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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Philebus + +Author: Plato + +Release Date: October 30, 2008 [EBook #1744] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILEBUS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + PHILEBUS + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + By Plato + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Contents + </h3> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> PHILEBUS </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + </h2> + <p> + The Philebus appears to be one of the later writings of Plato, in which + the style has begun to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has + become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the + development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the + Protagoras or the Phaedrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a + corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the + persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and + incompleteness in the general design. As in the speeches of Thucydides, + the multiplication of ideas seems to interfere with the power of + expression. Instead of the equally diffused grace and ease of the earlier + dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages; instead of the + ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, now concealed, but always + present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as we may venture to term + them. We may observe an attempt at artificial ornament, and far-fetched + modes of expression; also clamorous demands on the part of his companions, + that Socrates shall answer his own questions, as well as other defects of + style, which remind us of the Laws. The connection is often abrupt and + inharmonious, and far from clear. Many points require further explanation; + e.g. the reference of pleasure to the indefinite class, compared with the + assertion which almost immediately follows, that pleasure and pain + naturally have their seat in the third or mixed class: these two + statements are unreconciled. In like manner, the table of goods does not + distinguish between the two heads of measure and symmetry; and though a + hint is given that the divine mind has the first place, nothing is said of + this in the final summing up. The relation of the goods to the sciences + does not appear; though dialectic may be thought to correspond to the + highest good, the sciences and arts and true opinions are enumerated in + the fourth class. We seem to have an intimation of a further discussion, + in which some topics lightly passed over were to receive a fuller + consideration. The various uses of the word 'mixed,' for the mixed life, + the mixed class of elements, the mixture of pleasures, or of pleasure and + pain, are a further source of perplexity. Our ignorance of the opinions + which Plato is attacking is also an element of obscurity. Many things in a + controversy might seem relevant, if we knew to what they were intended to + refer. But no conjecture will enable us to supply what Plato has not told + us; or to explain, from our fragmentary knowledge of them, the relation in + which his doctrine stood to the Eleatic Being or the Megarian good, or to + the theories of Aristippus or Antisthenes respecting pleasure. Nor are we + able to say how far Plato in the Philebus conceives the finite and + infinite (which occur both in the fragments of Philolaus and in the + Pythagorean table of opposites) in the same manner as contemporary + Pythagoreans. + </p> + <p> + There is little in the characters which is worthy of remark. The Socrates + of the Philebus is devoid of any touch of Socratic irony, though here, as + in the Phaedrus, he twice attributes the flow of his ideas to a sudden + inspiration. The interlocutor Protarchus, the son of Callias, who has been + a hearer of Gorgias, is supposed to begin as a disciple of the partisans + of pleasure, but is drawn over to the opposite side by the arguments of + Socrates. The instincts of ingenuous youth are easily induced to take the + better part. Philebus, who has withdrawn from the argument, is several + times brought back again, that he may support pleasure, of which he + remains to the end the uncompromising advocate. On the other hand, the + youthful group of listeners by whom he is surrounded, 'Philebus' boys' as + they are termed, whose presence is several times intimated, are described + as all of them at last convinced by the arguments of Socrates. They bear a + very faded resemblance to the interested audiences of the Charmides, + Lysis, or Protagoras. Other signs of relation to external life in the + dialogue, or references to contemporary things and persons, with the + single exception of the allusions to the anonymous enemies of pleasure, + and the teachers of the flux, there are none. + </p> + <p> + The omission of the doctrine of recollection, derived from a previous + state of existence, is a note of progress in the philosophy of Plato. The + transcendental theory of pre-existent ideas, which is chiefly discussed by + him in the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Phaedrus, has given way to a + psychological one. The omission is rendered more significant by his having + occasion to speak of memory as the basis of desire. Of the ideas he treats + in the same sceptical spirit which appears in his criticism of them in the + Parmenides. He touches on the same difficulties and he gives no answer to + them. His mode of speaking of the analytical and synthetical processes may + be compared with his discussion of the same subject in the Phaedrus; here + he dwells on the importance of dividing the genera into all the species, + while in the Phaedrus he conveys the same truth in a figure, when he + speaks of carving the whole, which is described under the image of a + victim, into parts or members, 'according to their natural articulation, + without breaking any of them.' There is also a difference, which may be + noted, between the two dialogues. For whereas in the Phaedrus, and also in + the Symposium, the dialectician is described as a sort of enthusiast or + lover, in the Philebus, as in all the later writings of Plato, the element + of love is wanting; the topic is only introduced, as in the Republic, by + way of illustration. On other subjects of which they treat in common, such + as the nature and kinds of pleasure, true and false opinion, the nature of + the good, the order and relation of the sciences, the Republic is less + advanced than the Philebus, which contains, perhaps, more metaphysical + truth more obscurely expressed than any other Platonic dialogue. Here, as + Plato expressly tells us, he is 'forging weapons of another make,' i.e. + new categories and modes of conception, though 'some of the old ones might + do again.' + </p> + <p> + But if superior in thought and dialectical power, the Philebus falls very + far short of the Republic in fancy and feeling. The development of the + reason undisturbed by the emotions seems to be the ideal at which Plato + aims in his later dialogues. There is no mystic enthusiasm or rapturous + contemplation of ideas. Whether we attribute this change to the greater + feebleness of age, or to the development of the quarrel between philosophy + and poetry in Plato's own mind, or perhaps, in some degree, to a + carelessness about artistic effect, when he was absorbed in abstract + ideas, we can hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety of + indications, derived from style as well as subject, that the Philebus + belongs to the later period of his life and authorship. But in this, as in + all the later writings of Plato, there are not wanting thoughts and + expressions in which he rises to his highest level. + </p> + <p> + The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders the + progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas seem to + emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original elements, the + kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of goods. These are + only partially connected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly + entitled 'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good,' but should rather be + described as treating of the relations of pleasure and knowledge, after + they have been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The question is asked, + whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some nature higher than + either; and if the latter, how pleasure and wisdom are related to this + higher good. (2) Before we can reply with exactness, we must know the + kinds of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge. (3) But still we may affirm + generally, that the combined life of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge has + more of the character of the good than either of them when isolated. (4) + to determine which of them partakes most of the higher nature, we must + know under which of the four unities or elements they respectively fall. + These are, first, the infinite; secondly, the finite; thirdly, the union + of the two; fourthly, the cause of the union. Pleasure is of the first, + wisdom or knowledge of the third class, while reason or mind is akin to + the fourth or highest. + </p> + <p> + (5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed and unmixed. Of mixed pleasures + there are three classes—(a) those in which both the pleasures and + pains are corporeal, as in eating and hunger; (b) those in which there is + a pain of the body and pleasure of the mind, as when you are hungry and + are looking forward to a feast; (c) those in which the pleasure and pain + are both mental. Of unmixed pleasures there are four kinds: those of + sight, hearing, smell, knowledge. + </p> + <p> + (6) The sciences are likewise divided into two classes, theoretical and + productive: of the latter, one part is pure, the other impure. The pure + part consists of arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing. Arts like + carpentering, which have an exact measure, are to be regarded as higher + than music, which for the most part is mere guess-work. But there is also + a higher arithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusively + theoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still and the + truest and purest knowledge. + </p> + <p> + (7) We are now able to determine the composition of the perfect life. + First, we admit the pure pleasures and the pure sciences; secondly, the + impure sciences, but not the impure pleasures. We have next to discover + what element of goodness is contained in this mixture. There are three + criteria of goodness—beauty, symmetry, truth. These are clearly more + akin to reason than to pleasure, and will enable us to fix the places of + both of them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure; the + second place is assigned to symmetry; the third, to reason and wisdom; the + fourth, to knowledge and true opinion; the fifth, to pure pleasures; and + here the Muse says 'Enough.' + </p> + <p> + 'Bidding farewell to Philebus and Socrates,' we may now consider the + metaphysical conceptions which are presented to us. These are (I) the + paradox of unity and plurality; (II) the table of categories or elements; + (III) the kinds of pleasure; (IV) the kinds of knowledge; (V) the + conception of the good. We may then proceed to examine (VI) the relation + of the Philebus to the Republic, and to other dialogues. + </p> + <p> + I. The paradox of the one and many originated in the restless dialectic of + Zeno, who sought to prove the absolute existence of the one by showing the + contradictions that are involved in admitting the existence of the many + (compare Parm.). Zeno illustrated the contradiction by well-known examples + taken from outward objects. But Socrates seems to intimate that the time + had arrived for discarding these hackneyed illustrations; such + difficulties had long been solved by common sense ('solvitur ambulando'); + the fact of the co-existence of opposites was a sufficient answer to them. + He will leave them to Cynics and Eristics; the youth of Athens may + discourse of them to their parents. To no rational man could the + circumstance that the body is one, but has many members, be any longer a + stumbling-block. + </p> + <p> + Plato's difficulty seems to begin in the region of ideas. He cannot + understand how an absolute unity, such as the Eleatic Being, can be broken + up into a number of individuals, or be in and out of them at once. + Philosophy had so deepened or intensified the nature of one or Being, by + the thoughts of successive generations, that the mind could no longer + imagine 'Being' as in a state of change or division. To say that the verb + of existence is the copula, or that unity is a mere unit, is to us easy; + but to the Greek in a particular stage of thought such an analysis + involved the same kind of difficulty as the conception of God existing + both in and out of the world would to ourselves. Nor was he assisted by + the analogy of sensible objects. The sphere of mind was dark and + mysterious to him; but instead of being illustrated by sense, the greatest + light appeared to be thrown on the nature of ideas when they were + contrasted with sense. + </p> + <p> + Both here and in the Parmenides, where similar difficulties are raised, + Plato seems prepared to desert his ancient ground. He cannot tell the + relation in which abstract ideas stand to one another, and therefore he + transfers the one and many out of his transcendental world, and proceeds + to lay down practical rules for their application to different branches of + knowledge. As in the Republic he supposes the philosopher to proceed by + regular steps, until he arrives at the idea of good; as in the Sophist and + Politicus he insists that in dividing the whole into its parts we should + bisect in the middle in the hope of finding species; as in the Phaedrus + (see above) he would have 'no limb broken' of the organism of knowledge;—so + in the Philebus he urges the necessity of filling up all the intermediate + links which occur (compare Bacon's 'media axiomata') in the passage from + unity to infinity. With him the idea of science may be said to anticipate + science; at a time when the sciences were not yet divided, he wants to + impress upon us the importance of classification; neither neglecting the + many individuals, nor attempting to count them all, but finding the genera + and species under which they naturally fall. Here, then, and in the + parallel passages of the Phaedrus and of the Sophist, is found the germ of + the most fruitful notion of modern science. + </p> + <p> + Plato describes with ludicrous exaggeration the influence exerted by the + one and many on the minds of young men in their first fervour of + metaphysical enthusiasm (compare Republic). But they are none the less an + everlasting quality of reason or reasoning which never grows old in us. At + first we have but a confused conception of them, analogous to the eyes + blinking at the light in the Republic. To this Plato opposes the + revelation from Heaven of the real relations of them, which some + Prometheus, who gave the true fire from heaven, is supposed to have + imparted to us. Plato is speaking of two things—(1) the crude notion + of the one and many, which powerfully affects the ordinary mind when first + beginning to think; (2) the same notion when cleared up by the help of + dialectic. + </p> + <p> + To us the problem of the one and many has lost its chief interest and + perplexity. We readily acknowledge that a whole has many parts, that the + continuous is also the divisible, that in all objects of sense there is a + one and many, and that a like principle may be applied to analogy to + purely intellectual conceptions. If we attend to the meaning of the words, + we are compelled to admit that two contradictory statements are true. But + the antinomy is so familiar as to be scarcely observed by us. Our sense of + the contradiction, like Plato's, only begins in a higher sphere, when we + speak of necessity and free-will, of mind and body, of Three Persons and + One Substance, and the like. The world of knowledge is always dividing + more and more; every truth is at first the enemy of every other truth. Yet + without this division there can be no truth; nor any complete truth + without the reunion of the parts into a whole. And hence the coexistence + of opposites in the unity of the idea is regarded by Hegel as the supreme + principle of philosophy; and the law of contradiction, which is affirmed + by logicians to be an ultimate principle of the human mind, is displaced + by another law, which asserts the coexistence of contradictories as + imperfect and divided elements of the truth. Without entering further into + the depths of Hegelianism, we may remark that this and all similar + attempts to reconcile antinomies have their origin in the old Platonic + problem of the 'One and Many.' + </p> + <p> + II. 1. The first of Plato's categories or elements is the infinite. This + is the negative of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the unknowable; of + which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded + distinct kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression of + sense; the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having + certain affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which in + the scale of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good. To a + Greek of the age of Plato, the idea of an infinite mind would have been an + absurdity. He would have insisted that 'the good is of the nature of the + finite,' and that the infinite is a mere negative, which is on the level + of sensation, and not of thought. He was aware that there was a + distinction between the infinitely great and the infinitely small, but he + would have equally denied the claim of either to true existence. Of that + positive infinity, or infinite reality, which we attribute to God, he had + no conception. + </p> + <p> + The Greek conception of the infinite would be more truly described, in our + way of speaking, as the indefinite. To us, the notion of infinity is + subsequent rather than prior to the finite, expressing not absolute + vacancy or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which we + suppose to exist not before but after we have already set bounds to + thought and matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different + points of view, either the finite or infinite may be looked upon + respectively both as positive and negative (compare 'Omnis determinatio + est negatio')' and the conception of the one determines that of the other. + The Greeks and the moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite poles in + their manner of regarding them. And both are surprised when they make the + discovery, as Plato has done in the Sophist, how large an element negation + forms in the framework of their thoughts. + </p> + <p> + 2, 3. The finite element which mingles with and regulates the infinite is + best expressed to us by the word 'law.' It is that which measures all + things and assigns to them their limit; which preserves them in their + natural state, and brings them within the sphere of human cognition. This + is described by the terms harmony, health, order, perfection, and the + like. All things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which are + for the most part indefinite, partake of this element. We should be wrong + in attributing to Plato the conception of laws of nature derived from + observation and experiment. And yet he has as intense a conviction as any + modern philosopher that nature does not proceed by chance. But observing + that the wonderful construction of number and figure, which he had within + himself, and which seemed to be prior to himself, explained a part of the + phenomena of the external world, he extended their principles to the + whole, finding in them the true type both of human life and of the order + of nature. + </p> + <p> + Two other points may be noticed respecting the third class. First, that + Plato seems to be unconscious of any interval or chasm which separates the + finite from the infinite. The one is in various ways and degrees working + in the other. Hence he has implicitly answered the difficulty with which + he started, of how the one could remain one and yet be divided among many + individuals, or 'how ideas could be in and out of themselves,' and the + like. Secondly, that in this mixed class we find the idea of beauty. Good, + when exhibited under the aspect of measure or symmetry, becomes beauty. + And if we translate his language into corresponding modern terms, we shall + not be far wrong in saying that here, as well as in the Republic, Plato + conceives beauty under the idea of proportion. + </p> + <p> + 4. Last and highest in the list of principles or elements is the cause of + the union of the finite and infinite, to which Plato ascribes the order of + the world. Reasoning from man to the universe, he argues that as there is + a mind in the one, there must be a mind in the other, which he identifies + with the royal mind of Zeus. This is the first cause of which 'our + ancestors spoke,' as he says, appealing to tradition, in the Philebus as + well as in the Timaeus. The 'one and many' is also supposed to have been + revealed by tradition. For the mythical element has not altogether + disappeared. + </p> + <p> + Some characteristic differences may here be noted, which distinguish the + ancient from the modern mode of conceiving God. + </p> + <p> + a. To Plato, the idea of God or mind is both personal and impersonal. Nor + in ascribing, as appears to us, both these attributes to him, and in + speaking of God both in the masculine and neuter gender, did he seem to + himself inconsistent. For the difference between the personal and + impersonal was not marked to him as to ourselves. We make a fundamental + distinction between a thing and a person, while to Plato, by the help of + various intermediate abstractions, such as end, good, cause, they appear + almost to meet in one, or to be two aspects of the same. Hence, without + any reconciliation or even remark, in the Republic he speaks at one time + of God or Gods, and at another time of the Good. So in the Phaedrus he + seems to pass unconsciously from the concrete to the abstract conception + of the Ideas in the same dialogue. Nor in the Philebus is he careful to + show in what relation the idea of the divine mind stands to the supreme + principle of measure. + </p> + <p> + b. Again, to us there is a strongly-marked distinction between a first + cause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause + with God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work. But + Plato, though not a Pantheist, and very far from confounding God with the + world, tends to identify the first with the final cause. The cause of the + union of the finite and infinite might be described as a higher law; the + final measure which is the highest expression of the good may also be + described as the supreme law. Both these conceptions are realized chiefly + by the help of the material world; and therefore when we pass into the + sphere of ideas can hardly be distinguished. + </p> + <p> + The four principles are required for the determination of the relative + places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should + proceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before + assigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first find + out and arrange in order the general principles of things. Mind is + ascertained to be akin to the nature of the cause, while pleasure is found + in the infinite or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide pleasure + and knowledge after their kinds. + </p> + <p> + III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a + generation, and in all these points of view as in a category distinct from + good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of the + nature of the finite,' and, like virtue, either is, or is nearly allied + to, knowledge. The modern philosopher would remark that the indefinite is + equally real with the definite. Health and mental qualities are in the + concrete undefined; they are nevertheless real goods, and Plato rightly + regards them as falling under the finite class. Again, we are able to + define objects or ideas, not in so far as they are in the mind, but in so + far as they are manifested externally, and can therefore be reduced to + rule and measure. And if we adopt the test of definiteness, the pleasures + of the body are more capable of being defined than any other pleasures. As + in art and knowledge generally, we proceed from without inwards, beginning + with facts of sense, and passing to the more ideal conceptions of mental + pleasure, happiness, and the like. + </p> + <p> + 2. Pleasure is depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as absolute. + But this distinction seems to arise from an unfair mode of regarding them; + the abstract idea of the one is compared with the concrete experience of + the other. For all pleasure and all knowledge may be viewed either + abstracted from the mind, or in relation to the mind (compare Aristot. + Nic. Ethics). The first is an idea only, which may be conceived as + absolute and unchangeable, and then the abstract idea of pleasure will be + equally unchangeable with that of knowledge. But when we come to view + either as phenomena of consciousness, the same defects are for the most + part incident to both of them. Our hold upon them is equally transient and + uncertain; the mind cannot be always in a state of intellectual tension, + any more than capable of feeling pleasure always. The knowledge which is + at one time clear and distinct, at another seems to fade away, just as the + pleasure of health after sickness, or of eating after hunger, soon passes + into a neutral state of unconsciousness and indifference. Change and + alternation are necessary for the mind as well as for the body; and in + this is to be acknowledged, not an element of evil, but rather a law of + nature. The chief difference between subjective pleasure and subjective + knowledge in respect of permanence is that the latter, when our feeble + faculties are able to grasp it, still conveys to us an idea of + unchangeableness which cannot be got rid of. + </p> + <p> + 3. In the language of ancient philosophy, the relative character of + pleasure is described as becoming or generation. This is relative to Being + or Essence, and from one point of view may be regarded as the Heraclitean + flux in contrast with the Eleatic Being; from another, as the transient + enjoyment of eating and drinking compared with the supposed permanence of + intellectual pleasures. But to us the distinction is unmeaning, and + belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed away. Plato himself + seems to have suspected that the continuance or life of things is quite as + much to be attributed to a principle of rest as of motion (compare Charm. + Cratyl.). A later view of pleasure is found in Aristotle, who agrees with + Plato in many points, e.g. in his view of pleasure as a restoration to + nature, in his distinction between bodily and mental, between necessary + and non-necessary pleasures. But he is also in advance of Plato; for he + affirms that pleasure is not in the body at all; and hence not even the + bodily pleasures are to be spoken of as generations, but only as + accompanied by generation (Nic. Eth.). + </p> + <p> + 4. Plato attempts to identify vicious pleasures with some form of error, + and insists that the term false may be applied to them: in this he appears + to be carrying out in a confused manner the Socratic doctrine, that virtue + is knowledge, vice ignorance. He will allow of no distinction between the + pleasures and the erroneous opinions on which they are founded, whether + arising out of the illusion of distance or not. But to this we naturally + reply with Protarchus, that the pleasure is what it is, although the + calculation may be false, or the after-effects painful. It is difficult to + acquit Plato, to use his own language, of being a 'tyro in dialectics,' + when he overlooks such a distinction. Yet, on the other hand, we are + hardly fair judges of confusions of thought in those who view things + differently from ourselves. + </p> + <p> + 5. There appears also to be an incorrectness in the notion which occurs + both here and in the Gorgias, of the simultaneousness of merely bodily + pleasures and pains. We may, perhaps, admit, though even this is not free + from doubt, that the feeling of pleasureable hope or recollection is, or + rather may be, simultaneous with acute bodily suffering. But there is no + such coexistence of the pain of thirst with the pleasures of drinking; + they are not really simultaneous, for the one expels the other. Nor does + Plato seem to have considered that the bodily pleasures, except in certain + extreme cases, are unattended with pain. Few philosophers will deny that a + degree of pleasure attends eating and drinking; and yet surely we might as + well speak of the pains of digestion which follow, as of the pains of + hunger and thirst which precede them. Plato's conception is derived partly + from the extreme case of a man suffering pain from hunger or thirst, + partly from the image of a full and empty vessel. But the truth is rather, + that while the gratification of our bodily desires constantly affords some + degree of pleasure, the antecedent pains are scarcely perceived by us, + being almost done away with by use and regularity. + </p> + <p> + 6. The desire to classify pleasures as accompanied or not accompanied by + antecedent pains, has led Plato to place under one head the pleasures of + smell and sight, as well as those derived from sounds of music and from + knowledge. He would have done better to make a separate class of the + pleasures of smell, having no association of mind, or perhaps to have + divided them into natural and artificial. The pleasures of sight and sound + might then have been regarded as being the expression of ideas. But this + higher and truer point of view never appears to have occurred to Plato. + Nor has he any distinction between the fine arts and the mechanical; and, + neither here nor anywhere, an adequate conception of the beautiful in + external things. + </p> + <p> + 7. Plato agrees partially with certain 'surly or fastidious' philosophers, + as he terms them, who defined pleasure to be the absence of pain. They are + also described as eminent in physics. There is unfortunately no school of + Greek philosophy known to us which combined these two characteristics. + Antisthenes, who was an enemy of pleasure, was not a physical philosopher; + the atomists, who were physical philosophers, were not enemies of + pleasure. Yet such a combination of opinions is far from being impossible. + Plato's omission to mention them by name has created the same uncertainty + respecting them which also occurs respecting the 'friends of the ideas' + and the 'materialists' in the Sophist. + </p> + <p> + On the whole, this discussion is one of the least satisfactory in the + dialogues of Plato. While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely + considered, and the merely physical phenomenon imperfectly analysed, too + much weight is given to ideas of measure and number, as the sole principle + of good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really a comparison + of two elements, which have no common measure, and which cannot be + excluded from each other. Feeling is not opposed to knowledge, and in all + consciousness there is an element of both. The most abstract kinds of + knowledge are inseparable from some pleasure or pain, which accompanies + the acquisition or possession of them: the student is liable to grow weary + of them, and soon discovers that continuous mental energy is not granted + to men. The most sensual pleasure, on the other hand, is inseparable from + the consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who, to borrow Plato's + illustration, is leading the life of an oyster. Hence (by his own + confession) the main thesis is not worth determining; the real interest + lies in the incidental discussion. We can no more separate pleasure from + knowledge in the Philebus than we can separate justice from happiness in + the Republic. + </p> + <p> + IV. An interesting account is given in the Philebus of the rank and order + of the sciences or arts, which agrees generally with the scheme of + knowledge in the Sixth Book of the Republic. The chief difference is, that + the position of the arts is more exactly defined. They are divided into an + empirical part and a scientific part, of which the first is mere + guess-work, the second is determined by rule and measure. Of the more + empirical arts, music is given as an example; this, although affirmed to + be necessary to human life, is depreciated. Music is regarded from a point + of view entirely opposite to that of the Republic, not as a sublime + science, coordinate with astronomy, but as full of doubt and conjecture. + According to the standard of accuracy which is here adopted, it is rightly + placed lower in the scale than carpentering, because the latter is more + capable of being reduced to measure. + </p> + <p> + The theoretical element of the arts may also become a purely abstract + science, when separated from matter, and is then said to be pure and + unmixed. The distinction which Plato here makes seems to be the same as + that between pure and applied mathematics, and may be expressed in the + modern formula—science is art theoretical, art is science practical. + In the reason which he gives for the superiority of the pure science of + number over the mixed or applied, we can only agree with him in part. He + says that the numbers which the philosopher employs are always the same, + whereas the numbers which are used in practice represent different sizes + or quantities. He does not see that this power of expressing different + quantities by the same symbol is the characteristic and not the defect of + numbers, and is due to their abstract nature;—although we admit of + course what Plato seems to feel in his distinctions between pure and + impure knowledge, that the imperfection of matter enters into the + applications of them. + </p> + <p> + Above the other sciences, as in the Republic, towers dialectic, which is + the science of eternal Being, apprehended by the purest mind and reason. + The lower sciences, including the mathematical, are akin to opinion rather + than to reason, and are placed together in the fourth class of goods. The + relation in which they stand to dialectic is obscure in the Republic, and + is not cleared up in the Philebus. + </p> + <p> + V. Thus far we have only attained to the vestibule or ante-chamber of the + good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding essence, which, + like Glaucon in the Republic, we find a difficulty in apprehending. This + good is now to be exhibited to us under various aspects and gradations. + The relative dignity of pleasure and knowledge has been determined; but + they have not yet received their exact position in the scale of goods. + Some difficulties occur to us in the enumeration: First, how are we to + distinguish the first from the second class of goods, or the second from + the third? Secondly, why is there no mention of the supreme mind? Thirdly, + the nature of the fourth class. Fourthly, the meaning of the allusion to a + sixth class, which is not further investigated. + </p> + <p> + (I) Plato seems to proceed in his table of goods, from the more abstract + to the less abstract; from the subjective to the objective; until at the + lower end of the scale we fairly descend into the region of human action + and feeling. To him, the greater the abstraction the greater the truth, + and he is always tending to see abstractions within abstractions; which, + like the ideas in the Parmenides, are always appearing one behind another. + Hence we find a difficulty in following him into the sphere of thought + which he is seeking to attain. First in his scale of goods he places + measure, in which he finds the eternal nature: this would be more + naturally expressed in modern language as eternal law, and seems to be + akin both to the finite and to the mind or cause, which were two of the + elements in the former table. Like the supreme nature in the Timaeus, like + the ideal beauty in the Symposium or the Phaedrus, or like the ideal good + in the Republic, this is the absolute and unapproachable being. But this + being is manifested in symmetry and beauty everywhere, in the order of + nature and of mind, in the relations of men to one another. For the word + 'measure' he now substitutes the word 'symmetry,' as if intending to + express measure conceived as relation. He then proceeds to regard the good + no longer in an objective form, but as the human reason seeking to attain + truth by the aid of dialectic; such at least we naturally infer to be his + meaning, when we consider that both here and in the Republic the sphere of + nous or mind is assigned to dialectic. (2) It is remarkable (see above) + that this personal conception of mind is confined to the human mind, and + not extended to the divine. (3) If we may be allowed to interpret one + dialogue of Plato by another, the sciences of figure and number are + probably classed with the arts and true opinions, because they proceed + from hypotheses (compare Republic). (4) The sixth class, if a sixth class + is to be added, is playfully set aside by a quotation from Orpheus: Plato + means to say that a sixth class, if there be such a class, is not worth + considering, because pleasure, having only gained the fifth place in the + scale of goods, is already out of the running. + </p> + <p> + VI. We may now endeavour to ascertain the relation of the Philebus to the + other dialogues. Here Plato shows the same indifference to his own + doctrine of Ideas which he has already manifested in the Parmenides and + the Sophist. The principle of the one and many of which he here speaks, is + illustrated by examples in the Sophist and Statesman. Notwithstanding the + differences of style, many resemblances may be noticed between the + Philebus and Gorgias. The theory of the simultaneousness of pleasure and + pain is common to both of them (Phil. Gorg.); there is also a common + tendency in them to take up arms against pleasure, although the view of + the Philebus, which is probably the later of the two dialogues, is the + more moderate. There seems to be an allusion to the passage in the + Gorgias, in which Socrates dilates on the pleasures of itching and + scratching. Nor is there any real discrepancy in the manner in which + Gorgias and his art are spoken of in the two dialogues. For Socrates is + far from implying that the art of rhetoric has a real sphere of practical + usefulness: he only means that the refutation of the claims of Gorgias is + not necessary for his present purpose. He is saying in effect: 'Admit, if + you please, that rhetoric is the greatest and usefullest of sciences:—this + does not prove that dialectic is not the purest and most exact.' From the + Sophist and Statesman we know that his hostility towards the sophists and + rhetoricians was not mitigated in later life; although both in the + Statesman and Laws he admits of a higher use of rhetoric. + </p> + <p> + Reasons have been already given for assigning a late date to the Philebus. + That the date is probably later than that of the Republic, may be further + argued on the following grounds:—1. The general resemblance to the + later dialogues and to the Laws: 2. The more complete account of the + nature of good and pleasure: 3. The distinction between perception, + memory, recollection, and opinion which indicates a great progress in + psychology; also between understanding and imagination, which is described + under the figure of the scribe and the painter. A superficial notion may + arise that Plato probably wrote shorter dialogues, such as the Philebus, + the Sophist, and the Statesman, as studies or preparations for longer + ones. This view may be natural; but on further reflection is seen to be + fallacious, because these three dialogues are found to make an advance + upon the metaphysical conceptions of the Republic. And we can more easily + suppose that Plato composed shorter writings after longer ones, than + suppose that he lost hold of further points of view which he had once + attained. + </p> + <p> + It is more easy to find traces of the Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Megarians, + Cynics, Cyrenaics and of the ideas of Anaxagoras, in the Philebus, than to + say how much is due to each of them. Had we fuller records of those old + philosophers, we should probably find Plato in the midst of the fray + attempting to combine Eleatic and Pythagorean doctrines, and seeking to + find a truth beyond either Being or number; setting up his own concrete + conception of good against the abstract practical good of the Cynics, or + the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians, and his own idea of + classification against the denial of plurality in unity which is also + attributed to them; warring against the Eristics as destructive of truth, + as he had formerly fought against the Sophists; taking up a middle + position between the Cynics and Cyrenaics in his doctrine of pleasure; + asserting with more consistency than Anaxagoras the existence of an + intelligent mind and cause. Of the Heracliteans, whom he is said by + Aristotle to have cultivated in his youth, he speaks in the Philebus, as + in the Theaetetus and Cratylus, with irony and contempt. But we have not + the knowledge which would enable us to pursue further the line of + reflection here indicated; nor can we expect to find perfect clearness or + order in the first efforts of mankind to understand the working of their + own minds. The ideas which they are attempting to analyse, they are also + in process of creating; the abstract universals of which they are seeking + to adjust the relations have been already excluded by them from the + category of relation. + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + The Philebus, like the Cratylus, is supposed to be the continuation of a + previous discussion. An argument respecting the comparative claims of + pleasure and wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already carried on + between Philebus and Socrates. The argument is now transferred to + Protarchus, the son of Callias, a noble Athenian youth, sprung from a + family which had spent 'a world of money' on the Sophists (compare Apol.; + Crat.; Protag.). Philebus, who appears to be the teacher, or elder friend, + and perhaps the lover, of Protarchus, takes no further part in the + discussion beyond asserting in the strongest manner his adherence, under + all circumstances, to the cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p> + Socrates suggests that they shall have a first and second palm of victory. + For there may be a good higher than either pleasure or wisdom, and then + neither of them will gain the first prize, but whichever of the two is + more akin to this higher good will have a right to the second. They agree, + and Socrates opens the game by enlarging on the diversity and opposition + which exists among pleasures. For there are pleasures of all kinds, good + and bad, wise and foolish—pleasures of the temperate as well as of + the intemperate. Protarchus replies that although pleasures may be opposed + in so far as they spring from opposite sources, nevertheless as pleasures + they are alike. Yes, retorts Socrates, pleasure is like pleasure, as + figure is like figure and colour like colour; yet we all know that there + is great variety among figures and colours. Protarchus does not see the + drift of this remark; and Socrates proceeds to ask how he can have a right + to attribute a new predicate (i.e. 'good') to pleasures in general, when + he cannot deny that they are different? What common property in all of + them does he mean to indicate by the term 'good'? If he continues to + assert that there is some trivial sense in which pleasure is one, Socrates + may retort by saying that knowledge is one, but the result will be that + such merely verbal and trivial conceptions, whether of knowledge or + pleasure, will spoil the discussion, and will prove the incapacity of the + two disputants. In order to avoid this danger, he proposes that they shall + beat a retreat, and, before they proceed, come to an understanding about + the 'high argument' of the one and the many. + </p> + <p> + Protarchus agrees to the proposal, but he is under the impression that + Socrates means to discuss the common question—how a sensible object + can be one, and yet have opposite attributes, such as 'great' and 'small,' + 'light' and 'heavy,' or how there can be many members in one body, and the + like wonders. Socrates has long ceased to see any wonder in these + phenomena; his difficulties begin with the application of number to + abstract unities (e.g.'man,' 'good') and with the attempt to divide them. + For have these unities of idea any real existence? How, if imperishable, + can they enter into the world of generation? How, as units, can they be + divided and dispersed among different objects? Or do they exist in their + entirety in each object? These difficulties are but imperfectly answered + by Socrates in what follows. + </p> + <p> + We speak of a one and many, which is ever flowing in and out of all + things, concerning which a young man often runs wild in his first + metaphysical enthusiasm, talking about analysis and synthesis to his + father and mother and the neighbours, hardly sparing even his dog. This + 'one in many' is a revelation of the order of the world, which some + Prometheus first made known to our ancestors; and they, who were better + men and nearer the gods than we are, have handed it down to us. To know + how to proceed by regular steps from one to many, and from many to one, is + just what makes the difference between eristic and dialectic. And the + right way of proceeding is to look for one idea or class in all things, + and when you have found one to look for more than one, and for all that + there are, and when you have found them all and regularly divided a + particular field of knowledge into classes, you may leave the further + consideration of individuals. But you must not pass at once either from + unity to infinity, or from infinity to unity. In music, for example, you + may begin with the most general notion, but this alone will not make you a + musician: you must know also the number and nature of the intervals, and + the systems which are framed out of them, and the rhythms of the dance + which correspond to them. And when you have a similar knowledge of any + other subject, you may be said to know that subject. In speech again there + are infinite varieties of sound, and some one who was a wise man, or more + than man, comprehended them all in the classes of mutes, vowels, and + semivowels, and gave to each of them a name, and assigned them to the art + of grammar. + </p> + <p> + 'But whither, Socrates, are you going? And what has this to do with the + comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom:' Socrates replies, that + before we can adjust their respective claims, we want to know the number + and kinds of both of them. What are they? He is requested to answer the + question himself. That he will, if he may be allowed to make one or two + preliminary remarks. In the first place he has a dreamy recollection of + hearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, for the + good should be perfect and sufficient. But is the life of pleasure perfect + and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness, anticipation? Is + not this the life of an oyster? Or is the life of mind sufficient, if + devoid of any particle of pleasure? Must not the union of the two be + higher and more eligible than either separately? And is not the element + which makes this mixed life eligible more akin to mind than to pleasure? + Thus pleasure is rejected and mind is rejected. And yet there may be a + life of mind, not human but divine, which conquers still. + </p> + <p> + But, if we are to pursue this argument further, we shall require some new + weapons; and by this, I mean a new classification of existence. (1) There + is a finite element of existence, and (2) an infinite, and (3) the union + of the two, and (4) the cause of the union. More may be added if they are + wanted, but at present we can do without them. And first of the infinite + or indefinite:—That is the class which is denoted by the terms more + or less, and is always in a state of comparison. All words or ideas to + which the words 'gently,' 'extremely,' and other comparative expressions + are applied, fall under this class. The infinite would be no longer + infinite, if limited or reduced to measure by number and quantity. The + opposite class is the limited or finite, and includes all things which + have number and quantity. And there is a third class of generation into + essence by the union of the finite and infinite, in which the finite gives + law to the infinite;—under this are comprehended health, strength, + temperate seasons, harmony, beauty, and the like. The goddess of beauty + saw the universal wantonness of all things, and gave law and order to be + the salvation of the soul. But no effect can be generated without a cause, + and therefore there must be a fourth class, which is the cause of + generation; for the cause or agent is not the same as the patient or + effect. + </p> + <p> + And now, having obtained our classes, we may determine in which our + conqueror life is to be placed: Clearly in the third or mixed class, in + which the finite gives law to the infinite. And in which is pleasure to + find a place? As clearly in the infinite or indefinite, which alone, as + Protarchus thinks (who seems to confuse the infinite with the + superlative), gives to pleasure the character of the absolute good. Yes, + retorts Socrates, and also to pain the character of absolute evil. And + therefore the infinite cannot be that which imparts to pleasure the nature + of the good. But where shall we place mind? That is a very serious and + awful question, which may be prefaced by another. Is mind or chance the + lord of the universe? All philosophers will say the first, and yet, + perhaps, they may be only magnifying themselves. And for this reason I + should like to consider the matter a little more deeply, even though some + lovers of disorder in the world should ridicule my attempt. + </p> + <p> + Now the elements earth, air, fire, water, exist in us, and they exist in + the cosmos; but they are purer and fairer in the cosmos than they are in + us, and they come to us from thence. And as we have a soul as well as a + body, in like manner the elements of the finite, the infinite, the union + of the two, and the cause, are found to exist in us. And if they, like the + elements, exist in us, and the three first exist in the world, must not + the fourth or cause which is the noblest of them, exist in the world? And + this cause is wisdom or mind, the royal mind of Zeus, who is the king of + all, as there are other gods who have other noble attributes. Observe how + well this agrees with the testimony of men of old, who affirmed mind to be + the ruler of the universe. And remember that mind belongs to the class + which we term the cause, and pleasure to the infinite or indefinite class. + We will examine the place and origin of both. + </p> + <p> + What is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the mixed class, in + which health and harmony were placed. Pain is the violation, and pleasure + the restoration of limit. There is a natural union of finite and infinite, + which in hunger, thirst, heat, cold, is impaired—this is painful, + but the return to nature, in which the elements are restored to their + normal proportions, is pleasant. Here is our first class of pleasures. And + another class of pleasures and pains are hopes and fears; these are in the + mind only. And inasmuch as the pleasures are unalloyed by pains and the + pains by pleasures, the examination of them may show us whether all + pleasure is to be desired, or whether this entire desirableness is not + rather the attribute of another class. But if pleasures and pains consist + in the violation and restoration of limit, may there not be a neutral + state, in which there is neither dissolution nor restoration? That is a + further question, and admitting, as we must, the possibility of such a + state, there seems to be no reason why the life of wisdom should not exist + in this neutral state, which is, moreover, the state of the gods, who + cannot, without indecency, be supposed to feel either joy or sorrow. + </p> + <p> + The second class of pleasures involves memory. There are affections which + are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there is no + consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are affections which the + body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed consciousness. And + memory is the preservation of consciousness, and reminiscence is the + recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of pleasure, when a man is in + pain, is the memory of the opposite of his actual bodily state, and is + therefore not in the body, but in the mind. And there may be an + intermediate state, in which a person is balanced between pleasure and + pain; in his body there is want which is a cause of pain, but in his mind + a sure hope of replenishment, which is pleasant. (But if the hope be + converted into despair, he has two pains and not a balance of pain and + pleasure.) Another question is raised: May not pleasures, like opinions, + be true and false? In the sense of being real, both must be admitted to be + true: nor can we deny that to both of them qualities may be attributed; + for pleasures as well as opinions may be described as good or bad. And + though we do not all of us allow that there are true and false pleasures, + we all acknowledge that there are some pleasures associated with right + opinion, and others with falsehood and ignorance. Let us endeavour to + analyze the nature of this association. + </p> + <p> + Opinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken. You may + see a figure at a distance, and say first of all, 'This is a man,' and + then say, 'No, this is an image made by the shepherds.' And you may affirm + this in a proposition to your companion, or make the remark mentally to + yourself. Whether the words are actually spoken or not, on such occasions + there is a scribe within who registers them, and a painter who paints the + images of the things which the scribe has written down in the soul,—at + least that is my own notion of the process; and the words and images which + are inscribed by them may be either true or false; and they may represent + either past, present, or future. And, representing the future, they must + also represent the pleasures and pains of anticipation—the visions + of gold and other fancies which are never wanting in the mind of man. Now + these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions, which are sometimes + true, and sometimes false; for the good, who are the friends of the gods, + see true pictures of the future, and the bad false ones. And as there may + be opinion about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which is + opinion still, so there may be pleasure about things which are not, were + not, and will not be, which is pleasure still,—that is to say, false + pleasure; and only when false, can pleasure, like opinion, be vicious. + Against this conclusion Protarchus reclaims. + </p> + <p> + Leaving his denial for the present, Socrates proceeds to show that some + pleasures are false from another point of view. In desire, as we admitted, + the body is divided from the soul, and hence pleasures and pains are often + simultaneous. And we further admitted that both of them belonged to the + infinite class. How, then, can we compare them? Are we not liable, or + rather certain, as in the case of sight, to be deceived by distance and + relation? In this case the pleasures and pains are not false because based + upon false opinion, but are themselves false. And there is another + illusion: pain has often been said by us to arise out of the derangement—pleasure + out of the restoration—of our nature. But in passing from one to the + other, do we not experience neutral states, which although they appear + pleasureable or painful are really neither? For even if we admit, with the + wise man whom Protarchus loves (and only a wise man could have ever + entertained such a notion), that all things are in a perpetual flux, still + these changes are often unconscious, and devoid either of pleasure or + pain. We assume, then, that there are three states—pleasureable, + painful, neutral; we may embellish a little by calling them gold, silver, + and that which is neither. + </p> + <p> + But there are certain natural philosophers who will not admit a third + state. Their instinctive dislike to pleasure leads them to affirm that + pleasure is only the absence of pain. They are noble fellows, and, + although we do not agree with them, we may use them as diviners who will + indicate to us the right track. They will say, that the nature of anything + is best known from the examination of extreme cases, e.g. the nature of + hardness from the examination of the hardest things; and that the nature + of pleasure will be best understood from an examination of the most + intense pleasures. Now these are the pleasures of the body, not of the + mind; the pleasures of disease and not of health, the pleasures of the + intemperate and not of the temperate. I am speaking, not of the frequency + or continuance, but only of the intensity of such pleasures, and this is + given them by contrast with the pain or sickness of body which precedes + them. Their morbid nature is illustrated by the lesser instances of + itching and scratching, respecting which I swear that I cannot tell + whether they are a pleasure or a pain. (1) Some of these arise out of a + transition from one state of the body to another, as from cold to hot; (2) + others are caused by the contrast of an internal pain and an external + pleasure in the body: sometimes the feeling of pain predominates, as in + itching and tingling, when they are relieved by scratching; sometimes the + feeling of pleasure: or the pleasure which they give may be quite + overpowering, and is then accompanied by all sorts of unutterable feelings + which have a death of delights in them. But there are also mixed pleasures + which are in the mind only. For are not love and sorrow as well as anger + 'sweeter than honey,' and also full of pain? Is there not a mixture of + feelings in the spectator of tragedy? and of comedy also? 'I do not + understand that last.' Well, then, with the view of lighting up the + obscurity of these mixed feelings, let me ask whether envy is painful. + 'Yes.' And yet the envious man finds something pleasing in the misfortunes + of others? 'True.' And ignorance is a misfortune? 'Certainly.' And one + form of ignorance is self-conceit—a man may fancy himself richer, + fairer, better, wiser than he is? 'Yes.' And he who thus deceives himself + may be strong or weak? 'He may.' And if he is strong we fear him, and if + he is weak we laugh at him, which is a pleasure, and yet we envy him, + which is a pain? These mixed feelings are the rationale of tragedy and + comedy, and equally the rationale of the greater drama of human life. + (There appears to be some confusion in this passage. There is no + difficulty in seeing that in comedy, as in tragedy, the spectator may view + the performance with mixed feelings of pain as well as of pleasure; nor is + there any difficulty in understanding that envy is a mixed feeling, which + rejoices not without pain at the misfortunes of others, and laughs at + their ignorance of themselves. But Plato seems to think further that he + has explained the feeling of the spectator in comedy sufficiently by a + theory which only applies to comedy in so far as in comedy we laugh at the + conceit or weakness of others. He has certainly given a very partial + explanation of the ridiculous.) Having shown how sorrow, anger, envy are + feelings of a mixed nature, I will reserve the consideration of the + remainder for another occasion. + </p> + <p> + Next follow the unmixed pleasures; which, unlike the philosophers of whom + I was speaking, I believe to be real. These unmixed pleasures are: (1) The + pleasures derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell, which are + absolutely pure; and in general those which are unalloyed with pain: (2) + The pleasures derived from the acquisition of knowledge, which in + themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental pain of + forgetting; this, however, arises from a subsequent act of reflection, of + which we need take no account. At the same time, we admit that the latter + pleasures are the property of a very few. To these pure and unmixed + pleasures we ascribe measure, whereas all others belong to the class of + the infinite, and are liable to every species of excess. And here several + questions arise for consideration:—What is the meaning of pure and + impure, of moderate and immoderate? We may answer the question by an + illustration: Purity of white paint consists in the clearness or quality + of the white, and this is distinct from the quantity or amount of white + paint; a little pure white is fairer than a great deal which is impure. + But there is another question:—Pleasure is affirmed by ingenious + philosophers to be a generation; they say that there are two natures—one + self-existent, the other dependent; the one noble and majestic, the other + failing in both these qualities. 'I do not understand.' There are lovers + and there are loves. 'Yes, I know, but what is the application?' The + argument is in play, and desires to intimate that there are relatives and + there are absolutes, and that the relative is for the sake of the + absolute; and generation is for the sake of essence. Under relatives I + class all things done with a view to generation; and essence is of the + class of good. But if essence is of the class of good, generation must be + of some other class; and our friends, who affirm that pleasure is a + generation, would laugh at the notion that pleasure is a good; and at that + other notion, that pleasure is produced by generation, which is only the + alternative of destruction. Who would prefer such an alternation to the + equable life of pure thought? Here is one absurdity, and not the only one, + to which the friends of pleasure are reduced. For is there not also an + absurdity in affirming that good is of the soul only; or in declaring that + the best of men, if he be in pain, is bad? + </p> + <p> + And now, from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of knowledge. + Let us reflect that there are two kinds of knowledge—the one + creative or productive, and the other educational and philosophical. Of + the creative arts, there is one part purer or more akin to knowledge than + the other. There is an element of guess-work and an element of number and + measure in them. In music, for example, especially in flute-playing, the + conjectural element prevails; while in carpentering there is more + application of rule and measure. Of the creative arts, then, we may make + two classes—the less exact and the more exact. And the exacter part + of all of them is really arithmetic and mensuration. But arithmetic and + mensuration again may be subdivided with reference either to their use in + the concrete, or to their nature in the abstract—as they are + regarded popularly in building and binding, or theoretically by + philosophers. And, borrowing the analogy of pleasure, we may say that the + philosophical use of them is purer than the other. Thus we have two arts + of arithmetic, and two of mensuration. And truest of all in the estimation + of every rational man is dialectic, or the science of being, which will + forget and disown us, if we forget and disown her. + </p> + <p> + 'But, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias say that rhetoric is the greatest and + usefullest of arts; and I should not like to quarrel either with him or + you.' Neither is there any inconsistency, Protarchus, with his statement + in what I am now saying; for I am not maintaining that dialectic is the + greatest or usefullest, but only that she is the truest of arts; my remark + is not quantitative but qualitative, and refers not to the advantage or + repetition of either, but to the degree of truth which they attain—here + Gorgias will not care to compete; this is what we affirm to be possessed + in the highest degree by dialectic. And do not let us appeal to Gorgias or + Philebus or Socrates, but ask, on behalf of the argument, what are the + highest truths which the soul has the power of attaining. And is not this + the science which has a firmer grasp of them than any other? For the arts + generally are only occupied with matters of opinion, and with the + production and action and passion of this sensible world. But the highest + truth is that which is eternal and unchangeable. And reason and wisdom are + concerned with the eternal; and these are the very claimants, if not for + the first, at least for the second place, whom I propose as rivals to + pleasure. + </p> + <p> + And now, having the materials, we may proceed to mix them—first + recapitulating the question at issue. + </p> + <p> + Philebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be one + nature; I affirmed that they were two natures, and declared that knowledge + was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two together were + more eligible than either taken singly; and to this we adhere. Reason + intimates, as at first, that we should seek the good not in the unmixed + life, but in the mixed. + </p> + <p> + The cup is ready, waiting to be mingled, and here are two fountains, one + of honey, the other of pure water, out of which to make the fairest + possible mixture. There are pure and impure pleasures—pure and + impure sciences. Let us consider the sections of each which have the most + of purity and truth; to admit them all indiscriminately would be + dangerous. First we will take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the + impure—the art which uses the false rule and the false measure? That + we must, if we are any of us to find our way home; man cannot live upon + pure mathematics alone. And must I include music, which is admitted to be + guess-work? 'Yes, you must, if human life is to have any humanity.' Well, + then, I will open the door and let them all in; they shall mingle in an + Homeric 'meeting of the waters.' And now we turn to the pleasures; shall I + admit them? 'Admit first of all the pure pleasures; secondly, the + necessary.' And what shall we say about the rest? First, ask the pleasures—they + will be too happy to dwell with wisdom. Secondly, ask the arts and + sciences—they reply that the excesses of intemperance are the ruin + of them; and that they would rather only have the pleasures of health and + temperance, which are the handmaidens of virtue. But still we want truth? + That is now added; and so the argument is complete, and may be compared to + an incorporeal law, which is to hold fair rule over a living body. And now + we are at the vestibule of the good, in which there are three chief + elements—truth, symmetry, and beauty. These will be the criterion of + the comparative claims of pleasure and wisdom. + </p> + <p> + Which has the greater share of truth? Surely wisdom; for pleasure is the + veriest impostor in the world, and the perjuries of lovers have passed + into a proverb. + </p> + <p> + Which of symmetry? Wisdom again; for nothing is more immoderate than + pleasure. + </p> + <p> + Which of beauty? Once more, wisdom; for pleasure is often unseemly, and + the greatest pleasures are put out of sight. + </p> + <p> + Not pleasure, then, ranks first in the scale of good, but measure, and + eternal harmony. + </p> + <p> + Second comes the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect. + </p> + <p> + Third, mind and wisdom. + </p> + <p> + Fourth, sciences and arts and true opinions. + </p> + <p> + Fifth, painless pleasures. + </p> + <p> + Of a sixth class, I have no more to say. Thus, pleasure and mind may both + renounce the claim to the first place. But mind is ten thousand times + nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and not + first, even though all the animals in the world assert the contrary. + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + From the days of Aristippus and Epicurus to our own times the nature of + pleasure has occupied the attention of philosophers. 'Is pleasure an evil? + a good? the only good?' are the simple forms which the enquiry assumed + among the Socratic schools. But at an early stage of the controversy + another question was asked: 'Do pleasures differ in kind? and are some + bad, some good, and some neither bad nor good?' There are bodily and there + are mental pleasures, which were at first confused but afterwards + distinguished. A distinction was also made between necessary and + unnecessary pleasures; and again between pleasures which had or had not + corresponding pains. The ancient philosophers were fond of asking, in the + language of their age, 'Is pleasure a "becoming" only, and therefore + transient and relative, or do some pleasures partake of truth and Being?' + To these ancient speculations the moderns have added a further question:—'Whose + pleasure? The pleasure of yourself, or of your neighbour,—of the + individual, or of the world?' This little addition has changed the whole + aspect of the discussion: the same word is now supposed to include two + principles as widely different as benevolence and self-love. Some modern + writers have also distinguished between pleasure the test, and pleasure + the motive of actions. For the universal test of right actions (how I know + them) may not always be the highest or best motive of them (why I do + them). + </p> + <p> + Socrates, as we learn from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, first drew + attention to the consequences of actions. Mankind were said by him to act + rightly when they knew what they were doing, or, in the language of the + Gorgias, 'did what they would.' He seems to have been the first who + maintained that the good was the useful (Mem.). In his eagerness for + generalization, seeking, as Aristotle says, for the universal in Ethics + (Metaph.), he took the most obvious intellectual aspect of human action + which occurred to him. He meant to emphasize, not pleasure, but the + calculation of pleasure; neither is he arguing that pleasure is the chief + good, but that we should have a principle of choice. He did not intend to + oppose 'the useful' to some higher conception, such as the Platonic ideal, + but to chance and caprice. The Platonic Socrates pursues the same vein of + thought in the Protagoras, where he argues against the so-called sophist + that pleasure and pain are the final standards and motives of good and + evil, and that the salvation of human life depends upon a right estimate + of pleasures greater or less when seen near and at a distance. The + testimony of Xenophon is thus confirmed by that of Plato, and we are + therefore justified in calling Socrates the first utilitarian; as indeed + there is no side or aspect of philosophy which may not with reason be + ascribed to him—he is Cynic and Cyrenaic, Platonist and Aristotelian + in one. But in the Phaedo the Socratic has already passed into a more + ideal point of view; and he, or rather Plato speaking in his person, + expressly repudiates the notion that the exchange of a less pleasure for a + greater can be an exchange of virtue. Such virtue is the virtue of + ordinary men who live in the world of appearance; they are temperate only + that they may enjoy the pleasures of intemperance, and courageous from + fear of danger. Whereas the philosopher is seeking after wisdom and not + after pleasure, whether near or distant: he is the mystic, the initiated, + who has learnt to despise the body and is yearning all his life long for a + truth which will hereafter be revealed to him. In the Republic the + pleasures of knowledge are affirmed to be superior to other pleasures, + because the philosopher so estimates them; and he alone has had experience + of both kinds. (Compare a similar argument urged by one of the latest + defenders of Utilitarianism, Mill's Utilitarianism). In the Philebus, + Plato, although he regards the enemies of pleasure with complacency, still + further modifies the transcendentalism of the Phaedo. For he is compelled + to confess, rather reluctantly, perhaps, that some pleasures, i.e. those + which have no antecedent pains, claim a place in the scale of goods. + </p> + <p> + There have been many reasons why not only Plato but mankind in general + have been unwilling to acknowledge that 'pleasure is the chief good.' + Either they have heard a voice calling to them out of another world; or + the life and example of some great teacher has cast their thoughts of + right and wrong in another mould; or the word 'pleasure' has been + associated in their mind with merely animal enjoyment. They could not + believe that what they were always striving to overcome, and the power or + principle in them which overcame, were of the same nature. The pleasure of + doing good to others and of bodily self-indulgence, the pleasures of + intellect and the pleasures of sense, are so different:—Why then + should they be called by a common name? Or, if the equivocal or + metaphorical use of the word is justified by custom (like the use of other + words which at first referred only to the body, and then by a figure have + been transferred to the mind), still, why should we make an ambiguous word + the corner-stone of moral philosophy? To the higher thinker the + Utilitarian or hedonist mode of speaking has been at variance with + religion and with any higher conception both of politics and of morals. It + has not satisfied their imagination; it has offended their taste. To + elevate pleasure, 'the most fleeting of all things,' into a general idea + seems to such men a contradiction. They do not desire to bring down their + theory to the level of their practice. The simplicity of the 'greatest + happiness' principle has been acceptable to philosophers, but the better + part of the world has been slow to receive it. + </p> + <p> + Before proceeding, we may make a few admissions which will narrow the + field of dispute; and we may as well leave behind a few prejudices, which + intelligent opponents of Utilitarianism have by this time 'agreed to + discard'. We admit that Utility is coextensive with right, and that no + action can be right which does not tend to the happiness of mankind; we + acknowledge that a large class of actions are made right or wrong by their + consequences only; we say further that mankind are not too mindful, but + that they are far too regardless of consequences, and that they need to + have the doctrine of utility habitually inculcated on them. We recognize + the value of a principle which can supply a connecting link between Ethics + and Politics, and under which all human actions are or may be included. + The desire to promote happiness is no mean preference of expediency to + right, but one of the highest and noblest motives by which human nature + can be animated. Neither in referring actions to the test of utility have + we to make a laborious calculation, any more than in trying them by other + standards of morals. For long ago they have been classified sufficiently + for all practical purposes by the thinker, by the legislator, by the + opinion of the world. Whatever may be the hypothesis on which they are + explained, or which in doubtful cases may be applied to the regulation of + them, we are very rarely, if ever, called upon at the moment of performing + them to determine their effect upon the happiness of mankind. + </p> + <p> + There is a theory which has been contrasted with Utility by Paley and + others—the theory of a moral sense: Are our ideas of right and wrong + innate or derived from experience? This, perhaps, is another of those + speculations which intelligent men might 'agree to discard.' For it has + been worn threadbare; and either alternative is equally consistent with a + transcendental or with an eudaemonistic system of ethics, with a greatest + happiness principle or with Kant's law of duty. Yet to avoid + misconception, what appears to be the truth about the origin of our moral + ideas may be shortly summed up as follows:—To each of us + individually our moral ideas come first of all in childhood through the + medium of education, from parents and teachers, assisted by the + unconscious influence of language; they are impressed upon a mind which at + first is like a waxen tablet, adapted to receive them; but they soon + become fixed or set, and in after life are strengthened, or perhaps + weakened by the force of public opinion. They may be corrected and + enlarged by experience, they may be reasoned about, they may be brought + home to us by the circumstances of our lives, they may be intensified by + imagination, by reflection, by a course of action likely to confirm them. + Under the influence of religious feeling or by an effort of thought, any + one beginning with the ordinary rules of morality may create out of them + for himself ideals of holiness and virtue. They slumber in the minds of + most men, yet in all of us there remains some tincture of affection, some + desire of good, some sense of truth, some fear of the law. Of some such + state or process each individual is conscious in himself, and if he + compares his own experience with that of others he will find the witness + of their consciences to coincide with that of his own. All of us have + entered into an inheritance which we have the power of appropriating and + making use of. No great effort of mind is required on our part; we learn + morals, as we learn to talk, instinctively, from conversing with others, + in an enlightened age, in a civilized country, in a good home. A + well-educated child of ten years old already knows the essentials of + morals: 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'thou shalt speak the truth,' 'thou shalt + love thy parents,' 'thou shalt fear God.' What more does he want? + </p> + <p> + But whence comes this common inheritance or stock of moral ideas? Their + beginning, like all other beginnings of human things, is obscure, and is + the least important part of them. Imagine, if you will, that Society + originated in the herding of brutes, in their parental instincts, in their + rude attempts at self-preservation:—Man is not man in that he + resembles, but in that he differs from them. We must pass into another + cycle of existence, before we can discover in him by any evidence + accessible to us even the germs of our moral ideas. In the history of the + world, which viewed from within is the history of the human mind, they + have been slowly created by religion, by poetry, by law, having their + foundation in the natural affections and in the necessity of some degree + of truth and justice in a social state; they have been deepened and + enlarged by the efforts of great thinkers who have idealized and connected + them—by the lives of saints and prophets who have taught and + exemplified them. The schools of ancient philosophy which seem so far from + us—Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and a few + modern teachers, such as Kant and Bentham, have each of them supplied + 'moments' of thought to the world. The life of Christ has embodied a + divine love, wisdom, patience, reasonableness. For his image, however + imperfectly handed down to us, the modern world has received a standard + more perfect in idea than the societies of ancient times, but also further + removed from practice. For there is certainly a greater interval between + the theory and practice of Christians than between the theory and practice + of the Greeks and Romans; the ideal is more above us, and the aspiration + after good has often lent a strange power to evil. And sometimes, as at + the Reformation, or French Revolution, when the upper classes of a + so-called Christian country have become corrupted by priestcraft, by + casuistry, by licentiousness, by despotism, the lower have risen up and + re-asserted the natural sense of religion and right. + </p> + <p> + We may further remark that our moral ideas, as the world grows older, + perhaps as we grow older ourselves, unless they have been undermined in us + by false philosophy or the practice of mental analysis, or infected by the + corruption of society or by some moral disorder in the individual, are + constantly assuming a more natural and necessary character. The habit of + the mind, the opinion of the world, familiarizes them to us; and they take + more and more the form of immediate intuition. The moral sense comes last + and not first in the order of their development, and is the instinct which + we have inherited or acquired, not the nobler effort of reflection which + created them and which keeps them alive. We do not stop to reason about + common honesty. Whenever we are not blinded by self-deceit, as for example + in judging the actions of others, we have no hesitation in determining + what is right and wrong. The principles of morality, when not at variance + with some desire or worldly interest of our own, or with the opinion of + the public, are hardly perceived by us; but in the conflict of reason and + passion they assert their authority and are not overcome without remorse. + </p> + <p> + Such is a brief outline of the history of our moral ideas. We have to + distinguish, first of all, the manner in which they have grown up in the + world from the manner in which they have been communicated to each of us. + We may represent them to ourselves as flowing out of the boundless ocean + of language and thought in little rills, which convey them to the heart + and brain of each individual. But neither must we confound the theories or + aspects of morality with the origin of our moral ideas. These are not the + roots or 'origines' of morals, but the latest efforts of reflection, the + lights in which the whole moral world has been regarded by different + thinkers and successive generations of men. If we ask: Which of these many + theories is the true one? we may answer: All of them—moral sense, + innate ideas, a priori, a posteriori notions, the philosophy of + experience, the philosophy of intuition—all of them have added + something to our conception of Ethics; no one of them is the whole truth. + But to decide how far our ideas of morality are derived from one source or + another; to determine what history, what philosophy has contributed to + them; to distinguish the original, simple elements from the manifold and + complex applications of them, would be a long enquiry too far removed from + the question which we are now pursuing. + </p> + <p> + Bearing in mind the distinction which we have been seeking to establish + between our earliest and our most mature ideas of morality, we may now + proceed to state the theory of Utility, not exactly in the words, but in + the spirit of one of its ablest and most moderate supporters (Mill's + Utilitarianism):—'That which alone makes actions either right or + desirable is their utility, or tendency to promote the happiness of + mankind, or, in other words, to increase the sum of pleasure in the world. + But all pleasures are not the same: they differ in quality as well as in + quantity, and the pleasure which is superior in quality is incommensurable + with the inferior. Neither is the pleasure or happiness, which we seek, + our own pleasure, but that of others,—of our family, of our country, + of mankind. The desire of this, and even the sacrifice of our own interest + to that of other men, may become a passion to a rightly educated nature. + The Utilitarian finds a place in his system for this virtue and for every + other.' + </p> + <p> + Good or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the true and only end of + human life. To this all our desires will be found to tend, and in + accordance with this all the virtues, including justice, may be explained. + Admitting that men rest for a time in inferior ends, and do not cast their + eyes beyond them, these ends are really dependent on the greater end of + happiness, and would not be pursued, unless in general they had been found + to lead to it. The existence of such an end is proved, as in Aristotle's + time, so in our own, by the universal fact that men desire it. The + obligation to promote it is based upon the social nature of man; this + sense of duty is shared by all of us in some degree, and is capable of + being greatly fostered and strengthened. So far from being inconsistent + with religion, the greatest happiness principle is in the highest degree + agreeable to it. For what can be more reasonable than that God should will + the happiness of all his creatures? and in working out their happiness we + may be said to be 'working together with him.' Nor is it inconceivable + that a new enthusiasm of the future, far stronger than any old religion, + may be based upon such a conception. + </p> + <p> + But then for the familiar phrase of the 'greatest happiness principle,' it + seems as if we ought now to read 'the noblest happiness principle,' 'the + happiness of others principle'—the principle not of the greatest, + but of the highest pleasure, pursued with no more regard to our own + immediate interest than is required by the law of self-preservation. + Transfer the thought of happiness to another life, dropping the external + circumstances which form so large a part of our idea of happiness in this, + and the meaning of the word becomes indistinguishable from holiness, + harmony, wisdom, love. By the slight addition 'of others,' all the + associations of the word are altered; we seem to have passed over from one + theory of morals to the opposite. For allowing that the happiness of + others is reflected on ourselves, and also that every man must live before + he can do good to others, still the last limitation is a very trifling + exception, and the happiness of another is very far from compensating for + the loss of our own. According to Mr. Mill, he would best carry out the + principle of utility who sacrificed his own pleasure most to that of his + fellow-men. But if so, Hobbes and Butler, Shaftesbury and Hume, are not so + far apart as they and their followers imagine. The thought of self and the + thought of others are alike superseded in the more general notion of the + happiness of mankind at large. But in this composite good, until society + becomes perfected, the friend of man himself has generally the least + share, and may be a great sufferer. + </p> + <p> + And now what objection have we to urge against a system of moral + philosophy so beneficent, so enlightened, so ideal, and at the same time + so practical,—so Christian, as we may say without exaggeration,—and + which has the further advantage of resting morality on a principle + intelligible to all capacities? Have we not found that which Socrates and + Plato 'grew old in seeking'? Are we not desirous of happiness, at any rate + for ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind? If, as is natural, + we begin by thinking of ourselves first, we are easily led on to think of + others; for we cannot help acknowledging that what is right for us is the + right and inheritance of others. We feel the advantage of an abstract + principle wide enough and strong enough to override all the particularisms + of mankind; which acknowledges a universal good, truth, right; which is + capable of inspiring men like a passion, and is the symbol of a cause for + which they are ready to contend to their life's end. + </p> + <p> + And if we test this principle by the lives of its professors, it would + certainly appear inferior to none as a rule of action. From the days of + Eudoxus (Arist. Ethics) and Epicurus to our own, the votaries of pleasure + have gained belief for their principles by their practice. Two of the + noblest and most disinterested men who have lived in this century, Bentham + and J. S. Mill, whose lives were a long devotion to the service of their + fellows, have been among the most enthusiastic supporters of utility; + while among their contemporaries, some who were of a more mystical turn of + mind, have ended rather in aspiration than in action, and have been found + unequal to the duties of life. Looking back on them now that they are + removed from the scene, we feel that mankind has been the better for them. + The world was against them while they lived; but this is rather a reason + for admiring than for depreciating them. Nor can any one doubt that the + influence of their philosophy on politics—especially on foreign + politics, on law, on social life, has been upon the whole beneficial. + Nevertheless, they will never have justice done to them, for they do not + agree either with the better feeling of the multitude or with the idealism + of more refined thinkers. Without Bentham, a great word in the history of + philosophy would have remained unspoken. Yet to this day it is rare to + hear his name received with any mark of respect such as would be freely + granted to the ambiguous memory of some father of the Church. The odium + which attached to him when alive has not been removed by his death. For he + shocked his contemporaries by egotism and want of taste; and this + generation which has reaped the benefit of his labours has inherited the + feeling of the last. He was before his own age, and is hardly remembered + in this. + </p> + <p> + While acknowledging the benefits which the greatest happiness principle + has conferred upon mankind, the time appears to have arrived, not for + denying its claims, but for criticizing them and comparing them with other + principles which equally claim to lie at the foundation of ethics. Any one + who adds a general principle to knowledge has been a benefactor to the + world. But there is a danger that, in his first enthusiasm, he may not + recognize the proportions or limitations to which his truth is subjected; + he does not see how far he has given birth to a truism, or how that which + is a truth to him is a truism to the rest of the world; or may degenerate + in the next generation. He believes that to be the whole which is only a + part,—to be the necessary foundation which is really only a valuable + aspect of the truth. The systems of all philosophers require the criticism + of 'the morrow,' when the heat of imagination which forged them has + cooled, and they are seen in the temperate light of day. All of them have + contributed to enrich the mind of the civilized world; none of them occupy + that supreme or exclusive place which their authors would have assigned to + them. + </p> + <p> + We may preface the criticism with a few preliminary remarks:— + </p> + <p> + Mr. Mill, Mr. Austin, and others, in their eagerness to maintain the + doctrine of utility, are fond of repeating that we are in a lamentable + state of uncertainty about morals. While other branches of knowledge have + made extraordinary progress, in moral philosophy we are supposed by them + to be no better than children, and with few exceptions—that is to + say, Bentham and his followers—to be no further advanced than men + were in the age of Socrates and Plato, who, in their turn, are deemed to + be as backward in ethics as they necessarily were in physics. But this, + though often asserted, is recanted almost in a breath by the same writers + who speak thus depreciatingly of our modern ethical philosophy. For they + are the first to acknowledge that we have not now to begin classifying + actions under the head of utility; they would not deny that about the + general conceptions of morals there is a practical agreement. There is no + more doubt that falsehood is wrong than that a stone falls to the ground, + although the first does not admit of the same ocular proof as the second. + There is no greater uncertainty about the duty of obedience to parents and + to the law of the land than about the properties of triangles. Unless we + are looking for a new moral world which has no marrying and giving in + marriage, there is no greater disagreement in theory about the right + relations of the sexes than about the composition of water. These and a + few other simple principles, as they have endless applications in + practice, so also may be developed in theory into counsels of perfection. + </p> + <p> + To what then is to be attributed this opinion which has been often + entertained about the uncertainty of morals? Chiefly to this,—that + philosophers have not always distinguished the theoretical and the + casuistical uncertainty of morals from the practical certainty. There is + an uncertainty about details,—whether, for example, under given + circumstances such and such a moral principle is to be enforced, or + whether in some cases there may not be a conflict of duties: these are the + exceptions to the ordinary rules of morality, important, indeed, but not + extending to the one thousandth or one ten-thousandth part of human + actions. This is the domain of casuistry. Secondly, the aspects under + which the most general principles of morals may be presented to us are + many and various. The mind of man has been more than usually active in + thinking about man. The conceptions of harmony, happiness, right, freedom, + benevolence, self-love, have all of them seemed to some philosopher or + other the truest and most comprehensive expression of morality. There is + no difference, or at any rate no great difference, of opinion about the + right and wrong of actions, but only about the general notion which + furnishes the best explanation or gives the most comprehensive view of + them. This, in the language of Kant, is the sphere of the metaphysic of + ethics. But these two uncertainties at either end, en tois malista + katholou and en tois kath ekasta, leave space enough for an intermediate + principle which is practically certain. + </p> + <p> + The rule of human life is not dependent on the theories of philosophers: + we know what our duties are for the most part before we speculate about + them. And the use of speculation is not to teach us what we already know, + but to inspire in our minds an interest about morals in general, to + strengthen our conception of the virtues by showing that they confirm one + another, to prove to us, as Socrates would have said, that they are not + many, but one. There is the same kind of pleasure and use in reducing + morals, as in reducing physics, to a few very simple truths. And not + unfrequently the more general principle may correct prejudices and + misconceptions, and enable us to regard our fellow-men in a larger and + more generous spirit. + </p> + <p> + The two qualities which seem to be most required in first principles of + ethics are, (1) that they should afford a real explanation of the facts, + (2) that they should inspire the mind,—should harmonize, strengthen, + settle us. We can hardly estimate the influence which a simple principle + such as 'Act so as to promote the happiness of mankind,' or 'Act so that + the rule on which thou actest may be adopted as a law by all rational + beings,' may exercise on the mind of an individual. They will often seem + to open a new world to him, like the religious conceptions of faith or the + spirit of God. The difficulties of ethics disappear when we do not suffer + ourselves to be distracted between different points of view. But to + maintain their hold on us, the general principles must also be + psychologically true—they must agree with our experience, they must + accord with the habits of our minds. + </p> + <p> + When we are told that actions are right or wrong only in so far as they + tend towards happiness, we naturally ask what is meant by 'happiness.' For + the term in the common use of language is only to a certain extent + commensurate with moral good and evil. We should hardly say that a good + man could be utterly miserable (Arist. Ethics), or place a bad man in the + first rank of happiness. But yet, from various circumstances, the measure + of a man's happiness may be out of all proportion to his desert. And if we + insist on calling the good man alone happy, we shall be using the term in + some new and transcendental sense, as synonymous with well-being. We have + already seen that happiness includes the happiness of others as well as + our own; we must now comprehend unconscious as well as conscious happiness + under the same word. There is no harm in this extension of the meaning, + but a word which admits of such an extension can hardly be made the basis + of a philosophical system. The exactness which is required in philosophy + will not allow us to comprehend under the same term two ideas so different + as the subjective feeling of pleasure or happiness and the objective + reality of a state which receives our moral approval. + </p> + <p> + Like Protarchus in the Philebus, we can give no answer to the question, + 'What is that common quality which in all states of human life we call + happiness? which includes the lower and the higher kind of happiness, and + is the aim of the noblest, as well as of the meanest of mankind?' If we + say 'Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom, nor yet any quality which we + can abstract from these'—what then? After seeming to hover for a + time on the verge of a great truth, we have gained only a truism. + </p> + <p> + Let us ask the question in another form. What is that which constitutes + happiness, over and above the several ingredients of health, wealth, + pleasure, virtue, knowledge, which are included under it? Perhaps we + answer, 'The subjective feeling of them.' But this is very far from being + coextensive with right. Or we may reply that happiness is the whole of + which the above-mentioned are the parts. Still the question recurs, 'In + what does the whole differ from all the parts?' And if we are unable to + distinguish them, happiness will be the mere aggregate of the goods of + life. + </p> + <p> + Again, while admitting that in all right action there is an element of + happiness, we cannot help seeing that the utilitarian theory supplies a + much easier explanation of some virtues than of others. Of many patriotic + or benevolent actions we can give a straightforward account by their + tendency to promote happiness. For the explanation of justice, on the + other hand, we have to go a long way round. No man is indignant with a + thief because he has not promoted the greatest happiness of the greatest + number, but because he has done him a wrong. There is an immeasurable + interval between a crime against property or life, and the omission of an + act of charity or benevolence. Yet of this interval the utilitarian theory + takes no cognizance. The greatest happiness principle strengthens our + sense of positive duties towards others, but weakens our recognition of + their rights. To promote in every way possible the happiness of others may + be a counsel of perfection, but hardly seems to offer any ground for a + theory of obligation. For admitting that our ideas of obligation are + partly derived from religion and custom, yet they seem also to contain + other essential elements which cannot be explained by the tendency of + actions to promote happiness. Whence comes the necessity of them? Why are + some actions rather than others which equally tend to the happiness of + mankind imposed upon us with the authority of law? 'You ought' and 'you + had better' are fundamental distinctions in human thought; and having such + distinctions, why should we seek to efface and unsettle them? + </p> + <p> + Bentham and Mr. Mill are earnest in maintaining that happiness includes + the happiness of others as well as of ourselves. But what two notions can + be more opposed in many cases than these? Granting that in a perfect state + of the world my own happiness and that of all other men would coincide, in + the imperfect state they often diverge, and I cannot truly bridge over the + difficulty by saying that men will always find pleasure in sacrificing + themselves or in suffering for others. Upon the greatest happiness + principle it is admitted that I am to have a share, and in consistency I + should pursue my own happiness as impartially as that of my neighbour. But + who can decide what proportion should be mine and what his, except on the + principle that I am most likely to be deceived in my own favour, and had + therefore better give the larger share, if not all, to him? + </p> + <p> + Further, it is admitted that utility and right coincide, not in particular + instances, but in classes of actions. But is it not distracting to the + conscience of a man to be told that in the particular case they are + opposed? Happiness is said to be the ground of moral obligation, yet he + must not do what clearly conduces to his own happiness if it is at + variance with the good of the whole. Nay, further, he will be taught that + when utility and right are in apparent conflict any amount of utility does + not alter by a hair's-breadth the morality of actions, which cannot be + allowed to deviate from established law or usage; and that the + non-detection of an immoral act, say of telling a lie, which may often + make the greatest difference in the consequences, not only to himself, but + to all the world, makes none whatever in the act itself. + </p> + <p> + Again, if we are concerned not with particular actions but with classes of + actions, is the tendency of actions to happiness a principle upon which we + can classify them? There is a universal law which imperatively declares + certain acts to be right or wrong:—can there be any universality in + the law which measures actions by their tendencies towards happiness? For + an act which is the cause of happiness to one person may be the cause of + unhappiness to another; or an act which if performed by one person may + increase the happiness of mankind may have the opposite effect if + performed by another. Right can never be wrong, or wrong right, that there + are no actions which tend to the happiness of mankind which may not under + other circumstances tend to their unhappiness. Unless we say not only that + all right actions tend to happiness, but that they tend to happiness in + the same degree in which they are right (and in that case the word 'right' + is plainer), we weaken the absoluteness of our moral standard; we reduce + differences in kind to differences in degree; we obliterate the stamp + which the authority of ages has set upon vice and crime. + </p> + <p> + Once more: turning from theory to practice we feel the importance of + retaining the received distinctions of morality. Words such as truth, + justice, honesty, virtue, love, have a simple meaning; they have become + sacred to us,—'the word of God' written on the human heart: to no + other words can the same associations be attached. We cannot explain them + adequately on principles of utility; in attempting to do so we rob them of + their true character. We give them a meaning often paradoxical and + distorted, and generally weaker than their signification in common + language. And as words influence men's thoughts, we fear that the hold of + morality may also be weakened, and the sense of duty impaired, if virtue + and vice are explained only as the qualities which do or do not contribute + to the pleasure of the world. In that very expression we seem to detect a + false ring, for pleasure is individual not universal; we speak of eternal + and immutable justice, but not of eternal and immutable pleasure; nor by + any refinement can we avoid some taint of bodily sense adhering to the + meaning of the word. + </p> + <p> + Again: the higher the view which men take of life, the more they lose + sight of their own pleasure or interest. True religion is not working for + a reward only, but is ready to work equally without a reward. It is not + 'doing the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness,' but doing the + will of God because it is best, whether rewarded or unrewarded. And this + applies to others as well as to ourselves. For he who sacrifices himself + for the good of others, does not sacrifice himself that they may be saved + from the persecution which he endures for their sakes, but rather that + they in their turn may be able to undergo similar sufferings, and like him + stand fast in the truth. To promote their happiness is not his first + object, but to elevate their moral nature. Both in his own case and that + of others there may be happiness in the distance, but if there were no + happiness he would equally act as he does. We are speaking of the highest + and noblest natures; and a passing thought naturally arises in our minds, + 'Whether that can be the first principle of morals which is hardly + regarded in their own case by the greatest benefactors of mankind?' + </p> + <p> + The admissions that pleasures differ in kind, and that actions are already + classified; the acknowledgment that happiness includes the happiness of + others, as well as of ourselves; the confusion (not made by Aristotle) + between conscious and unconscious happiness, or between happiness the + energy and happiness the result of the energy, introduce uncertainty and + inconsistency into the whole enquiry. We reason readily and cheerfully + from a greatest happiness principle. But we find that utilitarians do not + agree among themselves about the meaning of the word. Still less can they + impart to others a common conception or conviction of the nature of + happiness. The meaning of the word is always insensibly slipping away from + us, into pleasure, out of pleasure, now appearing as the motive, now as + the test of actions, and sometimes varying in successive sentences. And as + in a mathematical demonstration an error in the original number disturbs + the whole calculation which follows, this fundamental uncertainty about + the word vitiates all the applications of it. Must we not admit that a + notion so uncertain in meaning, so void of content, so at variance with + common language and opinion, does not comply adequately with either of our + two requirements? It can neither strike the imaginative faculty, nor give + an explanation of phenomena which is in accordance with our individual + experience. It is indefinite; it supplies only a partial account of human + actions: it is one among many theories of philosophers. It may be compared + with other notions, such as the chief good of Plato, which may be best + expressed to us under the form of a harmony, or with Kant's obedience to + law, which may be summed up under the word 'duty,' or with the Stoical + 'Follow nature,' and seems to have no advantage over them. All of these + present a certain aspect of moral truth. None of them are, or indeed + profess to be, the only principle of morals. + </p> + <p> + And this brings us to speak of the most serious objection to the + utilitarian system—its exclusiveness. There is no place for Kant or + Hegel, for Plato and Aristotle alongside of it. They do not reject the + greatest happiness principle, but it rejects them. Now the phenomena of + moral action differ, and some are best explained upon one principle and + some upon another: the virtue of justice seems to be naturally connected + with one theory of morals, the virtues of temperance and benevolence with + another. The characters of men also differ; and some are more attracted by + one aspect of the truth, some by another. The firm stoical nature will + conceive virtue under the conception of law, the philanthropist under that + of doing good, the quietist under that of resignation, the enthusiast + under that of faith or love. The upright man of the world will desire + above all things that morality should be plain and fixed, and should use + language in its ordinary sense. Persons of an imaginative temperament will + generally be dissatisfied with the words 'utility' or 'pleasure': their + principle of right is of a far higher character—what or where to be + found they cannot always distinctly tell;—deduced from the laws of + human nature, says one; resting on the will of God, says another; based + upon some transcendental idea which animates more worlds than one, says a + third: + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + on nomoi prokeintai upsipodes, ouranian + di aithera teknothentes. +</pre> + <p> + To satisfy an imaginative nature in any degree, the doctrine of utility + must be so transfigured that it becomes altogether different and loses all + simplicity. + </p> + <p> + But why, since there are different characters among men, should we not + allow them to envisage morality accordingly, and be thankful to the great + men who have provided for all of us modes and instruments of thought? + Would the world have been better if there had been no Stoics or Kantists, + no Platonists or Cartesians? No more than if the other pole of moral + philosophy had been excluded. All men have principles which are above + their practice; they admit premises which, if carried to their + conclusions, are a sufficient basis of morals. In asserting liberty of + speculation we are not encouraging individuals to make right or wrong for + themselves, but only conceding that they may choose the form under which + they prefer to contemplate them. Nor do we say that one of these aspects + is as true and good as another; but that they all of them, if they are not + mere sophisms and illusions, define and bring into relief some part of the + truth which would have been obscure without their light. Why should we + endeavour to bind all men within the limits of a single metaphysical + conception? The necessary imperfection of language seems to require that + we should view the same truth under more than one aspect. + </p> + <p> + We are living in the second age of utilitarianism, when the charm of + novelty and the fervour of the first disciples has passed away. The + doctrine is no longer stated in the forcible paradoxical manner of + Bentham, but has to be adapted to meet objections; its corners are rubbed + off, and the meaning of its most characteristic expressions is softened. + The array of the enemy melts away when we approach him. The greatest + happiness of the greatest number was a great original idea when enunciated + by Bentham, which leavened a generation and has left its mark on thought + and civilization in all succeeding times. His grasp of it had the + intensity of genius. In the spirit of an ancient philosopher he would have + denied that pleasures differed in kind, or that by happiness he meant + anything but pleasure. He would perhaps have revolted us by his + thoroughness. The 'guardianship of his doctrine' has passed into other + hands; and now we seem to see its weak points, its ambiguities, its want + of exactness while assuming the highest exactness, its one-sidedness, its + paradoxical explanation of several of the virtues. No philosophy has ever + stood this criticism of the next generation, though the founders of all of + them have imagined that they were built upon a rock. And the utilitarian + system, like others, has yielded to the inevitable analysis. Even in the + opinion of 'her admirers she has been terribly damaged' (Phil.), and is no + longer the only moral philosophy, but one among many which have + contributed in various degrees to the intellectual progress of mankind. + </p> + <p> + But because the utilitarian philosophy can no longer claim 'the prize,' we + must not refuse to acknowledge the great benefits conferred by it on the + world. All philosophies are refuted in their turn, says the sceptic, and + he looks forward to all future systems sharing the fate of the past. All + philosophies remain, says the thinker; they have done a great work in + their own day, and they supply posterity with aspects of the truth and + with instruments of thought. Though they may be shorn of their glory, they + retain their place in the organism of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + And still there remain many rules of morals which are better explained and + more forcibly inculcated on the principle of utility than on any other. + The question Will such and such an action promote the happiness of myself, + my family, my country, the world? may check the rising feeling of pride or + honour which would cause a quarrel, an estrangement, a war. 'How can I + contribute to the greatest happiness of others?' is another form of the + question which will be more attractive to the minds of many than a + deduction of the duty of benevolence from a priori principles. In politics + especially hardly any other argument can be allowed to have weight except + the happiness of a people. All parties alike profess to aim at this, which + though often used only as the disguise of self-interest has a great and + real influence on the minds of statesmen. In religion, again, nothing can + more tend to mitigate superstition than the belief that the good of man is + also the will of God. This is an easy test to which the prejudices and + superstitions of men may be brought:—whatever does not tend to the + good of men is not of God. And the ideal of the greatest happiness of + mankind, especially if believed to be the will of God, when compared with + the actual fact, will be one of the strongest motives to do good to + others. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, when the temptation is to speak falsely, to be + dishonest or unjust, or in any way to interfere with the rights of others, + the argument that these actions regarded as a class will not conduce to + the happiness of mankind, though true enough, seems to have less force + than the feeling which is already implanted in the mind by conscience and + authority. To resolve this feeling into the greatest happiness principle + takes away from its sacred and authoritative character. The martyr will + not go to the stake in order that he may promote the happiness of mankind, + but for the sake of the truth: neither will the soldier advance to the + cannon's mouth merely because he believes military discipline to be for + the good of mankind. It is better for him to know that he will be shot, + that he will be disgraced, if he runs away—he has no need to look + beyond military honour, patriotism, 'England expects every man to do his + duty.' These are stronger motives than the greatest happiness of the + greatest number, which is the thesis of a philosopher, not the watchword + of an army. For in human actions men do not always require broad + principles; duties often come home to us more when they are limited and + defined, and sanctioned by custom and public opinion. + </p> + <p> + Lastly, if we turn to the history of ethics, we shall find that our moral + ideas have originated not in utility but in religion, in law, in + conceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many may be + inclined to think that this conclusively disproves the claim of utility to + be the basis of morals. But the utilitarian will fairly reply (see above) + that we must distinguish the origin of ethics from the principles of them—the + historical germ from the later growth of reflection. And he may also truly + add that for two thousand years and more, utility, if not the originating, + has been the great corrective principle in law, in politics, in religion, + leading men to ask how evil may be diminished and good increased—by + what course of policy the public interest may be promoted, and to + understand that God wills the happiness, not of some of his creatures and + in this world only, but of all of them and in every stage of their + existence. + </p> + <p> + 'What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral + philosophy?' is analogous to the question asked in the Philebus, 'What + rank does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?' Admitting the greatest + happiness principle to be true and valuable, and the necessary foundation + of that part of morals which relates to the consequences of actions, we + still have to consider whether this or some other general notion is the + highest principle of human life. We may try them in this comparison by + three tests—definiteness, comprehensiveness, and motive power. + </p> + <p> + There are three subjective principles of morals,—sympathy, + benevolence, self-love. But sympathy seems to rest morality on feelings + which differ widely even in good men; benevolence and self-love torture + one half of our virtuous actions into the likeness of the other. The + greatest happiness principle, which includes both, has the advantage over + all these in comprehensiveness, but the advantage is purchased at the + expense of definiteness. + </p> + <p> + Again, there are the legal and political principles of morals—freedom, + equality, rights of persons; 'Every man to count for one and no man for + more than one,' 'Every man equal in the eye of the law and of the + legislator.' There is also the other sort of political morality, which if + not beginning with 'Might is right,' at any rate seeks to deduce our ideas + of justice from the necessities of the state and of society. According to + this view the greatest good of men is obedience to law: the best human + government is a rational despotism, and the best idea which we can form of + a divine being is that of a despot acting not wholly without regard to law + and order. To such a view the present mixed state of the world, not wholly + evil or wholly good, is supposed to be a witness. More we might desire to + have, but are not permitted. Though a human tyrant would be intolerable, a + divine tyrant is a very tolerable governor of the universe. This is the + doctrine of Thrasymachus adapted to the public opinion of modern times. + </p> + <p> + There is yet a third view which combines the two:—freedom is + obedience to the law, and the greatest order is also the greatest freedom; + 'Act so that thy action may be the law of every intelligent being.' This + view is noble and elevating; but it seems to err, like other + transcendental principles of ethics, in being too abstract. For there is + the same difficulty in connecting the idea of duty with particular duties + as in bridging the gulf between phainomena and onta; and when, as in the + system of Kant, this universal idea or law is held to be independent of + space and time, such a mataion eidos becomes almost unmeaning. + </p> + <p> + Once more there are the religious principles of morals:—the will of + God revealed in Scripture and in nature. No philosophy has supplied a + sanction equal in authority to this, or a motive equal in strength to the + belief in another life. Yet about these too we must ask What will of God? + how revealed to us, and by what proofs? Religion, like happiness, is a + word which has great influence apart from any consideration of its + content: it may be for great good or for great evil. But true religion is + the synthesis of religion and morality, beginning with divine perfection + in which all human perfection is embodied. It moves among ideas of + holiness, justice, love, wisdom, truth; these are to God, in whom they are + personified, what the Platonic ideas are to the idea of good. It is the + consciousness of the will of God that all men should be as he is. It lives + in this world and is known to us only through the phenomena of this world, + but it extends to worlds beyond. Ordinary religion which is alloyed with + motives of this world may easily be in excess, may be fanatical, may be + interested, may be the mask of ambition, may be perverted in a thousand + ways. But of that religion which combines the will of God with our highest + ideas of truth and right there can never be too much. This impossibility + of excess is the note of divine moderation. + </p> + <p> + So then, having briefly passed in review the various principles of moral + philosophy, we may now arrange our goods in order, though, like the reader + of the Philebus, we have a difficulty in distinguishing the different + aspects of them from one another, or defining the point at which the human + passes into the divine. + </p> + <p> + First, the eternal will of God in this world and in another,—justice, + holiness, wisdom, love, without succession of acts (ouch e genesis + prosestin), which is known to us in part only, and reverenced by us as + divine perfection. + </p> + <p> + Secondly, human perfection, or the fulfilment of the will of God in this + world, and co-operation with his laws revealed to us by reason and + experience, in nature, history, and in our own minds. + </p> + <p> + Thirdly, the elements of human perfection,—virtue, knowledge, and + right opinion. + </p> + <p> + Fourthly, the external conditions of perfection,—health and the + goods of life. + </p> + <p> + Fifthly, beauty and happiness,—the inward enjoyment of that which is + best and fairest in this world and in the human soul. + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + The Philebus is probably the latest in time of the writings of Plato with + the exception of the Laws. We have in it therefore the last development of + his philosophy. The extreme and one-sided doctrines of the Cynics and + Cyrenaics are included in a larger whole; the relations of pleasure and + knowledge to each other and to the good are authoritatively determined; + the Eleatic Being and the Heraclitean Flux no longer divide the empire of + thought; the Mind of Anaxagoras has become the Mind of God and of the + World. The great distinction between pure and applied science for the + first time has a place in philosophy; the natural claim of dialectic to be + the Queen of the Sciences is once more affirmed. This latter is the bond + of union which pervades the whole or nearly the whole of the Platonic + writings. And here as in several other dialogues (Phaedrus, Republic, + etc.) it is presented to us in a manner playful yet also serious, and + sometimes as if the thought of it were too great for human utterance and + came down from heaven direct. It is the organization of knowledge + wonderful to think of at a time when knowledge itself could hardly be said + to exist. It is this more than any other element which distinguishes + Plato, not only from the presocratic philosophers, but from Socrates + himself. + </p> + <p> + We have not yet reached the confines of Aristotle, but we make a somewhat + nearer approach to him in the Philebus than in the earlier Platonic + writings. The germs of logic are beginning to appear, but they are not + collected into a whole, or made a separate science or system. Many + thinkers of many different schools have to be interposed between the + Parmenides or Philebus of Plato, and the Physics or Metaphysics of + Aristotle. It is this interval upon which we have to fix our minds if we + would rightly understand the character of the transition from one to the + other. Plato and Aristotle do not dovetail into one another; nor does the + one begin where the other ends; there is a gulf between them not to be + measured by time, which in the fragmentary state of our knowledge it is + impossible to bridge over. It follows that the one cannot be interpreted + by the other. At any rate, it is not Plato who is to be interpreted by + Aristotle, but Aristotle by Plato. Of all philosophy and of all art the + true understanding is to be sought not in the afterthoughts of posterity, + but in the elements out of which they have arisen. For the previous stage + is a tendency towards the ideal at which they are aiming; the later is a + declination or deviation from them, or even a perversion of them. No man's + thoughts were ever so well expressed by his disciples as by himself. + </p> + <p> + But although Plato in the Philebus does not come into any close connexion + with Aristotle, he is now a long way from himself and from the beginnings + of his own philosophy. At the time of his death he left his system still + incomplete; or he may be more truly said to have had no system, but to + have lived in the successive stages or moments of metaphysical thought + which presented themselves from time to time. The earlier discussions + about universal ideas and definitions seem to have died away; the + correlation of ideas has taken their place. The flowers of rhetoric and + poetry have lost their freshness and charm; and a technical language has + begun to supersede and overgrow them. But the power of thinking tends to + increase with age, and the experience of life to widen and deepen. The + good is summed up under categories which are not summa genera, but heads + or gradations of thought. The question of pleasure and the relation of + bodily pleasures to mental, which is hardly treated of elsewhere in Plato, + is here analysed with great subtlety. The mean or measure is now made the + first principle of good. Some of these questions reappear in Aristotle, as + does also the distinction between metaphysics and mathematics. But there + are many things in Plato which have been lost in Aristotle; and many + things in Aristotle not to be found in Plato. The most remarkable + deficiency in Aristotle is the disappearance of the Platonic dialectic, + which in the Aristotelian school is only used in a comparatively + unimportant and trivial sense. The most remarkable additions are the + invention of the Syllogism, the conception of happiness as the foundation + of morals, the reference of human actions to the standard of the better + mind of the world, or of the one 'sensible man' or 'superior person.' His + conception of ousia, or essence, is not an advance upon Plato, but a + return to the poor and meagre abstractions of the Eleatic philosophy. The + dry attempt to reduce the presocratic philosophy by his own rather + arbitrary standard of the four causes, contrasts unfavourably with Plato's + general discussion of the same subject (Sophist). To attempt further to + sum up the differences between the two great philosophers would be out of + place here. Any real discussion of their relation to one another must be + preceded by an examination into the nature and character of the + Aristotelian writings and the form in which they have come down to us. + This enquiry is not really separable from an investigation of Theophrastus + as well as Aristotle and of the remains of other schools of philosophy as + well as of the Peripatetics. But, without entering on this wide field, + even a superficial consideration of the logical and metaphysical works + which pass under the name of Aristotle, whether we suppose them to have + come directly from his hand or to be the tradition of his school, is + sufficient to show how great was the mental activity which prevailed in + the latter half of the fourth century B.C.; what eddies and whirlpools of + controversies were surging in the chaos of thought, what transformations + of the old philosophies were taking place everywhere, what eclecticisms + and syncretisms and realisms and nominalisms were affecting the mind of + Hellas. The decline of philosophy during this period is no less remarkable + than the loss of freedom; and the two are not unconnected with each other. + But of the multitudinous sea of opinions which were current in the age of + Aristotle we have no exact account. We know of them from allusions only. + And we cannot with advantage fill up the void of our knowledge by + conjecture: we can only make allowance for our ignorance. + </p> + <p> + There are several passages in the Philebus which are very characteristic + of Plato, and which we shall do well to consider not only in their + connexion, but apart from their connexion as inspired sayings or oracles + which receive their full interpretation only from the history of + philosophy in later ages. The more serious attacks on traditional beliefs + which are often veiled under an unusual simplicity or irony are of this + kind. Such, for example, is the excessive and more than human awe which + Socrates expresses about the names of the gods, which may be not unaptly + compared with the importance attached by mankind to theological terms in + other ages; for this also may be comprehended under the satire of + Socrates. Let us observe the religious and intellectual enthusiasm which + shines forth in the following, 'The power and faculty of loving the truth, + and of doing all things for the sake of the truth': or, again, the + singular acknowledgment which may be regarded as the anticipation of a new + logic, that 'In going to war for mind I must have weapons of a different + make from those which I used before, although some of the old ones may do + again.' Let us pause awhile to reflect on a sentence which is full of + meaning to reformers of religion or to the original thinker of all ages: + 'Shall we then agree with them of old time, and merely reassert the + notions of others without risk to ourselves; or shall we venture also to + share in the risk and bear the reproach which will await us': i.e. if we + assert mind to be the author of nature. Let us note the remarkable words, + 'That in the divine nature of Zeus there is the soul and mind of a King, + because there is in him the power of the cause,' a saying in which + theology and philosophy are blended and reconciled; not omitting to + observe the deep insight into human nature which is shown by the + repetition of the same thought 'All philosophers are agreed that mind is + the king of heaven and earth' with the ironical addition, 'in this way + truly they magnify themselves.' Nor let us pass unheeded the indignation + felt by the generous youth at the 'blasphemy' of those who say that Chaos + and Chance Medley created the world; or the significance of the words + 'those who said of old time that mind rules the universe'; or the pregnant + observation that 'we are not always conscious of what we are doing or of + what happens to us,' a chance expression to which if philosophers had + attended they would have escaped many errors in psychology. We may + contrast the contempt which is poured upon the verbal difficulty of the + one and many, and the seriousness with the unity of opposites is regarded + from the higher point of view of abstract ideas: or compare the simple + manner in which the question of cause and effect and their mutual + dependence is regarded by Plato (to which modern science has returned in + Mill and Bacon), and the cumbrous fourfold division of causes in the + Physics and Metaphysics of Aristotle, for which it has puzzled the world + to find a use in so many centuries. When we consider the backwardness of + knowledge in the age of Plato, the boldness with which he looks forward + into the distance, the many questions of modern philosophy which are + anticipated in his writings, may we not truly describe him in his own + words as a 'spectator of all time and of all existence'? + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PHILEBUS + </h2> + <p> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are + now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position is which I + maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted by + you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight, and + the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living being, + whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence and memory, + and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are better and more + desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and that + to all such who are or ever will be they are the most advantageous of all + things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of + the argument? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Nothing could be fairer, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned to + you? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left + the field. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be + ascertained. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall we further agree— + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To what? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That you and I must now try to indicate some state and + disposition of the soul, which has the property of making all men happy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, by all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a + state? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what if there be a third state, which is better than either? + Then both of us are vanquished—are we not? But if this life, which + really has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more akin to + pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage + over the life of wisdom. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, + then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;—do you agree? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what do you say, Philebus? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the + conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have + no longer a voice in the matter? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my + soul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You may appeal to us; we too will be the witnesses of your + words. And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we + will proceed with the argument. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus + says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the + gods is more than human—it exceeds all other fears. And now I would + not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she + pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just + now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one + name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she + takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the + intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very + temperance,—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish + fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and + how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite + pleasures are severally alike! + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from + opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must not + pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,—that is, + like itself? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;—in so + far as colours are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet + we all know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed to + white: or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are + comprehended under one class; and yet particular figures may be absolutely + opposed to one another, and there is an infinite diversity of them. And we + might find similar examples in many other things; therefore do not rely + upon this argument, which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme + opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposition among + pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to + them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now + although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as + we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call them + all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, to + acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell us what is the + identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes + you designate all of them as good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who + asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some + pleasures are good and others bad? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one + another, and sometimes opposed? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Not in so far as they are pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are + to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that they + are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not pierce + our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the weakest and + most inexperienced reasoners? (Probably corrupt.) + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, I mean to say, that in self-defence I may, if I like, + follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike are + most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I will prove + ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the argument will + be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and return to the old + position; then perhaps we may come to an understanding with one another. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other + qualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the + good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the pleasures of + which you spoke. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to present + great differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures, they are + opposite as well as different, should I be worthy of the name of + dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say (as you + are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between one science + and another;—would not the argument founder and disappear like an + idle tale, although we might ourselves escape drowning by clinging to a + fallacy? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: May none of this befal us, except the deliverance! Yet I like + the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us + assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and + different sciences. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences + between my good and yours; but let us bring them to the light in the hope + that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is to + be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for surely we are + not now simply contending in order that my view or that yours may prevail, + but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for the truth. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly we ought. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the + principle on which the argument rests. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What principle? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and + some men sometimes against their will. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Speak plainer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of + nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful + propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by + nature one and also many, dividing the single 'me' into many 'me's,' and + even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten + thousand other ways? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes + about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time + agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true + course of thought; and no more favour is shown to that other puzzle, in + which a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, and + then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his + own words: Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the + many are only one. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with + this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and + acknowledged? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things + that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for in + those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was + saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when the + assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the + good one, then the interest which attaches to these and similar unities + and the attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a controversy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of what nature? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real + existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same, and + incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining a + permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and + multiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still entire + and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest + impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be at the same + time in one and in many things? These, Protarchus, are the real + difficulties, and this is the one and many to which they relate; they are + the source of great perplexity if ill decided, and the right determination + of them is very helpful. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is what I should wish. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear + them discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and + we had better not stir him up with questions. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious + battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and + that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every + word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and + is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of + thought itself, which never grows old. Any young man, when he first tastes + these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure + of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or + rather no thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and + kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles + himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his + neighbours, whether they are older or younger, or of his own age—that + makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human + being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian + would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be + found. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are + young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set upon + you, if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is there no charm + by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way of + arriving at the truth? If there is, we hope that you will guide us into + that way, and we will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in which we + are engaged, Socrates, is not unimportant. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and + there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite way, + which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me helpless in + the hour of need. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Tell us what that is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy of + application; it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Tell us what it is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among + men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of light; and + the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we are, handed + down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be are composed of + one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in them: seeing, + then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought in every enquiry + to begin by laying down one idea of that which is the subject of enquiry; + this unity we shall find in everything. Having found it, we may next + proceed to look for two, if there be two, or, if not, then for three or + some other number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the + unity with which we began is seen not only to be one and many and + infinite, but also a definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to + approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate + between unity and infinity has been discovered,—then, and not till + then, we may rest from division, and without further troubling ourselves + about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, + as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one + another, which the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of our + time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. + Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass + at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never occur to them. And this, + I repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation + and true dialectic. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that I partly understand you Socrates, but I should + like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, + Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How do they afford an illustration? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The sound which passes through the lips whether of an individual + or of all men is one and yet infinite. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound is + infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge of the + number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same + kind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Sound is one in music as well as in grammar? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of equal + pitch:—may we affirm so much? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you + knew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of + music. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nothing. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But when you have learned what sounds are high and what low, and + the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or proportions, + and the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers discovered, and + have handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of + harmonies; and the affections corresponding to them in the movements of + the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be + called rhythms and measures; and they tell us that the same principle + should be applied to every one and many;—when, I say, you have + learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and you may be + said to understand any other subject, when you have a similar grasp of it. + But the infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is + in each of them, when not classified, creates in every one of us a state + of infinite ignorance; and he who never looks for number in anything, will + not himself be looked for in the number of famous men. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent, + Philebus. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the + argument? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Indeed he is, and you must answer him. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will; but you must let me make one little remark first about + these matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, + should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and + now I say conversely, that he who has to begin with infinity should not + jump to unity, but he should look about for some number representing a + certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And now let us return + for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to + have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first + distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then other + letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the semivowels); + these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he distinguished a third + class of letters which we now call mutes, without voice and without sound, + and divided these, and likewise the two other classes of vowels and + semivowels, into the individual sounds, and told the number of them, and + gave to each and all of them the name of letters; and observing that none + of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in + consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them, he + assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar + or letters. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding + the original statement, but I still feel the defect of which I just now + complained. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the + argument? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long + asking. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the question + which, as you say, you have been so long asking? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility + of pleasure and wisdom? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we maintain that they are each of them one? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the precise question to which the previous discussion + desires an answer is, how they are one and also many (i.e., how they have + one genus and many species), and are not at once infinite, and what number + of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass into + infinity (i.e. into the infinite number of individuals). + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates + has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall + answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to + answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken + the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to + answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let us + consider, then, what we are to do:—Socrates, if I understood him + rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is + the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed + that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, + likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the smallest + use in any enquiry. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would + the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him is + that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will tell + you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with + you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human + goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and + the like were the chief good, you answered—No, not those, but + another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what + you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to examine + and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are to be + designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, + are mind and knowledge and understanding and art, and the like. There was + a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that you + should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled; and you + agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as children say, + what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; cease then to fight + against us in this way. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In what way? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we + have not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine that a + general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we + are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider, then, + whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their kinds; + or you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to find some + other mode of clearing up our controversy. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words 'if + you are willing' dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to have + recalled something to my mind. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: What is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about + pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they were + to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good, but + some third thing, which was different from them, and better than either. + If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for + the good will cease to be identified with her:—Am I not right? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds + of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more clearly + as we proceed. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But, let us first agree on some little points. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: The most perfect, Socrates, of all things. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is the good sufficient? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt + after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care + not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is undeniable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of + wisdom, and pass them in review. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure + in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot + be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, + then it cannot really be the chief good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And will you help us to test these two lives? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then answer. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Ask. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the + enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you + if you had perfect pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and + forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the + greatest pleasures? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true + opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you + were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that + you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the + pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no + true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and + if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on + future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an + oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Could this be otherwise? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But is such a life eligible? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away + from me the power of speech. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We must keep up our spirits;—let us now take the life of + mind and examine it in turn. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And what is this life of mind? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, + having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having + no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like + feelings? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is likely, + as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to + one that was made out of the union of the two? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, that is the life which I mean. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would + surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in + addition to them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three + lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man + or for animal. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the + good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and + perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to + live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have + chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own + free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly that seems to be true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus' goddess is + not to be regarded as identical with the good? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Neither is your 'mind' the good, Socrates, for that will be open + to the same objections. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my 'mind'; + but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I + will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed + life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For + you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; + and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them + might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further + to argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element which makes this + mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than + to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share + either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own + mind, attain even to the third. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; in + fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid + low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be + thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim. And if + pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second place, she + would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to + them would she still appear as fair as before. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by + applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nonsense, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which + is an impossibility? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware + that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the argument. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just + at present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the cause of + mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of + another make from those which I used before; some, however, of the old + ones may do again. And must I then finish the argument? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of course you must. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us be very careful in laying the foundation. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you do + not object, into three classes. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Upon what principle would you make the division? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us take some of our newly-found notions. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Which of them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of + existence, and also an infinite? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which is + compounded out of them; but I fear that I am ridiculously clumsy at these + processes of division and enumeration. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, my good friend? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I say that a fourth class is still wanted. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What will that be? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a + fourth class to the three others. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of + resolution as well as a cause of composition? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future + time you shall allow me to have it. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of the + three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and + see how in each of them there is a one and many. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps I + might be able to follow you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before, one + the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the + infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter + discussed. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your + attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and + colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more + and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? + for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an end. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a + more and a less. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and + being endless they must also be infinite. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such an + expression as 'exceedingly,' which you have just uttered, and also the + term 'gently,' have the same significance as more or less; for whenever + they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity—they are + always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of a + more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each creation + of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if + quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to intrude in the + sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these last would be + driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, + there can be no longer a 'hotter' or a 'colder' (for these are always + progressing, and are never in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, + and has ceased to progress. Which proves that comparatives, such as the + hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Your remark certainly has the look of truth, Socrates; but + these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I + think however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or + twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather + not waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me know + whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite— + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit of + more or less, or are denoted by the words 'exceedingly,' 'gently,' + 'extremely,' and the like, may not be referred to the class of the + infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous + argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought + together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set + upon them—do you remember? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit + their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, or + again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure—all + these may, I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the limited + or finite; what do you say? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Excellent, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound + kind? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You, I think, will have to tell me that. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to + my prayers. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Offer up a prayer, then, and think. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has + befriended us. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what you + are saying? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will tell you, and do you listen to my words. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, greater, + smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we placed under the unity + of more and less. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In the class of the infinite, you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes; and now mingle this with the other. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is the other. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The class of the finite which we ought to have brought together + as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same thing if we + do so now;—when the two are combined, a third will appear. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by the class of the finite? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The class of the equal and the double, and any class which puts + an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number creates + harmony and proportion among the different elements. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various + opposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, takes + certain forms. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Does not the right participation in the finite give health—in + disease, for instance? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And whereas the high and low, the swift and the slow are + infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles aforesaid + introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the introduction + of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and + harmony? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the + seasons, and all the delights of life? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and + strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my + beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness + and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to + pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, + whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers + the soul.—What think you, Protarchus? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You will observe that I have spoken of three classes? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the + infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of + existences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too + much for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with the + infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were + sealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily + acknowledged it to be by nature one? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand me + to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being, effected by + the measure which the limit introduces. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I understand. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be investigated, + and you must assist in the investigation; for does not everything which + comes into being, of necessity come into being through a cause? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no + cause? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; + the agent and the cause may be rightly called one? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall + find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name—shall we + not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: We shall. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or + effect naturally follows it? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are + not the same, but different? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of + which they were generated, furnish all the three classes? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven + to be distinct from them,—and may therefore be called a fourth + principle? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: So let us call it. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think + that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in + order. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the + second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence compound + and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of + the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now what is the next question, and how came we hither? Were + we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: We were. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, having determined these points, shall we not be better + able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original + subject of dispute? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I dare say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and + wisdom was the conqueror—did we not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to what + class it is to be assigned? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Beyond a doubt. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; + which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the + elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be truly + said to comprehend the conqueror life. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all + sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? + Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class + which admits of more and less? + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for + pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity + and degree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the + infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of + good. But now—admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature + of the infinite—in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and + Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? + And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if + we err on this point. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; + but still I must beg you to answer the question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to him. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must + entreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say + anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a + difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you with + my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind and + knowledge belong? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You did, indeed, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with one + voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth—in reality they are + magnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should like + to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more fully. + </p> + <p> + PHILEBUS: Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we shall + not tire of you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the + guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our + fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence + and wisdom. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for + that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy; but the + other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of + the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars and of the + whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think otherwise. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this + doctrine,—not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk + to ourselves,—but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of + the reproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares + that all is disorder? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That would certainly be my wish. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the + bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor + cries, 'land' (i.e., earth), reappear in the constitution of the world. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers + over us, and we are at our wit's end. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is something to be remarked about each of these elements. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and that + of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of its + nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is fire within + us, and in the universe. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in the + universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that fire + has. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and + ruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other + animals, dependent on the universal fire? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is a question which does not deserve an answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the + earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you + would give a similar reply about all the other elements? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his + senses? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I do not think that he could—but now go on to the next + step. When we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered + up in one, did we not call them a body? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: We did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same + reason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same + elements. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body + nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which + we were just now speaking? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to + be asked. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, tell me, is this question worth asking? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: May our body be said to have a soul? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body + of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in + every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the + four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and + the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies + souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and + operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the + attributes of wisdom;—we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the + self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces + of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that + higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the + other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite + and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a + presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and + seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most justly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is + the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the + cause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased to + be called. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O + Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said + of old time that mind rules the universe. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that + mind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause of + all; and I think that you now have my answer. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had + answered. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts + earnest. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the + class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago + discovered? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was + akin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite + and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in itself, + a beginning, middle, or end of its own. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I shall be sure to remember. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We must next examine what is their place and under what + conditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since her + class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart + from pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: If this is the road, let us take it. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of + pleasure and pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the + aforesaid classes is the mixed one? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we + placed third in the list of four. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in which + you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Capital; and now will you please to give me your best attention? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed; I am attending. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is + also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is very probable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the + source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and + shortest words about matters of the greatest moment. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to be + a little plainer? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest + illustration? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What phenomena do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect of + moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the + unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the + natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is pain, + and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their + original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to + you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and + infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living + beings, is pain, and that the process of return of all things to their own + nature is pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Granted; what you say has a general truth. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating + severally in the two processes which we have described? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an + antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an + expectation of pain, fearful and anxious. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of + the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose them to + be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with pleasure, + methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class of pleasure is + to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not + rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been + mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other + things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not + to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but only sometimes and in + some instances admitting of the nature of good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You say most truly that this is the track which the + investigation should pursue. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and + pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be + the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration + nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether any animal who is + in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great + or small? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure + and of pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a + great difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this or + not. And I should like to say a few words about it. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What have you to say? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is + no reason why he should not live in this neutral state. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no + degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to + him who chose the life of thought and wisdom. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, we said so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this + may not be the most divine of all lives? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have + either joy or sorrow. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Certainly not—there would be a great impropriety in the + assumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not + indifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if in + any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion we will + place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second place, + should she have to resign the first. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Just so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely + mental, is entirely derived from memory. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I must first of all analyze memory, or rather perception which + is prior to memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be + properly cleared up. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How will you proceed? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished + before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other + affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to + both and to each of them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Granted. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but + not of the second? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness + in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this + case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which is not + yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you see? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then just be so good as to change the terms. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How shall I change them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the + state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say + unconsciousness. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I see. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and + motion would be properly called consciousness? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now we know the meaning of the word? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the + preservation of consciousness? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But do we not distinguish memory from recollection? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has + of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in + company with the body? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some + consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and + reminiscence? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is a reason why I say all this. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and + desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the + previous analysis helps to show the nature of both. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing + the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must + determine the nature and seat of desire. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the + answer. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: A fair retort; but let us proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of + desires? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in + view when we call them by a single name? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily + answered; but it must be answered. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us go back to our examples. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Where shall we begin? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do we mean anything when we say 'a man thirsts'? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We mean to say that he 'is empty'? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not thirst desire? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, of drink. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should say, of replenishment with drink. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of + what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain either + by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of which he + has no present or past experience? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet he who desires, surely desires something? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He does not desire that which he experiences, for he experiences + thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires replenishment? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some + way apprehends replenishment? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There must. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be + emptied? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the + replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way can + there be? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I cannot imagine any other. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But do you see the consequence? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That there is no such thing as desire of the body. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every + animal is to the reverse of his bodily state. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is + experiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us towards + the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and + the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or + thirsts or has any similar experience. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to + imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you + speaking? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all that + relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as well as + of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the pleasure which + succeeds to it. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what would you say of the intermediate state? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by 'intermediate'? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers + past pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him; but as + yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an intermediate + state? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is + the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man + who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other + times be quite in despair? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be + filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then man and the other animals have at the same time both + pleasure and pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I suppose so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there + will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred that + the double experience was the single case possible. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the + occasion of raising a question? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we + are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true + and false expectations, or true and false opinions? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious + enquiry. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys, the point to + be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Surely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is + said should be pertinent. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not + rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or + waking, mad or lunatic? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: So we have always held, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your + opinion? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that we should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has + arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And such a thing as pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And an opinion must be of something? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And a man must be pleased by something? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite correct. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no difference; + it will still be an opinion? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, + will always have a real feeling of pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is also quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true + only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is the question. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence + becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is + what you think should be examined? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in + other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as + well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have + various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we + should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of + a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of + rightness? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the + opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its + object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which + is not true, but false? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were + saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure + false. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure! + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure + which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is + often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There must be a very great difference, between them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Lead, and I will follow. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, my view is— + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We agree—do we not?—that there is such a thing as + false, and also such a thing as true opinion? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often + consequent upon these—upon true and false opinion, I mean. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always + spring from memory and perception? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of what nature? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and + the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very likely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Soon he begins to interrogate himself. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In what manner? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He asks himself—'What is that which appears to be standing + by the rock under the tree?' This is the question which he may be supposed + to put to himself when he sees such an appearance. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a + whisper to himself—'It is a man.' + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say—'No, it + is a figure made by the shepherds.' + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in + articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a + proposition. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him, he + may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation of + this phenomenon. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is your explanation? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think that the soul at such times is like a book. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant + feelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul, and when the + inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions + which are the expressions of opinion come into our souls—but when + the scribe within us writes falsely, the result is false. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I quite assent and agree to your statement. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy + at the same time in the chambers of the soul. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Who is he? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws + images in the soul of the things which he has described. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But when and how does he do this? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense + certain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the + subjects of them;—is not this a very common mental phenomenon? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the images answering to true opinions and words are true, + and to false opinions and words false; are they not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: They are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If we are right so far, there arises a further question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in + relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should say in relation to all times alike. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described + already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which we + may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the + future? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were saying + a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and present + only, and not to the future? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To the future, very much. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When you say, 'Very much,' you mean to imply that all these + representations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled + with hopes in every stage of existence? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Answer me another question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he + not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly he is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with + hopes? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which + exist in the minds of each of us? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often + have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture + there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good + fortune. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, + have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false + pictures? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as + the good; but I presume that they are false pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: They are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good + in true pleasures? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Doubtless. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of + men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of a + similar character? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a + real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the + past, present, or future? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not + right? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real + but illusory character? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure + who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased about things + which neither have nor have ever had any real existence, and, more often + than not, are never likely to exist. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like; + are they not often false? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are + true or false? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In no other way. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as + they are false. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no one + would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason + of some other great corruption to which they are liable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption we + will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present + I would rather show by another argument that there are many false + pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist + our final decision. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion which + should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new + argument. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as + they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart + from the soul—do you remember? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, I remember that you said so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily + state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was + experienced. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now you may infer what happens in such cases. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What am I to infer? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously; and + there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond to + them, as has been already shown. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there is another point to which we have agreed. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that + they are of the class of infinites. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly, we said so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But how can we rightly judge of them? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How can we? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is it our intention to judge of their comparative importance and + intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain, and + pleasure against pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them + accordingly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or distance + of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine falsely; + and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures + and pains? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were + saying before. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What was that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the + pleasures and pains with their own falsity. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and false + because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; + the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when placed side by + side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by side with the + pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly, and for the reason which you mention. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element + which makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you + will acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say + that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or + true. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find + pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are + still more false than these. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how shall we find them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and aches + and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of + nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and repletions, and + evacuations, and also by growth and decay? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, that has been often said. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural + state is pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body + experiences none of these changes. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: When can that be, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why not, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And what was that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may + ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed + either for good or bad? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be + neither pleasure nor pain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that + we must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell us; + for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, and their words are of no mean authority. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I + should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I + mean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: To them we will say: 'Good; but are we, or living things in + general, always conscious of what happens to us—for example, of our + growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly + unconscious of this and similar phenomena?' You must answer for them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: The latter alternative is the true one. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going + up and down cause pleasures and pains? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be— + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, + but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if this be true, the life to which I was just now referring + again appears. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What life? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of + joy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one + painful, and the third which is neither; what say you? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should say as you do that there are three of them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with + pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without + pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to + mean by that statement? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a + little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a + third which is neither. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably + spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and + think so. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free + from pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: They say so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they must think or they would not say that they have + pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I suppose not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct + natures, they are wrong. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were just + now saying, or that they are two only—the one being a state of pain, + which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of itself a + good, and is called pleasant? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not see + the reason. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of + our friend Philebus. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And who may they be? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural + philosophy, who deny the very existence of pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Indeed! + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are + all of them only avoidances of pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who + divine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance + and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, + in which they think that there is nothing sound, and her seductive + influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. This is + the use which you may make of them. And when you have considered the + various grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from me what I deem to be + true pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of pleasure from both + points of view, we will bring her up for judgment. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Well said. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers and + follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would say + something of this sort; they would begin at the beginning, and ask + whether, if we wanted to know the nature of any quality, such as hardness, + we should be more likely to discover it by looking at the hardest things, + rather than at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall answer these severe + gentlemen as you answer me. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at the + greatest instances. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class, + we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most extreme + and most vehement? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In that every one will agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we have + often said, are the pleasures of the body? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we are + sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer, + or we shall come to grief. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How will that be? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, because we might be tempted to answer, 'When we are in + health.' + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is the natural answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind + have the greatest desires? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, + feel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I not + right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the + satisfaction of their want? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is obvious as soon as it is said. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person + would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at + health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish:—do not + imagine that I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more + pleasures than those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of + the magnitude of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be + most intense. For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and + what they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think I follow you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether you + do or not, Protarchus. Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will not + say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in + temperance? Reflect before you speak. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I understand you, and see that there is a great difference + between them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorism of + 'Never too much,' which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing + the minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and makes them shout with + delight. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures and + pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body, and + not in a virtuous state. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and + see what makes them the greatest? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To be sure we ought. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain + disorders. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What disorders? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends + utterly detest. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What pleasures? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments + by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in Heaven's + name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?—Pleasure + or pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: A villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any + personal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration of + these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine the point + at issue. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of + pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in the + body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while there + are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, + which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and + sometimes pains. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a + man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold and is + growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is becoming cool, and he wants + to have the one and be rid of the other;—the sweet has a bitter, as + the common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and create + irritation and in time drive him to distraction. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That description is very true to nature. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are + sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example is + afforded by itching, of which we were just now speaking, and by the + tingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within, and + the rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the + parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort + apply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or + pain in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain or + pleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts; and this is due to the + forcible separation of what is united, or to the union of what is + separated, and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the + slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle + irritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an + excitement in him,—he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of + attitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath, and is + quite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, indeed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is + dying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing he + is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way; of all pleasures he + declares them to be the greatest; and he reckons him who lives in the most + constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of + the majority about pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise + out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the body; + there are also cases in which the mind contributes an opposite element to + the body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite and form one + mixture. Concerning these I have already remarked, that when a man is + empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. + But now I must further add what I omitted before, that in all these and + similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are + innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I believe that to be quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and + pains. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences + of purely mental feelings. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, + emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful + pleasures? need I remind you of the anger + </p> + <p> + 'Which stirs even a wise man to violence, And is sweeter than honey and + the honeycomb?' + </p> + <p> + And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and + bereavement? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, there is a natural connexion between them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the + spectators smile through their tears? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a + mixed feeling of pain and pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I do not quite understand you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in + recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There is, I think. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable is + the examination of it, because the difficulty in detecting other cases of + mixed pleasures and pains will be less. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of + the soul? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of + his neighbours at which he is pleased? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an + evil? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: From these considerations learn to know the nature of the + ridiculous. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Explain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to + describe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it is + that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You mean, Socrates, 'Know thyself.' + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I do; and the opposite would be, 'Know not thyself.' + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Indeed I am afraid that I cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be + shown? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself + richer than he is. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is a very common error. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer + than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he really + has not. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of + the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they are. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of + mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of + contention and lying conceit of wisdom? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And may not all this be truly called an evil condition? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very evil. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if + we would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure + and pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How can we make the further division which you suggest? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of + themselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two + classes—one having power and might; and the other the reverse. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who + are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may + be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be + more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in the + powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in + reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in + truth is, ridiculous. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the + admixture of pleasures and pains. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous + pain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the + misfortunes of enemies? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' + misfortunes—is not that wrong? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we + enumerated—the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are + ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we + not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of + mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: They are ridiculous. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a + misfortune? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly we feel pleasure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at + the misfortunes of friends? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our + friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has + been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant; and + so we envy and laugh at the same instant. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure + and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the + stage, but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless other + cases. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates, + however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, + and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a mixture of the + two elements so often named; did I not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had reference + only to sorrow and envy and anger. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I see. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then many other cases still remain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the + admixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that there + was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love and similar + affections; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you + would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a general truth that the + body without the soul, and the soul without the body, as well as the two + united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains; + and so further discussion would have been unnecessary. And now I want to + know whether I may depart; or will you keep me here until midnight? I + fancy that I may obtain my release without many words;—if I promise + that to-morrow I will give you an account of all these cases. But at + present I would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters + which remain to be settled, before the judgment can be given which + Philebus demands. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their + turn; this is the natural and necessary order. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Excellent. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for with + the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, + I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses, that there + are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are others again + which have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with + pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and distress, both of body and + mind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in + conceiving to be true? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and + form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, + and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and of + which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with + pain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be + plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or + pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the + argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane + or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers + and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively + beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely + beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of + scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and + have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will + try to make your meaning clearer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure tone, + then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, + and have natural pleasures associated with them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, there are such pleasures. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they + have no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and + wherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an + analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I understand. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger + of knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And this is the case. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his knowledge, + are there not pains of forgetting? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when he + feels grief at the loss of his knowledge. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the + natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In that case you are right in saying that the loss of + knowledge is not attended with pain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and + they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those + which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description + of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that + those which are not in excess have measure; the great, the excessive, + whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in referring to the class + of the infinite, and of the more and less, which pours through body and + soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite right, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess, abundance, + greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms stand to truth? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why do you ask, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and + knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and + impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for + judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me and + by all of us. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for + consideration a single instance. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What instance shall we select? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Suppose that we first of all take whiteness. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that + purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most + unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly that which is most unadulterated. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest + or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white + is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Perfectly right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is no need of adducing many similar examples in + illustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient to + prove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure + or unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a + great pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite + sufficient. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But what do you say of another question:—have we not heard + that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not + certain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to be + grateful to them? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do they mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by + putting a question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Ask, and I will answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the + other ever in want of something. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What manner of natures are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The one majestic ever, the other inferior. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You speak riddles. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of + them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and + are present everywhere. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in + play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else + (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former class + subserve (absolutes). + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Your many repetitions make me slow to understand. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning + will become clearer. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very likely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Here are two new principles. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: One is the generation of all things, and the other is essence. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I readily accept from you both generation and essence. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake of + essence, or essence for the sake of generation? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You want to know whether that which is called essence is, + properly speaking, for the sake of generation? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that + ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of + ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I have no objection, but you must take your part. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, + are given to us with a view to generation, and that each generation is + relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the whole + of generation is relative to the whole of essence. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Assuredly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake + of some essence? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that for the sake of which something else is done must be + placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of + something else, in some other class, my good friend. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in + some other class than that of good? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him + who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true + being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure + being a good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Assuredly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation + their highest end. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or + thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted at + the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they would not wish + to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might be + mentioned. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is certainly what they appear to think. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite + of generation? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and + destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were + saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible + thought. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is involved + in great absurdities, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Great, indeed; and there is yet another of them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good + or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul + only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that courage or + temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really + a good?—and is there not yet a further absurdity in our being + compelled to say that he who has a feeling of pain and not of pleasure is + bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even though he be the best of + men; and again, that he who has a feeling of pleasure, in so far as he is + pleased at the time when he is pleased, in that degree excels in virtue? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let us + not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge: let us ring their + metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we have + found out what in them is of the purest nature; and then the truest + elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Knowledge has two parts,—the one productive, and the other + educational? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part more + akin to knowledge, and the other less; and may not the one part be + regarded as the pure, and the other as the impure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of + them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are they, and how do you separate them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be + taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Not much, certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the + senses which is given by experience and practice, in addition to a certain + power of guessing, which is commonly called art, and is perfected by + attention and pains. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Nothing more, assuredly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism; for sounds are + harmonized, not by measure, but by skilful conjecture; the music of the + flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is + therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has little which is + certain. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and + husbandry and piloting and generalship. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The art of the builder, on the other hand, which uses a number + of measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater degree of + accuracy than the other arts. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of + the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line, + and a most ingenious machine for straightening wood. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking into + two kinds,—the arts which, like music, are less exact in their + results, and those which, like carpentering, are more exact. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Let us make that division. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Of the latter class, the most exact of all are those which we + just now spoke of as primary. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of + weighing and measuring. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable + into two kinds? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What are the two kinds? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which is + popular, and the other philosophical. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How would you distinguish them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is a wide difference between them, Protarchus; some + arithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two oxen, + two very large things or two very small things. The party who are opposed + to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the same as every + other unit. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among the + votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to be two + sorts of arithmetic. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when we compare the art of mensuration which is used in + building with philosophical geometry, or the art of computation which is + used in trading with exact calculation, shall we say of either of the + pairs that it is one or two? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion + that they were severally two. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think so, but I should like to be told by you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure, + and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether one sort of + knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly; that was the intention. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown + that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of + certainty? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And just now did not the argument first designate a particular + art by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity of that art; and + then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to enquire + whether the art as pursed by philosophers, or as pursued by + non-philosophers, has more of certainty and purity? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is the very question which the argument is asking. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: O Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference of + clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the answer will be the easier. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into which + arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others; and that of + these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic + impulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which, upon + your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of + misinterpretation? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What answer? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration; + and also several other arts which in like manner have this double nature, + and yet only one name. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you + speak, Socrates, and hope for good luck. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We have explained what we term the most exact arts or sciences. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, if + we do not award to her the first place. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And pray, what is dialectic? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Clearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge of + which we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a grain of + intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and + reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. + But how would you decide this question, Protarchus? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of + persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the best + of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their + own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you or with + him. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not + ashamed? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: As you please. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: May I not have led you into a misapprehension? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best or + usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy, and + the greatest amount of truth, however humble and little useful an art. And + as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in + usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you for saying that the + study of which I am speaking is superior in this particular of essential + truth; as in the comparison of white colours, a little whiteness, if that + little be only pure, was said to be superior in truth to a great mass + which is impure. And now let us give our best attention and consider well, + not the comparative use or reputation of the sciences, but the power or + faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of + doing all things for the sake of it; let us search into the pure element + of mind and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say whether the + science of which I have been speaking is most likely to possess the + faculty, or whether there be some other which has higher claims. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that any + other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general and + those engaged in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in + the investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who supposes himself to + be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this world, + how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of enquiry in + which his life is spent? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things which + are becoming, or which will or have become. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor + have been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of + truth ever become certain? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no + fixedness? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How indeed? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then mind and science when employed about such changing things + do not attain the highest truth? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I should imagine not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or + Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What point? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has + to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or + if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other + things are to be placed in a second or inferior class. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to + be given to the fairest things? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: That is natural. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured + most? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact + application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of + pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the ingredients, + pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who have their + materials ready to their hands. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now we must begin to mix them? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our + memories? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Of what? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, + that we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I + believe to be a fair summary of the argument. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living + beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good + of all, and that the two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are correctly given + to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by + denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are two, + and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was + not this what we were saying, Protarchus? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is there not and was there not a further point which was + conceded between us? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What was it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That the good differs from all other things. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: In what respect? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in + all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of + anything else. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of + wisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure + was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part + whatever in pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: We did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up + the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom and + knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider + whether he would desire to possess or acquire,—I will not say + pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that + he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any + recollection, however momentary, of the feeling,—but would he desire + to have anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about + wisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive that any one would choose + to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than with a + certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than + with a certain degree of wisdom? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any + more? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good + cannot possibly be either of them? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less + accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly + assigned. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Have we not found a road which leads towards the good? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What road? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in + what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery + of the man himself? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning, that + we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in + the life which is well mixed than in that which is not? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Far greater. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up + a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides + over the ceremony of mingling. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are not we the cup-bearers? and here are two fountains which are + flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain + of honey; the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine mingles, is + of water unpleasant but healthful; out of these we must seek to make the + fairest of all possible mixtures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Tell me first;—should we be most likely to succeed if we + mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Perhaps we might. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show + a safer plan. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and + one art to be more exact than another. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some of + them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the permanent + and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when judged by the + standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer than the former. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very good and right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If, then, we were to begin by mingling the sections of each + class which have the most of truth, will not the union suffice to give us + the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of another + kind? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that we ought to do what you suggest. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason as + well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other + things. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: We will suppose such a man. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with + the divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of our human spheres and + circles, but uses only divine circles and measures in the building of a + house? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is + ridiculous in man. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the cup + and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false measure and + the false circle? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, we must, if any of us is ever to find his way home. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And am I to include music, which, as I was saying just now, is + full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be a life at + all. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper who + is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let + knowledge of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle with the impure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of + having them all, if only you have the first sort. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer poetically + terms 'a meeting of the waters'? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There—I have let them in, and now I must return to the + fountain of pleasure. For we were not permitted to begin by mingling in a + single stream the true portions of both according to our original + intention; but the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the + sciences flow in together before the pleasures. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures + also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at once, or at first + only the true ones. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones + first. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary + pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle + them? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to + mingle. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent and + useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that all of them + are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we must let them all + mingle? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure and + wisdom to answer for themselves. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Tell us, O beloved—shall we call you pleasures or by some + other name?—would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of + opinion that they would certainly answer as follows: + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: They would answer, as we said before, that for any single class + to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether + possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with another + and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of things in + general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be, of ourselves + in every respect. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And our answer will be:—In that ye have spoken well. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and + mind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will + reply:—'What pleasures do you mean?' + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Likely enough. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have + the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition + to the true ones? 'Why, Socrates,' they will say, 'how can we? seeing that + they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble the + souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they prevent + us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of the children + which are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded; but the + true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our family, and + also those pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and which + every Virtue, like a goddess, has in her train to follow her about + wherever she goes,—mingle these and not the others; there would be + great want of sense in any one who desires to see a fair and perfect + mixture, and to find in it what is the highest good in man and in the + universe, and to divine what is the true form of good—there would be + great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the + company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup.'—Is not + this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her + own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and true opinion? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And still there must be something more added, which is a + necessary ingredient in every mixture. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be + created or subsist. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me whether + anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the + argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, + which is going to hold fair rule over a living body. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I agree with you, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And may we not say with reason that we are now at the vestibule + of the habitation of the good? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I think that we are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and + which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by + all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this + omnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any + mixture either of the highest value or of none at all. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Every man knows it. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: What? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture + whatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and to + the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medley which + brings confusion on the possessor of it. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the + beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the world + over. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, + with three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, + and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of the mixture, + and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Quite right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether + pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable + among gods and men. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to + the end. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We must take each of them separately in their relation to + pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which + of the two they are severally most akin. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing in review + mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself—as + to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is + palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is said + that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is + excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not the least + particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the same as truth, or + the most like truth, and the truest. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether + pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I + imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of + pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind a + greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer + of the two? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or + imagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past, + present, or future. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Right. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: But when we see some one indulging in pleasures, perhaps in + the greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the + action makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and consign them + to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of mouth + to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and wide, that + pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that in + measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like, the eternal nature + has been found. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful + and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will + not be far wrong, if I divine aright. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I dare say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we + were affirming to appertain specially to the soul—sciences and arts + and true opinions as we called them? These come after the third class, and + form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure is. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Surely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us as + painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, + which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Perhaps. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, as Orpheus says, + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.' +</pre> + <p> + Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set + the crown on our discourse. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus + offering the third libation to the saviour Zeus. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: How? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the + good. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you + spoke, meant a recapitulation. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just + been saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained, + not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was + far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than + pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But, suspecting that there were other things which were also + better, I went on to say that if there was anything better than either, + then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure + would lose the second place as well as the first. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: You did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the + unsatisfactory nature of both of them. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good + have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both + wanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But, though they must both resign in favour of another, mind is + ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror + than pleasure. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And, according to the judgment which has now been given, + pleasure will rank fifth. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and + animals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be so;—although + the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine that + pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to be + better witnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy. + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you have + been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And will you let me go? + </p> + <p> + PROTARCHUS: There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you of + it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to go away from an + argument. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Philebus, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILEBUS *** + +***** This file should be named 1744-h.htm or 1744-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/7/4/1744/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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