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The Project Gutenberg EBook of Practical Essays, by Alexander Bain
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Title: Practical Essays
Author: Alexander Bain
Release Date: January 23, 2006 [EBook #17522]
Language: English
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*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PRACTICAL ESSAYS ***
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<h1>PRACTICAL ESSAYS.</h1>
<h3>by</h3>
<h2>ALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D.,</h2>
<h3>EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN.</h3>
<br />
<h4>LONDON</h4>
<h4>1884.</h4>
<br />
<h2>PREFACE.</h2>
<p>The present volume is in great part a reprint
of articles contributed to Reviews. The principal
bond of union among them is their
practical character. Beyond that, there is little
to connect them apart from the individuality
of the author and the range of his studies.</p>
<p>That there is a certain amount of novelty in
the various suggestions here embodied, will be
admitted on the most cursory perusal. The
farther question of their worth is necessarily
left open.</p>
<p>The first two essays are applications of the
laws of mind to some prevailing Errors.</p>
<p>The next two have an educational bearing:
the one is on the subjects proper for Competitive
Examinations; the other, on the present
position of the much vexed Classical controversy.</p>
<p>The fifth considers the range of Philosophical
or Metaphysical Study, and the mode of conducting
this study in Debating Societies.</p>
<p>The sixth contains a retrospect of the growth
of the Universities, with more especial reference
to those of Scotland; and also a discussion of
the University Ideal, as something more than
professional teaching.</p>
<p>The seventh is a chapter omitted from the
author's "Science of Education"; it is mainly
devoted to the methods of self-education by
means of books. The situation thus assumed
has peculiarities that admit of being handled
apart from the general theory of Education.</p>
<p>The eighth contends for the extension of
liberty of thought, as regards Sectarian Creeds
and Subscription to Articles. The total emancipation
of the clerical body from the thraldom
of subscription, is here advocated without reservation.</p>
<p>The concluding essay discusses the Procedure
of Deliberative Bodies. Its novelty
lies chiefly in proposing to carry out, more
thoroughly than has yet been done, a few
devices already familiar. But for an extraordinary
reluctance in all quarters to adapt simple
and obvious remedies to a growing evil, the
article need never have appeared. It so happens,
that the case principally before the public
mind at present, is the deadlock in the House
of Commons; yet, had that stood alone, the
author would not have ventured to meddle
with the subject. The difficulty, however, is
widely felt: and the principles here put forward
are perfectly general; being applicable wherever
deliberative bodies are numerously constituted
and heavily laden with business.</p>
<p>ABERDEEN, <i>March</i>, 1884.</p>
<hr style="width: 65%;" />
<h2>CONTENTS.</h2>
<br />
<h4><a href='#EI'>I. COMMON ERRORS ON THE MIND.</a></h4>
<br />
<p><i>Error regarding Mind as a whole—that Mind can be exerted without
bodily expenditure</i>.</p>
<br />
<p>Errors with regard to the FEELINGS.</p>
<p><a href='#I.I'>I. Advice to take on cheerfulness.</a></p>
<p><i>Authorities for this prescription.</i><br />
<i>Presumptions against our ability to comply with it</i>.<br />
<i>Concurrence of the cheerful temperament with youth and health</i>.<br />
<i>With special corporeal vigour. With absence of care and anxiety</i>.<br />
<i>Limitation of Force applies to the mind</i>.<br />
<i>The only means of rescuing from dulness—to increase the supports
and diminish the burdens of life</i>.<br />
<i>Difficulties In the choice of amusements</i>.</p>
<br />
<p><a href='#I.II'>II. Prescribing certain tastes, or pursuits, to persons indiscriminately.</a></p>
<p><i>Tastes must repose as natural endowment, or else in prolonged education</i>.</p>
<br />
<p><a href='#I.III'>III. Inverted relationship of Feelings and Imagination.</a></p>
<p><i>Imagination does not determine Feeling, but the reverse</i>.<br />
<i>Examples:—Bacon, Shelley, Byron, Burke, Chalmers, the Orientals,
the Chinese, the Celt, and the Saxon</i>.</p>
<br />
<p><a href='#I.IV'>IV. Fallaciousness of the view, that happiness is best gained by not
being aimed at.</a></p>
<p><i>Seemingly a self-contradiction</i>.<br />
<i>Butler's view of the disinterestedness of Appetite</i>.<br />
<i>Apart from pleasure and pain, Appetite would not move us</i>.<br />
<i>Parallel from other ends of pursuit—Health</i>.<br />
<i>Life has two aims—Happiness and Virtue—each to be sought directly
on its own account</i>.</p>
<br />
<p>Errors connected with the WILL.</p>
<p><a href='#I.Ib'>I. Cost of energy, of Will. Need of a suitable physical confirmation.</a></p>
<p><i>Courage, Prudence, Belief</i>.</p>
<br />
<p><a href='#I.IIb'>II. Free-will a centre of various fallacies.</a></p>
<p><i>Doctrines repudiated from the offence given to personal dignity.
Operation of this on the history of Free-will</i>.</p>
<br />
<p><a href='#I.IIIb'>III. Departing from the usual rendering of a fact, treated as denying
the fact.</a></p>
<p><i>Metaphysical and Ethical examples</i>.<br />
<i>Alliance of Mind and Matter</i>.<br />
<i>Perception of a Material World</i>.</p>
<br />
<p><a href='#I.IVb'>IV. The terms Freedom and Necessity miss the real point of the
human will.</a></p>
<p><a href='#I.Vb'>V. Moral Ability and Inability.—Fallacy of seizing a question by the
wrong end.</a></p>
<p><i>Proper signification of Moral Inability—insufficiency of the ordinary
motives, but not of all motives</i>.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<h4><a href='#EII'>II. ERRORS OF SUPPRESSED CORRELATIVES.</a></h4>
<br />
<p>Meanings of Relativity—intellectual and emotional.</p>
<p>All impressions greatest at first. Law of Accommodation and habit.</p>
<p>The pleasure of rest presupposes toil.</p>
<p>Knowledge has its charm from previous ignorance.</p>
<p>Silence is of value, after excess of speech.</p>
<p>Previous pain not, in all cases, necessary to pleasure.</p>
<p>Simplicity of Style praiseworthy only under prevailing artificiality.
To extol Knowledge is to reprobate Ignorance.</p>
<p>Authority appealed to, when in our favour, repudiated when against
us.</p>
<p>Fallacy of declaring all labour honourable alike.</p>
<p>The happiness of Justice supposes reciprocity.</p>
<p>Love and Benevolence need to be reciprocated.</p>
<p>The <i>moral nature</i> of God—a fallacy of suppressed correlative</p>
<p>A perpetual miracle—a self-contradiction.</p>
<p>Fallacy that, in the world, everything is mysterious.</p>
<p>Proper meaning of Mystery.</p>
<p>Locke and Newton on the true nature of Explanation</p>
<p>The Understanding cannot transcend its own experience.—Time and
Space, their Infinity.</p>
<p>We can assimilate facts, and generalise the many into one. This
alone constitutes Explanation.</p>
<p>Example from Gravity: not now mysterious.</p>
<p>Body and Mind. In what ways the mysteriousness of their union
might be done away with.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<h4><a href='#EIII'>III. THE CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS.</a></h4>
<br />
<p><a href='#III.I'>I. HISTORICAL SKETCH.</a></p>
<p>First official recommendation of Competitive Examinations.</p>
<p>Successive steps towards their adoption.</p>
<p>First absolutely open Competition—in the India Service.</p>
<p>Macaulay's Report on the subjects for examination and their values.</p>
<p>Table of Subjects. Innovations of Lord Salisbury.</p>
<p>An amended Table.</p>
<br />
<p><a href='#III.II'>II. THE SCIENCE CONSIDERED.</a></p>
<p>Doubts expressed as to the expediency of the competitive system.</p>
<p>Criticism of the present prescription for the higher Services.</p>
<p>The Commissioners' Scheme of Mathematics and Natural Science
objectionable.</p>
<p>Classification of the Sciences into Abstract or fundamental, and Concrete
or derivative.</p>
<p>Those of the first class have a fixed order, the order of dependence.</p>
<p>The other class is represented by the Natural History Sciences, which
bring into play the Logic of Classification.</p>
<p>Each of these is allied to one or other members of the primary
Sciences.</p>
<p>The Commissioners' Table misstates the relationships of the various
Sciences.</p>
<p>The London University Scheme a better model.</p>
<p>The choice allowed by the Commissioners not founded on a proper
principle.</p>
<p>The higher Mathematics encouraged to excess.</p>
<p>Amended scheme of comparative values.</p>
<p>Position of Languages in the examinations.</p>
<p>The place in education of Language generally.</p>
<p>Purposes of Language acquisition.</p>
<p>Altered position of the Classical, languages.</p>
<p>Alleged benefits of these languages, after ceasing to be valuable in
their original use.</p>
<p>The teaching of the languages does not correspond to these secondary
values.</p>
<p>Languages are not a proper subject for competition with a view to
appointments.</p>
<p>For foreign service, there should be a pass examination in the languages
needful.</p>
<p>The training powers attributed to languages should be tested in its
own character.</p>
<p>Instead of the Languages of Greece, Rome, &c., substitute the History
and Literature.</p>
<p>Allocation of marks under this view.</p>
<p>Objections answered.</p>
<p>Certain subjects should be obligatory.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<h4><a href='#EIV'>IV. THE CLASSICAL CONTROVERSY. ITS PRESENT ASPECT.</a></h4>
<br />
<p>Attack on Classics by Combe, fifty years ago.</p>
<p>Alternative proposals at the present day:—</p>
<p><a href='#IV.1'>1. The existing system
Attempts at extending the Science course under this system.</a></p>
<p><a href='#IV.2'>2. Remitting Greek in favour of a modern language. A defective
arrangement.</a></p>
<p><a href='#IV.3'>3. Remitting both Latin and Greek in favour of French and German.</a></p>
<p><a href='#IV.4'>4. Complete bifurcation of the Classical and the Modern sides.</a></p>
<p>The Universities must be prepared to admit a thorough modern alternative
course.</p>
<p>Latin should not be compulsory in the modern side.</p>
<p>Defences of Classics.</p>
<p>The argument from the Greeks knowing only their own language—
never answered.</p>
<p>Admission that the teaching of classics needs improvement.</p>
<p>Alleged results of contact with the great authors of Greece and
Rome—unsupported by facts.</p>
<p>Amount of benefit attainable without knowledge of originals.</p>
<p>The element of training may be obtained from modern languages.</p>
<p>The classics said to keep the mind free from party bias.</p>
<p>Canon Liddon's argument in favour of Greek as a study.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<h4><a href='#EV.'>V. METAPHYSICS AND DEBATING SOCIETIES.</a></h4>
<br />
<p>Metaphysics here taken as comprising Psychology, Logic, and their
dependent sciences.</p>
<p>Importance of the two fundamental departments.</p>
<p>The great problems, such as Free-will and External Perception
should be run up into systematic Psychology.</p>
<p>Logic also requires to be followed out systematically.</p>
<p>Slender connection of Logic and Psychology.</p>
<p>Derivative Sciences:—Education.</p>
<p>Aesthetics—a corner of the larger field of Human Happiness</p>
<p>The treatment of Happiness should be dissevered from Ethics</p>
<p>Adam Smith's loose rendering of the conditions of happiness</p>
<p>Sociology—treated, partly in its own field, and partly as a derivative
of Psychology.</p>
<p>Through it lies the way to Ethics.</p>
<p>The sociological and the ethical ends compared.</p>
<p>Factitious applications of Metaphysical study.</p>
<p>Bearings on Theology, as regards both attack and defence.</p>
<p>Incapable of supplying the place of Theology.</p>
<p>Polemical handling of Metaphysics.</p>
<p>Methodised Debate in the Greek Schools.</p>
<p>Much must always be done by the solitary thinker.</p>
<p>Best openings for Polemic:—Settling' the meanings of terms.</p>
<p>Discussing the broader generalities.</p>
<p>The Debate a fight for mastery, and ill-suited for nice adjustments.</p>
<p>The Essay should be a centre of amicable co-operation, which would
have special advantages.</p>
<p>Avoidance of such debates as are from their very nature interminable.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<h4><a href='#EVI'>VI. THE UNIVERSITY IDEAL—PAST AND PRESENT.</a></h4>
<br />
<p>The Higher Teaching in Greece.</p>
<p>The Middle Age and Boëthius.</p>
<p>Eve of the University.</p>
<p>Separation of Philosophy from Theology.</p>
<p>The Universities of Scotland founded—their history.</p>
<p>First Period.—The Teaching Body.</p>
<p>The Subjects taught and manner of teaching.</p>
<p>Second Period.—The Reformation.</p>
<p>Modified Curriculum—Andrew Melville.</p>
<p>Attempted reforms in teaching.</p>
<p>System of Disputation.</p>
<p>Improvements constituting the transition to the Third Period.</p>
<p>The Universities and the political revolutions.</p>
<p>How far the Universities are essential to professional teaching: perennial
alternative of Apprenticeship.</p>
<p>The Ideal Graduate.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<h4><a href='#EVII'>VII. THE ART OF STUDY.</a></h4>
<br />
<p>Study more immediately supposes learning from Books.</p>
<p>The Greeks did not found an Art of Study, but afforded examples:
Demosthenes.</p>
<p>Quintilian's "Institutes" a landmark.</p>
<p>Bacon's Essay on Studies. Hobbes.</p>
<p>Milton's Tractate on Education.</p>
<p>Locke's "Conduct of the Understanding" very specific as to rules
of Study.</p>
<p>Watts's work entitled "The Improvement of the Mind".</p>
<p>What an Art of Study should attempt.</p>
<p>Mode of approaching it.</p>
<br />
<p><a href='#VII.I'>I. First Maxim—"Select a Text-book-in-chief".</a></p>
<p>Violations of the maxim: Milton's system.</p>
<p>Form or Method to be looked to, in the chief text-book.</p>
<p>The Sciences. History.</p>
<p>Non-methodical subjects.</p>
<p>Repudiation of plans of study by some.</p>
<p>Merits to be sought in a principal Text-book.</p>
<p>Question as between old writers and new.</p>
<p>Paradoxical extreme—one book and no more.</p>
<p>Single all-sufficing books do not exist.</p>
<p>Illustration from Locke's treatment of the Bible.</p>
<br />
<p><a href='#VII.II'>II. "What constitutes the study of a book?"</a></p>
<p><a href='#VII.II.1'>1. Copying literally:—Defects of this plan.</a></p>
<p><a href='#VII.II.2'>2. Committing to memory word for word.</a></p>
<p>Profitable only for brief portions of a book.</p>
<p>Memory in extension and intension.</p>
<p><a href='#VII.II.3'>3. Making Abstracts.</a></p>
<p>Variety of modes of abstracting.</p>
<p><a href='#VII.II.4'>4. Locke's plan of reading.</a></p>
<p>A sense of Form must concur with abstracting.</p>
<p>Example from the Practice of Medicine.</p>
<p>Example from the Oratorical Art</p>
<p>Choice of a series of Speeches to begin upon.</p>
<p>An oratorical scheme essential.</p>
<p>Exemplary Speeches.</p>
<p>Illustration from the oratorical quality of negative tact. Macaulay's
Speeches on Reform.</p>
<p>Study for improvement in Style.</p>
<br />
<p><a href='#VII.III'>III. Distributing the Attention in Reading.</a></p>
<br />
<p><a href='#VII.IV'>IV. Desultory Reading.</a></p>
<br />
<p><a href='#VII.V'>V. Proportion of book-reading to Observation at first hand.</a></p>
<br />
<p><a href='#VII.VI'>VI. Adjuncts of Reading.—Conversation.</a></p>
<p>Original Composition.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<h4><a href='#EVIII'>VIII. RELIGIOUS TESTS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS.</a></h4>
<br />
<p>Pursuit of Truth has three departments:—order of nature, ends of
practice, and the supernatural.</p>
<p>Growth of Intolerance. How innovations became possible.</p>
<p>In early society, religion a part of the civil government.</p>
<p>Beginnings of toleration—dissentients from the State Church.</p>
<p>Evils attendant on Subscription:—the practice inherently fallacious.</p>
<p>Enforcement of creeds nugatory for the end in view.</p>
<p>Dogmatic uniformity only a part of the religious character: element
of Feeling.</p>
<p>Recital of the general argument for religious liberty.</p>
<p>Beginnings of prosecution for heresy in Greece:—Anaxagoras, Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle.</p>
<p>Forced reticence in recent times:—Carlyle, Macaulay, Lyell.</p>
<p>Evil of disfranchising the Clerical class.</p>
<p>Outspokenness a virtue to be encouraged.</p>
<p>Special necessities of the present time: conflict of advancing knowledge
with the received orthodoxy.</p>
<p>Objections answered:—The Church has engaged itself to the State
to teach given tenets.</p>
<p>Possible abuse of freedom by the clergy.</p>
<p>The history of the English Presbyterian Church exemplifies the
absence of Subscription.</p>
<p>Various modes of transition from the prevailing practice.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<h4><a href='#EIX'>IX. PROCEDURE OF DELIBERATIVE BODIES.</a></h4>
<br />
<p>Growing evil of the intolerable length of Debates.</p>
<p>Hurried decisions might be obviated by allowing an interval previous
to the vote.</p>
<p>The oral debate reviewed.—Assumptions underlying it, fully examined.</p>
<p>Evidence that, in Parliament, it is not the main engine of persuasion.</p>
<p>Its real service is to supply the newspaper reports.</p>
<p>Printing, without speaking, would serve the end in view.</p>
<p>Proposal to print and distribute beforehand the reasons for each
Motion.</p>
<p>Illustration from decisions on Reports of Committees.</p>
<p>Movers of Amendments to follow the same course.</p>
<p>Further proposal to give to each member the liberty of circulating a
speech in print, instead of delivering it.</p>
<p>The dramatic element in legislation much thought of.</p>
<p>Comparison of the advantages of reading and of listening.</p>
<p>The numbers of backers to a motion should be proportioned to the
size of the assembly.</p>
<p>Absurdity of giving so much power to individuals.</p>
<p>In the House of Commons twenty backers to each bill not too many.</p>
<p>The advantages of printed speeches. Objections.</p>
<p>Unworkability of the plan in Committees. How remedied.</p>
<p>In putting questions to Ministers, there should be at least ten
backers.</p>
<p>How to compensate for the suppression of oratory in the House:—
Sectional discussions.</p>
<p>The divisions occasioned at one sitting to be taken at the beginning
of the next.</p>
<p>Every deliberative body must be free to determine what amount of
speaking it requires.</p>
<p>The English Parliamentary system considered as a model.</p>
<p>Lord Derby and Lord Sherbrooke on the extension of printing.</p>
<p>Defects of the present system becoming more apparent.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<h3><a href='#Notes'><i>Notes and References in connection with Essay VIII. on Subscription</i></a></h3>
<p>First imposition of Tests after the English Reformation.</p>
<p>Dean Milman's speech in favour of total abolition of Tests.</p>
<p>Tests in Scotland: Mr. Taylor Innes on the "Law of Creeds".</p>
<p>Resumption of Subscription in the English Presbyterian Church.</p>
<p>Other English Dissenting Churches.</p>
<p>Presbyterian Church in the United States.</p>
<p>French Protestant Church—its two divisions.</p>
<p>Switzerland:—Canton of Valid.</p>
<p>Independent Evangelical Church of Neuchatel.</p>
<p>National Protestant Church of Geneva.</p>
<p>Free Church of Geneva. Germanic Switzerland.</p>
<p>Hungarian Reformed Church.</p>
<p>Germany:—Recent prosecutions for heresy.</p>
<p>Holland:—Calvinists and Modern School.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<a name='EI'></a><h2>I.</h2>
<h2>COMMON ERRORS ON THE MIND.<a name="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a></h2>
<br />
<p>On the prevailing errors on the mind, proposed to be
considered in this paper, some relate to the Feelings,
others to the Will.</p>
<p>In regard to Mind as a whole, there are still to be
found among us some remnants of a mistake, once
universally prevalent and deeply rooted, namely, the
opinion that mind is not only a different fact from
body—which is true, and a vital and fundamental truth
—but is to a greater or less extent independent of the
body. In former times, the remark seldom occurred
to any one, unless obtruded by some extreme instance,
that to work the mind is also to work a number
of bodily organs; that not a feeling can arise, not a
thought can pass, without a set of concurring bodily
processes. At the present day, however, this doctrine
is very generally preached by men of science. The improved
treatment of the insane has been one consequence
of its reception. The husbanding of mental
power, through a bodily <i>régime</i>, is a no less important
application. Instead of supposing that mind is something
indefinite, elastic, inexhaustible,—a sort of perpetual
motion, or magician's bottle, all expenditure,
and no supply,—we now find that every single throb of
pleasure, every smart of pain, every purpose, thought,
argument, imagination, must have its fixed quota of
oxygen, carbon, and other materials, combined and
transformed in certain physical organs. And, as the
possible extent of physical transformation in each
person's framework is limited in amount, the forces
resulting cannot be directed to one purpose without
being lost for other purposes. If an extra share passes
to the muscles, there is less for the nerves; if the
cerebral functions are pushed to excess, other functions
have to be correspondingly abated. In several
of the prevailing opinions about to be criticised, failure
to recognise this cardinal truth is the prime source of
mistake.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>To begin with the FEELINGS.</p>
<p><a name='I.I'></a>I. We shall first consider an advice or prescription
repeatedly put forth, not merely by the unthinking
mass, but by men of high repute: it is, that with a
view to happiness, to virtue, and to the accomplishment
of great designs, we should all be cheerful, light-hearted,
gay.</p>
<p>I quote a passage from the writings of one of the
Apostolic Fathers, the Pastor of Hermas, as given in
Dr. Donaldson's abstract:—</p>
<p>"Command tenth affirms that sadness is the sister
of doubt, mistrust, and wrath; that it is worse than
all other spirits, and grieves the Holy Spirit. It is
therefore to be completely driven away, and, instead
of it, we are to put on cheerfulness, which is pleasing
to God. 'Every cheerful man works well, and
always thinks those things which are good, and despises
sadness. The sad man, on the other hand, is
always bad.'"<a name="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2"><sup>[2]</sup></a></p>
<p>[FALLACY OF PRESCRIBING CHEERFULNESS.]</p>
<p>Dugald Stewart inculcates Good-humour as a
means of happiness and virtue; his language implying
that the quality is one within our power to
appropriate.</p>
<p>In Mr. Smiles's work entitled "Self-Help," we find
an analogous strain of remarks:—</p>
<p>"To wait patiently, however, man must work cheerfully.
Cheerfulness is an excellent working quality,
imparting great elasticity to the character. As a
Bishop has said, 'Temper is nine-tenths of Christianity,'
so are cheerfulness and diligence [a considerable
make-weight] nine-tenths of practical wisdom."</p>
<p>Sir Arthur Helps, in those essays of his, combining
profound observation with strong genial sympathies
and the highest charms of style, repeatedly adverts to
the dulness, the want of sunny light-hearted enjoyment
of the English temperament, and, on one occasion,
piquantly quotes the remark of Froissart on our
Saxon progenitors: "They took their pleasures sadly,
as was their fashion; <i>ils se divertirent moult tristement
à la mode de leur pays</i>"</p>
<p>There is no dispute as to the value or the desirableness
of this accomplishment. Hume, in his "Life,"
says of himself, "he was ever disposed to see the
favourable more than the unfavourable side of things;
a turn of mind which it is more happy to possess
than to be born to an estate of ten thousand a year".
This sanguine, happy temper, is merely another form
of the cheerfulness recommended to general adoption.</p>
<p>I contend, nevertheless, that to bid a man be habitually
cheerful, he not being so already, is like bidding
him treble his fortune, or add a cubit to his stature.
The quality of a cheerful, buoyant temperament
partly belongs to the original cast of the constitution
—like the bone, the muscle, the power of memory,
the aptitude for science or for music; and is partly
the outcome of the whole manner of life. In order to
sustain the quality, the physical (as the support of the
mental) forces of the system must run largely in one
particular channel; and, of course, as the same forces
are not available elsewhere, so notable a feature of
strength will be accompanied with counterpart weaknesses
or deficiencies. Let us briefly review the facts
bearing upon the point.</p>
<p>The first presumption in favour of the position is
grounded in the concomitance of the cheerful temperament
with youth, health, abundant nourishment.
It appears conspicuously along with whatever promotes
physical vigour. The state is partially attained
during holidays, in salubrious climates, and health-bringing
avocations; it is lost, in the midst of toils, in
privation of comforts, and in physical prostration.
The seeming exception of elated spirits in bodily decay,
in fasting, and in ascetic practices, is no disproof
of the general principle, but merely the introduction
of another principle, namely, that we can feed one
part of the system at the expense of degrading and
prematurely wasting others.</p>
<p>[LIGHT-HEARTEDNESS NOT IN OUR OWN POWER.]</p>
<p>A second presumption is furnished also from our
familiar experience. The high-pitched, hilarious temperament
and disposition commonly appear in company
with some well-marked characteristics of corporeal
vigour. Such persons are usually of a robust
mould; often large and full in person, vigorous in
circulation and in digestion; able for fatigue, endurance,
and exhausting pleasures. An eminent
example of this constitution was seen in Charles
James Fox, whose sociability, cheerfulness, gaiety,
and power of dissipation were the marvel of his age.
Another example might be quoted in the admirable
physical frame of Lord Palmerston. It is no more
possible for an ordinarily constituted person to emulate
the flow and the animation of these men, than it
is to digest with another person's stomach, or to perform
the twelve labours of Hercules.</p>
<p>A third fact, less on the surface, but no less certain,
is, that the men of cheerful and buoyant temperament,
as a rule, sit easy to the cares and obligations
of life. They are not much given to care and anxiety
as regards their own affairs, and it is not to be expected
that they should be more anxious about other
people's. In point of fact, this is the constitution of
somewhat easy virtue: it is not distinguished by a
severe, rigid attention to the obligations and the
punctualities of life. We should not be justified in
calling such persons selfish; still less should we call
them cold-hearted: their exuberance overflows upon
others in the form of heartiness, geniality, joviality,
and even lavish generosity. Still, they can seldom
be got to look far before them; they do not often
assume the painfully circumspect attitude required in
the more arduous enterprises. They are not conscientious
in trifles. They cast off readily the burdensome
parts of life. All which is in keeping with
our principle. To take on burdens and cares is to
draw upon the vital forces—to leave so much the less
to cheerfulness and buoyant spirits. The same corporeal
framework cannot afford a lavish expenditure
in several different ways at one time. Fox had no
long-sightedness, no tendency to forecast evils, or to
burden himself with possible misfortunes. It is
very doubtful if Palmerston could have borne the part
of Wellington in the Peninsula; his easy-going temperament
would not have submitted itself to all the
anxieties and precautions of that vast enterprise.
But Palmerston was hale and buoyant, and the Prime
Minister of England at eighty: Wellington began to
be infirm at sixty.</p>
<p>[LIMITATIONS OF THE MENTAL FORCES.]</p>
<p>To these three experimental proofs we may add
the confirmation derived from the grand doctrine
named the Correlation, Conservation, Persistence, or
Limitation of Force, as applied to the human body
and the human mind. We cannot create force anywhere;
we merely appropriate existing force. The
heat of our fires has been derived from the solar fire.
We cannot lift a weight in the hand without the combustion
of a certain amount of food; we cannot think
a thought without a similar demand; and the force
that goes in one way is unavailable in any other way.
While we are expending ourselves largely in any
single function—in muscular exercise, in digestion, in
thought and feeling, the remaining functions must
continue for the time in comparative abeyance.
Now, the maintenance of a high strain of elated
feeling, unquestionably costs a great deal to the forces
of the system. All the facts confirm this high estimate.
An unusually copious supply of arterial blood
to the brain is an indispensable requisite, even although
other organs should be partially starved, and
consequently be left in a weak condition, or else
deteriorate before their time. To support the excessive
demand of power for one object, less must be
exacted from other functions. Hard bodily labour
and severe mental application sap the very foundations
of buoyancy; they may not entail much
positive suffering, but they are scarcely compatible
with exuberant spirits. There may be exceptional
individuals whose <i>total</i> of power is a very large figure,
who can bear more work, endure more privation,
and yet display more buoyancy, without shortened
life, than the average human being. Hardly any man
can attain commanding greatness without being constituted
larger than his fellows in the sum of human
vitality. But until this is proved to be the fact in
any given instance, we are safe in presuming that
extraordinary endowment in one thing implies deficiency
in other things. More especially must we
conclude, provisionally at least, that a buoyant, hopeful,
elated temperament lacks some other virtues,
aptitudes, or powers, such as are seen flourishing in the
men whose temperament is sombre, inclining to
despondency. Most commonly the contradictory
demand is reconciled by the proverbial "short life
and merry".</p>
<p>Adverting now to the object that Helps had so
earnestly at heart—namely, to rouse and rescue the
English population from their comparative dulness to
a more lively and cheerful flow of existence—let us
reflect how, upon the foregoing principles, this is to
be done. Not certainly by an eloquent appeal to the
nation to get up and be amused. The process will
turn out to be a more circuitous one.</p>
<p>The mental conformation of the English people,
which we may admit to be less lively and less easily
amused than the temperament of Irishmen, Frenchmen,
Spaniards, Italians, or even the German branch
of our own Teutonic race, is what it is from natural
causes, whether remote descent, or that coupled with
the operation of climate and other local peculiarities.
How long would it take, and what would be the way
to establish in us a second nature on the point of
cheerfulness?</p>
<p>Again, with the national temperament such as it is,
there may be great individual differences; and it may
be possible by force of circumstances, to improve the
hilarity and the buoyancy of any given person. Many
of our countrymen are as joyous themselves, and as
much the cause of joy in others, as the most light-hearted
Irishman, or the gayest Frenchman or Italian.
How shall we increase the number of such, so as to
make them the rule rather than the exception?</p>
<p>[SOLE MEANS OF ATTAINING CHEERFULLNESS.]</p>
<p>The only answer not at variance with the laws of
the human constitution is—<i>Increase the supports and
diminish the burdens of life</i>.</p>
<p>For example, if by any means you can raise the
standard of health and longevity, you will at once
effect a stride in the direction sought. But what an
undertaking is this! It is not merely setting up what
we call sanitary arrangements, to which, in our
crowded populations, there must soon be a limit
reached (for how can you secure to the mass of men
even the one condition of sufficient breathing-space?),
it is that health cannot be attained, in any high
general standard, without worldly means far above
the average at the disposal of the existing population;
while the most abundant resources are often neutralised
by ineradicable hereditary taint. To which it is
to be added, that mankind can hardly as yet be said
to be in earnest in the matter of health.</p>
<p>Farther: it is especially necessary to cheerfulness,
that a man should not be overworked, as many of us
are, whether from choice or from necessity. Much, I
believe, turns upon this circumstance. Severe toil
consumes the forces of the constitution, without leaving
the remainder requisite for hilarity of tone. The
Irishman fed upon three meals of potatoes a day,
the lazy Highlander, the Lazaroni of Naples living
upon sixpence a week, are very poorly supported;
but then their vitality is so little drawn upon by work,
that they may exceed in buoyancy of spirits the well-fed
but hard-worked labourer. We, the English
people, would not change places with them, notwithstanding:
our <i>ideal</i> is industry with abundance; but
then our industry sobers our temperament, and inclines
us to the dulness that Helps regrets. Possibly,
we may one day hit a happier mean; but to the human
mind extremes have generally been found easiest.</p>
<p>Once more: the light-hearted races trouble themselves
little about their political constitution, about
despotism or liberty; they enjoy the passing moments
of a despot's smiles, and if he turns round and crushes
them, they quietly submit. We live in dread of
tyranny. Our liberty is a serious object; it weighs
upon our minds. Now any weight upon the mind is
so much taken from our happiness; hilarity may
attend on poverty, but not so well on a serious, forecasting
disposition. Our regard to the future makes
us both personally industrious and politically anxious;
a temper not to be amused with the relaxations of
the Parisian in his <i>café</i> on the boulevards, or with the
Sunday merry-go-round of the light-hearted Dane.
Our very pleasures have still a sadness in them.</p>
<p>Then, again, what are to be our amusements? By
what recreative stimulants shall we irradiate the
gloom of our idle hours and vacation periods?
Doubtless there have been many amusements invented
by the benefactors of our species—society,
games, music, public entertainments, books; and in a
well-chosen round of these, many contrive to pass
their time in a tolerable flow of satisfaction. But
they all cost something; they all cost money, either
directly, to procure them, or indirectly, to be educated
for them. There are few very cheap pleasures.
Books are not so difficult to obtain, but
the enjoying of them in any high degree implies an
amount of cultivation that cannot be had cheaply.</p>
<p>Moreover, look at the difficulties that beset the
pursuit of amusements. How fatiguing are they very
often! How hard to distribute the time and the
strength between them and our work or our duties!
It needs some art to steer one's way in the midst of
variety of pleasures. Hence there will always be, in
a cautious-minded people, a disposition to remain
satisfied with few and safe delights; to assume a
sobriety of aims that Helps might call dulness, but
that many of us call the middle path.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[FALLACY OF PRESCRIBING TASTES.]</p>
<p><a name='I.II'></a>II. A second error against the limits of the human
powers is the prescribing to persons indiscriminately,
certain tastes, pursuits, and subjects of interest, on the
ground that what is a spring of enjoyment to one or
a few may be taken up, as a matter of course, by
others with the same relish. It is, indeed, a part of
happiness to have some taste, occupation, or pursuit,
adequate to charm and engross us—a ruling passion,
a favourite study. Accordingly, the victims of dulness
and <i>ennui</i> are often advised to betake themselves
to something of this potent character. Kingsley, in
his little book on the "Wonders of the Shore," endeavoured
to convert mankind at large into marine
naturalists; and, some time ago, there appeared in
the newspapers a letter from Carlyle, regretting that
he himself had not been indoctrinated into the
zoology of our waysides. I have heard a man out of
health, hypochondriac, and idle, recommended to
begin botany, geology, or chemistry, as a diversion of
his misery. The idea is plausible and superficial.
An overpowering taste for any subject—botany,
zoology, antiquities, music—is properly affirmed to be
born with a man. The forces of the brain must from
the first incline largely to that one species of impressions,
to which must be added years of engrossing
pursuit. We may gaze with envy at the fervour of a
botanist over his dried plants, and may wish to take
up so fascinating a pursuit: we may just as easily
wish to be Archimedes when he leaped out of the
bath; a man cannot re-cast his brain nor re-live his
life. A taste of a high order, founded on natural endowment,
formed by education, and strengthened by
active devotion, is also paid for by the atrophy of
other tastes, pursuits, and powers. Carlyle might
have contracted an interest in frogs, and spiders, and
bees, and the other denizens of the wayside, but it
would have been with the surrender of some other
interest, the diversion of his genius out of its present
channels. The strong emotions of the mind are not
to be turned off and on, to this subject and to that.
If you begin early with a human being, you may
impress a particular direction upon the feelings, you
may even cross a natural tendency, and work up a
taste on a small basis of predisposition. Place any
youth in the midst of artists, and you may induce a
taste for art that shall at length be decided and
strong. But if you were to take the same person in
middle life and immure him in a laboratory, that he
might become an enthusiastic chemist, the limits of
human nature would probably forbid your success.</p>
<p>Such very strong tastes as impart a high and
perennial zest to one's life are merely the special
direction of a natural exuberance of feeling or emotion.
A spare and thin emotional temperament will undoubtedly
have preferences, likings and dislikings,
but it can never supply the material for fervour or
enthusiasm in anything.</p>
<p>The early determining of natural tastes is a subject
of high practical interest. We shall only remark at
present that a varied and broad groundwork of
early education is the best known device for this
end.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[RELATION OF FEELINGS TO IMAGINATION.]</p>
<p><a name='I.III'></a>III. A third error, deserving of brief comment, is a
singular inversion of the relationship of the Feelings
to the Imagination. It is frequently affirmed, both
in criticism and in philosophy, that the Feelings depend
upon, or have their basis in, the Imagination.</p>
<p>An able and polished writer, discussing the character
of Edmund Burke, remarks: "The passions of
Burke were strong; this is attributable in great
measure to the intensity of the imaginative faculty".
Again, Dugald Stewart, observing upon the influence
of the Imagination on Happiness, says: "All that
part of our happiness or misery which arises from our
<i>hopes</i> or our <i>fears</i> derives its existence entirely from
the power of imagination". He even goes the length
of affirming that "<i>cowardice</i> is entirely a disease of
the imagination". Another writer accounts for the
intensity of the amatory sentiments in Robert Burns
by the strength of his imagination.</p>
<p>[IMAGINATION GROUNDED IN FEELING.]</p>
<p>Now, I venture to affirm that this view very nearly
reverses the fact. The Imagination is determined by
the Feelings, and not the Feelings by the Imagination.
Intensity of feeling, emotion, or passion, is the
earlier fact: the intellect swayed and controlled by
feeling, shaping forms to correspond with an existing
emotional tone, is Imagination. It was not the
imaginative faculty that gave Wordsworth, Byron,
Shelley, and the poets generally, their great enjoyment
of nature; but the love of nature, pre-existing,
turned the attention and the thoughts upon nature,
filling the mind as a consequence with the impressions,
images, recollections of nature; out of which grew
the poetic imaginings. Imagination is a compound
of intellectual power and feeling. The intellectual
power may be great, but if it is not accompanied with
feeling, it will not minister to feeling; or it will
minister to many feelings by turns, and to none in
particular. As far as the intellectual power of a poet
goes, few men have excelled Bacon. He had a mind
stored with imagery, able to produce various and
vivid illustrations of whatever thought came before
him; but these illustrations touched no deep feeling;
they were fresh, original, racy, fanciful, picturesque, a
play of the head that never touched the heart. The
man was by nature cold; he had not the emotional
depth or compass of an average Englishman. Perhaps
his strongest feeling of an enlarged or generous
description was for human progress, but it did not rise
to passion; there was no fervour, no fury in it. Compare
him with Shelley on the same subject, and you
will see the difference between meagreness and intensity
of feeling. What intellect can be, without
strong feeling, we have in Bacon; what intellect is,
with strong feeling, we have in Shelley. The feeling
gives the tone to the thoughts; sets the intellect at
work to find language having its own intensity, to pile
up lofty and impressive circumstances; and then we
have the poet, the orator, the thoughts that breathe,
and the words that burn. Bacon wrote on many
impressive themes—on Truth, on Love, on Religion,
on Death, and on the Virtues in detail; he was
always original, illustrative, fanciful; if intellectual
means and resources could make a man feel in these
things, he would have felt deeply; yet he never did.
The material of feeling is not contained in the intellect;
it has a seat and a source apart. There was
nothing in mere intellectual gifts to make Byron a
misanthrope: but, given that state of the feelings, the
intellect would be detained and engrossed by it;
would minister to, expand, and illustrate it; and
intellect so employed is Imagination.</p>
<p>Burke had indisputably a powerful imagination.
He had both elements:—the intellectual power, or
the richly stored and highly productive mind; and
the emotional power, or the strength of passion
that gives the lead to intellect. His intellectual
strength was often put forth in the Baconian manner
of illustration, in light and sportive fancies. There
were many occasions where his feelings were not
much roused. He had topics to urge, views to express,
and he poured out arguments, and enlivened
them with illustrations. He was, on those occasions,
an able expounder, and no more. But when his
passions were stirred to the depths by the French
Revolution, his intellectual power, taking a new flight,
supplied him with figures of extraordinary intensity;
it was no longer the play of a cool man, but the
thunders of an aroused man; we have then "the
hoofs of the swinish multitude,"—"the ten thousand
swords leaping from their scabbards". Such feelings
were not produced by the speaker's imagination: they
were produced by themselves; they had their independent
source in the region of feeling: coupled with
adequate powers of intellect, they burst out into strong
imagery.<a name="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3"><sup>[3]</sup></a></p>
<p>The Orientals, as a rule, are distinguished for
imaginative flights. This is apparent in their religion,
their morality, their poetry, and their science.
The explanation is to be sought in the strength of
their feelings, coupled with a certain intellectual force.
The same intellect, without the feelings, would have
issued differently. The Chinese are the exception.
They want the feelings, and they want the imagination.
They are below Europeans in this respect.
When we bring before them our own imaginative
themes, our own cast of religion, accommodated as
it is to our own peculiar temperament, we fail in
the desired effect. Our august mysteries are responded
to, not with reverential regard, but with,
cold analysis.</p>
<p>The Celt and the Saxon are often contrasted on
the point of imagination; the prior fact is the comparative
endowment for emotion.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[HOW HAPPINESS SHOULD BE AIMED AT.]</p>
<p><a name='I.IV'></a>IV. There is a fallacious mode of presenting the
attainment of happiness; namely, that happiness is
best secured by not being aimed at. We should be
aiming always at something else.</p>
<p>When examined closely, the doctrine resolves itself
into a kind of paradox. All sorts of puzzles come up
when we attempt to follow it to its consequences.</p>
<p>We might ask, first, whether there is any other
object of pursuit in the same predicament—wealth,
health, knowledge, fame, power. These are, every
one, a means or instrument of happiness, if not happiness
itself. Must we, then, in the case of each, avoid
aiming straight at the goal? must we look askance
in some other direction?</p>
<p>Next, in the case of happiness proper, are we to
aim at nothing at all, to drift at random; or may we
aim at a definite object, provided it is not happiness;
or, lastly, is there one side aim in particular that we
must take? The answer here would probably be—Aim
at duty in general, and at the good of others in
particular. These ends are not the same as happiness,
yet by keeping them steadily in the view, and
not thinking of self at all, we shall eventually realise
our greatest happiness.</p>
<p>Without, at present, raising any question as to the
fact alleged, we must again remark that the prescription
seems to contradict itself. Moralists of the
austere type will never allow us to pursue happiness
at all; we must never mention the thing to ourselves:
duty or virtue is the one single aim and end of being.
Such teachers may be right or they may be wrong,
but they do not contradict themselves. When, however,
we are told that by aiming at virtue, we are on
the best possible road to happiness, this is but
another way of letting us into the secret of happiness,
of putting us on the right, instead of on the wrong,
track, to attain it. Our teacher assumes that we are
in search of happiness, and he tells us how we are to
proceed; not by keeping it straight in the view, but by
keeping virtue straight in the view. Instead of pointing
us to the vulgar happiness-seeker who would take
the goal in a line, he corrects the course, and shows
us the deviation that is necessary in order to arrive
at it; like the sailor making allowance for the deviation
of the magnetic pole, in steering. Happiness is
not gained by a point-blank aim; we must take a
boomerang flight in some other line, and come back
upon the target by an oblique or reflected movement.
It is the idea of Young on the Love of Praise (Satire
I., 5.)—</p>
<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The love of Praise howe'er concealed by art,</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Reigns more or less and glows in every heart,</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 2em;">The proud to gain it, toils on toils endure,</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>The modest shun it but to make it sure</i>.</span><br />
<p>Under this corrected method, we are happiness
seekers all the same; only our aims are better
directed, and our fruition more assured.</p>
<p>These remarks are intended to show that the
doctrine of making men aim at virtue, in order to
happiness, has no further effect than to teach us to
include the interests of others with our own; by
showing that our own interests do not thereby suffer,
but the contrary. The doctrine does not substitute a
virtuous motive for a selfish one; it is a refined artifice
for squaring the two. The world is no doubt a
gainer by the change of view, although the individual
is not made really more meritorious.</p>
<p>We must next consider whether, in fact, the oblique
aim at happiness is really the most effectual.</p>
<p>A few words, first, as to the original source of the
doctrine of a devious course. Bishop Butler is renowned
for his distinction between Self-Love and
Appetite; he contends that in Appetite the object of
pursuit is not the pleasure of eating, but the food:
consequently, eating is not properly a self-seeking
act, it is an indifferent or disinterested act, to which
there is an incidental accompaniment of pleasure.
We should, under the stimulus of Hunger, seek the
food, whether it gave us pleasure or not.</p>
<p>Now, any truth that there is in Butler's view
amounts to this:—In our Appetites we are not thinking
every instant of subduing pain and attaining
pleasure; we are ultimately moved by these feelings;
but, having once seen that the medium of their gratification
is a certain material object (food), we direct
our whole aim to procuring that. The hungry wolf
ceases to think of his pains of hunger when he is in
sight of a sheep; but for these pains he would have
paid no heed to the sheep; yet when the sheep has
to be caught, the hunger is submerged for the time;
the only relevant course, even on its account, is to
give the whole mind and body to the chase of the
sheep. Butler calls this indifferent or disinterested
pursuit; and as much as says, that the wolf is not
self-seeking, but sheep-seeking, in its chase. Now, it
is quite true that if the wolf could give no place in its
mind for anything but its hungry pains, it would be
in a bad way. It is wiser than that; it knows the
remedy; it is prepared to dismiss the pains from its
thoughts, in favour of a concentrated attention upon
the distant flock. This proves nothing as to its
unselfishness; nor does it prove that Appetite is a
different thing from self-seeking or self-love.</p>
<p>[APPETITE DECLARED UNSELFISH.]</p>
<p>There may be disinterested motives in our constitution;
but Appetite is not in any sense one of these.
We may have instincts answering to the traditional
phrase used in defining instinct, "a blind propensity"
to act, without aiming at anything in particular, and
without any expectation of pleasure or benefit. Such
instincts would conform to Butler's notion of appetite:
they would be entirely out of the course of self-love
or self-seeking of any sort. Whether the nest-building
activity of birds, and the constructiveness of ants,
bees, and beavers, comply with this condition, I do not
undertake to say. There is one process better known
to ourselves, not exactly an instinct, but probably a
mixture of instinct and acquirement—I mean the
process of Imitation—which works very much upon
this model. Although coming under the control of
the Will, yet in its own proper character it operates
blindly, or without purpose; neither courting pleasure,
nor chasing pain. In like manner, Sympathy, in
its most characteristic form, proceeds without any
distinct aim of pleasure to ourselves.</p>
<p>Nothing of this can be affirmed of the Appetites.
In them, nature places us, as Bentham says, under
the government of two sovereign masters, <i>pain</i> and
<i>pleasure</i>. An appetite would cease to move us, if its
painful and pleasurable accompaniments were done
away with. It matters not that we remit our attention,
at times, to the pain or the pleasure; these are
always in the background; and the strength of the
appetite is their strength.</p>
<p>So far as concerns Butler's example of the Appetites,
there is no case for the view that to obtain
happiness we must avoid aiming at it directly. If we
do not aim at the pleasure in its own subjective
character, we aim at the thing that immediately
brings the pleasure; which is, for all practical purposes,
to aim at the pleasure.</p>
<p>The prescription to look away from the final end,
Happiness, in order to secure that end, may be tested
on the example of one of our intermediate pursuits,
as Health. It is not a good thing to be always
dwelling on the state of our health: by doing so, we
get into a morbid condition of self-consciousness, which
is in itself pernicious. It does not follow that we are
to live at random, without ever giving a thought to
our health. There is a plain middle course. Guided
by our own experience, and by the experience of
those that have gone before us, we arrange our plan
of life so as to preserve health; and our actions consist
in adhering to that plan in the detail. So long
as our scheme answers expectation, we think of nothing
but of putting it in force, as occasion arises; we
do not dwell upon our states of good health at all.
It is some interruption that makes us self-conscious;
and then it is that we have to exercise ourselves about
a remedial course. This, when found, is likewise objectively
pursued; our only subjectiveness lies in being
aware of gradual recovery; and we are glad to get
back to the state of paying no attention to the workings
of our viscera. We do not, therefore, remit our
pursuit; only, it is enough to observe the routine
of outward actions, whose sole motive is to keep us
in health.</p>
<p>The pursuit of the still wider end, Happiness, has
much in common with the narrower pursuit. When
we have discovered what things promote, and what
things impede our happiness, we transfer our attention
to these, as the most direct mode of compassing
the end. If we are satisfied that working for other
people brings us happiness, we work accordingly;
this is no side aim, it is as direct as any aim can be.
It may involve immediate sacrifice, but that does not
alter the case; we can get no considerable happiness
from any source without temporary sacrifice.</p>
<p>[HAPPINESS AND VIRTUE DISTINCT AIMS.]</p>
<p>If it be said that the best mode of attaining happiness
is to put ourselves entirely out of account, and to
work for others exclusively, this, as already noted,
is a self-contradiction. It is to tell people not to
think of their own happiness, and yet to know that
they are securing that in the most effectual way. It
is also very questionable, indeed absolutely erroneous,
in fact. The most apparent way to secure happiness
is to ply all the known means of happiness, just as far
as, and no farther than, they are discovered to produce
the effect. We must keep a check upon the methods
that we employ, and abandon those that do not
answer. So long as we find happiness in serving
others, so long we continue in that course. And it is
a melancholy fact that Pope's bold assertion—"Virtue
alone is happiness below,"—cannot be upheld against
the stern realities of life. Life needs to be made up
of two aims—the one, Happiness, the other Virtue,
each on its own account. There is a certain mutual
connection of the two, but all attempts at making out
their identity are failures.</p>
<p>It is of very great importance to teach men the
bearings of virtue on happiness, so far as these are
known. There will, however, always remain a portion
of duty that detracts from happiness, and must
be done as duty, nevertheless. Men are entitled to
pursue happiness as directly as ever they please;
only, they must couple with the pursuit their round
of duties to others; in which they may or may not
reap a share of the coveted good for self.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>Let us, next, consider some of the difficulties and
mistakes attaching to the WILL. Here there are the
questions of world-renown, questions known even
in Pandemonium—Free-will, Responsibility, Moral
Ability, and Inability. It is now suspected, on
good grounds, that, on these questions, we have
somehow got into a wrong groove—that we are
lost in a maze of our own constructing.</p>
<p>[A STRONG WILL THE GIFT OF NATURE.]</p>
<p><a name='I.Ib'></a>I. We shall first notice a misconception akin to
some of the foregoing mistakes respecting the feelings.
In addressing men with a view to spur their
activity, there is usually a too low estimate of what is
implied in great and energetic efforts of will. Here,
exactly as in the cheerful temperament, we find a
certain constitutional endowment, a certain natural
force of character, having its physical supports of
brain, muscle, and other tissue; and neither persuasion,
nor even education, can go very far to alter that
character. If there be anything at all in the observations
of phrenology, it is the connection of energetic
determination with size of brain. Lay your hand
first on the head of an energetic man, and then on
the head of a feeble man, and you will find a difference
that is not to be explained away. Now it
passes all the powers of persuasion and education
combined to make up for a great cranial inequality.
Something always comes of assiduous discipline; but
to set up a King Alfred, or a Luther, as a model to
be imitated by an ordinary man, on the points of
energy, perseverance, endurance, courage, is to pass
the bounds of the human constitution. Persistent
energy of a high order, like the temperament for
happiness, costs a great deal to the human system.
A large share of the total forces of the constitution
go to support it; and the diversion of power often
leaves great defects in other parts of the character, as
for example, a low order of the sensibilities, and a
narrow range of sympathies. The men of extraordinary
vigour and activity—our Roman emperors
and conquering heroes—are often brutal and coarse.
Nature does not supply power profusely on all sides;
and delicate sympathies, of themselves, use up a very
large fraction of the forces of the organisation. Even
intellectually estimated, the power of sympathising
with many various minds and conditions would occupy
as much room in the brain as a language, or an
accomplishment. A man both energetic and sympathetic—a
Pericles, a King Alfred, an Oliver Cromwell
—is one of nature's giants, several men in one.</p>
<p>There is no more notable phase of our active
nature than Courage. Great energy generally implies
great courage, and courage—at least in nine-tenths of
its amount—comes by nature. To exhort any one to
be courageous is waste of words. We may animate,
for the time, a naturally timid person, by explaining
away the signs of danger, and by assuming a confident
attitude ourselves; but the absolute force of
courage is what neither we nor the man himself can
add to. A long and careful education might effect a
slight increase in this, as in other aspects of energy
of character: we can hardly say how much, because
it is a matter that is scarcely ever subjected to the
trial; the very conditions of the experiment have not
been thought of.</p>
<p>The moral qualities expressed by Prudence, Forethought,
Circumspection, are talked of with a like
insufficient estimate of what they cost. Great are the
rewards of prudence, but great also is the expenditure
of the prudent man. To retain an abiding sense of
all the possible evils, risks and contingencies of an
ordinary man's position—professional, family, and
personal—is to go about under a constant burden;
the difference between a thorough-going and an easy-going
circumspection is a large additional demand
upon the forces of the brain. The being on the alert
to duck the head at every bullet is a charge to the
vital powers; so much so, that there comes a point
when it is better to run risks than to pile up costly
precautions and bear worrying anxieties.</p>
<p>Lastly, the attribute of our active nature called
Belief, Confidence, Conviction, is subject to the same
line of remark. This great quality—the opposite
of distrust and timidity, the ally of courage, the
adjunct of a buoyant temperament—is not fed upon
airy nothings. It is, indeed, a true mental quality,
an offshoot of our mental nature; yet, although not
material, it is based upon certain forces of the physical
constitution; it grows when these grow, and is
nourished when they are nourished. People possessed
of great confidence have it as a gift all through life,
like a broad chest or a good digestion. Preaching
and education have their fractional efficacy, and deserve
to be plied, provided the operator is aware of
nature's impassable barriers, and does not suppose
that he is working by charm. It is said of Hannibal
that he dissolved obstructions in the Alps by vinegar;
in the moral world, barriers are not to be removed
either by acetic acid or by honey.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[PREJUDICES DUE TO PERSONAL DIGNITY.]</p>
<p><a name='I.IIb'></a>II. The question of Free-will might be a text for
discoursing on some of the most inveterate erroneous
tendencies of the mind.</p>
<p>For one thing, it gives occasion to remark on the
influence exerted over our opinions by the feeling of
Personal Dignity. Of sources of bias, prejudices,
"Idola," "fallacies <i>a priori</i>" this may be allowed precedence.
For example, the maxim has been enunciated
by some philosophers, that, of two differing
opinions, preference is to be given (not to what is
true, but) to what ennobles and dignifies human
nature. One of the objections seriously entertained
against Darwin's theory is that it humbles our ancestral
pride. So, to ascribe to our mental powers a
material foundation is held to be degrading to our
nobler part. Again, a philosopher of our own day—Sir
W. Hamilton—has placed on the title-page of his
principal work this piece of rhetoric: "On earth,
there is nothing great but man; in man, there is
nothing great but mind". Now one would suppose
that there are on earth many things besides man deserving
the appellation of "great"; and that the
mechanism of the body is, in any view, quite as remarkable
a piece of work as the mechanism of the
mind. There was one step more that Hamilton, as an
Aristotelian, should have made: "In mind, there is
nothing great but intellect". Doubtless, we ought not
to dissect an epigram; but epigrams brought into a
perverting contact with science are not harmless.
Such gross pandering to human vanity must be held
as disfiguring a work on philosophy.</p>
<p>The sentiment of dignity has much to answer
for in the doctrine of Free-will. In Aristotle, the
question had not assumed its modern perplexity; but
the vicious element of factitious personal importance
had already peeped out, it being one of the few points
wherein the bias of the feelings operated decidedly in
his well-balanced mind. In maintaining the doctrine
that vice is voluntary, he argues, that if virtue is
voluntary, vice (its opposite) must also be voluntary;
now to assert virtue not to be voluntary would be to
cast an <i>indignity</i> upon it. This is the earliest association
of the feeling of personal dignity with the
exercise of the human will.</p>
<p>[FALSE PRIDE IN CONNECTION WITH FREE-WILL.]</p>
<p>The Stoics are commonly said to have started the
free-will difficulty. This needs an explanation. A
leading tenet of theirs was the distinction between
things in our power and things not in our power; and
they greatly overstrained the limits of what is in
our power. Looking at the sentiment about death,
where the <i>idea</i> is everything, and at many of our
desires and aversions, also purely sentimental, that is,
made and unmade by our education (as, for example,
pride of birth), they considered that pains in general,
even physical pains and grief for the loss of friends,
could be got over by a mental discipline, by intellectually
holding them not to be pains. They extolled
and magnified the power of the will that could
command such a transcendent discipline, and infused
an emotion of <i>pride</i> into the consciousness of this
greatness of will. In subsequent ages, poets, moralists,
and theologians followed up the theme; and the
appeal to the pride of will may be said to be a
standing engine of moral suasion. This originating
of a point of honour or dignity in connection with
our Will has been the main lure in bringing us into
the jungle of Free-will and Necessity.</p>
<p>It is in the Alexandrian school that we find the
next move in the question. In Philo Judaeus, the
good man is spoken of as free, the wicked man as a
slave. Except as the medium of a compliment to
virtue, the word "freedom" is not very apposite, seeing
that, to the highest goodness, there attaches submission
or restraint, rather than liberty.</p>
<p>The early Christian Fathers (notably Augustine)
advanced the question to the Theological stage, by
connecting it with the great doctrines of Original Sin
and Predestination; in which stage it shared all the
speculative difficulties attaching to these doctrines.
The Theological world, however, has always been
divided between Free-will and Necessity; and probably
the weightiest names are to be found among
the Necessitarians. No man ever brought greater
acumen into theological controversy than did Jonathan
Edwards; and he took the side of Necessity.</p>
<p>Latterly, however, since the question has become
one of pure metaphysics, Free-will has been the
favourite dogma, as being most consonant to the
dignity of man, which appears to be its chief recommendation,
and its only argument. The weight of
reasoning is, I believe, in favour of necessity; but the
word carries with it a seeming affront, and hardly
any amount of argument will reconcile men to indignity.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p><a name='I.IIIb'></a>III. Another weakness of the human mind receives
illustration from the free-will controversy, and deserves
to be noticed, as helping to account for the
prolonged existence of the dispute: I mean the
disposition to regard any departure from the accustomed
rendering of a fact as denying the fact itself.
The rose under another name is not merely less
sweet, it is not a rose at all. Some of the greatest
questions have suffered by this weakness.</p>
<p>[ANALYSIS DOES NOT DESTROY THE FACT.]</p>
<p>The physical theory of matter that resolves it into
<i>points of force</i> will seem to many as doing away with
matter no less effectually than the Berkeleyan Idealism.
A universe of inane mathematical points,
attracting and repelling each other, must appear to
the ordinary mind a sorry substitute for the firm-set
earth, and the majestically-fretted vault of heaven,
with its planets, stars, and galaxies. It takes a
special education to reconcile any one to this theory.
Even if it were everything that a scientific hypothesis
should be, the previously established modes of speech
would be a permanent obstruction to its being received
as the popular doctrine.</p>
<p>But the best illustrations occur in the Ethical and
Metaphysical departments. For example, some
ethical theorists endeavour to show that Conscience
is not a primitive and distinct power of the mind, like
the sense of colour, or the feeling of resistance, but a
growth and a compound, being made up of various
primitive impulses, together with a process of education.
Again and again has this view been represented
as denying conscience altogether. Exactly
parallel has been the handling of the sentiment of
Benevolence. Some have attempted to resolve it into
simpler elements of the mind, and have been attacked
as denying the existence of the sentiment. Hobbes,
in particular, has been subjected to this treatment.
Because he held pity to be a form of self-love, his
opponents charged him with declaring that there is
no such thing as pity or sympathy in the human
constitution.</p>
<p>A more notable example is the doctrine of the
alliance of Mind with Matter. It is impossible that any
mode of viewing this alliance can erase the distinction
between the two modes of existence—the
material and the mental; between extended inert
bodies, on the one hand, and pleasures and pains,
thoughts and volitions, on the other. Yet, after the
world has been made familiar with the Cartesian
doctrine of two distinct substances—the one for the
inherence of material facts, and the other for mental
facts—any thinker maintaining the separate mental
substance to be unproved, and unnecessary, is denounced
as trying to blot out our mental existence,
and to resolve us into watches, steam-engines, or
speaking and calculating machines. The upholder of
the single substance has to spend himself in protestations
that he is not denying the existence of the fact,
or the phenomena called mind, but is merely challenging
an arbitrary and unfounded hypothesis for
representing that fact.</p>
<p>[PERCEPTION OF A MATERIAL WORLD.]</p>
<p>The still greater controversy—distinct from the
foregoing, although often confounded with it—relating
to the Perception of a Material World, is the crowning
instance of the weakness we are considering. Berkeley
has been unceasingly stigmatised as holding
that there is no material world, merely because he
exposed a self-contradiction in the mode of viewing it,
common to the vulgar and to philosophers, and suggested
a mode of escaping the contradiction by an
altered rendering of the facts. The case is very
peculiar. The received and self-contradictory view is
exceedingly simple and intelligible in its statement;
it is well adapted, not merely for all the commoner
purposes of life, but even for most scientific purposes.
The supposition of an independent material world,
and an independent mental world, created apart, and
coming into mutual contact—the one the objects perceived,
and the other the mind perceiving—expresses
(or over-expresses) the division of the sciences into
sciences of matter and sciences of mind; and the
highest laws of the material world at least are in no
respect falsified by it. On the other hand, any
attempt to state the facts of the outer world on
Berkeley's plan, or on any plan that avoids the self-contradiction,
is most cumbrous and unmanageable.
A smaller, but exactly parallel instance of the situation
is familiar to us. The daily circuit of the sun
around the earth, supposed to be fixed, so exactly
answers all the common uses that, in spite of its
being false, we adhere to it in the language of every-day
life. It is a convenient misrepresentation, and
deceives nobody. And such will, in all likelihood, be
the usage regarding the external world, after the
contradiction is admitted, and rectified by a metaphysical
circumlocution. Speculators are still only
trying their hand at an unobjectionable circumlocution;
but we may almost be sure that nothing will
ever supersede, for practical uses, the notion of the
distinct worlds of Mind and Matter. If, after the
Copernican demonstration of the true position of the
sun, we still find it requisite to keep up the fiction of
his daily course; much more, after the final accomplishment
of the Berkeleyan revolution (to my mind
inevitable), shall we retain the fiction of an independent
external world: only, we shall then know how
to fall back upon some mode of stating the case,
without incurring the contradiction.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p><a name='I.IVb'></a>IV. To return to the Will. The fact that we have
to save, and to represent in adequate language, is this:
—A voluntary action is a sequence distinct and <i>sui
generis;</i> a human being avoiding the cold, searching
for food, and clinging to other beings, is not to be
confounded with a pure material sequence, as the fall
of rain, or the explosion of gunpowder. The phenomena,
in both kinds, are phenomena of sequence, and
of <i>regular</i> or <i>uniform</i> sequence; but the things that
make up the sequence are widely different: in the
one, a feeling of the mind, or a concurrence of feelings,
is followed by a conscious muscular exertion; in
the other, both steps are made up of purely material
circumstances. It is the difference between a mental
or psychological, and a material or physical sequence
—in short, the difference between mind and matter;
the greatest contrast within the whole compass of
nature, within the universe of being. Now language
must be found to give ample explicitness to this
diametrical antithesis; still, I am satisfied that rarely
in the usages of human speech has a more unfortunate
choice been made than to employ, in the present
instance, the antithetic couple—Freedom and Necessity.
It misses the real point, and introduces meanings
alien to the case. It converts the glory of the human
character into a reproach (although its leading motive
throughout has been to pay us a compliment). The
<i>constancy</i> of man's emotional nature (but for which
our life would be a chaos, an impossibility) has to be
explained away, for no other reason than that, at one
time, a blundering epithet was applied to designate
the mental sequences. Great is the difference between
Mind and Matter; but the terms Freedom and
Necessity represent the point of agreement as the
point of difference; and this being made familiar,
through iteration, as the mode of expressing the contrast,
the rectification is supposed to unsettle everything,
and to obliterate the wide distinction of the
two natures.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[SEIZING A QUESTION BY THE WRONG END.]</p>
<p><a name='I.Vb'></a>V. What is called Moral Ability and Inability is
another artificial perplexity in regard to the will, and
might also be the text for a sermon on prevailing
errors. More especially, it exemplifies what may be
termed <i>seizing a question by the wrong end</i>.</p>
<p>The votary, we shall say, of alcoholic liquor is found
fault with, and makes the excuse, he cannot help it—he
cannot resist the temptation. So far, the language
may pass. But what shall we say to the not uncommon
reply,—You could help it if you would. Surely
there is some mystification here; it is not one of
those plain statements that we desire in practical
affairs. Whether we are dealing with matter or with
mind, we ought to point out some clear and practicable
method of attaining an end in view. To get a good
crop, we till and enrich the soil; to make a youth
knowing in mathematics, we send him to a good
master, and stimulate his attention by combined
reward and punishment. There are also intelligible
courses of reforming the vicious: withdraw them
from temptation till their habits are remodelled;
entice them to other courses, by presenting objects of
superior attraction; or, at lowest, keep the fact of
punishment before their eyes. By these methods
many are kept from vices, and not a few reclaimed
after having fallen. But to say, "You can be virtuous
if you will," is either unmeaning, or it disguises a
real meaning. If it have any force at all—and it
would not be used unless, some efficacy had been
found attaching to it,—the force must be in the
indirect circumstances or accompaniments. What,
then, is the meaning that is so unhappily expressed?
In the first place, it is a vehicle for conveying the
strong wish and determination of the speaker; it is a
clumsy substitute for—"I do wish you would amend
your conduct"; an expression containing a real efficacy,
greater or less according to the estimate formed
of the speaker by the person spoken to. In the next
place, it presents to the mind of the delinquent the
<i>ideal</i> of improvement, which might also be done in
unexceptionable phrase; as one might say—"Reflect
upon your own state, and compare yourself with the
correct and virtuous liver". Then, there is a touch of
the stoical dignity and pride of will. Lastly, there
may be a hint or suggestion to the mind of good and
evil consequences, which is the most powerful motive
of all. In giving rise to these various considerations,
even the objectionable expression may have a genuine
efficacy; but that does not justify the form itself,
which by no interpretation can be construed into
sense or intelligibility.</p>
<p>[MEANING OF MORAL INABILITY.]</p>
<p>Moral Inability means that ordinary motives are
insufficient, but not all motives. The confirmed
drunkard or thief has got into the stage of moral
inability; the common motives that keep mankind
sober and honest have failed. Yet there are motives
that would succeed, if we could command them. Men
may be sometimes cured of intemperance when the
constitution is so susceptible that pain follows at once
on indulgence. And so long as pleasure and pain, in
fact and in prospect, operate upon the will, so long as
the individual is in a state wherein motives operate,
there may be moral weakness, but there is nothing
more. In such cases, punishment may be properly
employed as a corrective, and is likely to answer its
end. This is the state termed accountability, or, with
more correctness, PUNISHABILITY, for being accountable
is merely an incident bound up with liability to
punishment. Moral weakness is a matter of a degree,
and in its lowest grades shades into insanity, the state
wherein motives have lost their usual power—when
pleasure and pain cease to be apprehended by the
mind in their proper character. At <i>this</i> point, punishment
is unavailing; the moral inability has passed
into something like physical inability; the loss of
self-control is as complete as if the muscles were
paralysed.</p>
<p>In the plea of insanity, entered on behalf of any
one charged with crime, the business of the jury is to
ascertain whether the accused is under the operation
of the usual motives—whether pain in prospect has
a deterring effect on the conduct. If a man is as
ready to jump out of the window as to walk downstairs,
of course he is not a moral agent; but so long
as he observes, of his own accord, the usual precautions
against harm to himself, he is to be punished for his
misdeeds.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>These various questions respecting the Will, if
stripped of unsuitable phraseology, are not very difficult
questions. They are about as easy to comprehend
as the air-pump, the law of refraction of light,
or the atomic theory of chemistry. Distort them by
inapposite metaphors, view them in perplexing attitudes,
and you may make them more abstruse than
the hardest proposition of the "Principia". What is
far worse, by involving a simple fact in inextricable
contradictions, they have led people gravely to recognise
self-contradiction as the natural and the proper
condition of a certain class of questions. Consistency
is very well so far, and for the humbler matters of
every-day life, but there is a higher and a sacred
region where it does not hold; where the principles
are to be received all the more readily that they land
us in contradictions. In ordinary matters, inconsistency
is the test of falsehood; in transcendental
subjects, it is accounted the badge of truth.</p>
<br />
<p>FOOTNOTES:</p>
<a name="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1">[1]</a><div class="note"><p> <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, August, 1868.</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2">[2]</a><div class="note"><p> Donaldson's "History of Christian Literature and Doctrine," Vol.
I., p. 277.</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3">[3]</a><div class="note"><p> Intensity of passion stands confessed in the self-delineations of men
of imaginative genius. We forbear to quote the familiar instances of
Wordsworth, Shelley, or Burns, but may refer to a remarkable chapter
in the life of the famous Scotch preacher, Dr. Thomas Chalmers. The
mere title of the chapter is enough for our purpose. It related to his
early youth, and ran thus, in his own words:—"A year of mental
elysium". It is while living at a white-heat that all the thoughts and
conceptions take a lofty, hyperbolical character; and the outpouring of
these at the time, or afterwards, is the imagination of the orator or the
poet.
</p><p>
The spread of the misconception that we have been combating is
perhaps accounted for by the circumstance that imagination in one man
is the cause of feeling <i>in others</i>. Wordsworth, by his imaginative
colouring, has excited a warmer sentiment for nature in many spectators
of the lake country. That, however, is a different thing. We may
also allow that the poet intensifies his own feelings by his creative embodiments
of them.</p></div>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<a name='EII'></a><h2>II.</h2>
<h2>ERRORS OF SUPPRESSED CORRELATIVES.<a name="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4"><sup>[4]</sup></a></h2>
<br />
<p>By Relativity is here meant the all-pervading fact
of our nature that we are not impressed, made conscious,
or mentally alive, without some change of
state or impression. An unvarying action on any of
our senses is the same as no action at all. An even
temperature, such as that enjoyed by the fishes in
the tropical seas, leaves the mind an entire blank
as regards heat and cold. We can neither feel nor
know without recognising two distinct states. Hence
all knowledge is double, or is the knowledge of contrasts
or opposites: heavy is relative to light; up
supposes down; being awake implies the state of
sleep.</p>
<p>The applications of the law in the sphere of
emotion are chiefly contemplated in what follows.
Pleasure and pain are never absolute states; they
have reference always to the previous condition.
Until we know what that has been in any case, we
cannot pronounce upon the efficacy of a present
stimulation. We see a person reposing, apparently
in luxurious ease; if the state has been immediately
consequent upon a protracted and severe exertion,
we are right in calling it highly pleasurable. Under
other circumstances, it might be quite the reverse.</p>
<p>There is an offshoot or modification of the principle,
arising out of the operation of habit. Impressions
made upon us are greatest when they are absolutely
new: after repetition they all lose something of their
power; although, by remission and alternative, the
causes of pleasure and pain have still a very considerable
efficacy. Many of the consequences of this great fact
are sufficiently acknowledged, or, if they are not, it is
from other causes than our ignorance. The weakness
is moral, rather than intellectual, that makes us expect
that the first flush of a great pleasure, a newly-attained
joy or success, will continue unabated. The
poor man, probably, does not overrate the gratification
of newly-attained wealth; what he fails to allow for
is the deadening effect of an unbroken experience of
ease and plenty. The author of "Romola" says of
the hero and the heroine, in the early moments of
their affection, that they could not look forward to a
time when their kisses should be common things.
So it is with the attainment of all great objects of
pursuit: the first access of good fortune may not disappoint
us; but as we are more and more removed
from the state of privation, as the memory of the
prior experience fades away, so does the vividness of
the present enjoyment. It is the same with changes
for the worse: the agony of a great loss is at first
overpowering; gradually, however, the system accommodates
itself to the new condition, and the severity
dies away. What is called on these occasions the
"force of custom" is the application of the law of
Accommodation, or Relativity modified by habit.</p>
<p>[RELATIVITY IN PLEASURES.]</p>
<p>It is a familiar experience of mankind, yet hard
to realise upon mere testimony, that the pleasures
of rest, repose, retirement, are wholly relative to
foregone labour and toil; after the first shock of
transition, they are less and less felt, and can be
renewed only after a renewal of the contrasting experience.
The description, in "Paradise Lost," of
the delicious repose of Adam and Eve in Eden is
fallacious; the poet credits them with an intensity of
pleasure attainable only by the brow-sweating labourer
under the curse.</p>
<p>The delights of Knowledge are relative to previous
Ignorance; for, although the possession of knowledge
is in many ways a lasting good, yet the full intensity
of the charm is felt only at the moment of passing
from mystery to explanation, from blankness of impression
to intellectual attainment. This form of the
pleasure is sustained only by new acquisitions and
new discoveries. Moreover, in the minor forms of the
gratification due to knowledge, we never escape the
law of relativity; the "power" delights us by relation
to our previous impotence. Plato supposed that, in
knowledge, we have an example of a <i>pure</i> pleasure,
meaning one that had no reference to foregone privation
or pain; but such "purity" would be a barren
fact, not unlike the pure air of a bladeless and waterless
desert. A state of uninterrupted good health,
although a prime condition of enjoyment, is of itself
a state of neutrality or indifference. The man that
has never been ill cannot sing the joys of health;
the exultation of that strain is attainable only by
the valetudinarian.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>These examples have been remarked upon in every
age. It is the moral weakness of being carried away
by a present strong feeling, as if the state would last
for ever, that blinds each of us in turn to the stern
reality of the fact. There are, however, numerous instances,
coming under Relativity, wherein the indispensable
correlative is more or less dropped out of sight
and disavowed. These are the proper errors or fallacies
of Relativity, a branch of the comprehensive class
termed "Fallacies of Confusion". The object of the
present essay is to exhibit a few of these errors as
they occur in questions of practical moment.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>When it is said, as by Carlyle and others, "speech
is silvern, silence is golden," there is implied a condition
of things where speech has been in excess; and
but for this excess, the assertion is untrue. One
might as well talk of the delights of hunger, or of
cold, or of solitary confinement, on the ground of
there being times when food, warmth, or society may
be in excess, and when the opposing states would be
a joyful change.</p>
<p>The Relativity of Pleasures, although admitted in
many individual cases, has often been misconceived.
The view is sometimes expressed, that there can be
no pleasure without a previous pain; but this goes
beyond the exigencies of the principle. We
cannot go on for ever with any delight; but mere
remission, without any counterpart pain, is enough
for our entering with zest on many of our pleasures.
A healthy man enjoys his meals without any sensible
previous pain of hunger. We do not need to have
been miserable for some time as a preparation for the
reading of a new poem. It is true that if the sense of
privation has been acute, the pleasure is proportionally
increased; and that few pleasures of any great
intensity grow up from indifference: still, remission
and alternation may give a zest for enjoyment without
any consciousness of pain.</p>
<p>The principle of Comparison is capriciously made
use of by Paley, in his account of the elements of
Happiness. He applies it forcibly and felicitously to
depreciate certain pleasures—as greatness, rank, and
station—and withholds its application from the pleasures
that he more particularly countenances,—namely,
the social affections, the exercise of the
faculties, and health.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[SIMPLICITY OF STYLE A RELATIVE MERIT.]</p>
<p>The great praise often accorded to Simplicity of
Style, in literature, is an example of the suppression
of the correlative in a case of mutual relationship.
Simplicity is not an absolute merit; it is frequently a
merit by correlation. Thus, if a certain subject has
never been treated except in abstruse and difficult
terminology, a man of surpassing literary powers,
setting it forth in homely and intelligible language,
produces a work whose highest praise is expressed by
Simplicity. Again, after the last century period of
artificial, complex, and highly-wrought composition,
the reaction of Cowper and Wordsworth in favour of
simplicity was an agreeable and refreshing change,
and was in great part acceptable because of the
change. It does not appear that Wordsworth comprehended
this obvious fact; to him, a simplicity that
cost nothing to the composer, and brought no novelty
to the reader, had still a transcendent merit.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>It has been a frequent practice of late years to
celebrate the praises of Knowledge. Many eloquent
speakers have dilated on the happiness and the
superiority of the enlightened and the cultivated man.
Now, the correlative or obverse must be equally
true: there must be a corresponding degradation and
disqualification attaching to ignorance and the want
of instruction. This correlative and equally cogent
statement is suppressed on certain occasions, and by
persons that would not demur to the praises of knowledge:
as, when we are told of the native good sense,
the untaught sagacity, the admirable instincts of the
people,—that is, of the ignorant or the uneducated.
Hence the great value of the expository device of following
up every principle with its, counter-statement,
the matter denied when the principle is affirmed.
If knowledge is a thing superlatively good, ignorance
—the opposite of knowledge—is a thing superlatively
bad. There is no middle standing ground.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>In the way that people use the argument from
Authority, there is often an unfelt contradiction from
not adverting to the correlative implication. If I lay
stress upon some one's authority as lending weight to
my opinion, I ought to be equally moved in the
opposite direction when the same authority is against
me. The common case, however, is to make a great
flourish when the authority is one way, and to ignore
it when it is the other way. This is especially the
fashion in dealing with the ancient philosophers.
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are quoted with much
complacency when they chime in with a modern
view; but, in points where they contradict our
cherished sentiments, we treat them with a kind of
pity as half-informed pagans. It is not seen that
men liable to such gross errors as they are alleged to
have committed—say on Ethics—are by that fact
deprived of all weight in allied subjects, as, for example,
Politics—in which Aristotle is still quoted as
an authority.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[DIGNITY OF ALL LABOUR ABSURD.]</p>
<p>Many of the sins against Relativity can be traced
to rhetorical exaggeration. Some remarkable instances
of this can be cited.</p>
<p>When a system of ranks and dignities has once
been established, there are associations of dignity and
of indignity with different conditions and occupations.
It is more dignified to serve in the army than to
engage in trade; to be a surgeon is more honourable
than to be a watchmaker. In this state of things a
fervid rhetorician, eager to redress the inequalities of
mankind, starts forth to preach the dignity of <i>all</i>
labour. The device is a self-contradiction. Make all
labour alike dignified, and nothing is dignified; you
simply abolish dignity by depriving it of the contrast
that it subsists upon.</p>
<p>Pope's lines—</p>
<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Honour and shame from no condition rise;</span><br />
<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Act well your part; there all the honour lies—</span><br />
<p>cannot be exempted from the fallacy of self-contradiction.
Differences of condition are made by differences
in the degree of honour thereto attached. If
every man that did his work well were put on a level,
in point of honour, with every other man that did the
same; if the gatekeeper of a mansion, by being unfailingly
punctual in opening the gate, were to be equally
honoured with a great leader of the House of Commons,
then, indeed, equality of pay would be the
only thing wanted to abolish all differences of condition.
There is, no doubt, in society, a quantity of
misplaced honour; but so long as there are employments
exceptionally arduous, and virtues signally
beneficent in their operation, honour is a legitimate
spur and reward, and should be graduated according
to the desert in each case.</p>
<p>In spurring the ardour of youth to studious exertion,
it is common to repeat the Homeric maxim, "to
supplant every one else, and stand out first". The
stimulating effect is undoubted; it is strong rhetorical
brandy. Yet only one man can be first, and the
exhortation is given simultaneously to a thousand.<a name="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5"><sup>[5]</sup></a></p>
<p>[JUSTICE ADMIRABLE ONLY IF RECIPROCATED.]</p>
<p>In the discussion and inculcation of the moral
duties and virtues, there has been, in all ages, a
tendency to suppress correlative facts, and to affirm
unconditionally what is true only with a condition.
Thus, the admirable nature of Justice, and the happiness
of the Just man, are a proper theme to be
extolled with all the power of eloquence. It has been
so with every civilized people, pagan as well as
Christian. In the dialogues of Plato, justice is a prominent
subject, and is adorned with the full splendour
of his genius. Aristotle, in one of the few moments
when he rises to poetry, pronounces justice "greater
than the evening-star or the morning-star". Now all
this panegyric is admissible only on the supposition
of <i>reciprocal</i> justice. Plato, indeed, had the hardihood
to say that the just man is happy in himself, and by
reason of his justice, even although others are unjust
to him; but the position is untenable. A man is
happy in his justice if it procure for him justice in
return; as a citizen is happy in his civil obedience, if
it gain him protection in return. There are two
parties in the case, and the moralist should obtain
access to both; he should induce the one to fulfil his
share before promising to the other the happiness of
justice and obedience. It may be rhetorical, but it is
not true, that justice will make a man happy in a
society where it is not reciprocated. Justice, in these
circumstances, is highly noble, praiseworthy, virtuous;
but the applying of these lofty compliments is the
proof that it does not bring happiness, and is an
attempt to compensate the deficiency. There is a
certain tendency, not very great as human nature is
constituted, for justice to beget justice in return—for
social virtue on one side to procure it on the other
side. This is a certain encouragement to each man
to perform his own part, in hope that the other party
concerned may do the same. Still, the reciprocity
occasionally fails, and with that the benefits to the
just agent. It is necessary to urge strongly upon
individuals, to impress upon the young, the necessity
of performing their duty to society; it is equally
implied, and equally indispensable, that society should
perform its part to them. The suppressing of the
correlative obligation of the State to the individual
leaves a one-sided doctrine; the motive of the
suppression, doubtless, is that society does not often
fail of its duties to the individual, whereas individuals
frequently fail of their duties to society. This may
be the fact generally, but not always. It is not the
fact where there are bad laws and corrupt administration.
It is not the fact where the restraints on
liberty are greater than the exigencies of the State
demand. It is not the fact, so long as there is a
single vestige of persecution for opinions. To be
thoroughly veracious, for example, in a society that
restrains the discussion and expression of opinions, is
more than such a society is entitled to.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[PLEASURES OF BENEVOLENCE CONDITIONAL.]</p>
<p>The same fallacy occurs in an allied theme,—the
joys of Love and Benevolence. That love and benevolence
are productive of great happiness is beyond
question; but then the feeling must be mutual, it
must be reciprocated. One-sided love or benevolence
is a <i>virtue</i>, which is as much as to say it is <i>not</i> a
pleasure. The delights of benevolence are the delights
of reciprocated benevolence; until reciprocated,
in some form, the benevolent man has, strictly
speaking, the sacrifice and nothing more. There is a
great reluctance to encounter this simple naked truth;
to state it in theory, at least, for it is fully admitted in
practice. We fence it off by the assumption that
benevolence will always have its reward somehow;
that if the objects of it are ungrateful, others will
make good the defect at last. Now these qualifications
are very pertinent, very suitable to be
urged after allowing the plain truth, that benevolence
is intrinsically a sacrifice, a painful act; and
that this act is redeemed, and far more than redeemed,
by a fair reciprocity of benevolence. Only
such an admission can keep us out of a mesh of
contradictions. Like justice in itself, Benevolence in
itself is painful; any virtue is pain in the first
instance, although, when equally responded to, it
brings a surplus of pleasure. There may be acts of a
beneficent tendency that cost the performer nothing,
or that even may chance to be agreeable; but these
examples must not be given as the rule, or the type.
It is the essence of virtuous acts, the prevailing
character of the class, to tax the agent, to deprive
him of some satisfaction to himself; this is what we
must start from; we are then in a position to explain
how and when, and under what circumstances, and
with what limitations, the virtuous man, whether his
virtue be justice or benevolence, is from that cause a
happy man.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>It is a fallacy of the suppressed relative to describe
virtue as determined by the <i>moral nature</i> of God, as
opposed to his arbitrary will. The essence of Morality
is obedience to a superior, to a Law; where there
is no superior there is nothing either moral or immoral.
The supreme power is incapable of an
immoral act. Parliament may do what is injurious,
it cannot do what is illegal. So the Deity may
be beneficent or maleficent, he cannot be moral or
immoral.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>Among the various ways, proposed in the seventeenth
century, of solving the difficulty of the mutual
action of the heterogeneous agencies—matter and
mind—one was a mode of Divine interference, called
the "Theory of Occasional Causes". According to
this view, the Deity exerted himself by a <i>perpetual
miracle</i> to bring about the mental changes corresponding
to the physical agents operating on our
senses—light, sound, &c. Now in the mode of action
suggested there is nothing self-contradictory; but in
the use of the word "miracle" there is a mistake of
relativity. The meaning of a miracle is an exceptional
interference; it supposes an habitual state of
things, from which it is a deviation. The very idea
of miracle is abolished if every act is to be alike
miraculous.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[MYSTERY CORRELATES WITH THE INTELLIGIBLE.]</p>
<p>We shall devote the remainder of this exposition to
a still more notable class of mistakes due to the suppression
of a correlative member in a relative couple
—those, namely, connected with the designation,
"Mystery," a term greatly abused, in various ways,
and especially by disregarding its relative character.
Mystery supposes certain things that are plain, intelligible,
knowable, revealed; and, by contrast to
these, refers to certain other things that are obscure,
unintelligible, unknowable, unrevealed. When a
man's conduct is entirely plain, straightforward, or
accounted for, we call that an intelligible case; when
we are perplexed by the tortuosities of a crafty,
double-dealing person, we say it is all very mysterious.
So, in nature, we consider that we understand certain
phenomena: such as gravity, and all its consequences,
in the fall of bodies, the flow of rivers, the
motions of the planets, the tides. On the other hand,
earthquakes and volcanoes are very mysterious; we
do not know what they depend upon, how or in
what circumstances they are produced. Some of
the operations of living bodies are understood,—as
the heart's action in the mechanical propulsion
of the blood; others, and the greater number, are
mysterious, as the whole process of germination
and growth. Now the existence of the contrast
between things plainly understood, and things not
understood, gives one distinct meaning to the term
Mystery. In some cases, a mystery is formed by an
apparent contradiction, as in the Theological mystery
of Free-will and Divine Foreknowledge; here, too,
there is a contrast with the great mass of consistent
and reconcilable things. But now, when we are told
by sensational writers, that <i>everything is mysterious;</i>
that the simplest phenomenon in nature—the fall of
a stone, the swing of a pendulum, the continuance of a
ball shot in the air—are wonderful, marvellous, miraculous,
our understanding is confounded; there being
then nothing plain at all, there is nothing mysterious.
The wonderful rises from the common; as the lofty
is lofty by relation to something lower: if there is
nothing common, then there is nothing wonderful; if
all phenomena are mysterious, nothing is mysterious;
if we are to stand aghast in amazement because three
times four is twelve, what phenomenon can we take
as the type of the plain and the intelligible? You
must always keep up a standard of the common, the
easy, the comprehensible, if you are to regard other
things as wonderful, difficult, inexplicable.</p>
<p>[LOCKE ON THE LIMITS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.]</p>
<p>The real character of a MYSTERY, and what constitutes
the Explanation of a fact, have been greatly
misconceived. The changes of view on these points
make up a chapter in the history of the education of
the human mind. Perhaps the most decisive turning
point was the publication of Locke's "Essay concerning
Human Understanding," the motive of which,
as stated in the homely and forcible language of the
preface, was to ascertain what our understandings can
do, what subjects they are fit to deal with, and where
they should stop. I quote a few sentences:—</p>
<p>"If by this inquiry into the nature of the Understanding,
I can discover the powers thereof; how
far they reach; to what things they are in any
degree proportionate; and where they fail us: I
suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy
mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with
things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when
it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit
down in a quiet ignorance of those things which,
upon examination, are proved to be beyond the
reach of our capacities." "The candle that is set
up in us, shines bright enough for all our purposes.
The discoveries we can make with this ought to
satisfy us. And we shall then use our Understandings
aright, when we entertain all objects in that
way and proportion that they are suited to our
faculties, and upon those grounds they are capable
of being proposed to us." "It is of great use for
the sailor to know the length of his line, though he
cannot fathom with it all the depths of the ocean."</p>
<p>The course of physical science was preparing the
same salutary lesson. Locke's great contemporary
and friend, Isaac Newton, was his fellow-worker in
this tutorial undertaking; nor should Bacon be forgotten,
although there is dispute as to the extent and
character of his influence. The combined operation
of these great leaders of thought was apparent in the
altered views of scientific inquirers as to what is competent
in research—what is the proper aim of inquiry.
There arose a disposition to abandon the pursuit of
mysterious essences and grand pervading unities, and
ascertain with precision the facts and the laws of
natural phenomena. The study of astronomy was
inaugurated in Greenwich Observatory. The experiments
of Priestley and of Franklin farther exemplified
the eighteenth-century key to the secrets of the
universe.</p>
<p>The lesson imparted by Newton and Locke and
their successors still remains to be carried out and
embodied in the subtler inquiries. The bearing upon
what constitutes a Mystery, and what constitutes
Explanation, or the accounting for appearances, may
be expressed thus:—</p>
<p>In the first place, the Understanding can never
pass out of its own experience—its acquired knowledge,
whether of body or of mind. What we obtain
by our various sensibilities to the world about us, and
by our self-consciousness, are the foundation, the ABC
of everything that we are capable of knowing.
We know colours, and we know sound; we know
pleasure and pain, and the various emotions of wonder,
fear, love, anger. If there be any being endowed
with senses different from ours, with that being we
can have no communion. If there be any phenomena
that escape our limited sensibilities, they transcend
the possibility of our knowledge.</p>
<p>It is necessary, however, to take account of the
combining or constructive aptitudes of the mind. We
can go a certain length in putting together our alphabet
of sensation and experience into many various
compounds. We can imagine a paradise or a pandemonium;
but only as made up of our own knowledge
of things good and evil. The limits of this constructive
power are soon reached. We are baffled to enter
into the feelings of our own kindred, when they are
far removed in character and circumstances from
ourselves. The youth at twenty cannot approximate
to the feelings of men of middle age. The healthy
are unable to comprehend the life of the invalid.</p>
<p>[TIME AND SPACE RELATIVE TO OUR FACULTIES.]</p>
<p>To come to the practical applications. The great
leading notions called Time and Space are known to
us only under the conditions of our own sensibility.
Time is made known by all our actions, all our senses,
all our feelings, and by the succession of our thoughts;
it is experienced as a continuance and a repetition of
movement, sight, sound, fear, or any other state of
feeling, or of thinking. One motion or sensation is
continued longer than another; or it is more frequently
repeated after intermission, giving the <i>numerical</i>
estimate of time, as in the beats of the pendulum.
In these ways we form estimates of seconds, minutes,
hours, days. And our constructive faculty can be
brought into play to conceive the larger tracts of
duration—a century, or a hundred centuries. Nay,
by our arithmetical powers we can put down in cipher,
or conceive <i>symbolically</i> (which is the meagrest of all
conceptions) millions of millions of centuries; these
being after all but compounds of our alphabet of
enduring or repeated sensations and thoughts. We
can suppose this arithmetical process to operate upon
past duration or upon future duration, and there is no
limit to the numbers that we can write down. But there
is one thing that we cannot do; we cannot fix upon a
point when Time or succession began, or upon a point
when it will cease. That is an operation not in keeping
with our faculties; the very supposition is impracticable.
We cannot entertain the notion of a
state of things wherein the fact of continuance had no
place; the effort belies itself. Time is inseparable
from our mental nature; whatever we imagine, we
must imagine as enduring. Some philosophers have
supposed that we must be endowed by nature with
the conception of Time, before we begin to exercise
our senses; but the difficulty would be to deprive us
of that adjunct without extinguishing our mental
nature. Give us sensibility, and you cannot withhold
the element of Time. The supposition of Kant and
others, that it is implanted in us as an empty form,
before we begin to employ our senses upon things, is
needless; for as soon as we move, see, hear, think, are
pleased or pained, we create time. And our notion
of Time in general is exactly what these sensibilities
make it, only enlarged by our constructive power
already spoken of.</p>
<p>[MATTER AND VOID SUPPLEMENTARY.]</p>
<p>While all our senses and feelings give us time, it is
our experience of Motion and Resistance,—the energetic
or active side of our nature alone,—that gives us
Space. The simplest feature of Space is the alternation
of Resistance and Non-Resistance, of obstructed
motion and freedom to move. The hand presses
dead upon an obstacle; the obstacle gives way and
allows free motion; these two contrasting experiences
are the elements of the two contrasting facts—Matter
and Space. By none of the five senses, in their pure
and proper character as senses, can we obtain these
experiences; and hence at an earlier stage of inquiry
into the mind, when our knowledge-giving sensibilities
were referred to the five senses, there was no
adequate account of the notion of Space or Extension.
Space includes more than this simple contrast of the
resisting and the non-resisting; it includes what we call
the Co-existing or Contemporaneous, the great aggregate
of the outspread world, as existing at any
moment, a somewhat complicated attainment, which I
am not now specially concerned with. It sufficiently
illustrates the limitation of our knowledge by our
sensibilities, from the nature of space, to fasten attention
on the double and mutually supplementing
experience of Matter and Void; the one resisting
movement, and giving the consciousness of resistance,
or dead strain, the other permitting movement, and
giving the consciousness of the unobstructed sweep
of the limbs or members. Whatever else may be in
space, this freedom to move, to soar, to expatiate (in
contrast to being hemmed in, obstructed, held fast),
is an essential part of the conception, and is formed
out of our active or moving sensibilities. Now, as
far as movement is concerned, we must be in one
of two states;—we must be putting forth energy
without effecting movement, being met by obstacles
called matter; or we must be putting forth energy
unresisted and effecting movement, which is what we
mean by empty space. There is no third position in
the matter of putting forth our active energy. Where
resistance ends and freedom begins, there is space;
where freedom ends, and obstruction begins, there is
matter. We find our sentient life to be made up, as
regards movement, of a certain number and range of
these two alternations; in other words, free spaces
and resisting barriers. And we can, by the constructive
power already mentioned, imagine other proportions
of the two experiences; we can imagine the
scope for movement, the absence of obstruction, to
be enlarged more and more, to be counted by
thousands and millions of miles; but the only
terminus or boundary that we can imagine is
resistance, a dead obstacle. We are able to conceive
the starry spaces widened and prolonged from galaxy
to galaxy through enormous strides of increasing
amplitude, but when we try to think an end to this
career, we can think only of a dead wall. There is no
other end of space within the grasp of our faculties;
and that termination is not an end of extension; for
we know that solid matter, viewed in other ways than
as obstructing movement, has the same property of
the extended belonging to the empty void. The
inference is, that the limitation of our means of
knowledge renders altogether incompetent the imagination
of an end to either Time or Space. The
greatest efforts of our combining faculty cannot exceed
the elements presented to it, and these elements
contain nothing that would set forth the situation of
space ending, and obstruction not beginning.</p>
<p>[ARE TIME AND SPACE INFINITE?]</p>
<p>Under these circumstances, it is an irrevelant enquiry,
to ask, Are Time and Space finite or infinite?
Many philosophers have put the question, and even
answered it. They say Time has no beginning and
no end, and Space has no boundaries; or, as otherwise
expressed,—Time and Space are Infinite: an
answer of such vagueness as to mean anything, from
a harmless and proper assertion of the limits of our
faculties, up to the verge of extravagance and self-contradiction.</p>
<p>When, in fact, people talk of the Infinite in Time
and Space, they can point to one intelligible signification;
as to the rest, this word is not a subject for
scientific propositions, and the attempt at such can
lead only to contradictions. The Infinite is a phrase
most various in its purport: it is for the most part an
emotional word, expressing human desire and aspiration;
a word of poetry, imagination, and preaching,
not a word to be discussed under science; no intellectual
definition would exhibit its emotional force.</p>
<p>The second property of our intelligence is, that we
can generalise many facts into one. Tracing agreement
among the multifarious appearances of things,
we can comprehend in one statement a vast number
of details. The single law of gravity expresses the
fall of a stone, the flow of rivers, the retention of the
moon in her circuit round the earth. Now, this
generalising sweep is a real advance in our knowledge,
an ascent in the matter of intelligence, a step towards
centralising the empire of science. What is more,
this is the only real meaning of EXPLANATION. A
difficulty is solved, a mystery unriddled; when it
can be shown to resemble something else; to be an
example of a fact already known. Mystery is isolation,
exception, or, it may be, apparent contradiction;
the resolution of the mystery is found in assimilation,
identity, fraternity. When all things are assimilated,
so far as assimilation can go, so far as likeness holds,
there is an end to explanation; there is an end to
what the mind can do, or can intelligently desire.</p>
<p>[GRAVITY NOT A MYSTERY.]</p>
<p>Thus, when Gravity was generalised, by assimilating
the terrestrial attraction seen in falling bodies with the
celestial attraction of the sun and planets; and when,
by fair presumption, the same power was extended to
the remote stars; when, also, the <i>law</i> was ascertained,
so that the movements of the various bodies could be
computed and predicted, there was nothing further to
be done; explanation was exhausted. Unless we can
find some other force to fraternise with gravity, so
that the two might become a still more comprehensive
unity, we must rest in gravity as the ultimatum of our
faculties. There is no conceivable modification, or
substitute, that would better our position. Before
Newton, it was a mystery what kept the moon and
the planets in their places; the assimilation with
falling bodies was the solution. But, say many persons,
is not gravity itself a mystery? We say No;
gravity has passed through all the stages of legitimate
and possible explanation; it is the most highly generalised
of all physical facts, and by no assignable
transformation could it be made more intelligible than
it is. It is singularly easy of comprehension; its law
is exactly known; and, excepting the details of calculation,
in its more complex workings, there is nothing
to complain of, nothing to rectify, nothing to pretend
ignorance about; it is the very pattern, the model,
the consummation of knowledge. The path of
science, as exhibited in modern times, is towards
generality, wider and wider, until we reach the
highest, the widest laws of every department of things;
there explanation is finished, mystery ends, perfect
vision is gained.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>What is always reckoned the mystery by pre-eminence
is the union of BODY and MIND. How, then,
should we treat this Mystery according to the spirit
of modern thought, according to the modern laws of
explanation? The course is to <i>conceive</i> the elements
according to the only possible plan, our own sensibility
or consciousness; which gives us matter as one
class of facts—extension, inertness, weight, and so
on; and mind as another class of facts—pleasures,
pains, volitions, ideas. The difference between these
two is total, diametrical, complete; there is really
nothing common to the experience of pleasure and
the experience of a tree; difference has here reached
its <i>acme</i>; agreement is eliminated; there is no
higher genus to include these two in one; as the
ultimate, the highest elements of knowledge, they
admit of 110 fusion, no resolution, no unity. Our
utmost flight of generality leaves us in possession of a
double, a <i>couple</i> of absolutely heterogeneous elements.
Matter cannot be resolved into mind; mind cannot
be resolved into matter; each has its own definition;
each negatives the other.</p>
<p>This being the fact, we accept it, and acquiesce.
There is surely nothing to be dissatisfied with, to
complain of, in the circumstance that the elements of
our experience are, in the last resort, two, and not
one. If we had been provided with fifty ultimate
experiences, none of them having a single property in
common with any other; and if we had only our
present limited intellects, we might be entitled to
complain of the world's mysteriousness in the one
proper acceptation of mystery—namely, as overpowering
our means of comprehension, as loading us
with unassimilable facts. As it is, matter, in its
commoner aspects and properties, is perfectly intelligible;
in the great number and variety of its endowments
or properties, it is revealed to us slowly and
with much difficulty, and these subtle properties—the
deep affinities and molecular arrangements—- are
the mysteries rightly so called. Mind in itself is also
intelligible; a pleasure is as intelligible as would be
any transmutation of it into the inscrutable essence
that people often desiderate. It is one of the facts of
our sensibility, and has a great many facts of its own
kindred, which makes it all the more intelligible.</p>
<p>The varieties of pleasure, pain, and emotion are very
numerous; and to know, remember, and classify
them, is a work of labour, a <i>legitimate</i> mystery. The
subtle links of thought are also very various, although
probably all reducible to a small number; and the
ascertaining and following out of these has been a
work of labour and time; they have, therefore, been
mysterious; mystery and intellectual toil being the
real correlatives. The <i>complications</i> of matter and the
<i>complications</i> of mind are genuine mysteries; the
reducing or simplifying of these complications, by the
exertions of thinking men, is the way, and the only
way out of the darkness into light.</p>
<p>[UNION OF MIND AND BODY.]</p>
<p>But what now of the mysterious <i>union</i> of the two
great ultimate facts of human experience? What
should the followers of Newton and Locke say to this
crowning instance of deep and awful mystery? Only
one answer can be given. Accept the union, and
generalise it. Find out the fewest number of simple
laws, such as will express all the phenomena of this
conjoint life. Resolve into the highest possible
generalities the connections of pleasure and pain,
with all the physical stimulants of the senses—food,
tastes, odours, sounds, lights—with all the play of
feature and of gesture, and all the resulting movements
and bodily changes; and when you have
done that, you have so far truly, fully, finally explained
the union of body and mind. Extend your
generalities to the course of the thoughts; determine
what physical changes accompany the memory, the
reason, the imagination, and express those changes in
the most general, comprehensive laws, and you have
explained the how and the why brain causes thought,
and thought works in brain. There is no other explanation
needful, no other competent, no other that
would be explanation. Instead of our being "unfortunate,"
as is sometimes said, in not being able to
know the essence of either matter or mind—in not
comprehending their union; our misfortune would be
to have to know anything different from what we do
or may know. If there be still much mystery attaching
to this linking of the two extreme facts of our
experience, it is simply this: that we have made so
little way in ascertaining what in one goes with what
in the other. We know a good deal about the
feelings and their alliances, some of which are open
and palpable to all mankind; and we have obtained
some important generalities in these alliances. Of
the connections of thought with physical changes we
know very little: these connections, therefore, are
truly and properly mysterious; but they are not
intrinsically or hopelessly so. The advancing study
of the physical organs, on the one hand, and of the
mental functions, on the other, may gradually abate
this mystery. And if a day arrive when the links that
unite our intellectual workings with the workings of
the nervous system and the other bodily organs shall
be fully ascertained and adequately generalised, no
one thoroughly educated in the scientific spirit of the
last two centuries will call the union of mind and body
any longer inscrutable or mysterious.</p>
<p>FOOTNOTES:</p>
<a name="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4">[4]</a><div class="note"><p> <i>Fortnightly Review</i>, October, 1868.</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5">[5]</a><div class="note"><p> We may here recall an incident highly characteristic of the late
Earl of Carlisle. Being elected on one occasion to the office of Lord
Rector of Marischal College, Aberdeen, he had to deliver an address
to the students on the usual topics of diligence and hopefulness in their
studious career. Referring for a model to the addresses of former
rectors, he found, in that of his immediate predecessor, Lord Eglinton,
the Homeric sentiment above alluded to. It grated harshly on his mind,
and he avowed the fact to the students, he could not reconcile himself
to the elevating of one man upon the humiliation of all the rest. In a
strain more befitting a civilized age, he urged upon his hearers the pursuit
of excellence as such, without involving as a necessary accompaniment the
supplanting or throwing down of other men. He probably did not
sufficiently guard himself against a fallacy of Relativity; for excellence
is purely comparative; it subsists upon inferior grades of attainment:
still, there are many modes of it shared in by a great number, and not
confined to one or a few.</p></div>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<a name='EIII'></a><h2>III.</h2>
<h2>THE CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS<a name="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6"><sup>[6]</sup></a></h2>
<br />
<p><a name='III.I'></a>I. HISTORICAL SKETCH.</p>
<br />
<p>Up to the year 1853, the appointing of Civil Servants
lay wholly in the hands of patrons. In 1853, patronage
was severely condemned and competitive examination
officially recommended, for the first time, in a
Report by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles
Trevelyan; but, while the recommendation was taken
up in the following year and immediately acted upon
in the Indian Civil Service, it was not till very much
later that it was fully adopted in the Home Service.
The history, indeed, of this last is somewhat peculiar.
After the Report already referred to, came an Order
of Council, of date May 21, 1855, in which we find
it "ordered that all such young men as may be proposed
to be appointed to any junior situation in any
department of the Civil Service shall, before they are
admitted to probation, be examined by or under the
Directors of the said Commissioners, and shall receive
from them a Certificate of Qualification for such
situation". This order was rigorously carried out by
the Commissioners, and, although its absolute requirement
was simply that the nominees should pass a
certain examination, it, nevertheless, allowed the
heads of departments to institute competition if they
cared. Accordingly, we find that competition—<i>but
limited</i>—was immediately set on foot in several of the
offices, and the result led to the following remark in
the Report of 1856:—</p>
<p>"We do not think it within our province to discuss
the expediency of adopting the principle of open
competition as contra-distinguished from examination;
but we must remark that, both in the competitive
examination for clerkships in our own and in
other offices, those who have succeeded in attaining
the appointments have appeared to us to possess
considerably higher attainments than those who have
come in upon simple nomination; and, we may add,
that we cannot doubt that if it be adopted as a usual
course to nominate several candidates to compete for
each vacancy, the expectation of this ordeal will act
most beneficially on the education and industry of
those young persons who are looking forward to
public employment."</p>
<p>In 1857, a near approach was made to open competition,
in the case of four clerkships awarded by
the competing examination in the Commissioners'
own establishment. "The fact of the competition
was not made public, but was communicated to one
or two heads of schools and colleges, and mentioned
casually to other persons at various times. The
number of competitors who presented themselves was
forty-six, of which number, forty-four were actually
examined."</p>
<p>[BEGINNING OF OPEN COMPETITION.]</p>
<p>It was reserved for 1858 to see the first absolutely
open competition, in the case of eight writerships in
the Office of the Secretary of State for India; and in
that year, too, a step in advance was made when the
Commissioners in their Report "pointed out the advantage
which would result from enlarging the field
of competition by substituting, for the plan of nominating
three persons only to compete for each vacant
situation, the system of nominating a proportionate
number of candidates to compete for several appointments
at one examination".</p>
<p>The year 1860 sounded the death-knell of simple
pass examination. It was then recommended by a
Select Committee of the House of Commons, and the
recommendation was adopted, that the competitive
method, in its limited form, should be henceforth
<i>universally</i> applied to junior situations. This recommendation
was at once acted upon in the case of
clerkships under the control of the Lords Commissioners
of the Treasury, and others by and by followed;
but, as matter of fact, it was never strictly carried out
in all its scope and rigour; and as late as 1868 the
Commissioners in their Report stated that "the number
of situations filled on the competitive method has
been comparatively small". Meanwhile, competitive
examination was making way in other quarters.</p>
<p>From 1857, the Commissioners had been in the
habit of examining competitively, at the request of
the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, such candidates as
might be nominated for cadetships in the Royal Irish
Constabulary; and, in 1861, the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty "threw open to public competition"
appointments as apprentices in Her Majesty's dockyards,
and appointments as "engineer students" in the
steam factories connected therewith.</p>
<p>In 1870, the end so long aimed at was attained,
and by an Order in Council of June 4, open competition
was made the only door of entry to the
general Civil Service.</p>
<p>In entire contrast with this, as has been already
said, was the action in the case of the Indian Civil
Service. Here the principle of open competition was
adopted from the first, and the examination took a
very elevated start, comprising the highest branches
of a learned education. These branches were duly
specified in a Report drawn up in November, 1854, by a
Committee, of which Lord Macaulay was chairman;
and, with the exception of Sanskrit and Arabic, they
included simply (as might have been expected) the
literary and scientific subjects ordinarily taught at the
principal seats of general education in the Kingdom.
These were:—</p>
<p>English Language and Literature (Composition,
History, and General Literature,—to each of which
500 marks were assigned, making a total of 1,500);
Greek and Latin (each with 750 marks); French,
German, and Italian (valued at 375 marks, respectively);
Mathematics, pure and mixed (marks 1,000);
Natural and Moral Sciences (each 500); Sanscrit and
Arabic (375 each).</p>
<p>[PRINCIPLE OF SELECTION OF SUBJECTS.]</p>
<p>The principle of selection here is clear and obvious.
It did not rest upon any doctrine regarding the utility
or value of subjects for mental training, but simply
upon this, that those subjects already in the field
must be accepted, and that (as Mr. Jowett, in his
letter to Sir Charles Trevelyan, of January, 1854, put
it) "it will not do to frame our examination on any
mere theory of education. We must test a young
man's ability by what he knows, not by what we wish
him to know." Indeed, this is explicitly avowed in
the Report by the author of the Scheme himself.
The Natural Sciences are included, because (it is
confessed) "of late years they have been introduced
as a part of general education into several of our
universities and colleges": and, as for the Moral
Sciences, "those Sciences are, it is well known, much
studied both at Oxford and at the Scottish Universities".</p>
<p>Into the details of Macaulay's interesting Report,
I need not here enter. Room, however, must be
found for one quotation. It deals with the distribution
of marks, and is both characteristic and puts
the matter in small compass. "It will be necessary,"
says the writer, "that a certain number of marks
should be assigned to each subject, and that the place
of a candidate should be determined by the sum total
of the marks which he has gained. The marks ought,
we conceive, to be distributed among the subjects of
examination in such a manner that no part of the
kingdom, and no class of schools, shall exclusively
furnish servants to the East India Company. It
would be grossly unjust, for example, to the great
academical institutions of England, not to allow skill
in Greek and Latin versification to have a considerable
share in determining the issue of the competition.
Skill in Greek and Latin versification has, indeed, no
direct tendency to form a judge, a financier, or a
diplomatist. But the youth who does best what all the
ablest and most ambitious youths about him are trying
to do well will generally prove a superior man; nor can
we doubt that an accomplishment by which Fox and
Canning, Grenville and Wellesley, Mansfield and
Tenterden first distinguished themselves above their
fellows, indicates powers of mind, which, properly
trained and directed, may do great service to the
State. On the other hand, we must remember that
in the north of this island the art of metrical composition
in the ancient languages is very little cultivated,
and that men so eminent as Dugald Stewart, Horner,
Jeffrey, and Mackintosh, would probably have been
quite unable to write a good copy of Latin alcaics, or
to translate ten lines of Shakspeare into Greek
iambics. We wish to see such a system of examination
established as shall not exclude from the service
of the East India Company either a Mackintosh or a
Tenterden, either a Canning or a Horner."</p>
<p>[ORIGINAL SCHEME FOR THE INDIA SERVICE.]</p>
<p>Now, reverting to Macaulay's Table of Subjects as
above exhibited, I may observe that, till quite recently,
no very serious alterations were ever made upon it.
The scale of marks, indeed, was altered more than
once, and sometimes Sanskrit and Arabic were struck
off, and Jurisprudence and Political Economy put in
their stead; but, if we except the exclusion of Political
Philosophy in 1858, at the desire of the present Lord
Derby, from the Moral Science branch, the list remained,
till Lord Salisbury's late innovation, to all
intents and purposes what it was at the beginning.
Here, for instance, is the prescription for 1875:—</p>
<pre>
MAKES
English Composition 500
History of England, including that of the laws
and constitution 500
English Language and Literature 500
Language, literature, and history of Greece 750
Rome 750
France 375
Germany 375
Italy 375
Mathematics, pure and mixed 1,250
Natural Sciences, that is, (1) chemistry, including
heat; (2) electricity and magnetism; (3) geology
and mineralogy; (4) zoology; (5) botany 1,000
*** The total (1,000) marks may be obtained by
adequate proficiency in any two or more of the five
branches of science included under this head.
Moral Sciences, that is, logic, mental and
moral philosophy 500
Sanskrit, language and literature 500
Arabic, language and literature 500
</pre>
<p>But Lord Salisbury's changes have been great and
sweeping. They are probably in keeping with the
restriction of the competitor's age to "over 17 under
19"; but, if so, they serve only to shew all the more
conclusively that the restriction is a mistake. A
scheme that distributes marks on anything but a
rational and intelligent system; a scheme that excludes
the Natural History Sciences, mineralogy
and Geology, as well as Psychology and Moral
Philosophy from its scope altogether; a scheme that
prescribes only <i>Elements</i> and <i>Outlines</i> of such important
subjects as Natural Science (Chemistry, Electricity
and Magnetism, &c.) and Political Economy—stands
self-condemned. But, to do it justice, let us
produce the Table <i>in extenso</i>:—</p>
<pre>
MAKES.
English Composition 300
History of England, including _a period selected_
by the candidate 300
English Literature including _books selected_ by
the candidate 300
Greek 600
Latin 800
French 500
German 500
Italian 400
Mathematics, pure and mixed 1,000
Natural Science, that is, the _Elements_ of any
two of the following Sciences viz.:--
Chemistry, 500; Electricity and Magnetism,
300; Experimental Laws of Heat and Light,
300; Mechanical Philosophy, with _Outlines_
of Astronomy, 300.
Logic 300
_Elements_ of Political Economy 300
Sanskrit 500
Arabic 500
</pre>
<p>Further remarks are reserved for the sequel. Meanwhile,
I give the scheme advocated by myself in the present Essay:—
</p>
<pre>
GENERAL SCIENCES:--
Mathematics 500
Natural Philosophy 500
Chemistry 500
Biology, as physiology 500
Mental Science 500
SPECIAL OR CONCRETE SCIENCES:--
Mineralogy }
Botany } each 250
Zoology } or 300
Geology }
As a substitute for language, literature, and philosophy
of Greece, Rome, France, Germany, and Italy:--
Greece--Institutions and History 500
Literature 250
Rome--Institutions and History 500
Literature 250
France--Literature 250
Germany--Literature 250
Italy--Literature 250
Modern History 1,000
</pre>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<a name='III.II'></a><p>II. THE SCHEME CONSIDERED.</p>
<p>The system of competitive examinations for the
public service, of which I have laid before the Section
a brief history compiled from the Reports, is one of
those radical innovations that may ultimately lead to
great consequences. For the present, however, it
leads to many debates. Not merely does the working
out of the scheme involve conflicting views, but there
is still, in many quarters, great hesitation as to whether
the innovation is to be productive of good or of evil.
The Report of the Playfair Commission, and the
more recent Report relative to the changes in the
India Civil Service Regulations, indicate pretty
broadly the doubts that still cleave to many minds
on the whole question. It is enough to refer to the
views of Sir Arthur Helps, W.R. Greg, and Dr.
Farr, expressed to the Playfair Commission, as
decidedly adverse to the competitive system. The
authorities cited in the Report on the India Examinations
scarcely go the length of total condemnation;
but many acquiesce only because there is no hope
of a reversal.</p>
<p>The question of the expediency of the system as a
whole is not well suited to a sectional discussion.
We shall be much better employed in adverting to
some of those details in the conduct of the examinations
that have a bearing on the general education
of the country, as well as on the Civil Service itself.
It was very well for the Commissioners, at first
starting, to be guided, in their choice of subjects and
in their assigning of values to those subjects, by the
received branches of education in the schools and
colleges. But, sooner or later, these subjects must
be discussed on their intrinsic merits for the ends in
view. Indeed, the scheme of Lord Salisbury has
already made the venture that Macaulay declined
to make; it has absolutely excluded some of the
best recognised subjects of our school and college
teaching, instead of leaving them to the option of the
candidates.</p>
<p>I will occupy the present paper with the consideration
of two departments in the examination programme—the
one relating to the PHYSICAL or
NATURAL SCIENCES, the other relating to LANGUAGES.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[COMMISSIONER' SCHEME OF SCIENCE.]</p>
<p>The Commissioners' scheme of Mathematics and
Natural Science is not, in my opinion, accordant
either with the best views of the relations of the
sciences, or with the best teaching usages.</p>
<p>In the classification of the Sciences, the first and
most important distinction is between the fundamental
sciences, sometimes called the Abstract
sciences, and the derivative or Concrete branches.
My purpose does not require any nice clearing of
the meanings of those technical terms. It is sufficient
to say that the fundamental sciences are those that
embrace distinct departments of the natural forces or
phenomena; and the derivative or concrete departments
assume all the laws laid down in the others,
and apply them in certain spheres of natural objects.
For example, Chemistry is a primary, fundamental,
or abstract science; and Mineralogy is a derivative
and concrete science. In Chemistry the stress lies in
explaining a peculiar kind of force, called chemical
force; in Mineralogy the stress is laid on the description
and classification of a select group of natural
objects.</p>
<p>The fundamental, or departmental sciences, as most
commonly accepted, are these:—1. Mathematics; 2.
Natural Philosophy, or Physics; 3. Chemistry; 4.
Biology; 5. Psychology. They may be, therefore,
expressed as Formal, Inanimate, Animate, and Mental.
In these sciences, the idea is to view exhaustively
some department of natural phenomena, and to
assume the order best suited for the elucidation of
the phenomena. Mathematics, the Formal Science,
exhausts the relations of Quantity and Number;
measure being a universal property of things. Natural
Philosophy, in its two divisions (molar and molecular),
deals with one kind of force; Chemistry with
another: and the two together conspire to exhaust
the phenomena of <i>inanimate</i> nature; being indispensably
aided by the laws and formulae of quantity, as
given in Mathematics. Biology turns over a new
leaf; it takes up the phenomenon—Life, or the <i>animated</i>
world. Finally, Psychology makes another
stride, and embraces the sphere of <i>mind</i>.</p>
<p>Now, there is no fact or phenomenon of the world
that is not comprised under the doctrines expounded
in some one or other of these sciences. We may
have fifty "ologies" besides, but they will merely
repeat for special ends, or in special connections,
the principles already comprised in these five fundamental
subjects. The regular, systematic, exhaustive
account of the laws of nature is to be found within
their compass.</p>
<p>[ORDER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL SCIENCES.]</p>
<p>Again, these sciences have a fixed order or sequence,
the order of dependence. Mathematics precedes them
all, as being not dependent upon any, while all are
more or less dependent upon it. The physical forces
have to be viewed prior to the chemical; and both
physical and chemical forces are preparatory to vital.
So there are reasons for placing Mental Science last
of all. Hence a student cannot comprehend chemistry
without natural philosophy, nor biology without
both. You cannot stand a thorough examination in
chemistry without indirectly showing your knowledge
of physics; and a testing examination in biology
would guarantee, with some slight qualifications, both
physics and chemistry.</p>
<p>Let us now turn to the other sciences—those that
are not fundamental, but derivative. The chief
examples are the three commonly called Natural
History sciences—Mineralogy, Botany, Zoology. In
these sciences no law or principle is at work that has
not been already brought forward in the primary
sciences. The properties of a Mineral are mathematical,
physical, and chemical: the testing of minerals
is by measurement, by physical tests, by chemical
tests. The aim of this science is not to teach forces
unknown to the student of physics and chemistry;
it is to embrace, under the best classification, all the
bodies called minerals, and to describe the species in
detail under mathematical, physical, and chemical
characters. It is the first in order of the <i>classificatory</i>
sciences. Its purpose in the economy of education
is distinct and peculiar; it imparts knowledge, not
respecting laws, forces, or principles of operating,
but respecting the concrete constituents of the world.
It gives us a commanding view of one whole department
of the material universe; supplying information
useful in practice, and interesting to the feelings. It
also brings into exercise the great logical process,
wanted on many occasions, the process of CLASSIFICATION.</p>
<p>[CLASSIFICATORY SCIENCES.]</p>
<p>So much for an instance from the Inorganic world,
as showing the distinction between the two kinds of
sciences. Another example may be cited from the
field of Biology; it is a little more perplexing. For
"biology" is sometimes given as the name for the two
concrete classificatory sciences—botany and zoology.
In point of fact, however, there is a science that
precedes those two branches, although blending with
them; the science commonly expressed by the older
term, 'Physiology,' which is not a classificatory and a
dependent science, but a mother science, like chemistry.
It expounds the peculiarities of living bodies,
as such, and the laws of living processes—such processes
as assimilation, nutrition, respiration, innervation,
reproduction, and so on. One division is
Vegetable Physiology, which is generally fused with
the classificatory science of botany. Animal Physiology
is allied with zoology, but more commonly
stands alone. Lastly, the Physiology of the Human
animal has been from time immemorial a distinct
branch of knowledge, and is, of course, the chief of
them all. Man being the most complicated of all
organised beings, not only are the laws of his vitality
the most numerous, and the most practically interesting,
but they go far to include all that is to be said
of the workings of animal life in general. Thus, then,
the mother science of Biology, as a general or fundamental
science, comprises Vegetable, Animal, and
Human physiology. The classificatory adjunct
sciences are Botany and Zoology. It is in the
various aspects of the mother science that we look
for the account of all vital phenomena, and all practical
applications to the preservation of life. Even if
we stop at these, we shall have a full command of the
laws of the animate world. But we may go farther,
and embrace the sciences that arrange, classify, and
describe the innumerable host of living beings.
These have their own independent interest and
value, but they are not the sciences that of themselves
teach us the living processes.</p>
<p>Thus, then, a proper scheme of scientific instruction
starts from the essential, fundamental, and law-giving
sciences—Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology,
and Mind. It then proceeds to the adjunct branches
—such as Mineralogy, Botany, Zoology: and I might
add others, as Geology, Meteorology, Geography, no
one of which is primary; for they all repeat in new
connections, and for special purposes, the laws systematically
set forth in the primary sciences.</p>
<p>In the foregoing remarks, I do not advance any
new or debatable views. I believe the scientific
world to be substantially in accord upon all that I
have here stated; any differences that there are in
the manner of expressing the points do not affect
my present purpose—namely, to discuss the scheme
of the mathematical and physical sciences as set forth
in the Civil Service Examinations.</p>
<p>[BAD GROUPINGS OF SCIENCES.]</p>
<p>Under Mathematics (pure and mixed) the Commissioners
(in their Scheme of 1875), include mathematics,
properly so called, and those departments of
natural philosophy that are mathematically handled—statics,
dynamics, and optics. But the next branch,
entitled "Natural Science," is what I am chiefly to remark
upon. Under it there is a fivefold enumeration:
—(1) Chemistry, including Heat; (2) Electricity and
Magnetism; (3) Geology and Mineralogy; (4) Zoology;
(5) Botany. I cannot pretend to say where
the Commissioners obtained this arrangement of
natural knowledge. It is not supported by any
authority that I am acquainted with. If the scheme
just set forth is the correct one, it has <i>three</i> defects.
First, it does not embrace in one group the remaining
parts of natural philosophy, the <i>experimental</i> branches
which, with the mathematical treatment, complete the
department; one of these, Heat, is attached to chemistry,
to which undoubtedly it has important relations,
but not such as to withdraw it from physics and
embody it in chemistry. Then, again, the physical
branches, Electricity and Magnetism, are coupled in
a department and made of co-equal value with
chemistry together with heat. I need not say that
the united couple—electricity and magnetism—is in
point of extent of study not a half or a third of what
is included in the other coupling. Lastly, the
three remaining members of the enumeration are
three natural history sciences; geology being coupled
with mineralogy—which is a secondary consideration.
Now I think it is quite right that these three sciences
should have a place in the competition. What is
objectionable is, that Biology is represented solely by
its two classificatory components or adjuncts, botany
and zoology; there is no mother science of Physiology:
and consequently the knowledge of the vast
region of the Laws of Life goes for nothing. Nor
can it be said that physiology is given with the
others. The subject of <i>vegetable</i> physiology could
easily enough be taken with Botany: I would
not make a quarrel upon this part. It is zoology
and animal physiology that cannot be so coupled.
If we look to the questions actually set under
zoology, we shall see that there is no pretence to
take in physiology. I contend, therefore, that there
is a radical omission in the scheme of natural
science; an omission that seems without any justification.
I am not here to sing the praises of Physiology:
its place is fixed and determined by the
concurrence of all competent judges: I merely point
out that Zoology does not include it, but presupposes
it.</p>
<p>The Science scheme of the London University, to
which the first Civil Service Commissioners, Sir
Edward Ryan and Sir John Lefevre, were parties, is
very nearly what I contend for. It gives the order—Mathematics,
Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Biology,
Mental Science (including Logic). In the working of
that scheme, however, Biology is made to comprehend
both the mother science, Physiology, and the two
classificatory sciences, Botany and Zoology. Of
course the presence of two such enormous adjuncts
cramps and confines the purely physiological examination,
which in my opinion should have full justice
done to it in the first instance: still, the physiology is
not suppressed nor reduced to a mere formality.
Now, in any science scheme, I would provide for the
general sciences first, and take the others, so far as
expedient, in a new grouping, where those of a kind
shall appear together, and stand in their proper
character, not as law-giving, but as arranging and
describing sciences. There is no more reason for
coupling Zoology with Physiology, than for tacking
on Mineralogy to Chemistry. In point of outward
form, Mineralogy and Zoology are kindred subjects.</p>
<p>When the subjects are placed in the order that I
have suggested, there is an end of that promiscuous
and random choosing that the arrangement of the
Commissioners suggests and encourages. To the
specification of the five heads of natural science, it is
added, that the whole of the 1,000 marks may be
gained by high eminence in any two; as if the choice
were a matter of indifference. Now, I cannot think
that this suggestion is in conformity with a just view
of the continuity of science. When the sciences are
rightly arranged, there is but one order in the mother
sciences; if we are to choose a single science, it must
be (with some qualifications) the first; if two, the
first and second, and so on. To choose one of the
higher sciences, Chemistry or Physiology, without the
others that precede, is irrational. Indeed, it would
scarcely ever be done, and for this reason. A man
cannot have mastered Physiology without having
gone through Physics and Chemistry; and, although
it is not necessary that he should retain a hold of
everything in these previous sciences, yet he is sure to
have done enough in both one and the other to make
it worth his while to take these up in the examination.
So a good chemist must have so much familiarity
with Physics, as to make it bad economy on his
part not to give in Physics as well. The only case
where an earlier science might be dropped is Mathematics;
for although that finds its application extensively
in Physics and indirectly in Chemistry, yet there
is a very large body of physical and chemical doctrine
that is not dependent upon any of the more difficult
branches, so that these may admit of being partially
neglected. But, as an examination in Physics ought
to include (as in the London University) all the mathematical
applications, short of the higher calculus, it is
not likely that Mathematics would be often dropped.
So that, as regards the <i>mother</i> sciences, the variation
of choice would be reduced to the different lengths
that the candidate would go in the order as laid down.
As regards the other sciences—those of <i>classification</i>
and <i>description</i>—the selection might certainly be
arbitrary to this extent, that Mineralogy, Botany, and
Zoology might each be prescribed alone. But then,
whoever presented one of these would also present
the related mother science. He that took up Mineralogy,
would infallibly also take up the three first as
far as Chemistry. He that gave in Botany would
probably take up Physiology, although not so necessarily,
because the area of plant Physiology is very
limited, and has little bearing on descriptive Botany,
so that anything like a familiarity with Physiology
might be evaded. But he that took up Zoology, would
to a certainty take up Physiology; and very probably
also the antecedent members of the fundamental
group. As to Geology, it is usually coupled with
Mineralogy, although involving also a slight knowledge
of Botany and Zoology. A competent mineralogist
would be pretty sure to add Geology to his
professional subjects.</p>
<p>Before considering the re-arrangement of marks
entailed by the proposed distribution of the sciences,
I must advert to the position of Mathematics in the
Commissioners' scheme. This position was first
assigned in the original draft of 1854, and on the
motives therein set forth with such ostentatious
candour; namely, the wish to reward the existing
subjects of teaching, whatever they might be. Now,
I contend that it is wholly beside the ends either of
the Indian Civil Service, or of the Home Service, with
known exceptions, to stimulate the very high mathematical
knowledge that has hitherto entered into the
examination scheme. A certain amount of Mathematics,
the amount required in a pass examination in
the London University, is essential as a basis of
rational culture; but, for a good general education,
all beyond that is misdirected energy. After receiving
the modicum required, the student should pass on to
the other sciences, and employ his strength in adding
Experimental Physics and Chemistry to his stock.
Whether a candidate succeeds or fails in the competitions,
this is his best policy.</p>
<p>[PROPER SCIENCE VALUES.]</p>
<p>Without arguing the point farther, I will now come
to the amended scheme of science markings. It
would be over-refining, and would not bring conviction
to the general public, to make out a case for
inequality in the five fundamental branches. It may
be said that Physiology is of more value than Chemistry,
because it is farther on, and takes Chemistry
with it; the answer is, let the Physiology candidate go
in and take marks in Chemistry also, which he is sure
to do. I have purposely avoided all discussion about
Mental Science; I merely assume it as a branch coordinate
with the prior sciences placed before it in the
general list. I would then simply, in conclusion, give
the <i>primary sciences</i>, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy,
Chemistry, Biology (as explained), Mental Philosophy,
each 500 marks. The other sciences, Mineralogy,
Botany, Zoology, Geology, I would make equal as
between themselves, but somewhat lower than the
primaries. The reasons are already apparent: the
candidate for them would always have some of the
others to present; and their importance is, on the
whole, less than the importance of the law-giving
sciences. I should conceive that 250 or 300 marks
apiece would be a proper amount of consideration
shewn towards them. With that figure, I believe
many science students could take up one or other in
addition to the general sciences.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>The other topic that I am to bring forward is one
of very serious import. It concerns the Civil Service
competitions only as a part of our whole scheme of
Education. I mean the position of LANGUAGES
in our examinations. While the vast field of Natural
Science is comprised in one heading, with a total of
1,000 marks (raised finally to 1,400), our Civil Service
scheme presents a row of five languages besides our
own—two ancient, and three modern—with an aggregate
value of 2,625 marks, or 2,800, as finally adjusted.
The India scheme has, in addition, Sanskrit and
Arabic, at 500 marks each; the reasons for this prescription
being, however, not the same as for the
foregoing.</p>
<p>The place of Language in education is not confined
to the question as between the ancient and the modern
languages. There is a wider enquiry as to the place
of languages as a whole. In pursuing this enquiry,
we may begin with certain things that are obvious
and incontestable.</p>
<p>In the first place, it is apparent that if a man is
sent to hold intercourse with the people of a foreign
nation, he must be able to understand and to speak
the language of that nation. Our India civil servants
are on that ground required to master the Hindoo
spoken dialects.</p>
<p>[PLACE OF LANGUAGE IN EDUCATION.]</p>
<p>In the next place, if a certain range of information
that you find indispensable is locked up in a foreign
language, you are obliged to learn the language. If,
in course of time, all this information is transferred to
our native tongue, the necessity apparently ceases.
These two extreme suppositions will be allowed at
once. There may, however, be an indefinite number
of intermediate stages. The information may be
partially translated; and it will then be a question
whether the trouble of learning the language should
be incurred for the sake of the untranslated part. Or,
it may be wholly translated: but, conscious of the
necessary defects even of good translations, if the
subject-matter be supremely important, some people
will think it worth while to learn the language in
order to obtain the knowledge in its greatest purity
and precision. This is a situation that admits of no
certain rule. Our clergy are expected to know the
original languages of the Bible, notwithstanding the
abundance of translations; many of which must be
far superior in worth and authority to the judgment
of a merely ordinary proficient in Hebrew and in
Greek.</p>
<p>It is now generally conceded that the classical
languages are no longer the exclusive depository of
any kind of valuable information, as they were two or
three centuries ago. Yet they are still continued in
the schools as if they possessed their original function
unabated. We do not speak in them, nor listen to
them spoken, nor write in them, nor read in them, for
obtaining information. Why then are they kept up?
Many reasons are given, as we know. There is an
endeavour to show that even in their original function,
they are not quite effete. Certain professions are said
to rely upon them for some points of information not
fully communicated by the medium of English. Such
is the rather indirect example of the clergy with Greek.
So, it is said that Law is not thoroughly understood
without Latin, because the great source of law, the
Roman code, is written in Latin, and is in many
points untranslatable. Further, it is contended that
Greek philosophy cannot be fully mastered without a
knowledge of the language of Plato and Aristotle. But
an argument that is reduced to these examples must be
near its vanishing point. Not one of the cases stands
a rigorous scrutiny; and they are not relied upon as
the main justification of the continuance of classics.
A new line of defence is opened up which was not at
all present to the minds of sixteenth century scholars.
We are told of numerous indirect and secondary
advantages of cultivating language in general and the
classic languages in particular, which make the acquisition
a rewarding labour, even without one particle
of the primary use. But for these secondary advantages,
languages could have no claim to appear, with
such enormous values, in the Civil Service scheme.</p>
<p>[LANGUAGE MAY HAVE SECONDARY USES.]</p>
<p>My purpose requires me to advert in these alleged
secondary uses of language, not, however, for the view
of counter-arguing them, but rather in order to indicate
what seems to me the true mode of bringing them to
the proof.</p>
<p>The most usual phraseology for describing the indirect
benefit of languages is, that they supply a
<i>training</i> to the powers of the mind; that, if not information,
they are <i>culture</i>; that they re-act upon our
mastery of our own language, and so on. It is quite
necessary, however, to find phrases more definite and
tangible than the slippery words "culture" and "training":
we must know precisely what particular powers
or aptitudes are increased by the study of a foreign
language. Nevertheless, the conclusions set forth in
this paper do not require me to work out an exhaustive
review of these advantages. It is enough to give
as many as will serve for examples.</p>
<p>Now, it must be freely admitted as a possible case,
that a practice introduced in the first instance for a
particular purpose, may be found applicable to many
other purposes; so much so, that, ceasing to be employed
for the original use, the practice may be kept
up for the sake of the after uses. For example,
clothing was no doubt primarily contrived for
warmth; but it is not now confined to that:
decoration or ornament, distinction of sexes, ranks
and offices, modesty—are also attained by means of
clothes. This example is a suggestive one. We have
only to suppose ourselves migrating to some African
climate, where clothing for warmth is absolutely dispensed
with. We should not on that account adopt
literal nudity—we should still desire to maintain
those other advantages. The artistic decoration of
the person would continue to be thought of; and, as
no amount of painting and tattooing, with strings of
beads superadded, would answer to our ideal of personal
elegance, we should have recourse to some light
filmy textures, such as would allow the varieties of
drapery, colours, and design, and show off the poetry
of motion; we should also indicate the personal differences
that we were accustomed to show by vesture.
But now comes the point of the moral; we should not
maintain our close heavy fabrics, our great-coats,
shawls and cloaks. These would cease with the need
for them. Perhaps the first emigrants would keep up
the prejudice for their warm things, but not so their
successors.</p>
<p>Well, then, suppose the extreme case of a foreign
language that is entirely and avowedly superseded as
regards communication and interpretation of thoughts,
but still furnishing so many valuable aids to mental
improvement, that we keep it up for the sake of these.
As we are not to hear, speak, or read the language,
we do not need absolutely to know the meaning of
every word: we may, perhaps, dispense with much of
the technicality of its grammar. The vocables and
the grammar would be kept up exactly so far as to
serve the other purposes, and no farther. The teacher
would have in view the secondary uses alone. Supposing
the language related to our own by derivation
of words, and that this was what we put stress upon;
then the derivation would always be uppermost in the
teacher's thoughts. If it were to illustrate Universal
Grammar and Philology, this would be brought out
to the neglect of translation.</p>
<p>[CLASSICAL TEACHER'S IDEAL.]</p>
<p>I have made an imaginary supposition to prepare
the way for the real case. The classical or language
teacher, is assumed to be fully conscious of the fact
that the primary use of the languages is as good as
defunct; and that he is continued in office because of
certain clearly assigned secondary uses, but for which
he would be superseded entirely. Some of the secondary
uses present to his mind, at all events one of
those that are put forward in argument, is that a
foreign language, and especially Latin, conduces to
good composition in our own language. And as we
do compose in our own language, and never compose
in Latin, the teacher is bound to think mainly of the
English part of the task—to see that the pupils succeed
in the English translation, whether they succeed
in the other or not. They may be left in a state of
considerable ignorance of good Latin forms (ignorance
will never expose them); but any defects in their
English expression will be sure to be disclosed.
Again, it is said that Universal Grammar or Philology
is taught upon the basis of a foreign language. Is
this object, in point of fact, present to the mind of
every teacher, and brought forward, even to the sacrifice
of the power of reading and writing, which, by
the supposition, is never to be wanted? Further, the
Latin Grammar is said to be a logical discipline. Is
this, too, kept in view as a predominating end? Once
more, it is declared that, through the classics, we attain
the highest cultivation of Taste, by seeing models of
unparalleled literary form. Be it so: is this habitually
attended to in the teaching of these languages?</p>
<p>I believe I am safe in saying that, whilst these
various secondary advantages are put forward in the
polemic as to the value of languages, the teaching
practice is by no means in harmony therewith.
Even when in word the supporters of classics put
forward the secondary uses, in deed they belie themselves.
Excellence in teaching is held by them to
consist, in the first instance, in the power of accurate
interpretation,—as if that obsolete use were still <i>the</i>
use. If a teacher does this well, he is reckoned a
good teacher, although he does little or nothing for
the other ends, which in argument are treated as the
reason of his existence. Indeed, this is the kind of
teaching that is alone to be expected from the
ordinary teacher; all the other ends are more
difficult than simple word teaching. Even when
English Composition, Logic and Taste are taught in
the most direct way, they are more abstruse than
the simple teaching of a foreign language for purposes
of interpretation; but when tacked on as accessories
to instruction in a language, they are still more
troublesome to impart. A teacher of rare excellence
may help his pupils in English style, in philology, in
logic, and in taste; but the mass of teachers can do
very little in any of those directions. They are never
found fault with merely because their teaching does
not rise to the height of the great arguments that
justify their vocation; they would be found fault
with, if their pupils were supposed to have made
little way in that first function of language which is
never to be called into exercise.</p>
<p>I do not rest satisfied with quoting the palpable inconsistency
between the practice of the teacher and
the polemic of the defender of languages. I believe,
further, that it is not expedient to carry on so many
different acquisitions together. If you want to teach
thorough English, you need to arrange a course of
English, allot a definite time to it, and follow it with
undivided attention during that time. If you wish
to teach Philology you must provide a systematic
scheme, or else a text-book of Philology, and bring
together all the most select illustrations from languages
generally. So for Logic and for Taste. These
subjects are far too serious to be imparted in passing
allusions while the pupil is engaged in struggling
with linguistic difficulties. They need a place in the
programme to themselves; and, when so provided
for, the small dropping contributions of the language
teacher may easily be dispensed with.</p>
<p>[SECONDARY ENDS OF LANGUAGE NOT PRESSED.]</p>
<p>The argument for Languages may, no doubt, take
a bolder flight, and go so far as to maintain that the
teacher does not need to turn aside from his plain
path to secure these secondary ends—now the only
valuable ends. The contention may be that in the
close and rigorous attention to mere interpretation,
just as if interpretation were still the living use, these
other purposes are inevitably secured—good English,
universal grammar, logic, taste, &c. I think, however,
that this is too far from the fact to be very confidently
maintained. Of course, were it correct, the
teacher should never have departed from it, as the
best teachers continually do, and glory in doing.</p>
<p>On the face of the thing, it must seem an unworkable
position to surrender the value of a language,
as a language, and keep it up for something else.
The teaching must always be guided by the original,
although defunct, use; this is the natural, the easy,
course to follow; for the mass of teachers at all times
it is the broad way. Whatever the necessities of
argument may drive a man to say, yet in his teaching
he cannot help postulating to himself, as an indispensable
fiction, that his pupils are some day or other
to hear, to read, to speak, or to write the language.</p>
<p>The intense conservatism in the matter of Languages—the
alacrity to prescribe languages on all
sides, without inquiring whether they are likely to be
turned to account—may be referred to various causes.
For one thing—although the remark may seem ungracious
and invidious—many minds, not always of
the highest force, are absorbed and intoxicated by
languages. But apart from this, languages are, by
comparison, easy to teach, and easy to examine upon.
Now, if there is any motive in education more powerful
than another, it is ease in the work itself. We are
all, as teachers, copyists of that Irish celebrity who,
when he came to a good bit of road, paced it to
and fro a number of times before going forward to
his destination on the rougher footing.</p>
<p>So far I may seem to be arguing against the teaching
of language at all, or, at any rate, the languages
expressively called dead. I am not, however, pressing
this point farther than as an illustration. I do not
ask anyone to give an opinion against Classics as a
subject of instruction; although, undoubtedly, if this
opinion were prevalent, my principal task would be
very much lightened. I have merely analysed the
utilities ascribed to the ancient and the modern languages,
with a view to settling their place in competitive
examinations.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[LANGUAGES NOT PROPER FOR THE COMPETITION.]</p>
<p>My thesis, then, is, that languages are not a proper
subject for competition with a view to professional
appointments. The explanation falls under two
heads.</p>
<p>In the first place, there are certain avocations
where a foreign language must be known, because it
has to be used in actual business. Such are the
Indian spoken languages. Now, it is clear that in
these cases the knowledge of the language, as being
a <i>sine quâ non</i>, must be made imperative. This, however,
as I think, is not a case for competition, but for
a sufficient pass. There is a certain pitch of attainment
that is desirable even at first entering the service;
no one should fall below this, and to rise much
above it cannot matter a great deal. At all events, I
think the measure should be absolute and not relative.
I would not give a man merit in a competition because
another man happens to be worse than himself in a
matter that all must know; both the men may be
absolutely bad.</p>
<p>It may be the case that certain languages are so
admirably constructed and so full of beauties that to
study them is a liberal education in itself. But this
does not necessarily hold of every language that an
official of the British Empire may happen to need.
It does not apply to the Indian tongues, nor to
Chinese, nor, I should suppose, to the Fiji dialects.
The only human faculty that is tested and brought
into play in these acquisitions is the commonest kind
of memory exercised for a certain time. The value
to the Service of the man that can excel in spoken
languages does not lie in his superior administrative
ability, but in his being sooner fitted for actual duty.
Undoubtedly, if two men go out to Calcutta so
unequal in their knowledge of native languages, or
in the preparation for that knowledge, that one can
begin work in six months, while the other takes nine,
there is an important difference between them. But
what is the obvious mode of rewarding the difference?
Not, I should think, by pronouncing one a
higher man in the scale of the competition, but by
giving him some money prize in proportion to the
redemption of his time for official work.</p>
<p>Now, as regards the second kind of languages—those
that are supposed to carry with them all the
valuable indirect consequences that we have just reviewed.
There are in the Civil Service Scheme five
such languages—two ancient, and three modern.
They are kept there, not because they are ever to be
read or spoken in the Service, but because they
exercise some magical efficacy in elevating the whole
tone of the human intellect.</p>
<p>If I were discussing the Indian Civil Service in its
own specialities, I would deprecate the introduction
of extraneous languages into the competition, for this
reason, that the Service itself taxes the verbal powers
more than any other service. I do not think that
Lord Macaulay and his colleagues had this circumstance
fully in view. Macaulay was himself a glutton
for language; and, while in India, read a great quantity
of Latin and Greek. But he was exempted from
the ordinary lot of the Indian civil servant; he had
no native languages to acquire and to use. If a man
both speaks and writes in good English, and converses
familiarly in several Oriental dialects, his
language memory is sufficiently well taxed, and if
he carries with him one European language besides,
it is as much as belongs to the fitness of things in
that department.</p>
<p>[SECONDARY USES OF LANGUAGE DIRECTLY TESTED.]</p>
<p>My proposal, then, goes the length of excluding
all these five cultivated languages from the competition,
notwithstanding the influence that they may be
supposed to have as general culture. In supporting
it, I shall assume that everything that can be said in
their favour is true to the letter: that they assist us
in our own language, that they cultivate logic and
taste, that they exemplify universal grammar, and so
on. All that my purpose requires is to affirm that
the same good ends may be attained in other ways:
that Latin, Greek, &c, are but one of several instruments
for instructing us in English composition,
reasoning, or taste. My contention, then, is that the
<i>ends</i> themselves are to be looked to, and not the
means or instruments, since these are very various.
English composition is, of course, a valuable end,
whether got through the study of Latin, or through
the study of English authors themselves, or through
the inspiration of natural genius. Whatever amount
of skill and attainment a candidate can show in this
department should be valued <i>the examination for
English</i>; and all the good that Latin has done for
him would thus be entered to his credit. If, then, the
study of Latin is found the best means of securing
good marks in English, it will be pursued on that
account; if the candidate is able to discover other
less laborious ways of attaining the end, he will
prefer these ways.</p>
<p>The same applies to all the other secondary ends
of language. Let them be valued <i>in their own departments</i>.
Let the improvement of the reasoning
faculty be counted wherever that is shown in the
examination. Good reasoning powers will evince
themselves in many places, and will have their,
reward.</p>
<p>The principle is a plain and obvious one. It is
that of payment for results, without inquiring into
the means. There are certain extreme cases where
the means are not improperly coupled with the
results in the final examination; and these are illustrations
of the principle. Thus, in passing a candidate
for the medical profession, the final end is his or her
knowledge of diseases and their remedies. As it is
admitted, however, that there are certain indispensable
preparatory studies—anatomy, physiology, and
materia medica—such studies are made part of the
examination, because they contribute to the testing
for the final end.</p>
<p>[HISTORY AND LITERATURE DETACHABLE FROM LANGUAGE.]</p>
<p>The argument is not complete until we survey
another branch of the subject of examination in languages.
It will be observed in the wording of the
programme that each separate language is coupled
with 'literature and history (or, as latterly expressed,
'literature—including books selected by the
candidate')'. It is the Language, Literature, and History
of Rome, Greece, &c. And the examination
questions show the exact scope of these adjuncts,
and also the values attached to them, as compared
with the language by itself.</p>
<p>Let us consider this matter a little. Take History
first, as being the least perplexed. Greece and Rome
have both a certain lasting importance attaching to
their history and institutions; and these accordingly
are a useful study. Of course, the extant writings are
the chief groundwork of our knowledge of these, and
must be read. But, at the present day, all that can
be extracted from the originals is presented to the
student in English books; and to these he is exclusively
referred for this part of his knowledge. In the
small portion of original texts that a pupil at school
or college toils through, he necessarily gets a few of
the historical facts at first hand; but he could much
more easily get these few where he gets the rest—in
the English compilations. Admitting, then, that the
history and institutions of Greece and Rome constitute
a valuable education, it is in our power to secure
it independently of the original tongues.</p>
<p>The other branch—Literature—is not so easily disposed
of. In fact, the separating of the literature
from the language, you will say, is a self-evident
absurdity. That, however, only shows that you have
not looked carefully into examination papers. I am
not concerned with what the <i>à priori</i> imagination
may suppose to be Literature, but with the actual
questions put by examiners under that name. I find
that such questions are, generally speaking, very few,
perhaps one or two in a long paper, and nearly all
pertain to the outworks of literature, so to speak.
Here is the Latin literature of one paper:—In what
special branch of literature were the Romans independent
of the Greeks? Mention the principal
writers in it, with the peculiar characteristics of each.
Who was the first to employ the hexameter in Latin
poetry, and in what poem? To what language is
Latin most nearly related; and what is the cause of
their great resemblance? The Greek literature of
the same examination involves these points:—The
Aristophanic estimate of Euripides, with criticisms on
its taste and justice (for which, however, a historical
subject is given as an alternative); the Greek chorus,
and choric metres. Now such an examination is, in
the first place, a most meagre view of literature: it
does not necessarily exercise the faculty of critical
discernment. In the next place, it is chiefly a matter
of compilation from English sources; the actual readings
of the candidate in Greek and Latin would be of
little account in the matter. Of course, the choric
metres could not be described without some knowledge
of Greek, but the matter is of very trifling
importance in an educational point of view. Generally
speaking, the questions in literature, which in
number bear no proportion to historical questions,
are such as might be included under history, as the
department of the History of Literature.</p>
<p>[LANGUAGES EXAMINATION PAPERS REVIEWED.]</p>
<p>The distribution of the 750 marks allotted respectively
to Latin and to Greek, in the scheme of 1875,
is this. There are three papers: two are occupied
exclusively with translation. The third is language,
literature, and history: the language means purely
grammatical questions; so that possibly 583 marks
are for the language proper. The remaining number,
167, should be allotted equally between literature and
history, but history has always the lion's share, and is
in fact the only part of the whole examination that
has, to my mind, any real worth. It is generally a
very searching view of important institutions and
events, together with what may be called their philosophy.
Now, the reform that seems to me to be
wanted is to strike out everything else from the
examination. At the same time, I should like to see the
experiment of a <i>real</i> literary examination, such as
did not necessarily imply a knowledge of the originals.</p>
<p>It is interesting to turn to the examination in
modern languages, where the ancient scheme is
copied, by appending literature and history. Here
the Literature is decidedly more prominent and
thorough. There is also a fair paper of History
questions. What strikes us, however, in this, is a
slavish adherence to the form, without the reality, of
the ancient situation. We have independent histories
of Greece and Rome, but scarcely of Germany,
France, and Italy. Instead of partitioning Modern
European history among the language-examiners for
English, French, German, Italian, it would be better
to relieve them of history altogether, and place the
subject as a whole in the hands of a distinct examiner.
I would still allow merit for a literary examination in
French, German, and Italian, but would strike off the
languages, and let the candidate get up the literature
as he chose. The basis of a candidate's literary
knowledge, and his first introduction to literature,
ought to be his own language: but he may extend
his discrimination and his power by other literatures,
either in translations or in originals, as he pleases;
still the examination, as before, should test the discrimination
and the power, and not the vocabulary of
the languages themselves.</p>
<p>In order to do full justice to classical antiquity, I
would allow markings at the rate of 500 for Political
Institutions and History, and 250 for Literature.
Some day this will be thought too much; but political
philosophy or sociology may become more systematic
than at present, and history questions will then take
a different form.</p>
<p>In like manner, I would abolish the language-examination
in modern languages, and give 250
marks for the literature of each of the three modern
languages—French, German, Italian. The history
would be taken as Modern History, with an adequate
total value.</p>
<p>The objections to this proposal will mainly resolve
themselves into its revolutionary character. The remark
will at once be made that the classical languages
would cease to be taught, and even the modern
languages discouraged. The meaning of this I take
to be, that, if such teaching is judged solely by its
fruits, it must necessarily be condemned.</p>
<p>The only way to fence this unpalatable conclusion,
is to maintain that the results could not be fully tested
in an examination as suggested. Some of these are
so fine, impalpable, and spiritual in their texture, that
they cannot be seized by any questions that can be
put; and would be dropped out if the present system
were changed. But results so untraceable cannot be
proved to exist at all.</p>
<p>[LANGUAGE QUESTIONS TAKE THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT.]</p>
<p>So far from the results being missed by disusing
the exercises of translation, one might contend that
they would only begin to be appreciated fairly when
the whole stress of the examination is put upon them.
If an examiner sets a paper in Roman Law, containing
long Latin extracts to be translated, he is
starving the examination in Law by substituting for
it an examination in Latin. Whatever knowledge of
Latin terminology is necessary to the knowledge of
Law should be required, and no more. So, it is not
an examination in Aristotle to require long translations
from the Greek; only by dispensing with all
this, does the main subject receive proper attention.</p>
<p>If the properly literary part of the present examinations
were much of a reality, there would be a nice
discussion as to the amount of literary tact that could
be imparted in connection with a foreign language, as
translated or translatable. But I have made an
ample concession, when I propose that the trial
should be made of examining in literature in this
fashion; and I do not see any difficulty beyond the
initial repugnance of the professors of languages to be
employed in this task, and the fear, on the part of
candidates, that, undue stress might be placed on
points that need a knowledge of originals.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>I will conclude with a remark on the apparent
tendency of the wide options in the Commissioners'
scheme. No one subject is obligatory; and the choice
is so wide that by a very narrow range of acquirements
a man may sometimes succeed. No doubt, as
a rule, it requires a considerable mixture of subjects:
both sciences and literature have to be included. But
I find the case of a man entering the Indian Service
by force of Languages alone, which I cannot but
think a miscarriage. Then the very high marks
assigned to Mathematics allow a man to win with no
other science, and no other culture, but a middling
examination in English. To those that think so
highly of foreign languages, this must seem a much
greater anomaly than it does to me. I would prefer,
however, that such a candidate had traversed a wider
field of science, instead of excelling in high mathematics
alone.</p>
<p>There are, I should say, <i>three</i> great regions of study
that should be fairly represented by every successful
candidate. The first is the Sciences as a whole, in
the form and order that I have suggested. The
second is English Composition, in which successful
men in the Indian competition sometimes show a
cipher. The third is what I may call loosely the
Humanities, meaning the department of institutions
and history, with perhaps literature: to be computed
in any or all of the regions of ancient and modern
history. In every one of these three departments, I
would fix a minimum, below which the candidate must
not fall.</p>
<p>FOOTNOTES:</p>
<a name="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6">[6]</a><div class="note"><p> <i>The Civil Service Examination Scheme, considered with reference (1)
to Sciences, and (2) to Languages</i>. A paper read before the Educational
Section of the Social Science Association, at the meeting in Aberdeen.
1877: with additions relevant to Lord Salisbury's Scheme.</p></div>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<h2><a name='EIV'></a>IV.</h2>
<h2>THE CLASSICAL CONTROVERSY. ITS PRESENT ASPECT.<a name="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7"><sup>[7]</sup></a></h2>
<br />
<p>In the present state of the controversy on classical
studies, the publication of George Combe's contributions
to Education is highly opportune. Combe took
the lead in the attack on these studies fifty years ago,
and Mr. Jolly, the editor of the volume, gives a connected
view of the struggle that followed. The results
were, on the whole, not very great. A small portion
of natural science was introduced into the secondary
schools; but as the classical teaching was kept up as
before, the pupils were simply subjected to a greater
crush of subjects; they could derive very little benefit
from science introduced on such terms. The
effect on the Universities was <i>nil</i>; they were true
to Dugald Stewart's celebrated deliverance on their
conservatism.<a name="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> The general public, however, were
not unmoved; during a number of years there was
a most material reduction in the numbers attending
all the Scotch Universities, and the anti-classical
agitation was reputed to be the cause.</p>
<p>The reasonings of Combe will still repay perusal.
He puts with great felicity and clearness the standing
objections to the classical system; while he is exceedingly
liberal in his concessions, and moderate in his
demands. "I do not denounce the ancient languages
and classical literature on their own account, or desire
to see them cast into utter oblivion. I admit them to
be refined studies, and think that there are individuals
who, having a natural turn for them, learn them easily
and enjoy them much. They ought, therefore, to be
cultivated by all such persons. My objection is solely
to the practice of rendering them the main substance
of the education bestowed on young men who have
no taste or talent for them, and whose pursuits in life
will not render them a valuable acquisition."</p>
<p>Before alluding to the more recent utterances in
defence of classical teaching, I wish to lay out as
distinctly as I can the various alternatives that are
apparently now before us as respects the higher education—that
is to say, the education begun in the
secondary or grammar schools, and completed and
stamped in the Universities.</p>
<p>[THE EXISTING CLASSICAL TEACHING.]</p>
<p><a name='IV.1'></a>1. The existing system of requiring proficiency in
both classical languages. Except in the University
of London, this requirement is still imperative. The
other Universities agree in exacting Latin and Greek
as the condition of an Arts' Degree, and in very little
else. The defenders of classics say with some truth
that these languages are the principal basis of uniformity
in our degrees; if they were struck out, the
public would not know what a degree meant.</p>
<p>How exclusive was the study of Latin and Greek
in the schools in England, until lately, is too well
known to need any detailed statement. A recent
utterance of Mr. Gladstone, however, has felicitously
supplied the crowning illustration. At Eton, in his
time, the engrossment with classics was such as to
keep out religious instruction!</p>
<p>As not many contend that Latin and Greek make
an education in themselves, we may not improperly call
to mind what other things it has been found possible
to include with them in the scope of the Arts' Degree.
The Scotch Universities were always distinguished
from the English in the breadth of their requirements:
they have comprised, for many ages, three
other subjects; mathematics, natural philosophy, and
mental philosophy (including logic and ethics). In
exceptional instances, another science is added; in
one case, natural history, in another, chemistry. According
to the notions of scientific order and completeness
in the present day, a full course of the
primary sciences would comprise mathematics, natural
philosophy, chemistry, physiology or biology, and
mental philosophy. The natural history branches
are not looked upon as primary sciences; they give
no laws, but repeat the laws of the primary sciences
while classifying the kingdoms of Nature. (See
paragraph that begins with: In the classification
of the sciences ...).</p>
<p>In John Stuart Mill's celebrated Address at St.
Andrews, he stood up for the continuance of the
Classics in all their integrity, and suddenly became a
great authority with numbers of persons who probably
had never treated him as an authority before.
But his advocacy of the classics was coupled with an
equally strenuous advocacy for the extension of the
scientific course to the full circle of the primary
sciences; that is to say, he urged the addition of
chemistry and physiology to the received sciences.
Those that have so industriously brandished his
authority for retaining classics, are discreetly silent
upon this other recommendation. He was too little
conversant with the working of Universities to be
aware that the addition of two sciences to the existing
course was impracticable; and he was never
asked which alternative he would prefer. I am inclined
to believe that he would have sacrificed the
classics to scientific completeness; he would have
been satisfied with the quantum of these already
gained at school. But while we have no positive assurance
on this point, I consider that his opinion
should be wholly discounted as not bearing on the
actual case.</p>
<p>[UNIVERSITY OF LONDON CURRICULUM.]</p>
<p>The founders of the University of London attempted
to realise Mill's conception to the full. They
retained Classics; they added English and a modern
language, and completed the course of the primary
sciences by including both Chemistry and Physiology.
This was a noble experiment, and we can now report
on its success. The classical languages, English and
French or German, mathematics and natural philosophy,
and (after a time) logic and moral philosophy,
were all kept at a good standard; thus exceeding the
requirements of the Scotch Universities at the time
by English and a modern language. The amount of
attainment in chemistry was very small, and was disposed
of in the Matriculation examination. Physiology
was reserved for the final B.A. examination, and
was the least satisfactory of all. Having myself sat
at the Examining Board while Dr. Sharpey was
Examiner in Physiology, I had occasion to know
that he considered it prudent to be content with a
mere show of studying the subject. Thus, though
the experience of the University of London, as well
as of the Scotch Universities, proves that the classical
languages are compatible with a very tolerable scientific
education, yet these will need to be curtailed if
every one of the fundamental sciences, as Mill urged,
is to be represented at a passable figure.</p>
<p>In the various new proposals for extending the
sphere of scientific knowledge, a much smaller amount
of classics is to be required, but neither of the two
languages is wholly dispensed with. If not taught at
college, they must be taken up at school as a preparation
for entering on the Arts' curriculum in the
University. This can hardly be a permanent state
of things, but it is likely to be in operation for some
time.</p>
<p><a name='IV.2'></a>2. The remitting of Greek in favour of a modern
language is the alternative most prominently before
the public at present. It accepts the mixed form of
the old curriculum, and replaces one of the dead
languages by one of the living. Resisted by nearly
the whole might of the classical party, this proposal
finds favour with the lay professions as giving
one language that will actually be useful to the pupils
as a language. It is the very smallest change that
would be a real relief. That it will speedily be carried
we do not doubt.</p>
<p>Except as a relaxation of the grip of classicism,
this change is not altogether satisfactory. That there
must be two languages (besides English) in order to
an Arts' Degree is far from obvious. Moreover,
although it is very desirable that every pupil should
have facilities at school or at college for commencing
modern languages, these do not rank as indispensable
and universal culture, like the knowledge of sciences
and of literature generally. They would have to be
taught along with their respective literatures to correspond
to the classics.</p>
<p>Another objection to replacing classics by modern
languages is the necessity of importing foreigners as
teachers. Now, although there are plenty of Frenchmen
and Germans that can teach as well as any
Englishman, it is a painful fact that foreigners do
oftener miscarry, both in teaching and in discipline,
with English pupils, than our own countrymen.
Foreign masters are well enough for those that go to
them voluntarily with the desire of being taught; it
is as teachers in a compulsory curriculum that their
inferiority becomes apparent.</p>
<p>The retort is sometimes made to this proposal—
Why omit Greek rather than Latin? Should you not
retain the greater of the two languages? This may
be pronounced as mainly a piece of tactics; for every
one must know that the order of teaching Latin and
Greek at the schools will never be topsyturvied to
suit the fancy of an individual here and there, even
although John Stuart Mill himself was educated in
that order. On the scheme of withdrawing all foreign
languages from the imperative curriculum, and providing
for them as voluntary adjuncts, such freedom
of selection would be easy.<a name="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9"><sup>[9]</sup></a></p>
<p>[ALTERNATIVE OF MODERN LANGUAGES.]</p>
<p><a name='IV.3'></a>3. Another alternative is to remit both Latin and
Greek in favour of French and German. Strange to
say, this advance upon the previous alternative was
actually contained in Mr. Gladstone's ill-fated Irish
University Bill. Had that Bill succeeded, the Irish
would have been for fourteen years in the enjoyment
of a full option for both the languages.<a name="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> From a
careful perusal of the debates, I could not discover
that the opposition ever fastened upon this bold surrender
of the classical exclusiveness.</p>
<p>The proposal was facilitated by the existence of
professors of French and German in the Queen's
Colleges, In the English and Scotch Colleges endowments
are not as yet provided for these languages;
although it would be easy enough to make provision
for them in Oxford and Cambridge.</p>
<p>In favour of this alternative, it is urged that the
classics, if entered on at all, should be entered on
thoroughly and entirely. The two languages and
literatures form a coherent whole, a homogeneous
discipline; and those that do not mean to follow this
out should not begin it. Some of the upholders of
classics take this view.</p>
<p><a name='IV.4'></a>4. More thorough-going still is the scheme of complete
bifurcation of the classical and the modern
sides. In our great schools there has been instituted
what is called the <i>modern side</i>, made up of sciences
and modern languages, together with Latin. The
understanding hitherto has been, that the votaries of
the ancient and classical side should alone proceed to
the Universities; the modern side being the introduction
to commercial life, and to professions that
dispense with a University degree. Here, as far as
the schools are concerned, a fair scope is given to
modern studies.</p>
<p>As was to be expected, the modern side is now
demanding admission to the Universities on its own
terms; that is, to continue the same line of studies
there, and to be crowned with the same distinctions
as the classical side. This attempt to render school
and college homogeneous throughout, to treat ancient
studies and modern studies as of equal value in the
eye of the law, will of course be resisted to the utmost.
Yet it seems the only solution likely to bring about
a settlement that will last.</p>
<p>The defenders of the classical system in its extreme
exclusiveness are fond of adducing examples of very
illustrious men who at college showed an utter incapacity
for science in its simplest elements. They
say that, by classics alone, these men are what they
are, and if their way had been stopped by serious
scientific requirements, they would have never come
before the world at all. The allegation is somewhat
strongly put; yet we shall assume it to be correct, on
condition of being allowed to draw an inference. If
some minds are so constituted for languages, and for
classics in particular, may not there be other minds
equally constituted for science, and equally incapable
of taking up two classical languages? Should this
be granted, the next question is—Ought these two
classes of minds to be treated as equal in rights and
privileges? The upholders of the present system say,
No. The Language mind is the true aristocrat; the
Science mind is an inferior creation. Degrees and
privileges are for the man that can score languages,
with never so little science; outer darkness is assigned
to the man whose <i>forte</i> is science alone. But
a war of caste in education is an unseemly thing; and,
after all the levelling operations that we have passed
through, it is not likely that this distinction will be
long preserved.</p>
<p>[CLAIMS OF THE MODERN SIDE.]</p>
<p>The modern side, as at present constituted, still retains
Latin. There is a considerable strength of
feeling in favour of that language for all kinds of
people; it is thought to be a proper appendage of
the lay professions; and there is a wide-spread opinion
in favour of its utility for English. So much is this
the case, that the modern-siders are at present quite
willing to come under a pledge to keep up Latin,
and to pass in it with a view to the University. In
fact, the schools find this for the present the most
convenient arrangement. It is easier to supply teaching
in Latin than in a modern language, or in most
other things; and while Latin continues to be held in
respect, it will remain untouched. Yet the quantity
of time occupied by it, with so little result, must ultimately
force a departure from the present curriculum.
The real destination of the modern side is to be
modern throughout. It should not be rigorously tied
down even to a certain number of modern languages.
English and one other language ought to be quite
enough; and the choice should be free. On this
footing, the modern side ought to have its place in
the schools as the co-equal of classics; it would be
the natural precursor of the modernised alternatives
in the Universities; those where knowledge subjects
predominate.</p>
<p>The proposal to give an <i>inferior degree</i> to a curriculum
that excludes Greek should, in my judgment,
be simply declined. It is, however, a matter of opinion
whether, in point of tactics, the modern party did not
do well to accept this as an instalment in the meantime.
The Oxford offer, as I understand it, was so
far liberal, that the new degree was to rank equal in
privileges with the old, although inferior in <i>prestige</i>.
In Scotland, the decree conceded by the classical
party to a Greekless education was worthless, and was
offered for that very reason.<a name="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11"><sup>[11]</sup></a></p>
<p>[SURRENDER OF CLAIMS FOR SOME.]</p>
<p>Among the adherents of classics, Professor Blackie
is distinguished for surrendering the study of them
in the case of those that cannot profit by them. He
believes that with a free alternative, such as the thorough
bifurcation into two sides would give, they would
still hold their ground, and bear all their present fruits.
His classical brethren, however, do not in general
share this conviction. They seem to think that if
they can no longer compel every University graduate
to pass beneath the double yoke of Rome and Greece,
these two illustrious nationalities will be in danger of
passing out of the popular mind altogether. For
my own part, I do not share their fears, nor do I
think that, even on the voluntary footing, the study
of the two languages will decline with any great
rapidity. As I have said, the belief in Latin is wide
and deep. Whatever may be urged as to the extraordinary
stringency of the intellectual discipline now
said to be given by means of Latin and Greek, I am
satisfied that the feeling with both teachers and
scholars is, that the process of acquisition is not toilsome
to either party; less so perhaps than anything
that would come in their place. Of the hundreds of
hours spent over them, a very large number are
associated with listless idleness. Carlyle describes
Scott's novels as a "beatific lubber land"; with the
exception of the "beatific," we might say nearly the
same of classics. To all which must be added the
immense endowments of classical teaching; not only
of old date but of recent acquisition. It will be a
very long time before these endowments can be
diverted, even although the study decline steadily in
estimation.</p>
<p>The thing that stands to reason is to place the
modern and the ancient studies on exactly the same
footing; to accord a fair field and no favour. The
public will decide for themselves in the long run. If
the classical advocates are afraid of this test, they
have no faith in the merits of their own case.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>The arguments <i>pro</i> and <i>con</i> on the question have
been almost exhausted. Nothing is left except to
vary the expression and illustration. Still, so long as
the monopoly exists, it will be argued and counter-argued;
and, if there are no new reasons, the old will
have to be iterated.</p>
<p>[EXAMPLE FROM THE GREEKS THEMSELVES]</p>
<p>Perhaps the most hackneyed of all the answers to
the case for the classics is the one that has been most
rarely replied to. I mean the fact that the Greeks
were not acquainted with any language but their own.
I have never known an attempt to parry this thrust.
Yet, besides the fact itself, there are strong presumptions
in favour of the position that to know a language
well, you should devote your time and strength to it
alone, and not attempt to learn three or four. Of
course, the Greeks were in possession of the most
perfect language, and were not likely to be gainers
by studying the languages of their contemporaries.
So, we too are in possession of a very admirable
language, although put together in a nondescript
fashion; and it is not impossible that if Plato had
his Dialogues to compose among us, he would give
his whole strength to working up our own resources,
and not trouble himself with Greek. The popular
dictum—<i>multum non multa</i>, doing one thing well—may
be plausibly adduced in behalf of parsimony
in the study of languages.</p>
<p>The recent agitation in Cambridge, in Oxford, and
indeed, all over the country, for remitting the study
of Greek as an essential of the Arts' Degree, has led
to a reproduction of the usual defences of things as
they are. The articles in the March number of the
<i>Contemporary Review, 1879</i>, by Professors Blackie and
Bonamy Price, may claim to be the <i>derniers mots</i>.</p>
<p>Professor Blackie's article is a warning to the
teachers of classics, to the effect that they must
change their front; that, whereas the value of the
classics as a key to thought has diminished, and is
diminishing, they must by all means in the first place
improve their drill. In fact, unless something can be
done to lessen the labour of the acquisition by better
teaching, and to secure the much-vaunted intellectual
discipline of the languages, the battle will soon
be lost. Accordingly, the professor goes minutely
into what he conceives the best methods of teaching.
It is not my purpose to follow him in this sufficiently
interesting discussion. I simply remark that he is
staking the case, for the continuance of Latin and
Greek in the schools, on the possibility of something
like an entire revolution in the teaching art. Revolution
is not too strong a word for what is proposed.
The weak part of the new position is that the value
of the languages <i>as languages</i> has declined, and has
to be made up by the incident of their value as <i>drill</i>.
This is, to say the least, a paradoxical position for a
language teacher. If it is mere drill that is wanted,
a very small corner of one language would suffice.
The teacher and the pupil alike are placed between
the two stools—interpretation and drill. A new
generation of teachers must arise to attain the dexterity
requisite for the task.</p>
<p>Professor Blackie's concession is of no small importance
in the actual situation. "No one is to receive
a full degree without showing a fair proficiency
in two foreign languages, one ancient and one modern,
with free option." This would almost satisfy the
present demand everywhere, and for some time to
come.</p>
<p>[ARGUMENT FROM RESULTS.]</p>
<p>The article of Professor Bonamy Price is conceived
in even a higher strain than the other. There is so
far a method of argumentation in it that the case is
laid out under four distinct heads, but there is no
decisive separation of reasons; many of the things
said under one head might easily be transferred without
the sense of dislocation to any other head. The
writer indulges in high-flown rhetorical assertions
rather than in specific facts and arguments. The first
merit of classics is that "they are languages; not
particular sciences, nor definite branches of knowledge,
but literatures". Under this head we have
such glowing sentences as these: "Think of the
many elements of thought a boy comes in contact
with when he reads Caesar and Tacitus in succession,
Herodotus and Homer, Thucydides and Aristotle".
"See what is implied in having read Homer intelligently
through, or Thucydides or Demosthenes; what
light will have been shed on the essence and laws of
human existence, on political society, on the relations
of man to man, on human nature itself." There are
various conceivable ways of counter-arguing these
assertions, but the shortest is to call for the facts—the
results upon the many thousands that have passed
through their ten years of classical drill. Professor
Campbell of St. Andrews, once remarked, with reference
to the value of Greek in particular, that the
question would have to be ultimately decided by the
inner consciousness of those that have undergone
the study. To this we are entitled to add, their
powers as manifested to the world, of which powers
spectators can be the judges. When, with a few
brilliant exceptions, we discover nothing at all remarkable
in the men that have been subjected to the
classical training, we may consider it as almost a
waste of time to analyse the grandiloquent assertions
of Mr. Bonamy Price. But if we were to analyse
them, we should find that <i>boys</i> never read Caesar and
Tacitus through in succession; still less Thucydides
Demosthenes, and Aristotle; that very few <i>men</i> read
and understand these writers; that the shortest way
to come into contact with Aristotle is to avoid his
Greek altogether, and take his expositors and translators
in the modern languages.</p>
<p>The professor is not insensible to the reproach that
the vaunted classical education has been a failure, as
compared with these splendid promises. He says,
however, that though many have failed to become
classical scholars in the full sense of the word, "it
does not follow that they have gained nothing from
their study of Greek and Latin; just the contrary is
the truth". The "contrary" must mean that they
have gained something; which something is stated to
be "the extent to which the faculties of the boy have
been developed, the quantity of impalpable but not
less real attainments he has achieved, and his general
readiness for life, and for action as a man". But it
is becoming more and more difficult to induce people
to spend a long course of youthful years upon a confessedly
<i>impalpable</i> result. We might give up a few
months to a speculative and doubtful good, but we
need palpable consequences to show for our years
spent on classics. Next comes the admission that
the teaching is often bad. But why should the teaching
be so bad, and what is the hope of making it
better? Then we are told that science by itself
leaves the largest and most important portion of the
youths' nature absolutely undeveloped. But, in the
first place, it is not proposed to reduce the school and
college curriculum to science alone; and, in the next
place, who can say what are the "impalpable" results
of science?</p>
<p>[WORTH OF THE CLASSICAL WRITERS.]</p>
<p>The second branch of the argument relates to the
greatness of the classical writers. Undoubtedly the
Greek and Roman worlds produced some very great
writers, and a good many not great. But the greatness
of Herodotus, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Plato,
and Aristotle can be exhibited in a modern rendering;
while no small portion of the poetical excellence
of Homer and the Dramatists can be made
apparent without toiling at the original tongues.
The value of the languages then resolves itself, as
has been often remarked, into a <i>residuum</i>. Something
also is to be said for the greatness of the
writers that have written in modern times. Sir John
Herschel remarked long ago that the human intellect
cannot have degenerated, so long as we are able to
quote Newton, Lagrange and Laplace, against Aristotle
and Archimedes. I would not undertake to say
that any modern mind has equalled Aristotle in the
<i>range</i> of his intellectual powers; but in point of intensity
of grasp in any one subject, he has many
rivals; so that to obtain his equal, we have only to
take two or three first-rate moderns.</p>
<p>If a few fanatics are to go on lauding to the skies
the exclusive and transcendent greatness of the classical
writers, we shall probably be tempted to scrutinize
their merits more severely than is usual. Many things
could be said against their sufficiency as instructors
in matters of thought; and many more against the
low and barbarous tone of their <i>morale</i>—the inhumanity
and brutality of both their principles and their
practice. All this might no doubt be very easily
overdone, and would certainly be so, if undertaken in
the style of Professor Price's panegyric.</p>
<p>The professor's third branch of the argument comes
to the real point; namely, what is there in Greek and
Latin that there is not in the modern tongues? For
one thing, says the professor, they are dead; which of
course we allow. Then, being dead, they must be
learnt by book and by rule; they cannot be learnt by
ear. Here, however, Professor Blackie would dissent,
and would say that the great improvement of teaching,
on which the salvation of classical study now
hangs, is to make it a teaching by the ear. But, says
Professor Price: "A Greek or Latin sentence is a nut
with a strong shell concealing the kernel—a puzzle,
demanding reflection, adaptation of means to end,
and labour for its solution, and the educational value
resides in the shell and in the puzzle". As this strain
of remark is not new, there is nothing new to be said
in answer to it. Such puzzling efforts are certainly
not the rule in learning Latin and Greek. Moreover,
the very same terms would describe what may happen
equally often in reading difficult authors in French,
German, or Italian. Would not the pupil find puzzles
and difficulties in Dante, or in Goethe? And are
there not many puzzling exercises in deciphering
English authors? Besides, what is the great objection
to science, but that it is too puzzling for minds
that are quite competent for the puzzles of Greek and
Latin? Once more, the <i>teaching</i> of any language
must be very imperfect, if it brings about habitually
such situations of difficulty as are here described.</p>
<p>[ARGUMENTS FOR CLASSICS.]</p>
<p>The professor relapses into a cooler and correcter
strain when he remarks that the pupil's mind is necessarily
more delayed over the expression of a thought
in a foreign language (whether dead or alive matters
not), and therefore remembers the meaning better.
Here, however, the desiderated reform of teaching
might come into play. Granted that the boy left to
himself would go more rapidly through Burke than
through Thucydides, might not his pace be retarded
by a well-directed cross-examination; with this advantage,
that the length of attention might be graduated
according to the importance of the subject, and
not according to the accidental difficulty of the
language?</p>
<p>The professor boldly grapples with the alleged
waste of time in classics, and urges that "the gain
may be measured by the time expended," which is
very like begging the question.</p>
<p>One advantage adduced under this head deserves
notice. The languages being dead, as well as all the
societies and interests that they represent, they do not
excite the prejudices and passions of modern life.
This, however, may need some qualification. Grote
wrote his history of Greece to counterwork the party
bias of Mitford. The battles of despotism, oligarchy,
and democracy are to this hour fought over the dead
bodies of Greece and Rome. If the professor meant
to insinuate, that those that have gone through the
classical training are less violent as partisans, more
dispassionate in political judgments, than the rest of
mankind, we can only say that we should not have
known this from our actual experience. The discovery
of some sweet, oblivious, antidote to party
feeling seems, as far as we can judge, to be still in
the future. If we want studies that will, while they
last, thoroughly divert the mind from the prejudices
of party, science is even better than ancient history;
there are no party cries connected with the Binomial
Theorem.</p>
<p>The professor's last branch of argument, I am
obliged, with all deference, to say, contains no argument
at all. It is that, in classical education, a close
contact is established between the mind of the boy
and the mind of the master. He does not even
attempt to show how the effect is peculiar to classical
teaching. The whole of this part of the paper is, in
fact, addressed, by way of remonstrance, to the writer's
own friends, the classical teachers. He reproaches
them for their inefficiency, for their not being Arnolds.
It is not my business to interfere between him and
them in this matter. So much stress does he lay
upon the teacher's part in the work, that I almost
expected the admission—that a good teacher in English,
German, natural history, political economy,
might even be preferable to a bad teacher of Latin
and Greek.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[CANON LIDDON'S ARGUMENT.]</p>
<p>The recent Oxford contest has brought out the
eminent oratorical powers of Canon Liddon; and we
have some curiosity in noting his contributions to the
classical side. I refer to his letters in the <i>Times</i>.
The gist of his advocacy of Greek is contained in the
following allegations. First, the present system enables
a man to recur with profit and advantage to
Greek literature. To this, it has been often replied,
that by far the greater number are too little familiarized
with the classical languages, and especially
Greek, to make the literature easy reading. But
farther, the recurring to the study of ancient authors
by busy professional men in the present day, is an
event of such extreme rarity that it cannot be taken
into account in any question of public policy. The
second remark is, that the half-knowledge of the
ordinary graduate is a link between the total blank
of the outer world, and the thorough knowledge of
the accomplished classic. I am not much struck by
the force of this argument. I think that the classical
scholar, might, by expositions, commentaries, and
translations, address the outer world equally well,
without the intervening mass of imperfect scholars.
Lastly, the Canon puts in a claim for his own cloth.
The knowledge of Greek paves the way for serious
men to enter the ministry in middle life. Argument
would be thrown away upon any one that could for a
moment entertain this as a sufficient reason for compelling
every graduate in Arts to study Greek. The
observation that I would make upon it has a wider
bearing. Middle life is not too late for learning any
language that we suddenly discover to be a want; the
stimulus of necessity or of strong interest, and the
wider compass of general knowledge, compensate for
the diminution of verbal memory.</p>
<p>FOOTNOTES:</p>
<a name="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7">[7]</a><div class="note"><p> CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, August, 1879. A few months previously,
there were printed, in the Review, papers on the Classical
question, by Professors Blackie and Bonamy Price; both of which are
here alluded to and quoted, so far as either is controverted or concurred
with.</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8">[8]</a><div class="note"><p> "The academical establishments of some parts of Europe are not
without their use to the historian of the human mind. Immovably
moored to the same station by the strength of their cables and the
weight of their anchors, they enable him to measure the rapidity of the
current by which the rest of the world is borne along."</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9">[9]</a><div class="note"><p> If the two Literatures were studied, as they might be, by means of
expositions and translations, the Greek would be first as a tiling of
course. Historians of the Latin authors are obliged to trace their subject,
in every department, to the corresponding authors in Greece.</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10">[10]</a><div class="note"><p> No doubt the classical languages would have been required, to
some extent, in matriculating to enter college. This arrangement,
however, as regarded the students that chose the modern languages,
would have been found too burdensome by our Irish friends, and, on
their expressing themselves to that effect, would have been soon dispensed
with.</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11">[11]</a><div class="note"><p> One possible consequence of a Natural Science Degree might have
been, that the public would have turned to it with favour, while the
old one sank into discredit.</p></div>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<a name='EV.'></a><h2>V.</h2>
<h2>METAPHYSICS AND DEBATING SOCIETIES.<a name="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12"><sup>[12]</sup></a></h2>
<br />
<p>By "Metaphysical Study," or "Metaphysics," I here
mean—what seems intended by the designation in its
current employment at present—the circle of the
mental or subjective sciences. The central department
of the field is PSYCHOLOGY, and the adjunct to
psychology is LOGIC, which has its foundations partly
in psychology, but still more in the sciences altogether,
whose procedure it gathers up and formulates.
The outlying and dependent branches are: the
narrower metaphysics or Ontology, Ethics, Sociology,
together with Art or Aesthetics. There are other
applied sciences of the department, as Education and
Philology.</p>
<p>The branches most usually looked upon as the
cognate or allied studies of the subjective department
of human knowledge are, Psychology, Logic, Ontology,
Ethics. The debates in a society like the
present will generally be found to revolve in the orbit
thus chalked out. It is the sphere of the most
animated controversies, and the widest discordance of
view. The additional branch most nearly connected
with the group is Sociology, which under that name,
and under the older title, the Philosophy of History,
has opened up a new series of problems, of the kind
to divide opinions and provoke debate. A quieter
interest attaches to Aesthetics, although the subject is
a not unfruitful application and test of psychological
laws.</p>
<p>My remarks will embrace, first, the aims, real and
factitious, in the study of this group of sciences; and
next, the polemic conduct of such study, or the utility
and management of debating societies, instituted in
connection therewith.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC FUNDAMENTAL.]</p>
<p>The two sciences—PSYCHOLOGY and LOGIC—I consider
the fundamental and knowledge-giving
departments. The others are the applications of
these to the more stirring questions of human life.
Now, the successful cultivation of the field requires
you to give at least as much attention to the root
sciences as you give to the branch sciences. That is
to say, psychology, in its pure and proper character,
and logic, in its systematic array, should be kept
before the view, concurrently with ontology, ethics,
and sociology. Essays and debates tending to clear
up and expound systematic psychology and systematic
logic should make a full half of the society's
work.</p>
<p>Does any one feel a doubt upon the point, as so
stated? If so, it will be upon him to show that
Psychology, in its methodical pursuit, is a needless
and superfluous employment of strength; that the
problems of ethics, ontology, &c., can be solved
without it—a hard task indeed, so long as they are
unsolved in any way. I have no space for indulging
in a dissertation on the value of methodical study
and arrangement in the extension of our knowledge,
as opposed to the promiscuous mingling of
different kinds of facts, which is often required in
practice, but repugnant to the increase of knowledge.
If you want to improve our acquaintance with the
sense of touch, you accumulate and methodize all
the experiences relating to touch; you compare them,
see whether they are consistent or inconsistent, select
the good, reject the bad, improve the statement of
one by light borrowed from the others; you mark
desiderata, experiments to be tried, or observations to
be sought. All that time, you refrain from wandering
into other spheres of mental phenomena. You make
use of comparison with the rest of the senses, it may
be, but you keep strictly to the points of analogy,
where mutual lights are to be had. This is the
culture of knowledge as such, and is the best, the
essential, preparation for practical questions involving
the particular subject along with others.</p>
<p>To take an example from the question of the Will.
I do not object: to the detaching and isolating of the
problem of free-will, as a matter for discussion and
debate; but I think that it can be handled to equal, if
not greater advantage, in the systematic psychology of
voluntary power. Those that have never tried it in
this last form have not obtained the best vantage-ground
for overcoming the inevitable subtleties that
invest it.</p>
<p>The great problem of External Perception has a
psychological place, where its difficulties are very
much attenuated, to say the least of it; and, however
convenient it may be to treat it as a detached problem,
we should carry with us into the discussion all
the lights that we obtain while regarding it as it
stands among the intellectual powers.</p>
<p>It is in systematic Psychology that we are most
free to attend to the defining of terms (without which
a professed science is mere moonshine), to the formulating
of axioms and generalities, to the concatenating
and taking stock of all the existing knowledge,
and to the appraising of it at its real value. If these
things are neglected, there is nothing that I see to
constitute a psychology at all.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[DISCUSSIONS IN LOGIC PROPER.]</p>
<p>As to the other fundamental science, LOGIC, the
same remarks may be repeated. Of debated questions,
a certain number pertain properly to logic; yet
most of these relate to logic at its points of contact
with psychology. Since we have got out of the
narrow round of the Aristotelian syllogism, we have
agreed to call logic <i>ars artium</i>, or, better still, <i>scientia
scientiarum</i>, the science that deals with the sciences
altogether—both object sciences and subject sciences.
Now this I take to be a study quite apart from
psychology in particular, although, as I have said,
touching it at several points. It reviews all science
and all knowledge, as to its structure, method, arrangement,
classification, probation, enlargement. It deals
in generalities the most general of any. By taking
up what belongs to all knowledge, it seems to rise
above the matter of knowledge to the region of pure
form; it demands, therefore, a peculiar subtlety of
handling, and may easily land us, as we are all aware,
in knotty questions and quagmires.</p>
<p>Now what I have to repeat in this connection is,
that you should, in your debates, overhaul portions
or chapters of systematic logic, with a view to present
the difficulties in their natural position in the subject.
You might, for example, take up the question as to
the Province of logic, with its divisions, parts, and
order—all which admit of many various views—and
bring forward the vexed controversies under lights
favourable to their resolution. Regarding logic as an
aid to the faculties in tackling whatever is abstruse,
you should endeavour to cultivate and enhance its
powers, in this particular, by detailed exposition and
criticism of all its canons and prescriptions. The
department of Classification is a good instance; a
region full of delicate subtleties as well as "bread-and-butter"
applications.</p>
<p>It is in this last view of logic that we can canvass
philosophical systems upon the ground of their method
or procedure alone. Looking at the absence, in any
given system, of the arts and precautions that are
indispensable to the establishment of truth in the
special case, we may pronounce against it, <i>à priori</i>;
we know that such a system can be true only by
accident, or else by miracle. We may reasonably
demand of a system-builder—Is he in the narrow way
that leadeth to truth, or in the broad way that leadeth
somewhere else?</p>
<p>I have said that I consider the connection between
Logic and Psychology to be but slender, although not
unimportant. The amount and nature of this connection
would reward a careful consideration. There
would be considerable difficulty in seeing any connection
at all between the Aristotelian Syllogism and
psychology, but for the high-sounding designations
appended to the notion and the proposition—simple
apprehension and judgment—of which I fail to discover
the propriety or relevance. I know that Grote
gave a very profound turn to the employment of the
term "judgment" by Aristotle, as being a recognition
of the relativity of knowledge to the affirming mind.
I am not to say, absolutely, "Ice is cold"; I am to
say that, to the best of my judgment or belief, or in
so far as I am concerned, ice is cold. This, however,
has little to do with the logic of the syllogism, and
not much with any logic. So, when we speak of a
"notion," we must understand it as apprehended by
some mind; but for nearly all purposes, this is
assumed tacitly; it need not appear in a formal designation,
which, not being wanted, is calculated to
mislead.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[APPLIED OR DERIVATIVE SCIENCES.]</p>
<p>With these remarks on the two fundamental sciences
of our group, I now turn to the <i>applied</i> or <i>derivative</i>
sciences, wherein the great controversies stand out
most conspicuous, which, in fact, exist for the purpose
of contention—Ontology and Ethics. These
branches were in request long before the mother
sciences—psychology and logic—came into being at
all. They had occupied their chief positions without
consulting the others, partly because these were not
there to consult, and partly because they were not
inclined to consult any extraneous authority. By Ontology
we may designate the standing controversies
of the intellectual powers—perception, innate ideas,
nominalism <i>versus</i> realism, and noumenon <i>versus</i> phenomenon.
I am not going to pronounce upon these
questions; I have already recommended the alternative
mode of approaching them under systematic
psychology and logic; and I will now regard them
as constituents of the fourfold enumeration of the
metaphysical sciences.</p>
<p>The Germans may be credited for teaching us, or
trying to teach us, to distinguish "bread and butter"
from what passes beyond, transcends bread and butter.
With them the distinction is thoroughly ingrained,
and comes to hand at a moment's notice. If I am
to review in detail what may be considered the practical
or applied departments of logic and psychology,
I am in danger of trenching on their "bread-and-butter"
region. Before descending, therefore, into
the larder, let us first spend a few seconds in considering
psychology as the pursuit of <i>truth</i> in all
that relates to our mental constitution. If difficulty
be a stimulus to the human exertions, it may be
found here. To ascertain, fix, and embody the precise
truth in regard to the facts of the mind is about as
hard an undertaking as could be prescribed to a man.
But this is another way of saying that psychology is
not a very advanced science; is not well stored with
clear and certain doctrines; and is unable, therefore,
to confer any very great precision on its dependent
branches, whether purely speculative or practical. In
a word, the greatest modesty or humility is the
deportment most becoming to all that engage in this
field of labour, even when doing their best; while
the same virtues in even greater measure are due
from those engaging in it without doing their best.</p>
<p>It must be admitted, however, that the highest
evidence and safeguard of truth is application. In
every other science, the utility test is final. The
great parent sciences—mathematics, physics, chemistry,
physiology—have each a host of filial dependents,
in close contact with the supply of human
wants; and the success of the applications is the
testimony to the truth of the sciences applied. Thus,
although we may not narrow the sphere of truth to
bread and butter, yet we have no surer test of the
truth itself. Our trade requires navigation, and navigation
verifies astronomy; and, but for navigation,
we may be pretty confident that astronomy would
now have very little accuracy to boast of.</p>
<p>To come then to the practical bearings or outgoings
of psychology, assisted by logic. My contention
is that the parent sciences and the filial sciences
should be carried on together; that theses should be
extracted by turns from all; that the lights thus
obtained would be mutual. I will support the position
by a review of the subjects thus drawn into the
metaphysical field.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION.]</p>
<p>Foremost among these applied sciences I would
place EDUCATION, the subject of the day. The
priority of mention is due not so much to its special
or pre-eminent importance, as to its being the most
feasible and hopeful of the practical applications of
conjoined psychology and logic. I say this, however,
with a more express eye to <i>intellectual</i> education. I
deem it quite possible to frame a practical, science
applicable to the training of the intellect that shall be
precise and definite in a very considerable measure.
The elements that make up our intellectual furniture
can be stated with clearness; the laws of intellectual
growth or acquisition are almost the best ascertained
generalities of the human mind; even the most complicated
studies can be analyzed into their components,
partly by psychology and partly by the
higher logic. In a word, if we cannot make a science
of education, as far as Intellect is concerned, we may
abandon metaphysical study altogether.</p>
<p>I do not speak with the same confidence as to <i>moral</i>
education. There has long been in existence a respectable
rule-of-thumb practice in this region, the
result of a sufficiently wide experience. There are
certain psychological laws, especially those relating
to the formation of moral habits, that have a considerable
value; but to frame a theory of moral
education, on a level in a point of definiteness with
the possible theory of intellectual education, is a
task that I should not like to have imposed upon me.
In point of fact, two problems are joined in one, to
the confusion of both. There is <i>first</i> the vast question
of <i>moral control</i>, which stretches far and wide
over many fields, and would have to be tracked with
immense labour: it belongs to the arts of government;
it comes under moral suasion, as exercised by the
preacher and orator; it even implicates the tact of
diplomacy. I do not regard this as a properly educational
question (although it refers to an art that every
teacher must try to master); that is to say, its solution
is not connected with education processes
strictly so called. The <i>second</i> problem of moral
education is the one really within the scope of the
subject—the problem of <i>fixing moral bents</i> or habits,
when the right conduct is once initiated. On this
head, some scientific insight is attainable; and suggestions
of solid value may in time accrue, although
there never can be the precision attainable in the
intellectual region.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>I will next advert to the applied science of Art or
Aesthetics, long a barren ground, so far as scientific
handling was concerned, but now a land of promise.
The old thesis, "What is Beauty?" a good debating
society topic, is, I hope, past contending about. The
numerous influences that concur in works of art, or in
natural beauty, present a fine opening for delicate
analysis; at the same time, they implicate the vaguest
and least advanced portion of psychology—the
Emotions. The German philosophers have usually
ranked aesthetics as one of the subjective sciences;
but, it is only of late that the department has taken
shape in their country. Lessing gave a great impulse
to literary art, and originated a number of pregnant
suggestions; and the German love of music has
necessarily led to theories as well as to compositions.
We are now in the way to that consummation of
aesthetics which may be described as containing (1) a
reference to psychology as the mother science, (2) a
classification, comparison, and contrast of the fine
arts themselves, and (3) an induction of the principles
of art composition from the best examples. Anything
like a thorough sifting of fine-art questions would
strain psychology at every point—senses, emotions,
intellect; and, if criticism is to go deep, it must
ground upon psychological reasons. Now the mere
artist can never be a psychologist; the art critic may,
but seldom will; hence, as they will not come over
to us, some of us must go over to them. The Art
discussion of the greatest fountains of human feeling
—love and anger—would react with advantage upon
the very difficult psychology of these emotions, so
long the sport of superficiality.</p>
<p>[AESTHETICS: HEDONICS.]</p>
<p>But I hold that aesthetics is but a corner of a larger
field that is seldom even named among the sciences
of mind; I mean human happiness as a whole,
"eudaemonics," or "hedonics," or whatever you please
to call it. That the subject is neglected, I do not
affirm; but it is not cultivated in the proper place, or
in the proper light-giving connection—that is to say,
under the psychology of the human feelings. It
should have at once a close reference to psychology,
and an independent construction; while either in
comprehending aesthetics, or in lying side by side
with that, it would give and receive illumination.
The researches now making into the laws and limits
of human sensibility, if they have any value, ought to
lead to the economy of pleasure and the abatement
of pain. The analysis of sensation and of emotion
points to this end. Whoever raises any question as to
human happiness should refer it, in the first instance,
to psychology; in the next, to some general scheme
that would answer for a science of happiness; and,
thirdly, to an induction of the facts of human experience;
the three distinct appeals correcting one
another. If psychology can contribute nothing to the
point, it confesses to a desideratum for future inquirers.</p>
<p>[HEDONICS SEPARATE FROM ETHICS.]</p>
<p>I am not at all satisfied with the coupling of happiness
with ethics, as is usually done. Ethics is the
sphere of duty; happiness is mentioned only to be
repressed and discouraged. This is not the situation
for unfolding all the blossoms of human delight, nor
for studying to allay every rising uneasiness. He
would be a rare ethical philosopher that would permit
full scope to such an operation within his grounds;
neither Epicurus nor Bentham could come up to this
mark. But even if the thing were permitted, the
lights are not there; it is only by combining the parent
psychology and the hedonic derivative, that the work
can be done. It is neither disrespect nor disadvantage
to duty, that it is not mentioned in the department
until the very end. To cultivate happiness is not
selfishness or vice, unless you confine it to self; and
the mere act of inquiring does not so confine it. If
you are in other respects a selfish man, you will apply
your knowledge for your own sole behoof; if you are
not selfish, you will apply it for the good of your
fellows also, which is another name for virtue.</p>
<p>But the obstacles to a science of happiness are not
solely clue to the gaps and deficiencies in our psychological
knowledge; they are equally owing to the
prevailing terrorism in favour of self-denial at all
hands. Many of the maxims as to happiness would
not stand examination if people felt themselves free
to discuss them. You must work yourselves into a
fervour of revolt and defiance, before you call in
question Paley's declaration that "happiness is equally
distributed among all orders of the community".
I do not know whether I should wonder most at the
cheerful temperament or the complacent optimism of
Adam Smith, when he asks, "What can be added to
the happiness of the man who is in health, who is out
of debt, and has a clear conscience?"<a name="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> When the
greatest philosophers talk thus, what is to be expected
from the unphilosophic mob? The dependence of
health on activity is always kept very loose, it may
be for the convenience of shutting our mouths against
complaints of being overworked. To render this
dependence precise is a matter of pure psychology.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[SOCIOLOGY.]</p>
<p>Before coming to Ethics I must, as a preparation,
view another derivative branch of psychology, the old
subject of politics and society, under its new name,
SOCIOLOGY. It is obvious that all terms used in
describing social facts and their generalities are terms
of mind: command and obedience, law and right,
order and progress, are notions made up of human
feelings, purposes, and thoughts.</p>
<p>Sociology is usually studied in its own special field,
and nowhere else; that is to say, the sociologist
employs himself in observing and comparing the
operations of societies under all varieties of circumstances,
and in all historic ages. The field is essentially
human nature, and the laws arrived at are laws
of human nature. A consummate sociologist is not
often to be found; the really great theorists in society
could be counted on one's fingers. Some of them
have been psychologists as well; I need mention only
Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, the Mills. Others
as Vico, Montesquieu, Millar, Condorcet, Auguste
Comte, De Tocqueville, have not independently
studied the mind on the broad psychological basis.
Now the bearings on sociology of a pure psychological
preparation can be convincingly shown. The laws of
society, if not the merest empiricisms, are derivative
laws of the mind; hence a theorist cannot be trusted
with the handling of a derivative law, unless he knows,
as well as can be known, the simple or constituent
laws. All the elements of human character crop up
in men's social relations; in the foreground are their
self-interest or sense of self-preservation, together with
their social and anti-social promptings; a little farther
back are their active energy, their intelligence, their
artistic feelings, and their religious susceptibilities.
Now all these should be broadly examined as elements
of the mind, without an immediate reference to the
political machine. Of course, the social feelings need
a social situation, and cannot be studied without that;
but there are many social situations that give scope
for examining them, besides what is contemplated in
political society; and the psychologist proper ought
to avail himself of all the opportunities of rendering
the statement of these various elements precise. For
this purpose, his chief aim is the ultimate analysis of
the various faculties and feelings. This analysis nobody
but himself cares to institute; and yet a knowledge
of the ultimate constitution of an emotional
tendency is one of the best aids in appreciating its
mode of working. Without a good preliminary
analysis of the social and anti-social emotions, for
example, you are almost sure to be counting the same
thing twice over, or else confounding two different
facts under one designation. On the one hand,
the precise relationship of the states named love,
sympathy, disinterestedness; and, on the other hand,
the common basis of domination, resentment, pride,
egotism,—should be distinctly cleared up, as is possible
only in psychological study strictly so called. The
workings of the religious sentiment cannot be shown
sociologically, without a previous analysis of the constituent
emotions.</p>
<p>[SOCIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS.]</p>
<p>An allusion so very slender to so vast a subject as
sociology would be a waste of words, but for the
conviction, that through sociology is the way to the
great field of Ethics. This is to reverse the traditional
arrangement—ethics, politics, or government—followed
even by Bentham. The lights of ethics are, in
the first instance, psychological; its discussions presuppose
a number of definitions and distinctions that
are pure psychology. But before these have to be
adduced, the subject has to be set forth as a problem
of sociology. "How is the King's government to be
carried on?" "How is society to be held together?"
is the first consideration; and the sociologist—as
constitution-builder, administrator, judge—is the person
to grapple with the problem. It is with him that
law, obligation, right, command, obedience, sanction,
have their origin and their explanation. Ethics is an
important supplement to social or political law. But
it is still a department of law. In any other view it
is a maze, a mystery, a hopeless embroilment.</p>
<p>That ethics is involved in society is of course
admitted; what is not admitted is, that ethical terms
should be settled under the social science in the first
place. I may refer to the leading term "law," whose
meaning in sociology is remarkably clear; in ethics
remarkably the reverse. The confusion deepens
when the moral faculty is brought forward. In the
eye of the sociologist, nothing could be simpler than
the conception of that part of our nature that is
appealed to for securing obedience. He assumes a
certain effort of the intelligence for understanding the
signification of a command or a law; and, for the
motive part, he counts upon nothing but volition in
its most ordinary form—the avoidance of a pain.
Intelligence and Will, in their usual and recognised
workings, are all that are required for social obedience;
law is conceived and framed exactly to suit the
every-day and every-hour manifestations of these
powers. The lawgiver does not speak of an obedience-faculty,
nor even of a social-faculty. If there were in
the mind a power unique and apart, having nothing
in common with our usual intelligence, and nothing
in common with our usual will or volition, that
power ought to be expressed in terms that exclude
the smallest participation of both knowledge
and will; it ought to have a form special
to itself, and not the form:—"Do this, and ye shall
be made to suffer".</p>
<p>I am quite aware that there are elements in ethics
not included in the problem of social obedience;
what I contend for is, that the ground should be
cleared by marking out the two provinces, as is
actually done by a very small number of theorists, of
whom John Austin is about the best example.</p>
<p>The ethical philosopher, from not building on a
foregone sociology, is obliged to extemporize, in a
paragraph, the social system; just as the physical
philosopher would, if he had no regularly constructed
mathematics to fall back upon, but had to stop every
now and then to enunciate a mathematical theorem.</p>
<p>The question of the ethical end should first appear
as the question of the sociological end. For what
purpose or purposes is society maintained? All the
ethical difficulties are here met by anticipation, and
in a form much better adapted to their solution. It
is from the point of view of the social ruler, that you
learn reserve, moderation, and sobriety in your aims;
you learn to think that something much less than the
Utopias—universal happiness and universal virtue—should
be propounded; you find that a definite and
limited province can be assigned, separating what the
social power is able to do, must do, and can advantageously
do, from what it is unable to do, need not
do, and cannot with advantage do; and this or a
similar demarcation is reproducible in ethics.</p>
<p>[PRECEPTS OF ETHICS MAINLY SOCIAL.]</p>
<p>The precepts of ethics are mainly the precepts of
social authority; at all events the social precepts and
their sanctions have the priority in scientific method.
Some of the highest virtues are sociological; patriotic
self-sacrifice is one of the conditions of social preservation.
The inculcation of this and of many other
virtues would not appear in ethics at all, or only in a
supplementary treatment, if social science took its
proper sphere, and fully occupied that sphere.</p>
<p>Once more. The great problem of moral control,
which I would remove entirely from a science of
education, would be first dealt with in Sociology. It
there appears in the form of the choice and gradation
of punishments, in prison discipline, and in the reformation
of criminals,—all which have been made the
subject of enlightened, not to say scientific, treatment.
It is in the best experience in those subjects that I
would begin to seek for lights on the comprehensive
question. I would next go to diplomacy for the arts
of delicate address in reconciling opposing interests;
after which I would look to the management of parties
and conflicting interests in the State. I would farther
inquire how armies are disciplined, and subordination
combined with the enthusiasm that leads to noble
deeds.</p>
<p>There is an abundant field for the application of
pure psychology to ethics, when it takes its own
proper ground. The exact psychological character of
disinterested impulse needs to be assigned; and, if
that impulse can be fully referred to the sympathetic
or social instincts and habits, the supposed moral
faculty is finally eviscerated of its contents for all
ethical purposes.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>So far I have exemplified what seems to me real
or genuine aims and applications of metaphysical
study. I now proceed to the objects that are more or
less factitious. We are here on delicate ground, and
run the risk of discrediting our pursuit, as regards the
very things that in the eyes of many people make its
value.</p>
<p>First, then, as psychology involves all our sensibilities,
pleasures, affections, aspirations, capacities, it
is thought on that ground to have a special nobility
and greatness, and a special power of evoking in the
student the feelings themselves. The mathematician,
dealing with conic sections, spirals, and differential
equations, is in danger of being ultimately resolved
into a function or a co-efficient; the metaphysician, by
investigating conscience, must become conscientious;
driving fat oxen is the way to grow fat.</p>
<p>[MAN'S RELATIONS TO THE INFINITE.]</p>
<p>But to pass to a far graver application. It has
usually been supposed that metaphysical theory is
more especially akin to the speculation that mounts
to the supernatural and the transcendental world.
"Man's relations to the infinite" is a frequent phrase
in the mouth of the metaphysician. Metaphysics is
supposed to be "philosophy" by way of eminence;
and philosophy in the large sense has not merely to
satisfy the curiosity of the human mind, it has to
provide scope for its emotions and aspirations; in
fact, to play the part of theology. In times when the
prevailing orthodox beliefs are shaken, some scheme of
philosophy is brought forward to take their place. If
I understand aright the drift of the German metaphysical
systems for a century back, they all more or
less propose to themselves to supply the same
spiritual wants as religion supplies. In our own
country, such of us as are not under German influence
put the matter differently; but we still consider that
we have something to say on the "highest questions".
We are apt to believe that on us more than on any
other class of thinkers, does it depend whether the
prevailing theology shall be upheld, impugned, or
transformed. The chief weapons of the defenders of
the faith are forged in the schools of metaphysics.
Locke and Butler, Reid, Stewart and Brown are
theological authorities. And when theology is attacked,
its metaphysical buttresses have to be assailed
as the very first thing. If these are declared unsound,
either it must fall, or it must change its front. It is
Natural Theology, more particularly, that is thus
allied to metaphysics; yet, not exclusively; for the
defence of Revelation by miracles involves at the
outset a point of logic.</p>
<p>Now I do not mean to say, that this is a purely
factitious and ill-grounded employment of the metaphysical
sciences. I fully admit that the later defences
of theology, as well as the attacks, have been
furnished from psychology, logic, ethics, and ontology.
The earliest beliefs in religion, the greatest and
strongest convictions, had little to do with any of
these departments of speculation. But when simple
traditionary faith gave place to the questionings of
the reason, the basis of religion was transferred to the
reason-built sciences; and metaphysics came in for a
large share in the decision.</p>
<p>[METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY.]</p>
<p>What I maintain is, that there is something factitious
in the degree of prominence given to metaphysics
in this great enterprise; that its pretentions
are excessive, its importance over-stated; and when
most employed for such a purpose, it is least to be
trusted. Theological polemic is only in part conducted
through science; and physical science shares
equally with moral. The most serious shocks to the
traditional orthodoxy have come from the physical
sciences. The argument from Design has no doubt
a metaphysical or logical element—the estimate
of the degree of analogy between the universe
and a piece of human workmanship; but the argument
itself needs a scientific survey of the entire
phenomena of nature, both matter and mind. Our
Bridgewater Treatises proceeded upon this view;
they embraced the consideration of the whole circle
of the sciences, as bearing on the theological argument.
The scheme was so far just and to the purpose;
the obvious drawback to the value of the
Treatises lay in their being special pleadings, backed
by a fee of a thousand pounds to each writer for
maintaining one side. If a similar fee had been given
to nine equally able writers to represent the other side,
the argument from design would have been far more
satisfactorily sifted than by the exclusively metaphysical
criticism of Kant.</p>
<p>When theology is supported exclusively by such
doctrines as—an independent and immaterial soul, a
special moral faculty, and what is called free-will,—the
metaphysician is a person of importance in the
contest; he is powerful either to uphold or to subvert
the fabric. But, if these were ever to constitute the
chief stronghold of the faith, its tenure would not be
very secure. It is only a metaphysician, however,
that believes or disbelieves in metaphysical grounds
alone; such a man as Cousin, no doubt, rests his
whole spiritual philosophy on this foundation. But
the great mass will either adhere to religion in spite
of metaphysical difficulties, or else abandon it notwithstanding
its metaphysical evidences. An eminent
man now departed said in my hearing, that he was a
believer in Christianity until he became acquainted
with geology, when, finding the first chapter of Genesis
at variance with geological doctrines, he applied
to the Bible the rule <i>falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,</i>
and thenceforth abandoned his old belief. I never
heard of any one that was so worked upon by a
purely metaphysical argument.</p>
<p>The aspect of theological doctrine that has come
most to the front of late is the question of the Divine
goodness, as shown in the plan of the universe.
Speculations are divided between optimism and
pessimism. How shall we decide between these
extremes, or, if repudiating both, how shall we fix
the mean? Is a metaphysician more especially
qualified to find out the truth? I hardly think so. I
believe he could contribute, with others, to such a
solution as may be possible. He has, we shall suppose,
surveyed closely the compass of the human
sensibilities, and is able to assign, with more than
common precision, what things operate on them
favourably or unfavourably. So far good. Then, as
a logician, he is more expert at detecting bad inferences
in regard to the form of reasoning; but
whether certain allegations of fact are well or ill
founded, he may not be able to say, at least out of
his own department. If a mixed commission of
ten were nominated to adjudicate upon this vast
problem, metaphysics might claim to be represented
by two.</p>
<p>[FILLING THE THEOLOGICAL VOID.]</p>
<p>Least of all, do I understand the claims made in
behalf of this department to supply the spiritual void
in case the old theology is no longer accredited.
When one looks closely at the stream and tendency
of thought, one sees a growing alliance and kinship
between religion and poetry or art. There is, as we
know, a dogmatic, precise, severe, logical side of
theology, by which creeds are constructed, religious
tests imposed, and belief made a matter of legal
compulsion. There is also a sentimental, ideal,
imaginative side that resists definition, that refuses
dogmatic prescription, and seeks only to satisfy
spiritual needs and emotions. Metaphysics may no
doubt take a part in the dogmatic or doctrinal treatment,
but it must qualify itself by biblical study, and
become altogether theology. In the other aspect,
metaphysics, as I conceive it, is unavailing; the poet
is the proper medium for keeping up the emotional
side, under all transformations of doctrinal belief.
But as conceived by others, metaphysics is philosophy
and poetry in one, to which I can never agree. The
combination of the two, as hitherto exhibited, has
been made at the expense of both. The leading
terms of philosophy—reason, spirit, soul, the ideal,
the infinite, the absolute, phenomenal truth, being,
consciousness—are lubricated with emotion, and
thrown together in ways that defy the understanding.
The unintelligible, which ought to be the shame of
philosophy, is made its glory.</p>
<p>These remarks prepare for the conclusion that I
arrive at as to the scope of metaphysics with reference
to the higher questions. That it has bearings upon
these questions I allow; and those bearings are legitimately
within the range of metaphysical debates.
But I make a wide distinction between metaphysical
discussion and theological discussion; and do not
consider that they can be combined to advantage. In
the great latitude of free inquiry in the present day,
theology is freely canvassed, and societies might be
properly devoted to that express object; but I cannot
see any benefit that would arise by a philosophical
society undertaking, in addition to its own province,
to raise the questions belonging to theology. I am
well aware that there is one society of very distinguished
persons in the metropolis, calling itself
metaphysical, that freely ventures upon the perilous
seas of theological debate.<a name="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> No doubt good comes
from any exercise of the liberty of discussion, so long
restrained in this region; yet, I can hardly suppose
that purely metaphysical, studies can thrive in such a
connection. Many of the members must think far
more of the theological issues than of the cultivation
of mental and logical science; and a purely metaphysical
debate can seldom be pursued with profit
under these conditions.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[POLEMICS IN GREECE.]</p>
<p>I now pass to the POLEMICAL handling of the
metaphysical subjects. We owe to the Greeks the
study of philosophy through methodised debate; and
the state of scientific knowledge in the age of the
early Athenian schools was favourable to that mode
of treatment. The conversations of Socrates, the Dialogues
of Plato, and the Topics of Aristotle, are the
monuments of Greek contentiousness, turned to
account as a great refinement in social intercourse, as
a stimulus to individual thought, and a means of
advancing at least the speculative departments of
knowledge. Grote, both in his "Plato," and in his
"Aristotle," while copiously illustrating all these consequences,
has laid extraordinary stress on still
another aspect of the polemic of Socrates and Plato,
the aspect of <i>free-thought</i>, as against venerated
tradition and the received commonplaces of society.
The assertion of the right of private judgment in
matters of doctrine and belief, was, according to
Grote, the greatest of all the fruits of the systematised
negation begun by Zeno, and carried out in the
"Search Dialogues" of Plato. In the "Exposition
Dialogues" it is wanting; and in the "Topica," where
Eristic is reduced to method and system by one of
Aristotle's greatest logical achievements, the freethinker's
wings are very much clipt; the execution of
Socrates probably had to answer for that. It is to
the Platonic dialogues that we look for the full
grandeur of Grecian debate in all its phases. The
Plato of Grote is the apotheosis of Negation; it is
not a philosophy so much as an epic; the theme—
"The Noble Wrath of the Greek Dissenter".</p>
<p>At all times, there is much that has to be achieved
by solitary thinking. Some definite shape must be
given to our thoughts before we can submit them to
the operation of other minds; the greater the originality,
the longer must be the process of solitary
elaboration. The "Principia" was composed from
first to last by recluse meditation; probably the
attempt to discuss or debate any parts of it would
have only fretted and paralysed the author's invention.
Indeed, after an enormous strain of the constructive
intellect, a man may be in no humour to
have his work carped at, even to improve it. In the
region of fact, in observation and experiment, there
must be a mass of individual and unassisted exertion.
The use of allies in this region is to check and confirm
the accuracy of the first observer.</p>
<p>Again, an inquirer, by dint of prolonged familiarity
with a subject, may be his own best critic; he may
be better able to detect flaws than any one he could
call in. This is another way of stating the superiority
of a particular individual over all others in the same
walk. Such a monarchical position as removes a
man alike from the rivalry and from the sympathy
of his fellows, is the exception; mutual criticism
and mutual encouragement are the rule. The social
stimulants are of avail in knowledge and in truth as
well as everything else.</p>
<p>A comparison of the state of speculation in the
golden age of debate, with the state of the sciences in
the present day, both metaphysical and physical,
shows us clearly enough, what are the fields where
polemic is most profitable. I set aside the struggles
of politics and theology, and look to the scientific
form of knowledge, which is, after all, the type of our
highest certainty everywhere. Now, undoubtedly, it
is in classifying, generalising, defining, and in the so-called
logical processes—induction and deduction—that
a man can be least left to himself. Until many
men have gone over the same field of facts, a classification,
a definition, or an induction, cannot be held as safe
and sound. In modern science, there are numerous
matters that have passed through the fiery furnace of
iterated criticism, seven times purified; but there are,
attaching to every science, a number of things still in
the furnace. Most of all does this apply to the
metaphysical or subject sciences, where, according
to the popular belief, nothing has yet passed finally
out of the fiery trial. In psychology, in logic, in
eudaemonics, in sociology, in ethics, the facts are
nearly all around our feet; the question is how to
classify, define, generalise, express them. This
was the situation of Zeno, Socrates, and Plato, for
which they invoked the militant ardour of the mind.
Man, they saw, is a fighting being; if fighting will do
a thing, he will do it well.</p>
<p>[MOST USEFUL CLASSES OF DEBATES.]</p>
<p>In conformity with this view, the foremost class of
debates, and certainly not the least profitable, are
such as discuss the meanings of important terms.
The genius of Socrates perceived that this was the
beginning of all valid knowledge, and, in seeing this,
laid the foundation of reasoned truth. I need not
repeat the leading terms of metaphysical philosophy;
but you can at once understand the form of proceeding
by such an instance as "consciousness," debated
so as to bring out the question whether, as
Hamilton supposed, it is necessarily grounded on
knowledge.</p>
<p>Next to the leading terms are the broader and more
fundamental generalities: for example, the law of
relativity; the laws of memory and its conditions,
such as the intensity of the present consciousness;
Hamilton's inverse relationship of sensation and
perception. These are a few psychological instances.
The value of a debate on any of these questions
depends entirely upon its resolving itself into an
inductive survey of the facts, and such surveys are
never without fruit.</p>
<p>A debating society that includes logic in its sphere
should cultivate the methods of debate; setting an
example to other societies and to mankind in general.
The "Topica" of Aristotle shows an immensity of
power expended on this object, doubtless without
corresponding results. Nevertheless the attempt, if
resumed at the present day, with our clearer and
wider views of logical method, would not be barren.
This is too little thought of by us; and we may
say that polemic, as an art, is still immature. The
best examples of procedure are to be found in the
Law Courts, some of whose methods might be borrowed
in other debates. For one thing, I think that
each of the two leaders should provide the members
beforehand with a synopsis of the leading arguments
or positions to be set forth in the debate. This, I
believe, should be insisted on everywhere, not even
excepting the debates of Parliament.</p>
<p>It is the custom of debating societies to alternate
the Debate and the Essay: a very important distinction,
as it seems to me; and I will endeavour to
indicate how it should be maintained. Frequently
there is no substantial distinction observed; an essay
is simply the opening of a debate, and a debate the
criticism of an essay. I should like to see the two
carried out each on its own principle, as I shall now
endeavour to explain.</p>
<p>[THE DEBATE: A FIGHT FOR MASTERY.]</p>
<p>The Debate is <i>the fight for mastery</i> as between two
sides. The combatants strain their powers to say
everything that can be said so as to shake the case of
their opponents. The debate is a field-day, a challenge
to a trial of strength. Now, while I admit that
the intellectual powers may be quickened to unusual
perspicacity under the sound of the trumpet and the
shock of arms, I also see in the operation many perils
and shortcomings, when the subject of contest is
truth. In a heated controversy, only the more glaring
and prominent facts, considerations, doctrines, distinctions,
can obtain a footing. Now truth is the
still small voice; it subsists often upon delicate
differences, unobtrusive instances, fine calculations.
Whether or not man is a wholly selfish being, may be
submitted to a contentious debate, because the facts
and appearances on both sides are broad and palpable;
but whether all our actions are, in the last
resort or final analysis, self-regarding, is almost too
delicate for debate. Chalmers upholds, as a thesis,
the intrinsic misery of the vicious affections: there
could not be a finer topic of pure debate.</p>
<p>My conception of the Essay, on the other hand, is
that it should represent <i>amicable co-operation</i>, with an
eye to the truth. By it you should rise from the lower
or competitive, to the higher or communistic attitude.
There may be a loss of energy, but there is a gain
in the manner of applying it. The essayist should
set himself to ascertain the truth upon a subject; he
should not be anxious to make a case. The listeners,
in the same spirit, should welcome all his suggestions,
help him out where he is in difficulties, be indulgent
to his failings, endeavour to see good in everything.
If there be a real occasion for debate, it should be
purposely forborne and reserved. In propounding
subjects, the respective fitness for the debate and for
the essay might be taken into account.</p>
<p>[CO-OPERATIVE DISCUSSION IN THE ESSAY.]</p>
<p>When questions have been often debated without
coming nearer to a conclusion, it should be regarded
as a sign that they are too delicate and subtle for
debate. A trial should then be made of the amicable
or co-operative treatment represented by the Essay.
The Freedom of the Will might, I think, be adjusted
by friendly accommodation, but not by force of contention.
External Perception is beyond the province
of debate. It is fair and legitimate to try all
problems by debate, in the first instance, because the
excitement quickens the intelligence, and leads to
new suggestions; but if the question involves an
adjustment of various considerations and minute
differences, the contending sides will be contentious
still.</p>
<p>A society that really aims at the furtherance of
knowledge, might test its operations by now and then
preparing a report of progress; setting forth what
problems had been debated, what themes elucidated,
and with what results. It would be very refreshing
to see a candid avowal that after several attempts—both
debate and essay—some leading topic of the
department remained exactly where it stood at the
outset. After such a confession, the Society might
well resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole
House, to consider its ways, and indeed its entire
position, with a view to a new start on some more
hopeful track.</p>
<p>My closing remark is, as to avoiding debates that
are in their very nature interminable. It is easy to
fix upon a few salient features that make all the
difference between a hopeful and a hopeless controversy.
For one thing, there is a certain intensity of
emotion, interest, bias, or prejudice if you will, that
can neither reason nor be reasoned with. On the
purely intellectual side, the disqualifying circumstances
are complexity and vagueness. If a topic
necessarily hauls in numerous other topics of difficulty,
the essay may do something for it, but not the debate.
Worst of all is the presence of several large, ill-defined,
or unsettled terms, of which there are still plenty in
our department. A not unfrequent case is a combination
of the several defects each perhaps in a small
degree. A tinge of predilection or party, a double or
triple complication of doctrines, and one or two hazy
terms, will make a debate that is pretty sure to end
as it began. Thus it is that a question, plausible to
appearance, may contain within it capacities of misunderstanding,
cross-purposes, and pointless issues,
sufficient to occupy the long night of Pandemonium,
or beguile the journey to the nearest fixed star.</p>
<p>FOOTNOTES:</p>
<a name="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12">[12]</a><div class="note"><p> An Address, delivered on the 28th of March, 1877, to the Edinburgh
University Philosophical Society. CONTEMPORARY REVIEW,
April, 1877.</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13">[13]</a><div class="note"><p> This very plausible utterance begs every question. There would
be some difficulty in condensing an equal amount of fallacy, confusion
of thought, in so few words.
</p><p>
In the first place, it assumes that the three requisites—health,
freedom from debt, and a good conscience—are matters of easy and
general attainment; that they are, in fact, the rule among human
beings. Is this really so?
</p><p>
Take Health, a word of very wide import. There is a certain small
amount, such as is marked by being out of the physician's hands, but
implying very little of the energy needed for the labours and the enjoyment
of life. There is a high and resplendent degree that renders toil easy,
and responds to the commonest stimulants, so that enjoyment cannot
be quashed without unusually unfavourable circumstances. The first
kind is widely diffused; the second is very rare, except in the earlier
portion of life. Most men and women, as they pass middle age, lose the
elasticity required for easy and spontaneous enjoyment, and, even if
they keep the appearance of health, have too little animal spirits for
enjoyment under cheap and ordinary excitements.
</p><p>
But there is more to be said. In order to obtain, and to retain, health,
freedom from debt, and a good conscience, there are pre-supposed
very considerable advantages. We cannot continue healthy and out
of debt, unless we have a fair start in life, that is, unless we have a
tolerable provision to begin with; a circumstance that the maxim
keeps out of sight.
</p><p>
Yet farther. The conditions named are of themselves mere negatives;
they imply simply the absence of certain decided causes of
unhappiness—ill-health, poverty, and bad conduct. There is a farther
stealthy assumption, namely, that the individual is placed in a situation
otherwise conducive to happiness. Health, absence of debt, and a
good conscience will not make happiness, under severe or ungenial toil,
irritation, ill-usage, affliction, sorrow,—- even if they could be long
maintained under such circumstances. Nor even, in the case of
exemption from the worst ills of life, can we be happy without some
positive agreeables—family, general society, amusements, and gratifications.
There is a certain degree of loneliness, seclusion, dulness, that
destroys happiness without sapping health, or miming us into debt and
vice.
</p><p>
The maxim, as expressed, professes to aim at happiness, but it more
properly belongs to duty. If we fail in the conditions mentioned, we
run the risk rather of neglecting our duties than of missing our pleasures.
It is not every form of ill-health that makes us miserable; and
we may become seared to debt and ill-conduct, so as to suffer only the
incidental misery of being dunned, which many can take with great
composure.
</p><p>
The definition of happiness by Paley is vague and incomplete; but
it does not omit the positive conditions. After health, Paley enumerates
the exercise of the affections and some engaging occupation or
pursuit; both which are highly relevant to the attainment of happiness.
Indeed with an exemption from cares, and a considerable share of the
positive gratifications, we can enjoy life on a very slender stock of
health; otherwise, where should we be in the inevitable decline that
age brings with it?</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14">[14]</a><div class="note"><p> This Society has since been dissolved.</p></div>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<a name='EVI'></a><h2>VI.</h2>
<h2>THE UNIVERSITY IDEAL—PAST AND PRESENT.<a name="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15"><sup>[15]</sup></a></h2>
<br />
<p>GENTLEMEN,</p>
<p>By your flattering estimate of my services,
I have been unexpectedly summoned from
retirement, to assume the honours and the duties
of the purple, and to occupy the most historically
important office in the Universities of Europe.</p>
<p>The present demands upon the Rectorship somewhat
resemble what we are told of the Homeric chief,
who, in company with his Council or Senate, the
<i>Boulè</i>, and the Popular Assembly, or <i>Agora</i>, made up
the political constitution of the tribe. The functions
of the chief, it is said, were to supply wise counsel to
the <i>Boulè</i> (as we might call our Court), and unctuous
eloquence to the <i>Agora</i>. The second of these requirements
is what weighs upon me at the present
moment.</p>
<p>Whatever may have been the practice of my predecessors,
generally strangers to you, it would be
altogether unbecoming in me to travel out of our
University life, for the materials of an Address. My
remarks then will principally bear on the UNIVERSITY
IDEAL.</p>
<p>[THE HIGHER TEACHING IN GREECE.]</p>
<p>To the Greeks we are indebted for the earliest
germ of the University. It was with them chiefly
that education took that great leap, the greatest ever
made, from the traditional teaching of the home, the
shop, the social surroundings, to schoolmaster teaching
properly so called. Nowadays, we, schoolmasters,
think so much of ourselves, that we do not make full
allowance for that other teaching, which was, for unknown
ages, the only teaching of mankind. The
Greeks were the first to introduce, not perhaps the
primary schoolmaster, for the R's, but certainly the
secondary or higher schoolmaster, known as Rhetorician
or Sophist, who taught the higher professions;
while their Philosophers or wise men, introduced a
kind of knowledge that gave scope to the intellectual
faculties, with or without professional applications;
the very idea of our Faculty of Arts.</p>
<p>So self-asserting were these new-born teachers of
the Sophist class, that Plato thought it necessary to
recall attention to the good old perennial source of
instruction, the home, the trade, and the society. He
pointed out that the pretenders to teach virtue by
moral lecturing, were as yet completely outrivalled
by the influence of the family and the social pressure
of the community. In like manner, the arts of life
were all originally handed down by apprenticeship
and imitation. The greatest statesmen and generals
of early times had simply the education of the actual
work. Philip of Macedon could have had no other
teaching; his greater son was the first of the line to
receive what we may call a liberal, or a general
education, under the educator of all Europe.</p>
<p>[LOGIC IN THE MIDDLE AGES.]</p>
<p>THE MIDDLE AGE AND BOËTHIUS.</p>
<p>I must skip eight centuries, to introduce the man
that linked the ancient and the modern world, and
was almost the sole luminary in the west during the
dark ages, namely, Boëthius, minister of the Gothic
Emperor Theodoric. As much of Aristotle as was
known between the 6th and the 11th centuries was
handed down by him. During that time, only the
logical treatises existed among the Latins; and of
these the best parts were neglected. Historical importance
attaches to a small circle of them known as
the Old Logic (<i>vectus logica</i>), which were the pabulum
of abstract thought for five dreary centuries. These
consisted of the two treatises or chapters of Aristotle
called the "Categories," and the "De Interpretatione,"
or the Theory of Propositions; and of a book of
Porphyry the Neo-Platonist, entitled 'Introduction'
(<i>Isagoge</i>), and treating of the so-called Five Predicables.
A hundred average pages would include them
all; and three weeks would suffice to master them.</p>
<p>Boëthius, however, did much more than hand on
these works to the mediaeval students; he translated
the whole of Aristotle's logical writings (the Organon),
but the others were seldom taken up. It was he too
that handled the question of Universals in his first
Dialogue on Porphyry, and sowed the seed that was
not to germinate till four centuries afterwards, but
which, when the time came, was to bear fruit in no
measured amount. And Boëthius is the name associated
with the scheme of higher education that preceded
the University teaching, called the <i>quadrivium</i>,
or quadruple group of subjects, namely, Arithmetic,
Geometry, Music and Astronomy. This, together
with the <i>trivium</i>, or preparatory group of three subjects—Grammar,
Rhetoric, and Logic—constituted
what was known as the <i>seven liberal arts</i>; but, in the
darkest ages, the quadrivium was almost lost sight of,
and few went beyond the trivium.</p>
<br />
<p>EVE OF THE UNIVERSITY.</p>
<p>In the 7th century, the era of deepest intellectual
gloom, philosophy was at an entire stand-still. Light
arises with the 8th, when we are introduced to the
Cathedral and Cloister Schools of Charlemagne; and
the 9th saw these schools fully established, and an
educational reform completed that was to be productive
of lasting good results. But the range of instruction
was still narrow, scarcely proceeding beyond the
Old Logic, and the teachers were, as formerly, the
Monks. The 11th century is really the period of
dawn. The East was now opened up through the
Crusades, and there was frequent intercourse with
the learned Saracens of Spain; and thus there were
brought into the West the whole of Aristotle's works,
with Arabic commentaries, chiefly in Latin translations.
The effervescence was prodigious and alarming.
The schools were reinforced by a higher class
of teachers, Lay as well as Clerical; a marked advance
was made in Logic and Dialectic; and the
great controversy of Realism <i>versus</i> Nominalism,
which had found its birth in the previous century,
raged with extraordinary vigour. We are now on
the eve of the founding of the Universities; Bologna,
indeed, being already in existence.</p>
<p>[TWO CLASSES OF MEDIEVAL CHURCHMEN.]</p>
<p>SEPARATION OF PHILOSOPHY FROM THEOLOGY.</p>
<p>The University proper, however, can hardly be
dated earlier than the 12th century; and the important
particulars in its first constitution are these:—
First, the separation of Philosophy from Theology.
To expound this, would be to give a chapter of
mediaeval history. Suffice it to say that Aristotle and
the awakening intellect of the 11th century were the
main causes of it. Two classes of minds at this time
divided the Church—the pious, devout believers (such
as St. Bernard), who needed no reasons for their faith,
and the polemic speculative divines (such as Abaelard),
who wished to make Theology rational. It
was an age, too, of stirring political events; the
crusading spirit was abroad, and found a certain gratification
even in the war of words. The nature of
Universals was eagerly debated; but when this controversy
came into collision with such leading theological
doctrines as the Trinity and Predestination,
it was no longer possible for Philosophy and Theology
to remain conjoined.</p>
<p>A separation was effected, and determined the
leading feature of the University system. The foundation
was Philosophy, and the fundamental Faculty
the Faculty of Arts. Bologna, indeed, was eminent
for Law or Jurisprudence, and this celebrity it retained
for ages; but the University of Paris, which is the
prototype of our Scottish Universities, as of so many
others, taught nothing but Philosophy—in other
words, had no Faculty but Arts—for many years.
Neither Theology, Medicine, nor Law had existence
there till the 13th century.</p>
<p>Second, the system of conferring Degrees, after
appropriate trials. These were at first simply a
licence to teach. They acquired their commanding
importance through the action of Pope Nicholas I,
who gave to the graduates of the University of Paris,
the power of teaching everywhere, a power that our
own countrymen were the foremost to turn to
account.</p>
<br />
<p>THE OFFICE OF RECTOR.</p>
<p>Third, the Organisation of the primitive University.
Europe was unsettled; even in the capitals, the
civil power was often unhinged. Wherever multitudes
came together, there was manifested a spirit of
turbulence. The Universities often exemplified this
fact; and it was found necessary to establish a
government within themselves. The basis was popular;
but, while, in Paris, only the teaching body was
incorporated, in Bologna, the students had a voice.
They elected the Rector, and his jurisdiction was very
great indeed, and much more important than speechifying
to his constituents. His Court had the power
of internal regulation, with both a civil and criminal
jurisdiction. The Scotch Universities, on this point,
followed Bologna; and that fact is the remote cause
of this day's meeting.</p>
<p>[SCOTCHMEN ABROAD.]</p>
<p>THE UNIVERSITIES OF SCOTLAND FOUNDED.</p>
<p>So started the University. The idea took; and in
three centuries, many of the leading towns in Italy,
France, the German Empire, had their Universities;
in England arose Oxford and Cambridge; the model
was Paris or Bologna.</p>
<p>Scotland did not at first enter the race of University-founding,
but worked on the plan of the cuckoo,
by laying its eggs in the nests of others. For two
centuries, Scotchmen were almost shut out of England;
and so could not make for themselves a career
in Oxford and Cambridge, as in later times. They
had, however, at home, good grammar schools, where
they were grounded in Latin. They perambulated
Europe, and were familiar figures in the great University
towns, and especially Paris. From their disputatious
and metaphysical aptitude, they worked
their upward way—</p>
<span style="margin-left: 2em;">And gladly would they learn and gladly teach.</span><br />
<p>At length, the nation did take up the work in good
earnest. In 1411, was founded the first of the St.
Andrews' Colleges; 1451 is the date of Glasgow;
1494, King's College, Aberdeen. These are the
pre-Reformation colleges; but for the Reformation, we
might not have had any other. Their founders were
ecclesiastics; their constitution and ceremonial were
ecclesiastical. They were intended, no doubt, to keep
the Scotch students at home. They were also expected
to serve as bulwarks to the Church against the
rising heretics of the times. In this they were a disappointment;
the first-begotten of them became the
cradle of the Reformation.</p>
<p>In these our three eldest foundations, we are to seek
the primitive constitution and the teaching system of
our Universities. In essentials, they were the same;
only between the dates of Glasgow and Old Aberdeen
occurred two great events. One was the taking
of Constantinople, which spread the Greek scholars
with their treasures over Europe. The other was the
progress of printing. In 1451, when Glasgow commenced,
there was no printed text-book. In 1494,
when King's College began, the ancient classics had
been largely printed; the early editions of Aristotle in
our Library, show the date of 1486.</p>
<br />
<p>FIRST PERIOD—THE TEACHING BODY.</p>
<p>Our Universities have three well-marked periods;
the first anterior to the Reformation; the second from
the Reformation to the beginning of last century; the
third, the last and present centuries. Confining ourselves
still to the Faculty of Arts, the features of the
Pre-Reformation University were these:—</p>
<p>First, as regards the teaching Body. The quadriennial
Arts' course was conducted by so-called
Regents, who each carried the same students through
all the four years, thus taking upon himself the burden
of all the sciences—a walking Encyclopaedia. The
system was in full force, in spite of attempts to change
it, during both the first and the second periods. You,
the students of Arts, at the present day, encountering
in your four years, seven faces, seven voices, seven
repositories of knowledge, need an effort to understand
how your predecessors could be cheerful and
happy, confined all through to one personality; sometimes
juvenile, sometimes senile, often feeble at his
best.</p>
<p>[ARISTOTLE THE BASIS OF THE TEACHING.]</p>
<p>THE SUBJECTS TAUGHT.</p>
<p>Next, as regards the Subjects taught. To know
these you have simply to know what are the writings
of Aristotle. The little work on him by Sir Alexander
Grant supplies the needful information. The
records of the Glasgow University furnish the curriculum
of Arts soon after its foundation. The subjects
are laid out in two heads—Logic and Philosophy.
The Logic comprised first the three Treatises of the
Old Logic; to these were now added the whole of
the works making up Aristotle's Organon. This
brought in the Syllogism, and allied matters. There
was also a selection from the work known as the
<i>Topics</i>, not now included in Logical teaching, yet one
of the most remarkable and distinctive of Aristotle's
writings. It is a highly laboured account of the whole
art of Disputation, laid out under his scheme of the
Predicables. The selection fell chiefly on two books
—the second, comprising what Aristotle had to say
on Induction, and the sixth, on Definition; together
with the "Logical Captions" or Fallacies. Disputation
was one of the products of the Greek mind; and
Aristotle was its prophet.</p>
<p>Now for Philosophy. This comprised nearly the
whole of Aristotle's Physical treatises—his very worst
side—together with his Metaphysics, some parts of
which are hardly distinguishable from the Physics.
Next was the very difficult treatise—<i>De Anima</i>, on
the mind, or Soul—and some allied Psychological
treatises, as that on Memory. Such was the ordinary
and sufficing curriculum. It was allowed to be varied
with a part of the Ethics; but in this age we do not
find the Politics; and the Rhetoric is never mentioned.
So also, the really valuable Biological works
of Aristotle, including his book on Animals, appear
to have been neglected.</p>
<p>Certain portions of Mathematics always found a
place in the curriculum. Likewise, some work on
Astronomy, which was one of the quadrivium subjects.</p>
<p>All this was given in Latin. Greek was not then
known (it was introduced into Scotland, in 1534).
No classical Latin author is given; the education in
Latin was finished at the Grammar School.</p>
<p>[TEACHING EXCLUSIVELY IN TEXTS.]</p>
<p>MANNER OF TEACHING.</p>
<p>Such was the Arts' Faculty of the 15th century; a
dreary, single-manned, Aristotelian quadriennium.
The position is not completely before us, till we
understand farther the manner of working.</p>
<p>The pupils could not, as a rule, possess the text of
Aristotle. The teacher read and expounded the text
for them; but a very large portion of the time was
always occupied in dictating, or "diting," notes,
which the pupils were examined upon, <i>vivâ voce</i>;
their best plan usually being to get them by heart, as
any one might ask them to repeat passages literally;
while perhaps few could examine well upon the
meaning. The notes would be selections and abridgments
from Aristotle, with the comments of modern
writers. The "diting" system was often complained
of as waste of time, but was not discontinued till
the third, or present, University dynasty, and not
entirely then, as many of us know.</p>
<p>The teaching was thus exclusively <i>Text</i> teaching.
The teacher had little or nothing to say for himself
(at least in the earliest period). He was even restricted
in the remarks he might make by way of commentary.
He was as nearly as possible a machine.</p>
<p>But lastly, to complete the view of the first period,
we must add the practice of Disputation, of which
we shall have a better idea from the records of the
next period. This practice was co-eval with the
Universities; it was the single mode of stimulating
the thought of the individual student; the chief antidote
to the mechanical teaching by Text-books and
dictation.</p>
<p>The pre-Reformation period of Aberdeen University
was little more than sixty years. For a portion
of those years it attained celebrity. In 1541, the
town was honoured by a visit from James V., and the
University contributed to his entertainment. The
somewhat penny-a-lining account is, that there were
exercises and disputations in Greek, Latin, and other
languages! The official records, however, show that
the College at that very time had sunk into a convent
and conventual school.</p>
<br />
<p>SECOND PERIOD—THE REFORMATION.</p>
<p>The Reformation introduced the second period, and
made important changes. First of all, in the great
convulsion of European thought, the ascendancy of
Aristotle was shaken. It is enough to mention two
incidents in the downfall of the mighty Stagyrite.
One was the attack on him by the renowned Peter
Rainus, in the University of Paris. Our countryman,
Andrew Melville, attended Ramus's Lectures, and
became the means of introducing his system into
Scotland. The other incident is still more notable.
The Reformers had to consider their attitude towards
Aristotle. At first their opinion was condemnatory.
Luther regarded him as a very devil; he was "a godless
bulwark of the Papists". Melancthon was also
hostile; but he soon perceived that Theology would
crumble into fanatical dissolution without the co-operation
of some philosophy. As yet there was
nothing to fall back upon except the pagan systems.
Of these, Melancthon was obliged to confess that
Aristotle was the least objectionable, and was, moreover,
in possession. The plan, therefore, was to accept
him as a basis, and fence him round with orthodox
emendations. This done, Aristotle, no longer despotic,
but as a limited constitutional monarch, had his
reign prolonged a century and a half.</p>
<p>[NEW SUBJECTS INTRODUCED BY MELVILLE.]</p>
<p>THE MODIFIED CURRICULUM—ANDREW MELVILLE.</p>
<p>The first thing, after the Reformation in Scotland,
was to purge the Universities of the inflexible adherents
of the old faith. Then came the question of
amending the Curriculum, not simply with a view to
Protestantism, but for the sake of an enlightened
teaching. The right man appeared at the right
moment. In 1574, Andrew Melville, then in Geneva,
received pressing invitations to come home and take
part in the needed reforms. He was immediately
made Principal of Glasgow University, at that time
in a state of utter collapse and ruin. He had matured
his plans, after consultation with George Buchanan,
and they were worthy of a great reformer. He
sketched a curriculum, substantially the curriculum
of the second University period. The modifications
upon the almost exclusive Aristotelianism of the first
period, were significant. The Greek language was
introduced, and Greek classical authors read. The
reading in the Roman classics was extended. A
text-book on Rhetoric accompanied the classical
readings. The dialectics of Ramus made the prelude
to Logic, instead of the three treatises of the old
Logic. The Mathematics included Euclid. Geography
and Cosmography were taken up. Then
came a course of Moral Philosophy on an enlarged
basis. With the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle,
were combined Cicero's Ethical works and certain
Dialogues of Plato. Finally, in the Physics, Melville
still used Aristotle, but along with a more
modern treatise. He also gave a view of Universal
History and Chronology.</p>
<p>This curriculum, which Melville took upon himself
to teach, in order to train future teachers, was the
point of departure of the courses in all the Universities
during the second period. With variations of
time and place, the Arts' course may be described as
made up of the Greek and Latin classics, with Rhetoric,
Logic, and Dialectics, Moral Philosophy, or
Ethics, Mathematics, Physics, and Astronomy. The
little text-book of Rhetoric, by Talon or Talaeus,
was made up of notes from the Lectures of Peter
Ramus, and used in all our Colleges till superseded
by the better compilation of the Dutch scholar, Gerard
John Voss.</p>
<p>Melville had to contend with many opponents,
among them the sticklers for the infallibility of the
Stagyrite. Like the German Reformers, he had
accepted Aristotelianism as a basis, with a similar
process of reconciliation. So it was that Aristotle
and Calvin were brought to kiss each other.</p>
<p>[MELVILLE DEFEATED ON THE REGENTING.]</p>
<p>ATTEMPT TO ABOLISH REGENTING.</p>
<p>Melville's next proposal was all too revolutionary.
It consisted in restricting the Regents each to a
special group of subjects; in fact, anticipating our
modern professoriate. He actually set up this plan
in Glasgow: one Regent took Greek and Latin;
another, his nephew, James Melville, took Mathematics,
Logic, and Moral Philosophy; a third, Physics
and Astronomy. The system went on, in appearance
at least, for fifty years; it is only in 1642, that we
find the Regents given without a specific designation.
Why it should have gone on so long, and been then
dropt, we are not informed. Melville's influence
started it in the other Universities, but it was defeated
in every one from the very outset. After six
years at Glasgow, he went to St. Andrew's as Principal
and Professor of Divinity, and tried there the
same reforms, but the resistance was too great. In
spite of a public enactment, the division of labour
among the Regents was never carried out. Yet such
was Melville's authority, that the same enactment was
extended to King's College, in a scheme having a remarkable
history—the so-called New Foundation of
Aberdeen University, promulgated in a Royal Charter
of about the year 1581. The Earl Marischal was a
chief promoter of the plan of reform comprised in
this charter. The division of labour among the Regents
was most expressly enjoined. The plan fell
through; and there was a legal dispute fifty years
afterwards as to whether it had ever any legal validity.
Charles I. was made to express indignation
at the idea of reducing the University to a school!</p>
<p>We now approach the foundation of Marischal
College. The Earl Marischal may have been actuated
by the failure of his attempt to reform King's
College. At all events, his mind was made up to
follow Melville in assigning separate subjects to his
Regents. The Charter is explicit on this head. Yet
in spite of the Charter and in spite of his own presence,
the intention was thwarted; the old Regenting
lasted 160 years.</p>
<br />
<p>ARISTOTELIAN PHYSICS TOO LONG MAINTAINED.</p>
<p>Still the Curriculum reform was gained. There
was, indeed, one great miss. The year before Marischal
College was founded, Galileo had published
his work on Mechanics, which, taken with what had
been accomplished by Archimedes and others, laid
the foundations of our modern Physics. Copernicus
had already published his work on the Heavens. It
was now time that the Aristotelian Physics should be
clean swept away. In this whole department, Aristotle
had made a reign of confusion; he had thrown
the subject back, being himself off the rails from first
to last. Had there been in Scotland an adviser in
this department, like Melville in general literature, or
like Napier of Merchiston in pure mathematics, one
fourth of the college teaching might have been reclaimed
from utter waste, and a healthy tone of thinking
diffused through the remainder.</p>
<p>A curious fascination always attached to the study
of Astronomy, even when there was not much to be
said, apart from the unsatisfactory disquisitions of
Aristotle. A little book, entitled "<i>Sacrobosco</i> on the
Sphere," containing little more than what we should
now teach to boys and girls, along with the Globes,
was a University text-book throughout Europe for
centuries. I was informed by a late King's College
professor that the Use of the Globes was, within his
memory, taught in the Magistrand Class. This would
be simply what is termed a "survival".</p>
<p>[GRADUATION BY MEANS OF DISPUTES ON THESIS.]</p>
<p>SYSTEM OF DISPUTATION.</p>
<p>Now as to the mode of instruction. There were
<i>vivâ voce</i> examinations upon the notes, such as we
can imagine. But the stress was laid on Disputations
and Declamations in various forms. Besides
disputing and declaiming on the regular class work
before the Regent, we find that, in Edinburgh, and I
suppose elsewhere, the classes were divided into companies,
who met apart, and conferred and debated
among themselves daily. The students were occupied,
altogether, six hours a day. Then the higher classes
were frequently pitched against each other. This
was a favourite occupation on Saturdays. The doctrines
espoused by the leading students became their
nicknames. The pass for Graduation consisted in the
<i>propugning</i> or <i>impugning</i> of questions by each candidate
in turn. An elaborate Thesis was drawn up by
the Regent, giving the heads of his philosophy course;
this was accepted by the candidates, signed by them,
and printed at their expense. Then on the day of
trial, at a long sitting, each candidate stood up and
propunged or impunged a portion of the Thesis; all
were heard in turn; and on the result the Degree was
conferred. A good many of these Theses are preserved
in our Library; some of them are very long—a
hundred pages of close type; they are our best clue
to the teaching of the period. We can see how far
Aristotle was qualified by modern views.</p>
<br />
<p>REGENTING DOOMED.</p>
<p>I said there might have been times when the
students never had the relief of a second face all the
four years. The exceptions are of importance. First,
as regards Marischal College. Within a few years of
the foundation, Dr. Duncan Liddell founded the Mathematical
Chair, and thus withdrew from the Regents
the subject that most of all needed a specialist; a
succession of very able mathematicians sat in this
chair. King's College had not the same good fortune.
From its foundation it possessed a separate functionary,
the Humanist or Grammarian; but he had
also, till 1753, to act as Rector of the Grammar
School. Edinburgh obtained from an early date a
Mathematical chair, occupied by men of celebrity.
There was no other innovation till near the end of the
17th century, when Greek was isolated both in Edinburgh
and in Marischal College; but the end of
Regenting was then near.</p>
<p>The old system, however, had some curious writhings.
During the troubled 17th century, University
reform could not command persistent attention. But
after the 1688-Revolution, opinions were strongly
expressed in favour of the Melville system. The
obvious argument was urged, that, by division of
labour each man would be able to master a special
subject, and do it justice in teaching. Yet, it was
replied, that, by the continued intercourse, the master
knew better the humours, inclinations, and talents of
their scholars. To which the answer was—the
humours and inclinations of scholars are not so deeply
hid but that in a few weeks they appear. Moreover,
it was said, the students are more respectful to a
Master while he is new to them.</p>
<p>The final division of subjects took place in Edinburgh,
in 1708; in Glasgow, in 1727; in St. Andrews,
in 1747. In Marischal College, the change was made
by a minute of 11th Jan., 1753; but, whether from
ignorance, or from want of grace, the Senatus did
not record its satisfaction at having, after a lapse of
five generations, fulfilled the wishes of the pious
founder. In King's College, the old system lasted till
1798.</p>
<p>This closes the second age of the Universities, and
introduces the third age, the age of the Professoriate,
of Lecturing instead of Text-books, the end of Disputation,
and the use of the English Language. It was
now, and not till now, that the Scottish Universities
stood forth, in several leading departments of knowledge,
as the teachers of the world.</p>
<p>[AGE OF THE PROFESSORIATE.]</p>
<p>THE UNIVERSITIES AND THE POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS.</p>
<p>The second age of the Universities was Scotland's
most trying time. In a hundred and thirty years, the
country had passed through four revolutions and
counter-revolutions; every one of which told upon
the Universities. The victorious party imposed its
test upon the University teacher, and drove out recusants.
You must all know something of the purging
of the University and the Ministry of Aberdeen by
the Covenanting General Assembly of 1640. These
deposed Aberdeen doctors may have had too strong
leanings to episcopacy in the Church and to absolutism
in the State, but they were not Vicars of Bray.
The first half of the century was adorned by a band
of scholars, who have gained renown by their cultivation
of Latin poetry; a little oasis in the desert of
Aristotelian Dialectics. It would be needless and
ungracious to enquire whether this was the best thing
that could have been done for the generation of
Bishop Patrick Forbes.</p>
<p>Your reading in the History of Scotland will thus
bring you face to face with the great powers that contended
for the mastery from 1560: the Monarchy,
always striving to be absolute; the Church, whose
position made it the advocate of popular freedom; the
Universities, fluctuating as regards political liberty,
but standing up for intellectual liberty. In the 17th
century the Church ruled the Universities; in the
18th, it may be said, that the Universities returned
the compliment.</p>
<p>[PROFESSIONAL TEACHING BY APPRENTICESHIP]</p>
<p>UNIVERSITIES NOT ESSENTIAL FOR PROFESSIONS.</p>
<p>Enough for the past. A word or two on the present.
What is now the need for a University system,
and what must the system be to answer that need?
Many things are altered since the 12th century.</p>
<p>First, then, Universities, as I understand them, are
not absolutely essential to the teaching of professions.
Let me make an extreme supposition. A great naval
commander, like Nelson, is sent on board ship, at
eleven or twelve; his previous knowledge, or general
training, is what you may suppose for that age. It is
in the course of actual service, and in no other way,
that he acquires his professional fitness for commanding
fleets. Is this right or is it wrong? Perhaps it is
wrong, but it has gone on so for a long time. Well,
why may not a preacher be formed on the same plan?
John Wesley was not a greater man in preaching,
than Nelson in seamanship. Take, then, a youth of
thirteen from the school. Apprentice him to the
minister of a parish. Let him make at once preparations
for clerical work. Let him store his memory
with sermons, let him make abstracts of Divinity
systems; master the best exegetical commentators.
Then, in a year or two, he would begin to catechise
the young, to give addresses in the way of exposition,
exhortation, encouragement, and rebuke. Practice
would bring facility. Might not, I say; seven years of
the actual work, in the susceptible period of life, make
a preacher of no mean power, without the Grammar
School, without the Arts' Classes, without the Divinity
Hall?</p>
<p>What then do we gain by taking such a roundabout
approach to our professional work? The
answer is twofold.</p>
<p>First, as regards the profession itself. Nearly
every skilled occupation, in our time, involves principles
and facts that have been investigated, and are
taught, outside the profession; to the medical man
are given courses of Chemistry, Physiology, and so
on. Hence to be completely equipped for your professional
work, you must repair to the teachers of
those tributary departments of knowledge. The
requirement, however, is not absolute; it admits of
being evaded. Your professional teachers ought to
master these outside subjects, and give you just as
much of them as you need, and no more; which
would be an obvious economy of your valuable time.</p>
<p>Thus, I apprehend, the strictly professional uses of
general knowledge fail to justify the Grammar School
and the Arts' curriculum. Something, indeed, may
still be said for the higher grades of professional excellence,
and for introducing improved methods into
the practice of the several crafts; for which wider
outside studies lend their aid. This, however, is not
enough; inventors are the exception. In fact, the
ground must be widened, and include, secondly, <i>the
life beyond the profession</i>. We are citizens of a self-governed
country; members of various smaller societies;
heads, or members of families. We have, moreover,
to carve out recreation and enjoyment as the
alternative and the reward of our professional toil.
Now the entire tone and character of this life outside
the profession, is profoundly dependent on the compass
of our early studies. He that leaves the school
for the shop at thirteen, is on one platform. He that
spends the years from thirteen to twenty in acquiring
general knowledge, is on a totally different platform;
he is, in the best sense, an aristocrat. Those that
begin work at thirteen, and those that are born not to
work at all, are alike his inferiors. He should be able
to spread light all around. He it is that may stand
forth before the world as the model man.</p>
<p>[THE GRADUATE AS SUCH.]</p>
<p>THE IDEAL GRADUATE.</p>
<p>All this supposes that you realise the position; that
you fill up the measure of the opportunities; that you
keep in view at once the Professional life, the Citizen
life, and the life of Intellectual tastes. The mere professional
man, however prosperous, cannot be a power
in society, as the Arts' graduate may become. His
leisure occupations are all of a lower stamp. He does
not participate in the march of knowledge. He must
be aware of his incompetence to judge for himself in
the greater questions of our destiny; his part is to be
a follower, and not a leader.</p>
<p>It is not, then, the name of graduate that will do
all this. It is not a scrape pass; it is not decent
mediocrity with a languid interest. It is a fair and
even attention throughout, supplemented by auxiliaries
to the class work. It is such a hold of the leading
subjects, such a mastery of the various alphabets,
as will make future references intelligible, and a continuation
of the study possible.</p>
<p>Our curriculum is one of the completest in the
country, or perhaps anywhere. By the happy thought
of the Senatus of Marischal College, in 1753, you have
a fundamental class (Natural History) not existing in
the other colleges. You have a fair representation
of the three great lines of science—the Abstract, the
Experimental, and the Classifying. When it is a
general education that you are thinking of, every
scheme of option is imperfect that does not provide
for such three-sided cultivation of our reasoning
powers. A larger quantity of one will no more
serve for the absence of the rest than a double
covering of one part of the body, will enable another
part to be left bare.</p>
<br />
<p>VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF THE BASIS.</p>
<p>Your time in the Arts' curriculum is not entirely
used up by the classes. You can make up for deficiences
in the course, when once you have formed
your ideal of completeness. For a year, or two after
graduating, while still rejoicing in youthful freshness,
you can be widening your foundations. The thing
then is, to possess a good scheme and to abide by it.
Now, making every allowance for the variation of
tastes and of circumstances, and looking solely to
what is desirable for a citizen and a man, it is impossible
to refuse the claims of the department of
Historical and Social study. One or two good representative
historical periods might be thoroughly
mastered in conjunction with the best theoretical
compends of Social Philosophy.</p>
<p>[THE WELL-INSTRUCTED MAN.]</p>
<p>Farther, the ideal graduate, who is to guide and
not follow opinion, should be well versed in all the
bearings of the Spiritual Philosophy of the time.
The subject branches out into wide regions, but not
wider than you should be capable of following it.
This is not a professional study merely; it is the
study of a well-instructed man.</p>
<p>Once more. A share of attention should be bestowed
early on the higher Literature of the Imagination.
As, in after life, poetry and elegant composition
are to be counted on as a pleasure and solace, they
should be taken up at first as a study. The critical
examination of styles, and of authors, which forms
an admirable basis of a student's society, should be
a work of study and research. The advantages will
be many and lasting. To conceive the exact scope
and functions of the Imagination in art, in science,
in religion, and everywhere, will repay the trouble.</p>
<br />
<p>THE ARTS' GRADUATE IN LITERATURE.</p>
<p>Ever since I remember, I have been accustomed
to hear of the superiority of the Arts' graduate, in
various crafts, more especially as a teacher. Many
of you in these days pass into another vocation—Letters,
or the Press. Here too, almost everything
you learn will pay you professionally. Still, I am
careful not to rest the case for general education on
professional grounds alone. I might show you that
the highest work of all—original enquiry—needs a
broad basis of liberal study; or at all events is vastly
aided by that. Genius will work on even a narrow
basis, but imperfect preparatory study leaves marks
of imperfection in the product.</p>
<p>The same considerations that determine your voluntary
studies, determine also the University Ideal. A
University, in my view, stands or falls with its Arts'
Faculty. Without debating the details, we may say
that this Faculty should always be representative of
the needs of our intelligence, both for the professional
and for the extra-professional life; it should not be
of the shop, shoppy. The University exists because
the professions would stagnate without it; and still
more, because it may be a means of enlarging knowledge
at all points. Its watchword is Progress. We
have, at last, the division of labour in teaching; outside
the University, teachers too much resemble the
Regent of old—having too many subjects, and too
much time spent in grinding. Our teachers are exactly
the reverse.</p>
<p>Yet, there cannot be progress without a sincere
and single eye to the truth. The fatal sterility of
the middle ages, and of our first and second University
periods, had to do with the mistake of gagging
men's mouths, and dictating all their conclusions.
Things came to be so arranged that contradictory
views ran side by side, like opposing electric currents;
the thick wrappage of ingenious phraseology
arresting the destructive discharge. There was, indeed,
an elaborate and pretentious Logic, supplied
by Aristotle, and amended by Bacon; what was still
wanted was a taste of the Logic of Freedom.</p>
<p>FOOTNOTES:</p>
<a name="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15">[15]</a><div class="note"><p> RECTORIAL ADDRESS, to the Students of Aberdeen University,
<i>15th November</i>, 1882.</p></div>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<a name='EVII'></a><h2>VII.</h2>
<h2>THE ART OF STUDY.</h2>
<br />
<p>Of hackneyed subjects, a foremost place may be
assigned to the Art of Study. Allied to the theory
and practice of Education generally, it has still a
field of its own, although not very precisely marked
out. It relates more to self-education than to instruction
under masters; it supposes the voluntary
choice of the individual rather than the constraint of
an outward discipline. Consequently, the time for
its application is when the pupil is emancipated from
the prescription and control of the scholastic curriculum.</p>
<p>There is another idea closely associated with our
notion of study—namely, learning from books. We
may stretch the word, without culpable licence, to
comprise the observation of facts of all kinds, but it
more naturally suggests the resort to book lore for
the knowledge that we are in quest of. There is a
considerable propriety in restricting it to this meaning;
or, at all events, in treating the art of becoming
wise through reading, as different from the arts of
observing facts at first hand. In short, study should
not be made co-extensive with knowledge getting,
but with book learning. In thus narrowing the field,
we have the obvious advantage of cultivating it more
carefully, and the unobvious, but very real, advantage
of dealing with one homogeneous subject.</p>
<p>In the current phrase, "<i>studying under</i> some one,"
there is a more express reference to being taught
by a master, as in listening to lectures. There is,
however, the implication that the learner is applying
his own mind to the special field, and, at the same
time, is not neglecting the other sources of knowledge,
such as books. The master is looked upon
rather as a guide to enquiry, than as the sole fountain
of the information sought.</p>
<p>Thus, then, the mental exercise that we now call
"study" began when books began; when knowledge
was reduced to language and laid out systematically
in verbal compositions. A certain form of it existed
in the days when language was as yet oral merely;
when there might be long compositions existing
only in the memory of experts, and communicable
by speech alone. But study then was a very simple
affair: it would consist mainly in attentive listening
to recitation, so as to store up in the memory what
was thus communicated. The art, if any, would attach
equally to the reciter and to the listener; the duty
of the one would be to accommodate his lessons in
time, quantity, and mode of delivery to the retentive
capacity of the other; who, in his turn, would be
required to con and recapitulate what he had been
told, until he made it his own, whatever it might
be worth.</p>
<p>[BOOK STUDY AMONG THE ANCIENTS]</p>
<p>Even when books came into existence, an art of
study would be at first very simple. The whole
extent of book literature among the Jews before
Christ would be soon read; and, when once read,
there was nothing left but to re-read it in whole or in
part, with a view of committal to memory, whether
for meditative reflection, or for awakening the emotions.
We see, in the Psalms of David, the emphasis
attached to mental dwelling on the particulars of the
Mosaic Law, as the nourishment of the feelings of
devotion.</p>
<p>The Greek Literature about 350 B.C., when Aristotle
and Demosthenes had reached manhood (being
then 34), had attained a considerable mass; as one
may see at a glance from Jebb's chronology attached
to his Primer. There was a splendid poetical library,
including all the great tragedians, with the older and
the middle Comedy. There were the three great
historians—Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon;
and the orators—- Lysias, Isocrates, and Isaeus; there
were the precursors of Socrates in Philosophy; and,
finally, the Platonic Dialogues. To overtake all these
would employ several years of learned leisure; and
to imbibe their substance would be a rich and varied
culture, especially of the poetic and rhetorical kind.
To make the most of the field, a judicious procedure
would be very helpful; there was evident scope for
an art of study. The fertile intellect of the Greeks
produced the first systematic guides to high culture;
the Rhetorical art for Oratory and Poetry, the Logical
art for Reasoning, and the Eristic art for Disputation.
There was nothing precisely corresponding to an Art
of Study, but there were examples of the self-culture
of celebrated men. The most notorious of these is
Demosthenes; of whom we know that, while he took
special lessons in the art of oratory, he also bestowed
extraordinary pains upon the general cultivation of
his intellectual powers. His application to Thucydides
in particular is recounted in terms of obvious
mythical exaggeration; showing, nevertheless, his
idea of fixing upon a special book with a view to
extracting from it every particle of intellectual nourishment
that it could yield: in which we have an example
of the art of study as I have defined it. Then,
it is said that, in his anxiety to master his author, he
copied the entire work eight times, with his own
hand, and had it by heart <i>verbatim</i>, so as to be able
to re-write it when the manuscripts were accidentally
destroyed. Both points enter into the art of study,
and will come under review in the sequel.</p>
<p>We do not possess from the genius of Aristotle—the
originator or improver of so many practical departments—an
Art of Study. The omission was not
supplied by any other Greek writer known to us.
The oratorical art was a prominent part of education
both in Greece and in Rome; and was discussed
by many authors—notably by Cicero himself; but
the exhaustive treatment is found in Quintilian.
The very wide scope of the "Institutes of Oratory"
comprises a chapter upon the orator's reading, in
which the author reviews the principal Greek and
Roman classics from Homer to Seneca, with remarks
upon the value of each for the mental cultivation of
the oratorical pupil. Something of this sort might be
legitimately included in the art of study, but might
also be withheld, as being provided in the critical
estimates already formed respecting all writers of
note.</p>
<p>[MODERN GUIDES TO STUDY.]</p>
<p>After Ouintilian, it is little use to search for an
art of study, either among the later Latin classics,
or among the mediaeval authors generally. I proceed
at once to remark upon the well-known essay of
Bacon, which shows his characteristic subtlety, judiciousness,
and weight; yet is too short for practical
guidance. He hits the point, as I conceive it, when he
identifies study with reading, and brings in, but only
by way of contrast and complement, conference or
conversation and composition. He endeavours to
indicate the worth of book learning, as an essential
addition to the actual practice of business, and the
experience, of life. He marks a difference between
books that we are merely to dip into (books to be
tasted) and such as are to be mastered; without,
however, stating examples. He ventures also to
settle the respective kinds of culture assignable to
different departments of knowledge—history, poetry,
mathematics, natural philosophy, moral philosophy,
logic and rhetoric; a very useful attempt in its own
way, and one that may well enough enter into a
comprehensive art of study, if not provided for in
the still wider theory of Education at large.</p>
<p>Bacon's illustrious friend, Hobbes, did not write on
studies, but made a notable remark bearing on one
topic connected with the art,—namely, that if he had
read as much as other men, he should have remained
still as ignorant as other men. This must not be
interpreted too literally. Hobbes was really a great
reader of the ancients, and must have studied with
care some of the philosophers immediately preceding
himself. Still, it indicates an important point for
discussion in the art of study, in which great men
have gone to opposite extremes—I mean in reference
to the amount of attention to be given to previous
writers, in taking up new ground.</p>
<p>To come down to another great name, we have
Milton's ideal of Education, given in his short Tractate.
Here, with many protestations of knowing
things, rather than words, we find an enormous prescription
of book reading, including, in fact, every
known author on every one of a wide circle of subjects.
This was characteristic of the man: he was a voracious
reader himself, and an example to show, in
opposition to Hobbes, that original genius is not
necessarily quenched by great or even excessive
erudition. As bearing on the art of study, especially
for striplings under twenty, Milton's scheme is
open to two criticisms: first, that the amount of
reading on the whole is too great; second, that in
subjects handled by several authors of repute, one
should have been selected as the leading text-book
and got up thoroughly; the others being taken in
due time as enlarging or correcting the knowledge
thus laid in. Think of a boy learning Rhetoric upon
six authors taken together!</p>
<p>[LOCKE'S CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING.]</p>
<p>The transition from Milton to Locke is the inverse
of that from Hobbes to Milton. Locke was also a
man of few books. If he had been sent to school
under Milton, as he might have been,<a name="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> he would have
very soon thrown up the learned drudgery prescribed
for him, and would have bolted.</p>
<p>The practical outcome of Locke's enquiries respecting
the human faculties is to be found in the little
treatise named—"The Conduct of the Understanding".
It is an earnest appeal in favour of devotion
to the attainment of truth, and an exposure of <i>all</i> the
various sources of error, moral and intellectual; more
especially prejudices and bias. There are not, however,
many references to book study; and such as we
find are chiefly directed to the one aim of painful and
laborious examination, first, of an author's meaning,
and next of the goodness of his arguments. Two
or three sentences will give the clue. "Those who
have read of everything, are thought to understand
everything too; but it is not always so. Reading
furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge;
it is thinking makes what we read ours. We
are of the ruminating kind, and it is not enough to
cram ourselves with a great deal of collections, unless
we chew them over again, they will not give us strength
and nourishment." Farther: "Books and reading
are looked upon to be the great helps of the understanding,
and instruments of knowledge, as it must
be allowed that they are; and yet I beg leave to
question whether these do not prove a hindrance to
many, and keep several bookish men from attaining
to solid and true knowledge". Here, again, is his
stern way of dealing with any author:—"To fix in
the mind the clear and distinct idea of the question
stripped of words; and so likewise, in the train of
argumentation, to take up the author's ideas, neglecting
his words, observing how they connect or separate
those in the question." Of this last, more afterwards.</p>
<p>[WATT'S IMPROVEMENT OF THE MIND.]</p>
<p>A disciple of Locke, and a man of considerable
and various powers, the non-conformist divine Isaac
Watts, produced perhaps the first considerable didactic
treatise on Study. I refer, of course, to his
well-known work entitled "The Improvement of the
Mind"; on which, he tells us, he was occupied at intervals
for twenty years. It has two Parts: one on
the acquisition of knowledge; the other on Communication
or leaching. The scheme is a very wide one.
Observation, Reading, attending Lectures, Conversation,—are
all included. To the word "Study," Watts
attaches a special meaning, namely Meditation and
Reflection, together with the control or regulation of
all the exercises of the mind. I doubt if this meaning
is well supported by usage. At all events it is
not the signification that I propose to attach to the
term. Observation is an art in itself: so is Conversation,
whether amicable or contentious. The <i>proportions</i>
that these exercises should bear to reading,
would fairly claim a place in the complete Art of
Study.</p>
<p>Watts has two short chapters on Books and Reading,
containing sensible remarks. He urges the importance
of thorough mastery of select authors; but
assumes a power of discriminating good and bad
beyond the reach of a learner, and does not show
how it is to be attained. He is very much concerned
all through as to the moral tone and religious orthodoxy
of the books read, he also reproves hasty and
ill-natured judgments upon the authors.</p>
<p>Watts's Essay is so pithily written, and so full of
sense and propriety, that it long maintained a high
position in our literature; he tells us, that it had become
a text-book in the University. I do not know
of any better work on the same plan. A "Student's
Guide," by an American named Todd, was in vogue
with us, some time ago; but anyone looking at its
contents, will not be sorry that it is now forgotten.
It would not, however, be correct to say that the
subject has died out. If there have not been many
express didactic treatises of late, there has been an
innumerable host of small dissertations, in the form
of addresses, speeches, incidental discussions, leading
articles, sermons—all intended to guide both young
and old in the path of useful study. What to read,
when to read, and how to read,—have been themes of
many an essay, texts of many a discourse. According
as Education at large has been more and more
discussed, the particular province of self-education,
as here marked out, has had an ample share of attention
from more or less qualified advisers.</p>
<p>What we have got before us, then, is, first, to define
our ground, and then to appropriate and value the
accumulated fruits of the labour expended on it. I
have already indicated how I would narrow the subject
of Study, so as to occupy a field apart, and not
jumble together matters that follow distinct laws.
The theory of Education in general is the theory of
good Teaching: that is a field by itself, although
many things in it are applicable also to self-education.
To estimate the values of different acquisitions
—Science, Language, and the rest, is good for all modes
of culture. The laws of the understanding in general,
and of the memory in particular, must be taken into
account under every mode of acquiring knowledge.
Yet the alteration of circumstances, when a pupil is
carving out his own course, and working under his
own free-will, leads to new and distinct rules of
procedure. Also, that part of self-education consisting
in the application to books is distinct from the
other forms of mental cultivation, namely, conversing,
disputing, original composition, and tutorial aid. Each
of these has its own rules or methods, which I do
not mean to notice except by brief allusion.</p>
<p>In connection with the Plan of study, it is material
to ask what the individual is studying for. Each
profession, each accomplishment, has its own course of
education. If book reading is an essential part, then
the choice of books must follow the line of the special
pursuit. This is obvious; but does not do away
with the consideration of the best modes of studying
whatever books are suitable for the end. One man
has to read in Chemistry, another in Law, another in
Divinity, and so on. For each and all of these, there
is a profitable and an unprofitable mode of working,
and the speciality of the matter is unessential.</p>
<p>[DIFFERENT ENDS OF STUDY.]</p>
<p>The more important differences of subject, involving
differences of method, are seen in such
contrasted departments as Science and Language,
Thought and Style, Reality and Poetry, Generality
and Particularity. In applying the mind to these
various branches, and in using books as the medium
of acquisition, there are considerable differences in
the mode of procedure. The study of a book of
Science is not on the same plan as the study of
a History or a Poem. Yet even in these last, there
are many circumstances in common, arising out of
the constitution of our faculties and the nature of a
verbal medium of communication of thought.</p>
<p>An art of Study in general should not presume to
follow out in minute detail the education of the
several professions. There should still be, for example,
a distinct view of the training special in an
Orator, on which the ancients bestowed so much
pains; there being no corresponding course hitherto
chalked out for a Philosopher as such, or even for a
Poet.</p>
<p>Next, there is an important distinction between
studies for a professional walk, and the studies of a
man's leisure, with a view to gratifying a special taste,
or for the higher object of independent thinking on
all the higher questions belonging to a citizen and a
man. Both positions has its peculiarities; and an
art of study should be catholic enough to embrace
them. To have the best part of the day for study,
and the rest for recreation and refreshment, is one
thing: and to study in by-hours, in snatches of time,
and in holidays is quite another thing. In the latter
case, the choice of subjects, and the extent of them,
must be considerably different; while the consideration
of the best modes of economizing time and
strength, and of harmonizing one's life as a whole,
is more pressing and more arduous. But, when the
course is chalked out, the details of study must conform
to the general conditions of all acquirements
in knowledge through the instrumentality of books.</p>
<p>One, and only one, more preliminary clearing.
When an instructor proceeds, as Milton in his school,
or as James Mill with his son, by prescribing to each
pupil a mass of books to be read, with more or less
of examination as to their contents; in such a case,
education from without has passed into study in our
narrow sense; and the procedure for one situation
is applicable to both. The two cases are equally in
contrast to educating by the direct instruction of the
teacher. In so far, however, as any teacher requires
book study to co-operate with his own addresses, to
that extent do the methods laid down for private
study come into play.</p>
<p>Under every view, it is a momentous fact, that the
man of modern times has become a book-reading
animal. The acquisition of knowledge and the cultivation
of the intellectual powers of the mind, form
only a small part of the use of books; although the
part more properly named Study. The moral
tendencies are controlled; the emotions regulated;
sympathy with mankind, or the opposite, generated;
pleasurable excitement afforded. These other uses
may be provided apart, as in our literature of amusement,
or they may be given in combination with the
element of knowledge, in which case they are apt to
be a disturbing force, rendering uncertain our calculations
as to the efficacy of particular modes of study.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>The practical problem of Study is not to be
approached by any high <i>priori</i> road; in other words,
by setting out from abstract principles as to the nature
of the mind's receptivity and the operation of book-reading
upon that receptivity. A humbler line of
approach will be more likely to succeed.</p>
<p>There exist a number of received maxims on study,
the result of many men's experience and wisdom.
Our endeavour will be to collect these, arrange them
in a methodical plan, so that they may give mutual
aid, and supply each other's defects. We shall go a
little farther, and criticise them according to the best
available lights; and, when too vague or sweeping,
supply needful qualifications.</p>
<p>The Choice of Books, in the first instance, depends
on the merits attributed to them severally by persons
most conversant with the special department. In
some degree, too, this choice is controlled by the
consideration of the best modes of study, as will soon
be apparent.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[A TEXT-BOOK-IN-CHIEF.]</p>
<p><a name='VII.I'></a>I. Our first maxim is—"Select a Text-book-in-chief".
The meaning is, that when a large subject is
to be overtaken by book study alone, some one work
should be chosen to apply to, in the first instance,
which work should be conned and mastered before
any other is taken up. There being, in most subjects,
a variety of good books, the thorough student will
not be satisfied in the long run without consulting
several, and perhaps making a study of them all;
yet, it is unwise to distract the attention with more
than one, while the elements are to be learnt. In
Geometry, the pupil begins upon Euclid, or some
other compendium, and is not allowed to deviate
from the single line of his author. If he is once
thoroughly at home on the main ideas and the leading
propositions of Geometry, he is safe in dipping
into other manuals, in comparing the differences of
treatment, and in widening his knowledge by additional
theorems, and by various modes of demonstration.</p>
<p>In principle, the maxim is generally allowed.
Nevertheless, it is often departed from in practice.
This happens in several ways.</p>
<p>[MILTON'S PLAN WITH HIS PUPILS.]</p>
<p>[KEEPING TO A SINGLE LINE OF THOUGHT.]</p>
<p>One way is exemplified in Milton's Tractate, already
referred to. His method of teaching any subject
would appear to have been to take, the received
authors, and to read them one after another, probably
according to date; the reading pace, and degree
of concentration, being apparently equal all through.
His six authors on Rhetoric were—Plato (select Dialogues,
of course), Aristotle, Phalereus, Cicero, Hermogenes,
Longinus. To read their several treatises
through in the order named, with equal attention,
would undoubtedly leave in the mind a good many
thoughts on Rhetoric, but in a somewhat chaotic
state. Much better would it have been to have
adopted a Text-book-in-chief, the choice lying between
Aristotle and Ouintilian (who comes in at a
prior stage of the Miltonic curriculum). The book
so chosen would be read, and re-read; or rather each
chapter would be gone over several times, with appropriate
testing exercises and examinations. The
other works might then be overtaken and compared
with the principal text-book; the judgment of the
pupil being so far matured, as to see what in them
was already superseded, and what might be adopted
as additions to his already acquired stock of ideas.
Milton's views of education embraced the useful to a
remarkable degree; he was no pamperer of imagination
and the ornamental. His list of subjects might
be said to be utility run wild:—comprising the chief
parts of Mathematics, together with Engineering,
Navigation, Architecture, and Fortification; Natural
Philosophy; Natural History; Anatomy, and Practice
of Physic; Ethics, Politics, Economics, Jurisprudence,
Theology; a full course of the Orators and Poets;
Logic, Rhetoric, and Poetics. He tumbles out a whole
library of reading: but only in Ethics, does he indicate
a leading or preferential work; the half-dozen of
classical books on the subject are to be perused,
"under the determinate sentence" of the scripture
authorities. With all this voracity for the useful,
Milton had no conception of scientific form, or method;
and indeed, few of the subjects had as yet passed
the stage of desultory treatment; so that the idea of
casting the knowledge into some one form, under the
guidance of a chosen author, would never occur to
him. Better things might have been expected of
James Mill, in conducting the education of his son.
Yet we find his plan to have been to require an even
and exhaustive perusal of nearly every book on
nearly every subject, without singling out any one
to impart the best known form in each case. The
disadvantage of the process would be that, at first,
all the writers were regarded as profitable alike.
Nevertheless, in the special subjects that he knew
himself, he gave his own instructions as the leading
text, and his pupil's knowledge took form according
to these. In some cases, accident gave a text-in-chief,
as when young Mill at ten years of age, studied
Thomson's Chemistry, without the distraction of any
other work. If there had been half-a-dozen Chemical
manuals in existence, he would probably have
read them all, and fared much worse. It happens,
however, that, in the more exact sciences, there is a
greater sameness in the leading ideas, than in Politics,
Morals, or the Human Mind; and the evil of
distraction is so much smaller. Undoubtedly, the
best of all ways of learning anything is to have a
competent master to dole out a fixed quantity every
day, just sufficient to be taken in, and no more; the
pupils to apply themselves to the matter so imparted,
and to do nothing else. The singleness of aim is favourable
to the greatest rapidity of acquirement; and
any defects are to be left out of account, until one
thread of ideas is firmly set in the mind. Not unfrequently,
however, and not improperly, the teacher
has a text-book in aid of his oral instructions. To
make this a help, and not a hindrance, demands the
greatest delicacy; the sole consideration being that
the pupil must be kept <i>in one single line of thought</i>,
and never be required to comprehend, on the same
point, conflicting or varying statements.</p>
<p>Even the foot-notes to a work may have to be disregarded,
in the first instance. They may act like
a second author, and keep up an irritating friction.
There is, doubtless, a consummate power of annotation
that anticipates difficulties, and clears away
haze, without distracting the mind. There is also an
art of bringing out relief by an accompaniment, like
the two images of the stereoscope. This is most
likely to arise through a living teacher or commentator,
who, by his tones and emphasis, as well as by
his very guarded and reserved additions, can make
the meaning of the author take shape and fulness.</p>
<p>As the chief text-book is chosen, among other
reasons, for its method and system, any defects on
this head may be very suitably supplied, during the
reader's progress, by notes or otherwise. When the
end is clearly kept in view, we shall not go wrong as
to the means: the spirit will remedy an undue bias to
the letter.</p>
<p>The subjects that depend for their full comprehension
upon a certain method and order of details, are
numerous, and include the most important branches
of human culture. The Sciences, in mass, are avowedly
of this character: even such departments as Theology,
Ethics, Rhetoric, and Criticism have their definite
form; and, until the mind of the student is fully impressed
with this, all the particulars are vague and
chaotic, and comparatively useless for practical application.
So, any subject cast in a <i>polemic</i> form must
be received and held in the connection thereby given
to it. If the arguments <i>pro</i> and <i>con</i> fall out of their
places in the mind of the reader, their force is missed
or misconceived.</p>
<p>History is pre-eminently a subject for method, and,
therefore, involves some such plan as is here recommended.
Every narrative read otherwise than for
mere amusement, as we read a novel, should leave in
the mind—(1) the Chronological sequence (more or
less detailed); and (2) the Causal sequence, that is,
the influences at work in bringing about the events.
These are best gained by application to a single work
in the first place; other works being resorted to in
due time.</p>
<p>Of the non-methodical subjects, forming an illustrative
contrast, mention may be made of purely
didactic treatises, where the precepts are each valuable
for itself, and by itself: such as, until very
recently, the works on Agriculture, and even on
Medicine. A book of Domestic Receipts, consulted
by index, is not a work for study.</p>
<p>Poems and fictitious narrations will naturally be
regarded as of the un-methodical class. If there are
exceptions, they consist of long poems—Epics and
Dramas—whose plan is highly artistic, and must be
felt in order to the full effect. Probably, however,
this is the merit that the generality of readers are
content to miss, especially if greater strain of attention
is needed to discover it. Readers bent on enjoyment
dwell on the passing page, and are not inclined
to carry with them what has gone before, in order to
understand what is to follow.</p>
<p>[REPUDIATION OF METHOD BY MEN OF REPUTE.]</p>
<p>Very intelligent and superior men have wholly
repudiated the notion of study by method. We
must not lay too much stress upon these disclaimers,
seeing that they are usually cited from those in
advanced years, or men whose day of methodical
education is passed. When Johnson said—"A man
ought to read just as inclination leads him," he
was not thinking of beginners, for whom he would
probably have dictated a different course. Still, it is
a prevailing tendency of many minds, to read all
books equally, provided the interest or enjoyment of
them is equal. Macaulay, Sir William Hamilton, De
Quincey, as well as Johnson, and a numerous host
besides, were book-gluttons, books in breeches; they
imbibed information copiously, and also retained it,
but as a matter of chance. The enjoyment of their
life was to read; whereas, to master thoroughly a
considerable field of knowledge, can never be all
enjoyment. Gibbon was a book devourer, but he
had a plan; he was organizing a vast work of
composition. Macaulay, also, showed himself capable
of realizing a scheme of composition; both
his History and his Speeches have the stamp of
method, even to the pitch of being valuable as models.
Hamilton and De Quincey, each in his way, could
form high ideals of work, and in part execute them;
but their productiveness suffered from too much
bookish intoxication. While readers generally mix
the motive of instruction with stimulation, the class
that seek instruction solely is but small; the other
extreme is frequent enough.</p>
<p>[DIFFICULTY IN CHOOSING A FIRST TEXT-BOOK.]</p>
<p>In many subjects, the difficulties of fixing upon the
proper Text-book are not inconsiderable. The mere
reputation of a book may be great, and well-founded;
and yet the merits may not be of the kind that fits it
for the commencing student. Such conditions as the
following must be taken into account. The Form or
Method should be of a high order: this we shall
have occasion to illustrate under the next head. It
should be abreast: of the time, on its own subject. It
should be moderately full, without being necessarily
exhaustive in detail. It is on this point that the cheap
primers of the present day are mainly defective. They
state general ideas, and lay down outlines; but they
do not provide sufficiently expanded illustration to
stamp these on the mind of the learner. A shilling
primer is really a more advanced book than one on a
triple scale, that should embrace the same compass of
leading ideas. As a farther condition, the work
chosen should not have so much of individuality as to
fail in the character of representing the prevailing
views. The greatest authors often err on this point;
and, while a work of genius is not to be neglected, it
may, for this reason, have to take the second place in
the order of study. Newton's <i>Principia</i> could never
be a work suited for an early stage of mathematical
study. Lyell's Geology has been a landmark in the
history of the subject; but it is not cast in the form
for a beginner in Geology. It is, in its whole plan,
argumentative; setting up and defending a special
thesis in Geology; the facts being arrayed with that
view. Many other great works have assumed a like
form; such are Malthus on Population, Grove's Correlation
of Physical Forces, Darwin's Origin of Species.
Even expressly didactic works are often composed
more to bring forward a peculiar view, than from the
desire to develop a subject in its due proportions.
Locke's Essay on the Understanding does not propose
to give a methodical and exhaustive handling
of the Powers of the Mind, or even of the Intellect.
That was reserved for Reid.</p>
<p>The question as between old writers and new, would
receive an easy solution upon such grounds as the
foregoing, were it not for the sentiment of veneration
for the old, because they are old. If an ancient writer
retains a place by virtue of surpassing merits, as
against all subsequent writers, his case is quite clear.
In the nature of things, this must be rare: if there
be an example, it is Euclid; yet his position is held
only through the mutual jealousy of his modern
rivals.</p>
<p>The only motive for commencing a study upon a
very old writer is a desire to work out a subject
historically; which, in some instances may be allowed,
but not very often. In Politics, Ethics, and Rhetoric,
the plan might have its advantages; but, with this
imperative condition, that we shall follow out the
development in the modern works. In proportion as
a subject assumes a scientific shape, it must carefully
define its terms, marshal its propositions in proper
dependence, and offer strict proof of all matters of
fact; now, in these respects, every known branch of
knowledge has improved with the lapse of ages; so
that the more recent works are necessarily the best
for entering upon the study. A historical sequence
may be proper to be observed; but that should be
backward and not forward. The earlier stages of
some subjects are absolutely worthless; as, for example,
Physics, Chemistry, and most of Biology, in
other subjects, as Politics and Ethics, the tentatives of
such men as Plato and Aristotle have an undying
value; nevertheless, the student should not begin, but
end, with them.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>There is an extreme form of putting our present
doctrine that runs it into paradox: namely, the one-book-and-no-more
maxim. Scarcely any book in
existence is so all-sufficient for its purpose that a
student is better occupied in re-reading it for the
tenth time, than in reading some others once. Even
the merits of the one book are not fully known
unless we compare it with others; nor have we
grasped any subject unless we are able to see it
stated in various forms, without being distracted or
confused. It is not a high knowledge of horsemanship
that can be gained by the most thorough acquaintance
with one horse.</p>
<p>[NO WORK ENTIRELY SELF-SUFFICIENT.]</p>
<p>Any truth that there is in the paradox of excluding
all books but one from perusal, belongs to it as a
form of the maxim we have now been considering.
There is not in existence a work corresponding to
the notion of absolute self-sufficiency. Suppose we
were to go over the <i>chef-d'oeuvres</i> of human genius,
we should not find one in the position of entire
independence of all others. Take, for example, the
poems of Homer; the Republic and a few other of
Plato's pre-eminent Dialogues; the great speeches of
Demosthenes; the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle; the
poems of Dante; Shakespeare, as a whole; Bacon's
Novum Organum; Newton's Principia; Locke on the
Understanding; the <i>Méchanique Céleste</i> of Laplace.
No one of all these could produce its effect on the
mind without referring to other works, previous, contemporary,
or following. The remark is not confined
to works of elucidation and comment merely—as the
contemporary history of Greece, or the speeches of
Demosthenes—but extends to other compositions, of
the very same tenor, by different, although inferior,
writers. Shakespeare himself is made much more
profitable by a perusal of the other Elizabethans, and
by a comparison with dramatic models before and
after him.</p>
<p>The nearest approach to a perfectly all-sufficing
book is seen in scientific compilations by a conjunction
of highly accomplished editors. A new edition
of Quain's Anatomy, revised and brought up to date
by the best anatomists, would, for the moment, probably
be fully adequate to the wants of the student,
and dispense with all other references whatsoever. Not
that even then, it would be desirable to abstain from
ever opening a different compendium; although undoubtedly
there would be the very minimum of
necessity for doing so. Nevertheless, literature presents
few analogous instances. One of the great
works of an original genius, like Aristotle, might, by
profuse annotation, be made nearly sufficing; but
this is another way of reading by quotation a plurality
of writers; and it would be better still to peruse some
of these in full, there being no need for studying
them with the degree of intensity bestowed on a
main work.</p>
<p>[LOCKE'S TREATMENT OF THE BIBLE.]</p>
<p>The example, by pre-eminence, of one self-sufficing
work is the Bible. Being the sole and ultimate
authority of Christian doctrine, it holds a position
entirely apart; and, among Protestants at least, there
is a becoming jealousy of allowing any extraneous
writing to overbear its contents. Yet we are not to
infer, as many have done practically, that no other
work needs to be read in company with it. Granting
that its genuine doctrines have been overlaid by
subsequent accretions, the way to get clear of these
is not to neglect the entire body of fathers, commentators,
and theologians, and to give the whole attention
to the scriptural text. Locke himself set an example
of this attempt. He proposed, in his "Reasonableness
of Christianity," to ascertain the exact meaning of
the New Testament, by casting aside all the glosses
of commentators and divines, and applying his own
unassisted judgment to spell out its teachings. He
did not disdain to use the lights of extraneous history,
and the traditions of the heathen world; he only
refused to be bound by any of the artificial creeds
and systems devised in later ages to embody the
doctrines supposed to be found in the Bible. The
fallacy of his position obviously was, that he could
not strip himself of his education and acquired
notions, the result of the teaching of the orthodox
church. He seemed unconscious of the necessity of
trying to make allowance for his unavoidable prepossessions.
In consequence, he simply fell into an
old groove of received doctrines; and these he
handled under the set purpose of simplifying the
fundamentals of Christianity to the utmost. Such
purpose was not the result of his Bible study, but of
his wish to overcome the political difficulties of the
time. He found, by keeping close to the Gospels and
by making proper selections from the Epistles, that the
belief in Christ as the Messiah could be shown to be
the central fact of the Christian faith; that the other
main doctrines followed out of this by a process of
reasoning; and that, as all minds might not perform
the process alike, these doctrines could not be essential
to the acceptance of Christianity. He got out of the
difficulty of framing a creed, as many others have
done, by simply using Scripture language, without
subjecting it to any very strict definition; certainly
without the operation of stripping the meaning of its
words, to see what it amounted to. That his short
and easy method was not very successful, the history
of the Deistical controversy sufficiently proves. The
end in view would, in our time, be sought by an
opposite course. Instead of disregarding commentators,
and the successions of creed embodiments, a
scholar of the present day would ascend through
these to the original, and find out its meaning, after
making allowance for all the tendencies that operated
to give a bias to that meaning. As to putting us in the
position of listening to the Bible authors at first hand,
we should trust more to the erudition of a Pusey or an
Ewald, than to the unassisted judgment of a Locke.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p><a name='VII.II'></a>II. "What constitutes the study of a book?" Mere
perusal at the average reading pace is not the way to
imbibe the contents of any work of importance,
especially if the subject is new and difficult.</p>
<p>There are various methods in use among authoritative
guides. To revert to the Demosthenic traditions:
we find two modes indicated—namely, repeated
copying, and committing to memory <i>verbatim</i>. A
third is, making abstracts in writing. A fourth may
be designated the Lockian method. Let us consider
the respective merits of the four.</p>
<p>[STUDY BY LITERAL COPYING.]</p>
<p><a name='VII.II.1'></a>1. Of copying a book literally through, there is this
to be said, that it engages the attention upon every
word, until the act of writing serves to impress the
memory. But there are very important qualifications
to be assigned in judging of the worth of the exercise.
Observe what is the main design of the copyist. It
is to produce a <i>replica</i> of an original upon paper.
He cannot do this without a certain amount of
attention to the original; enough at least to enable
him to put down the exact words in the copy; and,
by such attention, he is so far impressed with the
matter, that a certain portion may remain in the
memory. If, however, instead of the paper, he could
write directly on the brain, he would be aiming
straight at his object. Now, experience shows that
the making of a copy of any document is compatible
with a very small amount of attention to the purport.
The extreme case is the copying clerk. He can
literally reproduce an original, with entire forgetfulness
of what it is about. If his eye takes a faithful
note of the sequence of words, he may entirely
neglect the meaning. In point of fact, he constantly
does so. He remembers nobody's secrets; and he
cannot be counted on to check blunders that make
nonsense of his text. Probably no one could go on
copying for eight hours a day unless the strain of
attention to the originals were at a minimum. I
conceive, therefore, that copying habits arising from a
certain amount of experience at the vocation, would
be utterly fatal to the employment of the exercise as
a means of study. It may be valuable to such as have
seldom used their pen except in original composition.
Very probably, in school lessons, to write an
exercise two or three times may be a help to the
usual routine of saying off the book. I have heard
experienced teachers testify to the good effects of the
practice. Yet very little would turn the attention the
wrong way. Even the requirement of neatness on
the part of the master, or the pupil's own liking for
it, would abate the desired impression. The multiplied
copying set as punishment might stamp a
thing on the memory through disgust; it might also
engender the mechanical routine of the copyist. In
short, to sit down and copy a long work is about the
last thing that I should dream of, as a means of
study. To copy Thucydides eight times, as the
tradition respecting Demosthenes goes, would be
about the same as copying Gibbon three times: and
who would undertake that?</p>
<p>[COMMITTING TO MEMORY WORD FOR WORD.]</p>
<p><a name='VII.II.2'></a>2. Committing to memory <i>verbatim</i>, or nearly so.
This too belongs to the same tradition regarding
Demosthenes, and is probably as inaccurate as the
other. Certainly the eight copyings would not suffice
for having the whole by heart. Excepting a professional
rhapsodist, or some one gifted with extraordinary
powers of memory that would hardly be
compatible with a great understanding, nobody would
think of committing Thucydides to memory. That
Demosthenes should be a perfect master both of the
narrated facts, and of the sagacious theorisings of
Thucydides in those facts, we may take for granted.
And, farther, the orations delivered by opposing
speakers in the great critical debates, might very well
have been committed <i>verbatim</i> by a young orator;
many of them are masterpieces of oratory in every
point of view. But the reason for getting them by
heart does not apply to the general narrative. Even
to imbibe the best qualities of the style of Thucydides
would not require whole pages to be learnt <i>verbatim</i>;
a much better way would readily occur to any intelligent
man.</p>
<p>In fact, there is no case where it is profitable to
load the memory with a whole book, or with large
portions of a book. There are many small portions
of every leading work that might be committed with
advantage. Principal propositions ought to be retained
to the letter. Passages, here and there,
remarkable for compact force, for argumentative
power, or elegant diction, might be read and re-read
till they clung to the memory; but this should be the
consummation of a thorough and critical estimate of
their merits. To commit to memory without thinking
of the meaning is a senseless act; and could not be
ascribed to Demosthenes. At the stage when the
young student is forming a style, he is assisted by
laying up <i>memoriter</i> a number of passages of great
authors; but it is never necessary to go beyond select
paragraphs. Detached sentences are valuable, and
strain the memory least. Entire paragraphs have a farther
value in impressing good paragraph connection;
but, to string a number of paragraphs together, or to
learn whole chapters by memory, has nothing to recommend
it in the way of mental culture.</p>
<p>There is a memory in <i>extension</i> that holds a long
string of words and ideas together. Its value is to
get readily at anything occurring in a certain train, as
in a given book. It is the memory of easy reference.
There is also a memory of <i>intension</i>, that takes a
strong grasp of brief expressions and thoughts, and
brings them out for use, on the slightest relevancy.
The two modes interfere with each other's development;
we cannot be great in both; while, for original
force, the second is worth the most: it extracts and
resets gems to tesselate our future structures; it constitutes
depth as against fluency.</p>
<p>To commit poetical passages to memory is a valuable
contribution to our stock of material for emotional
resuscitation in after years. It also aids in adorning
our style, even although we may not aspire to compose
in poetry. But the burden of holding the connection
of a long poem should be eschewed. Children
can readily learn a short psalm or hymn, and can
retain it in permanence; but to repeat the 119th
psalm from the beginning is the mere <i>tour-de-force</i> of
a strong natural memory, and a waste of power; just
as much as committing an entire book of the Aeneid
or of Paradise Lost.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[MAKING ABSTRACTS.]</p>
<p><a name='VII.II.3'></a>3. Making Abstracts.—This is the plan of studying
that most advances our intelligent comprehension of
any work of difficulty, and also impresses it on the
memory in the best form. But there are many ways
of doing it; and beginners, from the very fact that
they are beginners, are not competent to choose
the best. If a book has an obvious and methodical
plan in itself, the reader can follow that plan,
taking down the leading positions, selecting some
of the chief examples or illustrations, giving short
headings of chapters and paragraphs, and thus
making a synopsis, or full table of contents. All
this is useful. The memory is much better impressed
through the exertion of picking, choosing,
and condensing, than by copying <i>verbatim</i>; and the
plan or evolution of the whole is more fully comprehended.
But, if a work does not easily lend itself to a
methodical abstract, the task of the beginner is much
harder. To abstract the treatises of Aristotle was
fitting employment for Hobbes. The "Wealth of
Nations" is not easy to abstract; but, at the present
day, it would not be chosen as the Text-book-in-chief
for Political Economy: as a third or fourth work to
be perused at a reading pace, it would have its proper
effect. The best studious exercise upon it would be
to mark the agreements and disagreements with the
newer authority, the weak and strong points of the
exposition, and the perennial force of a certain number
of the propositions and examples. Many parts
could be skipped entirely as not even repaying historical
study. Yet, as the work of a great and
original mind, its interest is perennial.</p>
<p>To go back once more to the example of Thucydides.
Setting aside, from intrinsic improbability,
both the traditions—the copyings, and the committal
to memory <i>verbatim</i>,—we can easily see what Demosthenes
could find in the work, and how he could
make the most of it. The narrative or story could be
indelibly fixed in his memory by a few perusals, and,
if need be, by a full chronology drawn up by his own
hand. The speeches could be committed in whole or
in part, for their arguments and language; and a
minute study could be made of the turns of expression,
as they seemed to be either meritorious or
defective. The young orator had already studied the
more finished styles of Isocrates, Lysias, Isanis, and
Plato, and could make comparisons between their
forms and the peculiarities of Thucydides, which belonged
to an earlier age. This, however, was a
discipline altogether apart, and had nothing to do
with copying, committing, or abstracting. It involved
one exercise more or less allied to the last, namely,
<i>making changes upon an author, according to ones best
ideal at the time</i>: changes, if possible, for the better,
but perhaps not; still requiring, however, an effort of
mind, and so far favourable to culture.</p>
<p>[VARIOUS MODES OF ABSTRACTING.]</p>
<p>Every one's first attempts at abstracting must be
very bad. There is no more opportune occasion for
the assistance of a tutor or intelligent monitor, than to
revise an abstract. The weaknesses of a beginner are
apparent at a glance; even better than by a <i>viva voce</i>
interrogation. Useful abstracting comes at a late
stage of study, when one or two subjects have been
pretty well mastered. It is then that the pupil can
best overtake more advanced works on the subjects
already commenced, or can enter upon an entirely
new department, in the light of previous acquisitions.</p>
<p>Any work that deserves thorough study deserves
the labour of making an abstract; without which,
indeed, the study is not thorough. It is quite possible
to read so as to comprehend the drift of a book, and
yet forget it entirely. The point for us to consider is
—Are we likely to want any portion of it afterwards?
If we can fix upon the parts most likely to be useful,
we either copy or abstract these, or preserve a reference
so as to turn them up when wanted. In the case of
a work, containing a mass of new and valuable
materials, such as we wish to incorporate with our
intellectual structure, we must act the part of the
beginner in a new field, and make an abstract on the
most approved plan: that is, by such changes as shall
at once preserve the author's ideas, and intersperse
them with our own. There is an ideal balance of two
opposing tendencies: one to take down the writer too
literally, which fails to impress the meaning; the other
to accommodate him too much to our own language
and thinking, in which case, we shall remember more,
but it will be remembering ourselves and not him.
He that can hit the just mean between these extremes
is the perfect student.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>There are easier modes of abstracting, such as serve
many useful purposes, although not sufficient for the
mastery of a leading Text-book, or even of a second
or third in a new subject. We may pencil on the
margin, or underscore, all the leading propositions, and
the typical examples. In a well-composed scientific
manual, the proceeding is too obvious to be impressive.
Very often, however, the main points are not
given in the most methodical way, but have to be
searched out by carefully scanning each paragraph.
This is an exercise that both instructs and impresses
us; it is the kind of change that calls our faculties
into play, and gives us a better hold of an author,
without superseding him.</p>
<p>A Table of Contents carefully examined is favourable
to a comprehensive view of the whole; and, this
attained, the details are remembered in the best possible
way, that is, by taking their place in the scheme.
Any other form of recollection is of the desultory
kind.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[LOCKE'S RECOMMENDATIONS.]</p>
<p><a name='VII.II.4'></a>4. Let us next glance at Locke's method of reading,
which is unique and original, like the man himself.
It is given with much iteration in his Conduct of the
Understanding, but comes in substance to this:—</p>
<p>We are to fix in the mind the author's ideas,
stripped of his words; to distinguish between such
ideas as are pertinent to the subject, and such as are
not; to keep the precise question steadily before our
minds; to appreciate the bearing of the arguments;
and, finally, to see what the question bottoms upon,
or what are the fundamental verities or assumptions
underneath.</p>
<p>All this is very thorough in its way; but, in the
first place, it applies chiefly to argumentative works,
and, in the second place, it is entirely beyond the
powers of ordinary students. Such an examination
of an author as Locke contemplates is not seen many
times in a generation. His own controversies give
but indifferent examples of it; several of Bentham's
works and a few of John Mill's polemical articles
also give an idea of thorough handling; but it is not
so properly a studious effort, as the consummated
product of a highly logical discipline, and is within
the reach of only a small elect number.</p>
<p>Locke would have been more intelligible, if, instead
of telling us to strip an author's meaning of the words,
he had impressed strongly the necessity of <i>defining
all leading terms</i>; and of making sure that each was
always used in the same meaning. While, in order
to veracious conclusions, it is necessary that every
matter of fact should be truly given, it is equally
necessary that the language should be free from
ambiguity. If an author uses the word "law," at one
time as an enactment: by some authority, and at
another time, as a sequence in the order of nature, he
is sure to land us in fallacy and confusion, as Butler
did in explaining the Divine government. The remedy
is, not to perform the operation of separating the
meaning entirely from the language, but to vary
the language, so as to substitute terms that have no
ambiguity. "Law" is equivocal; "social enactment,"
and "order of nature," are both unequivocal; and
when one is chosen, and adhered to, the confusion is
at an end.</p>
<p>The mere art of study is no preparation for such a
task. It demands a very advanced condition of
knowledge on the particular subject, as well as a
logical habit of mind, however acquired; and to
include it in a practical essay on the Conduct of the
Understanding is to overstep the limits of the subject.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>As our present head represents the very pith and
marrow of the art of study, we may dwell a little
longer on the process of changing the form of an
author, whether by condensing, expanding, varying the
expression, altering the order, selecting, and rejecting,
—or by any other known device. Worst of all is
change for the mere sake of change; it is simply better
than literal copying. But, to rise above it, needs a
sense of FORM already attained. According as this
sense is developed, the exercise of altering or amending
is more and more profitable. Consequently,
there should be an express application of the mind
to the attainment of form; and particular works
pre-eminent for that quality should be sought out
and read. "Form" is doubtless a wide word, and comprises
both the logical or pervading method of a work,
and the expression or dress throughout. Method by
itself can be soonest acquired because it turns on a
small number of points; language is a multifarious
acquirement, and can hardly be forced, although it
will come eventually by due application.</p>
<p>[EXAMPLE FROM PRACTICE OF MEDICINE.]</p>
<p>To show what is meant by learning Form, with a
view to the more effectual study of subject-matter, I
will take the example of a work on the Practice of
Medicine; in which the idea is to describe Diseases
<i>seriatim</i>, with their treatment or cures. At the
present day, this subject possesses method or form:
there is a systematic classification of diseased processes
and diseases; also, a regular plan of setting
forth the specific marks of each disease, its diagnosis,
and, finally, its remedies. There are more and less
perfect models of the methodical element; while there
are differences among authors in the fulness of the
detailed information. There is, besides, a Logic of
Medicine, representing the absolute form, in a kind of
logical synopsis, by which it is more easily comprehended
in the first instance: not to mention the
general body of the Logic of the Inductive Sciences,
of which medicine is one. Now, undoubtedly, the
best work to begin with—the Text-book-in-chief—would
be one where Form is in its highest perfection;
the amount of matter being of less consequence. In
a subject of great complication, and vast detail, the
student cannot too soon get possession of the best
method or form of arrangement. When a work of
this character is before him, he is to read and re-read
it, till the form becomes strongly apparent; he is to
compare one part with another, to see how the author
adheres to his own pervading method; he should, if
possible, make a synopsis of the plan in itself, disentangling
it from the applications, for greater clearness.
The scheme of a medical work, for example,
comprises the Classification of Diseases, the parting
off of Diseased Processes—-Fever, Inflammation, &c.—from
Diseases properly so called; the modes of defining
Disease; the separation of defining marks, from
predications, and so on: all involved in a strict Logic
of Disease. Armed with these logical or methodical
preliminaries, the student next attacks one of the
extended treatises on the Practice of Medicine. He
is now prepared to work the process of abstracting to
the utmost advantage, both for clearness of understanding,
and for impressing the memory. As in
such a vast subject, no one author is deemed adequate
to a full exposition, and as, moreover, a great portion
of the information occurs, apart from systems, in
detached memoirs or monographs,—the only mode
of unifying and holding together the aggregate, is to
reduce all the statements to a common form and
order, by help of the pre-acquired plan. The progress
of study may amend the plan, as well as add to
the particular information; but absolute perfection in
the scheme is not so essential as strict adherence to
it through all the details. To work without a plan
at all, is not merely to tax the memory beyond its
powers, but probably also to misconceive and jumble
the facts.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>To enhance the illustration of the two main heads
of the Art of Study, I will so far deviate from the idea
of the essay, as to take up a special branch of education,
which, more than any other, has been reduced to
form and rule, I mean the great accomplishment of
Oratory, or the Art of Persuasion. The practical
Science of Rhetoric, cultivated both by ancients and
by moderns, has especially occupied itself with directions
for acquiring this great engine of influencing
mankind.</p>
<p>It was emphatically averred by the ancient teachers
of the Oratorical art, that it must be grounded on a
wide basis of general information. I do not here
discuss the exact scope of this preparatory study, as
my purpose is to narrow the illustration to what is
special to the faculty of persuasion. I must even
omit all those points relating to delivery or elocution,
on which so much depends; and also the consideration
of how to attain readiness or fluency in spoken
address, except in so far as that follows from abundant
oratorical resources. We thus sink the difference between
spoken oratory, and persuasion through the
press.</p>
<p>Even as thus limited, oratory is still too wide for a
pointed illustration: and, so, I propose farther to
confine my references to the department of Political
Oratory; coupling with that, however, the Forensic
branch—which has much in common with the other,
and has given birth to some of our most splendid
examples of the art of persuasion.</p>
<p>While declining to enter on the wide field of the
general education of the orator, I may not improperly
advert to the more immediate preparation for the
political orator, by a familiar acquaintance with History
and Political Philosophy, howsoever obtained.
Then, on the other hand, the course here to be chalked
out assumes a considerable proficiency in language or
expression. The special education will incidentally
improve both these accomplishments, but must not be
relied on for creating them, or for causing a marked
advance in either. The effect to be looked for is
rather to give them direction for the special end.</p>
<p>[EXAMPLE FROM THE ART OF ORATORY.]</p>
<p>These things premised, the line of proceeding
manifestly is to study the choicest examples of the
oratorical art, according to the methods already laid
down, with due adaptation to the peculiarities of the
case.</p>
<p>Now, we have not, as in a Science, two or three systematic
works, one of which is to be chosen as a chief,
to be followed by a reference more or less to the others.
Our material is a long series of detached orations;
from these we must make a selection at starting, and
such selection, which may comprise ten or twenty
or more, will have to be treated with the intense
single-minded devotion that we hitherto limited to a
single work. Repeated perusal, with a process of
abstracting to be described presently, must be bestowed
upon the chosen examples, before embarking,
as will be necessary, upon the wide field of miscellaneous
oratory.</p>
<p>No doubt, an oratorical education could be grounded
in a general and equal study of the orators at large,
taking the ancients either first or last, according to
fancy. Probably the greater number of students
have fallen into this apparently obvious course. Our
present contention is, that it is better to make a
thorough study of a proper selection of the greatest
speeches, together with the most persuasive unspoken
compositions. This, however, is not all. We are
following the wisdom of the ancients, in insisting on
the farther expedient of proceeding to the study
of the great examples by the aid of an oratorical
scheme. At a very early stage of Oratory in Greece,
its methods began to be studied, and, in the education
of the orator, these methods were made to accompany
the study of exemplary speeches.</p>
<p>The principles of Rhetoric at large, and of the
Persuasive art in particular, have been elaborated by
successive stages, and are now in a tolerable state
of advancement. The learner will choose the scheme
that is judged best, and will endeavour to master it
provisionally, before entering on the oratorical models;
holding it open to amendment from time to time, as
his education goes on. The scheme and the examples
mutually act and re-act: the better the scheme, the
more rapidly will the examples fructify; and the
scheme will, in its turn, profit by the mastery of the
details.</p>
<p>[NECESSITY OF AN ORATORICAL ANALYSIS.]</p>
<p>One great use of an oratorical analysis, as supplied
by the teachers of Rhetoric, is to part off the different
merits of a perfect oration; and to show which are
to be extracted from the various exemplary orators.
One man excels in forcible arguments, another in the
lucid array of facts; one is impressive and impassioned,
another is quiet but circumspect. Now, the
benefit of studying on principle, instead of working
at random, is, that we concentrate attention on each
one's strong points, and disregard the rest. But it
needs a preparatory analysis, in order to make the
discrimination. All that the uninstructed reader or
hearer of a great oration knows is, that the oration is
great: this may be enough for the persons to be
moved; it is insufficient for an oratorical disciple.</p>
<p>In the hazardous task of pursuing the illustration
by naming the examples of oratory most suitable to
commence with, I shall pass over living men, and
choose from the past orators of our own country.
Without discussing minutely the respective merits of
individuals, I am safe in selecting, as in every way
suitable for our purpose, Burke, Fox, Erskine, Canning,
Brougham, and Macaulay. Burke's Speeches
on America; Fox on the Westminster Scrutiny;
Erskine on Stockdale, and on Hardy, Tooke, &c.;
Canning on the Slave Trade; Brougham, Lyndhurst,
and Denman in the Queen's Trial; Macaulay on the
Reform Bill,—would comprise, in a moderate compass,
a considerable range of oratorical excellence. I doubt
if any member of the list would be more suitable
for a beginning than Macaulay's Reform Speeches.
These are no mere displays of a brilliant imagination:
they are known to have influenced thousands of minds
otherwise averse to political change. The reader finds
in them an immense repository of historical facts as
well as of doctrines; but facts and doctrines, by themselves,
do not make oratory. It is the use made of
these, that gives us the instruction we are now in
quest of. In a first or second reading, however, matter
and form equally captivate the mind. It would be
impossible, at that early stage, to make an abstract
such as would separate the oratorical from the non-oratorical
merits. Only when, by help of our scheme,
we have made a critical distinction between the two
kinds of excellence, are we able to arrive at an approach
to a pure oratorical lesson; and, for a long time,
we shall fail to make the desired isolation. We
have to learn not to expect too much from any one
speech: to pass over in Macaulay, what is more conspicuously
shown, say in Fox, or in Erskine. If our
political and historical education has made some progress,
the mere thoughts and facts do not detain us;
their employment for the end of persuasion is what we
have to take account of.</p>
<p>[COMPREHENSIVE PRINCIPLE OF ORATORY.]</p>
<p>It is impossible here to indicate, except in a very
general way, the successive steps of the operation.
The one summary consideration in the Rhetoric of
Oratory, from which flows the entire array of details,
is the regard to the dispositions and state of mind of
the audience; the presenting of topics and considerations
that chime in with these dispositions, and the
avoiding of everything that would conflict with them.
To grasp this comprehensive view, and to follow it out
in some of the chief circumstantials of persuasive
address—the leading forms of argument, and the
appeals to the more prominent feelings,—would soon
provide a touchstone to a great oration, and lead us to
distinguish the materials of oratory from the use made
of them.</p>
<p>Take the circumstance of <i>negative tact</i>; by which
is meant the careful avoidance of whatever might
grate on the minds of those addressed. Forensic
oratory in general, and the oratory of Parliamentary
leaders in particular, will show this in perfection; and,
for a first study of it, there is probably nothing to
surpass the Erskine Speeches above cited. It could,
however, be found in Macaulay; although in a different
proportion to the other merits.</p>
<p>The Macaulay Speeches have the abundance of
matter, and the powers of style, that minister to
oratory, although not constituting its distinctive feature.
In these speeches, we may note how he guages
the minds of the men of rank and property, in and
out of Parliament, who constituted the opposition to
Reform; how tenderly he deals with their prejudices
and class interests; how he shapes and adduces his
arguments so as to gain those very feelings to the
side he advocates; how he brings his accumulated
store of historical illustrations to his aid, under the
guidance of both the positive and the negative tact
of the orator; saying everything to gain, and nothing
to alienate the dispositions that he has carefully
measured.</p>
<p>After Erskine and Macaulay have yielded their first
contribution to the oratorical student, he could turn
with profit to Burke, who has the materials of oratory
in the same high order as Macaulay, but who in the
employment of them so often miscarries—sometimes
partially, at other times wholly. It then becomes
an exercise to distinguish his successes from his
failures; to resolve these into their elementary merits
and defects, according to the oratorical scheme. The
close study of one or two orations is still the preferable
course; and the most profitable transition from
the Burke sample is to the selected speech or speeches
of some other orator as Canning or Brougham. All
the time, the pupil must be enlarging and improving
his analytic scheme, which is the means of keeping
his mind to the point in hand, amid the distraction of
the orator's gorgeous material.</p>
<p>The subsequent stages of oratorical study are much
plainer than the commencement. A time comes when
the pupil will roam freely over the great field of
oratory, modern and ancient, knowing more and more
exactly what to appropriate and what to neglect. He
will be quite aware of the necessity of rivalling the
great masters in resources of knowledge on the one
hand, and of style on the other; but he will look for
these elsewhere, as well as in the professed orators.</p>
<p>[EXAMPLES OF PERSUASIVE ART.]</p>
<p>Moreover, as the persuasive art is exemplified in
men that have never been public speakers, the oratorical
pupil will make a selection from the most influential
of this class. He will find, for example, in the
argumentative treatises of Johnson, in the Letters of
Junius, in the writings of Godwin, in Sydney Smith,
in Bentham, in Cobbett, in Robert Hall, in Fonblanque,
in J.S. Mill, in Whately, and a host besides,
the exemplification of oratorical merits, together with
materials that are of value. It is understood, however,
that the search for materials and the acquisition
of oratorical form, are not made to advantage on the
same lines, and, for this and other reasons, should
not go together.</p>
<p>The extreme test of the principle of concentration
as against equal application, is the acquirement of
Style, or the extending of our resources of diction and
expression in all its particulars. Being a matter of
endless minute details, we may feel ourselves at a loss
to compass it by the intensive study of a narrow and
select example. Still, with due allowance for the
speciality of the case, the principle will still be found
applicable. We should, however, carry along with us,
the maxim exemplified under oratory, of separating in
our study, as far as may be, the style from the matter.
We begin by choosing a treatise of some great master.
We may then operate either (1) by simple reading
and re-reading, or (2) by committing portions to
memory <i>verbatim</i>, or (3), best of all, by making some
changes according to an already acquired ideal of
good composition. This too shows the great importance
of attaining as early as possible some regulating
principles of goodness of style: the action and reaction
of these, on the most exemplary authors, constitute
our progress in the art, and, in the quickest
way, store the memory with the resources of good
expression.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[ECONOMICS OF BOOK READING.]</p>
<p><a name='VII.III'></a>III. The head just now finished includes really
by far the greatest portion of the economy of study.
There are various other devices of importance in their
way, but much less liable to error in practice. Of
these, a leading place may be assigned to the best
modes of Distributing the Attention in reading. Such
questions as the following present themselves for consideration
to the earnest student. How many distinct
studies can be carried on together? What interval
should be allowed in passing from one to another?
How much time should be given to the art of reading,
and how much to subsequent meditating or ruminating
on what has been read? These points are
all susceptible of being determined, within moderate
limits of error. As to the first, the remark was
made by Quintilian, that, in youth, we can most
easily pass from one study to another. The reason
of this, however, is, that youth does not take very
seriously to any study. When a special study becomes
engrossing, the alternatives must rather be recreative
than acquisitive; not much progress being made in
what is slighted, or left over to the exhaustion
caused by attention to the favourite topic. A more
precise answer can be made to the second and
third queries, namely, as to an interval for recall and
meditation, after putting down a book, and before
turning the attention into other channels. There is
a very clear principle of economy here. We should
save as far as possible the fatigue of the reading
process, or make a given amount of attention to the
printed page yield the greatest impression on the
memory. This is done by the exercise of recalling
without the book; an advantage that we do not
possess in listening to a lecture, until the whole is
finished, when we have too much to recall. To
hurry from book to book is to gain stimulation at
the cost of acquisition.</p>
<p>I have alluded to the case of an engrossing subject,
which starves all accompanying studies. There are but
two ways of obviating the evil, if it be an evil; which
it indeed becomes, when the alternative demands also
are legitimate. The one is peremptorily to limit the
time given to it daily, so as to rescue some portion of
the strength for other topics. The other is to intermit
it wholly for a certain period, and let other subjects
have their swing. In advancing life, and when our
studious leisure is only what is left from professional
occupation, two different studies can hardly go on
together. The alternative of a single study needs to
be purely recreative.</p>
<p>One other point may be noted under this head. In
the application to a book of importance and difficulty,
there are two ways of going to work: to move on
slowly, and master as we go; or to move on quickly to
the end, and begin again. There is most to be said
for the first method, although distinguished men have
worked upon the other. The freshness of the matter
is taken off by a single reading; the re-reading is so
much flatter in point of interest. Moreover, there is
a great satisfaction in making our footing sure at each
step, as well as in finishing the task when the first
perusal is completed. We cannot well dispense with
re-reading, but it need not extend to the whole; marked
passages should show where the comprehension and
mastery are still lagging.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[DESULTORY READING.]</p>
<p><a name='VII.IV'></a>IV. Another topic is Desultory Reading. This is
the whole of the reading of the unstudious mass; it
is but a part of the reading of the true student. It
may mean, for one thing, jumping from book to book,
perhaps reading no one through, except for pure
amusement. It may also include the reading of
periodicals, where no one subject is treated at any
length. As a general rule, such reading does not
give us new foundations, or constitute the point of
departure of a fresh department of knowledge; yet
the amount of labour and thought bestowed upon
articles in periodicals, may render them efficacious in
adding to a previous stock of materials, or in correcting
imperfect views. The truth is, that to the studious
man, the desultory is not desultory. The only difference
with him is that he has two <i>attitudes</i> that he
may assume—the severe and the easy-going; the one
is most associated with systematic works on leading
subjects; the other with short essays, periodicals,
newspapers, and conversation. In this last attitude,
which is reserved for hours of relaxation, he skips
matters of difficulty, and absorbs scattered and interesting
particulars without expressly aiming at the
solution of problems or the discussion of abstract
principles. There is no reason why an essay in a
periodical, a pamphlet, or a speech in Parliament,
may not take a first place in anyone's education. All
the labour and resource that go to form a work of
magnitude may be concentrated in any one of these.
Still, they are presented in the form that we are accustomed
to associate with our desultory work, and our
times of relaxation; and so, they seldom produce in
the minds of readers the effect that they are capable
of producing. The thorough student will not fail to
extract materials from one and all of them, but even
he will scarcely choose from such sources the text for
the commencement of a new study.</p>
<p>The desultory is not a bad way of increasing our resources
of expression. Although there be a systematic
and a best mode of acquiring language, there is also
an inferior, yet not ineffective mode; namely, reading
copiously whatever authors have at once a good style
and a sustaining interest. Hence, for this purpose,
shifting from book to book, taking up short and light
compositions, may be of considerable value; anything
is better than not reading at all, or than reading compositions
inferior in point of style. The desultory
man will not be without a certain flow of language as
well as a command of ideas; notwithstanding which,
he will never be confounded with the studious man.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p><a name='VII.V'></a>V. A fifth point is the proportion of book-reading
to Observation of the facts at first hand. From want
of opportunity, or from disinclination, many persons
have all their information on certain subjects cast in
the bookish mould, and do not fully conceive the
particular facts as these strike the mind in their own
character. A reader of History, with no experience
of affairs, is likely to have imperfect bookish notions;
just as a man of affairs, not a reader, is subject to
narrowness of another kind. It was remarked by Sir
G. Cornewall Lewis, that the German historians of the
Athenian Democracy write like men that never had
any actual experience of popular assemblies. A
lawyer must be equally versed in principles and in
cases as heard in court: this is a type of knowledge
generally. In the Natural History Sciences, observation
and reading go hand in hand from the first. In
the science of the Human Mind, there are general
doctrines, contrived to embrace the world of mental
phenomena: the student may have to begin with these,
and work upon them exclusively for a time, but in the
end, phenomena must be independently viewed by him
in their naked character, as exhibited directly in his
own mind, and inferentially in the minds of those that
fall under his observation. Book knowledge of Disease
has to be coupled with bed-side knowledge;
neither will take the place of the other.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p><a name='VII.VI'></a>VI. I began by limiting the meaning of study to
the reading of books, and have reviewed the various
points in the economy of this process. The other
means of attaining, enlarging, deepening our knowledge,
namely, Observation of facts, Conversation,
Disputation, Composition, have each an art of its own
—especially Disputation, which has long been reduced
to rule. Observation also admits of specific directions,
but, in stating the necessity of combining observation
with book theories and descriptions, I have assumed
the knowledge of how to observe.</p>
<p>[AIDS OF CONVERSATION AND COMPOSITION.]</p>
<p>Of all the adjuncts of study, none is so familiar, so
available, and, on the whole, so helpful, as Conversation.
The authors of Guides to Students, as Isaac
Watts, give elaborate rules for carrying on conversation,
a good many of them being more moral than
intellectual; but an art of conversation would be very
difficult to formulate; it would take quite as long an
essay as I have devoted to study, and even then would
not follow half of the windings of the subject. The
only notice of it that my plan requires, is such as I
have already bestowed upon Observation: namely, to
point out the advantage of combining a certain amount
of reading with, conversation; a thing that almost
everybody does according to their opportunities. To
rehearse what we have read to some willing and sympathizing
listener, is the best way of impressing the
memory and of clearing up difficulties to the understanding.
It brings in the social stimulus, which ranks
so high among human motives. It is a wholesome
change of attitude; relieving the fatigue of book-study,
while adding to its fruitfulness. Even beginners in
study are mutually helpful, by exchanging the results
of their several book acquirements; while it is possible
to raise conversation to the rank of a high art,
both for intellectual improvement and for mutual
delectation. I cannot say that the ideal is often realized;
since two or more must combine to conversation,
and it is not often that the mutual action and
re-action is perfectly adjusted for the highest effect.</p>
<p>The last great adjunct of study is original Composition,
which also would need to be formulated
distinct from the theory of book-study. Viewed in
the same way as we have viewed the other collateral
exercises, one can pronounce it too an invaluable
adjunct to book-reading, as well as an end in itself;
it is a variation of effort that diverts the mental
strain, and re-acts powerfully upon the extraction
of nutriment from books. Besides the pride of
achievement, it evokes the social stimulus with the
highest effect; our compositions being usually intended
for some listeners. But, when to begin the
work of original composition, as distinct from the
written exercises upon books, in the way of abstracting,
amending, and the rest; what forms it should
assume at the outset, and by what steps it should
gradually ascend to the culminating effects of the
art,—would all admit of expansion and discussion
as an altogether separate theme. Enough to remark
here, that a course of book-reading without attempts
at original composition is as faulty an extreme, as to
begin and carry on writing upon a stinted basis of
reading. The thorough student, as concerned in my
present essay, carrying on book-study in the manner
I have sketched, will almost infallibly end, at the
proper time, in a self-thinker, and a self-originator.
An adequate familiarity with the great writers of the
past both checks presumptuous or hasty efforts of reproduction,
and encourages modest attempts of our
own as we feel ourselves becoming gradually invigorated
through the combined influence of all the various
modes of well-directed study.</p>
<p>FOOTNOTES:</p>
<a name="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16">[16]</a><div class="note"><p> Milton had charge of pupils in 1644, when Locke was twelve.</p></div>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<a name='EVIII'></a><h2>VIII.</h2>
<h2>RELIGIOUS TESTS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS.</h2>
<br />
<p>Every man has an interest in arriving at truth for
himself. However useful it may be to mislead other
people, however sweet to look down from a height on
the erring throng beneath, it is neither useful nor
sweet to be ourselves at sea without a compass. We
may not care to walk by the light we have, but we
do not choose to exchange it for darkness.</p>
<p>This reflection is most obvious with reference to the
order of Nature. Our life depends on adapting means
to ends; which supposes that we know cause and
effect in the world around us. A long story is cut
short by the adage, "Knowledge is power"; otherwise
rendered, "Truth is bliss".</p>
<p>The bearing of truth is free from all doubt when
the problem is, how to gain certain ends—how to be
fed, how to get from one place to another, how to
cure disease. A new case is presented by the choice
of ends. The tyrannical French minister, when appealed
to by a starving peasantry in the terms, "We
must live," replied, "I do not see the necessity".
There was here no question of true and false, no
problem for science to solve. It was a question of
ends, and could not be reargued. The only possible
retort was to ask, "What does your Excellency consider
a necessity?" If the reply were, "That I and my
King may rule France and be happy," then might the
starving wretches find some aid from a political
scientist who could show that, in the order of nature,
ruler and people must stand or fall together. So, it
is no question of true or false in the order of nature,
whether I shall adopt, as the end of life, my own
gratification purely, the good of others purely, or part
of both. In like manner the Benthamite, who propounds
happiness as the general end of human society,
cannot prove this, as Newton could prove that gravity
follows the inverse square of the distance; nor can
his position be impugned in the way that Newton
impugned the vortices of Descartes, by showing
that they were at variance with fact.</p>
<p>There is a third case. Assertions are made out of
the sphere of the sensible world, and beyond the
reach of verification by the methods of science.
There is a region of the supersensible or supernatural,
where cause and effect may be affirmed and human
interests involved, but where we cannot supply the
same evidence or the same confutation as in sublunary
knowledge. That all human beings shall have an
existence after death is matter of truth or falsehood,
but the evidence is of a kind that would not be
adduced for proving that a caterpillar becomes a
butterfly or that a seed turns to a plant. The reasoning
employed, no doubt, makes references to facts of
the order of nature; but it is circuitous and analogical,
and is admitted merely because better cannot be
had.</p>
<p>[THREE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF ASSERTIONS.]</p>
<p>The peculiarity of this last class of affirmations is
that they give great room for the indulgence of our
likings. So little being fixed with any precision, we
can shape our beliefs to please ourselves. Even as
regards the sensible world, we can sometimes accommodate
our views to what we wish, as when we
assume that our favourite foods and stimulants are
wholesome; but such license soon meets with checks
in the physical sphere, while there are no such checks
in the realms of the superphysical.</p>
<p>Now, in all these three departments of opinion, the
interest of mankind lies in obtaining the best views
that can possibly be obtained. As regards the first
and third—- the region of true and false, one in the
sensible, the other in the supersensible world—we are
clearly interested in getting the truth. As regards
the second—the region of ends—if there be one class
of ends preferable to another, we should find out that
class.</p>
<p>The only doubt that can arise anywhere is, whether
in the third case—the case of the supernatural,—truth
is of the same consequence to us. Such a doubt,
however, begs the whole question at issue. If the
truth be of no consequence here, it is because we shall
never be landed in any reality corresponding to what
is declared: that the nature of the future life is purely
imaginary and not to be converted into fact; in
other words, that there is no future life; that there is
merely a land of dreams and fiction, which can never
be proved true and never proved false. It would then
be a projection of thought from the present life, and
would cease with that life. All that people could claim
in the matter would be the liberty of imagination;
and this being so, we are not to be committed to any
one form. In short, we are to picture what we please
in a world that cannot be made out to exist. The
point is not, to be true or false; it is, to be well or ill
imagined.</p>
<p>What, then, is to be the criterion of proper or
improper imagination? On what grounds are we to
make our preference between the different schemes of
the supersensible world? Is each one of us to be
free to imagine for ourselves, or are we to submit to
the dictation of others? These questions lead up to
another. How far are the interests of the present life
concerned in the form given to our conceptions of a
future life?</p>
<p>It would seem to be an unanswerable assumption
that, in all the three situations above supposed, we
should do the very best that the case admits of. In
the order of nature we should get, as far as possible,
the truth and the whole truth; in the choice of ends
for this life we should embrace the best ends; in the
shaping of another life we should be free to follow out
whatever may be the course suitable to the operation.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[EARLY SOURCES OF INTOLERANCE.]</p>
<p>The means for arriving at truth in the order of
nature is an active search according to certain well-known
methods. It farther involves the negative condition
of perfect freedom to canvass, to controvert, or to
refute, every received doctrine or opinion. There is no
use in going after new facts, or in rising to new generalities,
if we are not to be allowed to displace errors.
This is now conceded, except at the points of contact
of the natural and the supernatural. In spite of the
wide separation of the two worlds—the world of fact
and the world of imagination,—we cannot conceive the
second except in terms of the first; and if the shaping
of the supernatural acquires fixity and consecration,
the natural facts made use of in the fabric acquire a
corresponding fixity, even although the rendering is
found to be inaccurate. The prevailing conception
of a future life needs a view of the separate and
independent subsistence of the mental powers of man,
very difficult to reconcile with present knowledge.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>The growth of intolerance is quite explicable, but
the explanation is not necessarily a justification.
Although every division of the human family must
have passed through many social phases, and must
therefore have experienced revolutionary shocks, yet
the rule of man's existence has been a rigorous fixity
of institutions, with a hatred of change. Innovations,
when not the effect of conquest, would be made under
the pressure of some great crisis, or some tremendous
difficulty that could not otherwise be met. The idea
of individuals being allowed, in quiet times, to propose
alterations in government, in religion, in morals, or
even in the common arts of life, was thought of only
to be stamped out. There was a step in advance of
the ancient and habitual order of things, when an
innovating citizen was permitted to make his proposal
to the assembled tribe, with a rope about his neck, to
be drawn tight if he failed to convince his audience.
This might make men think twice before advancing
new views, but it was not an entire suppression of them.</p>
<p>The first introduction of the great religions of the
world would in each case afford an interesting study
of the difficulties of change and of the modes of surmounting
these difficulties. There must always have
concurred at least two things,—general uneasiness or
discontent from some cause or other; and the moral
or intellectual ascendency of some one man, whose
views, although original, were yet of a kind to be
finally accepted by the people. These conditions are
equally shown in political changes, and are historically
illustrated in many notable instances. It is
enough to cite the Greek legislation of Lycurgus and
of Solon.</p>
<p>Such changes are the exceptions in human affairs;
they occur only at great intervals. In the ordinary
course of societies, the governing powers not merely
adhere to what is established, but forbid under severe
penalties the very suggestion of change. The chronic
misery of the race is compatible with unreasoning
acquiescence in a state of things once established;
incipient reformers are at once immolated <i>pour encourager
les autres</i>. It is the aim of governments to
make themselves superfluously strong; they take precautions
against unfavourable ideas no less than
against open revolt. In this, they are seconded by
the general community, which would make things too
hot even for a reforming king.</p>
<p>[SEPARATION OF RELIGION FROM POLITICS.]</p>
<p>It is said by the evolution or historical school of
politicians, that this was all as it should be. The
free permission to question the existing institutions,
political and religious, would have been incompatible
with stability. In early society more especially, religion
and morality were a part of civil government; a
dissenter in religion was the same thing as a rebel in
politics; the distinction between the civil and the
religious could not yet be drawn.</p>
<p>Without saying whether this was the case or not—for
I should not like to commit myself to the position,
"Whatever was, was right" at the time—I trust
we are now far on the way to being agreed that the
civil and the religious are no longer to be identified;
that the State, as a state, is not concerned to uphold
any one form of religious belief. Modern civilized
communities are believed capable of existing without
an official religion; the citizens being free to form
themselves into self-governed religious bodies, as
various as the prevailing modes of religious belief. It
may be long ere this goal be fully reached; but even
the upholders of the present state religions admit that,
supposing these were not in existence, nobody would
now propose to institute them.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>The foregoing remarks may appear somewhat desultory,
as well as too brief for the extent of the
theme. They must be accepted, however, as an
introduction to a more limited topic, which presupposes
in some measure the general principle of
toleration by the state of all forms of religious opinion.
Whether with or without established religions, perfect
freedom of dissent is now demanded, and, with some
hankering reservations, pretty generally conceded.
Individuals are allowed to congregate into religious
societies, on the most various and opposite creeds.</p>
<p>So far good. Yet there remains a difficulty. Long
before the age of toleration, when each state had an
established religion, the people in general formed their
habits of religious observance in connection with the
State Church—its doctrines, its ritual, its buildings,
and its sacred places. When disruption took place,
the separatists formed themselves into societies on
the original model, merely dropping the matters of
disagreement. Fixity of creed and of ritual was still
enacted; the only remedy for dissatisfaction on either
subject was to swarm afresh, and set up a new variety
of doctrine or of ritual, to which a rigid adherence was
still expected as a condition of membership.</p>
<p>By this costly and troublesome process, Churches
have been multiplied according to the changes of
view among sections of the community. A certain
energy of conviction has always been necessary to
such a result. Equally great changes of opinion occur
among members of the older Church communities,
without inducing them to break with these; so that
nominal membership ceases to be a mark of real
adhesion to the articles of belief.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[EVILS OF PENAL RESTRAINT ON DISCUSSION.]</p>
<p>These few commonplaces are meant to introduce
the enquiry—now a pressing one—whether, and how
far, fixed creeds are desirable or expedient in religious
bodies generally; no difference being made between
state Churches and voluntary Churches. This is the
question of Subscription to Articles by the clergy.</p>
<p>Let us now review the evils attendant on subscription,
and next consider the objections to its removal.</p>
<p>In the first place, the process of restraining discussion
by penal tests is inherently untenable, absurd,
and fallacious.</p>
<p>In support of this strong assertion, we have only
to repeat, that every man has an interest in getting at
the truth, and consequently in whatever promotes
that end. We live by the truth; error is death. To
stand between a man and the attainment of truth, is
to inflict an injury of incalculable amount. The
circumstances wherein the prohibition of truth is
desirable, must be extraordinary and altogether exceptional.
The few may have a self-interest in
withholding truth from the many; neither the few
nor the many have an interest in its being withheld
from themselves. Each one of us has the most direct
concern in knowing on what plan this universe is
constituted, what are its exact arrangements and
laws. Whether for the present life, or for any other
life, we must steer our course by our knowledge, and
that knowledge needs to be true. Obstruction to the
truth recoils upon the obstructors. To flee to the
refuge of lies is not the greatest happiness of anybody.</p>
<p>It has been maintained that there are illusions so
beneficial as to be preferable to truth. Occasionally,
in private life, we practise little deceptions upon individuals
when the truth would cause some great temporary
mischief. This case need not be discussed.
The important instance is in reference to religious
belief. A benevolent Deity and a future life are so
cheering and consoling, it is said, that they should be
secured against challenge or criticism; they ought
not to be weakened by discussion. This, of course,
assumes that these doctrines are unable to maintain
themselves against opponents, that, with all their
intrinsic charm (which nobody can be indifferent to),
they would give way under a free handling. Such a
confession is fatal. Men will go on cherishing pleasing
illusions, but not such as need to be <i>protected</i> in
order to exist. According to Plato, the belief in the
goodness of the Deity was of so great importance
that it was to be maintained by state penalties—about
the worst way of making the belief efficacious
for its end. What should we think of an Act passed
to imprison whoever disputed the goodness of King
Alfred, the Man of Ross, or Howard?</p>
<p>Granting that certain illusions are highly beneficial,
it does not follow that they are to be exempted from
criticism. Their effect depends on the prestige of
their truth. That is, they must have reasons on their
side. But a doctrine is not supported by reasons,
unless the objections are stated and answered; not
sham objections, but the real difficulties of an enquiring
mind. If the statement of such difficulties is
forcibly suppressed, the rational foundations will
sooner or later be sapped.</p>
<p>[FREEDOM ESSENTIAL TO THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH.]</p>
<p>If illusions are themselves good, freedom of thought
will give us the best. Why should we protect inferior
illusions against the discovery of the superior? The
unfettered march of the intellect may improve the
quality of our illusions as illusions, while also
strengthening their foundations. If religion be a
good thing, the best religion is the best thing; and
we cannot be sure of having the best, if men are
forbidden to make a search.</p>
<p>Supposing, then, truth is desirable, the means to the
end are desirable. Now one of the means is perfect
liberty to call in question every opinion whatsoever.
This is not all that is necessary; it is not even the
principal condition of the discovery of new truth. It
is, however, an indispensable adjunct, a negative condition.
While laborious search for facts, care in
comparing them, genius in detecting deep identities,
are the highways to knowledge,—the permission to
promulgate new doctrines and to counter-argue the
old is equally essential. Men cannot be expected
to go through the toil of making discoveries at the
hazard of persecution. If a few have done so, it is
their glory and everybody else's shame.</p>
<p>That the torch of truth should be shaken till it
shine, is generally admitted. Still, exceptions are
made; otherwise the present argument would be
superfluous. On certain subjects there is a demand
for protection against innovating views. The implication
is that, in these subjects, truth is better arrived
at by delegating the search to a few, and treating
their judgment as final. I need not ask where we
should have been, if this mode of arriving at truth
had been followed universally. The monopoly of
enquiry claimed for the higher subjects, if set up in
the lower, would be treated as the empire of darkness.</p>
<p>Second. The subscription to articles, and the enforcement
of a creed by penalties, are nugatory for
their own purpose; they fail to secure uniformity of
belief.</p>
<p>This is shown in various ways. For instance, to
inculcate adhesion to a set of articles, is merely to
ensure that none shall use words that formally deny
one or other of the doctrines prescribed. It does not
say, that the subscriber shall teach the whole round
of doctrines, in their due order and proportion. A
preacher may at pleasure omit from his pulpit discourses
any single doctrine; so that, in so far as his
ministrations are concerned, to the hearers such
doctrine is non-existent; without being denied, it is
ignored. Against omission, a prosecution for heresy
would not hold. In this way, the clergy have always
had a certain amount of liberty, and have freely used
it. In so doing, they have altered the whole character
of the prescribed creed, without being technically
heterodox. Everyone of us has listened to preachers
of this description. Some ignore the Trinity, some
the Atonement; many nowadays, without denying
future punishment, never mention hell to ears polite.
If the rigorous exclusion of a leading doctrine should
excite misgivings, a very slight, formal, and passing
admission may be made, while the stress of exhortation
is thrown upon quite different points.</p>
<p>[SUBSCRIPTION FAILS TO ATTAIN ITS END.]</p>
<p>To attain a conviction for heresy, involving deprivation
of office, the forms of justice must be respected.
It is only under peculiar circumstances, that the
ecclesiastical authority can be content with saying, "I
do not like thee, Dr. Fell, or Dr. Smith, and I depose
thee accordingly". A regular trial, with proof of
specific contradiction of specific articles, allowing the
accused the full benefit of his explanations, must be
the rule in every corporation that respects justice.
In the Church of England, a man cannot be deprived
unless he contradict the articles clearly and consistently;
the smallest incoherence on his part, the
slightest vacillation in the rigour of his denial, is
enough to save him. We may easily imagine, therefore,
how widely a clergyman may stray from the
fair, ordinary, current rendering of the doctrines of
the Church, without danger. The whole essence of
Christianity may be perverted under a few cunning
precautions and by observing a few verbal formalities.</p>
<p>It has been pointed out, many times over, that the
legally imposed creeds were the creatures of accident
and circumstances at the time of their enactment,
and are wholly unsuitable to the conservation of the
more permanent and essential articles of the Christian
faith. The amount of heresy, as against the more
truly representative doctrines, that may pass through
their meshes is very great.</p>
<p>This weakness is aggravated by another—the want
of any provision for amending the creed from time to
time. If it were desirable to adopt measures for
maintaining uniformity of opinions among the clergy,
the creed should be excised, or added to, according to
the needs of every age. That this is not done, shows
that the machinery of tests is altogether abnormal; it
is not within the type of regular legislation. That
any given creed should be regarded as out of keeping,
as both redundant and defective, and yet that the
ecclesiastical authority should shrink from applying a
remedy to its most obvious defects, proves that the
system itself is bad. All healthy legislation lends
itself to perpetual improvement; that the enactments
of articles of belief cannot be reconsidered, is a sign
of rottenness.</p>
<p>A third objection to tests is, that mere dogmatic
uniformity, if it were more complete than any tests can
make it, is at best but a part of the religious character.
It does nothing to secure or promote fervour, feeling,
the emotional element in religion. It is by moral heat,
far more than by its mould of doctrine, that religion
influences mankind. There is no means of censuring
preachers for coldness or languid indifference; or
rather, there is another and more legitimate means
than penal prosecutions, namely, expressed dissatisfaction
and the preference of those that excel in the
quality. A warm, glowing manner, an unctuous
delivery, commands hearers and conducts to popularity
and importance. The men of cold and unfeeling
natures may get into office, but they are lightly
esteemed. They are not had up to a public trial and
deposed, but they are treated, and spoken of, in such
a way as to discourage men of their type from becoming
preachers, and to encourage the other sort.
There are many qualifications that go to forming a
good preacher; the holding of the creed of the body
is only one. Yet, with the exception of gross immorality
or abandonment of duty, correctness of creed
is the only one that is subjected to the extreme
penalty of loss of office; the others are secured by
different means. Is it too much to infer that, without
the extreme penalty, a reasonable conformity to the
prevailing creed might also be secured?</p>
<p>[ELEMENT OF FEELING NOT SECURED.]</p>
<p>The importance of the element of feeling has been
most perceived in times when the religious current
was strongest. At these times, its expression would
not be hemmed in by rigorous formulas. The first
communication of religious doctrines has always
partaken of a broad and free rendering; apparent
discrepancies were disregarded. To reduce all the
utterances of the prophets and the apostles to definite
forms and rigid dogmas, was to misconceive the
situation. We may well suppose that the New
Testament writers would have refused to subscribe
the Athanasian Creed or the Westminster Confession;
not because these were in flat contradiction to Scripture,
but because the way of embodying the religious
verities in these documents would be repugnant to
their ideas of form in such matters. The creed-builders
may have been never so anxious to give
exact equivalents of the original authorities; yet
their fine distinctions and subtle logic would have, in
all probability, been ranked by Paul and Peter among
the latter-day perversions of the faith. The very composition
of a creed would have been as distasteful to the
first century, as it is incongruous to the nineteenth.</p>
<p>The evil operation of religious tests, and of the
accompanying intolerance of the public mind as shown
towards any form of dissent from the stereotyped
orthodoxy, admits of a very wide handling. It is of
course the problem of religious liberty. Some parts
of the argument need to be reproduced here, to help
us in replying to the objections against an unconditional
abolition of compulsory creeds.</p>
<p>In conversing, many years ago, with the late Jules
Mohl, the great Oriental scholar, professor of Persian
in the College de France, I was much struck with his
account of the nature of his duties as an expounder
of the modern Persian authors. These authors, for
example the poet Sadi, were in creed adherents of the
ancient Persian fire-worship, notwithstanding the Mohammedan
conquest of their country. They were, of
course, forbidden to avow that creed directly; and in
consequence, they had recourse to a form of composition
by <i>doubles entendres</i>, veiling the ancient creed
under Mohammedan forms. Mohl's business, as their
expounder, was to strip off the disguise and show the
true bearings of the writers, under their show of conformity
to the established opinions.</p>
<p>This is a typical illustration of what has happened
in Europe for more than two thousand years. The
first recorded martyr to free speculation in philosophy
was Anaxagoras in Greece. Muleted in the sum of
five talents, and expelled from Athens, he was considered
fortunate in being allowed to retire to Lampsacus
and end his days there. His fate, however, was
soon eclipsed by the execution of Socrates,—an event
whereby the Athenian burghers were enabled to bias
the expression of free opinions from that time to this.
The first person to feel the shock was Plato. That he
was affected by it, to the extent of suppressing his
views on the higher questions, we can infer with the
greatest probability.</p>
<p>[CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXECUTION OF SOCRATES.]</p>
<p>Aristotle was equally cowed. A little before his
death, the chief priest of Eleusis, following the Socratic
precedent, entered an indictment against him for
impiety. This indictment was supported by citations
of certain heretical doctrines from his published
writings; on which Grote makes the significant remark,
that his paean in honour of his friend Hermeias would
be more offensive to the feelings of an ordinary
Athenian citizen than any philosophical dogma extracted
from the <i>cautious prose compositions</i> of Aristotle.
That is to say, the execution of Socrates was
always before his eyes; he had to pare his expressions
so as not to give offence to Athenian orthodoxy.
We can never know the full bearings of such a disturbing
force. The editors of Aristotle complain of
the corruptness of his text; a far worse corruptness
lies behind. In Greece, Socrates alone had the
courage of his opinions. While his views as to a
future life, for example, are plain and frank, the real
opinion of Aristotle on the question is an insoluble
problem. Now, considering the enormous sway of
Aristotle in modern Europe,—how desirable was it
that his real sentiments had reached us unperverted
by the Athenian burgher and the hemlock!</p>
<p>It would be too adventurous to continue the illustration
in detail through the Christian ages. It is
well known that the later schoolmen strove to represent
reason as against authority, but wrote under
the curb of the Papal power; hence their aims can
only be divined. A modern instance or two will be
still more effective.</p>
<p>It can at last be clearly seen what was the motive
of Carlyle's perplexing style of composition. We
now know what his opinions were, when he began
to write, and that to express them then would
have been fatal to his success; yet he was not a
man to indulge in rank hypocrisy. He, accordingly,
adopted a studied and ambiguous phraseology,
which for long imposed upon the religious public,
who put their own interpretation upon his mystical
utterances, and gave him the benefit of any doubts.
In the "Life of Sterling" he threw off the mask, but
still was not taken at his word. Had there been a
perfect tolerance of all opinions he would have begun
as he ended; and his strain of composition, while still
mystical and high-flown, would never have been
identified with our national orthodoxy.</p>
<p>I have grave doubts as to whether we possess
Macaulay's real opinions on religion. His way of
dealing with the subject is so like the hedging of an
unbeliever that, without some good assurance to the
contrary, I must include him also among the imitators
of Aristotle's "caution". Some future critic will
devote himself, like Professor Mohl, to expounding
his ambiguous utterances.</p>
<p>[EVIL OF DISFRANCHISING THE CLERGY.]</p>
<p>When Sir Charles Lyell brought out his "Antiquity
of Man" he too was cautious. Knowing the dangers
of his footing, he abstained from giving an estimate
of the extension of time required by his evidences of
human remains. Society in London, however, would
not put up with that reticence, and he had to disclose
at dinner parties what he had withheld from the public
—namely, that, in his opinion, the duration of man
could not be less than fifty thousand years.</p>
<p>These few instances must suffice to represent a long
history of compelled reticence on the part of the men
best qualified to instruct mankind. The question now
is—What has been gained by it? What did the
condemnation of Socrates do for the Athenian public?
What did the chief priest of Eleusis hope to
attain by indicting Aristotle? Unless we can show,
as is no doubt attempted, that the set of opinions that
happen to be consecrated at any one time, whether
right or wrong, were essential to the existence of
society,—then the attempt to improve upon them was
truly meritorious, instead of being censurable. If the
good of society as a whole is not plainly implicated,
there remains only the interest of the place-holders
under the existing system, as opposed to the interest
of the mass of the people, who are, one and all, concerned
in knowing the truth.</p>
<p>Again contracting the discussion to the narrow
limits of the title of the essay, I must urge the special
injury done to mankind by disfranchising the whole
clerical class; that is to say, by depriving their authority
of its proper weight in matters of faith. It is
an incontrovertible rule of evidence, that the authority
of an interested party is devoid of worth. Reasons
are good in themselves, whoever utters them; but in
trusting to authority, apart from reason, we need a
disinterested authority. This the clergy at present
are not, except on the points left undecided by the
articles. If a man has five thousand a year, conditional
on his holding certain views, his holding those
views says nothing in their favour. For a much less
bribe, plenty of men can be 'got to maintain any
opinions whatsoever. When to this is added that, for
certain other views, the holders are subjected to loss
—it may be to fine, imprisonment, or death,—the
value of men's adhesion to the favoured creed, as mere
authority, is simply <i>nil</i>.</p>
<p>Truth, honesty, outspokenness, are not so well established
as virtues, that we can afford to subject
them to discouragement. The contrary course would
be more for the general good in every way. When
the law is intolerant in principle, men will be hypocrites
from policy. You cannot train children to speak
the truth if, from whatever cause, they have an interest
in deception. A repressive discipline induces a
coarse outward submission, but cannot reach the inward
parts: it only engenders hatred, and substitutes
for open revolt an insidious secret retaliation. Those
only that come under the generous nurture of freedom
can be counted on for hearty and willing devotion.
If we would reap the higher virtues, we must sow on
the soil of liberty. Encourage a man to say whatever
he thinks, and you make the most of him; for difficult
questions, where the mind needs all its powers,
there should be no burdensome 'caution' in giving
out the results.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[RELAXATION NOW PRESSING.]</p>
<p>The imposing of subscription has its defenders, and
these have to be fairly met. First, however, let us
advert to the reasons why relaxation is more pressing
now than formerly.</p>
<p>It is known that, among dissentients from the leading
dogmas of the prevailing creed of Christendom,
are to be included some of the most authoritative
names of the last three centuries; our present formulas
would not have been subscribed by Bacon,
Newton, Locke, Kant; unless from mere pliancy and
for the sake of quiet, like Hobbes. If they had
been in clerical orders, and had freely avowed their
opinions as we know them, they would have been liable
to deposition. Yet the difficulties that these men
might feel were far less than those that now beset the
profession of our prevailing creeds. The advances of
knowledge on all the subjects that come into contact
with the various articles, as received by the orthodox
Churches, may not, indeed, compel the relinquishment
of those articles, but will force the holders to change
front, to re-shape them in different forms. To such
necessary modification, the creeds are a fatal obstacle.
On a few points, such as the Creation in six days, these
have been found elastic. The doctrine that death
came by the fall has been explained away as spiritual
death. This process cannot go much further, without
too much paltering with obvious meanings. The
recently-proclaimed doctrine of the Antiquity of Man
comes into apparent conflict with man's creation and
fall, as set forth in Genesis, on which are suspended
the most vital doctrines of our creed. A reconciliation
may be possible, but not without a very extensive
modification of the scheme of the Atonement.
It is not necessary to press Darwin's doctrine of Evolution;
the deficiency of positive proof for that hypothesis
may always be pleaded, as against the havoc
it would make with the more distinctive points of
Christian doctrine. But the existence of man on the
earth, at the very lowest statement, must be carried
back twenty thousand years; this is not hypothesis, but
fact. The record of the creation and the fall of man
will probably have to be subjected to a process of
allegorising, but with inevitable loss. Now, whoever
refuses a matter of fact counts on being severely
handled; it is a different thing to refuse an allegory.</p>
<p>The modern doctrine named the "struggle for existence"
is the old difficulty, known as "the origin of
evil," presented in a new shape. It is rendered more
formidable, as a stumbling-block to the benevolence of
the Author of nature, by making what was considered
exceptional the rule. It gathers up into one comprehensive
statement the scattered occasions of misery,
and reveals a system whereby the few thrive at the
expense of the many. The apologist for Divine goodness
has thus an aggravation of his load, and needs
to be freed from all unnecessary trammels in the
shaping of his creed.</p>
<p>[OPPOSING DOGMAS TO THE RECONCILED.]</p>
<p>It has not escaped attention, that the honours paid
to the illustrious Darwin, are an admission that our
received Christianity is open to revision. In consequence
of a few conciliatory phrases, Darwin has been
credited with theism; nevertheless he has ridden
rough-shod over all that is characteristic in our established
creeds. Can the creeds come scathless out of
the ordeal?</p>
<p>It is passing from the greater to the less, to dwell
upon the increasing difficulties connected with the
Inspiration of the Bible. The Church-of-Englander
luckily escapes making shipwreck here; the legal
interpretation of the formularies saves him. Yet
to mankind, generally, it seems necessary that a
superior weight should attach to a revealed book;
and the other Churches cling to some form of
inspiration, notwithstanding the growing difficulties
attending it. Here too there must be more freedom
given to the men that would extricate the situation.
At all events, the doctrine should be made an open
question. Even Cardinal Newman suggests doubts
as to its being an imperative portion of the creed.</p>
<p>The attacks made on all sides against the Miraculous
element in religion will force on a change of
front. When an eminent popular writer and sincere
friend of the Church of England surrenders miracles
without the slightest compunction, it needs not the
elaborate argumentation of "Supernatural Religion"
to show that some new treatment of the question is
called for. But may it not be impossible to put the
new wine into the sworn bottles?</p>
<p>Like most great innovations, the proposal to liberate
the clergy from all restraint as to the opinions
that they may promulgate, necessarily encounters
opposition. We are, therefore, bound to consider
the reasons on the other side.</p>
<p>These reasons may be quoted in mass. As regards
Established Churches in particular, it is said there is
a State compact or understanding with the clergy
that they should teach certain doctrines and no other;
that if tests were abolished, there would be no security
against the most extreme opinions; men eating the
bread of a Reformed Church might inculcate Romanism
instead of Protestantism; the pulpits might
give forth Deism or Agnosticism. No sect could
hope to maintain its principles, if the clergy might
preach any doctrine that pleased themselves. More
especially would it be monstrous and unjust, to allow
the rich benefices of our highly endowed Church of
England to be enjoyed by men whose hearts are in
some quite different form of religion, or no religion,
and who would occupy themselves in drawing men
away from the faith.</p>
<p>On certain assumptions, these arguments have great
force. Clearly a man ought not to take pay for
doing one thing and do something quite different.
When a body of religionists come together upon
certain tenets, it would be a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>
for any of its ministers to be occupied in denying and
controverting these tenets.</p>
<p>All this supposes, however, that men will not be
made to conform by any means short of prosecution and
deprivation; that the suspending of a severe penalty
over men's heads is in itself a harmless device; and
that religious systems are now stereotyped to our
satisfaction, so that to deviate from them is mere
wantonness and love of singularity. Such are the
assumptions that we feel called upon to challenge.</p>
<p>The plea that the Church has engaged itself to
the State to teach certain tenets, in return for its
emoluments and privileges, has lost its point in our
time. 'L'état, c'est moi.' The Church and the State
are composed of the same persons. Gibbon's famous
<i>mot</i> has collapsed. 'The religions of the Roman
world,' he says, 'were all considered by the people as
equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and
by the magistrate as equally useful' The people are
now their own magistrates, and the true and the useful
must contrive to unite upon the same thing. If the
Church feels subscription and fixity of creed a burden,
it has only to turn its members to account in their
capacity of citizens of the State to relieve itself. If
it silently ignores the creed, it is still responsible
mainly to itself.</p>
<p>[POSSIBLE ABUSES OF CLERICAL FREEDOM.]</p>
<p>The more serious objection is the possible abuse of
the freedom of the clergy to utter opinions at variance
with the prevailing creed. This position needs a careful
scrutiny.</p>
<p>In the first place, the argument: supposes a condition
of things that has now ceased. When creeds
were accepted in their literality by the bodies professing
them, when the state of general opinion contained
nothing hostile, and suggested no difficulties,—for any
one member of a body to turn traitor may have well
seemed mere perversity, temper, love of singularity,
or anything but a wish to get at truth. The offence
assumed the character of a moral obliquity, and discipline
can never be relaxed for immorality proper.</p>
<p>All the circumstances are now changed. The ministers
and members of religious communities no longer
cherish the same set of doctrines with only immaterial
varieties; they no longer accept their articles
in the sense of the original framers. The body at
large has contracted the immoral taint; the whole
head is sick; any remaining soundness is not with
the acquiescent mass, but with the out-spoken individuals.
In such a state of things, ordinary rules are
inapplicable. There is a sort of paralysis of authority,
an uncertainty whether to punish or to wink at flagrant
heresy. To say in such a case that the relaxation
of the creed is not a thing to be proposed, is to
confess, like Livy on the condition of Rome, that we
can endure neither our vices nor their remedies.</p>
<p>Too much has at all times been made of individual
divergences from the established creed. The influence
of a solitary preacher smitten with the love of
heretical peculiarity has been grossly overrated. The
assumption is, that his own flock will, as a matter of
course, follow their shepherd; that is to say, the adhesion
of individual congregations to the creed of the
Church depends upon its being faithfully reproduced
by their regular minister. Such is not by any means
the fact; the creed of the members of a Church is
not at the mercy of any passing influence. It has been
engrained by a plurality of influences; one man did not
make it, and one man cannot unmake it. Moreover,
allowance should be made for the spirit of opposition
found in Church members, as well as in other people.</p>
<p>[INDIVIDUAL DIVERGENCES UNIMPORTANT.]</p>
<p>It may be said that persons ought not to be subjected
to the annoyance of hearing attacks upon
their hereditary tenets, in which they expect to be
more and more confirmed by their spiritual teacher.
This is of course, in itself, an evil. We are not to
expect ordinary men to recognise the necessity of
listening to the arguments against their views, in
order to hold these all the stronger. If this height
were generally reached, every Church would invite, as
a part of its constituted machinery, a representative
of all the heresies afloat; a certain number of its
ministers should be the avowed champions of the
views most opposed to its own—<i>advocati diaboli</i>, so
to speak. There would then be nothing irregular in
the retention of converts from its own number to
these other doctrines. It would be, however, altogether
improper to found any argument on the supposition
of such a state of matters.</p>
<p>It is an incident of every institution made up of
a large collection of officials, that some one or more
are always below the standard of efficiency, whence
those that depend on their services must suffer inconvenience.
A great amount of dulness in preaching
has always to be tolerated; so also might an occasional
deviation from orthodoxy; the more so, that the
severity of the discipline for heresy has a good deal
to do with the dulness.</p>
<p>If heretical tendencies have shown themselves in a
Church communion, either they are absurd, unmeaning,
irrelevant—perhaps a reversion to some defunct
opinion,—or they are the suggestion of new knowledge
in theology, or outside of it. In the first case, they
will die a natural death, unless prosecution gives them
importance; in the other case, they are to be candidly
examined, to be met by argument rather than by
deposition. An individual heretic can always be
neglected; if he is enthusiastic and able, he may
have a temporary following, especially when the
community has sunk into torpor. If two or three in
a hundred adopt erroneous opinions, it is nothing; if
thirty or forty in a hundred have been led astray, the
matter hangs dubious, and discretion is advisable.
When a majority is gained, the fulness of the time
has arrived; the heresy has triumphed.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>However strong may be the theoretical reasons for
the abolition of the penal sanctions to orthodoxy,
they do not dispense with the confirmation of experience;
and I must next refer to the more prominent
examples of Churches constituted on the
principle of freedom to the clergy.</p>
<p>[THE ENGLISH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH EXEMPLARY.]</p>
<p>The most remarkable and telling instance is that
furnished by the English Presbyterian Church, with
its coadjutor in Ireland. The history of this Church
is not unfamiliar to us; the great lawsuit relating to
Lady Hewley's charity gave notoriety to the changes
of opinion that had come over it in the course of a
century. But whoever is earnest on the question as
to the expediency of tests should study the history
thoroughly, as being in every way most instructive.
The leading facts, as concerns the present argument,
are mainly these:—</p>
<p>First, the great decision at the Salters' Hall conference,
on the 10th of March, 1719, when, by a
majority of 73 to 69, it was resolved to exact no test
from the clergy as a condition of their being ordained
ministers of the body. The point more immediately
at issue was the Trinity, on which opinions had been
already divided; but the decision was general. The
principle of the right of private judgment admitted of
no exceptions.</p>
<p>Second. Long before this decision, the minds of
the ministers had been ripening to the conviction,
that creeds and subscriptions could do no good, and
often did harm, indeed, the terms employed by
some of them are everything that we now desire.
For example, Joseph Hunter, on the eve of the
decision, wrote thus: "We have always thought that
such human declarations of faith were far from being
eligible on their own account, since they tend to narrow
the foundations of Christianity and to restrain that
latitude of expression in which our great Legislator
has seen fit to deliver His Will to us".</p>
<p>Third. Most remarkable is it to witness the consequences
of this great act of emancipation. A
hundred and sixty-five years have elapsed—a sufficient
time for judging of the experiment. The
Presbyterian body at the time were made up partly
of Arians, partly of Trinitarians, who held each other
in mutual tolerance; the ministers freely exchanging
pulpits. No bad consequence followed. We
do not hear of individual ministers going to extravagant
lengths in either direction. A large body
gravitated, in the course of time, to the modern
Unitarian position; but, considering the start, the
stride was not great. In such a century as the
eighteenth, there might well have been greater modifications
of the creeds than actually occurred. Evidently,
in the absence of any compulsory adherence
to settled articles, there was an abundant tendency to
conservatism. Commencing with Baxter, Howe, and
Calamy, we find, in the course of the century, such
names as Lardner, Price, Priestley, Belsham, Kippis,
James Lindsay, Lant Carpenter—men of liberal and
enlightened views on all political questions, and
earnest in their good works. These men's testimony
to what is truth in religion, is of more value to us
than the opinions of the creed-bound clergy. Reason
is still reason, but the weight of authority is with the
free enquirers.</p>
<p>Fourth. The history of the Presbyterians answers
a question that may be properly asked of the creed-abolitionist;
namely, What bond is left to hold a
religious community together? The bond, in their
case, simply was voluntary adhesion and custom. A
religious community may hold together, like a political
party, with only a vague tacit understanding.
When a body is once formed, it has an outward
cohesion, which is quite enough for maintaining it in
the absence of explosive materials. The established
Churches could retain their historical continuity under
any modification of the articles. By the present
system, they have been habituated to take their creed
as their legal definition; for that they could substitute
their history and framework.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[MODES OF TRANSITION FROM THE PRESENT SYSTEM.]</p>
<p>Various modes have been suggested for making
the transition from the present system.</p>
<p>One way is, to fall back upon the Bible as a test.
This is the same as no test at all. A man could not
call himself a Christian minister, if he did not accept
the Bible in some sense; and it would be obviously
impracticable to frame a libel, and conduct a process
for heresy, on an appeal to the Old and New Testaments
at large. The Bible may be the first source of
the Christian faith, but other confluent streams have
entered into its development; and we must accept
the consequences of a fact that we cannot deny.
However much religion may have to be broadened
and liberalised, the operation cannot consist in reverting
to the literal phraseology of the Bible.</p>
<p>A second method is, to prune away the portions
of the creed that are no longer tenable. It could
not have been intended by the original framers of
the creeds, that they should remain untouched for
centuries. With many Churches, there was a clear
understanding that the formulas should be revised at
brief intervals. The non-established Churches show
a disposition to resume this power. The United
Presbyterian Church of Scotland has had the courage
to make a beginning; still, relief will not in this way
be given to minorities, and small changes do not
correspond to the demands of new situations.</p>
<p>A more effectual mode is to discourage and suspend
prosecutions for heresy. The practice of heresy-hunting
might be allowed to fall into disuse. Instead of
deposing heretics, the orthodox champions should
simply refute them.</p>
<p>In the Church of England, in particular, a change
of the law may be necessary to give the desired relaxation.
The judges before whom heretics are tried
are very exacting in the matter of evidence, but they
cannot stop a prosecution made in regular form. The
Church of Scotland has more latitude in this respect,
and has already given indications of entering on the
path leading to desuetude.<a name="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17"><sup>[17]</sup></a></p>
<p>FOOTNOTES:</p>
<a name="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17">[17]</a><div class="note"><p> See, at the end, Notes and References on the history and
practice of Subscription and Penal Tests.</p></div>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<a name='EIX'></a><h2>IX.</h2>
<h2>THE PROCEDURE OF DELIBERATIVE
BODIES.<a name="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18"><sup>[18]</sup></a></h2>
<p>That great institution of political liberty, the Deliberative
Assembly, seems to be on the eve of
breaking down. I do not speak merely of the highest
assembly in the country, but of the numerous smaller
bodies as well, from many of which a cry of distress
may be heard. The one evil in all is the intolerable
length of the debates. Business has increased, local
representative bodies have a larger membership than
formerly, and, notwithstanding the assistance rendered
by committees, the meetings are protracted beyond
bounds.</p>
<p>In this difficulty, attention naturally fastens, in the
first instance, on the fact that the larger part of the
speaking is entirely useless; neither informing nor
convincing any of the hearers, and yet occupying the
time allotted for the despatch of business. How to
eliminate and suppress this ineffectual oratory would
appear to be the point to consider. But as Inspiration
itself did not reveal a mode of separating in advance
the tares from the wheat, so there is not now any
patent process for insuring that, in the debates of
corporate bodies, the good speaking, and only the good
speaking, shall be allowed.</p>
<p>Partial solutions of the difficulty are not wanting.
The inventors of corporate government—the Greeks,
were necessarily the inventors of the forms of debate,
and they introduced the timing of the speakers. To
this is added, occasionally, the selection of the
speakers, a practice that could be systematically
worked, if nothing else would do. Both methods have
their obvious disadvantages. The arbitrary selection
of speakers, even by the most impartial Committee of
Selection, would, according to our present notions,
seem to infringe upon a natural right, the right of each
member of a body to deliver an opinion, and give the
reasons for it. It would seem like reviving the censorship
of the press, to allow only a select number to be
heard on all occasions.</p>
<p>May not something be done to circumvent this vast
problem? May there not be a greater extension
given to maxims and forms of procedure already in
existence?</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[OBVIATING HURRIED DECISIONS.]</p>
<p>First, then, we recognize in various ways the propriety
of obviating hurried and unpremeditated
decisions. Giving previous notice of motions has that
end in view; although, perhaps, this is more commonly
regarded simply as a protection to absentees. Advantage
is necessarily taken of the foreknowledge of
the business to prepare for the debates. It is a farther
help, that the subject has been already discussed somewhere
or other by a committee of the body, or by the
agency of the public press. Very often an assembly
is merely called upon to decide upon the adoption of
a proposal that has been long canvassed out of doors.
The task of the speakers is then easy—we might almost
say no speaking should be required: but this is to
anticipate.</p>
<p>In legislation by Parliament, the forms allow
repetition of the debates at least three times in both
Houses. This is rather a cumbrous and costly remedy
for the disadvantage, in debate, of having to reply to
a speaker who has just sat down. In principle, no
one ought to be called to answer an argumentative
speech on the spur of the moment. The generality
of speakers are utterly unfit for the task, and accordingly
do it ill. A few men, by long training, acquire
the power of casting their thoughts into speaking train,
so as to make a good appearance in extempore reply;
yet even these would do still better if they had a little
time. The adjournment of a debate, and the reopening
of a question at successive stages, furnish the real
opportunities for effective reply. In a debate begun
and ended at one sitting, the speaking takes very
little of the form of an exhaustive review, by each
speaker, of the speeches that went before.</p>
<p>It is always reckoned a thing of course to take the
vote as soon as the debate is closed. There are some
historical occasions when a speech on one side has
been so extraordinarily impressive that an adjournment
has been moved to let the fervour subside; but
it is usually not thought desirable to let a day elapse
between the final reply and the division. This is a
matter of necessity in the case of the smaller corporations,
which have to dispose of all current business at
one sitting; but when a body meets for a succession
of days, it would seem to be in accordance with sound
principle not to take the vote on the same day as the
debate.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[ASSUMPTIONS AT THE BASIS OF ORAL DEBATE.]</p>
<p>These few remarks upon one important element of
procedure are meant to clear the way for a somewhat
searching examination of the principles that govern
the, entire system of oral debate. It is this practice
that I propose to put upon its trial. The grounds of
the practice I take to be the following:—</p>
<p>1. That each member of a deliberative body shall
be provided with a complete statement of the facts
and reasons in favour of a proposed measure, and also
an equally complete account of whatever can be said
against it. And this is a requirement I would concede
to the fullest extent. No decision should be asked
upon a question until the reasonings <i>pro</i> and <i>con</i> are
brought fairly within the reach of every one; to which
I would add—in circumstances that give due time for
consideration of the whole case.</p>
<p>2. The second ground is that this ample provision
of arguments, for and against, should be made by oral
delivery. Whatever opportunities members may have
previously enjoyed for mastering a question, these are
all discounted when the assembly is called to pronounce
its decision. The proposer of the resolution
invariably summarizes, if he is able, all that is to be
said for his proposal; his arguments are enforced and
supplemented by other speakers on his side; while
the opposition endeavours to be equally exhaustive.
In short, though one were to come to the meeting
with a mind entirely blank, yet such a one, having
ordinary faculties of judging, would in the end be
completely informed, and prepared for an intelligent
vote.</p>
<p>Now, I am fully disposed to acquiesce in this second
assumption likewise, but with a qualification that is of
considerable moment, as we shall see presently.</p>
<p>3. The third and last assumption is as follows:—Not
only is the question in all its bearings supposed
to be adequately set forth in the speeches constituting
the debate, but, in point of fact, the mass of the
members, or a very important section or proportion of
them, rely upon this source, make full use of it, and
are equipped for their decision by means of it; so
much so, that if it were withdrawn none of the other
methods as at present plied, or as they might be plied,
would give the due preparation for an intelligent
vote; whence must ensue a degradation in the quality
of the decisions.</p>
<p>It is this assumption that I am now to challenge, in
the greatest instance of all, as completely belied by
the facts. But, indeed, the case is so notoriously
the opposite, that the statement of it will be unavoidably
made up of the stalest commonplaces; and the
novelty will lie wholly in the inference.</p>
<p>The ordinary attendance in the House of Commons
could be best described by a member or a regular
official. An outsider can represent it only by the
current reports. My purpose does not require great
accuracy; it is enough, that only a very small fraction
of the body makes up the average audience. If an
official were posted to record the fluctuating numbers
at intervals of five minutes, the attendance might be
recorded and presented in a curve like the fluctuations
of the barometer; but this would be misleading as to
the proportion of effective listeners—those that sat out
entire debates, or at all events the leading speeches of
the debates, or whose intelligence was mainly fed from
the speaking in each instance. The number of this
class is next to impossible to get at; but it will be
allowed on all hands to be very small.</p>
<p>Perhaps, in such an inquiry, most can be made of
indirect evidences. If members are to be qualified for
an intelligent decision in chief part by listening to the
speeches, why is not the House made large enough
to accommodate them all at once? It would appear
strange, on the spoken-debate theory of enlightenment,
that more than one-third should be permanently
excluded by want of space. One might naturally
suppose that, in this fact, there was a breach of
privilege of the most portentous kind. That it is so
rarely alluded to as a grievance, even although
amounting to the exclusion of a large number of the
members from some of the grandest displays of
eloquence and the most exciting State communications,
is a proof that attendance in the House is not looked
upon as a high privilege, or as the <i>sine quâ non</i> of
political schooling.</p>
<p>[EVIDENCE OF THE INUTILITY OF THE MERE SPEAKING.]</p>
<p>If it were necessary to listen to the debates in order
to know how to vote, the messages of the whips would
take a different form. The members on each side
would be warned of the time of commencement of
each debate, that they might hear the comprehensive
statement of the opener, and remain at least through
the chief speech in reply. They might not attend all
through the inferior and desultory speaking, but they
would be ready to pop in when an able debater was
on his legs, and they would hear the leaders wind up
at the close. Such, however, is not the theory acted
on by the whips. They are satisfied if they can
procure attendance at the division, and look upon the
many hours spent in the debate as an insignificant
accessory, which could be disregarded at pleasure.
It would take the genius of a satirist to treat the
whipping-up machinery as it might well deserve to be
treated. We are here concerned with a graver view
of it—namely, to inquire whether the institution of
oral debate may not be transformed and contracted
in dimensions, to the great relief of our legislative
machinery.</p>
<p>Of course, no one is ignorant of the fact that the great
body of members of Parliament refrain altogether
from weighing individually the opposing arguments in
the several questions, and trust implicitly to their
leaders. This, however, is merely another nail in the
coffin of the debating system. The theory of independent
and intelligent consideration, by each member,
of every measure that comes up, is the one most favourable
to the present plan, while, even on that theory, its
efficiency breaks down under a critical handling.</p>
<p>It is time now to turn to what will have come into
the mind of every reader of the last few paragraphs—the
reporting of the speeches. Here, I admit, there is
a real and indispensable service to legislation. My
contention is, that in it we possess what is alone
valuable; and, if we could secure this, in its present
efficiency, with only a very small minimum of oral
delivery, we should be as well off as we are now. The
apparent self-contradiction of the proposal to report
speeches without speaking, is not hard to resolve.</p>
<p>To come at once, then, to the mode of arriving at
the printed debates, I shall proceed by a succession
of steps, each one efficient in itself, without necessitating
a farther. The first and easiest device, and one
that would be felt of advantage in all bodies whatsoever,
would be for the mover of a resolution to give in,
along with the terms of his resolution, his reasons—in
fact, what he intends as his speech, to be printed and
distributed to each member previous to the meeting.
Two important ends are at once gained—the time of
a speech is saved, and the members are in possession
beforehand of the precise arguments to be used. The
debate is in this way advanced an important step
without any speaking; opponents can prepare for,
instead of having to improvise their reply, and every
one is at the outset a good way towards a final
judgment.</p>
<p>[DEBATES INTRODUCED BY PRINTED STATEMENTS.]</p>
<p>As this single device could be adopted alone, I will
try and meet the objections to it, if I am only fortunate
enough to light on any. My experience of
public bodies suggests but very few; and I think the
strongest is the reluctance to take the requisite trouble.
Most men think beforehand what they are to say in
introducing a resolution to a public body, but do not
consider it necessary to write down their speech at full.
Then, again, there is a peculiar satisfaction in holding
the attention of a meeting for a certain time, great in
proportion to the success of the effort. But, on the
other hand, many persons do write their speeches, and
many are not so much at ease in speaking but that
they would dispense with it willingly. The conclusive
answer on the whole is—the greater good of the
commonwealth. Such objections as these are not of
a kind to weigh down the manifest advantages, at all
events, in the case of corporations full of business and
pressed for time.</p>
<p>I believe that a debate so introduced would be
shortened by more than the time gained by cutting
off the speech of the mover. The greater preparation
of everyone's mind at the commencement would
make people satisfied with a less amount of speaking,
and what there was would be more to the purpose.</p>
<p>We can best understand the effects of such an
innovation by referring to the familiar experience of
having to decide on the Report of Committee, which
has been previously circulated among the members.
This is usually the most summary act of a deliberative
body; partly owing, no doubt, to the fact that the
concurrence of a certain proportion is already gained;
while the <i>pros</i> and <i>cons</i> have been sifted by a regular
conference and debate. Yet we all feel that we are in
a much better position by having had before us in
print, for some time previous, the materials necessary
to a conclusion. At a later stage, I will consider
the modes of raising the quality and status of the
introductory speech to something of the nature of a
Committee's Report.<a name="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19"><sup>[19]</sup></a></p>
<p>The second step is to impose upon the mover of
every amendment the same obligation to hand in his
speech, in writing, along with the terms of the amendment.
Many public bodies do not require notice of
amendments. It would be in all cases a great improvement
to insist upon such notice, and of course a
still greater improvement to require the reasons to be
given in also, that they might be circulated as above.
The debate is now two steps in advance without a
moment's loss of time to the constituted meeting;
while what remains is likely to be much more rapidly
gone through.</p>
<p>The movers of resolutions and of amendments
should, as a matter of course, have the right of reply;
a portion of the oral system that would, I presume,
survive all the advances towards printing direct.</p>
<p>There remains, however, one farther move, in itself
as defensible, and as much fraught with advantage as
the two others. The resolution and the amendments
being in the hands of the members of a body, together
with the speeches in support of each, any member
might be at liberty to send in, also for circulation in
print, whatever remarks would constitute his speech
in the debate, thereby making a still greater saving of
the time of the body. This would, no doubt, be felt
as the greatest innovation of all, being tantamount to
the extinction of oral debate; there being then nothing
left but the replies of the movers. We need not, however,
go the length of compulsion; while a certain
number would choose to print at once, the others could
still, if they chose, abide by the old plan of oral
address. One can easily surmise that these last
would need to justify their choice by conspicuous
merit; an assembly, having in print so many speeches
already, would not be in a mood to listen to others of
indifferent quality.</p>
<p>[THE MAGIC OF ORATORY NOT DONE AWAY WITH.]</p>
<p>Such a wholesale transfer of living speech to the
silent perusal of the printed page, if seriously proposed
in any assembly, would lead to a vehement defence of
the power of spoken oratory. We should be told of
the miraculous sway of the human voice, of the way
that Whitfield entranced Hume and emptied
Franklin's purse; while, most certainly, neither of
these two would ever have perused one of his printed
sermons. And, if the reply were that Whitfield was
not a legislator, we should be met by the speeches of
Wilberforce and Canning and Brougham upon slavery,
where the thrill of the living voice accelerated the
conviction of the audience. In speaking of the
Homeric Assembly, Mr. Gladstone remarks, in answer
to Grote's argument to prove it a political nullity,
that the speakers were repeatedly cheered, and that
the cheering of an audience contributes to the decision.</p>
<p>Now, I am not insensible to the power of speech,
nor to the multitudinous waves of human feeling
aroused in the encounters of oratory before a large
assembly. Apart from this excitement, it would often
be difficult to get people to go through the drudgery
of public meetings. Any plan that would abolish
entirely the dramatic element of legislation would
have small chance of being adopted. It is only when
the painful side of debate comes into predominance,
that we willingly forego some of its pleasures: the
intolerable weariness, the close air, the late nights,
must be counted along with the occasional thrills of
delirious excitement. But as far as regards our great
legislative bodies, it will be easy to show that there
would still exist, in other forms, an ample scope for
living oratory to make up for the deadness that would
fall upon the chief assembly.</p>
<p>A friend of mine once went to Roebuck to ask his
attention to some point coming up in the House of
Commons, and offered him a paper to read. Roebuck
said, "I will not read, but I will hear". This well
illustrates one of the favourable aspects of speech.
People with time on their hands prefer being
instructed by the living voice; the exertion is less, and
the enlivening tones of a speaker impart an extraneous
interest, to which we have to add the sympathy of the
surrounding multitude. The early stages of instruction
must be conducted <i>vivâ voce</i>; it is a late acquirement
to be able to extract information from a printed page.
Yet circumstances arise when the advantage of the
printed page predominates. The more frequent
experience in approaching public men is to be told,
that they will not listen but will read. An hour's
address can be read in ten minutes: it is not impossible,
therefore, to master a Parliamentary debate in
one-tenth of the time occupied in the delivery.</p>
<p>A passing remark is enough to point out the
revolution that would take place in Parliamentary
reporting, and in the diffusion of political instruction
through the press, by the system of printing the
speeches direct. The full importance of this result
will be more apparent in a little. There has been
much talk of late about the desirability of a more
perfect system of reporting, with a view to the
preservation of the debates. Yet it may be very much
doubted, whether the House of Commons would ever
incur the expense of making up for the defects of
newspaper reporting, by providing short-hand writers
to take down every word, with a view to printing in
full.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[SECONDING EXTENDED TO A PLURALITY OF BACKERS.]</p>
<p>[PROPORTIONING OF BACKERS.]</p>
<p>Before completing the survey of possible improvements
in deliberative procedure, I propose to extend
the employment of another device already in use, but
scarcely more than a form; I mean the requiring of a
seconder before a proposal can be debated. The
signification of this must be, that in order to obtain
the judgment of an assembly on any proposal, the
mover must have the concurrence of one other member;
a most reasonable condition surely. What I
would urge farther in the same direction is that, instead
of demanding one person in addition to the mover, as
necessary in all cases, there should be a varying
number according to the number of the assembly. In
a copartnery of three or four, to demand a seconder to
a motion would be absurd; in a body of six or eight
it is scarcely admissible. I have known bodies of ten
and twelve, where motions could be discussed without
a seconder; but even with these, there would be a
manifest propriety in compelling a member to convince
at least one other person privately before putting the
body to the trouble of a discussion. If, however, we
should begin the practice of seconding with ten, is one
seconder enough for twenty, fifty, a hundred, or six
hundred? Ought there not to be a scale of steady
increase in the numbers whose opinions have been
gained beforehand? Let us say three or four for an
assembly of five-and-twenty, six for fifty, ten or fifteen
for a hundred, forty for six hundred. It is permissible,
no doubt, to bring before a public body resolutions
that there is no immediate chance of carrying; what
is termed "ventilating" an opinion is a recognized
usage, and is not to be prohibited. But when business
multiplies, and time is precious, a certain check should
be put upon the ventilating of views that have as yet
not got beyond one or two individuals; the process
of conversion by out-of-door agency should have made
some progress in order to justify an appeal to the
body in the regular course of business. That the
House of Commons should ever be occupied by a
debate, where the movers could not command more
than four or five votes, is apparently out of all reason.
The power of the individual is unduly exalted at the
expense of the collective body. There are plenty of
other opportunities of gaining adherents to any
proposal that has something to be said for it; and
these should be plied up to the point of securing a
certain minimum of concurrence, before the ear of
the House can be commanded. With a body of six
hundred and fifty, the number of previously obtained
adherents would not be extravagantly high, if it were
fixed at forty. Yet considering that the current
business, in large assemblies, is carried on by perhaps
one-third or one-fourth of the whole, and that the
quorum in the House of Commons is such as to make
it possible for twenty-one votes to carry a decision of
the House, there would be an inconsistency in
requiring more than twenty names to back every bill
and every resolution and amendment that churned to
be discussed. Now I can hardly imagine restriction
upon the liberty of individual members more
defensible than this. If it were impossible to find any
other access to the minds of individual members than
by speeches in the House, or if all other modes of
conversion to new views were difficult and inefficient
in comparison, then we should say that the time of
the House must be taxed for the ventilating process.
Nothing of the kind, however, can be maintained.
Moreover, although the House may be obliged to
listen to a speech for a proposal that has merely half
a dozen of known supporters, yet, whenever this is
understood to be the case, scarcely any one will be at
the trouble of counter-arguing it, and the question
really makes no way; the mover is looked upon as a
bore, and the House is impatient for the extinguisher
of a division. The securing of twenty names would
cost nothing to the Government, or to any of the
parties or sections that make up the House: an
individual standing alone should be made to work
privately, until he has secured his backing of nineteen
more names, and the exercise would be most wholesome
as a preparation for convincing a majority of the
House.</p>
<p>If I might be allowed to assume such an extension
of the device of seconding motions, I could make a
much stronger case for the beneficial consequences of
the operation of printing speeches without delivery.
The House would never be moved by an individual
standing alone; every proposal would be from the
first a collective judgment, and the reasons given in
along with it, although composed by one, would be
revised and considered by the supporters collectively.
Members would put forth their strength in one
weighty statement to start with; no pains would be
spared to make the argument of the nominal mover
exhaustive and forcible. So with the amendment;
there would be more put into the chief statement, and
less left to the succeeding speakers, than at present.
And, although the mover of the resolution and the
mover of the amendment would each have a reply,
little would be left to detain the House, unless when
some great interests were at stake.</p>
<p>Of course the preparation of the case in favour of
each measure would be entrusted to the best hands;
in Government business, it would be to some official
in the department, or some one engaged by the chief
in shaping the measure itself. The statement so
prepared would have the value of a carefully drawn-up
report, and nothing short of this should ever be submitted
to Parliament in the procuring of new enactments.
In like manner, the opponents and critics
could employ any one they pleased to assist them in
their compositions, A member's speech need not be in
any sense his own; if he borrows, or uses another
hand, it is likely to be some one wiser than himself,
and the public gets the benefit of the difference.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[OBJECTIONS TO DIRECT PRINTING OF SPEECHES.]</p>
<p>I may now go back for a little upon the details of
the scheme of direct printing, with the view of pressing
some of its advantages a little farther, as well as of
considering objections. I must remark more particularly
upon the permission, accorded to the members
generally, to send in their speeches to be circulated
with the proceedings. This I regard as not the least
essential step in an effective reform of the debating
system. It is the only possible plan of giving free
scope to individuals, without wasting the time of the
assembly. There need be no limit to the printing of
speeches; the number may be unnecessarily great, and
the length sometimes excessive, but the abuse may be
left to the corrective of neglect. The only material
disadvantage attending the plan of sending in speeches
in writing, without delivery, is that the speakers
would have before them only the statements-in-chief
of the movers of motion and amendment. They
could not comment upon one another, as in the oral
debate. Not but this might not: be practicable, by
keeping the question open for a certain length of time,
and circulating every morning the speeches given in
the day previously; but the cumbrousness of such an
operation would not have enough to recommend it.
The chief speakers might be expected to present a
sufficiently broad point for criticism; while the
greater number are well content, if allowed to give
their own views and arguments without reference to
those of others. And not to mention that, in Parliament,
all questions of principle may be debated several
times over, it is rare that any measure comes up
without such an amount of previous discussion out of
doors as fully to bring out the points for attack and
defence. Moreover, the oral debate, as usually
conducted, contains little of the reality of effective
rejoinder by each successive speaker to the one preceding.</p>
<p>The combined plan of printing speeches, and of
requiring twenty backers to every proposal, while
tolerable perhaps in the introduction of bills, and in
resolutions of great moment, will seem to stand self-condemned
in passing the bills through Committee,
clause by clause. That every amendment, however
trivial, should have to go through such a roundabout
course, may well appear ridiculous in the extreme.
To this I would say, in the first place, that the
exposing of every clause of every measure of importance
to the criticism of a large assembly, has long
been regarded as the weak point of the Parliamentary
system. It is thirty years since I heard the remark
that a Code would never get through the House of
Commons; so many people thinking themselves
qualified to cavil at its details. In Mill's "Representative
Government," there is a suggestion to the
effect, that Parliament should be assisted in passing
great measures by consultative commissions, who
would have the preparation of the details; and that
the House should not make alterations in the clauses,
but recommit the whole with some expression of
disapproval that would guide the commission in recasting
the measure.</p>
<p>[DIFFICULTIES OF PRINTING IN COMMITTEES.]</p>
<p>It must be self-evident that only a small body can
work advantageously in adjusting the details of a
measure, including the verbal expressions. If this
work is set before an assembly of two hundred, it is
only by the reticence of one hundred and ninety that
progress can be made. Amendments to the clauses
of a bill may come under two heads: those of
principle, where the force of parties expends itself; and
those of wording or expression, for clearing away
ambiguities or misconstruction. For the one class, all
the machinery that I have described is fully applicable.
To mature and present an amendment of principle,
there should be a concurrence of the same number as
is needed to move or oppose a second reading; there
should be the same giving in of reasons, and the same
unrestricted speech (in print) of individual members,
culminating in replies by the movers. If this had
to be done on all occasions, there would be much
greater concentration of force upon special points, and
the work of Committee would get on faster. As to
the second class of amendments, I do not think that
these are suitable for an open discussion. They
should rather be given as suggestions privately to the
promoter of the measure. But, be the matter small or
great, I contend that nothing should bring about a
vote in the House of Commons that has not already
acquired a proper minimum of support.</p>
<p>I am very far from presuming to remodel the entire
procedure of the House of Commons. What I have
said applies only to the one branch, not the least
important, of the passing of bills. There are other
departments that might, or might not, be subjected to
the printing system, coupled with the twentyfold
backing; for example, the very large subject of
Supply, on which there is a vast expenditure of
debating. The demand for twenty names to every
amendment would extinguish a very considerable
amount of these discussions.</p>
<p>There is a department of the business of the House
that has lately assumed alarming proportions—the
putting of questions to Ministers upon every conceivable
topic. I would here apply, without hesitation,
the printing direct and the plural backing, and sweep
away the practice entirely from the public proceedings
of the House. No single member unsupported should
have the power of trotting out a Minister at will. I
do not say that so large a number of backers should
be required in this case, but I would humbly suggest
that the concurrence of ten members should be
required even to put a public question. The leader
of the Opposition, in himself a host, would not be
encumbered with such a formality, but everyone else
would have to procure ten signatures to an interrogative:
the question would be sent in, and answered;
while question and answer would simply appear in
the printed proceedings of the House, and not occupy
a single moment of the legislative time. This is a
provision that would stand to be argued on its own
merits, everything else remaining as it is. The loss
would be purely in the dramatic interest attaching to
the deliberations.</p>
<p>[ALTERNATIVE SCOPE FOR ORATORY.]</p>
<p>The all but total extinction of oral debate by the
revolutionary sweep of two simple devices, would be
far from destroying the power of speech in other ways.
The influence exerted by conversation on the small
scale, and by oratory on the great, would still be
exercised. While the conferences in private society,
and the addresses at public meetings, would continue,
and perhaps be increased in importance, there would
be a much greater activity of sectional discussion, than
at present; in fact, the sectional deliberations,
preparatory to motions in the House, would become
an organized institution. A certain number of rooms
would be set aside for the use of the different
sections; and the meetings would rise into public
importance, and have their record in the public press.
The speaking that now protracts the sittings of the
House would be transferred to these; even the
highest oratory would not disdain to shine where the
reward of publicity would still be reaped. As no man
would be allowed to engage the attention of the
House without a following, it would be in the sections,
in addition to private society and the press, that new
opinions would have to be ventilated, and the first
converts gained.</p>
<p>Among the innovations that are justified by the
principle of avoiding at all points hurried decisions,
there is nothing that would appear more defensible
than to give an interval between the close of a debate
and the taking of the vote. I apprehend that the
chief and only reason why this has never been thought
of is, that most bodies have to finish a mass of current
business at one sitting. In assemblies that meet day
after day, the votes on all concluded debates could be
postponed till next day; giving a deliberate interval
in private that might improve, and could not: deteriorate,
the chances of a good decision. Let us
imagine that, in the House of Commons, for example,
the first hour at each meeting should be occupied with
the divisions growing out of the previous day's
debates. The consequences would be enormous, but
would any of them be bad? The hollowness of the
oral debate as a means of persuasion would doubtless
receive a blasting exposure; many would come up to
vote, few would remain to listen to speeches. The
greater number of those that cared to know what was
said, would rest satisfied with the reports in the
morning papers.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>We need to take account of the fact that even
greater moderation in the length of speeches would
not entirely overcome the real difficulty—the quantity
of business thrown upon our legislative bodies.
Doubtless, if there were less talk upon burning questions
there would be more attention given to unobtrusive
matters at present neglected. The mere
quantity of work is too great for an assembly to do
well. If this amount cannot be lessened—and I do
not see how it can be—there are still the six competing
vehicles at old Temple Bar. The single
legislative rail is crowded, and the only device equal
to the occasion is to remove some of the traffic to
other rails. Let a large part of the speaking be got
rid of, or else be transferred to some different arena.</p>
<p>[EVERY BODY ENTITLED TO CONTROL SPEECH-MAKING.]</p>
<p>I regard as unassailable Lord Sherbrooke's position
that every deliberative body must possess the entire
control of its own procedure, even to the point of
saying how much speaking it will allow on each topic.
The rough-and-ready method of coughing down a
superfluous speaker is perfectly constitutional, because
absolutely necessary. If a more refined method of
curtailing debates could be devised, without bringing
in other evils, it should be welcomed. The forcible
shutting of anyone's mouth will always tend to irritate,
and it is impossible by any plan to prevent a minority
from clogging the wheels of business. The freedom
of print seems to me one good safety-valve for
incontinent speech-makers; it allows them an equal
privilege with their fellows, and yet does not waste
legislative time.</p>
<p>I remember hearing, some time ago, that our
Chancellor of the Exchequer was induced, on the
suggestion of the <i>Times</i>, to put into print and circulate
to the House beforehand the figures and tables connected
with his financial statement. I could not help
remarking, why might the Chancellor not circulate, in
the same fashion, the whole statement, down to the
point of the declaration of the new taxes? It would
save the House at least an hour and a half, while not
a third of that time would be required to read the
printed statement. I believe the first thing that
would occur to anyone hearing this suggestion would
be—"so the Chancellor might, but the same reason
would apply to the movers of bills, and to all other
business as well ".</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>Our English Parliamentary system having been
matured by centuries of experience, has become a
model for other countries just entering upon representative
government. But the imitation, if too
literal, will not be found to work. Our system
supposes a large gentry, staying half the year in
London for pure pleasure, to which we may add the
rich men of business resident there. A sufficient
number of these classes can at any time be got to
make up the House of Commons; and, the majority
being composed of such, the ways of the House are
regulated accordingly. Daily constant attendance,
when necessary, and readiness to respond to the whip
at short notice, are assumed as costing nothing. But
in other countries, the case is not the same. In the
Italian Chamber I found professors of the University
of Turin, who still kept up their class-work, and made
journeys to Rome at intervals of a week or two, on
the emergence of important business. Even the payment
of members is not enough to bring people away
from their homes, and break up their avocations, for
several months every year. The forms of procedure,
as familiar to us, do not fit under such circumstances.
The system of printed speeches, with division days at
two or three weeks' interval, might be found serviceable.
But, at all events, the entire arrangements of
public deliberation need to be revised on much broader
grounds than we have been accustomed to; and it is
in this view, more than with any hope of bringing
about immediate changes, that I have ventured to
propound the foregoing suggestions.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[OPINIONS FAVOURABLE TO PRINTING.]</p>
<p>Since the foregoing paper was written, opinions
have been expressed favourable to the use of printing
as a means of shortening the debates in the
House of Commons. Among the most notable of
the authorities that have declared their views, we
may count Lord Derby and Lord Sherbrooke. Both
advocate the printing of the answers by ministers
to the daily string of questions addressed to them.
Lord Derby goes a step farther. He would have
everyone introducing a bill to prepare a statement
of his reasons, to be circulated among members
at the public expense. Even this small beginning
would be fruitful of important consequences; the
greatest being the inevitable extension of the system.</p>
<p>I am not aware that my suggestion as to requiring
a plurality of members to back every bill and every
proposal, has gained any degree of support. It was
urged that, if the power were taken away from single
members to move in any case whatever, the few
that are accustomed to find themselves alone, would
form into a group to back each other. I do not hesitate
to say that the supposition is contrary to all experience.
Crotcheteers have this in common with the
insane, that they can seldom agree in any conjoined
action. Even in the very large body constituting our
House of Commons, it is not infrequent for motions
to be made without obtaining a seconder. The requirement
of even five concurring members would
put an extinguisher upon a number of propositions
that have at present to be entertained.</p>
<p>The last session (1883) has opened the eyes of many
to the absurdity of allowing a single member to block
a bill. When it is considered that, in an assembly of
six hundred, there is probably at least one man,
like Fergus O'Conner, verging on insanity, and out of
the reach of all the common motives,—we may well
wonder that a deliberative body should so put itself
at the mercy of individuals. Surely the rule, for
stopping bills at half-past twelve, might have been
accompanied with the requirement of a seconder,
which would have saved many in the course of the
recent sessions. It is the gross abuse of this power
that is forcing upon reluctant minds the first advance
to plural backing, and there is now a demand for five
or six to unite in placing a block against a measure.</p>
<p>It occurred to Mr. Gladstone, during the autumn
session of 1882, to take down the statistics of attendance
in the House for several days running. His
figures were detailed to the House, in one of his
speeches, and were exactly what we were prepared
for. They completely "pounded and pulverised" the
notion, that listening to the debates is the way that
members have their minds made up for giving their
votes.</p>
<p>[EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION INCREASING.]</p>
<p>The recent parliamentary recess has witnessed an
unusual development in the out-of-door discussion of
burning questions. In addition to a full allowance
of vacation oratory, and the unremitted current of the
newspaper press, the monthlies have given forth a
number of reasoned articles by cabinet ministers and
by men of ministerial rank in the opposition. The
whole tendency of our time is, to supersede parliamentary
discussion by more direct appeals to the
mind of the public.</p>
<p>To stop entirely the oral discussion of business in
Parliament would have some inconveniences; but the
want of adequate consideration of such measures as
possessed the smallest interest with any class, would
not be one of them.</p>
<p>FOOTNOTES:</p>
<a name="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18">[18]</a><div class="note"><p> <i>Contemporary Review</i>, November, 1880.</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19">[19]</a><div class="note"><p> I have often thought that, the practice of circulating, with a motion,
the proposer's reasons, would, on many occasions, be worthy of being
voluntarily adopted.</p></div>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<a name='Notes'></a><h2><i>Notes and References in connection with Essay VIII., on
Subscription.</i></h2>
<br />
<p>It may be useful here to supply a few memoranda as to
the history and present practice of Subscription to Articles.</p>
<p>In the <i>Quarterly Review</i>, No. 117, the following observations
are made respecting the first imposition of Tests after
the English Reformation:—-</p>
<p>"Before the Reformation no subscription was required
from the body of the clergy, as none was necessary. The
bishops at their consecration took an oath of obedience to
the King, in which, besides promising subjection in matters
temporal, they 'utterly renounced and clearly forsook all
such clauses, words, sentences, and grants, which they had
or should have of the Pope's Holiness, that in any wise were
hurtful or prejudicial to His Highness or His Estate Royal';
whilst to the Pope they bound themselves by oath to keep
the rules of the Holy Fathers, the decrees, ordinances,
sentences, dispositions, reservations, provisions, and commandments
Apostolic, and, to their powers, to cause them to
be kept by others. And, as their command over their clergy
was complete, and they could at once remove any who
violated the established rule of opinion, no additional
obligation or engagement from men under such strict discipline
was requisite. The statement, therefore (by Dean
Stanley), that 'the Roman Catholic clergy, and the clergy of
the Eastern Church, neither formerly, nor now, were bound
by any definite forms of subscription; and that the unity of
the Church is preserved there as the unity of the State is
preserved everywhere, not by preliminary promises or oaths,
but by the general laws of discipline and order'; though
true to the letter, is really wholly untrue in its application to
the argument concerning subscriptions. For it is to the
total absence of liberty, and to the severity of 'the general
laws of discipline and order,' and not to a liberty greater
than our own, that this absence of subscription is due.</p>
<p>"In point of fact, the requirement of subscription from
the clergy was coeval with the upgrowth of liberty of opinion:
while the circumstances of the English Reformation of religion
made it essential to the success and the safety of that
great movement. It was essential to its success; for as it
was accomplished mainly by a numerical minority, both of
the clergy and laity of the land, there could be no other
guarantee of its maintenance than the assurance that its
doctrines would be honestly taught, and its ritual observed
by the whole body of the conforming clergy.</p>
<p>"Thus the <i>Reformation subscriptions aimed at the prevention
of covert Popery</i>, a danger to which the Reforming
laity felt that they were exposed by the strong wishes of a
majority of their own class; by the undissembled bias of
many of the parochial clergy; and by the secret bias of
some even of the bi-hops; whilst the diminution of their
absolute control over the clergy lessened the power of enforcing
the new opinions when the bishop was sincerely
attached to them."</p>
<p>The entire article is of value both for its historical information
as to the history of Tests in the English Church,
and for its mode of advocating the retention of subscription
to the Articles, as at present enforced.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[Subscription came with the English Reformation.]</p>
<p>The Report of the Royal Commission of 1864, on Subscription
in the English Church, supplied a complete account
of all the changes in subscription from the Reformation
downwards. Reference may also be made to Stoughton's
"History of Religion in England," for the incidents in
greater detail.</p>
<p>Perhaps the most remarkable defence of Liberty, as against
the prevailing view in the English Church, is Dean Milman's
speech before the Clerical Subscription Commission, of which
he was a member. It is printed in <i>Fraser's Magazine</i>, March,
1865, and is included in the criticism of the <i>Quarterly
Review</i> article, already quoted.</p>
<p>The Dean's Resolution submitted to the Commission was
as follows:—</p>
<p>"Conformity to the Liturgy of the Church of England
being the best and the surest attainable security for 'the
declared agreement of the Clergy with the doctrines of the
Church'; with many the daily, with all the weekly public
reading of the services of the Church of England (containing,
as they do, the ancient creeds of the Church Catholic), and
the constant use of the Sacramental offices and other formularies
in the Book of Common Prayer, being a solemn
and reiterated pledge of their belief in those doctrines, the
Subscription to the thirty-nine Articles is unnecessary. Such
Subscription adds no further guarantee for the clergyman's
faithfulness to the doctrines of the Church; while the
peculiar form and controversial tone in which the Articles
were compiled is the cause of much perplexity, embarrassment,
and difficulty, especially to the younger clergy and to
those about to enter into Holy Orders."</p>
<p>Much doubt was entertained, whether this motion came
within the terms of the Commission. It was not pressed by
the Dean.</p>
<p>I give the following quotation from the speech:—</p>
<p>... "And if I venture to question the expediency,
the wisdom, I will say the righteousness of retaining subscription
to the thirty-nine Articles as obligatory on all
clergymen, I do so, not from any difficulty in reconciling
with my own conscience what, during my life, I have done
more than once, but from the deep and deliberate conviction
that such subscription is altogether unnecessary as a safeguard
for the essential doctrines of Christianity, which are
more safely and fully protected by other means. It never
has been, is not, and never will be a solid security for its
professed object, the reconciling or removing religious differences,
which it tends rather to create and keep alive; is
embarrassing to many men who might be of the most valuable
service in the ministry of the Church; is objectionable
as concentrating and enforcing the attention of the youngest
clergy on questions, some abstruse, some antiquated, and in
themselves at once so minute and comprehensive as to
harass less instructed and profound thinkers, to perplex and
tax the sagacity of the most able lawyers and the most
learned divines....</p>
<p>"One of my chief objections to subscription to the thirty-nine
Articles as a perpetual test of English Churchmanship
is that they are throughout controversial, and speak, as of
necessity they must speak, the controversial language of their
day; they cannot, therefore, in my opinion, be fully, clearly,
and distinctly understood without a careful study and a very
wide knowledge of the disputes and opinions of those times,
a calm yet deep examination of their meaning, objects, limitations,
which cannot be expected from young theological
students, from men fresh from their academical pursuits.
I venture to add, indeed to argue, that their true bearing
and interpretation seems to me to have escaped some of our
most eminent judges from want of that full study and perfect
knowledge; and I must say that, in these laborious and
practical day, it may be questioned whether this study of
controversies, many of them bygone, will be so useful, so
profitable, as entire devotion to the plainer and simpler
duties of the clergyman.</p>
<p>"Their immense range, too, the infinite questions into
which they branch out (it has been said, I know not how
truly, that five hundred questions may be raised upon them),
is a further objection to their maintenance as a preliminary
and indispensable requirement before the young man is
admitted to Holy Orders. On the whole I stand, without
hesitation, to my proposition, that the doctrines of the
English Church are not only more simply, but more fully,
assuredly, more winningly, taught in our Liturgy and our
Formularies than in our Articles."</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>The very elaborate work of Mr. Taylor Innes, entitled
the "Law of Creeds," is exhaustive for Scotland; including
both the Established Church and the various sects of Protestant
Dissenters. It also incidentally takes notice of some
of the more critical decisions on heresy cases in the English
Church. Mr. Innes properly points out, that the abolition
of Subscription is compatible with compulsory adherence to
Articles. The relaxation of the forms of Subscription in
the English Church, by the Act of 1865, gave a certain
amount of relief to the consciences of the clergy, but left
them as much exposed as ever to suits for heresy.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[Report of Presbyterian Alliance.]</p>
<p>For the usages of the Reformed Churches, on the Continent,
and in America, a mass of valuable information has
been furnished in the Report of the Second General Council
of the Presbyterian Alliance, convened at Philadelphia,
September, 1880. At the previous meeting of the Council,
held at Edinburgh, July, 1877, a Committee was appointed
to Report on the Creeds and Subscriptions in use among the
various bodies forming the Alliance. It is unnecessary to
refer to the answers given in to the Committee's Queries,
from Great Britain and Ireland, except to complete the
history of the Presbyterian Church of England, so long
distinguished for the abeyance of clerical subscription.</p>
<p>It was in 1755, that the Presbytery of Newcastle made a
movement towards disclaiming the Arian, Socinian and
other heresies, but without proposing a Confession. In
1784, the same Presbytery adopted a Formula accepting the
Westminster Confession; in 1802, however, subscription to
the Formula was rescinded. Through Scottish influence,
the return to the Westminster Confession was gradually
brought about in the early part of the century. That Confession
was formally adopted by the Presbytery of Newcastle
in 1824; and since 1836, all the ministers of the body have
been required to accept it in the most unqualified manner.</p>
<p>The Calvinistic Methodists of Wales drew up, in 1823,
a Confession consisting of forty-four articles, agreeing substantially
with the Westminster Confession. Subscription
is not required: but the clergy, prior to ordination, make a
statement of their doctrinal views, which amounts to nearly
the same thing. Like the Roman Catholic Church, the
Methodists depend upon discipline rather than upon Subscription.</p>
<p>The Congregational Churches take up almost the same
attitude towards their clergy. There is no subscription; but
any great deviation from the prevailing views of the body
leads to forfeiture of the position of brotherhood, and
possibly also to severance from the charge of a congregation.
Still, the absence of a binding and penal test is
favourable to freedom, from the present tendency of men's
minds in that direction.</p>
<p>As regards the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America, we find that the first Presbytery was constituted
in 1705. No formal statement of doctrine was considered
necessary till the lapse of about a quarter of a century, when
the spread of Arianism in England urged the Synod of
Philadelphia to pass what was called the "Adopting Act" in
1729, by which they hoped to exclude from American
churches British ministers tainted with Arian views. They
agreed that all the ministers of this Synod, or that shall
hereafter be admitted into this Synod, shall declare their
agreement in and approbation of the Confession of Faith,
with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Assembly of
Divines at Westminster, as being, in all the essential and
necessary articles, good forms of sound words and systems
of Christian doctrine, "and we do also adopt the said
confession and the catechisms as the Confession of our
faith ".</p>
<p>The formula subscribed by ministers at their ordination
is, however, less stringent than that in use in the Churches
of Scotland.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[French Protestant Churches.]</p>
<p>Turning next to the Continent we may refer, first, to the
French Protestant Church, now consisting of two divisions
—(1) The Reformed Church united to the State, and (2)
The Union of the Evangelical Churches.</p>
<p>The Gallic Confession, styled "La Rochelle," the joint
work of Calvin and Chaudien, was adopted as the doctrinal
standard of the Reformed French Churches in their first
national synod, which met at Paris in May, 1559, and was
revised and confirmed by the seventh synod, which assembled
at La Rochelle under the presidency of Theodore
Beza in 1571. It is composed of forty articles, which reproduce
faithfully the Calvinistic doctrine. But it is not
accepted as infallible; the final authority, in the light of
which successive synods may reform it, is the Bible.</p>
<p>"The reformed doctrine, as sanctioned by the Confession
of La Rochelle, was, in its essential features, recognised and
professed by all Protestant France; and, notwithstanding
its sufferings and internal dissensions, the Church during the
first quarter of the 17th century held its own course and
remained faithful to itself. A consistory, that of Caen, had,
even as late as 1840, restored in the churches of its jurisdiction
the Confession of La Rochelle in its full vigour.
Little by little, however, under the influence of the naturalistic
philosophy of the 18th century, the negative criticism
of Germany, and above all the religious indifference which
followed the repose which the Church was enjoying after
two centuries of persecution, the Confession of Faith as
well as the discipline fell into disuse. It was never really
abrogated.... However, it is a practical fact that the
partisans of one of the two sections which to-day divide
the Reformed Church of France, not only do not consider
themselves bound by the Confession of La Rochelle, but,
tending more and more towards Rationalism, and seeing in
Protestantism only the religion of free thought, have come
to reject the great miracles of the gospel, and to demand
for their pastors, in the bosom of the Church, unlimited
freedom in teaching. While on the one hand the sovereignty
of the Holy Scriptures is claimed, on the other is held the
rule of individual conscience."</p>
<p>The majority of the official synod which met at Paris
in September, 1848, refused to put an end to the doctrinal
disorder in the Church by establishing in the Church a
clear and positive law of faith. The minority, regarding
the adverse vote as an official sufferance of indifference
on doctrinal matters, separated themselves from their
brethren, and founded the "Union of the Evangelical
Churches of France".</p>
<p>[General Synod of Paris in 1872.]</p>
<p>In 1872, "in the face of attacks directly aimed, in the
bosom of the Church, at the unity of her doctrine," the
thirtieth general synod, assembled at Paris, drew up, not a
complete Confession of Faith, but a declaration determining
the doctrinal limits of the Church, and proclaiming "the
sovereign authority of the Holy Scriptures with regard to
belief, and salvation through faith in Jesus Christ, the only
begotten Son of God, who died for our sins and rose again
for our justification".<a name="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20"><sup>[20]</sup></a></p>
<p>Down to 1824, new pastors indicated their adherence to
the Confession of Faith by signature. In 1824, however,
signature was replaced by a solemn promise. "Since that
time different formulas have been used at the will of the
pastors performing the ordination, without any one of them
having the sanction of a synod, and without the manner of
adherence having been expressly stipulated."</p>
<p>"Since the Synod of 1872, in ordinations over which
pastors attached to the Synodal Church have presided, candidates
are required to conform formally, in the presence of
the congregation, to the declaration of faith adopted by the
Synod. Article 2, of the complete law, declares: 'Every
candidate for holy orders must, before receiving ordination,
affirm that he adheres to the faith of the Church as stated
by the general synod'."</p>
<p>Theological professors were sometimes appointed without
conditions. Still they were not permitted to teach doctrines
in glaring contradiction to the general belief of the Churches.
For example, in 1812, M. Gasc, professor of theology at
Montauban, attacked in his lectures the doctrine of the
Trinity, whereupon several consistories required him either
to retract his opinions or to resign his post. M. Gasc
retracted his opinions.</p>
<p>"The Evangelical Churches of France, composed of
members who have made an explicit and individual profession
of faith, and who recognise in religious matters no
other authority than that of Jesus Christ, the only and
sovereign head of the Church," accept the Old and New
Testaments as directly inspired by God and so constituting
the only and infallible rule of faith and life.</p>
<p>[Churches of Switzerland.]</p>
<p>The Churches of Switzerland have the pre-eminence in
the relaxation or disuse of Tests. The following is a summary
of their practice:—</p>
<p><i>The Reformed Church of the Canton of Vaud</i>.</p>
<p>According to the ecclesiastical law of May 19, 1863
(slightly modified by a decree of December 2, 1874), the
<i>National Church</i> of the Canton of Vaud "desires chiefly
that its members should lead a Christian life," and "admits
no other rule of instruction than the Word of God contained
in the Holy Scriptures". Every candidate for the ministry
is required by the ecclesiastical law of December 14, 1839,
to "swear that he will discharge conscientiously the duties
which the National Reformed Evangelical Church imposes
upon its ministers, and that he will preach the Word of God
in its purity and integrity as it is contained in the Holy
Scriptures". "When accusation is brought against any
minister on the ground of doctrine, the proceedings are distinctly
marked; but in reality it is simply required that 'the
jurymen give a conscientious verdict'."</p>
<p>The <i>Free Evangelical Church</i> of the Canton of Vaud
requires that candidates for the ministry be examined as to
their religious life, their calling to the ministry, their doctrine
and their ecclesiastical principles by a committee of the
synodical commission, with pastors and elders. After
examination the candidate must "declare his cordial adhesion
to the doctrines and institutions of the Free Church".
This pledge is verbal.</p>
<br />
<p><i>Independent Evangelical Church of Neuchatel.</i></p>
<p>The ancient Reformed Church of Neuchatel never put
forth any special Confession of Faith. The assembly of
Pastors, the governing body of the Church, down to 1848,
accepted the Holy Scriptures, the forms used in baptism
and the communion, and the Apostles' Creed as fully adequate
to express the faith of the Church. The Synod, who
took over the government of the Church in 1848, maintained
the same position, refusing in 1857 to sanction an abridged
Confession.</p>
<p>On May 20, 1873, the Grand Council of the Republic
and Canton of Neuchatel passed a new law regulating the
relation of Church and State. Article 12 says: "Liberty
of conscience in matters of religion is inviolable; it may
neither be fettered by regulations, vows, or promises, by
disciplinary penalties, by formulas or a creed, nor by any
measures whatsoever".</p>
<p>Hence resulted the separation of those that formed the
Independent Evangelical Church of Neuchatel, which, in
1874, adopted a Confession "acknowledging as the only
source and rule of its faith the Old and New Testaments,
and proclaiming the great truths of salvation contained in
the Apostles' Creed". The ministers, on ordination, take
an oath to advance the honour and glory of God above all
things; to maintain his word at the risk of life, body, and
property; to be in unity with the brethren in the doctrines
of religion and in the holy ministry; and to avoid all sectarianism
and schism in the Church.</p>
<br />
<p><i>National Protestant Church of Geneva</i>.</p>
<p>[Historical Changes in the Church of Geneva.]</p>
<p>During the 16th century, from 1536 onwards, the National
Protestant Church of Geneva was in constant turmoil through
the insistence on, and the opposition to, the doctrines laid
down by Calvin in his Confession of Faith and System of
Ecclesiastical Ordinances. The 17th century is marked by the
conflicts of Calvinism and Arminianism. After numerous
variations, the oath of consecration was, in June 1725,
changed hack to the form provided by the Ecclesiastical
Ordinance of 1576: "You swear to hold the doctrine of
the holy prophets and apostles, as it is contained in the
books of the Old and New Testaments, of which doctrine
our Catechism is a summary ". This oath remained in force
for nearly a century, till 1806. "It was asserted in the
discussion (in the Assembly) that no one should be forced
to follow entirely Calvin's Catechism. It is further expected
that the candidates for the ministry should be
requested not to discuss in the pulpit any striking or useless
matter which might tend to disturb the peace. At this
time, the Confession of Faith of the 17th century was
abolished to return to that of the 16th century, interpreting
the latter with much freedom. The Lower Council ratified
this decision, but ordered the Assembly to keep the most
absolute silence upon this subject, especially in the presence
of strangers." In 1788, the Assembly adopted a new Catechism,
containing numerous points of divergence from the
orthodox Catechism of Calvin, which it superseded with the
sanction of the Lower Council. In 1806, the new formula
of consecration threw out the Catechism; it ran thus—
"You promise to teach divine truth as it is contained in
the books of the Old and New Testaments, of which we
have an abridgment in the Apostles' Creed". In 1810,
after long deliberation, there was published a revision in
the latitudinarian and utilitarian sense of the Larger Catechism.
In the same year, the Apostles' Creed was thrown
out of the pledge of the ministers, which now read thus:
"You promise ... to preach, in its purity, the gospel
of our Lord Jesus Christ, to recognise as the only infallible
rule of faith and conduct the word of God, as it is contained
in the sacred books of the Old and New Testaments".
Presently, however, in 1813, a religious revival led to dangerous
discussions, and the ministers were bound "to abstain
from all sectarian spirit, to avoid all that would create
any schism and break the union of the Church"—an addition
suppressed towards 1850; and in 1817, they were
required to pledge themselves to abstain from discussing
four points in particular—the manner of the union of the
divine and human nature in the person of Jesus Christ;
original sin; the manner in which grace operates, or saving
grace; and predestination; and, if led to utter their thoughts
on any one of these subjects, they were "to do so without
too much positiveness, to avoid expressions foreign to the
Holy Scriptures, and to use, as much as possible, the terms
which they employ". In 1847, the organisation of the
Protestant worship was set forth in a special law, and in
1849, the Consistory called in accordance with this, adopted
an organic rule for the Church. According to Article 74,
the functionaries of the Church may be subjected to discipline
"in case of teaching, preaching, or publicly professing
any doctrine that may bring scandal upon the Church".
Various modifications followed. In 1874 (April 26), Article
123 was made to declare that "each pastor teaches and
preaches freely on his own responsibility, and no restraint
can be put upon this liberty either by the Confession of
Faith or by the liturgic formulas". In the end of the same
year, however (Oct. 3), the State Council promulgated a
new organic law, "in virtue of which a pastor can either be
suspended or dismissed by the Consistory or by the Council
of State for dogmatic motives". In 1875, the pastor obtained
the right to use in his religious teaching any catechetical
manual he preferred, provided he informed the Consistory
of his choice. The use of the <i>liturgical prayers</i>, published
by the Consistory, became optional. The pastors were now
required merely to declare before God that "they will teach
and preach conscientiously, according to their lights and
faith the Christian truth contained in our holy hooks". The
<i>liturgical collection</i>, published by the Consistory in 1875,
contains two series of formulas, expressed in a dogmatic
sense on the one hand, and in a liberal sense on the other.
The Apostles' Creed is optional.</p>
<br />
<p><i>Free Evangelical Church of Geneva</i>.</p>
<p>The Free Evangelical Church of Geneva demands only a
formal adherence to its Profession of Faith from the elders
(including the ministers) and the deacons. "Some of these
officers have even been permitted to hold certain reserves
on such or such article."</p>
<br />
<p><i>Germanic Switzerland</i>.</p>
<p>Pastor Bernard of Berne, having enumerated the symbolical
writings of Germanic Switzerland, says: "For centuries
the pastors were obliged to sign them, although it is
true that the Second Confession of Helvetic Faith was
alone recognised as the general rule imposed upon pastors.
The signing of the Formula Consensus was exacted only
temporarily (being discarded about 1720). It has been
only from the beginning of this century that, under the
influence of rationalism, pastors have been required to
preach the Gospel merely according to the <i>principles</i> of the
Helvetic Confession. To-day we find all confession of
faith abolished in our Germanic Swiss Churches. Pastors
preach what pleases them. Chosen by the parishes, they
owe to them solely an avowal of their doctrines."</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>The Hungarian Reformed Church has a singular history,
in respect of Creeds. The Report of the Council goes very
minutely into the detail of eleven confessions held successively
by that church. Of these, there survive two—the
Helvetic Confession and the Catechism of Heidelberg, by
which ministers and office—bearers are still bound.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>[German Churches.]</p>
<p>Next as to Germany. As the several states have their
separate ecclesiastical usages, the same rule does not apply
everywhere. For an extreme case of absence of toleration,
we may refer to the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg.
Lutheranism is the established religion; and the Duchy is
the stronghold of mediaeval conservatism both in politics
and in religion. The, removal of Baumgarten from the
University of Rostock is an example in point; and the
decree is so characteristic, and illustrative that it deserves to
be given at length.</p>
<p>"We have to our sincere regret been given to understand
that, in your writings published in and since the year 1854,
you have advanced doctrines and principles that are in the
most important points at variance with the doctrines and
principles of the symbolic books of our Evangelical-Lutheran
Church and of our rules of Church Discipline, to such an
extent as to amount to an attempt to shake to the very
foundation the basis whereon these doctrines and principles
and our church rest. In order to reach more exact certainty
on these things, we have assembled our Consistory to
consider this matter, and from them we have received the
annexed opinion, by which the above-mentioned view has
been fully confirmed.</p>
<p>"Whereas, then, it is required by our Church Ordinances
of 1552 and 1602 (1650) that the Christian doctrine shall
be taught 'pure and unchanged,' as it is contained in Holy
Writ, the general symbols of the Christian Church, in Dr.
Luther's Catechism and Confession, and in the Augsburg
Confession of 1530, and that, if an academical teacher fall
away from these, he shall be proceeded against; whereas,
further, in Articles II. to IV. of the Reversals of 1621, the
sovereigns gave the States the assurance that in the University
of Rostock there should be neither appointed nor
tolerated any other teachers but such as should be attached
to the Augsburg Confession and the Lutheran religion: the
establishment of the University of Rostock on the pure
doctrine of the Christian symbols and of the Augsburg
Confession has been repeated in § 4 of the Regulations
upon the relations of the town of Rostock to the State
University of 1827, and once again in § 1 of the Statutes
of the University of 1837; no less do the statutes of the
Theological Faculty of Rostock of 1564, and the later
Regulation as to this Faculty of 1791, bind the members
of the Faculty to expound the writings of the Prophets and
the Apostles in the sense laid down in the general Christian
symbols, in the Augsburg Confession, the Smalkald Articles,
and the writings of Dr. Luther; your appointment of 31st
August, 1850, referred you to the Statutes of the University
and of the Theological Faculty, and also directed you to comport
yourself in accordance with the rule and line of the
revealed word of God, the unchanged Augsburg Confession,
the <i>formula concordia</i>, and all the other symbolic books
received in our (lands) country, as well as with the Mecklenburg
Church Ordinances relating to these, without any
innovation; you also on your induction on the 19th of
Oct., 1850, bound yourself by oath to the duties contained
in your appointment and to the Statutes of the University
and of the Theological Faculty."</p>
<p>[Removal of Baumgarten from Rostock.]</p>
<p>"We can the shorter time entrust you with the vocation of
an academic teacher of the Evangelical-Lutheran Theology
as you have united with your backslidings in theological
doctrine at the same time political doctrines of the most
delicate kind, deduced relatively from those; and we will,
therefore—after hearing of our High Consistory, and after
the foregoing resolution of our ministry according to § 10,
Lit. H. of the Ordinance of 4th April, 1853, relating to the
organisation of the Ministers—hereby remove you from the
office, hitherto filled by you, of an ordinary Professor of
Theology in our State University of Rostock."</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>In Prussia, the Clergy, and especially the University
Professors of Theology, enjoy more liberty than in Mecklenburg;
but they are not wholly secure from the attempts
of the Church Courts to enforce discipline against heretical
teaching. The following are recent cases.</p>
<p>1. The St. Jacobi Gemeinde (parish) in Berlin, belonging,
as is the rule in Prussia, to the "Unirte Kirche"—a fusion
of the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches—in 1877,
chose, as its pastor, Lic. Horzbach. The Consistory of
Brandenburg, within whose jurisdiction Berlin lies, refused
to admit him on account of his heterodox views. By the
ecclesiastical law, a pastor translated from one consistory to
another, has to be approved of by the one he enters; which
gives an opportunity of exercising a disciplinary power, not
beyond what is possessed by the consistory where he has
once been admitted, but more opportunely and conveniently
brought into play. St. Jacobi parish, having apparently a
taste for advanced views, next chose a Dr. Schramm; but
he too was rejected on the same grounds. The third selection
fell on Pastor Werner (Guben); this was confirmed by
the Consistory, but was quashed by the "Oberkirchenrath,"
or supreme ecclesiastical authority of the country, located in
Berlin. The parish was now considered to have forfeited
its right of election; and a pastor was chosen for it by the
Oberkirchenrath. Happily his views were not too strict for
the congregation, and peace was restored. In all the three
instances, the rejection took place on the complaint of a
small orthodox minority in the parish.</p>
<p>2. Rev. Lühr, pastor at Eckenforda, in the Prussian Province
of Schleswig-Holstein, was accused of heresy, and
deprived by the Provincial Consistory of Kiel in December,
1881. Pastor Lühr appealed to the Berlin Oberkirchenrath,
who reversed the sentence, and let him off with a reproof for
the use of incautious language.</p>
<p>There have been two still more notorious heresy hunts:
one, the case of Dr. Sydow in Berlin; the other, Pastor
Kalzhoff, who was ultimately deposed, and is now minister
of an independent congregation in Berlin.</p>
<p>Both the central ecclesiastical authority and the provincial
consistories, being nominated by the Government, reflect
the religious tendencies of the Emperor and his Ministers
for the time being. At present, these are probably behind
the country at large in point of liberality.</p>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<p>Next to Switzerland, Holland is most distinguished for
advanced views as to the remission of Tests, and the liberty
of the clergy. A very complete account of the history and
present position of the Dutch sects is given in a pamphlet,
entitled "The Ecclesiastical Institutions of Holland, by
Philip H. Wicksteed, M.A. (Williams & Norgate)".</p>
<p>[Subscription in the Dutch Church.]</p>
<p>It is pretty well known that in doctrinal views the majority
in the Dutch Church is Calvinist; while a minority forms
the "Modern School," a school partaking of the rationalism
of our century in matters of faith. The battle of the Confessions
began in 1842, and is not yet finished. In this
year an attempt was made to revive the binding authority
of the old confessions. The General Synod in that and the
following years successfully resisted the movement. In
1854, a new formula of subscription applicable to candidates
for the ministry was introduced, less stringent and more
liberal than the old one. The orthodoxy party endeavoured
to make it more stringent, the liberals proposed to make it
still less so. In 1874, a majority of the General Synod
passed the following declaration:—</p>
<p>"The doctrine contained in the Netherland Confession,
the Heidelberg Catechism, and the Canons of the Synod
of Dort, forms the historical foundation of the Reformed
Church of the Netherlands.</p>
<p>"Inasmuch as this doctrine is not confessed with sufficient
unanimity by the community, there can, under the
existing circumstances, be no possibility of 'maintaining the
doctrine' in the ecclesiastical sense. The community,
building on the principles of the Church, as manifested in
her origin and development, continues to confess her Christian
faith, and thereby to form the expression which may
in course of time once more become the adequate and
unanimous Confession of the Church.</p>
<p>"Meantime, care for the interests of the Christian Church
in general and the Reformed in particular, quickening of
Christian religion and morality, increase of religious knowledge,
preservation of order and unity, and furtherance of
love for King and Fatherland—are ever the main object of
all to whom any ecclesiastical office is entrusted, and no one
can be rejected as a member or a teacher who, complying
with all other requirements, declares himself to be convinced
in his own conscience that in compliance with the above-named
principles, he may belong to the Reformed Church
of the Netherlands."<a name="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21"><sup>[21]</sup></a></p>
<p>This declaration, however, did not pass the Provincial
Church Courts, which possess the right of veto; and the
law therefore remained as it was. But, in 1881, a new
proposal for altering the formula of subscription passed the
General Synod. Next year, it was definitely approved, and
is now the law of the church. According to it, licentiates
to the Ministry, on being admitted by the Provincial Church
Courts, are made to promise that they will labour in the
Ministry according to their vocation with zeal and faithfulness;
that they will further with all their power the interests
of the kingdom of God, and, so far as consistent therewith,
the interests of the Dutch Reformed Church, and give
obedience to the regulations of that Church.</p>
<p>There is, however, both in orthodox and in semi-orthodox
circles, a wide-spread dissatisfaction with this amount of
latitude, and fears are entertained for its continuance.</p>
<p>FOOTNOTES:</p>
<a name="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20">[20]</a><div class="note"><p> The debates in this Synod were conducted with the highest ability on both
sides. Guizot took a part on the side of orthodoxy. The published report will be
found abstracted in the <i>British Quarterly</i>, No. CXIV.</p></div>
<a name="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21">[21]</a><div class="note"><p> Mr. Wicksteed makes the following curious remark:—"I am often asked
whether the 'Moderns' are Unitarians. The question is rather startling. It is as if
one were asked whether the majority of English astronomers had ceased to uphold
the Ptolemaic system yet. The best answer I can give is a reference to the chapter on
'God' in a popular work by Dr. Matthes which has run through four editions. In
this chapter there is not a word about the Trinity, but at the close occurs this footnote:
On the antiquated doctrine of the <i>Trinity</i>, see the fourteenth note at the end
of the book,—where, accordingly, the doctrine is expounded and its confusions
pointed out rather with the calm interest of the antiquarian than the eagerness of the
controversialist.'"</p></div>
<hr style="width: 45%;" />
<br />
<p>WORKS BY PROFESSOR BAIN.</p>
<br />
<p>A FIRST ENGLISH GRAMMAR, 90th Thousand.</p>
<p>A KEY, with additional Exercises.</p>
<p>A HIGHER ENGLISH GRAMMAR, 80th Thousand of</p>
<p>Revised Edition.</p>
<p>A COMPANION TO THE HIGHER GRAMMAR.</p>
<p>ENGLISH COMPOSITION AND RHETORIC.</p>
<p>LOGIC, in Two Parts—</p>
<p>DEDUCTION.</p>
<p>INDUCTION.</p>
<p>MENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE.</p>
<p><i>The same, in Two Parts</i>,</p>
<p>MENTAL SCIENCE—PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY.</p>
<p>MORAL SCIENCE—ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
AND ETHICAL SYSTEMS.</p>
<p>THE SENSES AND THE INTELLECT, 3rd Edition.</p>
<p>THE EMOTIONS AND THE WILL, 3rd Edition.</p>
<p>JOHN STUART MILL, a Criticism: with Personal Recollections.</p>
<p>JAMES MILL, a Biography.</p>
<pre>
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