence."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary
+matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its
+own power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental
+form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified
+or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own
+power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by
+the intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and
+understand" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
+2). Therefore the soul is its own power.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an
+accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else
+besides the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to
+Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see Obj. 1) "are not in the
+soul as in a subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or
+quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the
+subject in which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other
+things" (De Trin. ix, 4).
+
+Obj. 6: Further, "a simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is
+a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as we
+have said above (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore the power of the soul cannot
+be in it as in a subject.
+
+Obj. 7: Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial
+difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences;
+and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the
+soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it
+would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly
+spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more,
+then, in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul
+is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present
+purpose this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power
+and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power
+and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the
+genus of substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the
+genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus
+of substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His
+own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of
+His operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true
+either of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when
+speaking of the angels (Q. 54, A. 3). Secondly, this may be also
+shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence
+is an act. Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the
+immediate principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always
+have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an
+actually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained
+to a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore,
+for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it
+according to its essence, as a form, but according to its power. So
+the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first
+act, with a further relation to the second act. Now we observe that
+what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital
+operations; whence also it is said in the definition of the soul,
+that it is "the act of a body having life potentially"; which
+potentiality, however, "does not exclude the soul." Therefore it
+follows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing
+is in potentiality by reason of an act, as act.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves
+itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known and
+loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very
+substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the same way
+are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those
+things are "one life, one mind, one essence." Or, as some say, this
+passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is
+predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole,
+and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each part
+according to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in
+a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each part. But
+the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its
+whole essence, nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way
+can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated,
+though improperly, of all the parts together; as if we were to say
+that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential
+whole is in each part according to its whole essence, not, however,
+according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated
+of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this
+sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the will
+are the one essence of the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is
+the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing
+else but its essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Action belongs to the composite, as does existence;
+for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial
+existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power
+which results from the substantial form. Hence an active accidental
+form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat
+compared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the
+soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: That the accidental form is a principle of action is
+due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the
+first principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this
+sense the Philosopher says that "the soul is that whereby we
+understand and sense."
+
+Reply Obj. 5: If we take accident as meaning what is divided against
+substance, then there can be no medium between substance and
+accident; because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that
+is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a
+subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence,
+it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species of
+accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five
+universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and
+accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a
+thing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be
+called accident in this sense; but only what is not caused by the
+essential principle of the species. For the 'proper' does not belong
+to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles
+of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and
+accident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be
+said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural
+properties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love
+are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be
+understood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared
+to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His
+argument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved
+as in a subject, it would follow that an accident transcends its
+subject, since even other things are loved through the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Although the soul is not composed of matter and form,
+yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (Q.
+75, A. 5, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an
+accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure
+Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De
+Trin. i).
+
+Reply Obj. 7: Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken
+from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and
+rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in
+themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing
+prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial
+differences.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Are Several Powers of the Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several powers of the
+soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of
+God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the
+intellectual soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But
+the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore
+above all others it has one virtue or power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the
+one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different
+degrees of perfection, as we have seen above (Q. 76, AA. 3, 4).
+Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of
+various degrees.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher places several powers in the soul
+(De Anima ii, 2,3).
+
+_I answer that,_ Of necessity we must place several powers in the
+soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says
+(De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect
+goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few
+movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect
+goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect
+goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in
+those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement
+whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only
+acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed
+is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and
+better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has
+perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that
+things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and
+so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can
+acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire
+beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature,
+of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul
+requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a
+smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power
+or action beyond His own Essence.
+
+There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of
+powers--because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal
+creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine
+likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire
+perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it
+falls short of more perfect creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A unified power is superior if it extends to equal
+things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many
+things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: One thing has one substantial existence, but may have
+several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several
+powers.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Powers Are Distinguished by Their Acts and Objects?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul are not
+distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its
+species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is
+subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore
+the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, contraries are what differ most from each other.
+Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows
+that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly
+false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to
+white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.
+Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects,
+the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly
+false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired
+by the appetitive.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is
+the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong
+to various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color
+belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they
+come under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are
+not distinguished according to the difference of their objects.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Things that are subsequent are distinguished by
+what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "acts
+and operations precede the powers according to reason; and these
+again are preceded by their opposites," that is their objects.
+Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and
+objects.
+
+_I answer that,_ A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we
+seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is
+directed, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as
+the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is
+diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every
+act is either of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the
+object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving
+cause: for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the
+sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the object is
+a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect
+quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from these two things an
+act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end
+or term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in
+this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active
+principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is the
+active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity
+distinguished by their acts and objects.
+
+Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not
+change the species. For since to be colored is accidental to an
+animal, its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a
+difference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is
+to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes
+rational, and sometimes otherwise. Hence "rational" and "irrational"
+are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In
+like manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the
+powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its
+very nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are
+directed to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color,
+sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with
+regard to color, namely, the sight, and another with regard to sound,
+namely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for
+instance, to something colored, to be a musician or a grammarian,
+great or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such
+differences the powers of the soul are not distinct.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is,
+nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is
+with regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is,
+nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those
+conditions which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its
+principle and end.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If any power were to have one of two contraries as such
+for its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. But
+the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as
+such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does
+not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of two
+contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the other, since
+they are to one another as perfect and imperfect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from
+being considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong
+to various powers of the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The higher power of itself regards a more universal
+formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a
+power is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore
+many things are combined in the one formality of the object, which
+the higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the
+formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is
+that various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects,
+however, are subject to one higher power.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Among the Powers of the Soul There Is Order?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order among the powers of
+the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is
+no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the
+powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore
+there is no order among them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects
+and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not order
+among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are
+various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no
+order among the powers of the soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the
+operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the action
+of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for
+sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore
+there is no order among the powers of the soul.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts
+or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among
+themselves. Therefore the powers of the soul have order.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and
+since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a
+certain order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul.
+Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of which
+correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third
+is taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence of one
+power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of
+nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to
+imperfect things; and according to the order of generation and time;
+forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus,
+according to the first kind of order among the powers, the
+intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they
+direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior
+in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul.
+
+In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers
+of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of
+the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The
+same is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the
+intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers
+are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling.
+For the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher
+and lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally
+prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the result.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The species of a given genus are to one another as
+before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their
+nature; although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as
+they receive the predication of the common genus.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This order among the powers of the soul is both on the
+part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence,
+has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the
+part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we
+have said above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument is verified as regards those powers among
+which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the
+two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one
+depends on another.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 5]
+
+Whether All the Powers of the Soul Are in the Soul As Their Subject?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the
+soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body;
+so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject
+of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the
+powers of the soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are
+attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the
+Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2), "The soul is that by which we
+sense and understand primarily." But the natural principles of the
+operations of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are
+primarily in the soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the
+soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without
+the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body.
+But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their
+subject, the soul could not sense anything without the body.
+Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; and for
+a similar reason, of all the other powers.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that
+"sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the
+composite." Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as
+its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the
+powers.
+
+_I answer that,_ The subject of operative power is that which is able
+to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now
+the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does
+operate. Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the
+subject of operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning
+of _De Somno et Vigilia._ Now, it is clear from what we have said
+above (Q. 75, AA. 2, 3; Q. 76, A. 1, ad 1), that some operations of
+the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding
+and will. Hence the powers of these operations are in the soul as
+their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means
+of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And
+so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive
+parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these
+operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul
+alone.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as
+their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that
+the composite has the power to perform such operations.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared
+to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation
+proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things
+relating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato,
+not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far as the
+present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses
+some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be
+taken in two ways. Firstly, the words "with the body or without the
+body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from
+the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because
+the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a
+corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be understood as determining the
+act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses
+some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as
+when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some
+things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but
+only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful
+on hearing something.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Powers of the Soul Flow from Its Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow
+from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one
+simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since,
+therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot
+proceed from its essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause.
+But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the
+powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes.
+Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But
+nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii,
+1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal
+is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and
+another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher
+proves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its
+powers within itself.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The powers of the soul are its natural properties.
+But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it
+is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from _Metaph._
+vii (Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its
+essence as their cause.
+
+_I answer that,_ The substantial and the accidental form partly agree
+and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that
+by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ,
+however, in two respects. First, because the substantial form makes
+a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely
+potential. But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist
+absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular
+condition; for its subject is an actual being. Hence it is clear that
+actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being
+observed in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is
+the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its
+subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of
+the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental
+form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the
+actuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as it is in
+potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as
+it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and _per se_
+accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is
+receptive only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent.
+Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that
+which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the
+more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial
+form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of
+the completeness of the subject.
+
+Now it is clear, from what has been said (A. 5), that either the
+subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be
+the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of
+potentiality, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 6); or else this subject
+is the composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it
+is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the
+soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as
+from their principle; because it has already been said that the
+accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is
+received into it according as it is in potentiality.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: From one simple thing many things may proceed
+naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of
+recipients. Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various
+powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and
+also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the
+active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the
+material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From
+this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all
+its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some
+as receptive thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is
+not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance;
+thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 7]
+
+Whether One Power of the Soul Arises from Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise
+from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does
+not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at
+the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from
+another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an
+accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the
+subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident.
+Therefore one power does not arise from another.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite;
+but everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the
+powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species.
+Therefore one of them does not proceed from another.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Powers are known by their actions. But the action
+of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action
+of the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power
+of the soul is caused by another.
+
+_I answer that,_ In those things which proceed from one according to
+a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is
+nearer to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more
+remote. Now it has been shown above (A. 4) that among the powers of
+the soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the
+soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another.
+But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a
+principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either
+separately by itself, or together with the body; and since the agent
+and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such,
+is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which
+precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the
+principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active
+principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of the
+intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are
+a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore,
+according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence
+as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive
+principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the
+others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is
+considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to
+the intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede
+the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated
+before the man.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not
+by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is
+simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as
+regards another.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an
+accident; but one accident is received prior to another into
+substance, as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident
+is said to be the subject of another; as surface is of color,
+inasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of
+another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as
+perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and
+figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from
+another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect
+things.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 8]
+
+Whether All the Powers Remain in the Soul When Separated from the
+Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in
+the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book _De Spiritu
+et Anima_ that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself
+sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and
+irascibility."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties.
+But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never
+separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even
+after death.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not
+weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says
+(De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he
+would see even as well as a young man." But weakness is the road to
+corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when
+the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the
+Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the
+separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in
+hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy
+lifetime" (Luke 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated
+soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which
+is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls
+grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive.
+Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the
+soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some
+things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite
+separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the
+sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in
+the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two
+substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the
+body with its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive
+powers do not remain.
+
+_I answer that,_ As we have said already (AA. 5, 6, 7), all the
+powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But
+some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the
+intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul,
+after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected
+in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive
+parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the
+subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not
+remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their
+principle or root.
+
+So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even
+after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they
+say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul;
+because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That book has no authority, and so what is there
+written can be despised with the same facility as it was said;
+although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers,
+not actually but virtually.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: These powers, which we say do not actually remain in
+the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of
+the composite.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These powers are said not to be weakened when the body
+becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the
+virtual principle of these powers.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the
+same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the
+mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the
+sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not
+as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said
+there (Retrac. ii, 24).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 78
+
+OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian,
+however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual
+and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the
+knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other
+powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken
+specifically will be divided into three parts: first, we shall
+consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect;
+secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) The powers of the soul considered generally;
+
+(2) The various species of the vegetative part;
+
+(3) The exterior senses;
+
+(4) The interior senses.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Are to Be Distinguished Five Genera of Powers in the
+Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are not to be distinguished
+five genera of powers in the soul--namely, vegetative, sensitive,
+appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul
+are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly
+assigned--namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the
+rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in
+the soul, and not five.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of its
+vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For the
+Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): "In several ways a thing is said
+to live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is said
+to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly,
+movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment." Therefore
+there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive
+is excluded.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as
+regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to
+each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible
+object; whence we read (Ecclus. 40:22): "The eye desireth favor and
+beauty, but more than these green sown fields." In the same way every
+other power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive
+power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the moving principle in animals is sense,
+intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10).
+Therefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a
+special genus of soul.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers
+are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion, and
+the intellectual."
+
+_I answer that,_ There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above
+numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes
+of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls
+being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul
+transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for
+the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to
+it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation
+of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not
+even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the operation of
+the _rational soul._ Below this, there is another operation of the
+soul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal organ, but not
+through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the
+_sensitive soul;_ for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other such
+corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they
+are not required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes
+place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the proper disposition
+of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which
+is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal
+quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature;
+because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle,
+while these operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is
+common to all the operations of the soul; since every animate thing,
+in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the _vegetative
+soul;_ for digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by
+the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4).
+
+Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their
+objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object
+to which it extends, as we have said above (Q. 77, A. 3, ad 4). But
+the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple
+order. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only
+the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are
+called "vegetative" for the vegetative power acts only on the body to
+which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the
+soul, which genus regards a more universal object--namely, every
+sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And
+there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus
+regards a still more universal object--namely, not only the sensible
+body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the
+latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard
+not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something
+extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to
+the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this
+something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation,
+must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as
+this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the
+soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are
+two kinds of powers--namely, the "sensitive" in regard to the less
+common object--the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard
+to the most common object--universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as
+the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something
+extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the
+soul: one--the "appetitive"--in respect of which the soul is referred
+to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention;
+the other--the "locomotive" power--in respect of which the soul is
+referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and
+movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its
+desires and intentions.
+
+The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of
+living things. There are some living things in which there exists only
+vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the
+vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive
+power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which
+besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require
+many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek
+necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things
+which with these have intellectual power--namely, men. But the
+appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things;
+because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima ii,
+3).
+
+Thus the first two objections are hereby solved.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The "natural appetite" is that inclination which each
+thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural
+appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the
+"animal appetite" results from the form apprehended; this sort of
+appetite requires a special power of the soul--mere apprehension does
+not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature,
+whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own
+nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight
+desires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act
+only--namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the
+appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose
+of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not
+require things perceived by the senses, except on account of the
+actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them;
+there would be no need for a special genus of appetitive powers,
+since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although sense and appetite are principles of movement
+in perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not
+sufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them;
+for immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not
+the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the
+appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the parts
+of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves
+them. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are
+deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience
+to the appetite.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Parts of the Vegetative Soul Are Fittingly Described As
+the Nutritive, Augmentative, and Generative?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are
+not fittingly described--namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and
+generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of
+the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class
+the above forces as powers of the soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, we should not assign a particular power of the
+soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But
+generation is common to all things that can be generated and
+corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative
+force should not be classed as a power of the soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the
+body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more,
+therefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the
+soul is not distinct from the generative power.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it
+exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing
+exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved.
+Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living
+thing (De Anima ii, 4), being "a power which is capable of preserving
+whatever receives it." Therefore we should not distinguish the
+nutritive power from the generative.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the
+operations of this soul are "generation, the use of food," and (cf.
+_De Anima_ iii, 9) "growth."
+
+_I answer that,_ The vegetative part has three powers. For the
+vegetative part, as we have said (A. 1), has for its object the body
+itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the
+soul is required. One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this
+is directed the _generative_ power. Another is whereby the living
+body acquires its due quantity; to this is directed the
+_augmentative_ power. Another is whereby the body of a living thing
+is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is
+directed the _nutritive_ power.
+
+We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The
+nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist,
+since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the
+augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same
+soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same
+body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the
+generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive
+soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although
+in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is
+highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in
+the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii).
+Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater
+finality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima
+ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to "produce
+another like unto itself." And the generative power is served by the
+augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the
+nutritive.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Such forces are called natural, both because they
+produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence,
+quantity and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these
+things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform their
+actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities,
+which are the principles of natural actions.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an
+extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a
+higher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is
+the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore
+there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen;
+and this is the generative power.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Since the generation of living things is from a semen,
+it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be
+generated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby
+it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is
+generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore
+it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to the
+condition of the matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As we have said above (A. 1), the operation of the
+vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of
+which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the
+humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food
+is changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for
+the action of the augmentative and generative powers.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Five Exterior Senses Are Properly Distinguished?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior
+senses. For sense can know accidents. But there are many kinds of
+accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects,
+it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of
+the kinds of accidents.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are
+called "common sensibles," are "not sensibles by accident," but are
+contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6).
+Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since,
+therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is,
+it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power
+than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or
+sound.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards
+white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries;
+such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a
+single sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But
+taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a
+distinct sense of touch.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): "There is
+no other besides the five senses."
+
+_I answer that,_ The reason of the distinction and number of the
+senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other
+of the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others
+it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or
+extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have
+ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities,
+according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from
+complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are
+not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there
+are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs;
+on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs,
+that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature
+provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the
+convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the
+natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to
+the intellect.
+
+The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must
+therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and
+_per se._ Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by
+the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation
+is what is _per se_ perceived by the sense, and according to the
+diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified.
+
+Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual.
+Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being
+received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted,
+as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual
+immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received,
+according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as
+the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby
+become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual
+immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is
+effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation
+alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel
+when they undergo alteration.
+
+But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in _sight:_
+while in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural
+immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the
+part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural
+immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of _hearing;_
+for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find
+natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of
+_smelling;_ for in order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a
+measure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation
+takes place in _touch_ and _taste;_ for the hand that touches
+something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the
+humidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and
+hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any
+natural immutation unless indirectly.
+
+Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its
+organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and
+the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and
+then the smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the
+object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior
+to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,
+7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction
+of which we shall speak later on (ad 3, 4). Hence it is that the three
+other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them, to
+obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards
+these two senses.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation
+but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of
+alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the
+senses; because "the senses are affected by the same things whereby
+inanimate bodies are affected," as stated in Phys. vii, 2.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Size, shape, and the like, which are called "common
+sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and "proper
+sensibles," which are the objects of the senses. For the proper
+sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since
+they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles
+are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear
+that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity,
+since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude.
+Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in
+one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local
+distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again,
+according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the
+movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a
+way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate
+subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of
+color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first
+and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as
+the surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental
+sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of
+the senses. For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a
+small surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small,
+and therefore it is divided according to its proper subject.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11),
+the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several
+specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various
+contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one
+another in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so
+that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the
+sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the
+whole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also
+say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus,
+and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of
+touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate
+genus of hot and cold is unnamed.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The sense of taste, according to a saying of the
+Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the
+tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from
+the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one
+sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must
+say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different
+formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only a
+spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is
+its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted
+by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper
+object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: but by
+reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based,
+the flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Interior Senses Are Suitably Distinguished?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably
+distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper.
+Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior
+sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of
+apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the
+proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things;
+for each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem
+to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the
+action of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it
+seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as
+being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other
+senses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior
+power, called the common sense.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin.
+i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first
+sensitive." But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore
+memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from
+the senses.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any
+power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what
+it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that
+"those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge." Therefore much
+less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call
+the "estimative" power, for the perception of intentions which the
+sense does not perceive.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists
+in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the
+reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for
+the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the
+estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative
+is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add
+the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative
+powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made
+distinct from the imagination.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7, 24) describes
+three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the
+sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy;
+and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there
+is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the
+imagination.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior
+sensitive powers; namely, "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and
+the estimative and memorative powers."
+
+_I answer that,_ As nature does not fail in necessary things, there
+must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice
+for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be
+reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse
+powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate
+principle of the soul's operation.
+
+Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal
+should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but
+also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action
+follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something
+absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect
+animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards
+something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the
+sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things,
+when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and
+preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things,
+reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive,
+but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things.
+Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ,
+it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible
+things must be distinct from the power which preserves them.
+
+Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and
+disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no
+need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of
+those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes
+pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs
+to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing
+or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages
+and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a
+wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy:
+and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are
+pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its
+nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the
+exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is
+necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an
+immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the
+perception of those intentions.
+
+Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper
+sense" and the _common sense_ are appointed, and of their distinction
+we shall speak farther on (ad 1, 2). But for the retention and
+preservation of these forms, the "phantasy" or "imagination" is
+appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it
+were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore,
+for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the
+senses, the "estimative" power is appointed: and for the preservation
+thereof, the "memorative" power, which is a storehouse of such-like
+intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of
+memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that
+something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past,
+which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.
+
+Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference
+between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the
+extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above
+intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some
+natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of
+ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the
+natural estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some
+sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also
+called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain
+particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares
+individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares
+universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only
+memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past;
+but also "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a
+recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions.
+Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative,
+a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when
+from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we
+compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen.
+But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in
+whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes
+attribute this action in his book _De sensu et sensibilibus_ (viii).
+So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the
+sensitive part--namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the
+estimative and memorative powers.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The interior sense is called "common" not by
+predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and
+principle of the exterior senses.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by
+discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for
+instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight
+nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between
+two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be
+assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all
+apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again,
+all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees
+that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only
+knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which
+immutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation
+follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As one power arises from the soul by means of another,
+as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 7), so also the soul is the subject
+of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the
+memory are called passions of the "first sensitive."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although the operation of the intellect has its origin
+in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the
+intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like
+manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their
+excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to
+a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so
+to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct
+powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected
+by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear
+that it is common to all interior apprehensions.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 79
+
+OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS
+(In Thirteen Articles)
+
+The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head
+there are thirteen points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?
+
+(2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?
+
+(3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?
+
+(4) Whether it is something in the soul?
+
+(5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?
+
+(6) Whether memory is in the intellect?
+
+(7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?
+
+(8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?
+
+(9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?
+
+(10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?
+
+(11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct
+powers?
+
+(12) Whether "synderesis" is a power of the intellectual part?
+
+(13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Intellect Is a Power of the Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the
+soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the
+same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the
+essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and spirit are not
+relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect
+is the essence of the soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united
+in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the
+appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's
+powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united
+in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence
+and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of
+the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension
+(xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels are
+called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of
+man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is
+immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore
+it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty
+as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).
+
+_I answer that,_ In accordance with what has been already shown (Q.
+54, A. 3; Q. 77, A. 1) it is necessary to say that the intellect is
+a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then
+alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle
+of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is to
+operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone
+His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone
+is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures,
+the intellect is a power.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes
+for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from
+its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual
+soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus
+we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in
+this sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence
+(De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The appetitive and intellectual powers are different
+genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities
+of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the
+intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of
+operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for
+appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the
+will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii,
+9).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the angels there is no other power besides the
+intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this
+reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his
+whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers,
+such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the
+comparison fails.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The immateriality of the created intelligent substance
+is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power
+of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the
+substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Intellect Is a Passive Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power.
+For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the
+intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent
+substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive
+power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have
+said above (Q. 79, A. 6). But "if the intellect is passive, it is
+corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is
+not passive.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine
+(Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all
+the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest
+among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the
+intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to
+understand is in a way to be passive."
+
+_I answer that,_ To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly,
+in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which
+belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper
+inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a
+man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to
+be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken
+away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be
+passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also
+he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly,
+in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact
+that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it
+was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And
+accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to
+be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand
+is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the
+intellect, as we have seen above (Q. 78, A. 1), has an operation
+extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the
+intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the
+nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we
+find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the
+act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the
+Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being
+pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect
+is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can
+be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it
+would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect
+is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very
+existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a
+potentiality to act.
+
+Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a
+potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of
+the heavenly bodies (Q. 58, A. 1). And there is another potentiality
+which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as
+we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the
+angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it
+can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect,
+which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect,
+which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote
+from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with
+regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet
+on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
+4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in
+potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand
+actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a
+way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And
+consequently the intellect is a passive power.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This objection is verified of passion in the first and
+second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense
+passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the
+sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which
+appetite is also called "rational by participation," because it
+"obeys the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive
+intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular
+reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the two first
+senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a
+corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things
+intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the
+"possible" intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the
+third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is
+incorruptible.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and
+the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they
+refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in
+regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is
+active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united
+to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being
+nobler than such an active one.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Is an Active Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as
+the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things
+intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible,
+the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since
+our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that
+we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is
+passive.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something
+active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight,
+inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of
+its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the
+intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into
+act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the
+patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive
+intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature
+suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form
+is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial.
+Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the
+species actually intelligible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in
+every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes
+all things, and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we
+must admit an active intellect.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the opinion of Plato, there is no
+need for an active intellect in order to make things actually
+intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to
+the intellect, as will be explained farther on (A. 4). For Plato
+supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from
+matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is
+actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And
+he called such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of
+which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that
+individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and
+species: and that our intellect was formed by such participation in
+order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But
+since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist
+apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually
+intelligible; it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible
+things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing
+is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as
+the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must
+therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make
+things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from
+material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active
+intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and
+hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear
+that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the
+sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there
+is something active and something passive.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For
+some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors
+actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is
+required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as
+light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is
+required for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible;
+but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the
+Commentator says on _De Anima_ ii. And according to this, Aristotle's
+comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that
+as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing;
+but not for the same reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its
+likeness is received variously into various things, on account of
+their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the
+disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now
+the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we
+consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart
+from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the
+immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for
+the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually
+intelligible by way of abstraction.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Active Intellect Is Something in the Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the active intellect is not something
+in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light
+for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher
+than the soul: according to John 1:9, "He was the true light that
+enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Therefore the active
+intellect is not something in the soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active
+intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not
+understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it
+understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active
+intellect is not something in our soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore,
+the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something
+belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an
+active power: it follows that a man would always be able to
+understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the
+active intellect is not something in our soul.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the
+active intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can
+be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If,
+therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all
+things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible
+for the active intellect to be also something in our soul.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul,
+it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since
+habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the
+passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the
+passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But
+every power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore
+follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul.
+And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from
+some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the active
+intellect is not something in our soul.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it
+is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active
+intellect, "to be in the soul."
+
+_I answer that,_ The active intellect, of which the Philosopher
+speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we
+must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs
+suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power
+of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is
+mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of
+something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul
+is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual
+power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only
+in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by
+arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it
+has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand
+everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it
+passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some
+higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.
+
+Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is
+the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were,
+makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the
+existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be
+necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in
+that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things
+actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things,
+besides the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its
+proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone
+does not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and
+in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower
+things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must
+say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect,
+whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by
+experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from
+their particular conditions, which is to make them actually
+intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some
+principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the
+passive intellect (Q. 76, A. 1). Therefore the power which is the
+principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this
+reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to
+light, which is something received into the air: while Plato compared
+the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius
+says in his commentary on _De Anima_ iii. But the separate intellect,
+according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the
+soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (Q. 90,
+A. 3; I-II, Q. 3, A. 7). Wherefore the human soul derives its
+intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7, "The light of Thy
+countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from
+which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says those words not of the active
+intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said:
+"Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those
+words to the active intellect, then they are said because it is not
+owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we
+do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If the relation of the active intellect to the passive
+were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the
+visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand
+all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes
+all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object,
+rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for
+which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the
+presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers,
+and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing
+understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are
+made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this
+point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is
+something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial,
+but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary,
+phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in
+potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul,
+inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it
+makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions
+of individual matter: which power is called the "active intellect";
+and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the
+"passive intellect" by reason of its being in potentiality to such
+species.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by
+the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives
+from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter,
+flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other
+powers.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Active Intellect Is One in All?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is one active intellect in all.
+For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the
+number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the
+Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in
+the many human bodies, but is one for all men.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal,
+which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is still
+more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts.
+But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all
+agree in one active intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the
+active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the
+various things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is
+not in various men.
+
+_I answer that,_ The truth about this question depends on what we
+have already said (A. 4). For if the active intellect were not
+something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance,
+there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what
+they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if
+the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of
+its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active
+intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the
+number of men, as we have said above (Q. 76, A. 2). For it is
+impossible that one same power belong to various substances.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is
+separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate:
+because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than
+the patient." Now the passive intellect is said to be separate,
+because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same
+sense the active intellect is also called "separate"; but not as a
+separate substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by
+abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the
+same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its
+relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the
+universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And
+this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All things which are of one species enjoy in common the
+action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently
+the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that
+power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible
+principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore
+all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this
+action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need
+for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one
+principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first
+principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato
+compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which
+Aristotle compares to light.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Memory Is in the Intellectual Part of the Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual
+part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to
+the higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not
+"common to man and beast." But memory is common to man and beast,
+for he says (De Trin. xii, 2, 3, 8) that "beasts can sense corporeal
+things through the senses of the body, and commit them to memory."
+Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the
+soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of
+something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a
+thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge
+under the conditions of "here" and "now." But this is not the
+province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is
+not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those
+things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen
+in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact
+that the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect
+in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect
+actually understands all things of which it has the species.
+Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory,
+understanding, and will are one mind."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve
+the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we
+must first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus
+be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was
+impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive
+part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal
+organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual
+apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ,
+nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of
+which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually
+understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to
+understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be
+in our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we
+must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate
+substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow
+again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of
+turning to the active intellect there is formed, according to him, a
+certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active
+intellect; which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According,
+therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the
+intellectual part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would
+not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part.
+
+But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle.
+For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect "is
+identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act,"
+and that "this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then,
+it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and
+discovering." Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing,
+inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To
+the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible
+things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so
+that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in
+a certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of
+understanding--namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual
+knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration.
+
+The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received
+into something is received according to the conditions of the
+recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more
+immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter
+holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does
+something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them,
+much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the
+species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from
+things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus,
+therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species,
+we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion
+of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is
+not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which
+apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies
+being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not
+common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the
+sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul
+united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the
+intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association
+of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
+4) that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but
+the intellect."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The condition of past may be referred to two
+things--namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of
+knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which
+apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present
+sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have
+sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible
+thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental,
+and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the
+intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is
+accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the
+part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be
+understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because
+our soul's act of understanding is an individual act, existing in
+this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or
+yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not incompatible with the
+intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though
+something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above
+of the intellect (Q. 76, A. 1); and therefore, as the intellect
+understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so
+also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual
+act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion
+of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the
+intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood:
+but not in the sense that it understands the past as something "here"
+and "now."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect
+only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in
+potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect
+as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it
+understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a
+middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual
+knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when
+it does not understand in act.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Intellectual Memory Is a Power Distinct from the Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct
+from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul
+memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a
+distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the
+intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the
+sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in
+the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (Q. 78, A.
+4). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the
+intellect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7),
+memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one
+flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect
+were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ From its nature the memory is the treasury or
+storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes
+this to the intellect, as we have said (A. 6, ad 1). Therefore the
+memory is not another power from the intellect.
+
+_I answer that,_ As has been said above (Q. 77, A. 3), the powers of
+the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their
+objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to
+which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said
+above (Q. 59, A. 4) that if any power by its nature be directed to an
+object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will
+not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that
+object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under
+the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of
+black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the
+common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that "in which
+all are in potentiality." Wherefore the passive intellect is not
+differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a
+distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the
+passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active
+power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the
+passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the
+active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a
+being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is
+compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act.
+Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the
+intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that
+memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to
+the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory,
+intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with
+the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if
+we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul,
+whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the
+memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand
+when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection
+which unites the child and its parent." Wherefore it is clear that
+Augustine does not take the above three for three powers; but by
+memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence,
+the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Past and present may differentiate the sensitive
+powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from
+habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to
+a power.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Reason Is Distinct from the Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from
+the intellect. For it is stated in _De Spiritu et Anima_ that "when we
+wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our
+aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect." Therefore the
+reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is
+compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to
+the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason
+and intellect are not the same power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and
+sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man,
+whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense.
+Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the
+intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called
+intellectual.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that
+in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or
+intelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to give it."
+Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power.
+
+_I answer that,_ Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct
+powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their
+respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend
+intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing
+understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And
+therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect
+knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one
+thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental
+discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at
+the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to
+another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore,
+is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition
+to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the
+imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something
+immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human
+reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain
+things simply understood--namely, the first principles; and, again,
+by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the
+light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that
+rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to
+one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a
+thing is moved towards a certain place, and rests in that place. Much
+more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and
+so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That enumeration is made according to the order of
+actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that
+book is not of great authority.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The answer is clear from what we have said. For
+eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus
+Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that they
+cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But
+man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible
+truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of
+knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the
+human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 9]
+
+Whether the Higher and Lower Reason Are Distinct Powers?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are
+distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the
+image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in
+the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the
+higher and lower reason are two powers.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason
+flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the
+higher reason is another power from the lower.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the
+scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary
+things, is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative"
+and "reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And he
+proves this from the principle that for those things which are
+"generically different, generically different parts of the soul are
+ordained." Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as
+corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same
+as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what
+the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the
+higher reason, which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) "is
+intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal"; and
+that what the Philosopher calls the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part
+is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, "is
+intent on the disposal of temporal things." Therefore the higher
+reason is another power than the lower.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion
+rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or
+error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence _mens_ (mind) is
+derived from _metiendo_ (measuring). And therefore the intellect
+regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true
+decision." Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower
+reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may
+understand the higher reason.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher
+and lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore
+they are not two powers.
+
+_I answer that,_ The higher and lower reason, as they are understood
+by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says
+that "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation
+and consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation it
+sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of
+action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent
+on the disposal of temporal things." Now these two--namely, eternal
+and temporal--are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of
+them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we
+come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal,
+according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), "The invisible
+things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that
+are made": while by way of judgment, from eternal things already
+known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things
+eternal we dispose of temporal things.
+
+But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong
+to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to
+the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw
+from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from
+the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another
+science--for example, perspective. But the power of the reason is
+such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the
+reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the
+same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end.
+Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power.
+But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of
+their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is
+attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided.
+And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the
+higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are
+different powers.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or
+to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower
+reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher
+reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher speaks,
+is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found
+even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics
+treat. And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part is more
+limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent.
+Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by
+which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power
+by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the
+same objective aspect--namely, under the aspect of being and truth.
+Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect
+being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which
+it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows
+contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but
+imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do
+not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of
+acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits
+themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts
+of the soul--namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," not
+because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according
+to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the
+variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though
+differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the
+common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which
+they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: That distinction given by Damascene is according to
+the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For
+"opinion" signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side
+of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" or
+"measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain
+principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word
+"mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed
+judgment with approval.
+_______________________
+
+TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 10]
+
+Whether Intelligence Is a Power Distinct from Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than
+the intellect. For we read in _De Spiritu et Anima_ that "when we wish
+to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid,
+then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards
+intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers.
+Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense
+considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another,
+intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason.
+Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from
+intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher
+says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from
+others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
+ii) that "the first movement is called intelligence; but that
+intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that
+which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is
+called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man,
+examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis (that is,
+wisdom), and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly
+internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the
+tongue." Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that
+"intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing
+false." But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect.
+Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect.
+
+_I answer that,_ This word "intelligence" properly signifies the
+intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works
+translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call
+angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that
+such substances are always actually understanding. But in works
+translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds."
+Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from
+power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized
+even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four
+intellects--namely, the "active" and "passive" intellects, the
+intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the
+active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all
+things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of
+these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which
+is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive;
+sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is
+called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act,
+which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or
+actual intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means
+the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as
+act against power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the
+intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also
+says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence
+alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things
+without any investigation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one
+power--namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all
+only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence."
+Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something
+else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when
+it goes on in search of what it "intends," it is called "invention."
+When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what
+it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to
+"phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to the wise man to judge,"
+as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained
+something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the
+means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of
+"interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech." For every
+difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what
+cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above
+(Q. 78, A. 4).
+_______________________
+
+ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 11]
+
+Whether the Speculative and Practical Intellects Are Distinct Powers?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical
+intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are
+different kinds of powers, as is clear from _De Anima_ ii, 3. But
+the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the
+practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct
+powers.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the different nature of the object differentiates
+the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is _truth,_
+and of the practical is _good;_ which differ in nature. Therefore the
+speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is
+compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative
+power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the
+imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above (Q. 78, A.
+4). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the
+practical.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The speculative intellect by extension becomes
+practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into
+another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not
+distinct powers.
+
+_I answer that,_ The speculative and practical intellects are not
+distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above
+(Q. 77, A. 3), what is accidental to the nature of the object of
+a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a
+thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such
+things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing
+apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed
+to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and
+practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which
+directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration
+of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it
+apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De
+Anima iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in
+its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the
+other practical--i.e. operative.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The practical intellect is a motive power, not as
+executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to
+it according to its mode of apprehension.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Truth and good include one another; for truth is
+something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is
+something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as
+the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the
+aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth;
+so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the
+operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect
+knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth
+to operation.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers,
+which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said
+above (A. 7, ad 2; Q. 77, A. 3, ad 4).
+_______________________
+
+TWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 12]
+
+Whether Synderesis Is a Special Power of the Soul Distinct from the
+Others?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power,
+distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one
+division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome
+on Ezech. 1:6, "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the
+concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore
+"synderesis" is a power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But
+"synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because
+"synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites
+to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from
+Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that
+"synderesis" is a power just as sensuality is.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the
+natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of
+virtue, both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call
+synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our
+judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says
+(De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is the same as reason:
+and thus it is a power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2),
+"rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not
+regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis"
+is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power,
+since it is not found in brute animals.
+
+_I answer that,_ "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though
+some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf.
+Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q. 73] said that it is reason
+itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear
+we must observe that, as we have said above (A. 8), man's act of
+reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the
+understanding of certain things--namely, those which are naturally
+known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an
+immovable principle--and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as
+by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things
+which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the
+speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical
+reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed
+on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical
+principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by
+nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which
+is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher
+explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles,
+bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a
+special natural habit, which we call "synderesis." Whence "synderesis"
+is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through
+first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have
+discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power,
+but a natural habit.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety
+of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can
+belong to one power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to
+"syneresis" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different
+species of one genus.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Those unchangeable notions are the first practical
+principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to
+reason as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit. Wherefore
+we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis."
+_______________________
+
+THIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 13]
+
+Whether Conscience Be a Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen
+says [*Commentary on Rom. 2:15] that "conscience is a correcting and
+guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from
+evil and made to cling to good." But in the soul, spirit designates a
+power--either the mind itself, according to the text (Eph. 4:13), "Be
+ye renewed in the spirit of your mind"--or the imagination, whence
+imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
+xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the
+soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some that
+"their mind and conscience are defiled" (Titus 1:15). Therefore it
+seems that conscience is a power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a
+habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always
+exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but
+many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of
+knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot
+be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.
+
+_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an
+act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things
+which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For
+conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the
+relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved
+into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to an individual
+case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some
+act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that
+conscience is an act.
+
+The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to
+conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite,
+and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the
+application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application
+is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have
+done or not done something; "Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast
+often spoken evil of others" (Eccles. 7:23), and according to this,
+conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the
+conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in
+this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way,
+so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or
+ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or
+torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual
+application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking,
+conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act,
+sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural
+habit--namely, "synderesis": thus Jerome calls "synderesis"
+conscience (Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the
+"natural power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22]
+says that it is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for
+causes and effects to be called after one another.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the
+same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the
+mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject,
+but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he is
+defiled.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet
+it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the
+habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless
+have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first
+principles, which is called "synderesis." And for this special
+reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said
+above.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 80
+
+OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL
+(In Two Articles)
+
+Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are
+four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general;
+second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the
+first there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the
+soul?
+
+(2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and
+sensitive as distinct powers?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Appetite Is a Special Power of the Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power
+of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those
+things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But
+appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since "all desire
+good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite
+is not a special power of the soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what
+we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power
+is not distinct from the apprehensive power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each
+power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing--namely its
+own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is
+the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power
+distinct from the others, called the appetitive power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the
+appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii,
+22) distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the
+soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination
+follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to
+rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more
+perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in
+those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the
+form is found to determine each thing only to its own being--that is,
+to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural
+inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things
+which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being
+by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless
+receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives
+the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things
+intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by
+sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in
+a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist,"
+as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
+
+Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a
+higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be
+in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is
+called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to
+the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to
+desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined
+by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive
+power to the soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above
+the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said
+above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular
+power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in
+reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as
+something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable
+or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not
+material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a
+natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the
+natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which
+natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the
+apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to
+this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing;
+but simply as suitable to the animal.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Sensitive and Intellectual Appetites Are Distinct Powers?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual
+appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated
+by accidental differences, as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 3). But
+it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by
+the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and
+intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it
+is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things.
+But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part:
+for since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual
+things, seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual
+thing. Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from
+the sensitive.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is
+subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the
+motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from
+the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a
+like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a
+double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite
+moves the lower.
+
+_I answer that,_ We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a
+distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power
+is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended:
+wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved,
+while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in _De
+Anima_ iii, 10 and _Metaph._ xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things passive and
+movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the
+corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be
+proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive: indeed,
+the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its
+active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the
+intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different;
+consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the
+sensitive.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is not accidental to the thing desired to be
+apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this
+belongs to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the
+appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the
+thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And
+so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of
+the things apprehended, as their proper objects.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual appetite, though it tends to
+individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as
+standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it
+is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred
+can regard a universal, as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the
+same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial
+good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue,
+and suchlike.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 81
+
+OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY
+(In Three Articles)
+
+Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which
+there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?
+
+(2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct
+powers?
+
+(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Sensuality Is Only Appetitive?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive,
+but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the
+sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses
+is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong to the
+apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be
+of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality
+against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge.
+Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place
+of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, the
+serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing
+sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a
+cognitive power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things
+belonging to the body."
+
+_I answer that,_ The name sensuality seems to be taken from the
+sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13),
+just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance,
+sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following
+sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not
+so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the
+operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact
+that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the
+operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he
+who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the
+operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the
+operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement.
+Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the
+appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive
+appetite.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is
+directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to
+understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but
+rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to
+the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended
+through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to
+sensuality as a preamble.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and lower
+reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the
+apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason,
+is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but
+also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is
+signified by the serpent.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Sensitive Appetite Is Divided into the Irascible and
+Concupiscible As Distinct Powers?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided
+into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same
+power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight
+regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima
+ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the
+concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is
+concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and
+concupiscible are the same power in the soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable
+according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible
+power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the
+concupiscible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on
+Matt. 13:33: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible
+power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible
+part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and
+Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive
+appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.
+
+_I answer that,_ The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and
+is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are
+species of the sensitive appetite--the irascible and the
+concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in
+natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to
+the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is
+harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary
+agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is
+suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural
+inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is
+unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but
+also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore,
+since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive
+apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the
+natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive
+powers--one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is
+suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful,
+and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal
+resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm,
+and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is
+something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above
+obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for
+sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the
+inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following
+the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles.
+Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the
+passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on
+being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes
+concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that
+the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the
+concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of
+the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what
+inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason
+all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of
+the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger
+rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy.
+For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things
+concupiscible--namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [*De
+Animal. Histor. viii.].
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable
+and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to
+resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part
+there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do
+not impress the senses, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 2); so also
+in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which
+regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but
+because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the
+irascible power.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite:
+but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong
+to the irascible appetite.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible
+appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are
+parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore
+it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii,
+12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not
+obey reason.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But
+the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according to
+the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting
+against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and
+concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational
+part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive
+part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see
+just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers
+of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupiscible, obey
+reason.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
+part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided
+into concupiscence and anger."
+
+_I answer that,_ In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers
+obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the
+will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the
+reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive
+appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance,
+a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the
+estimative power, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 4), is replaced
+by the cogitative power, which is called by some "the particular
+reason," because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man
+the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason.
+But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved
+according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters
+particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions.
+Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive
+appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this
+appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from
+universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but
+of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are
+said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone
+can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal
+considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.
+
+To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution,
+which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals
+movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites:
+for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it
+has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not
+moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible
+appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the
+superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of
+motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first:
+wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement,
+unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher
+says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower
+appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way,
+therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is
+proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and
+concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the
+part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in
+an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates
+the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the
+appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called
+despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to
+resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since
+they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and
+royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject
+to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their
+own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who
+commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic
+power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the
+sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and
+whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved
+at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible
+and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite
+has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the
+commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved,
+not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the
+cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the
+imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the
+irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we
+sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or
+unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the
+irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not
+conclude that they do not obey.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior
+sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which
+is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and
+apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are
+subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify
+the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the
+phantasms of the imagination.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 82
+
+OF THE WILL
+(In Five Articles)
+
+We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?
+
+(2) Whether it desires everything of necessity?
+
+(3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?
+
+(4) Whether the will moves the intellect?
+
+(5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Will Desires Something of Necessity?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing of
+necessity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything
+is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is
+voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of
+necessity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher
+(Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a
+rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is
+in the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and
+therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But
+we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act
+of the will cannot be necessitated.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire
+happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but
+contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the
+will desires something of necessity.
+
+_I answer that,_ The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For
+that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong
+to it by an intrinsic principle--either material, as when we say that
+everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible--or
+formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a
+triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is "natural" and
+"absolute necessity." In another way, that a thing must be, belongs
+to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or
+the agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not
+to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be
+necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is
+called "necessity of end," and sometimes also "utility." On the part
+of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent,
+so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called "necessity
+of coercion."
+
+Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will.
+For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing.
+But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something.
+Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the
+inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is
+according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is
+impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so
+it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and
+voluntary.
+
+But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot
+be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea,
+arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.
+
+In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will.
+Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to
+the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last
+end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what
+the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing
+naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else
+appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in
+everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of the
+necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away
+the liberty of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally,
+corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles
+than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in
+this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of our
+being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end,
+but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9).
+Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those
+actions of which we are masters.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Will Desires of Necessity, Whatever It Desires?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of
+necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
+that "evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will
+tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as
+the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable
+necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's
+object moves it of necessity.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of
+the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is
+the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will.
+But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of
+necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals
+are moved by things seen." Therefore it seems that whatever is
+apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the
+will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to
+opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all
+things whatsoever it desires.
+
+_I answer that,_ The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it
+desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the
+intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles,
+so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already (A. 1).
+Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary
+connection with the first principles; such as contingent
+propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the
+first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of
+necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary
+connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable
+conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first
+principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when
+once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions
+with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until
+through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such
+connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain
+individual goods which have not a necessary connection with
+happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the
+will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which
+have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things
+man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists.
+Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the
+necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to
+God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will
+of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God,
+just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear
+that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of
+good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is
+not of necessity determined to one.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the
+thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable,
+so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the
+capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its
+capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is
+not of necessity moved by it.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The sensitive power does not compare different things
+with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one
+thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive
+appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that
+compares several things together: therefore from several things the
+intellectual appetite--that is, the will--may be moved; but not of
+necessity from one thing.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Will Is a Higher Power Than the Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the
+intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the
+end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first
+and highest power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress
+from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers
+of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble.
+Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the
+intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than
+the intellect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as
+perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects
+the will--namely, charity--is more noble than the habits which
+perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "If I should
+know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not
+charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will is a higher power than
+the intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the
+higher power than the intellect.
+
+_I answer that,_ The superiority of one thing over another can be
+considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is
+considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself:
+but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If
+therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to
+themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear
+if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object
+of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of
+the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of
+appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the
+intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the
+more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and
+therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of
+the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its
+order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and
+absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by
+comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes
+higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will
+occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of
+the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is
+relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is
+sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though color
+is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above (Q. 16,
+A. 1; Q. 27, A. 4), the action of the intellect consists in
+this--that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who
+understands; while the act of the will consists in this--that the
+will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And
+therefore the Philosopher says in _Metaph._ vi (Did. v, 2) that "good
+and evil," which are objects of the will, "are in things," but "truth
+and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind."
+When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the
+soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such
+a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing
+which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison
+with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the
+love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the
+contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love
+thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one
+thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found
+to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and
+extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something
+true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect
+is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most
+excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is less
+perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act,
+and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely
+and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes
+potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the
+motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes
+the passive; for good which is understood moves the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared with
+what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love
+God.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Will Moves the Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect.
+For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves
+is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine
+says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5).
+But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above
+(A. 3). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except
+perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the
+good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas
+the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved
+by the will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If,
+therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to
+understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of
+the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the
+will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will
+does not move the intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in
+our power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our
+power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the
+will moves the intellect.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an
+end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this
+way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the
+object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said
+to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what
+impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the
+intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De
+Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among
+a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end
+moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe
+this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims
+at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and
+corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the
+preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also,
+who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves
+all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own
+particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in
+general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to
+it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the
+intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent
+moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the
+natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our
+will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as
+apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a
+particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the
+will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of
+its object--that is to say, as appetitive of universal good--and as
+a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If,
+therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another
+according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as
+we have said above (A. 3), the intellect is simply higher and nobler
+than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the
+common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then
+again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under
+the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and
+its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will,
+and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of
+things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of
+being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common
+nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and
+a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its
+object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are
+contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is
+higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily
+understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because
+the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the
+intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth,
+inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as
+it is a desired good.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will
+moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must
+stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement
+of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every
+apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle
+of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher
+than our intellect--namely, God--as also Aristotle says (Eth.
+Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need
+to proceed indefinitely.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 5]
+
+Whether We Should Distinguish Irascible and Concupiscible Parts in
+the Superior Appetite?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and
+concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For
+the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" (to desire),
+and the irascible part from "irasci" (to be angry). But there is a
+concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only
+to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of
+wisdom, of which it is said (Wis. 6:21): "The concupiscence of wisdom
+bringeth to the eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which
+cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual;
+as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome
+commenting on Matt. 13:33 warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the
+irascible part." Therefore we should distinguish irascible and
+concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the
+sensitive.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the
+concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in
+the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but
+intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible
+power to the intellectual part.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul
+has these powers"--namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and
+rational--"before it is united to the body." But no power of the
+sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body
+united, as we have said above (Q. 78, AA. 5, 8). Therefore the
+irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the
+intellectual appetite.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says that
+the irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and
+irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the
+Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is in reason, while
+in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or
+"desire and animus."
+
+_I answer that,_ The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the
+intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said
+above (Q. 59, A. 4; Q. 79, A. 7), a power which is directed to an
+object according to some common notion is not differentiated by
+special differences which are contained under that common notion. For
+instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common
+notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied
+according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power
+regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be
+distinct from a power regarding black as black.
+
+Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of
+good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And
+therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by
+the different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible
+regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to
+the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the
+notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is
+hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of
+good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite,
+there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in
+the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a
+concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are
+the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of
+the senses.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in
+two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions--arising, that is,
+with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly
+understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive
+appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they
+are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and
+thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are
+attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they
+do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is
+called the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The will itself may be said to [be] irascible, as far
+as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion,
+but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may
+be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And
+thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope--that
+is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may
+understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible
+and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the
+body (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time),
+although there is no need to have faith in what that book says.
+Whence the answer to the third objection is clear.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 83
+
+OF FREE-WILL
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four
+points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether man has free-will?
+
+(2) What is free-will--a power, an act, or a habit?
+
+(3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?
+
+(4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or
+distinct?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Man Has Free-Will?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever
+has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for
+it is written (Rom. 7:19): "For the good which I will I do not, but
+the evil which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not
+free-will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or
+not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for
+it is written (Rom. 9:16): "It is not of him that willeth"--namely,
+to will--"nor of him that runneth"--namely, to run. Therefore man has
+not free-will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the
+Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another
+is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. 21:1):
+"The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He
+will He shall turn it" and (Phil. 2:13): "It is God Who worketh in
+you both to will and to accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions.
+But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (Jer.
+10:23): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to
+walk." Therefore man has not free-will.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as
+each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in our
+power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from
+nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end,
+and therefore we are not free in so doing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): "God made man from
+the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the
+gloss adds: "That is of his free-will."
+
+_I answer that,_ Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations,
+commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In
+order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act
+without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all
+things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a
+free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf,
+judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free
+judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural
+instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute
+animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power
+he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this
+judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural
+instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he
+acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to
+various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite
+courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments.
+Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such
+matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not
+determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary
+that man have a free-will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 81, A. 3, ad 2), the
+sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case
+can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore
+the good which man does not when he wishes--namely, "not to desire
+against reason," as Augustine says.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as
+though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but
+because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved
+and helped by God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by
+his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity
+belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of
+itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be
+the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes
+both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He
+does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary
+causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but
+rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates
+in each thing according to its own nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of
+his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The
+choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and
+adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual
+part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore,
+that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the
+intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is
+happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not
+subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (Q.
+82, AA. 1, 2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be
+such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a
+temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by
+corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it
+is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue
+of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because
+from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject
+something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of
+reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (Q. 81, A.
+3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.
+
+The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which
+a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even
+these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such
+qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to
+acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them,
+or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant
+to free-will.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Free-Will Is a Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For
+free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an
+act, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and
+reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to
+a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De
+Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the soul's habit of
+disposing of itself." Therefore it is not a power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But
+free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, by
+abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is
+not a power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of
+a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which
+it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.
+
+_I answer that,_ Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium--i.e. free
+judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of
+speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by
+which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both
+power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge
+and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a
+power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit
+nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.
+First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit;
+for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not
+natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under
+free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we
+have natural habits--for instance, to assent to first principles:
+while those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject
+to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q. 82, AA.
+1, 2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it
+should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit
+is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.
+
+Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason
+of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and
+passions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as
+regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by
+knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we
+know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will
+is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible
+for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act.
+And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power
+which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will
+denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for
+operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of
+free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but
+as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of
+relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit:
+for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by
+the habit he is apt to act well or ill.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin,
+not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as
+regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat
+later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work
+(I-II, Q. 85, seqq.; Q. 109).
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Free-will Is an Appetitive Power?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but
+a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that
+"free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature." But reason
+is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free
+judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore
+free-will is a cognitive power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose.
+But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain
+comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive
+power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice
+is "the desire of those things which are in us." But desire is an act
+of the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is
+that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.
+
+_I answer that,_ The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say
+that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing
+another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature
+of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things
+concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other
+on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive
+power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be
+preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is
+required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel.
+Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice
+belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since
+he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an
+intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being
+an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire
+proceeding from counsel." And the reason of this is because the
+proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such,
+is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since
+good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice
+is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is
+an appetitive power.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and
+in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies
+the rational power.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel.
+Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason;
+secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher
+(Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, we
+desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice
+itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs
+to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the
+appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by
+the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of
+comparison by choosing one in preference to another.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Free-will Is a Power Distinct from the Will?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the
+will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that _thelesis_ is one
+thing and _boulesis_ another. But _thelesis_ is the will, while
+_boulesis_ seems to be the free-will, because _boulesis,_ according to
+him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two
+things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the
+will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is
+the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because
+"the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the
+means to the end" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct
+power from the will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the
+intellect there are two powers--the active and the passive.
+Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must
+be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be
+free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will
+is nothing else than the will.
+
+_I answer that,_ The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the
+apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q. 64, A. 2). Now, as on
+the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and
+reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and
+free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is
+clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For
+the act of _understanding_ implies the simple acceptation of
+something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which
+are known of themselves without any comparison. But to _reason,_
+properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of
+another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions,
+which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of
+the appetite to "will" implies the simple appetite for something:
+wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for
+itself. But to "choose" is to desire something for the sake of
+obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards
+the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles
+are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the
+principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to
+the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is
+evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the
+power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q.
+79, A. 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to
+reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be
+in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and
+to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two
+powers, but one.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: _Boulesis_ is distinct from _thelesis_ on account of a
+distinction, not of powers, but of acts.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Choice and will--that is, the act of willing--are
+different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to
+understand and to reason, as we have said.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the
+will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an
+active and a passive will.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 84
+
+HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS
+BENEATH IT
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the
+intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the
+soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian.
+Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under
+the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat
+of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration
+of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part
+we shall treat now.
+
+In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order:
+First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the
+body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.
+
+The former of these inquiries will be threefold:
+
+(1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it;
+
+(2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself;
+
+(3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.
+
+In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three
+points to be considered:
+
+(1) Through what does the soul know them?
+
+(2) How and in what order does it know them?
+
+(3) What does it know in them?
+
+Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?
+
+(2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any
+species?
+
+(3) If through some species, whether the species of all things
+intelligible are naturally innate in the soul?
+
+(4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain
+separate immaterial forms?
+
+(5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it
+understands?
+
+(6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?
+
+(7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is
+possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms?
+
+(8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle
+in the sensitive powers?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Soul Knows Bodies Through the Intellect?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through
+the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that "bodies cannot
+be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless
+it can be perceived by the senses." He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii,
+24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul
+by their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot
+know bodies through the intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect
+to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the senses,
+understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no
+means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are
+necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable.
+Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the
+intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of
+bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile
+bodies.
+
+_I answer that,_ It should be said in order to elucidate this
+question, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures
+of things, thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And
+because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them
+to be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have
+no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is in a
+continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of
+certitude, for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment
+thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, that "it is not
+possible twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent," as
+the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, Did. iii, 5).
+
+After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our
+knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, besides
+these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate
+from matter and movement, which beings he called species or
+"ideas," by participation of which each one of these singular and
+sensible things is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like.
+Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever
+appertains to the act of the intellect, are not referred to these
+sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate: so
+that according to this the soul does not understand these corporeal
+things, but the separate species thereof.
+
+Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because,
+since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge of
+movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge
+is proper to natural science), and likewise all demonstration through
+moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous,
+when we seek for knowledge of things which are to us manifest, to
+introduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those
+others, since they differ from them essentially: so that granted that
+we have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that
+reason claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things.
+
+Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having
+observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of
+similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of
+necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known.
+Then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the
+intellect under conditions of universality, immateriality, and
+immobility: which is apparent from the very operation of the
+intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal extension, and
+is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action
+corresponds to the mode of the agent's form. Wherefore he concluded
+that the things which we understand must have in themselves an
+existence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility.
+
+But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is
+to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in
+another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one,
+and of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with
+sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible
+form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the
+soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things
+without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving
+gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives
+under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of
+material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver
+according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore,
+that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which
+is immaterial, universal, and necessary.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words of Augustine are to be understood as
+referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its
+object. For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not
+indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species;
+but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the
+soul by their own essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is not
+correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect
+knows only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels
+would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that
+the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the
+higher power; whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent
+manner those things which belong to the lower power.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every movement presupposes something immovable: for
+when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and
+when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved.
+Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves
+immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet
+it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one
+place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an
+immovable science of movable things.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Soul Understands Corporeal Things Through Its Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things
+through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the soul
+"collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in
+the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it gives them something
+of its own substance." But the soul understands bodies by images of
+bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence, which it
+employs for the formation of such images, and from which it forms
+them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that "the
+soul, after a fashion, is everything." Since, therefore, like is known
+by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now
+lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in
+themselves, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all
+corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in
+themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through
+its essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that "the mind
+gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses." But
+the soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore
+it does not know corporeal things through itself.
+
+_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows
+bodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that
+"like is known by like." But they thought that the form of the thing
+known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. The
+Platonists however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having
+observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an
+immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known
+subsist immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers,
+observing that things known are corporeal and material, held that
+things known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them.
+And therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of all
+things, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And
+because the nature of a result is determined by its principles, they
+ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who
+thought fire to be the principle of all, held that the soul had the
+nature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly,
+Empedocles, who held the existence of our four material elements and
+two principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these.
+Consequently, since they held that things exist in the soul
+materially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is
+material, thus failing to discern intellect from sense.
+
+But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material
+principle of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save
+in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in
+potentiality, but only according as it is in act, as is shown
+_Metaph._ ix (Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known
+except through its act. It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to
+the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact
+that it knows all, unless we further admit in the soul natures and
+forms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and
+the like; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i,
+5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the thing known to
+exist materially in the knower, there would be no reason why things
+which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of
+knowledge; why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that
+fire also which is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire.
+
+We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs
+exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of
+this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the
+knower: for we know things even that are external to us. Now by
+matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore
+it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality. And
+consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially,
+have no power of knowledge whatever--such as plants, as the
+Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing
+receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its
+knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not
+only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of
+matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the
+form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to
+material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most
+perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have
+remarked above (Q. 78, A. 3): while among intellects the more perfect
+is the more immaterial.
+
+It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an
+intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence
+must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early
+philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all
+things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material
+things. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all
+things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause.
+God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence:
+but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary
+vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the
+formation of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just
+as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this
+way the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some
+part of the soul be turned into this or that image; but just as we
+say that a body is made into something colored because of its being
+informed with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what
+follows. For he says that the soul "keeps something"--namely, not
+informed with such image--"which is able freely to judge of the
+species of these images": and that this is the "mind" or "intellect."
+And he says that the part which is informed with these
+images--namely, the imagination--is "common to us and beasts."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually
+composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that
+the soul is all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in
+potentiality to all--through the senses, to all things
+sensible--through the intellect, to all things intelligible.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every creature has a finite and determinate essence.
+Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain
+likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in
+common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof,
+because it is determined to a certain species other than the species
+of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness
+of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being the
+universal principle of all.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Soul Understands All Things Through Innate Species?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands all things
+through innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the
+Ascension (xxix in Ev.), that "man has understanding in common with
+the angels." But angels understand all things through innate species:
+wherefore in the book _De Causis_ it is said that "every intelligence
+is full of forms." Therefore the soul also has innate species of
+things, by means of which it understands corporeal things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than
+corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under
+the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the
+intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. And so
+the soul understands corporeal things through innate species.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what
+he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired
+knowledge, answers the truth to every question if put to him in
+orderly fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato,
+concerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of
+things even before we acquire knowledge; which would not be the case
+unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands
+corporeal things through innate species.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says
+(De Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is
+written."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since form is the principle of action, a thing must
+be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is
+to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness,
+then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only
+potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs
+be actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a
+potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is
+reduced from such potentiality to act--through the action of sensible
+objects on his senses, to the act of sensation--by instruction or
+discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that
+the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are
+the principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles of
+understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 4) held that
+the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species,
+but is at first in potentiality to all such species.
+
+But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act
+according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing
+may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold
+that naturally man's intellect is filled with all intelligible
+species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from
+the realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. First,
+because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems
+impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such
+knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for no man
+forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is
+larger than the part, and such like. And especially unreasonable does
+this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united
+to the body, as we have established above ([Q. 76] , A. 1): for it is
+unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally
+hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the
+falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a
+sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that
+sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind can have
+no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had
+innate images of all intelligible things. We must therefore conclude
+that the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels,
+but not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower grades of
+bodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on
+Ascension, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection as
+the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally
+completed by its form, but is in potentiality to forms which it has
+not: whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by
+its form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we
+have said above (Q. 66, A. 2). In the same way the angelic intellect
+is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature;
+whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Primary matter has substantial being through its form,
+consequently it had need to be created under some form: else it would
+not be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in
+potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not
+receive substantial being through the intelligible species; and
+therefore there is no comparison.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed
+from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now by
+such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner.
+Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is
+not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns
+for the first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed
+from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by
+asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of
+what follows by that which preceded.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Intelligible Species Are Derived by the Soul from Certain
+Separate Forms?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species are derived
+by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by
+participation is caused by what is such essentially; for instance,
+that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But
+the intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding,
+participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in
+act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in
+its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual
+soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually
+understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the
+intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused by
+some separate forms.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the
+sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the
+senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object
+which exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible
+species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some
+things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these
+can be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the
+intelligible forms of our intellect are derived from some separate
+substances.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by
+something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in
+potentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be
+caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a
+separate intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we
+actually understand, are caused by some separate substances.
+
+_On the contrary,_ If this were true we should not need the senses in
+order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from
+the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any
+knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have held that the intelligible species of our
+intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And
+this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said (A. 1), held that the
+forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for
+instance, the form of a man which he called _per se_ man, and the
+form or idea of a horse which is called _per se_ horse, and so forth.
+He said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul
+and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge
+thereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that,
+just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone,
+becomes an individuating stone, so our intellect, by participating
+the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation
+of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator,
+just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that
+the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from
+the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible
+species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom.
+And for this reason, as we have said above (A. 1), he referred
+sciences and definitions to those ideas.
+
+But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their
+forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways
+(Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held
+that the intelligible species of all sensible things, instead of
+subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the
+separate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such species
+are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect
+which he called the "active intelligence," from which, according to
+him, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible species
+into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that
+the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain
+separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while
+Avicenna placed them in the "active intelligence." They differ, too,
+in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do
+not remain in our intellect after it has ceased actually to
+understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in
+order to receive them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the
+soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated
+ideas remain immovably in the soul.
+
+But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul
+being united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual
+soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is
+form for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the
+moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary
+to the intellectual soul, for the latter's proper operation which is
+to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the
+body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for
+receiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain
+separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it
+would not need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no
+purpose would it be united to the body.
+
+But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to
+understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the
+consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it
+receives from the separate principles: even this seems an insufficient
+explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul,
+except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists
+expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body:
+and thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except
+for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters
+through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union
+of the soul with the body still remains to be sought.
+
+And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to
+the soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the "active
+intelligence" from which it receives the species: neither is this
+a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to
+understand through species derived from the "active intelligence,"
+it follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one
+of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the
+inclination of its very nature, or through being roused by another
+sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which
+the corresponding sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born
+blind could have knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We
+must therefore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our
+soul understands, are not derived from separate forms.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The intelligible species which are participated by our
+intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle
+which is by its essence intelligible--namely, God. But they proceed
+from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material
+things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
+vii).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Material things, as to the being which they have
+outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually
+intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and
+intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to
+act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is
+a power of the soul, as we have said (Q. 79, A. 4); and not by a
+separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as
+remote cause.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Intellectual Soul Knows Material Things in the Eternal
+Types?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know
+material things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is
+known must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual
+soul of man, in the present state of life, does not know the eternal
+types: for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but
+is "united to God as to the unknown," as Dionysius says (Myst.
+Theolog. i). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal
+types.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 1:20) that "the invisible things
+of God are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made." But among
+the invisible things of God are the eternal types. Therefore the
+eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for
+Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that "ideas are permanent types
+existing in the Divine mind." If therefore we say that the
+intellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come back
+to the opinion of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from
+them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): "If we both see
+that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is
+true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor
+do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth
+which is above our minds." Now the unchangeable truth is contained in
+the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all true
+things in the eternal types.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): "If
+those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was
+true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as
+from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are
+spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be
+careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens."
+Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of
+the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with
+faith, he adopted it: and those thing which he found contrary to
+faith he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above (A. 4), that
+the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and
+these he called ideas, by participation of which he said that our
+intellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by
+participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our intellect,
+by participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since
+it seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves, outside
+the things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held,
+asserting that _per se_ life or _per se_ wisdom are creative
+substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); therefore Augustine
+(QQ. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas defended by Plato, substituted the
+types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to
+which types all things are made in themselves, and are known to the
+human soul.
+
+When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all
+things in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said to
+be known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known;
+as one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In
+this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all
+things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all
+things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types. Secondly,
+one thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of
+knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by
+the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all
+things in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we
+know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is
+nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in
+which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Ps. 4:6,
+7), "Many say: Who showeth us good things?" which question the
+Psalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed
+upon us," as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light
+in us, all things are made known to us.
+
+But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible
+species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us
+to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge
+is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the
+Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas
+sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16):
+"Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all
+things occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able
+to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds
+of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for
+this information from the story of times and places?"
+
+But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their
+"eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as though the eternal
+types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu.
+46)--viz. that "not each and every rational soul can be said to be
+worthy of that vision," namely, of the eternal types, "but only those
+that are holy and pure," such as the souls of the blessed.
+
+From what has been said the objections are easily solved.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Intellectual Knowledge Is Derived from Sensible Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived
+from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we
+cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the
+body." This he proves in two ways. First, because "whatever the
+bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never
+the same cannot be perceived." Secondly, because, "whatever we
+perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be
+present to the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we
+cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the
+sensible object or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be
+perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit." And so
+he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the
+senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. Therefore
+intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16): "We must not
+think that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as though
+the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's
+action; for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that
+which it acts on." Whence he concludes that "the body does not cause
+its image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself."
+Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause.
+But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for we
+understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses.
+Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii,
+15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses.
+
+_I answer that,_ On this point the philosophers held three opinions.
+For Democritus held that "all knowledge is caused by images issuing
+from the bodies we think of and entering into our souls," as
+Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle
+says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is
+caused by a "discharge of images." And the reason for this opinion
+was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not
+distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De
+Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the
+sensible, they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this
+mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression
+Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images.
+
+Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from
+the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a
+corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be
+affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not
+brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by
+separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as
+we have said above (AA. 4 ,5). Moreover he held that sense is a power
+operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a
+spiritual power, affected by the sensible: but the sensible organs
+are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a
+way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible.
+Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where
+he says that the "body feels not, but the soul through the body,
+which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within
+itself what is announced from without." Thus according to Plato,
+neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge,
+nor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these
+rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse
+the intellect to the act of understanding.
+
+Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that
+intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not
+its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to
+feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the "composite." And he
+held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part.
+Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects
+which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the
+"composite," Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the
+operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the
+sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by
+some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every
+operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from _De
+Gener._ i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation
+which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal
+can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to
+cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the
+impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something
+more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the
+patient," as he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that
+the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression
+of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more
+noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have
+spoken above (Q. 79, AA. 3, 4) causes the phantasms received from the
+senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.
+
+According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms,
+intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the
+phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and
+require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it
+cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause
+of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the
+material cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect
+the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active
+intellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth
+of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their
+likeness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual
+but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of
+Plato, the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul
+only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed
+on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same
+argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect must
+be separate, namely, because "the agent is more noble than the
+patient." And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the
+imagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active
+power. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that
+the action of the imagination is an action of the "composite," there
+is no difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the
+organ of the animal, in so far as it is compared to it as a being in
+act to a being in potentiality; even as the object actually colored
+is compared to the pupil which is potentially colored. It may,
+however, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is
+through the agency of the sensible, since "fancy is movement produced
+in accordance with sensation" (De Anima iii, 3), that nevertheless
+there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms
+images of various things, even of things not perceived by the senses.
+And Augustine's words may be taken in this sense.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of
+intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that
+intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Intellect Can Actually Understand Through the
+Intelligible Species of Which It Is Possessed, Without Turning to
+the Phantasms?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can actually understand
+through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without
+turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the
+intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the intellect is
+in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices
+for the intellect to understand actually, without turning to the
+phantasms.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses
+than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can
+actually imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more
+can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms.
+
+Obj. 3: There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the
+imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our
+intellect cannot understand anything actually without turning to the
+phantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal.
+Which is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the
+angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that "the
+soul understands nothing without a phantasm."
+
+_I answer that,_ In the present state of life in which the soul is
+united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to
+understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms.
+First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make
+use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act
+through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were
+not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal
+organ. Now sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the
+sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear
+that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it
+acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already
+acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the
+other powers. For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a
+lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance in a case of frenzy; or
+when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we
+see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which
+he had a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience this of
+himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain
+phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he
+examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is
+that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay
+examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of
+understanding.
+
+Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned
+to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelic
+intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible
+substance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human
+intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing
+in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it
+rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to
+such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from
+corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to
+be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an
+individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any
+material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much
+as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the
+individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for
+the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of
+necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal
+nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our
+intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists say, the
+natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there
+would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever
+it understands.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The species preserved in the passive intellect exist
+there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we
+have said above (Q. 79, A. 6). Wherefore for us to understand
+actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice;
+we need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things
+of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in
+individuals.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual
+thing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness
+of the individual, whereas the intellect does.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms,
+are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are
+phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which
+we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we
+know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other
+incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by
+way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And,
+therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need
+to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of
+the things themselves.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Judgment of the Intellect Is Hindered Through Suspension
+of the Sensitive Powers?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not
+hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does
+not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is
+higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is
+not hindered through suspension of the senses.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during
+sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in _De Somn. et Vigil._ i
+and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep.
+Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through
+suspension of the senses.
+
+_On the contrary,_ What a man does while asleep, against the moral
+law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
+xii, 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had
+free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the
+intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses.
+
+_I answer that,_ As we have said above (A. 7), our intellect's proper
+and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a
+perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all
+that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be
+ignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher
+says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is
+action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived
+principally through the senses"; for the smith does not seek
+knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that
+he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the
+natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and
+of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties
+of those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear
+that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the
+action of the knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher
+cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible
+things. But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we
+know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not
+possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the
+senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellect is superior to the senses,
+nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first
+and principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore
+suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the
+judgment of the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain
+evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in _De
+Somn. et Vigil._ iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of such
+evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the
+amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also
+the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does it happen,
+especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking
+copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms
+appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus it happens in a case
+of fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the
+phantasms will have a certain sequence: thus especially does it
+happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those who are gifted
+with a strong imagination. If the evaporation be very slight, not
+only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common
+sense is partly freed; so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge
+that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things,
+and their images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly
+suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from
+the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore,
+while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination are free, so
+is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely.
+Consequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes up he
+invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 85
+
+OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under
+this head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from
+the phantasms?
+
+(2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are
+what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?
+
+(3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more
+universal?
+
+(4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?
+
+(5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition
+and division?
+
+(6) Whether the intellect can err?
+
+(7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?
+
+(8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the
+divisible?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Our Intellect Understands Corporeal and Material Things by
+Abstraction from Phantasms?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand
+corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For
+the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as
+it really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as
+abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms.
+Therefore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the
+species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, material things are those natural things which
+include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood
+apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material
+things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the
+principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be
+understood by abstraction of the universal from the particular, which
+is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the
+phantasm.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the
+phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. But
+seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by
+color impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act
+of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the
+phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are
+two things in the intellectual soul--the passive intellect and the
+active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to
+abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive
+them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the
+active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to
+color; since light does not abstract anything from color, but rather
+streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction
+from phantasms.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that "the
+intellect understands the species in the phantasm"; and not,
+therefore, by abstraction.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "things
+are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter."
+Therefore material things must needs be understood according as they
+are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely,
+phantasms.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), the object of
+knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are
+three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power,
+namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the
+object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal
+matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality,
+therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge
+of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is
+neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with
+corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose
+cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for
+though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in
+something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the
+human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an
+organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body,
+as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 76, A. 1). And therefore
+it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal
+matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know
+what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to
+abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the
+phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands
+material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through
+material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of
+immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material
+things through the immaterial.
+
+But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect,
+and not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects
+of the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by
+abstraction, but by participating things abstract, as stated above
+(Q. 84, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of
+composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does
+not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly,
+by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand one
+thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to
+abstract one from another things which are not really abstract from
+one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood.
+But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract
+things which are not really abstract from one another, does not
+involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For
+if we understood or said that color is not in a colored body, or that
+it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or
+assertion. But if we consider color and its properties, without
+reference to the apple which is colored; or if we express in word
+what we thus understand, there is no error in such an opinion or
+assertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and therefore
+color can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the
+things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a
+stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the
+individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the
+species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the
+particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is,
+by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual
+qualities represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect
+is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it
+is, that is so, if the word "otherwise" refers to the thing
+understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing
+otherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be false if it
+abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to
+regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it
+is not so, if the word "otherwise" be taken as referring to the one
+who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding,
+in one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in
+existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who
+understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not
+materially, according to the mode of a material thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some have thought that the species of a natural thing
+is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that
+were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural
+things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold,
+common, and "signate" or individual; common, such as flesh and bone;
+and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect
+therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the
+individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter;
+for example, it abstracts the species of man from "this flesh and
+these bones," which do not belong to the species as such, but to the
+individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in
+the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the
+intellect from "flesh and bones."
+
+Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect
+from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common
+matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual
+matter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to
+sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the
+like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity.
+Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other
+sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension,
+and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be
+considered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract
+them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without
+understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for
+that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet
+they can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is
+to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things
+can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as
+"being," "unity," "power," "act," and the like; all these can exist
+without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because
+Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above
+explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated
+to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have
+the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can
+impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are
+images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the
+same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have
+not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive
+intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which
+by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a
+certain likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions
+only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the
+intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm;
+not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is
+subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from
+one place to another.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Not only does the active intellect throw light on
+the phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the
+intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the
+phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater
+power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power
+of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the
+abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the
+active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the
+phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are
+able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into
+our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs
+the passive intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species
+from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things
+in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the
+phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of which it
+abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have
+said above (Q. 84, A. 7).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Intelligible Species Abstracted from the Phantasm Is
+Related to Our Intellect As That Which Is Understood?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted
+from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is
+understood. For the understood in act is in the one who understands:
+since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But
+nothing of what is understood is in the intellect actually
+understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore
+this species is what is actually understood.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what is actually understood must be in something;
+else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the
+soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing
+therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually
+understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else
+than the aforesaid intelligible species.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that "words
+are signs of the passions in the soul." But words signify the things
+understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore
+these passions of the soul--viz. the intelligible species, are what
+is actually understood.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The intelligible species is to the intellect what
+the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not
+what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives.
+Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually
+understood, but that by which the intellect understands.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties
+know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is
+cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to
+this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression,
+namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this
+species is what is understood.
+
+This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because
+the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if
+what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it
+would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects
+outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the
+soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science
+is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [*Q. 84, A.
+1]]. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of
+the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true"
+[*Aristotle, _Metaph._ iii. 5, and that consequently contradictories
+are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression
+only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the
+impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive
+faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every
+judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own
+impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is
+sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste
+perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each
+would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every
+opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.
+
+Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to
+the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus.
+There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which
+remains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and
+another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat
+and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some
+form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something
+external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the
+heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which
+proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the
+object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the
+visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the
+intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands.
+But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it
+understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by
+which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is
+understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the
+object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from
+the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known
+by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself,
+by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we
+take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to
+Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says "that a stone is not in the
+soul, but only the likeness of the stone"; it follows that the soul
+knows external things by means of its intelligible species.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The thing understood is in the intellect by its own
+likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually
+understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing
+understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a
+sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not
+follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually
+understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In these words "the thing actually understood" there
+is a double implication--the thing which is understood, and the fact
+that it is understood. In like manner the words "abstract universal"
+imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or
+universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be
+understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in
+individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as
+universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in
+the senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple apart from its
+smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen
+apart from the smell, it is quite clear that the color which is seen
+is only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell,
+this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight
+receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner
+humanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity be
+apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be
+abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to
+humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the
+intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but
+not of the principles of individuality.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in
+regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes
+place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is
+formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of
+an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these
+operations are found in the intellect. For in the first place there
+is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the
+intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed
+forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a
+word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and
+a proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition. Words
+do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but
+that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging
+of external things.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the More Universal Is First in Our Intellectual Cognition?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in
+our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its
+own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves.
+But universals come first as regards their nature, because "that is
+first which does not involve the existence of its correlative"
+(Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as
+regards our intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to
+us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known
+secondarily by us.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object
+defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition.
+But the more universal is part of the definition of the less
+universal, as "animal" is part of the definition of "man." Therefore
+the universals are secondarily known by us.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But
+universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known
+by us.
+
+_On the contrary,_ "We must proceed from the universal to the
+singular and individual" (Phys. i, 1)
+
+_I answer that,_ In our knowledge there are two things to be
+considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises
+from sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and
+individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for
+its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before
+our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our
+intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of
+actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to
+actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium
+between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect
+act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the
+object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete
+act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly,
+and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known
+partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher
+says (Phys. i, 1), that "what is manifest and certain is known to us
+at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its
+principles and elements." Now it is evident that to know an object
+that comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing
+contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can
+have knowledge not only of the universal whole, which contains parts
+potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be
+known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know
+distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the
+less common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know it as "animal";
+whereas to know "animal" distinctly is know it as "rational" or
+"irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our
+intellect knows "animal" before it knows man; and the same reason
+holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.
+
+Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to
+act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense
+we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both
+to place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar
+off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to
+be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it
+seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time,
+for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes
+this man from that, and therefore "children at first call men fathers,
+and later on distinguish each one from the others" (Phys. i, 1). The
+reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is
+in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as
+he who knows genus is in a state of potentiality as regards
+"difference." Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway
+between potentiality and act.
+
+We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and
+individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal;
+as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both
+sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the
+knowledge of the less common.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The universal can be considered in two ways. First,
+the universal nature may be considered together with the intention
+of universality. And since the intention of universality--viz. the
+relation of one and the same to many--is due to intellectual
+abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary
+consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the "universal
+animal is either nothing or something secondary." But according to
+Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal
+considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter,
+according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent
+universals which he called ideas.
+
+Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself--for
+instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And
+thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of
+generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come
+first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature;
+as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for "the
+animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
+Animal ii, 3). The other order is the order of perfection or of the
+intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is
+naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect:
+thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man
+comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at
+the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The more common universal may be compared to the less
+common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that
+in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less
+universal, but also other things, as in "animal" is contained not
+only "man" but also "horse." As part, considering that the less
+common contains in its idea not only the more common, but also more;
+as "man" contains not only "animal" but also "rational." Therefore
+"animal" in itself comes into our knowledge before "man"; but "man"
+comes before "animal" considered as part of the same idea.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely
+considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known
+before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known.
+Secondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know
+the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we
+know its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are
+known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined
+would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are
+known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to
+distinguish all that belongs to human nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The universal, as understood with the intention of
+universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so
+far as the intention of universality results from the mode of
+understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of
+knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato
+thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and
+substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered,
+according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of
+existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi,
+13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as
+existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a
+formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the
+result of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the
+generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the
+fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken
+from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is
+taken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken
+from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the
+intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature
+is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because
+the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of
+the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of
+any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through
+sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and
+sometimes conversely.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 4]
+
+Whether We Can Understand Many Things at the Same Time?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that we can understand many things at the
+same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of
+before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not
+understand different things in succession, but at the same time.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not
+opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as,
+for instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible
+species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to
+prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different
+intelligible species, and thus it can understand many things at the
+same time.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time,
+such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore
+the intellect understands many things at the same time.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, we cannot know the difference between two things
+unless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the same
+is to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the
+difference and comparison between one thing and another. Therefore
+it knows many things at the same time.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that "understanding is
+of one thing only, knowledge is of many."
+
+_I answer that,_ The intellect can, indeed, understand many things
+as one, but not as many: that is to say by _one_ but not by _many_
+intelligible species. For the mode of every action follows the form
+which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the
+intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the
+same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same time,
+because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever
+things the intellect understands under different species, it does
+not understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it is
+impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same
+time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is
+impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have
+different colors or different shapes. Now all intelligible species
+belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one
+intellectual faculty: although the things which the species represent
+belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and
+the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different
+intelligible species so as actually to understand different things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The intellect is above that time, which is the measure
+of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of
+intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible
+operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this
+vicissitude is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii,
+20, 22), that "God moves the spiritual creature through time."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist
+at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms
+belonging to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one
+another, as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a
+confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known
+through the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In
+another way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its
+species; and so they are not understood at the same time.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: If the intellect sees the difference or comparison
+between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their
+difference or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as
+it knows the parts in the whole.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Our Intellect Understands by Composition and Division?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand by
+composition and division. For composition and division are only of
+many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same
+time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every composition and division implies past,
+present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as
+also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does
+not understand by composition and division.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the intellect understands things by a process of
+assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things,
+for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and
+the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the
+composition be true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore
+the intellect does not act by composition and division.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as
+the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition
+and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions.
+Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division.
+
+_I answer that,_ The human intellect must of necessity understand by
+composition and division. For since the intellect passes from
+potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated,
+which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by
+degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect
+knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends
+something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its
+first and proper object; and then it understands the properties,
+accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it
+necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or
+division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to
+another, which is the process of reasoning.
+
+But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible
+things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the
+angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing
+at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a
+thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division,
+and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition,
+division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic
+intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by
+the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Composition and division of the intellect are made by
+differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things
+by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and
+comparison of things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it
+does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as we
+have said (A. 1; Q. 84, A. 7). And forasmuch as it turns to the
+phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect
+according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode of
+the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds
+to the composition and division of the intellect; but it does not
+exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the
+proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material
+thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the
+imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition.
+First, there is the composition of form with matter; and to this
+corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal
+whole is predicated of its part: for the genus is derived from common
+matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived
+from the form, and the particular from individual matter. The second
+comparison is of accident with subject: and to this real composition
+corresponds that composition of the intellect, whereby accident is
+predicated of subject, as when we say "the man is white."
+Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of
+things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition
+of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the
+above composition of the intellect does not imply that "man" and
+"whiteness" are identical, but the assertion, "the man is white,"
+means that "the man is something having whiteness": and the subject,
+which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is
+the same with the composition of form and matter: for animal
+signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has
+an intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and Socrates that
+which has all these things together with individual matter; and
+according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the
+composition of one thing with another.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Intellect Can Be False?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the
+Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that "truth and falsehood
+are in the mind." But the mind and intellect are the same, as is
+shown above (Q. 79, A. 1). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But
+falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves
+falsehood: for "those err that work evil" (Prov. 14:22). Therefore
+falsehood can be in the intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), that "everyone
+who is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is
+deceived." And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that "the
+intellect is always true."
+
+_I answer that,_ The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect
+with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper
+object, as sight in regard to color; [unless] accidentally through
+some hindrance occurring to the sensile organ--for example, the taste
+of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through
+his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may be
+deceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when,
+for example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas
+in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived
+concerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that
+vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same. The reason of
+this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is _per se_ directed to
+its proper object; and things of this kind are always the same.
+Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own
+proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the intellect
+is the "quiddity" of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking,
+the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it
+may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence
+or quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards
+composition or division, or also in the process of reasoning.
+Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, which are
+understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first
+principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of
+scientific conclusions.
+
+The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity
+of composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the
+intellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the
+part of the composition affecting the definition, when, for instance,
+the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as
+the definition of a circle applied to a triangle; or when a
+definition is false in itself as involving the composition of things
+incompatible; as, for instance, to describe anything as "a rational
+winged animal." Hence as regards simple objects not subject to
+composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we
+understand nothing whatever about them, as is said _Metaph._ ix, Did.
+viii, 10.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect
+in regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to the
+Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the Third
+Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs in the
+practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute
+consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things which
+are known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense are
+to be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite
+conclusion.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 7]
+
+Whether One Person Can Understand One and the Same Thing Better Than
+Another Can?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one person cannot understand one and
+the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83,
+qu. 32), "Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does
+not understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect
+understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore
+there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one
+person understand a thing better than another can."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the intellect is true in its act of understanding.
+But truth, being a certain equality between thought and thing, is not
+subject to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be more or
+less equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less understood.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is in
+man. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if one
+man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not
+belong to the same species.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Experience shows that some understand more
+profoundly than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its
+first principles and ultimate causes understands it better than the
+one who reduces it only to its proximate causes.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing being understood more by one than by another
+may be taken in two senses. First, so that the word "more" be taken as
+determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood;
+and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another,
+because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or
+worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one would not
+understand it, as Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu. 32). In another sense
+the word "more" can be taken as determining the act of understanding
+on the part of him who understands; and so one may understand the same
+thing better than someone else, through having a greater power of
+understanding: just as a man may see a thing better with his bodily
+sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The
+same applies to the intellect in two ways. First, as regards the
+intellect itself, which is more perfect. For it is plain that the
+better the disposition of a body, the better the soul allotted to it;
+which clearly appears in things of different species: and the reason
+thereof is that act and form are received into matter according to
+matter's capacity: thus because some men have bodies of better
+disposition, their souls have a greater power of understanding,
+wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9), that "it is to be observed that
+those who have soft flesh are of apt mind." Secondly, this occurs in
+regard to the lower powers of which the intellect has need in its
+operation: for those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and
+memorative powers are of better disposition, are better disposed to
+understand.
+
+The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above; likewise the
+reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect consists in the
+intellect understanding a thing as it is.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The difference of form which is due only to the
+different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a
+numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms,
+diversified according to the difference of matter.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Intellect Understands the Indivisible Before the
+Divisible?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect understands the
+indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i,
+1) that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and
+elements." But principles are indivisible, and elements are of
+divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the
+divisible.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known
+previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more
+known," as is said _Topic._ vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the
+definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of
+a line; for as Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the
+extremities of which are points"; also unity comes into the
+definition of number, for "number is multitude measured by one," as
+is said _Metaph._ x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands
+the indivisible before the divisible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "Like is known by like." But the indivisible is more
+like to the intellect than is the divisible; because "the intellect
+is simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the
+indivisible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible
+is expressed as a privation." But privation is known secondarily.
+Therefore likewise is the indivisible.
+
+_I answer that,_ The object of our intellect in its present state
+is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the
+phantasms, as above stated (Q. 84, A. 7). And since that which is
+known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper
+object, we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order
+to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the
+indivisible is threefold, as is said _De Anima_ iii, 6. First, the
+continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although
+potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its
+division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge
+is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said above (A. 3).
+Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as
+man's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, the
+indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as
+we have said above (De Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect
+disposes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason of this
+is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the
+intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third kind of
+indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity,
+which cannot be divided either actually or potentially. And this
+indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of
+divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of privation "as
+that which has no parts"; and in like manner the notion of "one" is
+that is "indivisible," as stated in _Metaph._ x, Did. ix, 1. And the
+reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to
+a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and proper
+object of the intellect.
+
+But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate
+indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow
+that a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to
+the Platonists what is first is first participated by things.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and
+elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible
+effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible
+causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always
+depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the
+Philosopher says in the same passage: "Then do we consider that we
+know, when we can resolve principles into their causes."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A point is not included in the definition of a line in
+general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and
+in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid
+defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions a point in
+the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is
+limited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore it is included in
+the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the
+definition of the divisible, but rather conversely.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The likeness through which we understand is the species
+of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on
+account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on
+account of the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would
+perceive hearing rather than color.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 86
+
+WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things.
+Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether it knows singulars?
+
+(2) Whether it knows the infinite?
+
+(3) Whether it knows contingent things?
+
+(4) Whether it knows future things?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Our Intellect Knows Singulars?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For
+whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our
+intellect knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs
+to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows
+this singular, Socrates.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But
+action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows
+the singular.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it
+is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for
+actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an
+inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore,
+can the intellect know it.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that "the
+universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense."
+
+_I answer that,_ Our intellect cannot know the singular in material
+things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the
+principle of singularity in material things is individual matter,
+whereas our intellect, as have said above (Q. 85, A. 1), understands
+by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is
+abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our
+intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as
+it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because,
+as we have said above (Q. 85, A. 7), even after abstracting the
+intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to
+turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said
+_De Anima_ iii, 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly
+through the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular
+represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition
+"Socrates is a man." Wherefore the reply to the first objection is
+clear.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the
+conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is
+said _Ethic._ vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly
+concluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of
+a singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the
+practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the
+particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said _De Anima_
+iii, 11.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not
+as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise
+than immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such
+as the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be
+intelligible.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The higher power can do what the lower power can, but
+in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and
+concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect
+knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the
+universal.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Our Intellect Can Know the Infinite?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite.
+For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God,
+as we have said above (Q. 12, A. 1). Much more, therefore, can our
+intellect know all other infinite things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, our intellect can naturally know genera and
+species. But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in
+number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know
+the infinite.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same
+place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being
+in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in
+the same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the
+same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of
+an infinite number of things.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we
+have said (Q. 76, A. 1), it appears to be an infinite power. But an
+infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our
+intellect can know the infinite.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite,
+considered as such, is unknown."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since a faculty and its object are proportional to
+each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its
+object, which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material
+things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in
+the sense of one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6.
+Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering
+successively one thing after another: because never does our
+intellect understand so many things, that it cannot understand more.
+
+On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite
+either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot
+know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one
+species. But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if
+it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it
+cannot be understood except by a successive consideration of one part
+after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for
+the infinite is that "from which, however much we may take, there
+always remains something to be taken." Thus the infinite could not be
+known actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is
+impossible.
+
+For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite:
+because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration:
+since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said _Ethic._ ii, 1.
+Wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an
+infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered
+the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession
+of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually
+nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only
+potentially as explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 7, A. 1), God is called
+infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in
+material things, the term "infinite" is applied to that which is
+deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas
+matter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material
+infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is
+of Himself known; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble
+intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for
+material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present
+life except through material effects. In the future life this defect
+of intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be
+able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to
+comprehend Him.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted
+from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually
+species of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except
+in a general way and in their universal principles; and this is to
+know them potentially and confusedly.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If two or more bodies were in the same place, there
+would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order
+for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of
+occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into
+our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually
+understood at the same time: and therefore there must be a definite
+and not an infinite number of species in our intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know
+the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not
+terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal,
+which is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is
+not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to
+an infinite number of individuals.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Our Intellect Can Know Contingent Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent
+things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects
+of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but
+necessary things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, "what sometimes is and
+sometimes is not, is measured by time." Now the intellect abstracts
+from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is
+proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be,
+it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ All knowledge is in the intellect. But some
+sciences are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the
+objects of which are human actions subject to free-will; and again,
+the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated
+and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things.
+
+_I answer that,_ Contingent things can be considered in two ways;
+either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity,
+since every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for
+example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the
+relation of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that
+Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for
+contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality
+belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form, because
+whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But
+matter is the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes
+from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover
+it was laid down above (A. 1) that the intellect of itself and
+directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense
+is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the
+intellect, as we have said above (A. 1). Therefore the contingent,
+considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the
+intellect; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent
+things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the
+objects of science in their universal principles, then all science is
+of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus
+some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.
+
+From which the replies to the objections are clear.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Our Intellect Can Know the Future?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For
+our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from
+the "here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it
+can know the present. Therefore it can know the future.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know
+some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect
+is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the
+intellect of its own nature can know the future.
+
+Obj. 3: The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any
+knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows
+by their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can
+the intellect know the future.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 8:6, 7), "There is a great
+affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things
+to come he cannot know by any messenger."
+
+_I answer that,_ We must apply the same distinction to future things,
+as we applied above (A. 3) to contingent things. For future things
+considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect
+knows them by reflection only, as stated above (A. 1). But the
+principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter
+the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science.
+
+Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way,
+we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in
+itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by
+God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events
+is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole
+course of time, as we have said above when treating of God's
+knowledge (Q. 14, A. 13). But forasmuch as it exists in its cause,
+the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such
+as to have a necessary connection with its future result, then the
+future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer
+foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to
+produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the
+future be known more or less conjecturally, according as its cause
+is more or less inclined to produce the effect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn
+from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known,
+according to the order of the effects to the cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit. xii.
+13]), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very
+nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal
+sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the
+knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we
+were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the
+ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by
+its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would
+only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and hence when
+withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future.
+
+But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus,
+but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for
+the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather
+does it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and
+corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human
+intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the
+phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the
+influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the
+future known to the demons, as explained above (Q. 57, A. 3). The
+soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of
+spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then
+nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions.
+The same may also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is
+clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in
+consequence of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal
+organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination
+to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future
+events, the imagination receives certain images of some such events.
+These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in
+the daytime and while we are awake, because, as stated in _De Somn.
+et Vigil._ ii [*De Divinat. per somn. ii], "impressions made by day
+are evanescent. The night air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence
+bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements
+are felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements produce in the
+imagination images from which the future may be foreseen."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Brute animals have no power above the imagination
+wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their
+imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies.
+Thus from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain
+and the like, may be known rather than from human movements directed
+by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), that "some
+who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence
+is not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all
+anxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 87
+
+HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and
+all within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?
+
+(2) Whether it knows its own habits?
+
+(3) How does the intellect know its own act?
+
+(4) How does it know the act of the will?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself by Its Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by
+its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the mind
+knows itself, because it is incorporeal."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of
+intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own
+essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that
+which is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human
+mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above
+(Q. 76, A. 1). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in
+the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by
+its own essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect
+understands itself in the same way as it understands other things."
+But it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their
+similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own
+essence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and
+not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for
+a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as
+it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the
+eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored.
+In like manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows
+material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does
+not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated
+Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by
+their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence.
+
+Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is
+simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own
+Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence
+belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as _act,_ but
+not as a _pure act,_ nor as a _complete act,_ and hence the angel's
+act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an
+angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot
+understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things
+other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is
+only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as
+primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and
+hence it is called "possible" [*Possibilis--elsewhere in this
+translation rendered "passive"--Ed.]. Therefore in its essence the
+human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the
+power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made
+actual. For even the Platonists asserted that an order of
+intelligible beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch
+as the intellect understands only by participation of the
+intelligible; for they said that the participator is below what it
+participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists
+held, became actual by participating separate intelligible forms, it
+would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings.
+But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things
+for its proper natural object, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), it
+understands itself according as it is made actual by the species
+abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active
+intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things
+themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive
+intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence,
+but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place,
+singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an
+intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the
+second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the
+human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true,
+however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we
+know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation
+of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the
+types of all things as above stated (Q. 84, A. 5). Hence Augustine
+says (De Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can
+as perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but
+what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types." There is,
+however, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it
+consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the
+first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it
+perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own
+presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the mere
+presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required
+a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the soul's
+nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x,
+9), concerning such mental inquiry: "Let the mind strive not to see
+itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present"--i.e.
+to know how it differs from other things; which is to know its
+essence and nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at
+length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own
+act: because it is itself that it knows, since it loves itself, as he
+says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in
+two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except
+itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is
+not accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas
+substance is visible by its accident.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of
+intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing
+understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself:
+not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to
+intelligible things--as is the passive intellect--or is the act of
+intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms--as is the active
+intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in
+every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act,
+by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act,
+so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by
+reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of
+the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by
+the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the
+same species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without
+matter the intellect and what is understood are the same," is equal
+to saying that "as regards things actually understood the intellect
+and what is understood are the same." For a thing is actually
+understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn:
+since the essences of some things are immaterial--as the separate
+substances called angels, each of which is understood and
+understands, whereas there are other things whose essences are not
+wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence
+the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is
+true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified
+in their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already
+stated (Reply Obj. 2).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Our Intellect Knows the Habits of the Soul by Their Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the
+soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith
+is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may
+be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most
+certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence";
+and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul.
+Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by
+themselves.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by their
+likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be
+known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their
+essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by
+their essence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is
+still more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things to
+be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul
+in themselves.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But
+as is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior
+to powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and
+thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.
+
+_I answer that,_ A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and
+mere act. Now, it has been said (A. 1) that nothing is known but as
+it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect
+act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known
+only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from
+the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may
+inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act.
+The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being
+present, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it
+is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a
+careful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind (A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although faith is not known by external movement of
+the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the
+interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless
+he knows that he believes.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object
+since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the
+nature of a material thing as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), but as that
+by which it understands.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing being
+such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same
+order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may
+say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life
+is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders
+the axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by
+medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than
+health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas
+medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two things
+belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the
+one which is the cause of the other being known, is the more known,
+as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does
+not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are things known
+on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on
+account of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and
+therefore the argument does not prove.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Our Intellect Knows Its Own Act?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not know its own
+act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the
+act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know
+its own act.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then,
+the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again
+it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely,
+which seems impossible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as
+sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act,
+for this belongs to the common sense, as stated _De Anima_ iii, 2.
+Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand
+that I understand."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2) a thing is intelligible
+according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the
+intellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act
+tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work
+accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but
+it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said
+_Metaph._ ix, Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of
+the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in
+different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect,
+namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in
+God the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of
+His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act
+of understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which
+is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above (Q. 79,
+A. 1), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence.
+Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act
+whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he
+understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same
+act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection
+of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with
+its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the
+human intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor
+is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for
+this object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that
+which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this
+kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that
+object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known,
+the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason
+did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and
+acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The object of the intellect is something universal,
+namely, _being_ and _the true,_ in which the act also of
+understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand
+its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our
+intellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything
+true, but _being_ and _true,_ as considered in material things, as
+we have said above (Q. 84, A. 7), from which it acquires knowledge
+of all other things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the
+act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the
+nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood
+by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one
+act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is
+distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a
+stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being
+thus potentially infinite, as explained above (Q. 86, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in
+the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material
+object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another,
+and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common
+sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of
+understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there
+is no comparison.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Intellect Understands the Act of the Will?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand the
+act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be
+in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not
+in the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct.
+Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object
+of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore
+the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the
+intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the
+intellect.
+
+Obj. 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that
+"they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their
+presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not
+seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but
+either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof.
+Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such
+affections of the soul as the acts of the will.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand
+that I will."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 59, A. 1), the act of the will
+is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just
+as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural
+form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its
+mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a
+natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible
+appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the
+intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the
+intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper
+subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii,
+9)--that "the will is in the reason." Now whatever is intelligibly in
+an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the
+act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one
+knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this
+act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit
+or power.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold good if the will and the
+intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers;
+for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But
+as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one
+is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is
+in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The "good" and the "true" which are the objects of the
+will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in
+the other, as we have said above (Q. 82, A. 4, ad 1; Q. 16, A. 4, ad
+1); for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects
+of the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can
+fall under the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by
+similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject,
+as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which
+contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that
+the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 88
+
+HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself,
+viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand
+the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?
+
+(2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of
+material things?
+
+(3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 88, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Human Soul in the Present State of Life Can Understand
+Immaterial Substances in Themselves?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul in the present state of
+life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine
+(De Trin. ix, 3) says: "As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of
+corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from
+itself the knowledge of incorporeal things." But these are the
+immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial
+substances.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more
+akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature is
+immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 76, A. 1).
+Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it able
+to understand immaterial things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most
+sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted by
+their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a
+corrupting influence from its object, as is stated _De Anima_ iii, 4.
+Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of
+intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material
+things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them
+actually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear
+that those substances are more intelligible in themselves whose
+nature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than
+are material things.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that "nature would
+be frustrated in its end" were we unable to understand abstract
+substances, "because it would have made what in itself is naturally
+intelligible not to be understood at all." But in nature nothing is
+idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be
+understood by us.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the
+intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether
+superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our
+intellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the
+superior and immaterial.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 9:16): "The things that are in
+heaven, who shall search out?" But these substances are said to be in
+heaven, according to Matt. 18:10, "Their angels in heaven," etc.
+Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human
+investigation.
+
+_I answer that,_ In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are
+not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first
+of all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he
+called "Ideas," are the proper objects of our intellect, and thus
+first and _per se_ understood by us; and, further, that material
+objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are
+mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the
+more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial
+things.
+
+But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our
+intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to
+the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand
+by turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (Q. 84, A. 7).
+Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall
+under sense and imagination, cannot first and _per se_ be known by us,
+according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have.
+
+Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this
+present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate
+substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance,
+which he calls the "active intellect," and which, being a separate
+substance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence,
+when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to
+understand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate
+substances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive
+intellect united to us, we can understand material things. Now he
+said that the active intellect is united to us, thus. For since we
+understand by means of both the active intellect and intelligible
+objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles
+understood; it is clear that the active intellect must be compared to
+the objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the
+instrument, or as form to matter. For an action is ascribed to two
+principles in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an
+instrument, as cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its
+subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active
+intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is
+to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now a subject is
+made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as
+the reception of what is actually visible synchronizes with the
+reception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect
+receives the intelligible object and the active intellect together;
+and the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much the
+nearer do we come to the point of perfect union between ourselves and
+the active intellect; so much so that when we understand all the
+intelligible objects, the active intellect becomes one with us, and
+by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and
+immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist.
+Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether the
+passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate
+substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect, as he
+himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive
+intellect can never understand separate substances (because according
+to him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by
+means of the active intellect.
+
+This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active
+intellect to be a separate substance, we could not formally understand
+by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action
+consists in its form and act, since every agent acts according to its
+actuality, as was said of the passive intellect (Q. 70, A. 1).
+Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation,
+the active intellect, supposing it to be a separate substance, would
+not be joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as
+participated in things understood; and would not extend to the other
+acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand
+immaterial substances; just as when we see colors set off by the sun,
+we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the
+sun, but its light only is united to us, that we may see the colors.
+Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above
+explained, the active intellect were united to us in substance, still
+it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard to one
+intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all intelligible
+objects. But all such objects together do not equal the force of the
+active intellect, as it is a much greater thing to understand separate
+substances than to understand all material things. Hence it clearly
+follows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the
+active intellect to be so united to us as to enable us by its
+instrumentality to understand separate substances.
+
+Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for
+anyone in this world to understand all material things: and thus no
+one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against
+what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a "kind of
+common good, communicable to all capable of virtue." Further, it is
+unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of
+the species.
+
+Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that
+happiness is "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and after
+enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i,
+7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest
+things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which
+in the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative
+sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man
+in the knowledge of separate substances, obtainable by speculative
+science; and not by being united to the active intellect as some
+imagined.
+
+Sixthly, as was shown above (Q. 79, A. 4), the active intellect is
+not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself
+actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends
+receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive
+intellect is "all things potentially," and the active intellect is
+"all things in act." Therefore both intellects, according to the
+present state of life, extend to material things only, which are made
+actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in
+the passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot
+understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by
+the passive or by the active intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of
+incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This
+is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning
+the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances. For
+by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal
+substances, such as is within its compass; not that the knowledge of
+itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of
+knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true--that the
+soul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But
+knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the
+knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in
+the present state of life, is such that it can be informed with
+similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows
+material things rather than immaterial substances.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There must needs be some proportion between the object
+and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive,
+and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of
+great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the
+fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being
+improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that
+immaterial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our
+present state of life, so that it cannot understand them.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways.
+First, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it
+does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for
+they are understood by themselves, and by one another.
+
+Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate
+substances: while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails
+to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial
+substances are purposeless, even if they are not understood by us
+at all.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in
+the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do
+not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way.
+The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which is
+impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of
+what is immaterial.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 88, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Our Intellect Can Understand Immaterial Substances Through Its
+Knowledge of Material Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial
+substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius
+says (Coel. Hier. i) that "the human mind cannot be raised up to
+immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is
+led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature."
+Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial
+substances.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are
+sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene
+defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of
+both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can
+be understood by us.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial
+substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which
+it understands material things. Therefore also other material
+substances can be understood by us, through their material effects.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through
+its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and this
+belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances
+can be understood by us through material things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "intelligible
+things cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite
+things through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal."
+
+_I answer that,_ Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher
+named Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught
+that by the understanding of natural substances we can be led,
+according to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of
+immaterial substances. For since the nature of our intellect is to
+abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, anything
+material residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made
+subject to abstraction; and as the process of abstraction cannot go
+on forever, it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity,
+absolutely without matter; and this would be the understanding of
+immaterial substance.
+
+Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms
+and species of these material things; as the Platonists supposed.
+But supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ
+altogether from the quiddity of material things, it follows that
+however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things
+from matter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial
+substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand
+immaterial substances through material substances.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: From material things we can rise to some kind of
+knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge
+thereof; for there is no proper and adequate proportion between
+material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from
+material things for the understanding of immaterial things are
+very dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Science treats of higher things principally by way of
+negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies
+by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows
+that much less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a way
+as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific
+knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to
+material things.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The human soul understands itself through its own act
+of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power
+and nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot
+be perfectly known through such act, nor through any other material
+thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and the
+power of the former.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Created immaterial substances are not in the same
+natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power
+or in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even
+immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their
+essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection
+with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical
+genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 5).
+Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know
+something positive concerning the angels, according to some common
+notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we
+cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 88, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Is the First Object Known by the Human Mind?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God is the first object known by the
+human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by
+which we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to
+the eye, and first principles to the intellect. But we know all things
+in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as
+Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi); [*Confess. xii,
+25]. Therefore God is the first object known to us.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But
+God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is "the true light
+which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" (John 1:9).
+Therefore God is our first and most known object.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to
+which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine
+says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to
+our mind.
+
+_On the contrary,_ "No man hath seen God at any time" (John 1:18).
+
+_I answer that,_ Since the human intellect in the present state of
+life cannot understand even immaterial created substances (A. 1),
+much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance.
+Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first object of our
+knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the
+Apostle (Rom. 1:20), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen,
+being understood by the things that are made": while the first object
+of our knowledge in this life is the "quiddity of a material thing,"
+which is the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many
+passages (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 8; Q. 87, A. 2, ad 2)
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We see and judge of all things in the light of the
+first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether
+natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the
+first truth upon it, as stated above (Q. 12, A. 2). Hence, as the
+light itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, much
+less can it be said that God is the first object known by our
+intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The axiom, "Whatever causes a thing to be such is more
+so," must be understood of things belonging to one and the same
+order, as explained above (Q. 81, A. 2, ad 3). Other things than God
+are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object,
+but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God,
+as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know
+God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the
+argument does not prove.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 89
+
+OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this
+head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?
+
+(2) Whether it understands separate substances?
+
+(3) Whether it understands all natural things?
+
+(4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?
+
+(5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?
+
+(6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?
+
+(7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge?
+
+(8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Separated Soul Can Understand Anything?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul separated from the body can
+understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4)
+that "the understanding is corrupted together with its interior
+principle." But by death all human interior principles are corrupted.
+Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when
+the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained
+above (Q. 84, AA. 7,8). But death destroys the senses and
+imagination, as we have shown above (Q. 77, A. 8). Therefore after
+death the soul understands nothing.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be
+by means of some species. But it does not understand by means of
+innate species, because it has none such; being at first "like a
+tablet on which nothing is written": nor does it understand by
+species abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs
+of sense and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of
+species: nor does it understand by means of species, formerly
+abstracted and retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child's
+soul would have no means of understanding at all: nor does it
+understand by means of intelligible species divinely infused, for
+such knowledge would not be natural, such as we treat of now, but the
+effect of grace. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands
+nothing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), "If the soul
+had no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body."
+But the soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper
+operation and above all, that which consists in intelligence.
+Therefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body.
+
+_I answer that,_ The difficulty in solving this question arises from
+the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by
+turning to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed
+from the soul's very nature, but accidentally through its being bound
+up with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would
+vanish; for in that case when the body was once removed, the soul
+would at once return to its own nature, and would understand
+intelligible things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is
+exemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case,
+however, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul's good,
+for evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it;
+but for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since
+matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for the sake
+of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it
+to understand by turning to the phantasms, it will seem, since death
+does not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand
+nothing; as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn.
+
+To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except
+so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from
+its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the
+body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the
+same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an
+accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very
+nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it
+is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper
+place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to
+the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of
+understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in
+corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a
+mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as
+is proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the
+soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be
+joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in
+accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning
+to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to the
+body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable
+to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is
+always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand
+by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the
+phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the
+nobler way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it
+would not have needed the body for that purpose.
+
+In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is
+true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something
+higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a
+mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible
+to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual
+substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine
+light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther
+off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the
+more is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines
+radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one
+Essence understands all things; while the superior intellectual
+substances understand by means of a number of species, which
+nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper
+comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the
+intellectual power of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual
+natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal,
+and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they
+recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If,
+therefore, the inferior substances received species in the same degree
+of universality as the superior substances, since they are not so
+strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through
+them would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can
+see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker
+intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal
+conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things
+are explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in
+the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual
+substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades
+of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the
+same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge,
+so far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to
+make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper
+knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be
+joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate
+knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus
+we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by
+sensible examples.
+
+It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united
+to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms.
+Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and
+also to understand in another way.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher's words carefully examined will show
+that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is a
+movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had
+not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We
+may also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by
+turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of the second
+objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The separated soul does not understand by way of
+innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species
+retained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state
+understands by means of participated species arising from the
+influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other
+separate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it
+ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at
+once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural,
+for God is the author of the influx of both of the light of grace
+and of the light of nature.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Separated Soul Understands Separate Substances?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not
+understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when
+joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an
+essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more
+perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does
+not understand separate substances as shown above (Q. 88, A. 1).
+Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or
+by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul
+by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by
+means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel
+is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at
+all understand separate substances.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness
+of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If,
+therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its
+happiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot be
+reasonably be said.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Souls apart from the body know other separated
+souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus
+and Abraham (Luke 16:23). Therefore separated souls see the devils
+and the angels.
+
+_I answer that,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires
+the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"--i.e. by knowing
+itself (Q. 88, A. 1, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the
+separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other
+separate things. Now it was said above (A. 1), that as long as it is
+united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and
+therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming
+actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms;
+for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above
+(Q. 87, A. 1). When, however, it is separated from the body, it
+understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to
+simply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands
+itself through itself. Now, every separate substance "understands
+what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode
+of its substance" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood
+according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in
+another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode
+of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but
+is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul
+apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls,
+but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far
+as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is
+otherwise.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering
+its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but
+it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care
+of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the
+present life.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The separated soul understands the angels by means of
+divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect
+knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to
+that of an angel.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge
+of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen
+only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if
+perfectly understood gives great happiness--not final and ultimate
+happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly,
+as was shown above in this article.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Separated Soul Knows All Natural Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural
+things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate
+substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances,
+they also know all natural things.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will
+be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the
+separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the
+highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it
+understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of
+intelligibility.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The devils have greater natural knowledge than the
+separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to
+learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono
+i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the separated soul, like the
+angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence
+of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior
+to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul
+apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect
+knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge.
+Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such
+species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the
+angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such
+species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has
+produced in the respective natures of natural things has been
+produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen.
+ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated souls know all
+natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a
+general and confused manner.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Even an angel does not understand all natural things
+through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above
+(Q. 87, A. 1). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural
+things because it knows separate substances after a fashion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly
+understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural
+things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in
+this article.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which
+neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far
+as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine
+revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural
+things.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect;
+the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow
+that to study in order to learn is useless.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Separated Soul Knows Singulars?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not know
+singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in
+the separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 77,
+A. 8). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (Q.
+86, A. 1). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate
+than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no
+determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore
+much less can it know singulars.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the
+same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all
+singulars. Therefore it knows none.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The rich man in hell said: "I have five brethren"
+(Luke 16:28).
+
+_I answer that,_ Separated souls know some singulars, but not all,
+not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider
+that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of
+abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be
+directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above
+(Q. 86, A. 1). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of
+species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to
+know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular,
+by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles
+(Q. 14, A. 2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by
+species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine
+Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated
+souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a
+perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated souls have
+only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their
+perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific
+natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species;
+whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to
+which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by
+some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the
+Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is
+conditioned according to the mode of the recipient.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The intellect does not know the singular by way of
+abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as
+explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to
+those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of
+determinate relation, as we have said.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The separated soul has not the same relation to all
+singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore
+there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Habit of Knowledge Here Acquired Remains in the Separated
+Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in
+this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for
+the Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" (1 Cor. 13:8).
+
+Obj. 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge
+denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of
+knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some
+who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are
+better; which seems unreasonable.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence
+of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here
+acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two
+forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which
+cannot be.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4, 5), that "a
+habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is
+destroyed by sickness or the like." But in this life there is no
+change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of
+knowledge is destroyed by death.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn
+on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven."
+
+_I answer that,_ Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in
+the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the
+imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible
+species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it
+would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here
+acquired would also be entirely destroyed.
+
+But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode
+of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of
+knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive
+powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering
+the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the
+actions whereby they are acquired" (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of
+the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by
+the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers.
+Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain
+facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid
+sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action
+of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible
+object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in
+the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively
+in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to
+habit.
+
+Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in
+the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers;
+but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain;
+because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form
+may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its
+contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its
+subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not
+corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an
+incorruptible faculty, as above stated (Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Neither
+can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted
+by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible
+"intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a
+thing is." But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards
+mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what
+is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus
+knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument
+seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the
+Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge
+is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part of the
+memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false argument.
+But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must
+conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the
+intellect, remains in the separated soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit,
+but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the
+assertion quoted, "Now, I know in part."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily
+stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the
+future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however,
+cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better
+man.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same
+species, so there is no impossibility.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on
+the part of the sensitive powers.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Act of Knowledge Acquired Here Remains in the Separated
+Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired
+does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De
+Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither
+remembers nor loves." But to consider what is previously known is an
+act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of
+knowledge here acquired.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in
+the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But
+in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without
+turning to phantasms, as shown above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore the
+separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by
+intelligible species acquired in this life.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits
+produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But the
+habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning
+to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts,
+however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in
+the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired
+in this life.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It was said to Dives in hell (Luke 16:25):
+"Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime."
+
+_I answer that,_ Action offers two things for our consideration--its
+species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the
+faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which
+is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the
+power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the
+species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due
+to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species
+remain in the separated soul, as stated above (A. 5), and since the
+state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it
+follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life
+the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood
+formerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by
+a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of
+knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a
+different way.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as
+memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way
+to the intellect, as explained above (Q. 79, A. 6).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The different mode of intelligence is produced by the
+different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused
+by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just
+things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of
+political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic.
+v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Local Distance Impedes the Knowledge in the Separated Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that local distance impedes the separated
+soul's knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that
+"the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here."
+But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance
+impedes the knowledge in the separated soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the
+demons' rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to
+us." But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless
+their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a
+much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose
+nature is inferior to the demon's.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance
+of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated
+soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that
+distance of place also impedes its knowledge.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 16:23), that Dives, "lifting
+up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore
+local distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have held that the separated soul knows the
+singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might
+be that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the
+sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the
+sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be
+necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the
+species from the sensible is done through the senses and other
+sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart
+from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by
+species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what
+is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not
+hindered by local distance.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot
+see what is done here, not because they are "there," as if impeded by
+local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain (A. 8).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion
+that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have
+sensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he
+expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of
+narration than of assertion, as we may gather from _De Civ. Dei_ xxi,
+10.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The future, which is distant in time, does not actually
+exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a
+thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being
+knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is
+knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to
+distance of place.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Separated Souls Know What Takes Place on Earth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that separated souls know what takes place
+on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have,
+according to what Dives said (Luke 16:27, 28), "I have five brethren
+. . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of
+torments." Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or
+awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared to
+Saul (1 Kings 28:11). But this could not be unless they knew what
+takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves.
+If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be
+by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false (A. 7).
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 14:21): "He will not understand
+whether his children come to honor or dishonor."
+
+_I answer that,_ By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now,
+the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows
+from what has been laid down (A. 4), since the separated soul has
+knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either
+by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine
+order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the
+living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst
+they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and
+hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory
+gives the reason thus: "The dead do not know how the living act, for
+the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as
+corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are
+distinct in knowledge" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same
+(De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, "the souls of the
+dead have no concern in the affairs of the living."
+
+Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as
+regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the
+passage above quoted: "The case of the holy souls is different, for
+since they see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that
+external things are unknown to them." But Augustine (De Cura pro
+Mort. xiii) expressly says: "The dead, even the saints do not know
+what is done by the living or by their own children," as a gloss
+quotes on the text, "Abraham hath not known us" (Isa. 63:16). He
+confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled
+in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not
+think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and
+again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he
+should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions (4 Kings
+22:20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, "Let every
+one take, as he pleases, what I say." Gregory, on the other hand, is
+positive, since he says, "We cannot believe." His opinion, indeed,
+seems to be the more probable one--that the souls of the blessed who
+see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the
+angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among
+those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most
+perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow,
+nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with
+Divine justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The souls of the departed may care for the living, even
+if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring
+forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state.
+Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not
+immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and
+demons, or even by "the revelation of the Holy Ghost," as Augustine
+says in the same book.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever
+is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls
+of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living--and this is to be
+accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the
+instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the
+departed; as may likewise happen when the living appear, without
+their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says in the same
+book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine
+revelation; according to Ecclus. 46:23, "he slept, and told the king
+the end of his life." Or, again, this apparition was procured by the
+demons; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside
+through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the
+obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 90
+
+OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL
+(In Four Articles)
+
+After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man,
+concerning which there are four subjects of treatment:
+
+(1) the production of man himself;
+
+(2) the end of this production;
+
+(3) the state and condition of the first man;
+
+(4) the place of his abode.
+
+Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be
+considered:
+
+(1) the production of man's soul;
+
+(2) the production of man's body;
+
+(3) the production of the woman.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of the Divine
+substance?
+
+(2) Whether, if made, it was created?
+
+(3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?
+
+(4) Whether it was made before the body?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Soul Was Made or Was of God's Substance?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's
+substance. For it is written (Gen. 2:7): "God formed man of the slime
+of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man
+was made a living soul." But he who breathes sends forth something of
+himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine
+substance.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 5), the soul is a
+simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act;
+which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's substance.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, things that exist and do [not] differ are the same.
+But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only
+be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be
+composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions
+certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse,
+and contrary to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the
+opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself."
+
+_I answer that,_ To say that the soul is of the Divine substance
+involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has
+been said (Q. 77, A. 2; Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6), the human soul
+is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence
+--acquires its knowledge somehow from things--and thus has various
+powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which
+is a pure act--receives nothing from any other--and admits of no
+variety in itself, as we have proved (Q. 3, AA. 1, 7; Q. 9, A. 1).
+
+This error seems to have originated from two statements of the
+ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things,
+being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing
+but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which
+they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they
+held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they
+regarded as the first principle, as is stated _De Anima_ i, 2, it
+followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According
+to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was
+corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up
+with the body.
+
+Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the
+existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the
+form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the
+world by movement and reason," as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii,
+6 [*The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.]). So some supposed
+man's soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole
+world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the
+different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the
+distinction of bodies.
+
+But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (Q. 3, AA. 1,
+8; and Q. 75, A. 1), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is
+of the substance of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material
+sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe (spirare), is the
+same as to _make a spirit._ Moreover, in the material sense, man by
+breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an
+extraneous thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet
+it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as
+above explained (Q. 75, A. 5, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act
+like God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That which differs, properly speaking, differs in
+something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also
+resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be
+compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble
+each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet
+all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are
+diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which
+enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ
+by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that
+these again differ by some further difference.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Soul Was Produced by Creation?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not produced by
+creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced
+from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure
+act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not
+created.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the
+potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to
+act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the
+act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore
+the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is
+created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come
+into existence by generation; which is not true.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:27): "God created man to His
+own image." But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul
+was created.
+
+_I answer that,_ The rational soul can be made only by creation;
+which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because,
+since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in
+such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly
+exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own
+existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called
+beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is
+(modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance,
+whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence
+it is said _Metaph._ vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be
+described as "of something rather than as something." The same is to
+be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking,
+it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are
+said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the
+other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above
+explained (Q. 75, A. 2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be
+made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter--whether
+corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being--or spiritual,
+which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into
+another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The soul's simple essence is as the material element,
+while its participated existence is its formal element; which
+participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence,
+because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds
+if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as
+some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to
+another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise
+the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way
+be made of pre-existent matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The production of act from the potentiality of matter
+is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was
+in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its
+existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the
+capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q. 75, A. 2), it is
+not educed from the potentiality of matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As we have said, there is no comparison between the
+rational soul and other forms.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Rational Soul Is Produced by God Immediately?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately
+made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual
+things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are
+produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
+Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are
+produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for
+God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things
+from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their
+end. But "inferior things are forwarded by the higher," as Dionysius
+says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into
+existence by the higher, and souls by angels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, "perfect is that which can produce its like," as is
+stated _Metaph._ v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect
+than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their
+own species, much more are angels able to produce something
+specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7) that God Himself
+"breathed into the face of man the breath of life."
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have held that angels, acting by the power of
+God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is
+against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot
+be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the
+first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of
+anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived
+from the first cause, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 3): and every
+agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change
+therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change,
+whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational
+soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced,
+save immediately by God.
+
+Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce
+their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher
+things lead forward the inferior--all these things are effected
+through a certain transmutation.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Human Soul Was Produced Before the Body?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul was made before the
+body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and
+adornment, as shown above (Q. 66, A. 1; Q. 70, A. 1). But the soul
+was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the
+work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels
+than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies,
+or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body
+of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made.
+Therefore the soul of man was created before the body.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in
+the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was
+created before the body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The proper act is produced in its proper
+potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body,
+the soul was produced in the body.
+
+_I answer that,_ Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the
+soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at
+the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought
+that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in
+their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of
+them--namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies--are united to
+bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free
+from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken (Q. 47, A. 2);
+and so we need say nothing about it here.
+
+Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the
+first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the
+body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man,
+during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but
+only as to some "causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul,
+because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or
+spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue.
+Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six
+days, when all things were made, was created, together with the
+angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the
+service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as
+his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): "We may believe,
+if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the
+sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal
+virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already
+created."
+
+Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of
+itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to
+the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is
+united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human
+nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear
+that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as
+their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has
+its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would
+have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.
+
+Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the
+six days (Q. 74, A. 2), we may say that the human soul preceded in
+the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as
+it has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself
+created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints,
+both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of
+the six days.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so
+that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that
+the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is
+naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not
+separately, but in the body.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The same observation applies to the second objection.
+For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still
+more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it
+belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That the soul remains after the body, is due to a
+defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the
+soul was first created.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 91
+
+THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)
+
+We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under
+this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) The matter from which it was produced;
+
+(2) The author by whom it was produced;
+
+(3) The disposition it received in its production;
+
+(4) The mode and order of its production.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Body of the First Man Was Made of the Slime of the Earth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the body of the first man was not made
+of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make
+something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is
+farther off from actual existence than "being in potentiality." But
+since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was
+fitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should
+be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the
+slime of the earth, but out of nothing.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies.
+But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected
+by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should
+not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is
+clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most
+noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the
+slime of the earth.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the human body is composed of the four elements.
+Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four
+elements.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7): "God made man of the
+slime of the earth."
+
+_I answer that,_ As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed
+perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works
+are perfect" (Deut. 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact
+that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts,
+but as "united in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v);
+in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause,
+according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the
+angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature
+through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this
+perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a
+natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed
+of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus
+of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is
+removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the
+elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that
+the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power;
+for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and
+where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements
+abound in man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements
+would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which
+have the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of
+man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because
+earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is
+called "a little world," because all creatures of the world are in a
+way to be found in him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man's
+body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting
+that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man
+might have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being
+something between spiritual and corporeal substances.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the
+earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body
+is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of
+truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot
+be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that
+something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition
+of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united
+to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is
+false--that light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something
+to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to
+be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible;
+wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies,
+except as in the effects of its power.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If fire and air, whose action is of greater power,
+predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely
+draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the
+mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the
+sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the
+organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries
+of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either
+in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole genus of such
+contraries--thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without
+color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is
+not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very
+elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense--or so
+that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as much needs be
+the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to
+the extremes.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding
+the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no
+mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we
+have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention
+is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of
+uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately
+addressed.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Human Body Was Immediately Produced by God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the human body was not produced by God
+immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal
+things are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was
+made of corporeal matter, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it
+was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately
+by God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not
+necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be
+produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain
+animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a
+heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat
+and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the
+human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some
+material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of
+a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the
+human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a
+heavenly body had part in its production.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's
+body was made during the work of the six days, according to the
+causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that
+afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the
+corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by
+some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some
+created power, and not immediately by God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): "God created man out
+of the earth."
+
+_I answer that,_ The first formation of the human body could not be
+by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from
+God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal
+matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher
+refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot
+be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have
+explained (Q. 65, A. 4); and because the agent must be like its
+effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter,
+should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made
+by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter
+can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as
+composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely
+immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation:
+wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of
+any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot
+transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a
+seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no
+pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same
+species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity
+made immediately by God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Although the angels are the ministers of God, as
+regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies
+beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or
+giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of
+the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels
+could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man,
+in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by
+collecting the dust.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by
+the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the
+power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of
+natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), "man and
+the sun beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of moderate
+temperature is required for the production of man and other animals.
+But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some
+imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that
+more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect
+thing.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but
+not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the
+Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the
+blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime
+of the earth.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal
+virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in
+passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of
+pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can
+produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out
+of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense,
+according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous
+work in their causal virtues.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Body of Man Was Given an Apt Disposition?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt
+disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought
+to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in
+sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker
+movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter
+flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body
+lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided
+with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking.
+Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the
+brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in
+stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right."
+
+_I answer that,_ All natural things were produced by the Divine art,
+and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to
+give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but
+the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some
+defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes
+himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which
+is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it
+of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very
+beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God
+gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so,
+but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says
+(Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for
+each one's substance."
+
+Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its
+operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments
+are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned
+the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to
+such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the
+disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect
+arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions
+required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to
+the soul and its operations.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the
+other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and
+for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all
+animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior
+sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 78, A.
+4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals
+in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least
+sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the
+body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers
+required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (Q.
+84, A. 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may
+modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for
+him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason
+of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires
+dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals
+have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on
+account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the
+perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to
+explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since
+this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the
+human temperament.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals,
+and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the
+clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly
+element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the
+human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of
+man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make
+himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite
+variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8),
+"the organ of organs." Moreover this was more becoming to the
+rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of
+things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An upright stature was becoming to man for four
+reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the
+purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed
+on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence,
+whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses
+only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the
+beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses
+are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned
+to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and
+procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that
+by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and
+penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely
+survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so
+as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the
+greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain,
+wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down,
+but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if
+man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands
+as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease.
+Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he
+used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his
+food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with
+thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from
+being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover,
+such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper
+operation.
+
+Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For
+man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of
+the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior
+world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general
+situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards
+the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their
+inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a
+middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by
+which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids
+itself of the surplus.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Production of the Human Body Is Fittingly Described in
+Scripture?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is
+not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made
+by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other
+works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and it was made."
+Therefore the same should have been said of man.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as
+explained above (A. 2). Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let us
+make man."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which
+is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man of the
+slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed into
+him the breath of life."
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the
+whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly
+said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life."
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while
+the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to
+Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore
+having said: "To His image He made them," he should not have added,
+"male and female He created them."
+
+_On the contrary,_ Is the authority of Scripture.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man
+surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man,
+as though He did not make other things; since it is written (Ps.
+101:26), "The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere (Ps.
+94:5), "His hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is
+made to God's image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture
+uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made
+for man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation
+and care what we have chiefly in mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: We must not imagine that when God said "Let us make
+man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think.
+But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person,
+Whose image is more clearly expressed in man.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Some have thought that man's body was formed first in
+priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the
+formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the
+production of things, that God should have made either the body
+without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part
+of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body,
+for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.
+
+To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made
+man," must be understood of the production of the body with the soul;
+and that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the
+breath of life," should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord
+breathed on His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (John
+20:22). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii,
+24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther
+on, "And man was made a living soul"; which words the Apostle (1 Cor.
+15:45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore,
+by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, "He
+breathed into his face the breath of life," are a sort of exposition
+of what goes before; for the soul is the form of the body.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's
+face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore
+Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works
+of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him
+man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not
+made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the
+first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But
+other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man
+were actually made.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 92
+
+THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head
+there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production
+of things?
+
+(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?
+
+(3) Whether of man's rib?
+
+(4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Woman Should Have Been Made in the First Production of
+Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made
+in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De
+Gener. ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing
+misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of
+things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first
+production.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for
+to the woman was it said after sin (Gen. 3:16): "Thou shalt be under
+the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin,
+there is no inequality." But woman is naturally of less strength and
+dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the
+patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman
+should not have been made in the first production of things before
+sin.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw
+that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He
+should not have made woman.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:18): "It is not good for man
+to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."
+
+_I answer that,_ It was necessary for woman to be made, as the
+Scripture says, as a _helper_ to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in
+other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped
+by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of
+generation. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of
+generation carried out in various living things. Some living things
+do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are
+generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and
+animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting
+matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive
+generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated
+from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation.
+Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation
+invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the
+active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive
+power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation
+nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed;
+therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the
+female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that
+we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in
+plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them
+preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered
+to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation.
+Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two
+forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from
+the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore
+directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall
+be two in one flesh" (Gen. 2:24).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is defective
+and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the
+production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the
+production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from
+some material indisposition, or even from some external influence;
+such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher
+observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards
+human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included
+in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the
+general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal
+Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not
+only the male but also the female.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of
+which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and
+this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of
+subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior
+makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this
+kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have
+been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others
+wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is
+naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason
+predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of
+innocence, as we shall prove (Q. 96, A. 3).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If God had deprived the world of all those things which
+proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect.
+Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that
+individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful
+that He can direct any evil to a good end.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Woman Should Have Been Made from Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from
+man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals
+the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it
+have been so with man.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same matter.
+But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was
+made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the
+same, and not from man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work
+of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that
+office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is
+written (Lev. 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from
+man.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): "He created of him,"
+that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman.
+
+_I answer that,_ When all things were first formed, it was more
+suitable for the woman to be made from man than (for the female to
+be from the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the
+first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the
+principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to
+God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says
+that "God made the whole human race from one" (Acts 17:26). Secondly,
+that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more
+closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is
+written (Gen. 2:23, 24): "She was taken out of man, wherefore a man
+shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." This
+was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and
+female live together for life; which is not the case with other
+animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12),
+the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as
+with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in
+which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is
+the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be
+made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a
+sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church
+takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32):
+"This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."
+
+Reply Obj. 1 is clear from the foregoing.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Matter is that from which something is made. Now
+created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is
+determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of
+proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something
+in a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being
+infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter,
+such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of
+man.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and
+this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced
+from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone.
+Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this
+argument does not prove.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Woman Was Fittingly Made from the Rib of Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed
+from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's
+body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made
+only--either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been
+described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the
+rib itself)--or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
+lit. x): "A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction." But
+the woman's body is not more rarefied than man's--at least, not in
+the proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed
+from a rib of Adam.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in those things which were first created there was
+nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the
+integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained
+imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But
+there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib
+to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:22): "God built the rib,
+which He took from Adam, into a woman."
+
+_I answer that,_ It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of
+man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the
+woman should neither "use authority over man," and so she was not
+made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's
+contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet.
+Secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of
+Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed--namely, blood
+and water--on which the Church was established.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material
+increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord
+multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an
+increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance
+of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change
+of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in
+itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence,
+and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and
+size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore
+multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the
+matter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless
+it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is
+for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher
+says (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged,
+without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories--viz. the
+definition with the absence of the thing defined.
+
+Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of
+matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or
+which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
+xxiv in Joan.) that "Christ filled five thousand men with five
+loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest
+of corn"--that is, by transformation of the nourishment.
+Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or
+that woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to
+the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam,
+not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as
+the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released
+by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it
+possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be
+produced from the man's rib.
+
+From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Woman Was Formed Immediately by God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately
+by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another
+individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is
+of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal
+things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body
+was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the
+ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to
+their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and
+not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its
+causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen.
+ad lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to
+Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman
+from the man's rib."
+
+_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 2, ad 2), the natural
+generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the
+matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or
+woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human
+species cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of
+nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary
+course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man
+from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This argument is verified when an individual is
+begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the
+same species.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not
+know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the
+woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by
+the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of
+the woman formed by them from the man's rib.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The first
+creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it
+made it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the
+woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things
+first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a
+potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the
+Creator.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 93
+
+THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN
+(In Nine Articles)
+
+We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is
+said to be made "to the image and likeness of God." There are under
+this head nine points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the image of God is in man?
+
+(2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?
+
+(3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?
+
+(4) Whether the image of God is in every man?
+
+(5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence,
+or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?
+
+(6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?
+
+(7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and
+acts?
+
+(8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every
+object?
+
+(9) Of the difference between "image" and "likeness."
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Image of God Is in Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it
+is written (Isa. 40:18): "To whom have you likened God? or what image
+will you make for Him?"
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to be the image of God is the property of the
+First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 1:15): "Who is the
+image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature."
+Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can]. Synod.
+Ancyr.) that "an image is of the same species as that which it
+represents"; and he also says that "an image is the undivided and
+united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But
+there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a
+comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no
+image of God in man.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): "Let Us make man to Our
+own image and likeness."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image
+exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness,
+there is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness
+is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to
+likeness--namely, that it is copied from something else. For an
+"image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of
+something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like
+and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg,
+because it is not copied from it.
+
+But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as
+Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is
+not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in
+a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a
+perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which
+it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness
+to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not
+one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy.
+Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect
+likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says
+that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to"
+signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man.
+Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But
+God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of
+God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is
+said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to
+be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by
+reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to
+God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists
+in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is
+of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an
+alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as
+Augustine says explains in _De decem Chordis_ (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De
+Tempore).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As unity means absence of division, a species is said
+to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not
+only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to
+a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with
+God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which
+adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect
+image.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Image of God Is to Be Found in Irrational Creatures?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in
+irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are
+contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of
+rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of
+God is to be found in irrational creatures.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it
+approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
+iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine
+goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more
+it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness
+than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things
+together are called "very good" (Gen. 1:31). Therefore the whole
+universe is to the image of God, and not only man.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the
+world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore the
+whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational
+creature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's
+excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by
+giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of
+the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's
+image.
+
+_I answer that,_ Not every likeness, not even what is copied from
+something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be
+only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does
+not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a
+worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image,
+merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white
+like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing;
+for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature
+of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king
+exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and
+chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper.
+Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species."
+
+Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate
+difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly
+because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because
+they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83,
+qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all
+creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." It is clear, therefore, that
+intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's
+image.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what is
+perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image,
+so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in
+some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects
+are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they
+happen (_contingit_) to be so, but not absolutely.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as
+regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is
+involved in the idea of an image.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the
+intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but
+intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is
+found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for
+the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly
+divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore,
+when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of
+God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's
+image, but that the other parts are excluded.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the
+likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species
+in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the
+exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using
+the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in
+nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the
+First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent,
+like to the Supreme Wisdom.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Angels Are More to the Image of God Than Man Is?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not more to the image
+of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon _de Imagine_ xliii
+(de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature
+besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that
+the angels are more than man to the image of God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so
+much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between
+Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a
+creature is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore
+the angels are not more to the image of God than man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it
+is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not
+admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing,
+since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the
+image of God than man.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is
+called a "seal of resemblance" (Ezech. 28:12) because in him the
+resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression.
+
+_I answer that,_ We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we
+may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is,
+the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the
+angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more
+perfect, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, A.
+8). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its
+accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation
+of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God
+from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the
+whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the
+whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more
+perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of
+themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we
+presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature;
+otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as
+in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God
+than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are
+more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man
+is more like to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of
+reason from the image of God; but not the angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of
+bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than
+another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human
+soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had
+said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in
+likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." Wherefore this does
+not mean that the angels are not more to God's image.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: When we say that substance does not admit of more or
+less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more
+perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not
+participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another;
+nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different
+individuals in a greater or lesser degree.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Image of God Is Found in Every Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in every
+man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman is
+the image [Vulg. glory] of man" (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is
+an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual
+is not an image of God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): "Whom God foreknew, He
+also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son." But
+all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the
+conformity of image.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as
+above explained (A. 1). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore
+he loses the image of God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 38:7): "Surely man passeth as
+an image."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since man is said to be the image of God by reason
+of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God
+according to that in which he can best imitate God in his
+intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly
+in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see
+that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man
+possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and
+this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is
+common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually
+knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in
+the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God
+perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory.
+Wherefore on the words, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is
+signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image
+of "creation," of "re-creation," and of "likeness." The first is
+found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the
+blessed.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The image of God, in its principal signification,
+namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman.
+Hence after the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is
+added, "Male and female He created them" (Gen. 1:27). Moreover it is
+said "them" in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22)
+remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one
+individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in
+man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as
+God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle
+had said that "man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the
+glory of man," he adds his reason for saying this: "For man is not of
+woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman
+for man."
+
+Reply Obj. 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in
+the conformity of grace and glory.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Image of God Is in Man According to the Trinity of
+Persons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man
+as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide
+ad Petrum i): "One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and
+one is the image to which man was made." And Hilary (De Trin. v) says:
+"Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity."
+Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of
+the Trinity of Persons.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God
+in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide
+Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as "an
+intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement." Gregory
+of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture
+says that "man was made to the image of God, it means that human
+nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the
+fulness of goodness." Now all these things belong more to the unity
+of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the
+image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the
+unity of the Essence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it
+is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to
+the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural
+reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the
+Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above
+(Q. 32, A. 1).
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the
+Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi,
+2) that "the Son alone is the image of the Father." Therefore, if in
+man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not
+be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The plurality of the
+Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been
+made to the image of God."
+
+_I answer that,_ as we have seen (Q. 40, A. 2), the distinction of
+the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations
+of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but
+in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being
+produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way,
+and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction
+of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore
+to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not
+exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine
+Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore,
+say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the
+Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God
+Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons.
+
+Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument would avail if the image of God in man
+represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin.
+xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within
+ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: "We
+see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas
+we believe rather than see that God is Trinity."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son
+only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First,
+because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it
+would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son,
+that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if
+man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have
+said, "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness"; but "to Thy
+image." When, therefore, it is written, "He made him to the image of
+God," the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the
+Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine
+Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it
+is said that God "made man to His image," this can be understood in
+two ways: first, so that this preposition "to" points to the term of
+the making, and then the sense is, "Let Us make man in such a way
+that Our image may be in him." Secondly, this preposition 'to' may
+point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, "This book is made
+(like) to that one." Thus the image of God is the very Essence of
+God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put
+for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an
+image because thereby one Person imitates another.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Image of God Is in Man As Regards the Mind Only?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not only in
+man's mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:7) that "the man is the
+image . . . of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image
+of God is to be observed not only in his mind.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Gen. 1:27): "God created man to His
+own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He
+created them." But the distinction of male and female is in the body.
+Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the
+mind.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of
+a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God
+is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24)
+there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or
+imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual
+vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by
+reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like
+reason there must be another trinity in the others.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24): "Be renewed in
+the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given
+to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new
+man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): "Putting on the
+new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to
+the image of Him that created him," where the renewal which consists
+in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore
+to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only.
+
+_I answer that,_ While in all creatures there is some kind of
+likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness
+of "image" as we have explained above (AA. 1,2); whereas in other
+creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect
+or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures;
+wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational
+creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the
+rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a
+"trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts,
+the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the
+reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the
+way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents
+something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace"
+represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause
+in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For
+imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called
+"traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the
+land a trace of a hostile army.
+
+Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures
+and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the
+Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of
+the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature,
+rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the
+representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only
+in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A.
+2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in
+them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we
+consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is
+distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of
+Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q. 28, A. 3); so we may say
+that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word
+in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there
+exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation
+of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the
+principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a
+certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced
+them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite
+nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species
+points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a
+house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the
+maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end;
+as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So
+we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind;
+but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man is called to the image of God; not that he is
+essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his
+mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the
+king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as
+existing in every part of man.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought
+that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally.
+They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those
+born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a
+third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded
+from man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly
+absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the
+principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's
+offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one
+Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have
+mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the
+offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said,
+"to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He
+created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the
+distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes,
+since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction.
+Wherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after saying, "According to the
+image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male
+nor female" [*these words are in reality from Gal. 3:28] (Vulg.
+"neither Gentile nor Jew").
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the image of God in man is not to be found in
+his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among
+terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is
+adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say
+that it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies
+of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is
+not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body;
+but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the
+image of God in the soul by way of a trace.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we
+may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in
+corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body;
+secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the
+sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the
+intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what
+is seen.
+
+Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in
+the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the
+penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination,
+informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the
+will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short
+of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is
+extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the
+memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and
+thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the
+connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal
+vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external
+body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer;
+in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is
+preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these
+reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not
+suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the
+two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or
+spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from
+the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Image of God Is to Be Found in the Acts of the Soul?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in the
+acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man
+was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist,
+and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify
+an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's
+acts.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in
+the soul to these three things--mind, knowledge, and love. But mind
+does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the
+intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the
+acts of the soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the
+Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these
+three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the
+Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the
+powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul.
+But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does
+not extend to the acts.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the
+trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual
+vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity
+in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be
+referred to actual vision.
+
+_I answer that,_ As above explained (A. 2), a certain representation
+of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image
+of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it
+where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the
+species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct
+from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the
+Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul
+word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De
+Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity
+is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the
+knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal
+word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of
+acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in
+its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of
+the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still
+more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our being bears the image of God so far as it is proper
+to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so
+far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the
+same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which
+consists in mind, knowledge, and love.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in
+the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a
+certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself--namely, as
+being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as
+Augustine subsequently proves--De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though
+knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things
+in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory,
+understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing;
+and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as
+though the first assignation were in part deficient.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said
+to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we
+actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they
+are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our
+memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual
+retention of knowledge and love [*Cf. Q. 79, A. 7, ad 1]. "But
+since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought
+(for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that
+interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly
+consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And
+by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual
+thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites
+this child with its parent." From which it is clear that he places
+the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and
+will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the
+memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the
+soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is
+clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as
+stated in the Sentences.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's
+statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself,
+ever understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean
+that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he
+excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think
+of itself as actually distinct from other things." Thus it is clear
+that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but
+habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it
+understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is
+not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must
+say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever
+exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore,
+Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to
+the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and
+intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was
+in the soul from the beginning of its existence."
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 8]
+
+Whether the Image of the Divine Trinity Is in the Soul Only by
+Comparison with God As Its Object?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in
+the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image
+of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (A.
+7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love
+from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object.
+Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards
+any object.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek
+trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without
+separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the
+consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of the Trinity
+is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If,
+therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of
+the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not
+in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to
+the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2
+Cor. 3:18): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory
+to glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision.
+Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal
+things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of
+God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself,
+loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also
+remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less,
+therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other
+objects.
+
+_I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 2, 7), image means a
+likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a
+representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image
+of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of
+species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a
+creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated (AA. 6, 7), are
+distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word
+from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the
+Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love
+proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that
+diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in
+the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from
+that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is
+specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the
+verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived
+therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as
+the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn
+to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly
+and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when
+anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be
+turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), that
+"the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If
+we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but,
+nevertheless, rightly called the image of God." But this is due to
+the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that
+thereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority
+quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: For the notion of an image it is not enough that
+something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe
+what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of
+God proceeds from knowledge of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity,
+not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the
+contemplation of eternal things, "any third thing should be required
+to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that
+part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although
+a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there,"
+as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things
+is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal
+things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are
+actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they
+begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which
+comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life
+faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be
+in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love
+as seen above (Q. 12, A. 12; Q. 56, A. 3; Q. 60, A. 5).
+This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can
+make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image
+of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be so
+obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in
+those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured and disfigured," as
+in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine
+says (De Trin. xiv, 6).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: By the vision of glory temporal things will be
+seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong
+to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6),
+when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully
+adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the
+Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures.
+_______________________
+
+NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 9]
+
+Whether "Likeness" Is Properly Distinguished from "Image"?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that "likeness" is not properly
+distinguished from "image." For genus is not properly distinguished
+from species. Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species:
+because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not
+conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness"
+is not properly to be distinguished from "image."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the
+representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation
+of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and
+indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the
+essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is
+in other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi).
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the image of God in man is threefold--the image of
+nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (A. 4). But
+innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is
+incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is taken from the
+memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from
+innocence and righteousness."
+
+Obj. 4: Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and
+love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image.
+Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image
+consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of
+virtue."
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider
+that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and
+"likeness," since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed."
+
+_I answer that,_ Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality
+causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15).
+Now, since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and
+adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true.
+Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both
+as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some
+perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of
+comparison between "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble
+to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good
+is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he
+is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness
+may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it
+is something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1):
+and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as
+it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image
+is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation
+is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from
+image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things,
+and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than
+the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be
+seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit"
+(namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. "But
+the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties,
+or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's
+likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the
+likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for
+corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings.
+But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the
+expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says
+(De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being,
+endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a
+likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the
+same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for
+there is no virtue without love of virtue.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general
+notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so far
+as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects
+the idea of "image."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as
+representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the
+intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to
+general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least,
+in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural
+"likeness" exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term
+"image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to
+the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as
+virtue itself belongs to likeness.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 94
+
+OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as
+regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first
+there are two things to be considered:
+
+(1) The condition of man as to his intellect;
+
+(2) the condition of man as to his will.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?
+
+(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?
+
+(3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?
+
+(4) Whether he could err or be deceived?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the First Man Saw God Through His Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the first man saw God through His
+Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine
+Essence. But the first man, "while established in paradise, led a
+life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says
+(De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If
+man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have
+been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" Therefore the
+first man in paradise saw God through His Essence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that
+"the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." But
+our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine
+Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the vision of God in His Essence is whereby God is
+seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence
+"saw God immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent.
+iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies
+obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity
+resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God
+through His Essence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not
+first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God
+through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the
+primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His
+Essence.
+
+_I answer that,_ The first man did not see God through His Essence if
+we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be
+said that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon
+Adam" (Gen. 2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence
+is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine
+Essence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now
+it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude,
+since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness.
+Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away
+from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His
+Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for
+eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear
+that he did not see God through His Essence.
+
+Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now.
+Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the
+present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see
+God through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the
+vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the
+vision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is,
+and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it;
+for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his
+image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more
+perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those
+which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is
+impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible
+creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible
+things. Now, it is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right." And
+man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers
+were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not
+to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by
+exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the
+intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first
+truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence
+Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps God used to speak
+to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a
+ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the
+experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the
+Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God,
+man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect
+happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of
+the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of
+happiness in a certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi,
+18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the
+first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in
+the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which,
+and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example,
+a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another
+kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of
+something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was
+seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first
+kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the
+knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we
+need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in
+the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must
+remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be
+of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure
+when compared with the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam
+saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect:
+secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is
+impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being
+preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God
+in an enigma.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Adam in the State of Innocence Saw the Angels Through Their
+Essence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw
+the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1):
+"In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by
+purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the
+good angels."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the
+knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body
+which "is a load upon the soul," as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore
+the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained
+(Q. 89, A. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his
+soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to
+see separate substances.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one separate substance knows another separate
+substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the
+first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours.
+But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore
+neither could Adam's soul.
+
+_I answer that,_ The state of the human soul may be distinguished in
+two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence;
+and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished
+from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of
+the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption,
+the state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state
+of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's
+soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern
+the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a
+"living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body--namely animal
+life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the
+body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we
+have said above (A. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already
+said (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1; Q. 89, A. 1) that since the soul is
+adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is
+fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by
+turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was
+becoming to the soul of the first man also.
+
+Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees
+of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first
+is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its
+powers on itself"; the second is by the soul ascending "so as to be
+associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the
+third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good,"
+that is, to God.
+
+In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to
+itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the
+intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external
+things, as we have said above (Q. 87, A. 3): and so by the knowledge
+thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act
+through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself,
+the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its
+proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect
+knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to
+phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above
+(Q. 55, A. 2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the
+soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of
+an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect
+knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know
+themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine
+Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul
+of the first man could not see the angels in their essence.
+Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the
+angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things
+within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was
+on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he
+enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits."
+
+This makes clear the reply to the first objection.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of the
+knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact
+that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural
+object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in
+our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at
+knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as
+we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others
+in its own measure.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the First Man Knew All Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the first man did not know all
+things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired
+species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not,
+however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired
+by experience, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1; and the first man had not
+then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural species,
+because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as
+Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which
+nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by infused species, it
+would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from
+things themselves.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of
+arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning,
+knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time
+according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all
+things when he was first created.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the present state of life is given to man in order
+that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul
+seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have
+advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge.
+Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Man named the animals (Gen. 2:20). But names
+should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the
+animals' natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the
+knowledge of all other things.
+
+_I answer that,_ In the natural order, perfection comes before
+imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in
+potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God
+created things not only for their own existence, but also that they
+might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in
+their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man
+can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the
+body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man
+was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work
+of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to
+instruct and govern others.
+
+Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the
+first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge
+of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are
+whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles,
+that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in
+order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not
+only those things which can be naturally known, but also things
+surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a
+supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of
+faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was
+endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was
+necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those
+things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not
+necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first
+man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some
+individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream;
+and the like.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely
+infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as
+the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different
+from those given by nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To Adam, as being the first man, was due a degree of
+perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is
+above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in
+the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because
+what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by
+experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have
+advanced as regards the number of things known, by further
+revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover
+there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in
+merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another,
+although he can be to another a principle of knowledge.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Man in His First State Could Be Deceived?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that man in his primitive state could have
+been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14) that "the woman
+being seduced was in the transgression."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the woman
+was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that
+he had received the faculty of speech from God." But this was untrue.
+Therefore before sin the woman was deceived.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from
+us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not
+changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state
+of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of
+what he saw, just as he is deceived now.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep
+the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things
+themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and
+consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been
+deceived, adhering to images as to realities.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other
+men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above
+(A. 3). So if anyone had told him what was false about these things,
+he would have been deceived.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard
+what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a
+punishment of man condemned."
+
+_I answer that,_ in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things;
+namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as
+though it were true, but without the assent of belief--or it may mean
+a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of
+these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended;
+but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might
+have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term
+for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with
+the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion
+in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is
+not to be blamed.
+
+Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of
+the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and
+while it remained so, no evil could exist." Now it is clear that as
+truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the
+Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of
+innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to
+assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such
+as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man,
+though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect
+the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.
+
+This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by
+virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower
+faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment
+to their action. And from what has preceded (Q. 85, A. 6), it is
+clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true;
+and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception
+occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the
+imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of
+judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it
+is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the
+rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of
+the intellect.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in
+deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride.
+For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not
+have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already
+acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of
+self-conceit."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The woman thought that the serpent had received this
+faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of
+some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master
+of the Sentences in this point.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of
+the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would
+not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to
+judge the truth.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep;
+as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's
+proper action.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: If anyone had said something untrue as regards future
+contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive
+state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed
+that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to
+entertain a false opinion.
+
+It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from
+above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge
+did not extend.
+
+If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted,
+though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had
+already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to
+the Divine aid.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 95
+
+OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL--NAMELY, GRACE AND
+RIGHTEOUSNESS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning
+which there are two points of treatment:
+
+(1) the grace and righteousness of the first man;
+
+(2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the first man was created in grace?
+
+(2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?
+
+(3) Whether he had all virtues?
+
+(4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the First Man Was Created in Grace?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in
+grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says
+(1 Cor. 15:45): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last
+Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace.
+Therefore Christ alone was made in grace.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123)
+[*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St.
+Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever
+possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in
+grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so
+ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they
+could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by
+the discernment of righteousness." God thus first created men and
+angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards
+bestowed grace on them.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was
+created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to
+advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the
+first man was not created in grace.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the
+recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place
+between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence.
+Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his
+creation.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from
+glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes
+glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the
+angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9):
+"God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with
+grace." Therefore man also was created in grace.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some say that man was not created in grace; but that
+it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of
+the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.
+
+But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was
+endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created
+in grace, according to Eccles. 7:30, "God made man right." For this
+rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower
+powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection
+was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was
+subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as
+Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.
+i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul
+and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it
+would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural
+gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence
+it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which
+reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a
+supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the
+effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine
+says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the
+Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their
+nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as
+though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience."
+Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the
+soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the
+soul through grace existing therein.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle in these words means to show that there
+is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the
+spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn
+of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the
+Apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no
+spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as
+regards the body.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not
+disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted
+with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the
+faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness
+directly after death.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels
+or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed
+grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before
+being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being
+so confirmed.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion of
+those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state
+of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet
+it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he
+could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there is
+nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the
+first moment of his existence.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit
+grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Passions Existed in the Soul of the First Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions.
+For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit"
+(Gal. 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence.
+Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the
+soul.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body
+was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral
+virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the
+passions were entirely excluded from him.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our
+first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions
+of the soul.
+
+_I answer that,_ The passions of the soul are in the sensual
+appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some
+passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy;
+others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the
+primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any
+good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion
+with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither
+had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed
+then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard
+present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had
+at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed
+in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in
+ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is
+not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall
+and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's
+judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some
+extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was
+wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the
+soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of
+the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of
+innocence.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The human body was impassible in the state of innocence
+as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as
+will be explained later on (Q. 97, A. 2); likewise the soul was
+impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of
+reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away
+the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he
+ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in _Ethic._
+iii, 11.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Adam Had All the Virtues?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For
+some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate
+concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by
+fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed
+in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which
+have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with
+fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as
+stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed.
+Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state
+of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither
+did those virtues exist.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not;
+as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every
+virtue.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state
+of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to
+be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra
+Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the
+slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty,
+restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness."
+
+_I answer that,_ in the state of innocence man in a certain sense
+possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes.
+For it was shown above (A. 1) that such was the rectitude of the
+primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers
+to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby
+reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according
+to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the
+Virtues (I-II, Q. 63, A. 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the
+primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every
+virtue.
+
+It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do
+not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these
+virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit
+and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply
+imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If
+such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive
+state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which
+is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed.
+For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the
+Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final
+beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state,
+both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies
+imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state,
+could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for
+instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which
+is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and
+unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive
+state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but
+not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if
+there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his
+neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in
+accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards what
+is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally;
+as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong" (Ethic.
+iv, 9).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue
+superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which
+happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are
+_per se_ competent to moderate the passions.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Passions which have evil for their object were
+incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil
+be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But
+passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with
+the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could
+hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the
+virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive
+state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions
+which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions
+only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in
+habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other
+virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but
+to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but
+also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also
+to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the
+primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner,
+fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating
+sorrow and fear.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: appears from what has been said above.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as
+a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice
+of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In
+another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a
+certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did
+not possess perseverance.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: appears from what has been said above.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Actions of the First Man Were Less Meritorious Than Ours
+Are?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were
+less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the
+mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are
+more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence.
+Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace
+is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for
+it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive
+lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of
+virtue is the difficult and the good." But there is more strife and
+difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would
+not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now,
+when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in
+the primitive state.
+
+_On the contrary,_ if such were the case, man would be better off
+after sinning.
+
+_I answer that,_ Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways.
+First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured
+corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the
+enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions
+proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree
+of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree
+is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two
+mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree
+than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate
+degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in
+proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit
+corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for
+created good.
+
+We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were
+more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the
+degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more
+copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like
+manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because,
+as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater
+works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason
+for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a
+small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with
+difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: After sin man requires grace for more things than
+before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even
+before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief
+reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also
+for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit
+according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above
+explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after
+what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is
+caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person
+performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an
+arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to
+him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the
+deed to satisfy for sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The first man would not have gained merit in resisting
+temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not
+possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not
+grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the
+primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our
+present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist
+temptation even without grace.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 96
+
+OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of
+innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?
+
+(2) Whether he was master over all creatures?
+
+(3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?
+
+(4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Adam in the State of Innocence Had Mastership Over the
+Animals?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had
+no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix,
+14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of
+the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not
+have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals.
+Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the
+animals.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another
+should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are
+hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all
+animals were not brought under the mastership of man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St.
+Jerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as
+quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Gen. 1:26]: "God gave man
+mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of
+them: for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to
+man." Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to
+make use of his mastership.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command
+is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no
+mastership over the irrational animals.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): "Let him have dominion
+over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts
+of the earth" [Vulg."and the whole earth"].
+
+_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 95, A. 1) for his disobedience
+to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which
+should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before
+man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject
+to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be
+proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for
+just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of
+procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the
+sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect),
+so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the
+imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of
+the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and
+man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping
+with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals.
+Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild
+animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural
+right. Secondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence
+which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as
+man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these
+are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, this is proved from a
+property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a
+certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to
+certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence
+as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is
+subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection
+of other animals to man is proved to be natural.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A higher power can do many things that an inferior
+power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is
+naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to
+animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for
+instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some, those animals which now are
+fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not
+only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this
+is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by
+man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of
+others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor
+does Bede's gloss on Gen. 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given
+as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have
+been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not,
+however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of
+man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the
+mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this
+Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in
+regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to
+the trained falcon.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In the state of innocence man would not have had any
+bodily need of animals--neither for clothing, since then they were
+naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of
+concupiscence--nor for food, since they fed on the trees of
+paradise--nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for
+that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental
+knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God
+led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of
+their respective natures.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: All animals by their natural instinct have a certain
+participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact
+that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all
+animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present
+state some domestic animals obey him.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Man Had Mastership Over All Other Creatures?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would
+not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel
+naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De
+Trin. iii, 8), "corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy
+angels." Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state
+of innocence.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are
+nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these do not naturally
+obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore,
+since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership,
+it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over
+plants.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But
+man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for
+this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii).
+Therefore man had no dominion over them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): "That he may have
+dominion over . . . every creature."
+
+_I answer that,_ Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so
+according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way
+he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four
+things in man: his _reason,_ which makes him like to the angels; his
+_sensitive powers,_ whereby he is like the animals; his _natural
+forces,_ which liken him to the plants; and _the body itself,_ wherein
+he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of
+a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over
+the angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all creatures," we
+must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over
+the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey
+reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in
+the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by
+commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is
+master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of
+innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted
+not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them
+without hindrance.
+
+The answers to the objections appear from the above.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Men Were Equal in the State of Innocence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence all would
+have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): "Where there is no
+sin, there is no inequality." But in the state of innocence there
+was no sin. Therefore all were equal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love,
+according to Ecclus. 13:19, "Every beast loveth its like; so also
+every man him that is nearest to himself." Now in that state there
+was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace.
+Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the
+cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of
+God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on
+the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of
+nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which
+would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 13:1): "The things which are
+of God, are well ordered" [Vulg."Those that are, are ordained of
+God"]. But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says
+(De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Order disposes things equal and unequal in
+their proper place." Therefore in the primitive state, which was
+most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed.
+
+_I answer that,_ We must needs admit that in the primitive state there
+would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because
+generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age;
+for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have
+been sterile.
+
+Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to
+righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of
+his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or
+less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a
+greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others.
+
+There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was
+not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from
+exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was
+dependent on food wherewith to sustain life.
+
+So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the
+stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and
+also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so
+that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been
+no defect or fault either in soul or body.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality
+as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some
+are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet
+between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than
+between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father
+naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother;
+although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by
+him.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The cause of inequality could be on the part of God;
+not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He
+would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the
+more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part
+of nature as above described, without any defect of nature.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 4]
+
+Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Master Over Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would
+not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,
+15): "God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His
+image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men,
+but over cattle."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would
+not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject
+to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Gen.
+3:16): "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power." Therefore in the
+state of innocence man would not have been subject to man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one
+of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state
+of innocence, "where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could
+desire," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man would
+not have been master over man in the state of innocence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The condition of man in the state of innocence was
+not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the
+angels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of
+"Dominations." Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state
+of innocence that one man should be subject to another.
+
+_I answer that,_ Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed
+to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is
+subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a
+general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who
+has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a
+master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of
+men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is
+founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that
+the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning
+of the _Metaphysics,_ whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that
+one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one
+whose master he is, to his own--namely the master's use. And since
+every man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it
+is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be
+one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain
+inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence
+such a mastership could not have existed between man and man.
+
+But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either
+towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of
+mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man
+and man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social
+being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social
+life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless
+under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many,
+as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore
+the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the _Politics,_ that
+wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at
+the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in
+knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these
+gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. 4:10,
+"As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to
+another." Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): "Just men
+command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of
+counsel": and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "The natural order of things
+requires this; and thus did God make man."
+
+From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on
+the first-mentioned mode of mastership.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 97
+
+OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man:
+first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as
+regards the preservation of the species.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?
+
+(2) Whether he was impassible?
+
+(3) Whether he stood in need of food?
+
+(4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 1]
+
+Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Immortal?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not
+immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. But
+if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined.
+Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically
+distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there
+can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first
+man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present
+state.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence,
+this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature,
+for since nature does not change within the same species, he would
+also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to
+grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to
+Wis. 10:2: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have
+regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore
+man was not immortal in the state of innocence.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward,
+according to Apoc. 21:4: "Death shall be no more." But man was not
+created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward.
+Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:12): "By sin death came into
+the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin.
+
+_I answer that,_ A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First,
+on the part of matter--that is to say, either because it possesses
+no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in
+potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things
+as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is
+incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible,
+yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from
+corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as
+Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul of such a
+powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds
+to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption."
+Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient
+cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state
+of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19
+[*Work of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.
+Augustine): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that
+he might achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was
+indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but
+by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby
+it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it
+remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for
+since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter,
+as above explained (Q. 76, A. 1), it was most properly endowed at
+the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner
+surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural
+incorruptibility and immortality.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural to
+the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace
+as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not
+recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this
+was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature
+was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further
+on (III, Q. 14, A. 4, ad 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs
+from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of
+innocence.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 2]
+
+Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Passible?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was
+passible. For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of
+innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been
+passible.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the
+state of innocence, according to Gen. 2:21, "God cast a deep sleep
+upon Adam." Therefore he would have been passible.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a rib
+out of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the
+cutting out of part of his body.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally
+passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in
+contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have
+suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Had man been passible, he would have been also
+corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive
+suffering wastes the very substance."
+
+_I answer that,_ "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its
+proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from
+its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in
+nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one
+thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly,
+"passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change,
+even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus
+understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second
+sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive
+both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both
+in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his
+passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.
+
+Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since
+sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition,
+but are ordered to his natural welfare.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As already explained (Q. 92, A. 3, ad 2), the rib was
+in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who
+is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any
+natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the
+separation of the rib.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved
+from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his
+reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by
+Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful
+nature could come upon him unawares.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 3]
+
+Whether in the State of Innocence Man Had Need of Food?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not
+require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has
+lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible.
+Therefore he had no need of food.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment
+involves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it does
+not appear how food could be needful to him.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam
+could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would
+not have died. Therefore he did not require food.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the
+surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore
+it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:16): "Of every tree in
+paradise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat."
+
+_I answer that,_ In the state of innocence man had an animal life
+requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual
+life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe
+that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul
+by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls--that is,
+as giving life to the body; whence it is written (Gen. 2:7): "Man was
+made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body.
+But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to
+itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual
+immaterial power.
+
+Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the
+body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called
+"animal" [*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 seqq.], through
+having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in
+these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is
+the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food,
+generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the
+state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection,
+the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what
+properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone,
+impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be
+called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require
+food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19
+[*Works of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.
+Augustine): "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained
+by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." For
+we have explained (A. 1) that the immortality of the primitive state
+was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any
+intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the
+body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the
+entire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on
+the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing
+nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible,
+but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion
+conduced to the perfection of the nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he
+also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the
+same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil,
+and to eat of every other tree of Paradise.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Some say that in the state of innocence man would not
+have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been
+nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as
+implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there
+was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be
+decorous and suitable to the state.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 4]
+
+Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Acquired Immortality
+by the Tree of Life?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the
+cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as
+an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was
+corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is
+changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree
+of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other
+natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused
+immortality, this would have been natural immortality.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable,
+that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the
+Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4).
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 3:22): "Lest perhaps he put
+forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for
+ever." Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work
+of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.
+Augustine): "A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the
+body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he
+been allowed to eat of the tree of life."
+
+_I answer that,_ The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of
+immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe
+that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of
+life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the
+lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the
+soul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with
+food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided
+with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect,
+as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that
+the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the
+humor already existing, lessens the specific active power: as water
+added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is
+added, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes
+watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force
+of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of
+the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what
+suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not
+suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in
+old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body
+declines, and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect
+man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was
+to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting
+from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says
+(De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to
+slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of
+old age"; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous
+author], among the supposititious works of St. Augustine) "The tree of
+life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption."
+
+Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the
+soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life,
+nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to
+immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from
+the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree
+of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of
+living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is
+manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect;
+therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life
+was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and
+when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a
+spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.
+
+From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first
+proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality;
+while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off
+corruption, according to the explanation above given.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 98
+
+OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and,
+first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under
+the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been
+generation?
+
+(2) Whether generation would have been through coition?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [Q. 98, Art. 1]
+
+Whether in the State of Innocence Generation Existed?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem there would have been no generation in the
+state of innocence. For, as stated in _Phys._ v, 5, "corruption is
+contrary to generation." But contraries affect the same subject: also
+there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence.
+Therefore neither would there have been generation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the
+species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore
+there is no generation in those individual things which last for
+ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever.
+Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no
+generation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the
+multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid
+confusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the
+animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights
+when the human race increased by generation. This is against the
+natural law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore
+says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in
+the state of innocence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:28): "Increase and multiply,
+and fill the earth." But this increase could not come about save by
+generation, since the original number of mankind was two only.
+Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence.
+
+_I answer that,_ In the state of innocence there would have been
+generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race;
+otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great
+blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by
+his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and
+incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while
+his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's
+purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and
+incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of
+nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a
+time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were,
+subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist,
+nature's purpose would become void.
+
+Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and
+permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of
+nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which
+natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible
+substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the
+individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief
+purpose of nature.
+
+Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the
+naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is
+incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should
+be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature,
+Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for
+the multiplication of the human race, He established the begetting of
+offspring even in the state of innocence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence the human body was in itself
+corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul.
+Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was
+not to be deprived thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although generation in the state of innocence might not
+have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would
+have been required for the multiplication of the individual.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In our present state a division of possessions is
+necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as
+community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher
+says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will
+of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife
+they would have used in common, according to each one's need, those
+things of which they were masters--a state of things to be observed
+even now among many good men.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 98, Art. 2]
+
+Whether in the State of Innocence There Would Have Been Generation by
+Coition?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that generation by coition would not have
+existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide
+Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was
+"like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, when men
+will be like the angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as
+is written Matt. 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would there have
+been generation by coition.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect
+development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before
+sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which
+was not the case according to Scripture (Gen. 4:1).
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time,
+man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which
+he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man
+refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason
+of sin, according to Ps. 48:13: "Man, when he was in honor, did not
+understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to
+them." Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such
+intercourse of man and woman.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no
+corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse.
+Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of
+innocence.
+
+_On the contrary,_ God made man and woman before sin (Gen. 1, 2). But
+nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned,
+there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of
+sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a
+help to man (Gen. 2:18, 20). But she is not fitted to help man except
+in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective
+help in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation
+also in the state of innocence.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some of the earlier doctors, considering the
+nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state,
+concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have
+been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom.
+Opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been
+multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied without
+coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made
+man male and female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of
+generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But
+this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired
+nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is
+natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even
+before sin, as above explained (Q. 97, A. 3), just as it is natural
+to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So
+we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use,
+as other members had, before sin.
+
+Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present
+state of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from
+nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation
+there is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever
+there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the
+passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose
+of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The
+second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive
+concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have
+existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason.
+Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from
+supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence.
+All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will,
+without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In paradise man would have been like an angel in his
+spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the
+resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and
+body. Wherefore there is no parallel.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first
+parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin
+they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the
+woman; or because, having received the general Divine command
+relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to
+time.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as
+it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate
+concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would
+have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight
+of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight
+have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature
+and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of
+concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such
+pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen
+sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from
+cleaving to it immoderately. By "immoderately" I mean going beyond
+the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure
+in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence
+lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the
+words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the
+state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind.
+Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of
+innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not
+because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate
+desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state
+"intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity;
+this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just
+as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of
+pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the
+union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 99
+
+OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We must now consider the condition of the offspring--first, as
+regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge.
+Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full
+powers of the body immediately after birth?
+
+(2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 99, Art. 1]
+
+Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Had Perfect
+Strength of Body As to the Use of Its Members Immediately After Birth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
+would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its
+members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit.
+et Remiss. i, 38): "This weakness of the body befits their weakness
+of mind." But in the state of innocence there would have been no
+weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of
+body in infants.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to
+use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore
+much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at
+birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not
+that strength.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes
+affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their
+limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something
+pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted,
+which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of
+innocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their
+limbs.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that
+of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no
+weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such
+weakness in infancy.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Everything generated is first imperfect. But in
+the state of innocence children would have been begotten by
+generation. Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect
+in bodily size and power.
+
+_I answer that,_ By faith alone do we hold truths which are above
+nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making
+any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in
+those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by
+Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is
+befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not
+have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after
+birth. Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a
+larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable
+humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are
+instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On
+the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by
+Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth.
+
+Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that "God made man right"
+(Eccles. 7:30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
+11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As,
+therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the
+human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it
+impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands.
+Now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are
+befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every
+season of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not
+have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the
+purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts
+befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe
+in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of
+infancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that "even when close
+to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to
+suckle."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs
+immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more
+perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain,
+and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that
+a small amount of strength suffices them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that
+they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and
+only what was befitting to their state of life.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet
+not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have
+been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not
+senile defects leading to corruption.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 99, Art. 2]
+
+Whether, in the Primitive State, Women Would Have Been Born?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the primitive state woman would
+not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii,
+3) that woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product
+outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have
+been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women
+would not have been born.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by
+insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot
+burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male.
+Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was
+not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the
+woman, it seems that males would always have been born.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to
+the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been
+sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact
+that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of
+innocence, there was no need for women to be born.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Nature's process in generation would have been in
+harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But God
+established male and female in human nature, as it is written (Gen.
+1, 2). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would
+have been born.
+
+_I answer that,_ Nothing belonging to the completeness of human
+nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as
+different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also
+diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore
+in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a
+product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual
+case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above
+explained (Q. 92, A. 1, ad 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a
+defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection
+proposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the
+Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): "The northern wind
+favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of
+females": sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the
+parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the
+child). Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when
+the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of
+the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The offspring would have been begotten to an animal
+life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that
+all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it
+seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal
+number.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 100
+
+OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to
+righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?
+
+(2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 100, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Men Would Have Been Born in a State of Righteousness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence men would
+not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St.
+Victor says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have
+begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's
+righteousness."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle
+says (Rom. 5:16, 21). Now grace is not transfused from one to
+another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone.
+Therefore children would not have been born righteous.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not
+transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness
+have been transmitted from parents, to the children.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man
+did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with
+righteousness together with the rational soul."
+
+_I answer that,_ Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself.
+Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the
+species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in
+its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of
+innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in
+parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man
+was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species,
+not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift
+conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the
+fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is
+opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature,
+wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for
+this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their
+parents as regards original righteousness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring,
+not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act
+thereof.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some say that children would have been born, not with
+the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with
+original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness,
+which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made,
+consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which
+subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q. 95,
+A. 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original
+righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have
+said above that the first man was created in grace (Q. 95, A. 1).
+This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not
+have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been
+conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the
+same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent,
+is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.
+
+From this the reply to the third objection is clear.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 100, Art. 2]
+
+Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born
+Confirmed in Righteousness?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
+would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says
+(Moral. iv) on the words of Job 3:13: "For now I should have been
+asleep, etc.": "If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent,
+he would not have begotten 'children of hell'; no children would have
+been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the
+Redeemer." Therefore all would have been born confirmed in
+righteousness.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first
+parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have
+been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have
+been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children would have been
+born confirmed in righteousness.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the
+first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin.
+Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his
+descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving
+righteousness.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the
+others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable
+henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been
+confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten
+children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born
+confirmed in righteousness.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would
+have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first
+parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their
+descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which
+they would have been condemned." From which words we gather that even
+if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might
+have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed
+in righteousness.
+
+_I answer that,_ It does not seem possible that in the state of
+innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.
+For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater
+perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the
+parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed
+in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in
+righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God;
+and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the
+essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is
+desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to
+the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special
+privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God.
+And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in
+His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his
+animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation.
+Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in
+righteousness.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten
+"children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin
+which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will
+they could have become "children of hell." If, however, they did not
+become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have
+been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine
+Providence preserving them free from sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only
+as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows:
+"It seems that if they had lived, etc."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to
+have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted.
+For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have
+been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the
+case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have
+transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which
+is only in the blessed.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: There is no comparison between man and the angels; for
+man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas
+the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of
+the angels (Q. 64, A. 2).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 101
+
+OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge.
+Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born
+with perfect knowledge?
+
+(2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment
+of birth?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 101, Art. 1]
+
+Whether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born with
+Perfect Knowledge?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children
+would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have
+begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect
+knowledge (Q. 94, A. 3). Therefore children would have been born
+of him with perfect knowledge.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf.
+I-II, Q. 85, A. 3). But ignorance is privation of knowledge.
+Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as
+soon as they were born.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness
+from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it
+directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with
+knowledge.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet
+on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
+4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been
+in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have
+been without knowledge at birth.
+
+_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 99, A. 1), as regards belief in
+matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so,
+when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course
+of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the
+senses, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6); and for this
+reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its
+proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed
+at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We
+must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would
+not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they
+would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or
+learning.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident
+of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and
+instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like
+himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were
+natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some
+particular time; and this would not have been in children from their
+birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at
+that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only
+nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in
+the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct
+them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal
+principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been
+much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise
+their knowledge of other universal principles.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 101, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Children Would Have Had Perfect Use of Reason at Birth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that children would have had perfect use
+of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason
+in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the
+body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written,
+"The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" (Wis. 9:15).
+Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom,
+children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural
+powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more,
+therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use
+of reason at birth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In all things produced by generation nature
+proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would
+not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.
+
+_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 84, A. 7), the use of reason
+depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers;
+wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive
+powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in
+those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are
+situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are
+hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and
+likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered
+in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain;
+wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of
+reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have
+had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on
+in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have
+now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained
+above regarding the use of their limbs (Q. 99, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because
+it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to
+man at all ages.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use
+of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the
+fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be
+observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in
+man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Q. 99, A.
+1).
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 102
+
+OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there
+are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?
+
+(2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?
+
+(3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?
+
+(4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Paradise Is a Corporeal Place?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place.
+For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on Gen. 2:8] says that "paradise reaches to
+the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description,
+both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised
+up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which
+would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise
+(Gen. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources
+elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore
+paradise is not a corporeal place.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, although men have explored the entire habitable
+world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore
+apparently it is not a corporeal place.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the tree of life is described as growing in
+paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is
+written of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold
+on her" (Prov. 3:18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but
+a spiritual place.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of
+paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal
+trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees
+of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore
+paradise was not a corporeal place.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three
+general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place
+merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others,
+whose opinion, I confess, pleases me, hold that paradise was both
+corporeal and spiritual."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing
+prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise;
+so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having
+there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set
+down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this
+method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a
+foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so
+paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the
+east, its name being the Greek for garden." It was fitting that it
+should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated
+in the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right
+hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and
+the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God
+should place the earthly paradise in the east.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious
+sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to
+the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says
+(Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually even
+temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies,
+which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made of
+the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly
+bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to
+the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to
+be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the
+moon--that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind,
+and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on
+such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human
+dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the
+human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of
+the earth.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable
+that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose
+sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground,
+and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the
+case with some other streams?"
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The situation of paradise is shut off from the
+habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which
+cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography
+make no mention of it.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The tree of life is a material tree, and so called
+because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above
+stated (Q. 97, A. 4). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the
+rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified
+Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was
+a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after
+eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent
+punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil
+of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the
+free-will as some say.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3),
+the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their
+seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants,
+both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to
+other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually
+produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what
+is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the
+six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation.
+Whence our text reads: "The Lord God had planted a paradise of
+pleasure from the beginning" (Gen. 2:8).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Paradise Was a Place Adapted to Be the Abode of Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to
+be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to
+beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence
+were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed--that is, the empyrean
+heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been
+there also.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if some definite place were required for man's
+abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of
+the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven,
+which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of
+heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no
+need for any other place than the one provided for other animals.
+Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after
+sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted
+as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no
+purpose.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place
+for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an
+even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator--a
+situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes
+vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was
+not a fit dwelling-place for man.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise
+was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to
+God's image."
+
+_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 97, A. 1), Man was incorruptible
+and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to
+incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power
+preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be
+corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is
+corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above
+explained (Q. 97, A. 4), and man was able to ward off such corruption
+by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the
+chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such
+corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In
+paradise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (De
+Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was permeated with the all pervading
+brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked
+with ever-flowering plants." Whence it is clear that paradise was
+most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his
+original state of immortality.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places,
+and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two
+conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as
+Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through
+spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature
+should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding
+over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state
+of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability.
+Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the
+angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's
+nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal
+creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his
+beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the
+empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the
+state of his final beatitude.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place
+is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some
+particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual
+substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as
+regards both his body and his soul--that is, inasmuch as in his soul
+was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This
+could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says
+(De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise";
+although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither
+by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the
+complicity of the devil.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Paradise did not become useless through being
+unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred
+on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's
+kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that
+Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line
+are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of
+the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold
+there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot,
+because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants,
+it does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle
+distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable
+on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even
+those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are
+extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But
+whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was
+situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or
+elsewhere.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Man Was Placed in Paradise to Dress It and Keep It?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to
+dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin
+would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the
+cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gen. 3:17).
+Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear
+of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of
+trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep
+paradise.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it,
+man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not
+contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in
+paradise to dress and keep it.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2: 15): "The Lord God took man
+and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it."
+
+_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these
+words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense
+that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and
+keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once
+relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases
+to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly,
+that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have
+involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on
+account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor
+would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have
+striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin.
+All of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to
+man's benefit, and not conversely.
+
+Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Man Was Created in Paradise?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the
+angel was created in his dwelling-place--namely, the empyrean heaven.
+But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it
+seems that man was created in paradise.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, other animals remain in the place where they are
+produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth
+from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise
+after he was created (Q. 97, A. 4). Therefore he was created in
+paradise.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than
+woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:15): "God took man and
+placed him in paradise."
+
+_I answer that,_ Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the
+incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility
+was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God.
+Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human
+nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him
+there to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having
+attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels
+as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there.
+
+In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places
+befit those animals in their nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own
+dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which
+her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been
+born in paradise, where their parents were already.
+_______________________
+
+TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ. 103-119)
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 103
+
+OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we
+now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the
+government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of
+this government. Under the first head there are eight points of
+inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the world is governed by someone?
+
+(2) What is the end of this government?
+
+(3) Whether the world is governed by one?
+
+(4) Of the effects of this government?
+
+(5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?
+
+(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?
+
+(7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?
+
+(8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the World Is Governed by Anyone?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone.
+For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for
+an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world
+do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their
+end. Therefore the world is not governed.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved towards
+an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has
+stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature
+to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of
+government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain
+necessity determined to something particular in their actions and
+movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 14:3): "But Thou, O Father,
+governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De
+Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal."
+
+_I answer that,_ Certain ancient philosophers denied the government
+of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an
+opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by
+observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature
+things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not
+be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards
+good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we
+observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if
+we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of
+him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii),
+quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a
+consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (Q.
+44, A. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), was the cause of the production of things in
+existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is
+not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things
+without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate
+perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it
+belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence,
+so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two
+ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational
+creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the
+means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an
+end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow
+directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the
+arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end
+shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the
+unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows
+clearly that the world is governed by some reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In all created things there is a stable element,
+at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under
+movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both:
+because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing,
+would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand,
+as will be explained later (Q. 104, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The natural necessity inherent in those beings
+which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression
+from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an
+arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression
+from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference,
+inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature,
+while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their
+nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the
+movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural
+necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the End of the Government of the World Is Something Outside
+the World?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the
+world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the
+government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought.
+But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself;
+thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in
+him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not
+outside, but within the things themselves.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are
+an operation; some are a work"--i.e. produced by an operation. But
+nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and
+operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the
+end of the government of things.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order,
+and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine says (De
+Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of
+things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the
+peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the
+government of the world is not an extrinsic good.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made
+all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the
+universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to
+them.
+
+_I answer that,_ As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning,
+it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know
+their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is
+something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what
+has been expounded above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2), that we must conclude
+that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved
+by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end;
+wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular
+good; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good;
+Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very
+essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by
+participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe
+there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore
+that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good
+outside the universe.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form
+existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something
+done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house;
+thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer
+of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore
+nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to
+which it is directed.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various
+arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as
+the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other
+arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not
+the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that
+something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as
+possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say
+that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him.
+Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the
+end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and
+represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to
+an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of
+the universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate
+end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the
+order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in _Metaph._
+xii, Did. xi, 10.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the World Is Governed by One?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For
+we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the
+universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but
+some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways.
+Therefore the world is not governed by one.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, things which are governed by one do not act against
+each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler;
+which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and
+act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries.
+Therefore the world is not governed by one.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it
+"is better that two should be together than one" (Eccles. 4:9).
+Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.
+
+_On the contrary,_ We confess our belief in one God and one Lord,
+according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 8:6): "To us there is
+but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain
+to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the
+name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (Q. 13,
+A. 8). Therefore the world is governed by one.
+
+_I answer that,_ We must of necessity say that the world is governed
+by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that
+which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government
+of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best
+government is the government by one. The reason of this is that
+government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the
+end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of
+goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as
+all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which they
+would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence
+we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the
+dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the
+intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the
+proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be
+the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united.
+Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause
+of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better
+governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the
+government of the world, being the best form of government, must be
+by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi,
+10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of
+authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the
+mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity
+of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of
+the universe (Q. 47, AA. 1,2; Q. 48, A. 2), and not by a diversity of
+governors.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Although contraries do not agree with each other in
+their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so
+far as they are included in the one order of the universe.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If we consider individual goods, then two are better
+than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is
+possible.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Effect of Government Is One or Many?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one effect of the
+government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is
+that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the
+good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an
+army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the
+world is governed by one as we have proved (A. 3). Therefore also the
+effect of this government is but one.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of
+the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many
+things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore
+we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all
+and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government
+belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of
+the Divine government.
+
+_I answer that,_ The effect of any action may be judged from its end;
+because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected.
+Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to
+the participation and similarity of which all things tend.
+Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken
+in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way
+there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good.
+Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered
+on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made
+like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the
+government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things;
+first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature
+becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this,
+that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature
+becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two
+effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness,
+and the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the
+individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this
+way they are without number.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The order of the universe includes both the
+preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards
+these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better
+than another; and one is moved by another.
+
+From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other
+two objections.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 5]
+
+Whether All Things Are Subject to the Divine Government?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that not all things are subject to the
+Divine government. For it is written (Eccles. 9:11): "I saw that
+under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the
+strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor
+to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to
+the Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things
+which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): "God hath no care
+for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs.
+Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by
+another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is
+master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by
+another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore
+all things are not subject to the Divine government.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only
+heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the
+lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant,
+the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of
+their nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government.
+
+_I answer that,_ For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He
+is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection;
+and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only
+of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being,
+as proved above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing
+which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not
+subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of
+the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those
+things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the
+Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown (A. 2).
+Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine
+goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 44,
+A. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), so it is impossible for anything to escape from
+the Divine government.
+
+Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the
+corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human
+affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are
+represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth" (Ezech. 9:9).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These things are said to be under the sun which are
+generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such
+things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in
+such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And
+the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things
+proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless
+corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend
+to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of
+knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes
+the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance
+and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say
+absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and
+chance," that is to say, that defects may be found in these things
+according to some order of time.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Government implies a certain change effected by the
+governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a
+movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down
+_Phys._ iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is
+an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously,
+even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one
+art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed
+according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of
+themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are
+governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God
+Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they
+are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and
+prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which
+do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence,
+when the Apostle says that "God hath no care for oxen," he does not
+wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards
+the way in which rational creatures are governed.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The rational creature governs itself by its intellect
+and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the
+Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby
+the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it
+requires to be governed by God.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 6]
+
+Whether all things are immediately governed by God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all things are governed by God
+immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves
+the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The
+first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly
+things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to
+the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over
+generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to
+certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions.
+Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if
+possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But
+God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause.
+Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it
+seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus
+an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything
+himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time,
+requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all
+things immediately.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower
+and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of
+greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational
+spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the
+good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself."
+
+_I answer that,_ In government there are two things to be considered;
+the design of government, which is providence itself; and the
+execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs
+all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some
+things by means of others.
+
+The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness,
+so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of
+goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order,
+design or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists
+in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not
+the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but
+who can consider the least details; and so on in other things.
+Therefore we must say that God has the design of the government of
+all things, even of the very least.
+
+But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection
+by government, this government will be so much the better in the
+degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a
+greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the
+cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself.
+Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be
+causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts
+knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching
+others.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that
+God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of
+government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence,
+which is the design of government, into three parts.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the
+perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would
+not be accomplished by one.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That an earthly king should have ministers to execute
+his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his
+dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is
+brought into greater evidence.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Anything Can Happen Outside the Order of the Divine
+Government?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem possible that something may occur outside
+the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol.
+iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens
+outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no
+evil exists.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, nothing that is in accordance with the
+pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing
+occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that
+there is nothing fortuitous and casual.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and
+unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design.
+Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine
+government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and
+nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for
+something to occur outside the order of the Divine government.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Esther 13:9): "O Lord, Lord,
+almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that
+can resist Thy will."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is possible for an effect to result outside the
+order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the
+universal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside
+the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding
+cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first
+universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the
+nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the
+food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on
+till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the
+first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in
+general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of
+the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of
+view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence
+considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily
+come back to that order as regards some other cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is
+ever founded on good, as shown above (Q. 48, A. 3). Therefore
+something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of
+some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the
+Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some
+particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the
+order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance,"
+as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared
+to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not
+as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine
+government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of
+some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to
+the Divine government.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 8]
+
+Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem possible that some resistance can be made
+to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Isa. 3:8):
+"Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel
+against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's
+commands, no one would be justly punished by God.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine
+government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things
+rebel against the order of the Divine government.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing
+that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this
+sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all
+sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.
+
+_I answer that,_ We may consider the order of Divine providence in
+two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing
+cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some
+particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.
+
+Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the
+Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the
+fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to
+good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good
+only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
+iv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 3;
+A. 5, ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or
+voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover;
+as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but
+an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether
+natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of
+its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things
+sweetly."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act against
+God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government;
+for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but
+because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their
+nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2 is clear from the above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: From the fact that one thing opposes another, it
+follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular
+cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all
+things.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 104
+
+THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular;
+concerning which four points of inquiry arise:
+
+(1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?
+
+(2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?
+
+(3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?
+
+(4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Creatures Need to Be Kept in Being by God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in
+being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in
+being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept
+from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot
+not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God.
+The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the
+nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary
+cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and
+cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself,
+because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But
+some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels
+(Q. 50, AA. 2, 5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same
+reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality
+to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (Q. 66, A.
+2). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be
+necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to
+not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter
+existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in
+potentiality to any other form.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a
+created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be
+preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the
+builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time
+after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God
+cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create
+it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some
+active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and
+violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be.
+Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some
+active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature
+that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances
+and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to
+not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by
+some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be
+efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the
+preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But
+this is not so; because this action does not give being to the
+creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does
+it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not
+keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually
+adding something new to the creature; either of which is
+unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 1:3): "Upholding all things by
+the word of His power."
+
+_I answer that,_ Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures
+are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a
+thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and
+accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing
+the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a
+child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God
+preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such
+a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary
+to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve
+another _per se_ and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends
+on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In
+this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being
+of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it
+subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by
+the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).
+
+This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so
+far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the
+cause of the _becoming_ of its effect, but not directly of its
+_being._ This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings:
+for the builder causes the house in its _becoming,_ but he is not the
+direct cause of its _being._ For it is clear that the _being_ of the
+house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together
+and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural
+qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying
+the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by
+making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put
+together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the _being_
+of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its
+_becoming_ depends on the action of the builder. The same principle
+applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form
+as such, neither will it be directly the cause of _being_ which
+results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in
+its _becoming_ only.
+
+Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot
+directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the
+cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of
+the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is
+in matter--in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter"
+receives _this form._ And this is to be the cause of _becoming,_ as
+when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural
+effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active
+cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause,
+then the _becoming_ of the effect, but not its _being,_ depends on
+the agent.
+
+Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the
+impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent:
+as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect
+of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the
+generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such
+an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as
+existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of
+_becoming_ but also the cause of _being._
+
+Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action
+of the agent ceases which causes the _becoming_ of the effect: so
+neither can the _being_ of a thing continue after that action of the
+agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in
+_becoming_ but also in _being._ This is why hot water retains heat
+after the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary, the
+air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun
+ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the
+fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it
+were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that
+form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and
+inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the
+imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand,
+air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it
+exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since
+it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the
+sun.
+
+Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun
+which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and
+as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is
+Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His
+existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that
+its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen.
+ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His
+creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would
+collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: "As the
+air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by
+the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: _Being_ naturally results from the form of a creature,
+given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from
+the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun.
+Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and
+heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His
+influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being
+after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make
+it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature
+needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect
+depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison
+with an agent that is not the cause of _being_ but only of _becoming._
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation
+which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not
+need to be preserved thus, as stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The preservation of things by God is a continuation of
+that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without
+either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air
+is by the continual influence of the sun.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Preserves Every Creature Immediately?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature
+immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action,
+as above stated (A. 1, ad 4). But God created all things immediately.
+Therefore He preserves all things immediately.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it
+cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore
+can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God
+preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of
+its _becoming,_ but also of its being. But all created causes do not
+seem to cause their effects except in their _becoming,_ for they
+cause only by moving, as above stated (Q. 45, A. 3). Therefore they
+do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.
+
+_On the contrary,_ A thing is kept in being by that which gives it
+being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes.
+Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in
+being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or
+hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and
+_per se,_ by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as
+the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a
+created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in
+corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of
+corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just
+as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many
+other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as
+to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one
+another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first
+and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way
+on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal
+cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the
+middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle
+cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.
+
+For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and
+continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the
+Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the
+diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated;
+whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of
+diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner
+astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those
+things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps
+certain things in being, by means of certain causes.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God created all things immediately, but in the
+creation itself He established an order among things, so that some
+depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He
+remains the principal cause of their preservation.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause
+on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can
+only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the
+power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving
+another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: No created nature can be the cause of another,
+as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by
+virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something
+presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect,
+without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form
+or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow
+some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light
+is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the
+source of light.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Can Annihilate Anything?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For
+Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything
+tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to
+annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist,
+since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because God is
+good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot
+cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to
+annihilate anything.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by
+His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is
+existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term
+in something generated; for when one thing is generated another
+undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord,
+but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to
+nothing."
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have held that God, in giving existence to
+creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could
+not annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we
+have said above (Q. 19, A. 4), such an opinion is entirely false, and
+absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God
+created things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6:
+"Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done." Therefore that God gives
+existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve
+things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out
+existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before
+things existed, God was free not to give them existence, and not to
+make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their
+existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to
+annihilate them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a
+cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as
+such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a
+thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency
+of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can
+be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing
+His action therefrom.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by
+natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on
+creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to
+His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so,
+without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in
+existence.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If God were to annihilate anything, this would not
+imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Anything Is Annihilated?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end
+corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing
+but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall
+be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite
+power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
+viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time."
+Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at
+some time it will be reduced to nothing.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of
+themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are
+reduced to nothing.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that
+all the works that God hath made continue for ever."
+
+_I answer that,_ Some of those things which God does in creatures
+occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen
+miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will
+be explained (Q. 105, A. 6). Now whatever God wills to do according
+to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but
+those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the
+manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To each one is
+given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" (1 Cor. 12:7);
+and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.
+
+Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated.
+For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality
+to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to
+exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the
+subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of
+things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather
+the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of
+things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely
+that anything at all will be annihilated.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That things are brought into existence from a state of
+non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that
+they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation,
+since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all
+things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things
+by the word of His power" (Heb. 1:3).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A creature's potentiality to existence is merely
+receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom
+existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a
+consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things,
+however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time,
+so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving
+the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot
+resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which
+have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to
+exist for ever.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they
+do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for
+it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their
+mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to
+nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain
+in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 105
+
+OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the
+change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God;
+secondly, the change of one creature by another.
+
+Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?
+
+(2) Whether He can immediately move a body?
+
+(3) Whether He can move the intellect?
+
+(4) Whether He can move the will?
+
+(5) Whether God works in every worker?
+
+(6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?
+
+(7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?
+
+(8) Of the diversity of miracles.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 1]
+
+Whether God Can Move the Matter Immediately to the Form?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately
+to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did.
+vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except
+that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is
+not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce
+none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some
+other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a
+general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some
+particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause
+of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form,
+except by means of a particular agent.
+
+Obj. 3: As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so
+determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we
+have seen above (Q. 104, A. 2). But the determinate being of a
+particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things
+are produced by God, only by means of particular causes.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7): "God formed man of the
+slime of the earth."
+
+_I answer that,_ God can move matter immediately to form; because
+whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the
+active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since
+the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be
+reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by
+matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the
+act of matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two
+ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by
+man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the
+cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause:
+thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are
+like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way
+the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which
+the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both
+matter and form; as we have said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 44, A. 2);
+wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by
+way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite
+generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite
+generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing
+like itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in
+matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance
+extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible
+matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of
+corporeal seeds.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: This argument would hold if God were to act of natural
+necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows
+the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it
+follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to
+determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other
+causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by
+Himself without any other cause.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 2]
+
+Whether God Can Move a Body Immediately?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately.
+For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the
+Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some
+contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact
+between God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is
+no contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the
+desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object
+of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the
+intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore
+God cannot move a body immediately.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an
+infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body
+to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between
+opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the
+same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved
+immediately by an infinite power. But God's power is infinite, as we
+have explained (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore God cannot move a body
+immediately.
+
+_On the contrary,_ God produced the works of the six days immediately
+among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen.
+1:9 "Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore
+God alone can move a body immediately.
+
+_I answer that,_ It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself
+produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created
+cause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created
+causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any
+bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated (A.
+1). For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a
+form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form
+which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the
+generator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating
+tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to
+imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement
+which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but
+it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint
+form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body
+whatever in respect of any movement whatever.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when
+two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of
+sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first
+kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is
+touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by
+moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no
+creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the
+words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself
+be touched.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but
+it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and
+apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by
+Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to
+prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first
+mover _of bulk,_ by the following argument. The power of the first
+mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover
+can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power
+_of bulk,_ would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the
+infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not
+measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved
+without time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason
+is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by
+the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of
+all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the
+mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a
+finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite
+power does not move in any time; for between one time and any other
+time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not
+in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its
+effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it
+cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not
+follow that it moves without time.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 3]
+
+Whether God Moves the Created Intellect Immediately?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God does not immediately move the
+created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its
+own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated
+in _Metaph._ ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by
+another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover.
+Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently
+God cannot move the created intellect.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle
+of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the
+intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say
+that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the
+Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which
+is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding.
+Therefore it is not moved by another.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the
+intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible
+to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God
+cannot move our intellect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught.
+But it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God "teaches man knowledge."
+Therefore God moves the human intellect.
+
+_I answer that,_ As in corporeal movement that is called the mover
+which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is
+said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is
+the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of
+the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual
+operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual
+power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in
+potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual
+understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the
+one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect,
+whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding;
+or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.
+
+Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First
+immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality,
+it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in
+each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must
+conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like
+manner, since He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in
+Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly
+in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible
+types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived from
+Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand;
+so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore
+God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the
+intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on
+the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and
+preserves both power and species in existence.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The intellectual operation is performed by the
+intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds
+from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand
+is given to the one who understands.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness of
+the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but
+it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so
+far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of
+which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses
+which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to
+enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence,
+as we have seen above (Q. 12, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 3). Hence He moves the
+created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we
+have explained (Q. 12, A. 4).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 4]
+
+Whether God Can Move the Created Will?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For
+whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be
+forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot
+be moved by God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at
+the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be
+voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another.
+Therefore God cannot move the will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to
+the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but
+to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that
+voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But
+this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): "It is God who worketh
+in us [Vulgate--'you'] both to will and to accomplish."
+
+_I answer that,_ As the intellect is moved by the object and by the
+Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the
+will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the
+power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object,
+but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move
+a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover
+surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable.
+Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for
+its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect
+is the universal being. But every created good is some particular
+good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the
+capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In
+like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will
+is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which
+is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs
+to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just
+as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs
+the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both
+ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second
+way by an interior inclination of the will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its
+natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the
+proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is
+made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not
+forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it,
+because He gives the will its own natural inclination.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within,
+that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be
+caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is
+not repugnant to being moved by another.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be
+moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed
+for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not
+prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2),
+it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 5]
+
+Whether God Works in Every Agent?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For
+we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works
+in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be
+superfluous for the created agent to work at all.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from
+two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two
+movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God
+operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from
+the creature; and so no creature works at all.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing
+made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is
+the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be
+inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the
+beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not
+operate any further in the operating creature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 26:12): "Lord, Thou hast
+wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have understood God to work in every agent in
+such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that
+God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance,
+that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so
+forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and
+effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply
+lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the
+cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because
+the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be
+bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through
+them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be
+purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the
+purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is
+always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the
+matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first
+act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and
+thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore
+understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have
+their proper operation.
+
+In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few
+kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the
+subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the
+end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a
+certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which
+moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of
+that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts
+through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art.
+For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing
+wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the
+axe which cuts through its being sharp.
+
+Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three
+things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake
+of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or
+apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the
+Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause
+of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where
+there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue
+of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus
+all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the
+cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not
+only moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and
+powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who
+nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also
+gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being.
+Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which
+is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause
+of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the
+forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause
+of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves
+the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a
+thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer
+to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God
+Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost
+in all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately.
+For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are
+attributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11:
+"Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together
+with bones and sinews."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it
+does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is
+superfluous.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of the same
+order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a
+primary and a secondary agent.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God not only gives things their form, but He also
+preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover
+the end of every action, as above explained.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 6]
+
+Whether God Can Do Anything Outside the Established Order of Nature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the
+established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3)
+says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against
+nature." But that which is outside the natural order seems to be
+against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural
+order.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order
+of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice;
+for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do
+anything outside the order of nature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it
+God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He
+is changeable; which cannot be said.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God
+sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of
+nature."
+
+_I answer that,_ From each cause there results a certain order to its
+effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the
+multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders,
+subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore
+a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but
+conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the
+father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is
+contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the
+ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king,
+by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.
+
+If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first
+cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so,
+He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness.
+But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary
+cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not
+subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this
+order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural
+necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have
+created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something
+outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by
+producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by
+producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So
+Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts against the wonted
+course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme
+law; because He does not act against Himself."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In natural things something may happen outside this
+natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent
+which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example,
+when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its
+natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against
+nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the
+natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is
+clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature;
+although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward
+direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on
+which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore
+since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does
+anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore
+Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each
+thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and
+order in nature."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the First
+Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do
+nothing against such order.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that
+at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do
+otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this
+order, He does not change.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Whatever God Does Outside the Natural Order Is Miraculous?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside
+the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the
+world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are
+done by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by
+the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called
+miracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural
+order is a miracle.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom
+occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our
+hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate
+credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of nature are not
+arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and
+healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they
+happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be
+healed by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the
+faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they
+beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead,
+which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore
+not all things are outside the course of nature are miraculous.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now
+admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes
+things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to
+the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without
+studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs
+outside the order of nature is miraculous.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where
+God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are
+accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."
+
+_I answer that,_ The word miracle is derived from admiration, which
+arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as
+when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the
+Philosopher says in the beginning of his _Metaphysics._ Now the cause
+of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others.
+Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others:
+as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle
+is so called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely
+hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which
+God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous,
+though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles,
+because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so
+they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not
+belong to that order.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of
+the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it
+surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual,
+not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the
+usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be
+above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of
+the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which
+it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of
+nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes from faith,
+whereby we believe in the future resurrection.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in
+itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown
+to be wonderful.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 8]
+
+Whether One Miracle Is Greater Than Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than
+another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In
+miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the
+doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore
+one miracle is not greater than another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite
+exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more
+reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another.
+Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (John
+14:12): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than
+these shall he do."
+
+_I answer that,_ Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the
+Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the
+power of God, according to Isa. 40:15: "Behold the Gentiles are as a
+drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a
+balance." But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the
+power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature
+is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is
+surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for
+instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes
+backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is
+absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among
+miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the
+deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and
+giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life,
+but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles.
+Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in
+which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without
+treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is
+suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural
+cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold
+the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has
+various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power
+of nature is surpassed.
+
+From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do
+from the Divine power.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 106
+
+HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration
+will be threefold:
+
+(1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures;
+
+(2) How bodies move;
+
+(3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal
+nature.
+
+Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered:
+
+(1) How an angel acts on an angel;
+
+(2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature;
+
+(3) How an angel acts on man.
+
+The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and
+speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the
+good and of the bad angels.
+
+Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?
+
+(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?
+
+(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?
+
+(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that
+he knows himself?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 1]
+
+Whether One Angel Enlightens Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another.
+For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain.
+But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34:
+"They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his
+brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of
+grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of
+nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in
+the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God.
+Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational
+mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as
+Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not
+enlighten the mind of another.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels
+of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by
+the angels of the first hierarchy."
+
+_I answer that,_ One angel enlightens another. To make this clear,
+we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a
+manifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: "All that is made
+manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to
+communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according
+to the Apostle (Eph. 3:8): "To me the least of all the saints is
+given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what
+is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from
+eternity in God." Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by
+manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says
+(Coel. Hier. vii): "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the
+heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds."
+
+Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we
+have said (Q. 105, A. 3), namely, the intellectual power, and the
+likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can
+notify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his
+intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is
+strengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body--for
+instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is
+hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened
+by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for
+one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal
+things. Secondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards
+the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives
+the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive
+which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for
+it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner.
+Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which
+he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior
+angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us
+that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into
+many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This
+is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual
+substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform
+knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its
+inferiors upwards by analogy."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the
+Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach
+another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he
+adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know
+the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the
+greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in
+God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends
+Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types,
+the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more
+about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and
+concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by
+the types of existing things."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the
+light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural
+light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of
+nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either
+as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image
+of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for
+the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it
+adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment
+that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to
+this ultimate form.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 2]
+
+Whether one angel moves another angel's will?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel's
+will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (A. 1), as one
+angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But
+cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former
+seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to
+be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will.
+Therefore an angel can move another angel's will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of
+the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are so
+called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love
+which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's
+will.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the
+higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior
+angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the
+superior angel can change the will of another angel.
+
+_On the contrary,_ To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it
+belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness
+of the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel
+cannot change another angel's will.
+
+_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 105, A. 4), the will is
+changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of
+the power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is
+the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the
+appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one
+who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (Q. 105,
+A. 4), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing
+sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God.
+And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed,
+Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show
+thee all good" (Ex. 33:18, 19). Therefore an angel does not move the
+will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But
+he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some
+created good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the
+will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.
+
+But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by
+God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the
+willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination,
+Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent
+alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to
+which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the
+creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the
+intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's
+will.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according
+to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing
+the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect
+and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But
+the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as
+explained above (A. 1); therefore an angel is to be understood as
+cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as
+perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the
+knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in
+the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an
+enlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect
+knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is
+cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of
+light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the
+colored object.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion
+as explained above.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite
+which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it
+belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior
+appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to
+the angels.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 3]
+
+Whether an Inferior Angel Can Enlighten a Superior Angel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a
+superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and
+represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is
+called "our mother" (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are
+enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor.
+14:31): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all
+may be exhorted." Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the
+superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the
+will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as
+was said above (Q. 105, A. 6), God sometimes acts outside the order
+of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the
+order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise
+than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors
+enlightened by God can enlighten superiors.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as
+was above explained (A. 1). But since this turning to another is
+voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the
+others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the
+latter can enlighten his superiors.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says that "this is the Divine
+unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior"
+(Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v).
+
+_I answer that,_ The inferior angels never enlighten the superior,
+but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above
+explained (Q. 105, A. 6), one order is under another, as cause is
+under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to
+order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is
+done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the
+superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is
+passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God
+works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men
+may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the
+order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the
+ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made
+known to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order
+which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so
+that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not
+conversely.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in
+some degree, but not by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly
+hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its
+nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more
+sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account
+the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the
+ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God
+in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for
+science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail
+in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As above explained, there is no similarity between what
+God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual
+nature. Hence the argument does not hold.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel,
+but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made
+the order in the angels.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Superior Angel Enlightens the Inferior As Regards All He
+Himself Knows?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten
+the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says
+(Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal
+knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual
+knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than
+under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior
+angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being
+enlightened by the former.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that
+the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation,
+whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was
+accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as
+it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who
+knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory," as
+Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the
+superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know
+themselves. Therefore they do not do so.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about
+all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown
+to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could
+communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to
+objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in
+all things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf.
+Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though
+there are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually."
+And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the
+inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as
+quoted above (A. 1).
+
+_I answer that,_ Every creature participates in the Divine goodness,
+so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the
+nature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal
+agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more
+an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much
+the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far
+as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace
+share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received
+grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the
+manifold grace of God" (1 Pet. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy
+angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine
+goodness, impart the same to those below them.
+
+Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior
+as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in
+a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master
+understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more
+universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The Master's words are not to be understood as if the
+inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the
+Incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior
+angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards
+when the Mystery was accomplished.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being
+revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the
+world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is
+always something for the superior angels to make known to the
+inferior.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 107
+
+THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS
+(In Five Articles)
+
+We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points
+of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether one angel speaks to another?
+
+(2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?
+
+(3) Whether an angel speaks to God?
+
+(4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?
+
+(5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 1]
+
+Whether One Angel Speaks to Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another.
+For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection
+"each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less,
+therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech
+manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not
+necessary that one angel should speak to another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to
+oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior
+speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or
+some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot
+apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he
+says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to
+listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore
+one angel does not speak to another.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): "If I speak with
+the tongues of men and of angels."
+
+_I answer that,_ The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory
+says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the
+properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and
+unknown methods of interior speech."
+
+To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that,
+as we explained above (Q. 82, A. 4), when treating of the actions and
+powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation.
+Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways;
+first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,
+6, 7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as
+related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible
+object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of
+the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur,
+"which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible
+object passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by
+the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as,
+for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made
+known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual
+consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to
+himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior word."
+And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be
+made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept
+of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel
+speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known
+the mental concept to another.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The
+first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or
+can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of
+another, according to 1 Cor. 2:11: "What man knoweth the things of a
+man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle
+whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge,
+comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will
+directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at
+once make known to another; but some sensible sign must be used.
+Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes
+we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and
+when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the
+door of the tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under
+no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at
+once.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for
+us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an
+angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not
+only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being
+ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel
+is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his
+mental concept.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the good
+angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as
+one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself.
+But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and
+even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the
+intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is
+affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by
+the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to
+attention by some intelligible power.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Inferior Angel Speaks to the Superior?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to
+the superior. For on the text (1 Cor. 13:1), "If I speak with the
+tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the
+angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the
+inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was
+above explained (Q. 106, A. 3). Therefore neither do the inferior
+speak to the superior.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as was said above (Q. 106, A. 1), to enlighten means
+merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is
+to speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the
+same conclusion follows.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels
+by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and
+invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever
+God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an
+enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a
+superior angel.
+
+_On the contrary,_ According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel.
+Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this
+King of Glory?"
+
+_I answer that,_ The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To
+make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is
+an angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an
+enlightening; because, as we have said (A. 1), for one angel to speak
+to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he
+directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to
+the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold
+principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will
+of the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything.
+But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is
+the rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the
+mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and
+enlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was
+created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however,
+of what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be
+called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one
+says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that."
+The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of
+truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes
+from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know
+what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the
+perfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality.
+
+Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by
+comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment,
+which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the
+superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the
+principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the
+manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by
+the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to
+the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior.
+
+From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second
+   objections.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening;
+because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the
+perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what
+God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as
+was explained above.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 3]
+
+Whether an Angel Speaks to God?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For
+speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make
+known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does
+not speak to God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference
+to another, as was shown above (A. 1). But an angel ever orders his
+mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks
+to God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel
+sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel
+never speaks to God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Zech. 1:12): "The angel of the Lord
+answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy
+on Jerusalem." Therefore an angel speaks to God.
+
+_I answer that,_ As was said above (AA. 1, 2), the angel speaks by
+ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is
+ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of
+giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is
+ordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to
+the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God
+either of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the
+created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth
+and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered to another to
+receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the
+agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and in this
+way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of
+what ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he
+can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels
+speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they
+rise to emotions of admiration."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Speech is not always for the purpose of making
+something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the
+purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the
+disciples ask instruction from the master.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of
+praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by
+consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to
+perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Local Distance Influences the Angelic Speech?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that local distance affects the angelic
+speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works
+where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an
+angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is
+limited by the bounds of that place.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of
+the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one to
+another" (Isa. 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance
+has some effect.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to
+Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (Luke 16:24). Much less
+therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to
+another.
+
+_I answer that,_ The angelic speech consists in an intellectual
+operation, as explained above (AA. 1, 2, 3). And the intellectual
+operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our
+own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the "here
+and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do
+not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted
+from "here and now," neither difference of time nor local distance has
+any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is
+no impediment.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The angelic speech, as above explained (A. 1, ad 2), is
+interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it
+exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is
+who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing
+another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is
+ordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his
+speech.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by
+reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude
+of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what
+Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less one cries
+out."
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 5]
+
+Whether All the Angels Know What One Speaks to Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks
+to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do
+not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech
+local distance has no effect, as above explained (A. 4). Therefore
+all the angels know what one speaks to another.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in
+common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known
+by one, it is for the same reason known by all.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the
+enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels,
+because, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the
+heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore
+the speech of one angel to another extends to all.
+
+_On the contrary,_ One man can speak to another alone; much more can
+this be the case among the angels.
+
+_I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 1, 2), the mental concept of
+one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses
+the concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be
+ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another;
+consequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not
+by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one
+angel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of
+local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained
+above.
+
+From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the
+first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels;
+and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may
+be of something ordered to the principle of the created will, which
+is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that
+these speeches should be common to all.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 108
+
+OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and
+orders; for it was said above (Q. 106, A. 3), that the superior
+angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.
+
+Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?
+
+(2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?
+
+(3) Whether in one order there are many angels?
+
+(4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?
+
+(5) Of the names and properties of each order.
+
+(6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.
+
+(7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?
+
+(8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 1]
+
+Whether All the Angels Are of One Hierarchy?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels belong to one
+hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is
+evident that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of
+a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the
+Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4).
+Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it
+seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is
+order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one order
+towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are
+ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be
+found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy.
+Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three
+hierarchies of angels.
+
+_I answer that,_ Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above
+explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself
+and the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there
+is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and
+all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels,
+but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of
+sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There
+are two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and
+men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality on
+the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality
+is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude can be subject in
+_one_ way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be
+governed in the same way by a prince belong to different
+principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities,
+which are governed by different laws and administrators. Now it is
+evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same
+way as do the angels; for the angels receive them in their
+intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs,
+as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a
+distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same
+manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown
+above (Q. 55, A. 3), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the
+superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the
+inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the
+angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are
+enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as
+preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of
+knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with
+God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius
+says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on
+the universal created causes which in some way are already
+multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly,
+forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as
+depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest
+hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of
+the orders (A. 6). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on
+the part of the multitude of subjects.
+
+Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of
+Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it
+the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there
+exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order,
+for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is
+so directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and
+that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from
+us to apply to the Divine Persons.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This objection considers principality on the part of
+the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as
+the Philosopher asserts in those passages.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one
+way--that is, in His essence--there is no hierarchical distinction
+among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the
+types of created things, as above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: All men are of one species, and have one connatural
+mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and
+hence the same argument does not apply to both.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Are Several Orders in One Hierarchy?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not
+several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined
+is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel.
+Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one
+hierarchy only, but many.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, different orders are different grades, and grades
+among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among
+the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is
+possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not
+different orders of angels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are
+distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing,"
+"enlightening," and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is
+"cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops
+"perfecting," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the
+angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no
+distinction of orders among the angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that "God has set
+the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and
+dominion": which are the various orders of the angels, and some of
+them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained (A. 6).
+
+_I answer that,_ As explained above, one hierarchy is one
+principality--that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the
+rule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but
+confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of
+a hierarchy requires diversity of orders.
+
+This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and
+actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders
+according to the different actions; for there is one order of those
+who judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who
+labor in the fields, and so forth.
+
+But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be
+reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a
+beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order
+of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others
+are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between
+these, as the middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the same way we
+find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to
+their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to
+three--namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in
+every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order
+comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy
+is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and
+in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: All things are possessed in common by the angelic
+society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some
+than by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who
+can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the
+hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is
+unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can communicate a
+gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect
+grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this
+similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the
+angels, according to their different offices and actions.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of
+our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the
+kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"--namely, John the Baptist,
+than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of
+women" (Matt. 11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly
+hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and
+in a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the
+heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by
+reason of other different acts.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Are Many Angels in One Order?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order.
+For it was shown above (Q. 50, A. 4), that all the angels are
+unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many
+angels in one order.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many,
+which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one
+angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more
+sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the
+sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If,
+therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated
+above (A. 2), several angels in one order would be superfluous.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it was said above (Obj. 1) that all the angels are
+unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four),
+are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more
+akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of
+his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with
+the latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels
+of one order.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another"
+(Isa. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the
+Seraphim.
+
+_I answer that,_ Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to
+distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest
+details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only
+distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points.
+Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their
+orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order,
+inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals
+in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to
+distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and
+in each of the other orders.
+
+Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel.
+Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and
+orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But
+if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we
+should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own
+order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be
+hidden from us.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a
+common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but
+absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel.
+Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who
+are first, middle, and last.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: That special distinction of orders and offices wherein
+each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly black,
+the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as
+regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less
+akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders
+are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to
+the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for
+similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Distinction of Hierarchies and Orders Comes from the
+Angelic Nature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of
+orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a
+sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it
+"approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel. Hier. iii).
+But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not
+by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the
+angels is by grace, and not by nature.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as
+Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which comes
+not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts
+by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5): "which is said not
+only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De
+Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but
+from grace.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the
+heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the
+gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop,
+and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the
+angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order
+is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by
+some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of
+natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels
+is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.
+
+_I answer that,_ The order of government, which is the order of a
+multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of
+the angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the
+faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural
+knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the
+orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly,
+the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above
+their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine
+Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which
+end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the
+orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of
+grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels
+are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural
+gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q. 62, A.
+6). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the
+gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.
+
+From the above the replies to the objections are evident.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 5]
+
+Whether the Orders of the Angels Are Properly Named?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not
+properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and
+heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to
+individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are
+ineptly named.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the
+words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one
+order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and
+likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore these
+three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore
+this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the
+"Principalities."
+
+Obj. 5: Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which
+pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But
+charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore
+they ought not to be names of any particular orders.
+
+Obj. 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows
+and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it.
+Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the
+"Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the orders of
+angels are not properly styled.
+
+On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are
+so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in Isa. 6:2; the name
+"Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in Col. 1:16;
+"Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are
+mentioned in Eph. 1:21; the name "Archangels" in the canonical
+epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many
+places of Scripture.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of
+the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of
+each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of
+each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something
+may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of
+excess, and by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another
+by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its
+nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is
+attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have
+stated (Q. 13, A. 2) concerning all the names which are attributed to
+God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something
+not fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by
+participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name
+designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it
+participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess,
+but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we
+wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational
+substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter is the
+proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an
+angel as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him
+a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because
+sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a
+more excellent way than to other animals.
+
+So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual
+perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more
+excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as
+in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs
+to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the
+inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection
+belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by
+way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the
+superior perfection.
+
+So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the
+orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they
+signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom.
+xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for
+he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and
+the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought;
+by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities
+preside over the good spirits themselves."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits,
+so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But
+the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this
+manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The
+lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common
+manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation
+only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the
+lowest order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that
+the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels,"
+forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.
+
+"Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the
+medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all
+the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly
+essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and
+thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says
+(Coel. Hier. viii) that the "name 'virtues' signifies a certain
+virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine
+operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine
+gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine
+behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is
+attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the
+Divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of
+Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the
+Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that
+the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free from
+servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians,
+and from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great.
+Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy
+which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act of those who
+are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies "the
+desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God."
+Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what
+belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of
+the Divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the rest.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality"
+belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only
+to prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in
+Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are
+subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name
+"Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle
+says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God"
+(Rom. 13:2). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name
+"Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception
+of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by
+superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above.
+Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to
+be done by those who are subject to them. To preside [principari] as
+Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as
+being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so
+Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities"
+signifies "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead
+others, being first among them, are properly called "princes,"
+according to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers"
+(Ps. 67:26).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier.
+ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium
+compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the
+nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and
+hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel
+princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the "Angels," and
+angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory (Hom.
+xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over
+the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing greater things:
+and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the
+heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine commands.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only,
+but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire.
+Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim"
+according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat.
+Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which
+is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are borne
+inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat,"
+which is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain
+sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to
+the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor;
+whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised powerfully
+upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor,
+and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly we consider in fire
+the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these
+angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they
+also perfectly enlighten others.
+
+In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of
+knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," which
+Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the
+perfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their
+contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard
+to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth
+copiously upon others.
+
+Reply Obj. 6: The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders
+as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works;
+whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the
+"Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent
+attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones"
+does not include the other two; and so the order of the "Thrones" is
+distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the "Seraphim."
+For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the
+inferior is contained in the superior, but not conversely. But
+Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its
+relation to material seats, in which we may consider four things.
+First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to
+the angels who are called "Thrones" are raised up to the immediate
+knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in
+material seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits
+firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels
+themselves are made firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives
+him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the
+angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to
+the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is
+open on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels
+promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Grades of the Orders Are Properly Assigned?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the grades of the orders are not
+properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the
+names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves
+imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be supreme.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But
+the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer
+to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is
+the highest.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher
+than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher than
+the "Seraphim."
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the
+"Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed
+immediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest
+hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle,
+the "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the
+"Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the
+"Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first,
+then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels."
+
+_I answer that,_ The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by
+Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree
+as regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For
+Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above
+the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the
+"Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities" between
+the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the
+"Powers" and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim
+authority from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21)
+enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that
+"God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the heavenly places
+above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he
+places "Virtues" between "Powers" and "Dominations," according to the
+placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16),
+numbering the same orders from the highest, he says: "Whether
+Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things
+were created by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities"
+between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory.
+
+Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius,
+in which we see, that, as said above (A. 1), the highest hierarchy
+contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the
+universal causes; and third in their application to particular
+effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic
+ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first
+hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal
+disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the
+application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying
+out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in
+every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering the properties of
+the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy
+those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to God,
+the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle
+hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common
+government or disposition--the "Dominations," "Virtues," and
+"Powers"; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names
+denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels," and
+"Archangels."
+
+As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we
+consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end;
+thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an
+addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because
+God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as
+the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar
+order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the
+dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader;
+others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others
+above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this
+similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the
+first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the
+familiar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing
+immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the
+whole of the first hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets
+supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme
+excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in
+such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the
+"Thrones"; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits
+together, they are all called "Angels."
+
+As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first
+of which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this
+belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of
+carrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the "Virtues"; the
+third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done
+can be carried out by others, which belongs to the "Powers."
+
+The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing
+Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners
+and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and
+officers; this belongs to the "Principalities." There are others who
+simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others
+hold a middle place; and these are the "Archangels," as above
+explained.
+
+This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the
+highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the
+higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the
+first order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the
+Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the
+first hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of
+love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the
+"Thrones," who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for
+the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called
+"because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are
+enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening
+of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the
+Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers" is akin to the order
+of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose
+order on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once
+in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government
+of peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place
+in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof;
+"for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man"
+(Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of the kingdom of
+the Persians resisted me" (Dan. 10:13).
+
+The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also
+reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order what belongs
+to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged
+according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine
+ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii),
+"bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior;
+and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the
+good spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called
+that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then the
+"Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced
+by earthly powers, as it is written (Rom. 13:3,4). After these come
+the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working
+of miracles; after these are the "Angels" and the "Archangels," who
+announce to men either great things above reason, or small things
+within the purview of reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The angels' subjection to God is greater than their
+presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the
+former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are
+not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name
+from their nearness and relation to God.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the
+"Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a
+more excellent way, as above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As above explained (Q. 27, A. 3), knowledge takes place
+accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the
+lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a
+nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things
+are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves.
+Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to
+love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no
+difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders
+according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name
+"Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also
+agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a
+certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the
+execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory,
+the "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius.
+For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine
+ministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the
+announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels."
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 7]
+
+Whether the Orders Will Outlast the Day of Judgment?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast
+the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ
+will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have
+delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father," and this will be in
+the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will
+be abolished in that state.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to
+cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one
+angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they
+will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders
+would remain for no purpose.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. 1:14), that
+"they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall
+receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence it appears that the
+angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to
+salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the
+Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not
+outlast the Day of Judgment.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Judges 5:20): "Stars remaining in
+their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore
+the angels will ever remain in their orders.
+
+_I answer that,_ In the angelic orders we may consider two things;
+the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The
+distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the
+difference of grace and nature, as above explained (A. 4); and these
+differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of
+natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be
+corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them
+according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution
+of the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the
+Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease
+accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to
+their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the
+attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have
+different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end in
+that final consummation as regards their office of leading others
+to their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer
+necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of
+the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God
+and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful to the
+enjoyment of God Himself.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are to be
+considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions.
+In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered
+according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually
+arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest
+that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding
+middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also
+as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is
+that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can
+have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he
+is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior angels
+know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior
+angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels
+not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards
+the preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the
+Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of
+some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by
+the superior angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led
+any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who
+are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 8]
+
+Whether Men Are Taken Up into the Angelic Orders?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders
+of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest
+heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the
+middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are
+never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are
+men transferred to the angelic orders.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels,
+as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like;
+which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore
+they are not transferred to the angelic orders.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons
+to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men
+are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in
+Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will
+be transferred to the orders of angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as
+the angels of God" (Matt. 22:30). _I answer that,_ As above explained
+(AA. 4,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to
+the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace.
+Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be
+assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will
+always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men
+can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this
+is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying
+that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in
+heaven (Luke 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material
+part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which
+depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature.
+Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree
+as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this
+implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some,
+however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic
+orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will
+constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole
+society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De
+Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies of men and
+angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to
+God alone."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their
+natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above
+explained (A. 4; Q. 62, A. 6). So, as the inferior angels cannot be
+transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be
+transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to
+the grade of grace, but not of nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The angels according to the order of nature are between
+us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human
+affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But
+holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves;
+and hence according to the common law they do not administer human
+affairs, "nor do they interfere in the things of the living," as
+Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain
+special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to
+exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons,
+or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro
+mortuis xvi).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to
+the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons
+are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom
+rejects.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 109
+
+THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there
+are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether there are orders among the demons?
+
+(2) Whether among them there is precedence?
+
+(3) Whether one enlightens another?
+
+(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Are Orders Among the Demons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons.
+For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine
+says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to
+evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore
+in the bad angels there are no orders.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy.
+But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy
+principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the
+demons there are no orders.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic
+orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said
+to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem
+necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. But we
+never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or
+"Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed
+in any other order.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling . . .
+is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world
+of this darkness."
+
+_I answer that,_ As explained above (Q. 108, AA. 4, 7, 8), order in
+the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and
+according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the
+imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of
+consummate glory.
+
+If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the
+perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders,
+and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect
+grace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of
+angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above
+(Q. 62, A. 3), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we
+consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in
+those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as
+Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist
+without good (Q. 49, A. 3); so there is order in the demons, as
+possessing a good nature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part
+of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for
+Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred
+thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity;
+and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name
+"Dominations" imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to
+sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 2]
+
+Whether among the demons there is precedence?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there is no precedence among the
+demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice.
+But the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no
+precedence among them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, there is no precedence where obedience and
+subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which
+is not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among
+the proud there are always contentions" (Prov. 13:10). Therefore
+there is no precedence among the demons.
+
+Obj. 3: If there be precedence among them it is either according to
+nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not
+according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come
+from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin
+or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have
+sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior.
+Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.
+
+_On the contrary,_ On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: "While the world
+lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over
+demons."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since action follows the nature of a thing, where
+natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each
+other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by
+natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and
+movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly
+bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said (A. 1), that the
+demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions
+are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we
+mean by precedence--that the action of the subject should be under
+the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the
+demons requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees
+too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which
+"reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly"
+(Wis. 8:1).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on
+their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey
+others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common
+wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For
+it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom
+they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among
+them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with
+men, who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the
+superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their
+detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to
+unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 3]
+
+Whether There Is Enlightenment in the Demons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For
+enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can
+manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural
+knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body
+deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior
+demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it
+seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Enlightenment is not without cleansing and
+perfecting, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 1). But to cleanse does
+not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean
+by the unclean?" (Ecclus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.
+
+_I answer that,_ There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among
+the demons. For, as above explained (Q. 107, A. 2), enlightenment
+properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to
+God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of
+the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to
+another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another
+to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one
+demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental
+concept to another by way of speech.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is
+enlightenment, but only that which is above described.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there
+is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or
+in the demons, because, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 58, A. 2;
+Q. 79, A. 2), they know from the first all that belongs to their
+natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the
+superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Good Angels Have Precedence Over the Bad Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence
+over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially
+connected with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are
+not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not
+rule over the bad.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence
+for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil.
+Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that
+negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be
+admitted.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of
+nature, as above explained (A. 2). But if the demons fell from every
+order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many
+good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no
+precedence over all the bad angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the
+treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational,
+pious, and just spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that
+"the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile
+powers."
+
+_I answer that,_ The whole order of precedence is first and
+originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they
+are the nearer to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect
+and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest
+perfection and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the
+creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the
+demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence
+over the bad, and these are ruled by them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known
+by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice
+requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or
+for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors
+make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if
+compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment,
+forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on
+the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the
+fulfilment of their own wickedness.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom.
+Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels
+or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good
+angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides
+over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the
+power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger
+than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, "the
+spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Cor. 2:15), and the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and
+measure of all human acts."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 110
+
+HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures.
+Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?
+
+(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?
+
+(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies
+locally?
+
+(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Corporeal Creature Is Governed by the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not
+governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of
+action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we
+require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal
+things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed
+upon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But
+some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior.
+Therefore they need not be governed by the angels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished
+by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the
+angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species
+of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there
+are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (Q.
+108, A. 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by
+angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies
+are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial.
+iv, 6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the
+agency of the invisible creature."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is generally found both in human affairs and in
+natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by
+the universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed
+by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above
+(Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 108, A. 1), the superior angels who preside over the
+inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that
+the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of
+any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form
+individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now";
+whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as
+the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by
+the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This
+is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all
+philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they
+exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it
+belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature
+must be moved by a spiritual creature.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of
+Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are
+moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to
+assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly
+bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances
+with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human
+souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations
+were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for
+which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we
+assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the
+natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly
+bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert
+that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the
+heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about
+immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances
+were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more
+universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances
+preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over
+different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are
+not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more
+universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate
+presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the
+heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed
+with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside
+immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as
+Plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are
+derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato
+because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all
+inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence."
+
+The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual
+substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ.
+83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power
+placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): "The devil
+was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial
+order"; and Origen says on the text, "When the ass saw the angel"
+(Num. 22:23), that "the world has need of angels who preside over
+beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and
+over the increase of all other things" (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason
+of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature
+to preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even
+the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of
+corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine
+wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does
+it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as
+above expounded (Q. 108, A. 2), the orders are distinguished by their
+general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose
+proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of
+the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem
+to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their
+ministration miracles are sometimes performed.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Corporeal Matter Obeys the Mere Will of an Angel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will
+of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul.
+But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of
+man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold,
+and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much
+more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be
+done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to
+corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform
+corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much
+more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal
+matter.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic
+administration, as appears above (A. 1), and thus it appears that
+bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is
+essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is
+due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due
+to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the
+principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the
+force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul:
+but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the
+soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it
+assumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the
+[joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the
+principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic
+power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this
+visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."
+
+_I answer that,_ The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii,
+p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by
+immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are
+participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this
+opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in
+matter proceed from the concept of the _intellect;_ and that
+corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to
+have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be
+something made _per se,_ so that it would be the effect of a formal
+principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8),
+what is made, properly speaking, is the _composite:_ for this
+properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is
+called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something
+is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for
+that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to
+existence.
+
+Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch
+as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has
+a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself,
+as when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both
+matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone.
+Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God,
+or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it
+is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's
+concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which
+is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the
+command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection
+with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior
+power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for
+example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way
+than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a
+more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the
+corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking
+place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would
+not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as
+neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating
+the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish
+that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce
+matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power
+of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Bodies Obey the Angels As Regards Local Motion?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local
+motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms.
+But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated
+above (A. 2). Therefore neither can they cause in them local
+motion.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local
+motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause
+other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither
+can they cause local motion.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul
+as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of
+life. In natural bodies, however, there is no vital principle.
+Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels
+use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do
+this without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in
+local motion.
+
+_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom
+has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second."
+Hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in
+conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the
+spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect
+is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The
+reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in
+potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something
+extrinsic--that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a
+natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as
+regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme
+bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see
+that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides those
+which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the
+sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from
+the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result
+from the power of spiritual substances.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first
+motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing
+corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire
+to soften iron.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power
+of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the
+body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move
+other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence
+it can move locally bodies not joined to it.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Angels Can Work Miracles?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For
+Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues
+by whom signs and miracles are usually done."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work
+miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, bad
+Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work
+miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere
+in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the
+supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work
+miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi,
+Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]
+that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen
+may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our
+atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside
+the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for
+instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of
+nature. Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an
+inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel.
+Therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents;
+which is to work miracles.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): "Who alone doth
+great wonders."
+
+_I answer that,_ A miracle properly so called is when something is
+done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle
+if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for
+otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards,
+as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a
+miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created
+nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any
+other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of
+created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can
+work miracles.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either because
+God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are
+said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in
+the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the
+general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those
+things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature.
+But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows
+that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a
+power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So
+when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things
+are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to
+ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the
+demons; and these are said to be done by "private contracts,"
+forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be
+compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a
+magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it
+were by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in
+the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good
+Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said
+to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the
+"signs of public justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by
+making use of other sacred signs.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in
+this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Although the angels can do something which is outside
+the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside
+the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above
+explained.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 111
+
+THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire:
+
+(1) How far they can change them by their own natural power;
+
+(2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men;
+
+(3) How they guard and protect men.
+
+Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?
+
+(2) Whether he can change man's will?
+
+(3) Whether he can change man's imagination?
+
+(4) Whether he can change man's senses?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 1]
+
+Whether an Angel Can Enlighten Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For
+man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii)
+attributes enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But
+faith is immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you
+are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the
+gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but
+immediately by God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" (Rom.
+1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for
+the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them
+by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from
+God--that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God
+enlightens man immediately.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being
+enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.
+Therefore he is not enlightened by them.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the
+revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the
+angels. But such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated
+(Q. 106, A. 1; Q. 107, A. 2). Therefore men are enlightened by the
+angels.
+
+_I answer that,_ Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that
+lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above
+(Q. 109, A. 2); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the
+superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by
+them.
+
+The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way
+alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Q. 106, A.
+1), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has
+two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is
+strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according
+as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are
+proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes
+place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal
+concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel,
+as explained above (Q. 106, A. 1).
+
+The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself
+unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to
+the phantasms, as above explained (Q. 84, A. 7). So the angels
+propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of
+sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i),
+that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise
+than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils." On the other hand,
+the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of
+the angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an
+angel.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first,
+the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will
+tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of
+faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will;
+hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this
+respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that
+what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is
+accomplished by man, according to Rom. 10:17, "Faith cometh by
+hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things
+are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the
+enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels
+not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what
+is to be done.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be
+strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the
+human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth
+can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is
+assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more
+perfect knowledge of God.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be
+understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood;
+thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands
+or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to
+him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not
+follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is,
+which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner
+not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is
+enlightened by him.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Angels Can Change the Will of Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of
+man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His
+ministers a flame of fire" (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that "they are
+fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices."
+This could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore
+the angels can change the will.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil
+does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however,
+says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious
+act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men"
+(De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce
+and kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the
+will. Therefore the will is changed by them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human
+intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which
+serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive
+appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a
+corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can
+he change the will.
+
+_On the contrary,_ To change the will belongs to God alone, according
+to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord,
+whithersoever He will He shall turn it."
+
+_I answer that,_ The will can be changed in two ways. First, from
+within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but
+the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus
+change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to
+the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God
+alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from
+God alone, Who causes the will.
+
+Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this
+can be only in one way--by the good apprehended by the intellect.
+Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended
+as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also
+God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move
+the will by way of persuasion, as above explained (Q. 106, A. 2).
+
+In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in
+another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive
+appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will
+something. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these
+passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will
+ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels,
+are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of
+persuasion.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing
+them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject
+to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of
+thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the
+things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions.
+Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because such a work is
+accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher
+principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry
+of the angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The human intellect in its present state can understand
+only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will
+something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of
+the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 3]
+
+Whether an Angel Can Change Man's Imagination?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man's
+imagination. For the phantasy, as is said _De Anima_ iii, is "a motion
+caused by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an
+angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is
+contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the
+imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual,
+they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an
+angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (Q. 110, A. 2).
+Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he
+cannot change it.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit
+by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the
+other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands
+it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other." But it does
+not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor
+that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore
+it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the
+similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this
+there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of
+deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by
+changing the imagination.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by
+imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as
+appears from Matt. 1:20; 2:13, 19 in regard to the angel who appeared
+to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.
+
+_I answer that,_ Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural
+power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as
+follows. For it was said above (Q. 110, A. 3), that corporeal nature
+obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be
+caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural
+power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions
+are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits
+and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis
+iii], when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that "when an
+animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive
+principle, and movements descend with it," that is, the impressions
+left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and
+move the sensitive principle"; so that a certain appearance ensues,
+as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external
+objects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors
+may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are
+awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by
+a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will
+of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so
+also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel,
+sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without
+such alienation.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The first principle of the imagination is from the
+sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by
+the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot
+imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in
+such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the
+impressions preserved within.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the
+impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from
+the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but
+by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human
+imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect
+which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that
+he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes
+enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what
+these images signify; and then there is no deception. But sometimes
+by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the
+imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but
+by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus
+neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to
+the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 4]
+
+Whether an Angel Can Change the Human Senses?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses.
+For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an
+operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the
+sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the
+nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other
+natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible
+objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (Q. 110, A.
+4). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are
+changed always by the sensible object.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the
+people of Sodom with blindness or _aorasia_, so that they could not
+find the door" (Gen. 19:11). [*It is worth noting that these are the
+only two passages in the Greek version where the word _aorasia_
+appears. It expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of
+Sodom--namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the
+Latin "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily imply.] The same is
+recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kings 6:18).
+
+_I answer that,_ The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from
+without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within,
+for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors
+are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with
+choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the
+other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change
+in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible
+object from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as
+when he assumes a body, as we have said above (Q. 51, A. 2). Likewise
+he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked,
+whereby the senses are changed in various ways.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be
+without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this
+interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior
+principle, as above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an
+angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive
+power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any
+other power using a corporeal organ.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of
+creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since
+he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel
+can work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 112
+
+THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise
+four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?
+
+(2) Whether all are sent?
+
+(3) Whether those who are sent, assist?
+
+(4) From what orders they are sent.
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Angels Are Sent on Works of Ministry?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of
+ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But
+intellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect
+abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic
+actions are intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to
+perform their own actions.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the
+angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it
+seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is
+unseemly.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of
+wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive
+wisdom" (Ecclus. 38:25). So if some angels are sent on external
+ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation.
+But the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of
+God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which
+is unfitting.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is
+written (Luke 22:27): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at
+table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the
+angels are naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent
+to administer to us.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 23:20): "Behold I will send My
+angels who shall go before thee."
+
+_I answer that,_ From what has been said above (Q. 108, A. 6), it may
+be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we
+have already stated (Q. 43, A. 1), in treating of the mission of the
+Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from
+another so as to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another
+way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to
+be sent as proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in
+a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before by
+the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present
+everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, His power
+reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (Q. 8, A. 1).
+An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to
+the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to
+reach another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be
+"there." But it is clear from what was above stated (Q. 110, A. 1),
+that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence,
+whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal
+creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power;
+and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this takes place
+by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.
+
+Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God
+as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the
+angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is
+what is meant by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent
+instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action
+is ordered to another. Hence angels' actions are called "ministries";
+and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one
+way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an
+operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine
+says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting
+something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action
+is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by
+some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently
+have sometimes a determinate place.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by
+way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body
+should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above
+bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean
+heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of
+his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his dignity when
+not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his dignity.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by
+exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through the
+sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the
+action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary,
+regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence
+it follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his
+contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule
+and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other.
+Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels do not go abroad
+in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In their external actions the angels chiefly minister
+to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them,
+absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by
+cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior
+to every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): "Esteeming
+others better than themselves."
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 2]
+
+Whether All the Angels Are Sent in Ministry?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry.
+For the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14): "All are ministering spirits, sent
+to minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?'].
+
+Obj. 2: Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the
+Seraphim, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 6). But a Seraph was sent to
+purify the lips of the prophet (Isa. 6:6, 7). Therefore much more are
+the inferior orders sent.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic
+orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more are even
+the highest angels sent.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external
+ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the
+Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the
+angels are unequal, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 4), each angel has an
+angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the
+last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words,
+"Thousands of thousands ministered to Him" (Dan. 7:10).
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the
+statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks
+fulfil no exterior service."
+
+_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (Q. 106, A.
+3; Q. 110, A. 1), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not
+only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior
+things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation,
+however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal
+things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is
+suitable for the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was
+enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished
+immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies.
+Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these
+bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of
+the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. Nor can
+anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without
+the help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior.
+From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law
+the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet that
+sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.
+
+It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is
+greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law;
+in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old
+law. Hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides
+those who were sent to give the law.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel
+who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior
+order; but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an
+equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet.
+It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own
+proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of
+the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as
+purifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so
+immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as
+the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means
+of someone else.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are
+said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been
+said (Q. 43, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence
+there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent
+immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior
+are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior
+ministries.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 3]
+
+Whether All the Angels Who Are Sent, Assist?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist.
+For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "So the angels are sent, and
+assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme
+Spirit, God, is not limited."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he
+said, "I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the
+Lord" (Tob. 12:15). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet
+Satan assisted God, according to Job 1:6: "When the sons of God came
+to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them."
+Therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is
+because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, but
+through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine
+enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all.
+Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to
+the text of Dan. 7:10: "Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood
+before Him." Therefore the angels who are sent also assist.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Gregory says, on Job 25:3: "Is there any numbering
+of His soldiers?" (Moral. xvii): "Those powers assist, who do not go
+forth as messengers to men." Therefore those who are sent in ministry
+do not assist.
+
+_I answer that,_ The angels are spoken of as "assisting" and
+"administering," after the likeness of those who attend upon a king;
+some of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately;
+while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by
+those who are in attendance--for instance, those who are placed at
+the head of the administration of various cities; these are said to
+administer, not to assist.
+
+We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine
+Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister,
+are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "those who
+are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist
+and see the face of the Father." Yet not all the angels can perceive
+the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the
+Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the
+inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to
+the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative
+it is to be enlightened immediately by God.
+
+From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second
+objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Satan is not described as having assisted, but as
+present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii),
+"though he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to
+the angels."
+
+Reply Obj. 4: All the assistants see some things immediately in the
+glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the
+prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately
+enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than is
+seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among
+those who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than
+another.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 4]
+
+Whether All the Angels of the Second Hierarchy Are Sent?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels of the second
+hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister,
+according to Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do
+not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first
+hierarchy, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the
+angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who
+minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the angels
+of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the
+angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the
+"Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies
+subjection. Therefore the dominations are not sent to minister.
+
+_I answer that,_ As above stated (A. 1), to be sent to external
+ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine
+command in respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the
+execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are
+manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and
+therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry
+whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name
+"dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only
+disposition and command in administering. On the other hand, the
+names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels"
+and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing"; the "Virtues" and
+"Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that
+the "Prince," according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.),
+"be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders
+to be sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering
+angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to
+be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the
+production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are
+to do.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number
+of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those
+who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he
+takes the words (Dan. 7:10) "thousands of thousands ministered to
+Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands
+out of thousands"; thus the number of those who minister is
+indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is
+finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred
+thousand assisted Him." This explanation rests on the opinion of the
+Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first
+principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is
+to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified
+as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist.
+
+Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of
+angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the
+superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable
+degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal
+natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and
+more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the
+ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way,
+the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication,
+to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because ten times a
+hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand"
+it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but
+since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are
+given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than
+the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise
+number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it
+exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the
+multiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a
+hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 113
+
+OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS
+(In Eight Articles)
+
+We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and
+their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight
+points of inquiry arise:
+
+(1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?
+
+(2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?
+
+(3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of
+angels?
+
+(4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?
+
+(5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?
+
+(6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?
+
+(7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?
+
+(8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their
+guardianship?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Men Are Guarded by the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels.
+For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how,
+or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But
+man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his
+natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an
+angel.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But
+men are guarded by God, according to Ps. 120:4: "He shall neither
+slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need
+to be guarded by an angel.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence
+of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep this man;
+and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" (3 Kings
+20:39). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the
+angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some
+such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are
+given to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore
+the angels are not the guardians of men.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 90:11): "He hath given His
+angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways."
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find
+that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated
+by the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable
+spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which
+are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as
+regards conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the
+principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover
+manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and
+affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was
+necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men,
+in order to regulate them and move them to good.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree,
+but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in
+affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the
+soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by
+nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but
+not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the
+universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be
+deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): "The
+thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain."
+Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Two things are required for a good action; first, that
+the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the
+habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the
+proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this the
+Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first,
+God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as
+regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose
+precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q.
+111, A. 1).
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good by
+reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the
+instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they
+enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is
+not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice
+of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the
+ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as
+likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Each Man Is Guarded by an Angel?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel.
+For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard
+many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the lower things are brought to God through the
+medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But
+as all the angels are unequal (Q. 50, A. 4), there is only one angel
+between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one
+angel who immediately keeps men.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater
+offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than
+another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all
+the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says (Coel.
+Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different
+angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (Matt.
+8:10), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to
+have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."
+
+_I answer that,_ Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him.
+This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to
+the execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's
+providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other
+corruptible creatures, for they are related differently to
+incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common
+species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are
+the rational souls, which cannot be said of other incorruptible
+things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly
+exercised towards what remains for ever; whereas as regards things
+which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their
+existence to the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of
+God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of
+things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.),
+the different orders are deputed to the different genera of things,
+for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to
+work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable that the
+different species are presided over by different angels of the same
+order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels
+are appointed to the guardianship of different men.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons:
+first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one
+guardian is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one.
+Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man
+is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to
+provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community,
+such as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to
+others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards
+invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in
+his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard
+individual men.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As above stated (Q. 112, A. 3, ad 4), all the angels of
+the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God
+directly; but as to other things, only the superior are directly
+enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the
+same also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is
+enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other
+respects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is possible that
+some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels
+beneath him whom he enlightens.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although men are equal in nature, still inequality
+exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the
+greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Ecclus. 33:11,
+12: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified
+their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of
+them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to
+guard one man than another.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 3]
+
+Whether to Guard Men Belongs Only to the Lowest Order of Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the guardianship of men does not
+belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says
+that the text (Matt. 18:10), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be
+understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the
+superior angels guard men.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to
+minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"
+(Heb. 1:14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is
+directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in
+external ministry (Q. 112, A. 4). Therefore all the angels of the
+five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially
+necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the
+Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work
+miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are
+also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest
+order.
+
+_On the contrary,_ In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is
+attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according
+to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. v, ix).
+
+_I answer that,_ As above stated (A. 2), man is guarded in two ways;
+in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an
+angel is appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the
+lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory,
+to announce the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the
+angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one
+man. The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied
+according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent
+is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs
+to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels,"
+whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an
+archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (Dan. 10:13). Moreover
+all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise
+the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits by the
+"Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the
+lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in
+each order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however,
+probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by
+God for the higher degree of glory.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of
+individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship,
+greater or less, as above explained.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Even inferior angels exercise the office of the
+superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the
+superiors' power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order
+can coerce the demons, and work miracles.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Angels Are Appointed to the Guardianship of All Men?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that angels are not appointed to the
+guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that
+"He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If
+therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ
+also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for
+Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels are not
+appointed to the guardianship of all men.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not
+fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state
+of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore
+angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men,
+that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life,
+encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults
+of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain
+to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good
+works, do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention:
+for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps.
+31). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the
+working of Satan," as it is written (2 Thess. 2:9). Therefore angels
+are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.
+
+_On the contrary,_ is the authority of Jerome quoted above (A. 2),
+for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it."
+
+_I answer that,_ Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on
+a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is
+threatened by many dangers both from within and from without,
+according to Ps. 159:4: "In this way wherein I walked, they have
+hidden a snare for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for
+men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is
+assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, however, he
+arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in
+the kingdom he will have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon
+to punish him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of
+God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards
+His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible
+body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right that He
+should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a
+ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Matt.
+4:11) that "angels came and ministered to Him."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In the state of innocence man was not threatened
+by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as
+we have said above (Q. 95, AA. 1, 3). But peril threatened from
+without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the
+event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even
+Antichrist, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason;
+so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to
+the whole human race--namely the guardianship of the angels. And
+although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in
+their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless
+conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt
+both themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the
+good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner
+Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 5]
+
+Whether an Angel Is Appointed to Guard a Man from His Birth?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard
+a man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who
+shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says
+(Heb. 1:14). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation,
+when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a
+man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels
+enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of
+instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of
+reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as
+soon as they are born.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before
+birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is
+appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then
+admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not
+appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (_vide_ A. 4) that "each soul has an
+angel appointed to guard it from its birth."
+
+_I answer that,_ as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there
+are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel
+guardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is
+appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves
+(loc. cit.), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred
+by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as
+receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred
+by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth,
+for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter
+benefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said
+above (AA. 1, 4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man
+has an angel guardian appointed to him.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously
+indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if
+we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the
+realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic
+ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so
+efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless,
+they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by
+instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it
+has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to
+ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not
+entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still
+part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of
+the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of
+probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child
+while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from
+the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above
+quoted, says.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 6]
+
+Whether the Angel Guardian Ever Forsakes a Man?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes
+the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in
+the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not
+healed: let us forsake her." And (Isa. 5:5) it is written: "I will
+take away the hedge"--that is, "the guardianship of the angels"
+[gloss]--"and it shall be wasted."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But
+God forsakes man at times, according to Ps. 21:2: "O God, my God,
+look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does
+an angel guardian forsake man.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When
+the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes
+they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1
+Pet. 5:8: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about,
+seeking whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good angels
+ever guard us.
+
+_I answer that,_ As appears above (A. 2), the guardianship of the
+angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is
+evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn
+from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates
+being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all
+being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering
+of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some
+defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that
+the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he
+leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him
+from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin,
+according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon
+and the House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels,
+because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject
+to tribulation.
+
+From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally,
+he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his
+guardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is
+happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he
+can be with man in an instant.
+_______________________
+
+SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 7]
+
+Whether Angels Grieve for the Ills of Those Whom They Guard?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those
+whom they guard. For it is written (Isa. 33:7): "The angels of peace
+shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow.
+Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15),
+"sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the
+loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's
+will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary
+to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are
+told, Luke 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls
+into sin.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: "Whatsoever first-fruits they
+offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to
+judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or
+through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve
+for the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels
+grieve for men's sins.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not
+perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 21:4): "Death shall
+be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are
+perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.
+
+_I answer that,_ Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the
+pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine
+(De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our
+will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the
+angels and the other blessed, because their will cleaves entirely to
+the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world
+save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore
+simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the
+blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called
+simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a
+particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although
+universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the
+sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea,
+considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the
+threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is
+voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage.
+Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will
+sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the
+fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in
+respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall
+into sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels,
+i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of
+Rabsaces, as related Isa. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal
+sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are
+the apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins. If according to
+the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels,
+then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally
+speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense
+we attribute passions to God and the angels.
+
+The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one
+reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of
+the Divine Providence.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of
+men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.
+_______________________
+
+EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 8]
+
+Whether There Can Be Strife or Discord Among the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there can be [no] strife or discord among
+the angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): "Who maketh peace in His
+high places." But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high
+angels there is no strife.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, where there is perfect charity and just
+authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the
+angels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they
+guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the
+opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in
+the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder
+of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good
+angels.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dan. 10:13): "The prince of the
+kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days." But this
+prince of the Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of
+the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the
+others; and thus there is strife among them.
+
+_I answer that,_ The raising of this question is occasioned by this
+passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the
+kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of
+the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being
+offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been
+caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in
+Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the
+prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.
+
+But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of
+Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom.
+To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must
+note that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and
+various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the
+angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in
+various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits,
+so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what
+is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot
+know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult
+Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult the
+Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are
+said to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition,
+since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine
+decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in
+opposition.
+
+From this the answers to the objections are clear.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 114
+
+OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS
+(In Five Articles)
+
+We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are
+five points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?
+
+(2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?
+
+(3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or
+temptations of the demons?
+
+(4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading
+men astray?
+
+(5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from
+making further assaults?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Men Are Assailed by the Demons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons.
+For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by
+God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is
+the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail
+man.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set
+against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are
+weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not
+therefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men
+should be assailed by demons.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are
+enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed
+that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be
+assailed by the demons.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling is
+not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers,
+against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits
+of wickedness in the high places."
+
+_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the assault of the
+demons--the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault
+itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor
+to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of
+Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the
+angels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation.
+But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make
+orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in
+regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering
+thereof are to be referred to God as their first author.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by
+instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail
+us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just
+judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and
+thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish
+Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings 22:20. For punishment
+is referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who
+are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which
+they are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are
+sent by God on account of His justice.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not
+unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be
+gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the
+guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to
+his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice
+for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the
+demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men.
+But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 2]
+
+Whether to Tempt Is Proper to the Devil?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil.
+For God is said to tempt, according to Gen. 22:1, "God tempted
+Abraham." Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again,
+man is said to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not
+proper to the devil to tempt.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know
+what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the
+will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears
+from what has been said above (Q. 111, A. 2), it seems that it is not
+in their province to tempt.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): "Lest perhaps he
+that tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds,
+"that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt."
+
+_I answer that,_ To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of
+something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something
+about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But
+sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired
+through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires
+to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or
+virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge
+is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.
+
+From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in
+various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for
+the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to
+tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an
+experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help,
+sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in
+order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be
+his proper office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he
+does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may
+know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to
+know. Hence it is written (Deut. 13:3): "The Lord your God trieth
+you, that it may appear whether you love him."
+
+The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or
+matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man
+someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the
+flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity:
+of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.
+
+Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but
+the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the "weigher of
+spirits" (Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more
+prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order
+to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him
+to that vice to which he is most prone.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated
+above (Q. 111, A. 3), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a
+certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it
+can nevertheless be inclined.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 3]
+
+Whether All Sins Are Due to the Temptation of the Devil?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of
+the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the multitude of
+demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others."
+And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "all malice and all
+uncleanness have been devised by the devil."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of
+the Jews (John 8:44): "You are of your father the devil." But this
+was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation.
+Therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are
+deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the
+suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne
+to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the
+instigation of the devil.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): "Not all
+our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they
+arise from the movement of our free-will."
+
+_I answer that,_ One thing can be the cause of another in two ways;
+directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of
+a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional
+and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he
+who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we
+must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it
+was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there
+resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this
+sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.
+
+But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its
+action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the
+cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's
+instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of
+the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were
+no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like
+pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those
+desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the
+corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to
+curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need
+for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins
+which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the
+same blandishments as were our first parents," as Isidore says (De
+Summo Bono ii).
+
+Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: When man commits sin without being thereto instigated
+by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby,
+in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot
+advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man
+by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part
+in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the
+demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is
+not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 4]
+
+Whether Demons Can Lead Men Astray by Means of Real Miracles?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by
+means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show
+itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says
+(2 Thess. 2:9), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in
+all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at
+other times do the demons perform lying wonders.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change.
+But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine
+says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body
+can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power."
+Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If
+therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of
+what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the
+faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (Mk. 16:20): "The Lord
+working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed."
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Q. 83) [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4,
+among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]: "Often by means of
+the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by
+the servants of God."
+
+_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said above (Q. 110,
+A. 4), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot
+work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the
+strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the
+entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is
+contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for
+whatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can
+work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by
+reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of
+knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and
+knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so
+that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.
+
+It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which
+appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes
+nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the
+demons' power produced real serpents and frogs. And "when fire came
+down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep;
+when the storm struck down his house and with it his children--these
+were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei
+xx, 19).
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says in the same place, the works of
+Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will
+deceive men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really
+do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies,
+they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him."
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As we have said above (Q. 110, A. 2), corporeal matter
+does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons
+be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another;
+but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the
+world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin.
+iii, 8, 9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation
+of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers,
+to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be
+produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these
+seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or
+frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those
+transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature,
+cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for
+instance, that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or
+that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something
+of this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is
+not real but a mere semblance of reality.
+
+Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a
+demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses,
+so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (Q.
+111, AA. 3,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by
+the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as he
+can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so
+as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can clothe any
+corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein.
+This is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "Man's
+imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of
+an innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as
+it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be
+understood as though the imagination itself or the images formed
+therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the
+senses of another man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a
+man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's
+senses.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do
+what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different
+right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the
+glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter by
+the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is
+subject."
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 5]
+
+Whether a Demon Who Is Overcome by Man, Is for This Reason Hindered
+from Making Further Assaults?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is
+not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ
+overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon
+assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is
+not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted
+in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not
+befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not
+prevented from further assaults.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 4:11): "Then the devil left
+Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he
+can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any
+other sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same
+man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so
+for a certain definite time: wherefore (Luke 4:13) it is written:
+"All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time."
+There are two reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency;
+for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus
+Imperfectum, among his supposititious works], "the devil does not
+tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God
+allows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He
+orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken
+from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Luke
+4:13: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from
+frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return
+to the assault, is apparent from Matt. 12:44: "I will return into my
+house from whence I came out."
+
+From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 115
+
+OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE
+(In Six Articles)
+
+We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and
+fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal
+actions there are six points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether a body can be active?
+
+(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?
+
+(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here
+by the inferior bodies?
+
+(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?
+
+(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?
+
+(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things
+which are subject to their influence?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 1]
+
+Whether a Body Can Be Active?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine
+says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): "There are things that are acted upon, but
+do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted
+upon; this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon;
+these are the spiritual substances."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its
+work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance
+below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the
+latter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings.
+Therefore corporeal substance is not active.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity.
+But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it
+surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from
+receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in
+quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore
+no corporeal substance is active.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to
+its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most
+composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most
+simple. Therefore no bodies are active.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is
+either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a
+substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any
+principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident;
+and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the
+cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is
+it an accidental form, for "an accident does not extend beyond its
+subject," as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are
+active.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other
+qualities of corporeal fire, "it shows its greatness in its action
+and power on that of which it lays hold."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are
+active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three
+errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of
+Avicebron in his book on _The Fount of Life,_ where, by the arguments
+mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that
+all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the
+actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that,
+according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power
+which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be
+derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in
+corporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited
+thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were
+universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes
+of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which
+is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by
+quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and
+imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to
+be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the
+spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by
+quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else.
+
+But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but
+that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is
+participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is
+proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is
+the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else
+than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act
+as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the
+fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to
+quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and
+universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it
+owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form
+of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a
+fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is
+in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes
+from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the
+contact of two bodies.
+
+But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For
+Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred
+accidents to the material principles which are "the great" and "the
+small," which he considered to be the first contraries, by others
+considered to the "the rare" and "the dense." Consequently both
+Plato and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that
+corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing
+matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection
+attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an
+immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the
+action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of
+the creation (Q. 45, A. 8).
+
+The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes
+place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while
+passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the
+passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,
+9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole,
+and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its
+action; which things are manifestly untrue.
+
+We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on
+a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the
+whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, which thus has no
+nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature
+acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created.
+Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in
+potentiality to that which the other has in act.
+
+From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must
+be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, "There is a mover who is not
+moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand,
+there exists something moved which is purely passive," that this is
+to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure
+potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of
+potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form
+from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent,
+forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject
+to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the
+purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight;
+as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that
+weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the
+greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto.
+Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as
+Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to
+act.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: A body is not that which is most distant from God; for
+it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being,
+forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is
+primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure
+potentiality.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental form
+and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat,
+although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the
+substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can
+terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument
+of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh.
+But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the
+nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to
+surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an
+accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient;
+thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 2]
+
+Whether There Are Any Seminal Virtues in Corporeal Matter?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in
+corporeal matter. For virtue (_ratio_) implies something of a
+spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually,
+but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which
+it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that demons
+produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain
+seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues,
+can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to
+say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active
+principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter
+is not competent to act (A. 1, ad 2, 4). Therefore there are no
+seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues"
+(Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the
+production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for
+miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal
+virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal
+virtues in corporeal matter.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the
+things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion,
+certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is customary to name things after what is more
+perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole
+corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the
+word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural
+things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says
+(Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation
+of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living
+things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a
+tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united,
+consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of
+movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the
+active and passive principles of the generation of living things are
+the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine
+fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to
+all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of
+natural generation and movement.
+
+These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders.
+For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they
+are principally and originally in the Word of God, as _typal ideas._
+Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were
+produced altogether at the beginning, as in _universal causes._
+Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time,
+are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in
+that animal, as in _particular causes._ Fourthly, they are in the
+_seeds_ produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared
+to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to
+the first effects produced.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These active and passive virtues of natural things,
+though not called "virtues" (rationes) by reason of their being in
+corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their
+origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes
+ideales].
+
+Reply Obj. 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain parts
+of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement
+for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as
+employing seeds.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the
+generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the
+female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed"
+covers both active and passive principles.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these
+seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal
+virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii,
+9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is
+the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things."
+Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but
+not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a
+separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the
+scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought
+outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the
+creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God
+commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of
+the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are
+ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we
+say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 3]
+
+Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of What Is Produced in
+Bodies Here Below?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause
+of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide
+Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"--namely, the heavenly bodies--"are
+not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of
+storms and atmospheric changes."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter
+suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there
+are contrary agents--heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the
+production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe
+causality to the heavenly bodies.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be
+observed that everything which is produced here below is produced
+through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other
+such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the
+heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more
+corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a
+sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one
+may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not
+the cause of things produced in bodies here below.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a
+grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of
+a more subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says
+that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible
+bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and
+perfection."
+
+_I answer that,_ Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since
+what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is
+moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the
+whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore
+the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of
+those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of
+all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally.
+Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and
+multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies,
+as to their cause.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as
+denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation
+and corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held
+that the heavenly bodies are gods.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The active principles of bodies here below are only the
+active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like.
+If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not
+diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles
+of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the
+"dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these
+inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act.
+But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those
+accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the
+substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself
+sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some
+active principle above these material dispositions.
+
+This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate
+species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their
+substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate
+species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have
+the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in
+the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly
+false.
+
+Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10),
+to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or
+absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior
+bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates
+here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument
+of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man
+and the sun generate man."
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the
+bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of
+their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is
+contained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like
+God.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received
+in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter.
+Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is
+not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes
+into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an
+argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the
+stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various
+dispositions of matter.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of Human Actions?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of
+human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
+substances, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 3), they act by virtue
+thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are
+superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause
+impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle.
+But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that
+they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to
+their principles.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the
+outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and
+will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the
+heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions.
+Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the
+heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."
+
+_I answer that,_ The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves
+act on bodies, as stated above (A. 3). They can act directly indeed
+on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs,
+but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be
+hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot
+see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to
+corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not
+differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly
+bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow
+that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other
+animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed
+to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the
+action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore
+follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate
+actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false,
+and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that
+indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can
+reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and
+will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to
+corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently
+situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior
+apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or
+memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of
+necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of
+necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for
+although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a
+certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains
+the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the
+impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior
+powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the
+proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.
+
+To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human
+actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ
+from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of
+men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on"
+(Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect
+and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that
+heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly
+bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly
+bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by
+enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will,
+as stated above (Q. 111, A. 2).
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is
+reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause:
+so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the
+will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect
+and will.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are
+movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the
+heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist
+these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the
+truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not
+in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions
+by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to
+say that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy,
+Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
+_______________________
+
+FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 5]
+
+Whether Heavenly Bodies Can Act on the Demons?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons.
+For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass
+men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Matt.
+4:24 and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the
+heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order
+to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the
+heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are
+subject to them.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior
+bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies,
+namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words,
+forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ.
+Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action
+of heavenly bodies.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The demons are superior in the order of nature, to
+the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as
+Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not
+subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
+
+_I answer that,_ There have been three opinions about the demons. In
+the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and
+held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the
+necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies.
+This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been
+held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain powers
+useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion
+is manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are
+done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no
+way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should
+speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no
+previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move,
+and other like things.
+
+For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are
+"animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says,
+quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of
+the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said
+that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have
+said man is subject thereto (A. 4). But this opinion is proved to be
+false from what we have said above (Q. 51, A. 1): for we hold that
+demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is
+clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither
+essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: That demons harass men, according to certain phases
+of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to
+"defame God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv,
+24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because as
+they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural
+forces, as stated above (Q. 114, A. 4, ad 2) they take into account
+the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest
+that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as
+Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De
+Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action
+of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it
+is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore
+the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's
+imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Demons when summoned through certain constellations,
+come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error
+of believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly,
+because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal
+matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are
+enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals,
+songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by
+signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them
+in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
+_______________________
+
+SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 6]
+
+Whether Heavenly Bodies Impose Necessity on Things Subject to Their
+Action?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on
+things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
+effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient
+cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their
+movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their
+effects follow of necessity.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter,
+when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to
+itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject
+to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than
+theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity
+received in corporeal matter.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow
+of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal
+cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must
+of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the
+heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below.
+Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it
+follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
+Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below
+happens of necessity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De
+Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs
+observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and
+wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of
+heavenly bodies take place of necessity.
+
+_I answer that,_ This question is partly solved by what was said
+above (A. 4); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown
+that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain
+inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of
+necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
+prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of
+the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which
+human action extends.
+
+But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with
+freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by
+heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least,
+everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some
+of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause;
+and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded
+that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by
+Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.
+
+For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,
+the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered
+to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the
+majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But
+that such causes do fail in the minority of cases is due to some
+hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems
+not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of
+necessity.
+
+Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is
+a being _per se,_ has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a
+cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one.
+For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise (that a man is)
+"musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has
+not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it
+is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so
+ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases,
+clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of
+these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause.
+Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be
+reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of
+necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the
+higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some
+heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some
+combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that
+the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is
+not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not
+all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take
+place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes,
+which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore
+it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local
+distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect.
+Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body
+(for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in
+Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or
+other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of another
+cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless
+the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the
+causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+ON FATE
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are
+four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Is there such a thing as fate?
+
+(2) Where is it?
+
+(3) Is it unchangeable?
+
+(4) Are all things subject to fate?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 1]
+
+Whether There Be Such a Thing As Fate?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a
+homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): "Far be it from the hearts
+of the faithful to think that fate is anything real."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), "fate is understood to be derived
+from the verb 'fari' which means to speak"; as though things were said
+to happen by fate, which are "fore-spoken" by one who decrees them to
+happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If
+therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance
+in the world.
+
+_On the contrary,_ What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius
+(De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: "Fate is a disposition inherent to
+changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its
+proper order."
+
+_I answer that,_ In this world some things seem to happen by luck or
+chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or
+chance-like as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some
+higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are
+sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two
+servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the
+master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.
+
+So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events
+which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the
+existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De
+Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about
+Providence (Q. 22, A. 2).
+
+On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes
+place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or
+in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the
+heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than "a
+disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born"
+[*Cf. St. Augustine , loc. cit., v, 1, 8, 9]. But this will not hold.
+First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (Q. 115, A.
+4) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly
+bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate,
+since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of
+necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place.
+Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been
+said (Q. 115, A. 6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking
+neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates
+in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is
+accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No
+natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man
+intending to dig a grave finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a
+acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects
+in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active
+power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident
+here below, whether by luck or by chance.
+
+We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in
+natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining
+cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which
+happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect:
+otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: "The digger
+of a grave found a treasure." And just as an intellect can apprehend
+this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place
+where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of
+this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what
+happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some
+ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine
+intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q. 105,
+A. 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of
+which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.
+
+So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to
+Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were
+"fore-spoken," we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy
+doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted
+its application to a certain force in the position of the stars.
+Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): "If anyone ascribes human
+affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him
+keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue." For this reason Gregory
+denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's
+solution is manifest.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by
+chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to
+Divine Providence, whereby "nothing happens at random in the world,"
+as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Fate Is in Created Things?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For
+Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
+called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but
+in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as
+their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
+cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below,
+is God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and
+not in creatures.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or
+an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to
+the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing
+only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a
+disposition inherent to changeable things."
+
+_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been stated above (Q. 22,
+A. 3; Q. 103, A. 6), Divine Providence produces effects through
+mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects
+in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering
+of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering
+as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of
+certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what
+Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine
+Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by
+all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements
+of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of
+the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is
+forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above (A. 1; Q. 104,
+A. 2; Q. 110, A. 1; Q. 113; Q. 114). It is therefore manifest that
+fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the
+production of their effects.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine
+(De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature
+of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or
+will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially
+fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second
+causes.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the
+second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition
+which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies
+order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be
+considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is
+one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the
+mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote:
+"Thy fate draws thee."
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Fate Is Unchangeable?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says
+(De Consol. iv): "As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is
+to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so
+is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of
+Providence."
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): "If we be
+moved, what is in us is moved." But fate is a "disposition inherent
+to changeable things," as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore
+fate is changeable.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate
+happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate
+seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no
+contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an
+unchangeable disposition.
+
+_I answer that,_ The disposition of second causes which we call fate,
+can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second
+causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to
+the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some,
+therefore, have held that the series itself o[f] dispositions of
+causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of
+necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a
+cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as
+proved above (Q. 115, A. 6).
+
+Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as
+dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that
+fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says
+(Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the
+reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.
+
+We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second
+causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it
+derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of
+conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is
+true and necessary: "If God foreknew that this would happen, it will
+happen." Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is
+fickle, shortly afterwards adds--"which, since it is derived from an
+unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable."
+
+From this the answers to the objections are clear.
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 4]
+
+Whether All Things Are Subject to Fate?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For
+Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven
+and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them
+by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born
+into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of
+offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from
+the domain of fate.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is
+something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the
+Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says
+(De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a
+disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are
+changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above
+(Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things
+subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of
+second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is
+subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is
+done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes,
+neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification
+of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says
+(De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a
+state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence
+it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the
+more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it
+is bound up with second causes.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by
+God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in
+the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as
+stated above.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as
+to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever
+is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as
+already stated.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet
+some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And
+these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 117
+
+OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN
+(In Four Articles)
+
+We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of
+man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In
+the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and
+secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the
+first, there are four points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his
+knowledge?
+
+(2) Whether man can teach an angel?
+
+(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?
+
+(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local
+movement?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 1]
+
+Whether One Man Can Teach Another?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the
+Lord says (Matt. 22:8): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss
+of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God."
+Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it
+belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is
+proper to God.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as
+he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the
+other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his
+like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an
+active quality just as heat is.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the
+species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of
+these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause
+knowledge in another man.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple
+save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by
+words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to
+cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are
+signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know.
+If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is
+already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from
+the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can
+learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to
+a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore
+in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): "Whereunto I am
+appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles
+in faith and truth."
+
+_I answer that,_ On this question there have been various opinions.
+For Averroes, commenting on _De Anima_ iii, maintains that all men
+have one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).
+From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all
+men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have
+a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he
+communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving
+him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be
+rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true
+so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we
+consider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective
+truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all
+men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible
+species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is
+false, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).
+
+Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that
+our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through
+the participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q. 84, AA. 3,
+4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body,
+from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According
+to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his
+master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to
+learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they
+held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms,
+which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But
+against this we have proved above (Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 3) that the
+passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to
+intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).
+
+We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the
+teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from
+potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In
+order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding
+from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle
+alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone:
+whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle,
+sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick
+man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art,
+sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the
+force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed.
+First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals
+a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused
+the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior
+principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the
+principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the
+interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with
+instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use
+in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and
+employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended
+end.
+
+Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as
+is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from
+an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by
+instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of
+knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which
+certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally
+understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone
+applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the
+memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by
+his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains
+knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches,
+leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge
+of things previously unknown to him; according to what the
+Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning
+proceed from previous knowledge."
+
+Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of
+the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him
+certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use
+for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him
+certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the
+disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose
+to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of
+opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the
+learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown.
+Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed,
+by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q.
+106, A. 1; Q. 111, A. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all
+human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch
+as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to
+conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power
+to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the
+Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism
+that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer
+to know.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help
+as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the
+principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the
+intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are
+from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy
+diseases" (Ps. 102:3); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man
+knowledge" (Ps. 93:10), inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is
+signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown
+to us.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause
+knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause.
+Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the
+principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the
+principle by which one is directed in working.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light in the
+disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he
+moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of
+his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are
+proposed to him from without.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of
+things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in
+detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by
+himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own
+master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is
+required in a master.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 2]
+
+Whether Man Can Teach the Angels?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says
+(Eph. 3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the
+principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church."
+But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things
+are made known to angels through men.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately
+concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as
+stated above (Q. 116, A. 1; Q. 112, A. 3). But some men are
+instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God;
+as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1, 2: "Last of
+all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore
+some men have been able to teach the angels.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior.
+But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up
+to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom.
+xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be
+instructed by men concerning Divine things.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine
+enlightenment is borne to men by the ministry of the angels.
+Therefore angels are not instructed by men concerning Divine things.
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 107, A. 2), the inferior angels
+can indeed speak to the superior angels, by making their thoughts
+known to them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never
+enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same
+way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men
+are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's
+words (Matt. 11:11): "There hath not risen among them that are born
+of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in
+the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." Therefore angels are never
+enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of
+speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it
+belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this
+passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the
+least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all
+men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which
+hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the
+multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and
+powers in the heavenly places--that is, through the Church." As
+though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from
+the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and
+powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because
+the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this
+Church composed of men will be gathered together."
+
+It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by
+the angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place
+and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v,
+19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled
+by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became
+apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this
+way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad
+Eph.)--that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned
+certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the
+apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus
+by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which
+mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of
+God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His
+human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater than
+certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have
+such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude
+than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say
+that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree,
+though actually it is much smaller.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Man by the Power of His Soul Can Change Corporeal Matter?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can
+change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints
+work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus
+Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof
+delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working
+of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men,
+by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): "Who hath bewitched you,
+that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have
+blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially
+children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could
+change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by
+the power of his soul.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies.
+But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed
+to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed
+this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death.
+Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal
+matter.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal
+matter obeys God alone at will."
+
+_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 2), corporeal matter is
+not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent
+composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter
+and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both.
+Wherefore of the angels also we have stated (Q. 110, A. 2) that they
+cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by
+employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects.
+Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change
+corporeal matter, except by means of bodies.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power of
+grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the
+same place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says--what
+wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?"
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact
+that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual
+substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the
+soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This
+he says is the cause of the "evil eye."
+
+But it has been shown above (Q. 110, A. 2) that corporeal matter
+does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone.
+Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the
+(corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed,
+which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to
+which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air
+which is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way
+as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a
+"menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; [*De Insomniis
+ii]).
+
+Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs
+mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the
+countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who
+have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that
+by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons
+co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and the
+sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as
+stated above (Q. 81, A. 3), it is the act of a corporeal organ.
+Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive
+appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal
+operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice
+to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in
+the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).
+_______________________
+
+FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 4]
+
+Whether the Separate Human Soul Can Move Bodies at Least Locally?
+
+Objection 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at
+least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to
+local motion, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 5). But the separate
+soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies
+by its command.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the
+narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained
+power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through
+this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been
+without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the
+separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.
+
+_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul
+cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.
+
+_I answer that,_ The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a
+body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the
+body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that
+if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as
+to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by
+the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power
+the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by
+the power of God, it can exceed those limits.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are
+not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are
+naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey
+them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance
+is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will
+not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower
+degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven
+cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its
+nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it
+cannot by its natural power move any other body.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom.
+xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the
+dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is
+therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who
+pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 118
+
+OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL
+(In Three Articles)
+
+We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the
+soul; secondly, as to the body.
+
+Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
+
+(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?
+
+(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 1]
+
+Whether the Sensitive Soul Is Transmitted with the Semen?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted
+with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not
+composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence
+not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save
+from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise
+it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is
+not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by
+generation but by creation.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is the
+generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the
+vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now
+nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot
+be caused by the animal's generating power.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of
+the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But
+neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in
+the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in
+some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a
+particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body
+which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore
+the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of
+the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is
+begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it
+would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal;
+which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between
+begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct
+therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above
+(Q. 76, A. 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle,
+which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does
+not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent
+would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the
+sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The power in the semen is to the animal seminally
+generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals
+produced from these elements--for instance by putrefaction. But in
+the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power,
+according to Gen. 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping
+creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally
+generated are produced by the seminal power.
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals
+are created by God (Q. 65, A. 4). This opinion would hold if the
+sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself.
+For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would
+needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot
+be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul
+would arrive at existence by creation.
+
+But this principle is false--namely, that being and operation are
+proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q. 75,
+A. 3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since,
+therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is
+that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as
+proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the
+subsistent composites exist through them.
+
+Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator
+is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the
+sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into
+existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from
+potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are
+possessed.
+
+Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for
+instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its
+heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the
+lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some
+medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But
+living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their
+like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium--in the work
+of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium--in the
+act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives
+a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the
+instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent.
+And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the
+instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter
+whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul
+of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent
+substance. We have said enough (Q. 25, A. 3) on this point, nor need
+we repeat it here.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The generating power begets not only by its own virtue
+but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the
+generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal
+begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more
+perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This active force which is in the semen, and which is
+derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain
+movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the
+soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the
+axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is
+no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is
+based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is
+attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a
+certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue
+of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the
+species as stated above (Q. 115, A. 3, ad 2). And since in this
+(vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of
+a heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun generate
+man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the
+soul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii,
+4).
+
+Reply Obj. 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active
+force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
+Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In
+this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not
+as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul
+is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract
+nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore
+is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until
+it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the
+force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for
+thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical;
+moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than
+generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by
+the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in
+one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that
+the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the
+perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the
+active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the
+semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is
+there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the
+principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an
+instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Intellectual Soul Is Produced from the Semen?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced
+from the semen. For it is written (Gen. 46:26): "All the souls that
+came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from
+the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual
+soul is produced from the semen.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, as shown above (Q. 76, A. 3), the intellectual,
+sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man.
+But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in
+other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii,
+3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but
+first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore
+also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is
+directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and
+the form there would not result something simply one. But the
+intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced
+by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is
+produced by the power of the semen.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the human
+species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational
+soul is from the begetter.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if
+the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the
+sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit
+intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the
+rational soul is not engendered by coition."
+
+_I answer that,_ It is impossible for an active power existing in
+matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial
+effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man
+transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no
+part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to
+produce the intellectual principle.
+
+Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter
+according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making
+use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever
+to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the
+intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen.
+Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows
+that the intellect alone comes from without."
+
+Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of
+the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q. 75, A. 2): therefore
+to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an
+immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only
+through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul
+is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to
+be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is
+therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted
+with the semen.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the
+whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in the
+embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or
+from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are
+false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth
+cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said
+that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the
+beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.
+
+Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which
+existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in
+addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus
+there would be in man three souls of which one would be in
+potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Q. 76,
+A. 3).
+
+Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely
+vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power,
+becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes
+intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by
+the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from
+without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect
+comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no
+substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of
+greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition
+of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not
+possible for the same identical form to belong to different species.
+Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal
+would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the
+imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because
+it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not
+generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in
+act. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter
+of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection;
+this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of
+the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of
+generation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that which is
+caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must
+needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was
+non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those
+who held the existence of several souls in the body--or else it is
+not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from
+this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with
+the body, which cannot be admitted.
+
+There is again another explanation, according to those who held that
+all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved
+above (Q. 76, A. 2).
+
+We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the
+corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and
+in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous
+form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the
+perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in
+this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at
+the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This
+indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from
+putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is
+created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at
+the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being
+corrupted.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not
+ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to
+one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from
+reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior
+agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the
+generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but
+the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what
+has been said above (Q. 105, A. 5; Q. 110, A. 1) that the whole of
+corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power,
+especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the
+body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul
+is from God alone.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power
+the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.
+
+Reply Obj. 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is
+good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is
+evil; in this God does not concur.
+_______________________
+
+THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 3]
+
+Whether Human Souls Were Created Together at the Beginning of the
+World?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that human souls were created together at
+the beginning of the world. For it is written (Gen. 2:2): "God rested
+Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He
+created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the
+same time.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the
+perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the
+bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to
+the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the
+universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Gen. 2:2,
+where it is said that "God ended" all "His work."
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But
+the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it
+began to exist before the body.
+
+_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the
+soul is created together with the body."
+
+_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that it is accidental to the
+intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul
+is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not
+united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were
+created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement
+is false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if
+it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would
+follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident;
+or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Q. 75, A.
+4). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the
+angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown
+above (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 85, A. 1): for man understands through
+receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above
+(Q. 84, AA. 6, 7; Q. 85, A. 1). For this reason the soul needs to be
+united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the
+sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel.
+
+Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if
+it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural
+to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is
+deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God
+should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did
+not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a
+man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.
+
+But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to
+the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the
+reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other
+reason. If because the soul willed it--this seems incongruous. First,
+because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to
+the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would
+be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not fail in
+what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why,
+having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should,
+after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a
+spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly
+revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united
+to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills
+would have to concur--to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of
+the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural
+on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent
+cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting
+nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that
+souls were embodied in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these
+opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not
+created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are
+infused into them.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from
+all work, since we read (John 5:17): "My Father worketh until now";
+but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not
+have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls
+which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the
+species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's
+soul.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: Something can be added every day to the perfection of
+the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the
+number of species.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to the
+corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it
+was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from
+the beginning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not
+death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to
+them."
+_______________________
+
+QUESTION 119
+
+OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY
+(In Two Articles)
+
+We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning
+this there are two points of inquiry:
+
+(1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?
+
+(2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation,
+is produced from the surplus food?
+_______________________
+
+FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 119, Art. 1]
+
+Whether Some Part of the Food Is Changed into True Human Nature?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true
+human nature. For it is written (Matt. 15:17): "Whatsoever entereth
+into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy."
+But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature.
+Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh
+belonging to the species from flesh belonging to "matter"; and says
+that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes
+and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to
+matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature
+belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true
+human nature.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality
+of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according
+to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed
+into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature,
+whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due
+only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking
+food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.
+
+Obj. 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there
+is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is
+generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If
+therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end
+nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the
+beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man
+throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same,
+identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore
+the food is not changed into true human nature.
+
+_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily
+food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into
+the texture of the members." But the texture of the members belongs
+to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality
+of human nature.
+
+_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The
+relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being."
+Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters
+into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in
+two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as
+in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong
+to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate
+matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true
+nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body
+belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human
+nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.
+
+Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one
+individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the
+matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that
+the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which,
+they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man.
+So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by
+posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human
+nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.
+
+But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject
+of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the
+multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man.
+According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we
+take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action
+of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the "radical humor";
+just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed
+by fire.
+
+But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to
+the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it
+can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can
+be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that
+the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which
+is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible.
+Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that
+something else be changed into true human nature. Secondly, because
+in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual
+there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case
+with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one
+individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of
+matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of
+quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter
+increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the
+matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it
+cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the
+addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result
+from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to
+matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into
+it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by
+rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some
+other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or
+lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of
+matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the
+body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of
+a child. Nor does it occur by creation of fresh matter: for,
+according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things were created
+together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific
+form." Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be
+the result of the food being changed into the true human nature.
+Fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants
+in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of
+animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment
+into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication.
+Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot
+naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does
+anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change
+of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of
+generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would
+be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.
+
+Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to
+exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in
+general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the
+individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter,
+on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual,
+so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of
+the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the
+true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the
+requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the
+change of food into the substance of the individual partaking
+thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required.
+And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human
+nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the
+individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further
+is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature,
+properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because
+this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in
+which, although there be a power of generating their like in species,
+there is not the power of generating their like in the individual;
+which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing,
+therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power,
+if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly,
+because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from
+the soul of the begetter, as stated above (Q. 118, A. 1). Hence it
+cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is
+derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly
+assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the
+nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food
+which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for
+growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer;
+but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat.
+But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food,
+took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was
+there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that
+which is formed from the food.
+
+Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is
+really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming
+the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what
+the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food nourishes inasmuch as
+it is potentially flesh."
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters
+into the mouth, but "all"--because something from every kind of food
+is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is
+generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast
+aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood
+that which first receives the human species, which is derived from
+the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does.
+By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated
+from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it
+comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For
+he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in
+matter"--for instance, wood or stone--"so in flesh, there is
+something belonging to the species, and something belonging to
+matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in
+inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished.
+Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing
+with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the
+Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and
+that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they
+are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no
+reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the
+other remains.
+
+It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is
+not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered
+from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according
+to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein,
+thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains
+together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh
+according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually
+destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of
+fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter
+is substituted in its place.
+
+Reply Obj. 3: The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the
+virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot
+be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the
+"nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the
+specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and
+the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species
+remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by
+continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore
+the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to
+transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also
+for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of
+what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this;
+and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether,
+the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water
+added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to
+become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example
+(De Gener. i, 5).
+
+Reply Obj. 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a
+certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said
+to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire
+already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the
+entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter
+transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if,
+while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on
+until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire
+will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into
+what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by
+means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural
+heat.
+_______________________
+
+SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 119, Art. 2]
+
+Whether the Semen Is Produced from Surplus Food?
+
+Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the
+surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene
+says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that "generation is a work of nature,
+producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is
+begotten." But that which is generated is produced from the semen.
+Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.
+
+Obj. 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which
+he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is
+generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive
+nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never
+existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or
+ancestors, than to any other men.
+
+Obj. 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of
+cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from
+surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to
+the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.
+
+Obj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in
+Adam "not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of
+the body." But this would not be, if the semen were produced from
+surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.
+
+_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener.
+Animal. i, 18) that "the semen is surplus food."
+
+_I answer that,_ This question depends in some way on what has been
+stated above (A. 1; Q. 118, A. 1). For if human nature has a virtue
+for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in
+another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which
+at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form
+communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing
+should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things
+generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is
+afterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the
+proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see
+that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first,
+then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a
+certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which
+virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part.
+
+Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what
+is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this
+solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken
+from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would
+be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have
+the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that
+nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from,
+then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not
+have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature,
+but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the
+solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains
+the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in
+act; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as
+mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after
+being cut in two: which is inadmissible.
+
+It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something
+separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the
+whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of
+the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (A. 1; Q.
+108, A. 1). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that
+which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the
+substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In
+this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power:
+because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as
+semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the
+Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food,
+have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and
+generate seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.
+
+Reply Obj. 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter in
+animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the
+form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the
+substance.
+
+Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on
+account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that
+generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his
+grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter
+should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a
+virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father.
+In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in
+relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.
+
+Reply Obj. 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood as
+though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from
+which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that
+both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter,
+which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal
+substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active
+seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue
+(in the production) of this man.
+
+But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal
+substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter
+from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin
+Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not
+derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal
+virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For "such a
+birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary,
+O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars), by 
+Thomas Aquinas
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SUMMA THEOLOGICA, PART I ***
+
+***** This file should be named 17611.txt or 17611.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        http://www.gutenberg.org/1/7/6/1/17611/
+
+Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and
+supplementation by David McClamrock
+
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
+will be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
+one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
+(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
+permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
+set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
+copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
+protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
+Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
+charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
+do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
+rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
+such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
+research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
+practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
+subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
+redistribution.
+
+
+
+*** START: FULL LICENSE ***
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
+http://gutenberg.org/license).
+
+
+Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works
+
+1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
+all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
+If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
+terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
+entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
+
+1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
+paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
+and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.  See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
+or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
+collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
+individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
+located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
+copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
+works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
+are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
+Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
+freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
+this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
+the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
+keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
+a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
+the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
+before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
+creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
+Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
+the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
+States.
+
+1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
+access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
+whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
+copied or distributed:
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
+from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
+posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
+and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
+or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
+with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
+work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
+through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
+Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
+1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
+terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
+to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
+permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
+word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
+distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
+"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
+posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
+you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
+copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
+request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
+form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
+that
+
+- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
+     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
+     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
+     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
+     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
+     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
+     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
+     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
+     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
+     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+     License.  You must require such a user to return or
+     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
+     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
+     Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
+     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
+     of receipt of the work.
+
+- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
+forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
+both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
+Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
+Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
+collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
+"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
+property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
+computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
+your equipment.
+
+1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
+your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
+the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
+refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
+providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
+receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
+is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
+opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
+If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
+law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
+interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
+the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
+provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
+with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
+promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
+harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
+that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
+or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
+work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
+Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
+
+
+Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
+including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
+because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
+people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
+To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
+and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org.
+
+
+Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
+Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
+http://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
+permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
+Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
+throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
+809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
+business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
+information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
+page at http://pglaf.org
+
+For additional contact information:
+     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
+     Chief Executive and Director
+     gbnewby@pglaf.org
+
+
+Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
+spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
+SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
+particular state visit http://pglaf.org
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations.
+To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate
+
+
+Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
+concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
+with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
+Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
+
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
+unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
+keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+
+Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:
+
+     http://www.gutenberg.org
+
+This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
diff --git a/old/17611.zip b/old/17611.zip
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a9dfdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/old/17611.zip