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+The Project Gutenberg Etext of Statesman by Plato
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+Statesman
+
+by Plato
+
+translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+May, 1999  [Etext #1738]
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+
+STATESMAN
+
+by
+
+Plato
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.
+
+In the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Parmenides, and the
+Sophist, we may observe the tendency of Plato to combine two or more
+subjects or different aspects of the same subject in a single dialogue.  In
+the Sophist and Statesman especially we note that the discussion is partly
+regarded as an illustration of method, and that analogies are brought from
+afar which throw light on the main subject.  And in his later writings
+generally we further remark a decline of style, and of dramatic power; the
+characters excite little or no interest, and the digressions are apt to
+overlay the main thesis; there is not the 'callida junctura' of an artistic
+whole.  Both the serious discussions and the jests are sometimes out of
+place.  The invincible Socrates is withdrawn from view; and new foes begin
+to appear under old names.  Plato is now chiefly concerned, not with the
+original Sophist, but with the sophistry of the schools of philosophy,
+which are making reasoning impossible; and is driven by them out of the
+regions of transcendental speculation back into the path of common sense. 
+A logical or psychological phase takes the place of the doctrine of Ideas
+in his mind.  He is constantly dwelling on the importance of regular
+classification, and of not putting words in the place of things.  He has
+banished the poets, and is beginning to use a technical language.  He is
+bitter and satirical, and seems to be sadly conscious of the realities of
+human life.  Yet the ideal glory of the Platonic philosophy is not
+extinguished.  He is still looking for a city in which kings are either
+philosophers or gods (compare Laws).
+
+The Statesman has lost the grace and beauty of the earlier dialogues.  The
+mind of the writer seems to be so overpowered in the effort of thought as
+to impair his style; at least his gift of expression does not keep up with
+the increasing difficulty of his theme.  The idea of the king or statesman
+and the illustration of method are connected, not like the love and
+rhetoric of the Phaedrus, by 'little invisible pegs,' but in a confused and
+inartistic manner, which fails to produce any impression of a whole on the
+mind of the reader.  Plato apologizes for his tediousness, and acknowledges
+that the improvement of his audience has been his only aim in some of his
+digressions.  His own image may be used as a motto of his style:  like an
+inexpert statuary he has made the figure or outline too large, and is
+unable to give the proper colours or proportions to his work.  He makes
+mistakes only to correct them--this seems to be his way of drawing
+attention to common dialectical errors.  The Eleatic stranger, here, as in
+the Sophist, has no appropriate character, and appears only as the
+expositor of a political ideal, in the delineation of which he is
+frequently interrupted by purely logical illustrations.  The younger
+Socrates resembles his namesake in nothing but a name.  The dramatic
+character is so completely forgotten, that a special reference is twice
+made to discussions in the Sophist; and this, perhaps, is the strongest
+ground which can be urged for doubting the genuineness of the work.  But,
+when we remember that a similar allusion is made in the Laws to the
+Republic, we see that the entire disregard of dramatic propriety is not
+always a sufficient reason for doubting the genuineness of a Platonic
+writing.
+
+The search after the Statesman, which is carried on, like that for the
+Sophist, by the method of dichotomy, gives an opportunity for many humorous
+and satirical remarks.  Several of the jests are mannered and laboured: 
+for example, the turn of words with which the dialogue opens; or the clumsy
+joke about man being an animal, who has a power of two-feet--both which are
+suggested by the presence of Theodorus, the geometrician.  There is
+political as well as logical insight in refusing to admit the division of
+mankind into Hellenes and Barbarians:  'if a crane could speak, he would in
+like manner oppose men and all other animals to cranes.'  The pride of the
+Hellene is further humbled, by being compared to a Phrygian or Lydian. 
+Plato glories in this impartiality of the dialectical method, which places
+birds in juxtaposition with men, and the king side by side with the bird-
+catcher; king or vermin-destroyer are objects of equal interest to science
+(compare Parmen.).  There are other passages which show that the irony of
+Socrates was a lesson which Plato was not slow in learning--as, for
+example, the passing remark, that 'the kings and statesmen of our day are
+in their breeding and education very like their subjects;' or the
+anticipation that the rivals of the king will be found in the class of
+servants; or the imposing attitude of the priests, who are the established
+interpreters of the will of heaven, authorized by law.  Nothing is more
+bitter in all his writings than his comparison of the contemporary
+politicians to lions, centaurs, satyrs, and other animals of a feebler
+sort, who are ever changing their forms and natures.  But, as in the later
+dialogues generally, the play of humour and the charm of poetry have
+departed, never to return.
+
+Still the Politicus contains a higher and more ideal conception of politics
+than any other of Plato's writings.  The city of which there is a pattern
+in heaven (Republic), is here described as a Paradisiacal state of human
+society.  In the truest sense of all, the ruler is not man but God; and
+such a government existed in a former cycle of human history, and may again
+exist when the gods resume their care of mankind.  In a secondary sense,
+the true form of government is that which has scientific rulers, who are
+irresponsible to their subjects.  Not power but knowledge is the
+characteristic of a king or royal person.  And the rule of a man is better
+and higher than law, because he is more able to deal with the infinite
+complexity of human affairs.  But mankind, in despair of finding a true
+ruler, are willing to acquiesce in any law or custom which will save them
+from the caprice of individuals.  They are ready to accept any of the six
+forms of government which prevail in the world.  To the Greek, nomos was a
+sacred word, but the political idealism of Plato soars into a region
+beyond; for the laws he would substitute the intelligent will of the
+legislator.  Education is originally to implant in men's minds a sense of
+truth and justice, which is the divine bond of states, and the legislator
+is to contrive human bonds, by which dissimilar natures may be united in
+marriage and supply the deficiencies of one another.  As in the Republic,
+the government of philosophers, the causes of the perversion of states, the
+regulation of marriages, are still the political problems with which
+Plato's mind is occupied.  He treats them more slightly, partly because the
+dialogue is shorter, and also because the discussion of them is perpetually
+crossed by the other interest of dialectic, which has begun to absorb him.
+
+The plan of the Politicus or Statesman may be briefly sketched as follows: 
+(1) By a process of division and subdivision we discover the true herdsman
+or king of men.  But before we can rightly distinguish him from his rivals,
+we must view him, (2) as he is presented to us in a famous ancient tale: 
+the tale will also enable us to distinguish the divine from the human
+herdsman or shepherd:  (3) and besides our fable, we must have an example;
+for our example we will select the art of weaving, which will have to be
+distinguished from the kindred arts; and then, following this pattern, we
+will separate the king from his subordinates or competitors.  (4) But are
+we not exceeding all due limits; and is there not a measure of all arts and
+sciences, to which the art of discourse must conform?  There is; but before
+we can apply this measure, we must know what is the aim of discourse:  and
+our discourse only aims at the dialectical improvement of ourselves and
+others.--Having made our apology, we return once more to the king or
+statesman, and proceed to contrast him with pretenders in the same line
+with him, under their various forms of government.  (5) His characteristic
+is, that he alone has science, which is superior to law and written
+enactments; these do but spring out of the necessities of mankind, when
+they are in despair of finding the true king.  (6) The sciences which are
+most akin to the royal are the sciences of the general, the judge, the
+orator, which minister to him, but even these are subordinate to him.  (7)
+Fixed principles are implanted by education, and the king or statesman
+completes the political web by marrying together dissimilar natures, the
+courageous and the temperate, the bold and the gentle, who are the warp and
+the woof of society.
+
+The outline may be filled up as follows:--
+
+SOCRATES:  I have reason to thank you, Theodorus, for the acquaintance of
+Theaetetus and the Stranger.
+
+THEODORUS:  And you will have three times as much reason to thank me when
+they have delineated the Statesman and Philosopher, as well as the Sophist.
+
+SOCRATES:  Does the great geometrician apply the same measure to all three?
+Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical ratio can express?
+
+THEODORUS:  By the god Ammon, Socrates, you are right; and I am glad to see
+that you have not forgotten your geometry.  But before I retaliate on you,
+I must request the Stranger to finish the argument...
+
+The Stranger suggests that Theaetetus shall be allowed to rest, and that
+Socrates the younger shall respond in his place; Theodorus agrees to the
+suggestion, and Socrates remarks that the name of the one and the face of
+the other give him a right to claim relationship with both of them.  They
+propose to take the Statesman after the Sophist; his path they must
+determine, and part off all other ways, stamping upon them a single
+negative form (compare Soph.).
+
+The Stranger begins the enquiry by making a division of the arts and
+sciences into theoretical and practical--the one kind concerned with
+knowledge exclusively, and the other with action; arithmetic and the
+mathematical sciences are examples of the former, and carpentering and
+handicraft arts of the latter (compare Philebus).  Under which of the two
+shall we place the Statesman?  Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether
+the king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many?  As the
+adviser of a physician may be said to have medical science and to be a
+physician, so the adviser of a king has royal science and is a king.  And
+the master of a large household may be compared to the ruler of a small
+state.  Hence we conclude that the science of the king, statesman, and
+householder is one and the same.  And this science is akin to knowledge
+rather than to action.  For a king rules with his mind, and not with his
+hands.
+
+But theoretical science may be a science either of judging, like
+arithmetic, or of ruling and superintending, like that of the architect or
+master-builder.  And the science of the king is of the latter nature; but
+the power which he exercises is underived and uncontrolled,--a
+characteristic which distinguishes him from heralds, prophets, and other
+inferior officers.  He is the wholesale dealer in command, and the herald,
+or other officer, retails his commands to others.  Again, a ruler is
+concerned with the production of some object, and objects may be divided
+into living and lifeless, and rulers into the rulers of living and lifeless
+objects.  And the king is not like the master-builder, concerned with
+lifeless matter, but has the task of managing living animals.  And the
+tending of living animals may be either a tending of individuals, or a
+managing of herds.  And the Statesman is not a groom, but a herdsman, and
+his art may be called either the art of managing a herd, or the art of
+collective management:--Which do you prefer?  'No matter.'  Very good,
+Socrates, and if you are not too particular about words you will be all the
+richer some day in true wisdom.  But how would you subdivide the herdsman's
+art?  'I should say, that there is one management of men, and another of
+beasts.'  Very good, but you are in too great a hurry to get to man.  All
+divisions which are rightly made should cut through the middle; if you
+attend to this rule, you will be more likely to arrive at classes.  'I do
+not understand the nature of my mistake.'  Your division was like a
+division of the human race into Hellenes and Barbarians, or into Lydians or
+Phrygians and all other nations, instead of into male and female; or like a
+division of number into ten thousand and all other numbers, instead of into
+odd and even.  And I should like you to observe further, that though I
+maintain a class to be a part, there is no similar necessity for a part to
+be a class.  But to return to your division, you spoke of men and other
+animals as two classes--the second of which you comprehended under the
+general name of beasts.  This is the sort of division which an intelligent
+crane would make:  he would put cranes into a class by themselves for their
+special glory, and jumble together all others, including man, in the class
+of beasts.  An error of this kind can only be avoided by a more regular
+subdivision.  Just now we divided the whole class of animals into
+gregarious and non-gregarious, omitting the previous division into tame and
+wild.  We forgot this in our hurry to arrive at man, and found by
+experience, as the proverb says, that 'the more haste the worse speed.'
+
+And now let us begin again at the art of managing herds.  You have probably
+heard of the fish-preserves in the Nile and in the ponds of the Great King,
+and of the nurseries of geese and cranes in Thessaly.  These suggest a new
+division into the rearing or management of land-herds and of water-herds:--
+I need not say with which the king is concerned.  And land-herds may be
+divided into walking and flying; and every idiot knows that the political
+animal is a pedestrian.  At this point we may take a longer or a shorter
+road, and as we are already near the end, I see no harm in taking the
+longer, which is the way of mesotomy, and accords with the principle which
+we were laying down.  The tame, walking, herding animal, may be divided
+into two classes--the horned and the hornless, and the king is concerned
+with the hornless; and these again may be subdivided into animals having or
+not having cloven feet, or mixing or not mixing the breed; and the king or
+statesman has the care of animals which have not cloven feet, and which do
+not mix the breed.  And now, if we omit dogs, who can hardly be said to
+herd, I think that we have only two species left which remain undivided: 
+and how are we to distinguish them?  To geometricians, like you and
+Theaetetus, I can have no difficulty in explaining that man is a diameter,
+having a power of two feet; and the power of four-legged creatures, being
+the double of two feet, is the diameter of our diameter.  There is another
+excellent jest which I spy in the two remaining species.  Men and birds are
+both bipeds, and human beings are running a race with the airiest and
+freest of creation, in which they are far behind their competitors;--this
+is a great joke, and there is a still better in the juxtaposition of the
+bird-taker and the king, who may be seen scampering after them.  For, as we
+remarked in discussing the Sophist, the dialectical method is no respecter
+of persons.  But we might have proceeded, as I was saying, by another and a
+shorter road.  In that case we should have begun by dividing land animals
+into bipeds and quadrupeds, and bipeds into winged and wingless; we should
+than have taken the Statesman and set him over the 'bipes implume,' and put
+the reins of government into his hands.
+
+Here let us sum up:--The science of pure knowledge had a part which was the
+science of command, and this had a part which was a science of wholesale
+command; and this was divided into the management of animals, and was again
+parted off into the management of herds of animals, and again of land
+animals, and these into hornless, and these into bipeds; and so at last we
+arrived at man, and found the political and royal science.  And yet we have
+not clearly distinguished the political shepherd from his rivals.  No one
+would think of usurping the prerogatives of the ordinary shepherd, who on
+all hands is admitted to be the trainer, matchmaker, doctor, musician of
+his flock.  But the royal shepherd has numberless competitors, from whom he
+must be distinguished; there are merchants, husbandmen, physicians, who
+will all dispute his right to manage the flock.  I think that we can best
+distinguish him by having recourse to a famous old tradition, which may
+amuse as well as instruct us; the narrative is perfectly true, although the
+scepticism of mankind is prone to doubt the tales of old.  You have heard
+what happened in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes?  'You mean about the
+golden lamb?'  No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how
+the sun and stars once arose in the west and set in the east, and that the
+god reversed their motion, as a witness to the right of Atreus.  'There is
+such a story.'  And no doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos, and of
+the earthborn men?  The origin of these and the like stories is to be found
+in the tale which I am about to narrate.
+
+There was a time when God directed the revolutions of the world, but at the
+completion of a certain cycle he let go; and the world, by a necessity of
+its nature, turned back, and went round the other way.  For divine things
+alone are unchangeable; but the earth and heavens, although endowed with
+many glories, have a body, and are therefore liable to perturbation.  In
+the case of the world, the perturbation is very slight, and amounts only to
+a reversal of motion.  For the lord of moving things is alone self-moved;
+neither can piety allow that he goes at one time in one direction and at
+another time in another; or that God has given the universe opposite
+motions; or that there are two gods, one turning it in one direction,
+another in another.  But the truth is, that there are two cycles of the
+world, and in one of them it is governed by an immediate Providence, and
+receives life and immortality, and in the other is let go again, and has a
+reverse action during infinite ages.  This new action is spontaneous, and
+is due to exquisite perfection of balance, to the vast size of the
+universe, and to the smallness of the pivot upon which it turns.  All
+changes in the heaven affect the animal world, and this being the greatest
+of them, is most destructive to men and animals.  At the beginning of the
+cycle before our own very few of them had survived; and on these a mighty
+change passed.  For their life was reversed like the motion of the world,
+and first of all coming to a stand then quickly returned to youth and
+beauty.  The white locks of the aged became black; the cheeks of the
+bearded man were restored to their youth and fineness; the young men grew
+softer and smaller, and, being reduced to the condition of children in mind
+as well as body, began to vanish away; and the bodies of those who had died
+by violence, in a few moments underwent a parallel change and disappeared.
+In that cycle of existence there was no such thing as the procreation of
+animals from one another, but they were born of the earth, and of this our
+ancestors, who came into being immediately after the end of the last cycle
+and at the beginning of this, have preserved the recollection.  Such
+traditions are often now unduly discredited, and yet they may be proved by
+internal evidence.  For observe how consistent the narrative is; as the old
+returned to youth, so the dead returned to life; the wheel of their
+existence having been reversed, they rose again from the earth:  a few only
+were reserved by God for another destiny.  Such was the origin of the
+earthborn men.
+
+'And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos, or our
+present state of existence?'  No, Socrates, that blessed and spontaneous
+life belongs not to this, but to the previous state, in which God was the
+governor of the whole world, and other gods subject to him ruled over parts
+of the world, as is still the case in certain places.  They were shepherds
+of men and animals, each of them sufficing for those of whom he had the
+care.  And there was no violence among them, or war, or devouring of one
+another.  Their life was spontaneous, because in those days God ruled over
+man; and he was to man what man is now to the animals.  Under his
+government there were no estates, or private possessions, or families; but
+the earth produced a sufficiency of all things, and men were born out of
+the earth, having no traditions of the past; and as the temperature of the
+seasons was mild, they took no thought for raiment, and had no beds, but
+lived and dwelt in the open air.
+
+Such was the age of Cronos, and the age of Zeus is our own.  Tell me, which
+is the happier of the two?  Or rather, shall I tell you that the happiness
+of these children of Cronos must have depended on how they used their time? 
+If having boundless leisure, and the power of discoursing not only with one
+another but with the animals, they had employed these advantages with a
+view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their
+store of knowledge;--or again, if they had merely eaten and drunk, and told
+stories to one another, and to the beasts;--in either case, I say, there
+would be no difficulty in answering the question.  But as nobody knows
+which they did, the question must remain unanswered.  And here is the point
+of my tale.  In the fulness of time, when the earthborn men had all passed
+away, the ruler of the universe let go the helm, and became a spectator;
+and destiny and natural impulse swayed the world.  At the same instant all
+the inferior deities gave up their hold; the whole universe rebounded, and
+there was a great earthquake, and utter ruin of all manner of animals. 
+After a while the tumult ceased, and the universal creature settled down in
+his accustomed course, having authority over all other creatures, and
+following the instructions of his God and Father, at first more precisely,
+afterwards with less exactness.  The reason of the falling off was the
+disengagement of a former chaos; 'a muddy vesture of decay' was a part of
+his original nature, out of which he was brought by his Creator, under
+whose immediate guidance, while he remained in that former cycle, the evil
+was minimized and the good increased to the utmost.  And in the beginning
+of the new cycle all was well enough, but as time went on, discord entered
+in; at length the good was minimized and the evil everywhere diffused, and
+there was a danger of universal ruin.  Then the Creator, seeing the world
+in great straits, and fearing that chaos and infinity would come again, in
+his tender care again placed himself at the helm and restored order, and
+made the world immortal and imperishable.  Once more the cycle of life and
+generation was reversed; the infants grew into young men, and the young men
+became greyheaded; no longer did the animals spring out of the earth; as
+the whole world was now lord of its own progress, so the parts were to be
+self-created and self-nourished.  At first the case of men was very
+helpless and pitiable; for they were alone among the wild beasts, and had
+to carry on the struggle for existence without arts or knowledge, and had
+no food, and did not know how to get any.  That was the time when
+Prometheus brought them fire, Hephaestus and Athene taught them arts, and
+other gods gave them seeds and plants.  Out of these human life was framed;
+for mankind were left to themselves, and ordered their own ways, living,
+like the universe, in one cycle after one manner, and in another cycle
+after another manner.
+
+Enough of the myth, which may show us two errors of which we were guilty in
+our account of the king.  The first and grand error was in choosing for our
+king a god, who belongs to the other cycle, instead of a man from our own;
+there was a lesser error also in our failure to define the nature of the
+royal functions.  The myth gave us only the image of a divine shepherd,
+whereas the statesmen and kings of our own day very much resemble their
+subjects in education and breeding.  On retracing our steps we find that we
+gave too narrow a designation to the art which was concerned with command-
+for-self over living creatures, when we called it the 'feeding' of animals
+in flocks.  This would apply to all shepherds, with the exception of the
+Statesman; but if we say 'managing' or 'tending' animals, the term would
+include him as well.  Having remodelled the name, we may subdivide as
+before, first separating the human from the divine shepherd or manager.
+Then we may subdivide the human art of governing into the government of
+willing and unwilling subjects--royalty and tyranny--which are the extreme
+opposites of one another, although we in our simplicity have hitherto
+confounded them.
+
+And yet the figure of the king is still defective.  We have taken up a lump
+of fable, and have used more than we needed.  Like statuaries, we have made
+some of the features out of proportion, and shall lose time in reducing
+them.  Or our mythus may be compared to a picture, which is well drawn in
+outline, but is not yet enlivened by colour.  And to intelligent persons
+language is, or ought to be, a better instrument of description than any
+picture.  'But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you speak?'  No
+higher truth can be made clear without an example; every man seems to know
+all things in a dream, and to know nothing when he is awake.  And the
+nature of example can only be illustrated by an example.  Children are
+taught to read by being made to compare cases in which they do not know a
+certain letter with cases in which they know it, until they learn to
+recognize it in all its combinations.  Example comes into use when we
+identify something unknown with that which is known, and form a common
+notion of both of them.  Like the child who is learning his letters, the
+soul recognizes some of the first elements of things; and then again is at
+fault and unable to recognize them when they are translated into the
+difficult language of facts.  Let us, then, take an example, which will
+illustrate the nature of example, and will also assist us in characterizing
+the political science, and in separating the true king from his rivals.
+
+I will select the example of weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool.
+In the first place, all possessions are either productive or preventive; of
+the preventive sort are spells and antidotes, divine and human, and also
+defences, and defences are either arms or screens, and screens are veils
+and also shields against heat and cold, and shields against heat and cold
+are shelters and coverings, and coverings are blankets or garments, and
+garments are in one piece or have many parts; and of these latter, some are
+stitched and others are fastened, and of these again some are made of
+fibres of plants and some of hair, and of these some are cemented with
+water and earth, and some are fastened with their own material; the latter
+are called clothes, and are made by the art of clothing, from which the art
+of weaving differs only in name, as the political differs from the royal
+science.  Thus we have drawn several distinctions, but as yet have not
+distinguished the weaving of garments from the kindred and co-operative
+arts.  For the first process to which the material is subjected is the
+opposite of weaving--I mean carding.  And the art of carding, and the whole
+art of the fuller and the mender, are concerned with the treatment and
+production of clothes, as well as the art of weaving.  Again, there are the
+arts which make the weaver's tools.  And if we say that the weaver's art is
+the greatest and noblest of those which have to do with woollen garments,--
+this, although true, is not sufficiently distinct; because these other arts
+require to be first cleared away.  Let us proceed, then, by regular steps:
+--There are causal or principal, and co-operative or subordinate arts.  To
+the causal class belong the arts of washing and mending, of carding and
+spinning the threads, and the other arts of working in wool; these are
+chiefly of two kinds, falling under the two great categories of composition
+and division.  Carding is of the latter sort.  But our concern is chiefly
+with that part of the art of wool-working which composes, and of which one
+kind twists and the other interlaces the threads, whether the firmer
+texture of the warp or the looser texture of the woof.  These are adapted
+to each other, and the orderly composition of them forms a woollen garment. 
+And the art which presides over these operations is the art of weaving.
+
+But why did we go through this circuitous process, instead of saying at
+once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof?  In order
+that our labour may not seem to be lost, I must explain the whole nature of
+excess and defect.  There are two arts of measuring--one is concerned with
+relative size, and the other has reference to a mean or standard of what is
+meet.  The difference between good and evil is the difference between a
+mean or measure and excess or defect.  All things require to be compared,
+not only with one another, but with the mean, without which there would be
+no beauty and no art, whether the art of the statesman or the art of
+weaving or any other; for all the arts guard against excess or defect,
+which are real evils.  This we must endeavour to show, if the arts are to
+exist; and the proof of this will be a harder piece of work than the
+demonstration of the existence of not-being which we proved in our
+discussion about the Sophist.  At present I am content with the indirect
+proof that the existence of such a standard is necessary to the existence
+of the arts.  The standard or measure, which we are now only applying to
+the arts, may be some day required with a view to the demonstration of
+absolute truth.
+
+We may now divide this art of measurement into two parts; placing in the
+one part all the arts which measure the relative size or number of objects,
+and in the other all those which depend upon a mean or standard.  Many
+accomplished men say that the art of measurement has to do with all things,
+but these persons, although in this notion of theirs they may very likely
+be right, are apt to fail in seeing the differences of classes--they jumble
+together in one the 'more' and the 'too much,' which are very different
+things.  Whereas the right way is to find the differences of classes, and
+to comprehend the things which have any affinity under the same class.
+
+I will make one more observation by the way.  When a pupil at a school is
+asked the letters which make up a particular word, is he not asked with a
+view to his knowing the same letters in all words?  And our enquiry about
+the Statesman in like manner is intended not only to improve our knowledge
+of politics, but our reasoning powers generally.  Still less would any one
+analyze the nature of weaving for its own sake.  There is no difficulty in
+exhibiting sensible images, but the greatest and noblest truths have no
+outward form adapted to the eye of sense, and are only revealed in thought.
+And all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them.  I make these
+remarks, because I want you to get rid of any impression that our
+discussion about weaving and about the reversal of the universe, and the
+other discussion about the Sophist and not-being, were tedious and
+irrelevant.  Please to observe that they can only be fairly judged when
+compared with what is meet; and yet not with what is meet for producing
+pleasure, nor even meet for making discoveries, but for the great end of
+developing the dialectical method and sharpening the wits of the auditors.
+He who censures us, should prove that, if our words had been fewer, they
+would have been better calculated to make men dialecticians.
+
+And now let us return to our king or statesman, and transfer to him the
+example of weaving.  The royal art has been separated from that of other
+herdsmen, but not from the causal and co-operative arts which exist in
+states; these do not admit of dichotomy, and therefore they must be carved
+neatly, like the limbs of a victim, not into more parts than are necessary.
+And first (1) we have the large class of instruments, which includes almost
+everything in the world; from these may be parted off (2) vessels which are
+framed for the preservation of things, moist or dry, prepared in the fire
+or out of the fire.  The royal or political art has nothing to do with
+either of these, any more than with the arts of making (3) vehicles, or (4)
+defences, whether dresses, or arms, or walls, or (5) with the art of making
+ornaments, whether pictures or other playthings, as they may be fitly
+called, for they have no serious use.  Then (6) there are the arts which
+furnish gold, silver, wood, bark, and other materials, which should have
+been put first; these, again, have no concern with the kingly science; any
+more than the arts (7) which provide food and nourishment for the human
+body, and which furnish occupation to the husbandman, huntsman, doctor,
+cook, and the like, but not to the king or statesman.  Further, there are
+small things, such as coins, seals, stamps, which may with a little
+violence be comprehended in one of the above-mentioned classes.  Thus they
+will embrace every species of property with the exception of animals,--but
+these have been already included in the art of tending herds.  There
+remains only the class of slaves or ministers, among whom I expect that the
+real rivals of the king will be discovered.  I am not speaking of the
+veritable slave bought with money, nor of the hireling who lets himself out
+for service, nor of the trader or merchant, who at best can only lay claim
+to economical and not to royal science.  Nor am I referring to government
+officials, such as heralds and scribes, for these are only the servants of
+the rulers, and not the rulers themselves.  I admit that there may be
+something strange in any servants pretending to be masters, but I hardly
+think that I could have been wrong in supposing that the principal
+claimants to the throne will be of this class.  Let us try once more: 
+There are diviners and priests, who are full of pride and prerogative;
+these, as the law declares, know how to give acceptable gifts to the gods,
+and in many parts of Hellas the duty of performing solemn sacrifices is
+assigned to the chief magistrate, as at Athens to the King Archon.  At
+last, then, we have found a trace of those whom we were seeking.  But still
+they are only servants and ministers.
+
+And who are these who next come into view in various forms of men and
+animals and other monsters appearing--lions and centaurs and satyrs--who
+are these?  I did not know them at first, for every one looks strange when
+he is unexpected.  But now I recognize the politician and his troop, the
+chief of Sophists, the prince of charlatans, the most accomplished of
+wizards, who must be carefully distinguished from the true king or
+statesman.  And here I will interpose a question:  What are the true forms
+of government?  Are they not three--monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy? and
+the distinctions of freedom and compulsion, law and no law, poverty and
+riches expand these three into six.  Monarchy may be divided into royalty
+and tyranny; oligarchy into aristocracy and plutocracy; and democracy may
+observe the law or may not observe it.  But are any of these governments
+worthy of the name?  Is not government a science, and are we to suppose
+that scientific government is secured by the rulers being many or few, rich
+or poor, or by the rule being compulsory or voluntary?  Can the many attain
+to science?  In no Hellenic city are there fifty good draught players, and
+certainly there are not as many kings, for by kings we mean all those who
+are possessed of the political science.  A true government must therefore
+be the government of one, or of a few.  And they may govern us either with
+or without law, and whether they are poor or rich, and however they govern,
+provided they govern on some scientific principle,--it makes no difference. 
+And as the physician may cure us with our will, or against our will, and by
+any mode of treatment, burning, bleeding, lowering, fattening, if he only
+proceeds scientifically:  so the true governor may reduce or fatten or
+bleed the body corporate, while he acts according to the rules of his art,
+and with a view to the good of the state, whether according to law or
+without law.
+
+'I do not like the notion, that there can be good government without law.'
+
+I must explain:  Law-making certainly is the business of a king; and yet
+the best thing of all is, not that the law should rule, but that the king
+should rule, for the varieties of circumstances are endless, and no simple
+or universal rule can suit them all, or last for ever.  The law is just an
+ignorant brute of a tyrant, who insists always on his commands being
+fulfilled under all circumstances.  'Then why have we laws at all?'  I will
+answer that question by asking you whether the training master gives a
+different discipline to each of his pupils, or whether he has a general
+rule of diet and exercise which is suited to the constitutions of the
+majority?  'The latter.'  The legislator, too, is obliged to lay down
+general laws, and cannot enact what is precisely suitable to each
+particular case.  He cannot be sitting at every man's side all his life,
+and prescribe for him the minute particulars of his duty, and therefore he
+is compelled to impose on himself and others the restriction of a written
+law.  Let me suppose now, that a physician or trainer, having left
+directions for his patients or pupils, goes into a far country, and comes
+back sooner than he intended; owing to some unexpected change in the
+weather, the patient or pupil seems to require a different mode of
+treatment:  Would he persist in his old commands, under the idea that all
+others are noxious and heterodox?  Viewed in the light of science, would
+not the continuance of such regulations be ridiculous?  And if the
+legislator, or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to be
+prohibited from altering his own laws?  The common people say:  Let a man
+persuade the city first, and then let him impose new laws.  But is a
+physician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force?  Is he
+a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the cure? 
+Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich man, and
+unjust, if by a poor man?  May not any man, rich or poor, with or without
+law, and whether the citizens like or not, do what is for their good?  The
+pilot saves the lives of the crew, not by laying down rules, but by making
+his art a law, and, like him, the true governor has a strength of art which
+is superior to the law.  This is scientific government, and all others are
+imitations only.  Yet no great number of persons can attain to this
+science.  And hence follows an important result.  The true political
+principle is to assert the inviolability of the law, which, though not the
+best thing possible, is best for the imperfect condition of man.
+
+I will explain my meaning by an illustration:--Suppose that mankind,
+indignant at the rogueries and caprices of physicians and pilots, call
+together an assembly, in which all who like may speak, the skilled as well
+as the unskilled, and that in their assembly they make decrees for
+regulating the practice of navigation and medicine which are to be binding
+on these professions for all time.  Suppose that they elect annually by
+vote or lot those to whom authority in either department is to be
+delegated.  And let us further imagine, that when the term of their
+magistracy has expired, the magistrates appointed by them are summoned
+before an ignorant and unprofessional court, and may be condemned and
+punished for breaking the regulations.  They even go a step further, and
+enact, that he who is found enquiring into the truth of navigation and
+medicine, and is seeking to be wise above what is written, shall be called
+not an artist, but a dreamer, a prating Sophist and a corruptor of youth;
+and if he try to persuade others to investigate those sciences in a manner
+contrary to the law, he shall be punished with the utmost severity.  And
+like rules might be extended to any art or science.  But what would be the
+consequence?
+
+'The arts would utterly perish, and human life, which is bad enough
+already, would become intolerable.'
+
+But suppose, once more, that we were to appoint some one as the guardian of
+the law, who was both ignorant and interested, and who perverted the law:  
+would not this be a still worse evil than the other?  'Certainly.'  For the
+laws are based on some experience and wisdom.  Hence the wiser course is,
+that they should be observed, although this is not the best thing of all,
+but only the second best.  And whoever, having skill, should try to improve
+them, would act in the spirit of the law-giver.  But then, as we have seen,
+no great number of men, whether poor or rich, can be makers of laws.  And
+so, the nearest approach to true government is, when men do nothing
+contrary to their own written laws and national customs.  When the rich
+preserve their customs and maintain the law, this is called aristocracy, or
+if they neglect the law, oligarchy.  When an individual rules according to
+law, whether by the help of science or opinion, this is called monarchy;
+and when he has royal science he is a king, whether he be so in fact or
+not; but when he rules in spite of law, and is blind with ignorance and
+passion, he is called a tyrant.  These forms of government exist, because
+men despair of the true king ever appearing among them; if he were to
+appear, they would joyfully hand over to him the reins of government.  But,
+as there is no natural ruler of the hive, they meet together and make laws. 
+And do we wonder, when the foundation of politics is in the letter only, at
+the miseries of states?  Ought we not rather to admire the strength of the
+political bond?  For cities have endured the worst of evils time out of
+mind; many cities have been shipwrecked, and some are like ships
+foundering, because their pilots are absolutely ignorant of the science
+which they profess.
+
+Let us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is the least
+bad, and which of them is the worst?  I said at the beginning, that each of
+the three forms of government, royalty, aristocracy, and democracy, might
+be divided into two, so that the whole number of them, including the best,
+will be seven.  Under monarchy we have already distinguished royalty and
+tyranny; of oligarchy there were two kinds, aristocracy and plutocracy; and
+democracy may also be divided, for there is a democracy which observes, and
+a democracy which neglects, the laws.  The government of one is the best
+and the worst--the government of a few is less bad and less good--the
+government of the many is the least bad and least good of them all, being
+the best of all lawless governments, and the worst of all lawful ones.  But
+the rulers of all these states, unless they have knowledge, are maintainers
+of idols, and themselves idols--wizards, and also Sophists; for, after many
+windings, the term 'Sophist' comes home to them.
+
+And now enough of centaurs and satyrs:  the play is ended, and they may
+quit the political stage.  Still there remain some other and better
+elements, which adhere to the royal science, and must be drawn off in the
+refiner's fire before the gold can become quite pure.  The arts of the
+general, the judge, and the orator, will have to be separated from the
+royal art; when the separation has been made, the nature of the king will
+be unalloyed.  Now there are inferior sciences, such as music and others;
+and there is a superior science, which determines whether music is to be
+learnt or not, and this is different from them, and the governor of them.
+The science which determines whether we are to use persuasion, or not, is
+higher than the art of persuasion; the science which determines whether we
+are to go to war, is higher than the art of the general.  The science which
+makes the laws, is higher than that which only administers them.  And the
+science which has this authority over the rest, is the science of the king
+or statesman.
+
+Once more we will endeavour to view this royal science by the light of our
+example.  We may compare the state to a web, and I will show you how the
+different threads are drawn into one.  You would admit--would you not?--
+that there are parts of virtue (although this position is sometimes
+assailed by Eristics), and one part of virtue is temperance, and another
+courage.  These are two principles which are in a manner antagonistic to
+one another; and they pervade all nature; the whole class of the good and
+beautiful is included under them.  The beautiful may be subdivided into two
+lesser classes:  one of these is described by us in terms expressive of
+motion or energy, and the other in terms expressive of rest and quietness.
+We say, how manly! how vigorous! how ready! and we say also, how calm! how
+temperate! how dignified!  This opposition of terms is extended by us to
+all actions, to the tones of the voice, the notes of music, the workings of
+the mind, the characters of men.  The two classes both have their
+exaggerations; and the exaggerations of the one are termed 'hardness,'
+'violence,' 'madness;' of the other 'cowardliness,' or 'sluggishness.'  And
+if we pursue the enquiry, we find that these opposite characters are
+naturally at variance, and can hardly be reconciled.  In lesser matters the
+antagonism between them is ludicrous, but in the State may be the occasion
+of grave disorders, and may disturb the whole course of human life.  For
+the orderly class are always wanting to be at peace, and hence they pass
+imperceptibly into the condition of slaves; and the courageous sort are
+always wanting to go to war, even when the odds are against them, and are
+soon destroyed by their enemies.  But the true art of government, first
+preparing the material by education, weaves the two elements into one,
+maintaining authority over the carders of the wool, and selecting the
+proper subsidiary arts which are necessary for making the web.  The royal
+science is queen of educators, and begins by choosing the natures which she
+is to train, punishing with death and exterminating those who are violently
+carried away to atheism and injustice, and enslaving those who are
+wallowing in the mire of ignorance.  The rest of the citizens she blends
+into one, combining the stronger element of courage, which we may call the
+warp, with the softer element of temperance, which we may imagine to be the
+woof.  These she binds together, first taking the eternal elements of the
+honourable, the good, and the just, and fastening them with a divine cord
+in a heaven-born nature, and then fastening the animal elements with a
+human cord.  The good legislator can implant by education the higher
+principles; and where they exist there is no difficulty in inserting the
+lesser human bonds, by which the State is held together; these are the laws
+of intermarriage, and of union for the sake of offspring.  Most persons in
+their marriages seek after wealth or power; or they are clannish, and
+choose those who are like themselves,--the temperate marrying the
+temperate, and the courageous the courageous.  The two classes thrive and
+flourish at first, but they soon degenerate; the one become mad, and the
+other feeble and useless.  This would not have been the case, if they had
+both originally held the same notions about the honourable and the good;
+for then they never would have allowed the temperate natures to be
+separated from the courageous, but they would have bound them together by
+common honours and reputations, by intermarriages, and by the choice of
+rulers who combine both qualities.  The temperate are careful and just, but
+are wanting in the power of action; the courageous fall short of them in
+justice, but in action are superior to them:  and no state can prosper in
+which either of these qualities is wanting.  The noblest and best of all
+webs or states is that which the royal science weaves, combining the two
+sorts of natures in a single texture, and in this enfolding freeman and
+slave and every other social element, and presiding over them all.
+
+'Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less than of the
+Sophist, is quite perfect.'
+
+...
+
+The principal subjects in the Statesman may be conveniently embraced under
+six or seven heads:--(1) the myth; (2) the dialectical interest; (3) the
+political aspects of the dialogue; (4) the satirical and paradoxical vein;
+(5) the necessary imperfection of law; (6) the relation of the work to the
+other writings of Plato; lastly (7), we may briefly consider the
+genuineness of the Sophist and Statesman, which can hardly be assumed
+without proof, since the two dialogues have been questioned by three such
+eminent Platonic scholars as Socher, Schaarschmidt, and Ueberweg.
+
+I.  The hand of the master is clearly visible in the myth.  First in the
+connection with mythology;--he wins a kind of verisimilitude for this as
+for his other myths, by adopting received traditions, of which he pretends
+to find an explanation in his own larger conception (compare Introduction
+to Critias).  The young Socrates has heard of the sun rising in the west
+and setting in the east, and of the earth-born men; but he has never heard
+the origin of these remarkable phenomena.  Nor is Plato, here or elsewhere,
+wanting in denunciations of the incredulity of 'this latter age,' on which
+the lovers of the marvellous have always delighted to enlarge.  And he is
+not without express testimony to the truth of his narrative;--such
+testimony as, in the Timaeus, the first men gave of the names of the gods
+('They must surely have known their own ancestors').  For the first
+generation of the new cycle, who lived near the time, are supposed to have
+preserved a recollection of a previous one.  He also appeals to internal
+evidence, viz. the perfect coherence of the tale, though he is very well
+aware, as he says in the Cratylus, that there may be consistency in error
+as well as in truth.  The gravity and minuteness with which some
+particulars are related also lend an artful aid.  The profound interest and
+ready assent of the young Socrates, who is not too old to be amused 'with a
+tale which a child would love to hear,' are a further assistance.  To those
+who were naturally inclined to believe that the fortunes of mankind are
+influenced by the stars, or who maintained that some one principle, like
+the principle of the Same and the Other in the Timaeus, pervades all things
+in the world, the reversal of the motion of the heavens seemed necessarily
+to produce a reversal of the order of human life.  The spheres of
+knowledge, which to us appear wide asunder as the poles, astronomy and
+medicine, were naturally connected in the minds of early thinkers, because
+there was little or nothing in the space between them.  Thus there is a
+basis of philosophy, on which the improbabilities of the tale may be said
+to rest.  These are some of the devices by which Plato, like a modern
+novelist, seeks to familiarize the marvellous.
+
+The myth, like that of the Timaeus and Critias, is rather historical than
+poetical, in this respect corresponding to the general change in the later
+writings of Plato, when compared with the earlier ones.  It is hardly a
+myth in the sense in which the term might be applied to the myth of the
+Phaedrus, the Republic, the Phaedo, or the Gorgias, but may be more aptly
+compared with the didactic tale in which Protagoras describes the fortunes
+of primitive man, or with the description of the gradual rise of a new
+society in the Third Book of the Laws.  Some discrepancies may be observed
+between the mythology of the Statesman and the Timaeus, and between the
+Timaeus and the Republic.  But there is no reason to expect that all
+Plato's visions of a former, any more than of a future, state of existence,
+should conform exactly to the same pattern.  We do not find perfect
+consistency in his philosophy; and still less have we any right to demand
+this of him in his use of mythology and figures of speech.  And we observe
+that while employing all the resources of a writer of fiction to give
+credibility to his tales, he is not disposed to insist upon their literal
+truth.  Rather, as in the Phaedo, he says, 'Something of the kind is true;'
+or, as in the Gorgias, 'This you will think to be an old wife's tale, but
+you can think of nothing truer;' or, as in the Statesman, he describes his
+work as a 'mass of mythology,' which was introduced in order to teach
+certain lessons; or, as in the Phaedrus, he secretly laughs at such stories
+while refusing to disturb the popular belief in them.
+
+The greater interest of the myth consists in the philosophical lessons
+which Plato presents to us in this veiled form.  Here, as in the tale of
+Er, the son of Armenius, he touches upon the question of freedom and
+necessity, both in relation to God and nature.  For at first the universe
+is governed by the immediate providence of God,--this is the golden age,--
+but after a while the wheel is reversed, and man is left to himself.  Like
+other theologians and philosophers, Plato relegates his explanation of the
+problem to a transcendental world; he speaks of what in modern language
+might be termed 'impossibilities in the nature of things,' hindering God
+from continuing immanent in the world.  But there is some inconsistency;
+for the 'letting go' is spoken of as a divine act, and is at the same time
+attributed to the necessary imperfection of matter; there is also a
+numerical necessity for the successive births of souls.  At first, man and
+the world retain their divine instincts, but gradually degenerate.  As in
+the Book of Genesis, the first fall of man is succeeded by a second; the
+misery and wickedness of the world increase continually.  The reason of
+this further decline is supposed to be the disorganisation of matter:  the
+latent seeds of a former chaos are disengaged, and envelope all things. 
+The condition of man becomes more and more miserable; he is perpetually
+waging an unequal warfare with the beasts.  At length he obtains such a
+measure of education and help as is necessary for his existence.  Though
+deprived of God's help, he is not left wholly destitute; he has received
+from Athene and Hephaestus a knowledge of the arts; other gods give him
+seeds and plants; and out of these human life is reconstructed.  He now
+eats bread in the sweat of his brow, and has dominion over the animals,
+subjected to the conditions of his nature, and yet able to cope with them
+by divine help.  Thus Plato may be said to represent in a figure--(1) the
+state of innocence; (2) the fall of man; (3) the still deeper decline into
+barbarism; (4) the restoration of man by the partial interference of God,
+and the natural growth of the arts and of civilised society.  Two lesser
+features of this description should not pass unnoticed:--(1) the primitive
+men are supposed to be created out of the earth, and not after the ordinary
+manner of human generation--half the causes of moral evil are in this way
+removed; (2) the arts are attributed to a divine revelation:  and so the
+greatest difficulty in the history of pre-historic man is solved.  Though
+no one knew better than Plato that the introduction of the gods is not a
+reason, but an excuse for not giving a reason (Cratylus), yet, considering
+that more than two thousand years later mankind are still discussing these
+problems, we may be satisfied to find in Plato a statement of the
+difficulties which arise in conceiving the relation of man to God and
+nature, without expecting to obtain from him a solution of them.  In such a
+tale, as in the Phaedrus, various aspects of the Ideas were doubtless
+indicated to Plato's own mind, as the corresponding theological problems
+are to us.  The immanence of things in the Ideas, or the partial separation
+of them, and the self-motion of the supreme Idea, are probably the forms in
+which he would have interpreted his own parable.
+
+He touches upon another question of great interest--the consciousness of
+evil--what in the Jewish Scriptures is called 'eating of the tree of the
+knowledge of good and evil.'  At the end of the narrative, the Eleatic asks
+his companion whether this life of innocence, or that which men live at
+present, is the better of the two.  He wants to distinguish between the
+mere animal life of innocence, the 'city of pigs,' as it is comically
+termed by Glaucon in the Republic, and the higher life of reason and
+philosophy.  But as no one can determine the state of man in the world
+before the Fall, 'the question must remain unanswered.'  Similar questions
+have occupied the minds of theologians in later ages; but they can hardly
+be said to have found an answer.  Professor Campbell well observes, that
+the general spirit of the myth may be summed up in the words of the Lysis: 
+'If evil were to perish, should we hunger any more, or thirst any more, or
+have any similar sensations?  Yet perhaps the question what will or will
+not be is a foolish one, for who can tell?'  As in the Theaetetus, evil is
+supposed to continue,--here, as the consequence of a former state of the
+world, a sort of mephitic vapour exhaling from some ancient chaos,--there,
+as involved in the possibility of good, and incident to the mixed state of
+man.
+
+Once more--and this is the point of connexion with the rest of the
+dialogue--the myth is intended to bring out the difference between the
+ideal and the actual state of man.  In all ages of the world men have
+dreamed of a state of perfection, which has been, and is to be, but never
+is, and seems to disappear under the necessary conditions of human society.
+The uselessness, the danger, the true value of such political ideals have
+often been discussed; youth is too ready to believe in them; age to
+disparage them.  Plato's 'prudens quaestio' respecting the comparative
+happiness of men in this and in a former cycle of existence is intended to
+elicit this contrast between the golden age and 'the life under Zeus' which
+is our own.  To confuse the divine and human, or hastily apply one to the
+other, is a 'tremendous error.'  Of the ideal or divine government of the
+world we can form no true or adequate conception; and this our mixed state
+of life, in which we are partly left to ourselves, but not wholly deserted
+by the gods, may contain some higher elements of good and knowledge than
+could have existed in the days of innocence under the rule of Cronos.  So
+we may venture slightly to enlarge a Platonic thought which admits of a
+further application to Christian theology.  Here are suggested also the
+distinctions between God causing and permitting evil, and between his more
+and less immediate government of the world.
+
+II.  The dialectical interest of the Statesman seems to contend in Plato's
+mind with the political; the dialogue might have been designated by two
+equally descriptive titles--either the 'Statesman,' or 'Concerning Method.' 
+Dialectic, which in the earlier writings of Plato is a revival of the
+Socratic question and answer applied to definition, is now occupied with
+classification; there is nothing in which he takes greater delight than in
+processes of division (compare Phaedr.); he pursues them to a length out of
+proportion to his main subject, and appears to value them as a dialectical
+exercise, and for their own sake.  A poetical vision of some order or
+hierarchy of ideas or sciences has already been floating before us in the
+Symposium and the Republic.  And in the Phaedrus this aspect of dialectic
+is further sketched out, and the art of rhetoric is based on the division
+of the characters of mankind into their several classes.  The same love of
+divisions is apparent in the Gorgias.  But in a well-known passage of the
+Philebus occurs the first criticism on the nature of classification.  There
+we are exhorted not to fall into the common error of passing from unity to
+infinity, but to find the intermediate classes; and we are reminded that in
+any process of generalization, there may be more than one class to which
+individuals may be referred, and that we must carry on the process of
+division until we have arrived at the infima species.
+
+These precepts are not forgotten, either in the Sophist or in the
+Statesman.  The Sophist contains four examples of division, carried on by
+regular steps, until in four different lines of descent we detect the
+Sophist.  In the Statesman the king or statesman is discovered by a similar
+process; and we have a summary, probably made for the first time, of
+possessions appropriated by the labour of man, which are distributed into
+seven classes.  We are warned against preferring the shorter to the longer
+method;--if we divide in the middle, we are most likely to light upon
+species; at the same time, the important remark is made, that 'a part is
+not to be confounded with a class.'  Having discovered the genus under
+which the king falls, we proceed to distinguish him from the collateral
+species.  To assist our imagination in making this separation, we require
+an example.  The higher ideas, of which we have a dreamy knowledge, can
+only be represented by images taken from the external world.  But, first of
+all, the nature of example is explained by an example.  The child is taught
+to read by comparing the letters in words which he knows with the same
+letters in unknown combinations; and this is the sort of process which we
+are about to attempt.  As a parallel to the king we select the worker in
+wool, and compare the art of weaving with the royal science, trying to
+separate either of them from the inferior classes to which they are akin. 
+This has the incidental advantage, that weaving and the web furnish us with
+a figure of speech, which we can afterwards transfer to the State.
+
+There are two uses of examples or images--in the first place, they suggest
+thoughts--secondly, they give them a distinct form.  In the infancy of
+philosophy, as in childhood, the language of pictures is natural to man: 
+truth in the abstract is hardly won, and only by use familiarized to the
+mind.  Examples are akin to analogies, and have a reflex influence on
+thought; they people the vacant mind, and may often originate new
+directions of enquiry.  Plato seems to be conscious of the suggestiveness
+of imagery; the general analogy of the arts is constantly employed by him
+as well as the comparison of particular arts--weaving, the refining of
+gold, the learning to read, music, statuary, painting, medicine, the art of
+the pilot--all of which occur in this dialogue alone:  though he is also
+aware that 'comparisons are slippery things,' and may often give a false
+clearness to ideas.  We shall find, in the Philebus, a division of sciences
+into practical and speculative, and into more or less speculative:  here we
+have the idea of master-arts, or sciences which control inferior ones. 
+Besides the supreme science of dialectic, 'which will forget us, if we
+forget her,' another master-science for the first time appears in view--the
+science of government, which fixes the limits of all the rest.  This
+conception of the political or royal science as, from another point of
+view, the science of sciences, which holds sway over the rest, is not
+originally found in Aristotle, but in Plato.
+
+The doctrine that virtue and art are in a mean, which is familiarized to us
+by the study of the Nicomachean Ethics, is also first distinctly asserted
+in the Statesman of Plato.  The too much and the too little are in restless
+motion:  they must be fixed by a mean, which is also a standard external to
+them.  The art of measuring or finding a mean between excess and defect,
+like the principle of division in the Phaedrus, receives a particular
+application to the art of discourse.  The excessive length of a discourse
+may be blamed; but who can say what is excess, unless he is furnished with
+a measure or standard?  Measure is the life of the arts, and may some day
+be discovered to be the single ultimate principle in which all the sciences
+are contained.  Other forms of thought may be noted--the distinction
+between causal and co-operative arts, which may be compared with the
+distinction between primary and co-operative causes in the Timaeus; or
+between cause and condition in the Phaedo; the passing mention of
+economical science; the opposition of rest and motion, which is found in
+all nature; the general conception of two great arts of composition and
+division, in which are contained weaving, politics, dialectic; and in
+connexion with the conception of a mean, the two arts of measuring.
+
+In the Theaetetus, Plato remarks that precision in the use of terms, though
+sometimes pedantic, is sometimes necessary.  Here he makes the opposite
+reflection, that there may be a philosophical disregard of words.  The evil
+of mere verbal oppositions, the requirement of an impossible accuracy in
+the use of terms, the error of supposing that philosophy was to be found in
+language, the danger of word-catching, have frequently been discussed by
+him in the previous dialogues, but nowhere has the spirit of modern
+inductive philosophy been more happily indicated than in the words of the
+Statesman:--'If you think more about things, and less about words, you will
+be richer in wisdom as you grow older.'  A similar spirit is discernible in
+the remarkable expressions, 'the long and difficult language of facts;' and
+'the interrogation of every nature, in order to obtain the particular
+contribution of each to the store of knowledge.'  Who has described 'the
+feeble intelligence of all things; given by metaphysics better than the
+Eleatic Stranger in the words--'The higher ideas can hardly be set forth
+except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things
+in a kind of dream, and then again nothing when he is awake?'  Or where is
+the value of metaphysical pursuits more truly expressed than in the words,
+--'The greatest and noblest things have no outward image of themselves
+visible to man:  therefore we should learn to give a rational account of
+them?'
+
+III.  The political aspects of the dialogue are closely connected with the
+dialectical.  As in the Cratylus, the legislator has 'the dialectician
+standing on his right hand;' so in the Statesman, the king or statesman is
+the dialectician, who, although he may be in a private station, is still a
+king.  Whether he has the power or not, is a mere accident; or rather he
+has the power, for what ought to be is ('Was ist vernunftig, das ist
+wirklich'); and he ought to be and is the true governor of mankind.  There
+is a reflection in this idealism of the Socratic 'Virtue is knowledge;'
+and, without idealism, we may remark that knowledge is a great part of
+power.  Plato does not trouble himself to construct a machinery by which
+'philosophers shall be made kings,' as in the Republic:  he merely holds up
+the ideal, and affirms that in some sense science is really supreme over
+human life.
+
+He is struck by the observation 'quam parva sapientia regitur mundus,' and
+is touched with a feeling of the ills which afflict states.  The condition
+of Megara before and during the Peloponnesian War, of Athens under the
+Thirty and afterwards, of Syracuse and the other Sicilian cities in their
+alternations of democratic excess and tyranny, might naturally suggest such
+reflections.  Some states he sees already shipwrecked, others foundering
+for want of a pilot; and he wonders not at their destruction, but at their
+endurance.  For they ought to have perished long ago, if they had depended
+on the wisdom of their rulers.  The mingled pathos and satire of this
+remark is characteristic of Plato's later style.
+
+The king is the personification of political science.  And yet he is
+something more than this,--the perfectly good and wise tyrant of the Laws,
+whose will is better than any law.  He is the special providence who is
+always interfering with and regulating all things.  Such a conception has
+sometimes been entertained by modern theologians, and by Plato himself, of
+the Supreme Being.  But whether applied to Divine or to human governors the
+conception is faulty for two reasons, neither of which are noticed by
+Plato:--first, because all good government supposes a degree of co-
+operation in the ruler and his subjects,--an 'education in politics' as
+well as in moral virtue; secondly, because government, whether Divine or
+human, implies that the subject has a previous knowledge of the rules under
+which he is living.  There is a fallacy, too, in comparing unchangeable
+laws with a personal governor.  For the law need not necessarily be an
+'ignorant and brutal tyrant,' but gentle and humane, capable of being
+altered in the spirit of the legislator, and of being administered so as to
+meet the cases of individuals.  Not only in fact, but in idea, both
+elements must remain--the fixed law and the living will; the written word
+and the spirit; the principles of obligation and of freedom; and their
+applications whether made by law or equity in particular cases.
+
+There are two sides from which positive laws may be attacked:--either from
+the side of nature, which rises up and rebels against them in the spirit of
+Callicles in the Gorgias; or from the side of idealism, which attempts to
+soar above them,--and this is the spirit of Plato in the Statesman.  But he
+soon falls, like Icarus, and is content to walk instead of flying; that is,
+to accommodate himself to the actual state of human things.  Mankind have
+long been in despair of finding the true ruler; and therefore are ready to
+acquiesce in any of the five or six received forms of government as better
+than none.  And the best thing which they can do (though only the second
+best in reality), is to reduce the ideal state to the conditions of actual
+life.  Thus in the Statesman, as in the Laws, we have three forms of
+government, which we may venture to term, (1) the ideal, (2) the practical,
+(3) the sophistical--what ought to be, what might be, what is.  And thus
+Plato seems to stumble, almost by accident, on the notion of a
+constitutional monarchy, or of a monarchy ruling by laws.
+
+The divine foundations of a State are to be laid deep in education
+(Republic), and at the same time some little violence may be used in
+exterminating natures which are incapable of education (compare Laws). 
+Plato is strongly of opinion that the legislator, like the physician, may
+do men good against their will (compare Gorgias).  The human bonds of
+states are formed by the inter-marriage of dispositions adapted to supply
+the defects of each other.  As in the Republic, Plato has observed that
+there are opposite natures in the world, the strong and the gentle, the
+courageous and the temperate, which, borrowing an expression derived from
+the image of weaving, he calls the warp and the woof of human society.  To
+interlace these is the crowning achievement of political science.  In the
+Protagoras, Socrates was maintaining that there was only one virtue, and
+not many:  now Plato is inclined to think that there are not only parallel,
+but opposite virtues, and seems to see a similar opposition pervading all
+art and nature.  But he is satisfied with laying down the principle, and
+does not inform us by what further steps the union of opposites is to be
+effected.
+
+In the loose framework of a single dialogue Plato has thus combined two
+distinct subjects--politics and method.  Yet they are not so far apart as
+they appear:  in his own mind there was a secret link of connexion between
+them.  For the philosopher or dialectician is also the only true king or
+statesman.  In the execution of his plan Plato has invented or
+distinguished several important forms of thought, and made incidentally
+many valuable remarks.  Questions of interest both in ancient and modern
+politics also arise in the course of the dialogue, which may with advantage
+be further considered by us:--
+
+a.  The imaginary ruler, whether God or man, is above the law, and is a law
+to himself and to others.  Among the Greeks as among the Jews, law was a
+sacred name, the gift of God, the bond of states.  But in the Statesman of
+Plato, as in the New Testament, the word has also become the symbol of an
+imperfect good, which is almost an evil.  The law sacrifices the individual
+to the universal, and is the tyranny of the many over the few (compare
+Republic).  It has fixed rules which are the props of order, and will not
+swerve or bend in extreme cases.  It is the beginning of political society,
+but there is something higher--an intelligent ruler, whether God or man,
+who is able to adapt himself to the endless varieties of circumstances. 
+Plato is fond of picturing the advantages which would result from the union
+of the tyrant who has power with the legislator who has wisdom:  he regards
+this as the best and speediest way of reforming mankind.  But institutions
+cannot thus be artificially created, nor can the external authority of a
+ruler impose laws for which a nation is unprepared.  The greatest power,
+the highest wisdom, can only proceed one or two steps in advance of public
+opinion.  In all stages of civilization human nature, after all our
+efforts, remains intractable,--not like clay in the hands of the potter, or
+marble under the chisel of the sculptor.  Great changes occur in the
+history of nations, but they are brought about slowly, like the changes in
+the frame of nature, upon which the puny arm of man hardly makes an
+impression.  And, speaking generally, the slowest growths, both in nature
+and in politics, are the most permanent.
+
+b.  Whether the best form of the ideal is a person or a law may fairly be
+doubted.  The former is more akin to us:  it clothes itself in poetry and
+art, and appeals to reason more in the form of feeling:  in the latter
+there is less danger of allowing ourselves to be deluded by a figure of
+speech.  The ideal of the Greek state found an expression in the
+deification of law:  the ancient Stoic spoke of a wise man perfect in
+virtue, who was fancifully said to be a king; but neither they nor Plato
+had arrived at the conception of a person who was also a law.  Nor is it
+easy for the Christian to think of God as wisdom, truth, holiness, and also
+as the wise, true, and holy one.  He is always wanting to break through the
+abstraction and interrupt the law, in order that he may present to himself
+the more familiar image of a divine friend.  While the impersonal has too
+slender a hold upon the affections to be made the basis of religion, the
+conception of a person on the other hand tends to degenerate into a new
+kind of idolatry.  Neither criticism nor experience allows us to suppose
+that there are interferences with the laws of nature; the idea is
+inconceivable to us and at variance with facts.  The philosopher or
+theologian who could realize to mankind that a person is a law, that the
+higher rule has no exception, that goodness, like knowledge, is also power,
+would breathe a new religious life into the world.
+
+c.  Besides the imaginary rule of a philosopher or a God, the actual forms
+of government have to be considered.  In the infancy of political science,
+men naturally ask whether the rule of the many or of the few is to be
+preferred.  If by 'the few' we mean 'the good' and by 'the many,' 'the
+bad,' there can be but one reply:  'The rule of one good man is better than
+the rule of all the rest, if they are bad.'  For, as Heracleitus says, 'One
+is ten thousand if he be the best.'  If, however, we mean by the rule of
+the few the rule of a class neither better nor worse than other classes,
+not devoid of a feeling of right, but guided mostly by a sense of their own
+interests, and by the rule of the many the rule of all classes, similarly
+under the influence of mixed motives, no one would hesitate to answer--'The
+rule of all rather than one, because all classes are more likely to take
+care of all than one of another; and the government has greater power and
+stability when resting on a wider basis.'  Both in ancient and modern times
+the best balanced form of government has been held to be the best; and yet
+it should not be so nicely balanced as to make action and movement
+impossible.
+
+The statesman who builds his hope upon the aristocracy, upon the middle
+classes, upon the people, will probably, if he have sufficient experience
+of them, conclude that all classes are much alike, and that one is as good
+as another, and that the liberties of no class are safe in the hands of the
+rest.  The higher ranks have the advantage in education and manners, the
+middle and lower in industry and self-denial; in every class, to a certain
+extent, a natural sense of right prevails, sometimes communicated from the
+lower to the higher, sometimes from the higher to the lower, which is too
+strong for class interests.  There have been crises in the history of
+nations, as at the time of the Crusades or the Reformation, or the French
+Revolution, when the same inspiration has taken hold of whole peoples, and
+permanently raised the sense of freedom and justice among mankind.
+
+But even supposing the different classes of a nation, when viewed
+impartially, to be on a level with each other in moral virtue, there remain
+two considerations of opposite kinds which enter into the problem of
+government.  Admitting of course that the upper and lower classes are equal
+in the eye of God and of the law, yet the one may be by nature fitted to
+govern and the other to be governed.  A ruling caste does not soon
+altogether lose the governing qualities, nor a subject class easily acquire
+them.  Hence the phenomenon so often observed in the old Greek revolutions,
+and not without parallel in modern times, that the leaders of the democracy
+have been themselves of aristocratic origin.  The people are expecting to
+be governed by representatives of their own, but the true man of the people
+either never appears, or is quickly altered by circumstances.  Their real
+wishes hardly make themselves felt, although their lower interests and
+prejudices may sometimes be flattered and yielded to for the sake of
+ulterior objects by those who have political power.  They will often learn
+by experience that the democracy has become a plutocracy.  The influence of
+wealth, though not the enjoyment of it, has become diffused among the poor
+as well as among the rich; and society, instead of being safer, is more at
+the mercy of the tyrant, who, when things are at the worst, obtains a
+guard--that is, an army--and announces himself as the saviour.
+
+The other consideration is of an opposite kind.  Admitting that a few wise
+men are likely to be better governors than the unwise many, yet it is not
+in their power to fashion an entire people according to their behest.  When
+with the best intentions the benevolent despot begins his regime, he finds
+the world hard to move.  A succession of good kings has at the end of a
+century left the people an inert and unchanged mass.  The Roman world was
+not permanently improved by the hundred years of Hadrian and the Antonines. 
+The kings of Spain during the last century were at least equal to any
+contemporary sovereigns in virtue and ability.  In certain states of the
+world the means are wanting to render a benevolent power effectual.  These
+means are not a mere external organisation of posts or telegraphs, hardly
+the introduction of new laws or modes of industry.  A change must be made
+in the spirit of a people as well as in their externals.  The ancient
+legislator did not really take a blank tablet and inscribe upon it the
+rules which reflection and experience had taught him to be for a nation's
+interest; no one would have obeyed him if he had.  But he took the customs
+which he found already existing in a half-civilised state of society: 
+these he reduced to form and inscribed on pillars; he defined what had
+before been undefined, and gave certainty to what was uncertain.  No
+legislation ever sprang, like Athene, in full power out of the head either
+of God or man.
+
+Plato and Aristotle are sensible of the difficulty of combining the wisdom
+of the few with the power of the many.  According to Plato, he is a
+physician who has the knowledge of a physician, and he is a king who has
+the knowledge of a king.  But how the king, one or more, is to obtain the
+required power, is hardly at all considered by him.  He presents the idea
+of a perfect government, but except the regulation for mixing different
+tempers in marriage, he never makes any provision for the attainment of it.
+Aristotle, casting aside ideals, would place the government in a middle
+class of citizens, sufficiently numerous for stability, without admitting
+the populace; and such appears to have been the constitution which actually
+prevailed for a short time at Athens--the rule of the Five Thousand--
+characterized by Thucydides as the best government of Athens which he had
+known.  It may however be doubted how far, either in a Greek or modern
+state, such a limitation is practicable or desirable; for those who are
+left outside the pale will always be dangerous to those who are within,
+while on the other hand the leaven of the mob can hardly affect the
+representation of a great country.  There is reason for the argument in
+favour of a property qualification; there is reason also in the arguments
+of those who would include all and so exhaust the political situation.
+
+The true answer to the question is relative to the circumstances of
+nations.  How can we get the greatest intelligence combined with the
+greatest power?  The ancient legislator would have found this question more
+easy than we do.  For he would have required that all persons who had a
+share of government should have received their education from the state and
+have borne her burdens, and should have served in her fleets and armies. 
+But though we sometimes hear the cry that we must 'educate the masses, for
+they are our masters,' who would listen to a proposal that the franchise
+should be confined to the educated or to those who fulfil political duties? 
+Then again, we know that the masses are not our masters, and that they are
+more likely to become so if we educate them.  In modern politics so many
+interests have to be consulted that we are compelled to do, not what is
+best, but what is possible.
+
+d.  Law is the first principle of society, but it cannot supply all the
+wants of society, and may easily cause more evils than it cures.  Plato is
+aware of the imperfection of law in failing to meet the varieties of
+circumstances:  he is also aware that human life would be intolerable if
+every detail of it were placed under legal regulation.  It may be a great
+evil that physicians should kill their patients or captains cast away their
+ships, but it would be a far greater evil if each particular in the
+practice of medicine or seamanship were regulated by law.  Much has been
+said in modern times about the duty of leaving men to themselves, which is
+supposed to be the best way of taking care of them.  The question is often
+asked, What are the limits of legislation in relation to morals?  And the
+answer is to the same effect, that morals must take care of themselves. 
+There is a one-sided truth in these answers, if they are regarded as
+condemnations of the interference with commerce in the last century or of
+clerical persecution in the Middle Ages.  But 'laissez-faire' is not the
+best but only the second best.  What the best is, Plato does not attempt to
+determine; he only contrasts the imperfection of law with the wisdom of the
+perfect ruler.
+
+Laws should be just, but they must also be certain, and we are obliged to
+sacrifice something of their justice to their certainty.  Suppose a wise
+and good judge, who paying little or no regard to the law, attempted to
+decide with perfect justice the cases that were brought before him.  To the
+uneducated person he would appear to be the ideal of a judge.  Such justice
+has been often exercised in primitive times, or at the present day among
+eastern rulers.  But in the first place it depends entirely on the personal
+character of the judge.  He may be honest, but there is no check upon his
+dishonesty, and his opinion can only be overruled, not by any principle of
+law, but by the opinion of another judging like himself without law.  In
+the second place, even if he be ever so honest, his mode of deciding
+questions would introduce an element of uncertainty into human life; no one
+would know beforehand what would happen to him, or would seek to conform in
+his conduct to any rule of law.  For the compact which the law makes with
+men, that they shall be protected if they observe the law in their dealings
+with one another, would have to be substituted another principle of a more
+general character, that they shall be protected by the law if they act
+rightly in their dealings with one another.  The complexity of human
+actions and also the uncertainty of their effects would be increased
+tenfold.  For one of the principal advantages of law is not merely that it
+enforces honesty, but that it makes men act in the same way, and requires
+them to produce the same evidence of their acts.  Too many laws may be the
+sign of a corrupt and overcivilized state of society, too few are the sign
+of an uncivilized one; as soon as commerce begins to grow, men make
+themselves customs which have the validity of laws.  Even equity, which is
+the exception to the law, conforms to fixed rules and lies for the most
+part within the limits of previous decisions.
+
+IV.  The bitterness of the Statesman is characteristic of Plato's later
+style, in which the thoughts of youth and love have fled away, and we are
+no longer tended by the Muses or the Graces.  We do not venture to say that
+Plato was soured by old age, but certainly the kindliness and courtesy of
+the earlier dialogues have disappeared.  He sees the world under a harder
+and grimmer aspect:  he is dealing with the reality of things, not with
+visions or pictures of them:  he is seeking by the aid of dialectic only,
+to arrive at truth.  He is deeply impressed with the importance of
+classification:  in this alone he finds the true measure of human things;
+and very often in the process of division curious results are obtained. 
+For the dialectical art is no respecter of persons:  king and vermin-taker
+are all alike to the philosopher.  There may have been a time when the king
+was a god, but he now is pretty much on a level with his subjects in
+breeding and education.  Man should be well advised that he is only one of
+the animals, and the Hellene in particular should be aware that he himself
+was the author of the distinction between Hellene and Barbarian, and that
+the Phrygian would equally divide mankind into Phrygians and Barbarians,
+and that some intelligent animal, like a crane, might go a step further,
+and divide the animal world into cranes and all other animals.  Plato
+cannot help laughing (compare Theaet.) when he thinks of the king running
+after his subjects, like the pig-driver or the bird-taker.  He would
+seriously have him consider how many competitors there are to his throne,
+chiefly among the class of serving-men.  A good deal of meaning is lurking
+in the expression--'There is no art of feeding mankind worthy the name.' 
+There is a similar depth in the remark,--'The wonder about states is not
+that they are short-lived, but that they last so long in spite of the
+badness of their rulers.'
+
+V.  There is also a paradoxical element in the Statesman which delights in
+reversing the accustomed use of words.  The law which to the Greek was the
+highest object of reverence is an ignorant and brutal tyrant--the tyrant is
+converted into a beneficent king.  The sophist too is no longer, as in the
+earlier dialogues, the rival of the statesman, but assumes his form.  Plato
+sees that the ideal of the state in his own day is more and more severed
+from the actual.  From such ideals as he had once formed, he turns away to
+contemplate the decline of the Greek cities which were far worse now in his
+old age than they had been in his youth, and were to become worse and worse
+in the ages which followed.  He cannot contain his disgust at the
+contemporary statesmen, sophists who had turned politicians, in various
+forms of men and animals, appearing, some like lions and centaurs, others
+like satyrs and monkeys.  In this new disguise the Sophists make their last
+appearance on the scene:  in the Laws Plato appears to have forgotten them,
+or at any rate makes only a slight allusion to them in a single passage
+(Laws).
+
+VI.  The Statesman is naturally connected with the Sophist.  At first sight
+we are surprised to find that the Eleatic Stranger discourses to us, not
+only concerning the nature of Being and Not-being, but concerning the king
+and statesman.  We perceive, however, that there is no inappropriateness in
+his maintaining the character of chief speaker, when we remember the close
+connexion which is assumed by Plato to exist between politics and
+dialectic.  In both dialogues the Proteus Sophist is exhibited, first, in
+the disguise of an Eristic, secondly, of a false statesman.  There are
+several lesser features which the two dialogues have in common.  The styles
+and the situations of the speakers are very similar; there is the same love
+of division, and in both of them the mind of the writer is greatly occupied
+about method, to which he had probably intended to return in the projected
+'Philosopher.'
+
+The Statesman stands midway between the Republic and the Laws, and is also
+related to the Timaeus.  The mythical or cosmical element reminds us of the
+Timaeus, the ideal of the Republic.  A previous chaos in which the elements
+as yet were not, is hinted at both in the Timaeus and Statesman.  The same
+ingenious arts of giving verisimilitude to a fiction are practised in both
+dialogues, and in both, as well as in the myth at the end of the Republic,
+Plato touches on the subject of necessity and free-will.  The words in
+which he describes the miseries of states seem to be an amplification of
+the 'Cities will never cease from ill' of the Republic.  The point of view
+in both is the same; and the differences not really important, e.g. in the
+myth, or in the account of the different kinds of states.  But the
+treatment of the subject in the Statesman is fragmentary, and the shorter
+and later work, as might be expected, is less finished, and less worked out
+in detail.  The idea of measure and the arrangement of the sciences supply
+connecting links both with the Republic and the Philebus.
+
+More than any of the preceding dialogues, the Statesman seems to
+approximate in thought and language to the Laws.  There is the same decline
+and tendency to monotony in style, the same self-consciousness,
+awkwardness, and over-civility; and in the Laws is contained the pattern of
+that second best form of government, which, after all, is admitted to be
+the only attainable one in this world.  The 'gentle violence,' the marriage
+of dissimilar natures, the figure of the warp and the woof, are also found
+in the Laws.  Both expressly recognize the conception of a first or ideal
+state, which has receded into an invisible heaven.  Nor does the account of
+the origin and growth of society really differ in them, if we make
+allowance for the mythic character of the narrative in the Statesman.  The
+virtuous tyrant is common to both of them; and the Eleatic Stranger takes
+up a position similar to that of the Athenian Stranger in the Laws.
+
+VII.  There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of
+the Sophist and Statesman, if they had been compared with the Laws rather
+than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they ought to
+be, on the authority of Aristotle and on the ground of their intrinsic
+excellence, as an undoubted work of Plato.  The detailed consideration of
+the genuineness and order of the Platonic dialogues has been reserved for
+another place:  a few of the reasons for defending the Sophist and
+Statesman may be given here.
+
+1.  The excellence, importance, and metaphysical originality of the two
+dialogues:  no works at once so good and of such length are known to have
+proceeded from the hands of a forger.
+
+2.  The resemblances in them to other dialogues of Plato are such as might
+be expected to be found in works of the same author, and not in those of an
+imitator, being too subtle and minute to have been invented by another. 
+The similar passages and turns of thought are generally inferior to the
+parallel passages in his earlier writings; and we might a priori have
+expected that, if altered, they would have been improved.  But the
+comparison of the Laws proves that this repetition of his own thoughts and
+words in an inferior form is characteristic of Plato's later style.
+
+3.  The close connexion of them with the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and
+Philebus, involves the fate of these dialogues, as well as of the two
+suspected ones.
+
+4.  The suspicion of them seems mainly to rest on a presumption that in
+Plato's writings we may expect to find an uniform type of doctrine and
+opinion.  But however we arrange the order, or narrow the circle of the
+dialogues, we must admit that they exhibit a growth and progress in the
+mind of Plato.  And the appearance of change or progress is not to be
+regarded as impugning the genuineness of any particular writings, but may
+be even an argument in their favour.  If we suppose the Sophist and
+Politicus to stand halfway between the Republic and the Laws, and in near
+connexion with the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, the Philebus, the arguments
+against them derived from differences of thought and style disappear or may
+be said without paradox in some degree to confirm their genuineness.  There
+is no such interval between the Republic or Phaedrus and the two suspected
+dialogues, as that which separates all the earlier writings of Plato from
+the Laws.  And the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and Philebus, supply links, by
+which, however different from them, they may be reunited with the great
+body of the Platonic writings.
+
+
+
+STATESMAN
+
+by
+
+Plato
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:
+Theodorus, Socrates, The Eleatic Stranger, The Younger Socrates.
+
+
+SOCRATES:  I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the acquaintance
+both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.
+
+THEODORUS:  And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three times as
+many, when they have completed for you the delineation of the Statesman and
+of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist.
+
+SOCRATES:  Sophist, statesman, philosopher!  O my dear Theodorus, do my
+ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great
+calculator and geometrician?
+
+THEODORUS:  What do you mean, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES:  I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they
+are really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can
+express.
+
+THEODORUS:  By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair hit;
+and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry.  I will retaliate on
+you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger, who will not, I
+hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with the Statesman or
+with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers.
+
+STRANGER:  That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and not
+leave the work unfinished.  But what shall be done with Theaetetus?
+
+THEODORUS:  In what respect?
+
+STRANGER:  Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young
+Socrates, instead of him?  What do you advise?
+
+THEODORUS:  Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose.  The young always
+do better when they have intervals of rest.
+
+SOCRATES:  I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in some
+way related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly face
+(compare Theaet.), the other is called by my name.  And we should always be
+on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his conversation.  I
+myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday, and I have just been
+listening to his answers; my namesake I have not yet examined, but I must. 
+Another time will do for me; to-day let him answer you.
+
+STRANGER:  Very good.  Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates
+is proposing?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I do.
+
+STRANGER:  And do you agree to his proposal?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  As you do not object, still less can I.  After the Sophist,
+then, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order of
+enquiry.  And please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked among those
+who have science.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  Then the sciences must be divided as before?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I dare say.
+
+STRANGER:  But yet the division will not be the same?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How then?
+
+STRANGER:  They will be divided at some other point.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman?  We must find
+and separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we will set the mark of
+another class upon all diverging paths.  Thus the soul will conceive of all
+kinds of knowledge under two classes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not mine.
+
+STRANGER:  Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must be yours
+as well as mine.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts,
+merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  But in the art of carpentering and all other handicrafts, the
+knowledge of the workman is merged in his work; he not only knows, but he
+also makes things which previously did not exist.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are
+practical and those which are purely intellectual.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Let us assume these two divisions of science, which is one
+whole.
+
+STRANGER:  And are 'statesman,' 'king,' 'master,' or 'householder,' one and
+the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of these names? 
+Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Let me hear.
+
+STRANGER:  If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise
+one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  And if any one who is in a private station is able to advise the
+ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the knowledge which the
+ruler himself ought to have?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  But surely the science of a true king is royal science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he happens
+to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in reference to his art,
+be truly called 'royal'?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  He certainly ought to be.
+
+STRANGER:  And the householder and master are the same?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Of course.
+
+STRANGER:  Again, a large household may be compared to a small state:--will
+they differ at all, as far as government is concerned?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  They will not.
+
+STRANGER:  Then, returning to the point which we were just now discussing,
+do we not clearly see that there is one science of all of them; and this
+science may be called either royal or political or economical; we will not
+quarrel with any one about the name.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER:  This too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his
+hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his empire,
+compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of his mind.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Clearly not.
+
+STRANGER:  Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to
+knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly he has.
+
+STRANGER:  Then we may put all together as one and the same--statesmanship
+and the statesman--the kingly science and the king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Clearly.
+
+STRANGER:  And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on to
+divide the sphere of knowledge?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Tell me of what sort.
+
+STRANGER:  Such as this:  You may remember that we made an art of
+calculation?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  And to this art of calculation which discerns the differences of
+numbers shall we assign any other function except to pass judgment on their
+differences?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How could we?
+
+STRANGER:  You know that the master-builder does not work himself, but is
+the ruler of workmen?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  He contributes knowledge, not manual labour?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical
+science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Quite true.
+
+STRANGER:  But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his functions
+as at an end when he has formed a judgment;--he must assign to the
+individual workmen their appropriate task until they have completed the
+work.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and the like,
+subjects of pure knowledge; and is not the difference between the two
+classes, that the one sort has the power of judging only, and the other of
+ruling as well?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That is evident.
+
+STRANGER:  May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there are
+two divisions--one which rules, and the other which judges?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I should think so.
+
+STRANGER:  And when men have anything to do in common, that they should be
+of one mind is surely a desirable thing?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind
+about the fancies of others?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER:  And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the king?--
+Is he a judge and a kind of spectator?  Or shall we assign to him the art
+of command--for he is a ruler?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  The latter, clearly.
+
+STRANGER:  Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the
+art of command too.  I am inclined to think that there is a distinction
+similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which parts off the king
+from the herald.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How is this?
+
+STRANGER:  Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the
+productions of others, which have been sold before?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly he does.
+
+STRANGER:  And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive
+orders, and in his turn give them to others?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the
+art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the
+numerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as in the preceding
+comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for themselves, and of
+retailers,--seeing, too, that the class of supreme rulers, or rulers for
+themselves, is almost nameless--shall we make a word following the same
+analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or ruling-for-self science, leaving
+the rest to receive a name from some one else?  For we are seeking the
+ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not a ruler.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the man
+who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's.  And now let us
+see if the supreme power allows of any further division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  By all means.
+
+STRANGER:  I think that it does; and please to assist me in making the
+division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  At what point?
+
+STRANGER:  May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of
+producing something?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced into
+two classes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How would you divide them?
+
+STRANGER:  Of the whole class, some have life and some are without life.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we please, a
+subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  At what point?
+
+STRANGER:  One part may be set over the production of lifeless, the other
+of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one half,
+and take up the other; which may also be divided into two.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Which of the two halves do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  Of course that which exercises command about animals.  For,
+surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman, a science
+presiding over lifeless objects;--the king has a nobler function, which is
+the management and control of living beings.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed to
+be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a common care of
+creatures in flocks?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  But the statesman is not a tender of individuals--not like the
+driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared with
+the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, I see, thanks to you.
+
+STRANGER:  Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the art
+of managing a herd, or the art of collective management?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  No matter;--whichever suggests itself to us in the course
+of conversation.
+
+STRANGER:  Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too
+particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when you are
+an old man.  And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the name,--can
+you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of herding to be of two
+kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst twice the number of
+things, to be then sought amongst half that number?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I will try;--there appears to me to be one management of
+men and another of beasts.
+
+STRANGER:  You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and
+manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think that
+we had better avoid.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is the error?
+
+STRANGER:  I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion
+which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a
+species.  To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most
+excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were under
+the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would come to
+man; and this led you to hasten the steps.  But you should not chip off too
+small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through the middle; which
+is also the more likely way of finding classes.  Attention to this
+principle makes all the difference in a process of enquiry.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean, Stranger?
+
+STRANGER:  I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your good
+parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain myself,
+I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little clearer.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in
+our recent division?
+
+STRANGER:  The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the human
+race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this part of
+the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and all the other
+species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have no ties or common
+language, they include under the single name of 'barbarians,' and because
+they have one name they are supposed to be of one species also.  Or suppose
+that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten thousand from all the
+rest, and make of it one species, comprehending the rest under another
+separate name, you might say that here too was a single class, because you
+had given it a single name.  Whereas you would make a much better and more
+equal and logical classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd
+and even; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and
+female; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe,
+and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you could no longer
+make a division into parts which were also classes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a part
+and a class could still be made somewhat plainer.
+
+STRANGER:  O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very
+difficult task.  We have already digressed further from our original
+intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further away. 
+But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there is a
+leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time, I wish
+you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What?
+
+STRANGER:  That a class and a part are distinct.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What did I hear, then?
+
+STRANGER:  That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar
+necessity that a part should be a class; that is the view which I should
+always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  So be it.
+
+STRANGER:  There is another thing which I should like to know.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is it?
+
+STRANGER:  The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken, the
+exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the management of
+herds.  To this you appeared rather too ready to answer that there were two
+species of animals; man being one, and all brutes making up the other.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the
+remainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the common
+name of brutes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That again is true.
+
+STRANGER:  Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise
+and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in
+imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes against all
+other animals to their own special glorification, at the same time jumbling
+together all the others, including man, under the appellation of brutes,--
+here would be the sort of error which we must try to avoid.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How can we be safe?
+
+STRANGER:  If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be less
+likely to fall into that error.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  We had better not take the whole?
+
+STRANGER:  Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How?
+
+STRANGER:  You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which was
+concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living creatures,--I
+mean, with animals in herds?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  In that case, there was already implied a division of all
+animals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be tamed are called
+tame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And the political science of which we are in search, is and ever
+was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to gregarious
+animals.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  But then we ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole
+class at once.  Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at
+the political science; for this mistake has already brought upon us the
+misfortune of which the proverb speaks.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What misfortune?
+
+STRANGER:  The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little speed.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  And all the better, Stranger;--we got what we deserved.
+
+STRANGER:  Very well:  Let us then begin again, and endeavour to divide the
+collective rearing of animals; for probably the completion of the argument
+will best show what you are so anxious to know.  Tell me, then--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What?
+
+STRANGER:  Have you ever heard, as you very likely may--for I do not
+suppose that you ever actually visited them--of the preserves of fishes in
+the Nile, and in the ponds of the Great King; or you may have seen similar
+preserves in wells at home?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often heard
+the others described.
+
+STRANGER:  And you may have heard also, and may have been assured by
+report, although you have not travelled in those regions, of nurseries of
+geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  I asked you, because here is a new division of the management of
+herds, into the management of land and of water herds.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  There is.
+
+STRANGER:  And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective rearing
+of herds into two corresponding parts, the one the rearing of water, and
+the other the rearing of land herds?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the
+royal art, for it is evident to everybody.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How would you divide them?
+
+STRANGER:  I should distinguish between those which fly and those which
+walk.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Most true.
+
+STRANGER:  And where shall we look for the political animal?  Might not an
+idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  The art of managing the walking animal has to be further
+divided, just as you might halve an even number.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Clearly.
+
+STRANGER:  Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part or
+class which the argument aims at reaching,--the one a speedier way, which
+cuts off a small portion and leaves a large; the other agrees better with
+the principle which we were laying down, that as far as we can we should
+divide in the middle; but it is longer.  We can take either of them,
+whichever we please.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Cannot we have both ways?
+
+STRANGER:  Together?  What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn,
+you clearly may.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Then I should like to have them in turn.
+
+STRANGER:  There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we had
+been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to your
+request; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin with the
+longer way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better.  And now attend to
+the division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Let me hear.
+
+STRANGER:  The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature into
+two classes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Upon what principle?
+
+STRANGER:  The one grows horns; and the other is without horns.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Clearly.
+
+STRANGER:  Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian
+animals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you try to
+invent names for them, you will find the intricacy too great.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How must I speak of them, then?
+
+STRANGER:  In this way:  let the science of managing pedestrian animals be
+divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned herd, and the
+other to the herd that has no horns.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  All that you say has been abundantly proved, and may
+therefore be assumed.
+
+STRANGER:  The king is clearly the shepherd of a polled herd, who have no
+horns.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That is evident.
+
+STRANGER:  Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and
+endeavour to assign to him what is his?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  By all means.
+
+STRANGER:  Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven
+feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed?  You know what I mean.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What?
+
+STRANGER:  I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one another.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will not
+mix the breed.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  And of which has the Statesman charge,--of the mixed or of the
+unmixed race?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Clearly of the unmixed.
+
+STRANGER:  I suppose that we must divide this again as before.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  We must.
+
+STRANGER:  Every tame and herding animal has now been split up, with the
+exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs should be reckoned
+among gregarious animals.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining
+species?
+
+STRANGER:  There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately
+employed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of geometry.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is that?
+
+STRANGER:  The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter.  (Compare
+Meno.)
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Just so.
+
+STRANGER:  And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice
+two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly understand
+you.
+
+STRANGER:  In these divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make another
+famous jest.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is it?
+
+STRANGER:  Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest and
+airiest of creation, and have been running a race with them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I remark that very singular coincidence.
+
+STRANGER:  And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Indeed I should.
+
+STRANGER:  And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the king
+is found running about with the herd and in close competition with the
+bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy life. 
+(Plato is here introducing a new suddivision, i.e. that of bipeds into men
+and birds.  Others however refer the passage to the division into
+quadrupeds and bipeds, making pigs compete with human beings and the pig-
+driver with the king.  According to this explanation we must translate the
+words above, 'freest and airiest of creation,' 'worthiest and laziest of
+creation.')
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of
+what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist?  (Compare Sophist.)
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What?
+
+STRANGER:  That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does
+not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her own way at the
+truest result.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Clearly.
+
+STRANGER:  And now, I will not wait for you to ask the, but will of my own
+accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  By all means.
+
+STRANGER:  I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land
+animals into biped and quadruped; and since the winged herd, and that
+alone, comes out in the same class with man, we should divide bipeds into
+those which have feathers and those which have not, and when they have been
+divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought to light, the
+time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler, and set him like a
+charioteer in his place, and hand over to him the reins of state, for that
+too is a vocation which belongs to him.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good; you have paid me the debt,--I mean, that you
+have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the digression by
+way of interest.  (Compare Republic.)
+
+STRANGER:  Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the links,
+which together make the definition of the name of the Statesman's art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  By all means.
+
+STRANGER:  The science of pure knowledge had, as we said originally, a part
+which was the science of rule or command, and from this was derived another
+part, which was called command-for-self, on the analogy of selling-for-
+self; an important section of this was the management of living animals,
+and this again was further limited to the management of them in herds; and
+again in herds of pedestrian animals.  The chief division of the latter was
+the art of managing pedestrian animals which are without horns; this again
+has a part which can only be comprehended under one term by joining
+together three names--shepherding pure-bred animals.  The only further
+subdivision is the art of man-herding,--this has to do with bipeds, and is
+what we were seeking after, and have now found, being at once the royal and
+political.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To be sure.
+
+STRANGER:  And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you say?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What?
+
+STRANGER:  Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled our
+intention?--There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the investigation
+seems to me not to be perfectly worked out:  this is where the enquiry
+fails.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I do not understand.
+
+STRANGER:  I will try to make the thought, which is at this moment present
+in my mind, clearer to us both.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Let me hear.
+
+STRANGER:  There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the
+political, which had the charge of one particular herd?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not
+horses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from
+all other shepherds.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To what do you refer?
+
+STRANGER:  I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen has a rival
+who professes and claims to share with him in the management of the herd?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  I mean to say that merchants, husbandmen, providers of food, and
+also training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the herdsmen of
+humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they themselves have the
+care of rearing or managing mankind, and that they rear not only the common
+herd, but also the rulers themselves.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Are they not right in saying so?
+
+STRANGER:  Very likely they may be, and we will consider their claim.  But
+we are certain of this,--that no one will raise a similar claim as against
+the herdsman, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and only feeder
+and physician of his herd; he is also their match-maker and accoucheur; no
+one else knows that department of science.  And he is their merry-maker and
+musician, as far as their nature is susceptible of such influences, and no
+one can console and soothe his own herd better than he can, either with the
+natural tones of his voice or with instruments.  And the same may be said
+of tenders of animals in general.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king be
+true and unimpeachable?  Were we right in selecting him out of ten thousand
+other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human flock?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Surely not.
+
+STRANGER:  Had we not reason just to now to apprehend, that although we may
+have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately worked
+out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal him as he
+truly is in his own nature, until we have disengaged and separated him from
+those who hang about him and claim to share in his prerogatives?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not mean to
+bring disgrace upon the argument at its close.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  We must certainly avoid that.
+
+STRANGER:  Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different
+road.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What road?
+
+STRANGER:  I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous
+tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then we
+may resume our series of divisions, and proceed in the old path until we
+arrive at the desired summit.  Shall we do as I say?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  By all means.
+
+STRANGER:  Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear; and
+you are not too old for childish amusement.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Let me hear.
+
+STRANGER:  There did really happen, and will again happen, like many other
+events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the portent
+which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of Atreus and
+Thyestes.  You have heard, no doubt, and remember what they say happened at
+that time?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the golden
+lamb.
+
+STRANGER:  No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the
+sun and the stars once rose in the west, and set in the east, and that the
+god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they now have as a
+testimony to the right of Atreus.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes; there is that legend also.
+
+STRANGER:  Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, very often.
+
+STRANGER:  Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earth-born,
+and not begotten of one another?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, that is another old tradition.
+
+STRANGER:  All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still more
+wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in the lapse
+of ages, or are repeated only in a disconnected form; but the origin of
+them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for the tale is
+suited to throw light on the nature of the king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole story,
+and leave out nothing.
+
+STRANGER:  Listen, then.  There is a time when God himself guides and helps
+to roll the world in its course; and there is a time, on the completion of
+a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a living creature,
+and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator,
+turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite
+direction.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Why is that?
+
+STRANGER:  Why, because only the most divine things of all remain ever
+unchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class.  Heaven and
+the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by
+the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, and therefore
+cannot be entirely free from perturbation.  But their motion is, as far as
+possible, single and in the same place, and of the same kind; and is
+therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration
+possible.  For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of
+himself; and to think that he moves them at one time in one direction and
+at another time in another is blasphemy.  Hence we must not say that the
+world is either self-moved always, or all made to go round by God in two
+opposite courses; or that two Gods, having opposite purposes, make it move
+round.  But as I have already said (and this is the only remaining
+alternative) the world is guided at one time by an external power which is
+divine and receives fresh life and immortality from the renewing hand of
+the Creator, and again, when let go, moves spontaneously, being set free at
+such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a reverse
+movement:  this is due to its perfect balance, to its vast size, and to the
+fact that it turns on the smallest pivot.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable
+indeed.
+
+STRANGER:  Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been said the
+nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the cause of all these
+wonders.  It is this.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What?
+
+STRANGER:  The reversal which takes place from time to time of the motion
+of the universe.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How is that the cause?
+
+STRANGER:  Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider this to
+be the greatest and most complete.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I should imagine so.
+
+STRANGER:  And it may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to the
+human beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Such changes would naturally occur.
+
+STRANGER:  And animals, as we know, survive with difficulty great and
+serious changes of many different kinds when they come upon them at once.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them,
+which extends also to the life of man; few survivors of the race are left,
+and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and remarkable
+phenomena, and of one in particular, which takes place at the time when the
+transition is made to the cycle opposite to that in which we are now
+living.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is it?
+
+STRANGER:  The life of all animals first came to a standstill, and the
+mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and grew
+young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again, and the
+cheeks the bearded man became smooth, and recovered their former bloom; the
+bodies of youths in their prime grew softer and smaller, continually by day
+and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a newly-born
+child in mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they wasted away and
+wholly disappeared.  And the bodies of those who died by violence at that
+time quickly passed through the like changes, and in a few days were no
+more seen.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those
+days; and in what way were they begotten of one another?
+
+STRANGER:  It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the
+then order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; the
+earth-born race, of which we hear in story, was the one which existed in
+those days--they rose again from the ground; and of this tradition, which
+is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who were nearest in
+point of time to the end of the last period and came into being at the
+beginning of this, are to us the heralds.  And mark how consistent the
+sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth, follows the return
+of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life; simultaneously with the
+reversal of the world the wheel of their generation has been turned back,
+and they are put together and rise and live in the opposite order, unless
+God has carried any of them away to some other lot.  According to this
+tradition they of necessity sprang from the earth and have the name of
+earth-born, and so the above legend clings to them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly that is quite consistent with what has preceded;
+but tell me, was the life which you said existed in the reign of Cronos in
+that cycle of the world, or in this?  For the change in the course of the
+stars and the sun must have occurred in both.
+
+STRANGER:  I see that you enter into my meaning;--no, that blessed and
+spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but to
+the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of the
+universe; and the several parts the universe were distributed under the
+rule of certain inferior deities, as is the way in some places still. 
+There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and
+herds of animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of
+whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any violence, or devouring of
+one another, or war or quarrel among them; and I might tell of ten thousand
+other blessings, which belonged to that dispensation.  The reason why the
+life of man was, as tradition says, spontaneous, is as follows:  In those
+days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, who
+is by comparison a divine being, still rules over the lower animals.  Under
+him there were no forms of government or separate possession of women and
+children; for all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of the
+past.  And although they had nothing of this sort, the earth gave them
+fruits in abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not
+planted by the hand of man.  And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open
+air, for the temperature of their seasons was mild; and they had no beds,
+but lay on soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of the earth. 
+Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character of
+our present life, which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your own
+experience.  Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the
+happier?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Impossible.
+
+STRANGER:  Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  By all means.
+
+STRANGER:  Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless
+leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men, but with
+the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to
+philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another, and
+learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and was
+able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom, there
+would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times
+happier than the men of our own day.  Or, again, if they had merely eaten
+and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another and to the
+animals--such stories as are now attributed to them--in this case also, as
+I should imagine, the answer would be easy.  But until some satisfactory
+witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge and discussion,
+we had better let the matter drop, and give the reason why we have
+unearthed this tale, and then we shall be able to get on.  In the fulness
+of time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born race had all
+perished, and every soul had completed its proper cycle of births and been
+sown in the earth her appointed number of times, the pilot of the universe
+let the helm go, and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and innate
+desire reversed the motion of the world.  Then also all the inferior
+deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being informed of what was
+happening, let go the parts of the world which were under their control. 
+And the world turning round with a sudden shock, being impelled in an
+opposite direction from beginning to end, was shaken by a mighty
+earthquake, which wrought a new destruction of all manner of animals. 
+Afterwards, when sufficient time had elapsed, the tumult and confusion and
+earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at peace, attained
+to a calm, and settled down into his own orderly and accustomed course,
+having the charge and rule of himself and of all the creatures which are
+contained in him, and executing, as far as he remembered them, the
+instructions of his Father and Creator, more precisely at first, but
+afterwords with less exactness.  The reason of the falling off was the
+admixture of matter in him; this was inherent in the primal nature, which
+was full of disorder, until attaining to the present order.  From God, the
+constructor, the world received all that is good in him, but from a
+previous state came elements of evil and unrighteousness, which, thence
+derived, first of all passed into the world, and were then transmitted to
+the animals.  While the world was aided by the pilot in nurturing the
+animals, the evil was small, and great the good which he produced, but
+after the separation, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded
+well enough; but, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and
+the old discord again held sway and burst forth in full glory; and at last
+small was the good, and great was the admixture of evil, and there was a
+danger of universal ruin to the world, and to the things contained in him. 
+Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, seeing that the
+world was in great straits, and fearing that all might be dissolved in the
+storm and disappear in infinite chaos, again seated himself at the helm;
+and bringing back the elements which had fallen into dissolution and
+disorder to the motion which had prevailed under his dispensation, he set
+them in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and
+immortal.  And this is the whole tale, of which the first part will suffice
+to illustrate the nature of the king.  For when the world turned towards
+the present cycle of generation, the age of man again stood still, and a
+change opposite to the previous one was the result.  The small creatures
+which had almost disappeared grew in and stature, and the newly-born
+children of the earth became grey and died and sank into the earth again. 
+All things changed, imitating and following the condition of the universe,
+and of necessity agreeing with that in their mode of conception and
+generation and nurture; for no animal was any longer allowed to come into
+being in the earth through the agency of other creative beings, but as the
+world was ordained to be the lord of his own progress, in like manner the
+parts were ordained to grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as
+they could, of themselves, impelled by a similar movement.  And so we have
+arrived at the real end of this discourse; for although there might be much
+to tell of the lower animals, and of the condition out of which they
+changed and of the causes of the change, about men there is not much, and
+that little is more to the purpose.  Deprived of the care of God, who had
+possessed and tended them, they were left helpless and defenceless, and
+were torn in pieces by the beasts, who were naturally fierce and had now
+grown wild.  And in the first ages they were still without skill or
+resource; the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and as yet
+they knew not how to procure it, because they had never felt the pressure
+of necessity.  For all these reasons they were in a great strait; wherefore
+also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition were imparted to man by the
+gods, together with so much teaching and education as was indispensable;
+fire was given to them by Prometheus, the arts by Hephaestus and his
+fellow-worker, Athene, seeds and plants by others.  From these is derived
+all that has helped to frame human life; since the care of the Gods, as I
+was saying, had now failed men, and they had to order their course of life
+for themselves, and were their own masters, just like the universal
+creature whom they imitate and follow, ever changing, as he changes, and
+ever living and growing, at one time in one manner, and at another time in
+another.  Enough of the story, which may be of use in showing us how
+greatly we erred in the delineation of the king and the statesman in our
+previous discourse.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What was this great error of which you speak?
+
+STRANGER:  There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an error
+on a much larger and grander scale.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and statesman
+of the present cycle and generation, we told of a shepherd of a human flock
+who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a god when he ought to
+have been a man; and this a great error.  Again, we declared him to be the
+ruler of the entire State, without explaining how:  this was not the whole
+truth, nor very intelligible; but still it was true, and therefore the
+second error was not so great as the first.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the
+statesman we must define the nature of his office.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  And the myth was introduced in order to show, not only that all
+others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our search, but
+in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is alone worthy to
+receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds and herdsmen,
+according to the image which we have employed, has the care of human
+beings.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of the
+divine shepherd is even higher than that of a king; whereas the statesmen
+who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects in character,
+and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and education.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Still they must be investigated all the same, to see whether,
+like the divine shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a level with
+them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Of course.
+
+STRANGER:  To resume:--Do you remember that we spoke of a command-for-self
+exercised over animals, not singly but collectively, which we called the
+art of rearing a herd?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, I remember.
+
+STRANGER:  There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or
+mentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place in our
+nomenclature.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How was that?
+
+STRANGER:  All other herdsmen 'rear' their herds, but this is not a
+suitable term to apply to the Statesman; we should use a name which is
+common to them all.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True, if there be such a name.
+
+STRANGER:  Why, is not 'care' of herds applicable to all?  For this implies
+no feeding, or any special duty; if we say either 'tending' the herds, or
+'managing' the herds, or 'having the care' of them, the same word will
+include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the rest, as the
+argument seems to require.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the
+division?
+
+STRANGER:  As before we divided the art of 'rearing' herds accordingly as
+they were land or water herds, winged and wingless, mixing or not mixing
+the breed, horned and hornless, so we may divide by these same differences
+the 'tending' of herds, comprehending in our definition the kingship of to-
+day and the rule of Cronos.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That is clear; but I still ask, what is to follow.
+
+STRANGER:  If the word had been 'managing' herds, instead of feeding or
+rearing them, no one would have argued that there was no care of men in the
+case of the politician, although it was justly contended, that there was no
+human art of feeding them which was worthy of the name, or at least, if
+there were, many a man had a prior and greater right to share in such an
+art than any king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  But no other art or science will have a prior or better right
+than the royal science to care for human society and to rule over men in
+general.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Quite true.
+
+STRANGER:  In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a great
+error was committed at the end of our analysis.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What was it?
+
+STRANGER:  Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such an art as
+the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no reason why we should
+call this the royal or political art, as though there were no more to be
+said.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER:  Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name, so
+as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to divide,
+for there may be still considerable divisions.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How can they be made?
+
+STRANGER:  First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human guardian
+or manager.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And the art of management which is assigned to man would again
+have to be subdivided.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  On what principle?
+
+STRANGER:  On the principle of voluntary and compulsory.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Why?
+
+STRANGER:  Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here; for
+our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas they are
+utterly distinct, like their modes of government.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide
+human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and the
+voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we not
+further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the true
+king and statesman?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the account
+of the Statesman.
+
+STRANGER:  Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself as
+well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not yet
+perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having overdone
+the several parts of their work, lose time in cutting them down, so too we,
+partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire to expose our
+former error, and also because we imagined that a king required grand
+illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable, and have been
+obliged to use more than was necessary.  This made us discourse at large,
+and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end.  And our discussion
+might be compared to a picture of some living being which had been fairly
+drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the life and clearness which is
+given by the blending of colours.  Now to intelligent persons a living
+being had better be delineated by language and discourse than by any
+painting or work of art:  to the duller sort by works of art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true; but what is the imperfection which still
+remains?  I wish that you would tell me.
+
+STRANGER:  The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except
+through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a
+dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to know nothing.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question about
+our experience of knowledge.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Why so?
+
+STRANGER:  Why, because my 'example' requires the assistance of another
+example.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire.
+
+STRANGER:  I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in you: 
+when children are beginning to know their letters--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What are you going to say?
+
+STRANGER:  That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very
+short and easy syllables, and are able to tell them correctly.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and think
+and speak falsely of them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a
+knowledge of what they do not as yet know be--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Be what?
+
+STRANGER:  To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge
+correctly about the letters in question, and then to compare these with the
+cases in which they do not as yet know, and to show them that the letters
+are the same, and have the same character in both combinations, until all
+cases in which they are right have been placed side by side with all cases
+in which they are wrong.  In this way they have examples, and are made to
+learn that each letter in every combination is always the same and not
+another, and is always called by the same name.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Are not examples formed in this manner?  We take a thing and
+compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of which we
+have a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true
+notion, which includes both of them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Exactly.
+
+STRANGER:  Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty
+about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly
+fixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in other cases is
+altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correct notion of
+combinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long and
+difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  There is nothing wonderful in that.
+
+STRANGER:  Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever
+expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Hardly.
+
+STRANGER:  Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the nature
+of example in general in a small and particular instance; afterwards from
+lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class, which is the highest
+form of the same nature, and endeavour to discover by rules of art what the
+management of cities is; and then the dream will become a reality to us.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as
+there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the care
+of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone; and, as I was
+saying, a model or example of this process has first to be framed.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Exactly.
+
+STRANGER:  What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with
+the political occupation?  Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no other
+example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool--
+this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to
+illustrate our meaning?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of
+division and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes;
+going once more as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come to
+that which is needed for our purpose?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  I shall reply by actually performing the process.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  All things which we make or acquire are either creative or
+preventive; of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and human, and
+also defences; and defences are either military weapons or protections; and
+protections are veils, and also shields against heat and cold, and shields
+against heat and cold are shelters and coverings; and coverings are
+blankets and garments; and garments are some of them in one piece, and
+others of them are made in several parts; and of these latter some are
+stitched, others are fastened and not stitched; and of the not stitched,
+some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of hair; and of these,
+again, some are cemented with water and earth, and others are fastened
+together by themselves.  And these last defences and coverings which are
+fastened together by themselves are called clothes, and the art which
+superintends them we may call, from the nature of the operation, the art of
+clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman was derived from the
+State; and may we not say that the art of weaving, at least that largest
+portion of it which was concerned with the making of clothes, differs only
+in name from this art of clothing, in the same way that, in the previous
+case, the royal science differed from the political?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Most true.
+
+STRANGER:  In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art of
+weaving clothes, which an incompetent person might fancy to have been
+sufficiently described, has been separated off from several others which
+are of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  And which are the kindred arts?
+
+STRANGER:  I see that I have not taken you with me.  So I think that we had
+better go backwards, starting from the end.  We just now parted off from
+the weaving of clothes, the making of blankets, which differ from each
+other in that one is put under and the other is put around:  and these are
+what I termed kindred arts.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I understand.
+
+STRANGER:  And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made of
+flax and cords, and all that we just now metaphorically termed the sinews
+of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting and the
+putting together of materials by stitching and sewing, of which the most
+important part is the cobbler's art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Precisely.
+
+STRANGER:  Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared
+coverings in entire pieces, and the art of sheltering, and subtracted the
+various arts of making water-tight which are employed in building, and in
+general in carpentering, and in other crafts, and all such arts as furnish
+impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are concerned with making
+the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being divisions of the art of
+joining; and we also cut off the manufacture of arms, which is a section of
+the great and manifold art of making defences; and we originally began by
+parting off the whole of the magic art which is concerned with antidotes,
+and have left, as would appear, the very art of which we were in search,
+the art of protection against winter cold, which fabricates woollen
+defences, and has the name of weaving.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for the first process to which
+the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How so?
+
+STRANGER:  Weaving is a sort of uniting?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  But the first process is a separation of the clotted and matted
+fibres?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that
+carding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER:  Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the warp
+and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was paradoxical and
+false.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To be sure.
+
+STRANGER:  Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender
+has nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes, or are we to
+regard all these as arts of weaving?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER:  And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are
+concerned with the treatment and production of clothes; they will dispute
+the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning a larger sphere
+to that, will still reserve a considerable field for themselves.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Besides these, there are the arts which make tools and
+instruments of weaving, and which will claim at least to be co-operative
+causes in every work of the weaver.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Most true.
+
+STRANGER:  Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that part
+of it which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest of arts
+which are concerned with woollen garments--shall we be right?  Is not the
+definition, although true, wanting in clearness and completeness; for do
+not all those other arts require to be first cleared away?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that the
+argument may proceed in a regular manner?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  By all means.
+
+STRANGER:  Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds of
+arts entering into everything which we do.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What are they?
+
+STRANGER:  The one kind is the conditional or co-operative, the other the
+principal cause.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which
+furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, without which the several
+arts could not fulfil their appointed work, are co-operative; but those
+which make the things themselves are causal.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  A very reasonable distinction.
+
+STRANGER:  Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other instruments
+of the production of clothes, may be called co-operative, and those which
+treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  The arts of washing and mending, and the other preparatory arts
+which belong to the causal class, and form a division of the great art of
+adornment, may be all comprehended under what we call the fuller's art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the process
+which are concerned with the actual manufacture of a woollen garment form a
+single art, which is one of those universally acknowledged,--the art of
+working in wool.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To be sure.
+
+STRANGER:  Of working in wool, again, there are two divisions, and both
+these are parts of two arts at once.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How is that?
+
+STRANGER:  Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the other
+processes of wool-working which separate the composite, may be classed
+together as belonging both to the art of wool-working, and also to one of
+the two great arts which are of universal application--the art of
+composition and the art of division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  To the latter belong carding and the other processes of which I
+was just now speaking; the art of discernment or division in wool and yarn,
+which is effected in one manner with the comb and in another with the
+hands, is variously described under all the names which I just now
+mentioned.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Again, let us take some process of wool-working which is also a
+portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of division
+which we found there, make two halves, one on the principle of composition,
+and the other on the principle of division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Let that be done.
+
+STRANGER:  And once more, Socrates, we must divide the part which belongs
+at once both to wool-working and composition, if we are ever to discover
+satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  We must.
+
+STRANGER:  Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art of
+twisting threads, the other the art of combining them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be
+referring to manufacture of the warp?
+
+STRANGER:  Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is the woof
+made?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  There is no other way.
+
+STRANGER:  Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I think
+that the definition will be of use to you.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How shall I define them?
+
+STRANGER:  As thus:  A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise
+and breadthwise is said to be pulled out.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  And the wool thus prepared, when twisted by the spindle, and
+made into a firm thread, is called the warp, and the art which regulates
+these operations the art of spinning the warp.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And the threads which are more loosely spun, having a softness
+proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the degree of force
+used in dressing the cloth,--the threads which are thus spun are called the
+woof, and the art which is set over them may be called the art of spinning
+the woof.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of the part
+of weaving which we have undertaken to define.  For when that part of the
+art of composition which is employed in the working of wool forms a web by
+the regular intertexture of warp and woof, the entire woven substance is
+called by us a woollen garment, and the art which presides over this is the
+art of weaving.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of
+entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in
+what was said.
+
+STRANGER:  Very likely, but you may not always think so, my sweet friend;
+and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in your
+mind, as it very well may, let me lay down a principle which will apply to
+arguments in general.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Proceed.
+
+STRANGER:  Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and
+defect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise or
+blame too much length or too much shortness in discussions of this kind.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Let us do so.
+
+STRANGER:  The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the
+following:--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What?
+ 
+STRANGER:  Length and shortness, excess and defect; with all of these the
+art of measurement is conversant.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts,
+with a view to our present purpose.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Where would you make the division?
+
+STRANGER:  As thus:  I would make two parts, one having regard to the
+relativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and there is another,
+without which the existence of production would be impossible.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to be
+called greater with reference to the less alone, and the less less with
+reference to the greater alone?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  Well, but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded by
+the principle of the mean, both in speech and action, and is not this a
+reality, and the chief mark of difference between good and bad men?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Plainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are
+discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only
+relatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of
+them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason
+why?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less,
+there will never be any comparison of either with the mean.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and
+their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art
+of weaving disappear?  For all these arts are on the watch against excess
+and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion a
+difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of art is
+due to this observance of measure.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search for
+the royal science will be impossible.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the
+inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point at
+which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour to show
+that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one another, but
+also have to do with the production of the mean; for if this is not
+admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an
+undisputed master of his science.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.
+
+STRANGER:  But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which
+we only too well remember the length.  I think, however, that we may fairly
+assume something of this sort--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What?
+
+STRANGER:  That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a view
+to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument that the
+very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the possibility of
+measuring more or less, not only with one another, but also with a view to
+the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand support and
+satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining; for if there
+are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of
+measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is neither.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True; and what is the next step?
+
+STRANGER:  The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into
+two parts, as we have said already, and to place in the one part all the
+arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness with their
+opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the
+mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those
+words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the extremes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very different
+spheres.
+
+STRANGER:  There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing
+themselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement is universal, and
+has to do with all things.  And this means what we are now saying; for all
+things which come within the province of art do certainly in some sense
+partake of measure.  But these persons, because they are not accustomed to
+distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble together two widely
+different things, relation to one another, and to a standard, under the
+idea that they are the same, and also fall into the converse error of
+dividing other things not according to their real parts.  Whereas the right
+way is, if a man has first seen the unity of things, to go on with the
+enquiry and not desist until he has found all the differences contained in
+it which form distinct classes; nor again should he be able to rest
+contented with the manifold diversities which are seen in a multitude of
+things until he has comprehended all of them that have any affinity within
+the bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the reality of a
+single kind.  But we have said enough on this head, and also of excess and
+defect; we have only to bear in mind that two divisions of the art of
+measurement have been discovered which are concerned with them, and not
+forget what they are.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  We will not forget.
+
+STRANGER:  And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to
+consider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the
+conduct of such arguments in general.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is this new question?
+
+STRANGER:  Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his letters: 
+when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say that the
+question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge of that
+particular word, or of all words?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of
+all words.
+
+STRANGER:  And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve
+our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is general.
+
+STRANGER:  Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the notion of
+weaving for its own sake.  But people seem to forget that some things have
+sensible images, which are readily known, and can be easily pointed out
+when any one desires to answer an enquirer without any trouble or argument;
+whereas the greatest and highest truths have no outward image of themselves
+visible to man, which he who wishes to satisfy the soul of the enquirer can
+adapt to the eye of sense (compare Phaedr.), and therefore we ought to
+train ourselves to give and accept a rational account of them; for
+immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, are shown only in
+thought and idea, and in no other way, and all that we are now saying is
+said for the sake of them.  Moreover, there is always less difficulty in
+fixing the mind on small matters than on great.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  Let us call to mind the bearing of all this.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is it?
+
+STRANGER:  I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we
+may have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal of
+the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the being of
+not-being.  I know that they were felt to be too long, and I reproached
+myself with this, fearing that they might be not only tedious but
+irrelevant; and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent the
+recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.  Will you proceed?
+
+STRANGER:  Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering what
+has been said, should praise or blame the length or shortness of
+discussions, not by comparing them with one another, but with what is
+fitting, having regard to the part of measurement, which, as we said, was
+to be borne in mind.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to what
+is fitting; for we should only want such a length as is suited to give
+pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and reason tells us, that we
+should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry, not our
+first, but our second object; the first and highest of all being to assert
+the great method of division according to species--whether the discourse be
+shorter or longer is not to the point.  No offence should be taken at
+length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed indifferently,
+according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the
+auditors.  Reason would also say to him who censures the length of
+discourses on such occasions and cannot away with their circumlocution,
+that he should not be in such a hurry to have done with them, when he can
+only complain that they are tedious, but he should prove that if they had
+been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better
+dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things; about
+any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself--he should pretend
+not to hear them.  But we have had enough of this, as you will probably
+agree with me in thinking.  Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to
+his case the aforesaid example of weaving.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good;--let us do as you say.
+
+STRANGER:  The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts of
+shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds at all. 
+There still remain, however, of the causal and co-operative arts those
+which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first be
+distinguished from one another.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two
+halves; the reason will be very evident as we proceed.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Then we had better do so.
+
+STRANGER:  We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs, since we
+cannot bisect them.  (Compare Phaedr.)  For we certainly should divide
+everything into as few parts as possible.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is to be done in this case?
+
+STRANGER:  What we did in the example of weaving--all those arts which
+furnish the tools were regarded by us as co-operative.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any
+implement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as co-
+operative, for without them neither State nor Statesmanship would be
+possible; and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is a product
+of the kingly art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  No, indeed.
+
+STRANGER:  The task of separating this class from others is not an easy
+one; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world is the
+instrument of doing something.  But there is another class of possessions
+in a city, of which I have a word to say.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What class do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  A class which may be described as not having this power; that is
+to say, not like an instrument, framed for production, but designed for the
+preservation of that which is produced.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To what do you refer?
+
+STRANGER:  To the class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed,
+which are constructed for the preservation of things moist and dry, of
+things prepared in the fire or out of the fire; this is a very large class,
+and has, if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the royal art
+of which we are in search.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER:  There is also a third class of possessions to be noted,
+different from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land or
+water, honourable and also dishonourable.  The whole of this class has one
+name, because it is intended to be sat upon, being always a seat for
+something.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is it?
+
+STRANGER:  A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman, but
+of the carpenter, potter, and coppersmith.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I understand.
+
+STRANGER:  And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and in
+which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained,--every kind of
+dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of earth or stone,
+and ten thousand other things? all of which being made for the sake of
+defence, may be truly called defences, and are for the most part to be
+regarded as the work of the builder or of the weaver, rather than of the
+Statesman.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and of
+the imitations produced by drawing and music, which are designed for
+amusement only, and may be fairly comprehended under one name?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is it?
+
+STRANGER:  Plaything is the name.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them, for none
+of these things have a serious purpose--amusement is their sole aim.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That again I understand.
+
+STRANGER:  Then there is a class which provides materials for all these,
+out of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their
+works;--this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and offspring of
+many other arts, may I not rank sixth?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  I am referring to gold, silver, and other metals, and all that
+wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the art of carpentry
+and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and stripping the cuticle
+of plants, and the currier's art, which strips off the skins of animals,
+and other similar arts which manufacture corks and papyri and cords, and
+provide for the manufacture of composite species out of simple kinds--the
+whole class may be termed the primitive and simple possession of man, and
+with this the kingly science has no concern at all.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  The provision of food and of all other things which mingle their
+particles with the particles of the human body, and minister to the body,
+will form a seventh class, which may be called by the general term of
+nourishment, unless you have any better name to offer.  This, however,
+appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor, cook, and
+is not to be assigned to the Statesman's art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER:  These seven classes include nearly every description of
+property, with the exception of tame animals.  Consider;--there was the
+original material, which ought to have been placed first; next come
+instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings, nourishment; small
+things, which may be included under one of these--as for example, coins,
+seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the character of
+any larger kind which includes them; but some of them may, with a little
+forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made to harmonize
+with the class of implements.  The art of herding, which has been already
+divided into parts, will include all property in tame animals, except
+slaves.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect
+that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of the
+king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered; just as
+spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the weaver. 
+All the others, who were termed co-operators, have been got rid of among
+the occupations already mentioned, and separated from the royal and
+political science.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I agree.
+
+STRANGER:  Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more certain
+of the complexion of this remaining class.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Let us do so.
+
+STRANGER:  We shall find from our present point of view that the greatest
+servants are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we
+anticipated.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Who are they?
+
+STRANGER:  Those who have been purchased, and have so become possessions;
+these are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not claim royal science.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER:  Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of
+the other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalise the products of
+husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the market-place, others
+going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in exchange for
+money or for other productions--the money-changer, the merchant, the ship-
+owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to statecraft or politics?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  No; unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce.
+
+STRANGER:  But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and
+too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in
+royal science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER:  But what would you say of some other serviceable officials?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Who are they, and what services do they perform?
+
+STRANGER:  There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice, and divers
+others who have great skill in various sorts of business connected with the
+government of states--what shall we call them?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as you
+just now called them, but not themselves rulers.
+
+STRANGER:  There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be a
+ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when I
+imagined that the principal claimants to political science would be found
+somewhere in this neighbourhood.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of some who have
+not yet been tested:  in the first place, there are diviners, who have a
+portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the
+interpreters of the gods to men.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  There is also the priestly class, who, as the law declares, know
+how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices which are
+acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf blessings in return from them. 
+Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, clearly.
+
+STRANGER:  And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right track;
+for the priest and the diviner are swollen with pride and prerogative, and
+they create an awful impression of themselves by the magnitude of their
+enterprises; in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to reign, unless he
+have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust
+himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood.  In many parts of
+Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is
+assigned to the highest magistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn
+and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him
+who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Precisely.
+
+STRANGER:  But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who now
+come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng, as the former
+class disappears and the scene changes?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Whom can you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  They are a strange crew.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Why strange?
+
+STRANGER:  A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every tribe;
+for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs and
+such weak and shifty creatures;--Protean shapes quickly changing into one
+another's forms and natures; and now, Socrates, I begin to see who they
+are.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Who are they?  You seem to be gazing on some strange
+vision.
+
+STRANGER:  Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him; and just
+now I myself fell into this mistake--at first sight, coming suddenly upon
+him, I did not recognize the politician and his troop.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Who is he?
+
+STRANGER:  The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who must
+at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are ever to
+see daylight in the present enquiry.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That is a hope not lightly to be renounced.
+
+STRANGER:  Never, if I can help it; and, first, let me ask you a question.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What?
+
+STRANGER:  Is not monarchy a recognized form of government?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the
+few?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Of course.
+
+STRANGER:  Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude,
+which is called by the name of democracy?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing
+out of themselves two other names?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What are they?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What are they?
+
+STRANGER:  There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and
+riches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days apply to them; the
+two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two forms and
+two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of
+aristocracy and oligarchy.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws or not, and
+whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their consent or
+against their consent, always in ordinary language has the same name.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  But do you suppose that any form of government which is defined
+by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of poverty or
+wealth, of voluntary or compulsory submission, of written law or the
+absence of law, can be a right one?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Why not?
+
+STRANGER:  Reflect; and follow me.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  In what direction?
+
+STRANGER:  Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract our
+words?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To what do you refer?
+
+STRANGER:  If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out of the
+rest as having a character which is at once judicial and authoritative?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  And there was one kind of authority over lifeless things and
+another other living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step by
+step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable as yet to
+determine the nature of the particular science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing principle of
+the State cannot be the few or many, the voluntary or involuntary, poverty
+or riches; but some notion of science must enter into it, if we are to be
+consistent with what has preceded.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  And we must be consistent.
+
+STRANGER:  Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the
+science of government, which is among the greatest of all sciences and most
+difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside?  That we must discover, and
+then we shall see who are the false politicians who pretend to be
+politicians but are not, although they persuade many, and shall separate
+them from the wise king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That, as the argument has already intimated, will be our
+duty.
+
+STRANGER:  Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political
+science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Impossible.
+
+STRANGER:  But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a
+hundred, or say fifty, who could?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  In that case political science would certainly be the
+easiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of that number
+as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by the standard of the
+rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as many kings.  For kings
+we may truly call those who possess royal science, whether they rule or
+not, as was shown in the previous argument.
+
+STRANGER:  Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that any true
+form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two,
+or, at any rate, of a few.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the will,
+of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and whether
+they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their rule, must be
+supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some scientific
+principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us against our will or
+with our will, and whatever be his mode of treatment,--incision, burning,
+or the infliction of some other pain,--whether he practises out of a book
+or not out of a book, and whether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or
+reduces in some other way, or even fattens his patients, is a physician all
+the same, so long as he exercises authority over them according to rules of
+art, if he only does them good and heals and saves them.  And this we lay
+down to be the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art
+of command.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Quite true.
+
+STRANGER:  Then that can be the only true form of government in which the
+governors are really found to possess science, and are not mere pretenders,
+whether they rule according to law or without law, over willing or
+unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves--none of these things
+can with any propriety be included in the notion of the ruler.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And whether with a view to the public good they purge the State
+by killing some, or exiling some; whether they reduce the size of the body
+corporate by sending out from the hive swarms of citizens, or, by
+introducing persons from without, increase it; while they act according to
+the rules of wisdom and justice, and use their power with a view to the
+general security and improvement, the city over which they rule, and which
+has these characteristics, may be described as the only true State.  All
+other governments are not genuine or real; but only imitations of this, and
+some of them are better and some of them are worse; the better are said to
+be well governed, but they are mere imitations like the others.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say;
+but as to their ruling without laws--the expression has a harsh sound.
+
+STRANGER:  You have been too quick for me, Socrates; I was just going to
+ask you whether you objected to any of my statements.  And now I see that
+we shall have to consider this notion of there being good government
+without laws.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the
+business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law
+should rule, but that a man should rule supposing him to have wisdom and
+royal power.  Do you see why this is?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Why?
+
+STRANGER:  Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest
+and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best.  The
+differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of
+human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule.  And no art
+whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Of course not.
+
+STRANGER:  But the law is always striving to make one;--like an obstinate
+and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to his
+appointment, or any question to be asked--not even in sudden changes of
+circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he commanded
+for some one.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the manner
+which you describe.
+
+STRANGER:  A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of
+things which is the reverse of simple.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we
+compelled to make laws at all?  The reason of this has next to be
+investigated.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic contests
+in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men compete in
+running, wrestling, and the like?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes; they are very common among us.
+
+STRANGER:  And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by
+professional trainers or by others having similar authority?  Can you
+remember?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To what do you refer?
+
+STRANGER:  The training-masters do not issue minute rules for individuals,
+or give every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution; they
+think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and to prescribe
+generally the regimen which will benefit the majority.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them all;
+they send them forth together, and let them rest together from their
+running, wrestling, or whatever the form of bodily exercise may be.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over the
+herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another, will not
+be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly what is
+suitable for each particular case.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  He cannot be expected to do so.
+
+STRANGER:  He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority,
+roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will deliver
+in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last will be
+traditional customs of the country.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  He will be right.
+
+STRANGER:  Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man's side all
+through his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty? 
+Who, Socrates, would be equal to such a task?  No one who really had the
+royal science, if he had been able to do this, would have imposed upon
+himself the restriction of a written law.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  So I should infer from what has now been said.
+
+STRANGER:  Or rather, my good friend, from what is going to be said.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  And what is that?
+
+STRANGER:  Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer, who
+is about to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long time away
+from his patients--thinking that his instructions will not be remembered
+unless they are written down, he will leave notes of them for the use of
+his pupils or patients.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he had
+intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other
+celestial influences, something else happened to be better for them,--would
+he not venture to suggest this new remedy, although not contemplated in his
+former prescription?  Would he persist in observing the original law,
+neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the patient daring to do
+otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea that this course only was
+healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and heterodox?  Viewed in the
+light of science and true art, would not all such enactments be utterly
+ridiculous?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Utterly.
+
+STRANGER:  And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining what
+was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust, to the tribes
+of men who flock together in their several cities, and are governed in
+accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were suddenly to come
+again, or another like to him, is he to be prohibited from changing them?--
+would not this prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the other?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is in
+point?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I do not recall what you mean at the moment.
+
+STRANGER:  They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be
+improved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and then
+he may legislate, but not otherwise.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  And are they not right?
+
+STRANGER:  I dare say.  But supposing that he does use some gentle violence
+for their good, what is this violence to be called?  Or rather, before you
+answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our previous
+instances.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of whatever sex
+or age, whom he compels against his will to do something for his good which
+is contrary to the written rules; what is this compulsion to be called? 
+Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art, or a breach of
+the laws of health?  Nothing could be more unjust than for the patient to
+whom such violence is applied, to charge the physician who practises the
+violence with wanting skill or aggravating his disease.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Most true.
+
+STRANGER:  In the political art error is not called disease, but evil, or
+disgrace, or injustice.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Quite true.
+
+STRANGER:  And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is compelled
+to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did before, the last and
+most absurd thing which he could say about such violence is that he has
+incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of those who compelled
+him.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man,
+is just, and if by a poor man, unjust?  May not any man, rich or poor, with
+or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against the will of the
+citizens, do what is for their interest?  Is not this the true principle of
+government, according to which the wise and good man will order the affairs
+of his subjects?  As the pilot, by watching continually over the interests
+of the ship and of the crew,--not by laying down rules, but by making his
+art a law,--preserves the lives of his fellow-sailors, even so, and in the
+self-same way, may there not be a true form of polity created by those who
+are able to govern in a similar spirit, and who show a strength of art
+which is superior to the law?  Nor can wise rulers ever err while they
+observing the one great rule of distributing justice to the citizens with
+intelligence and skill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as may be,
+to make them better from being worse.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  No one can deny what has been now said.
+
+STRANGER:  Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other statement.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What was it?
+
+STRANGER:  We said that no great number of persons, whoever they may be,
+can attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the true
+government is to be found in a small body, or in an individual, and that
+other States are but imitations of this, as we said a little while ago,
+some for the better and some for the worse.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?  I cannot have understood your previous
+remark about imitations.
+
+STRANGER:  And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out is highly
+important, even if we leave the question where it is, and do not seek by
+the discussion of it to expose the error which prevails in this matter.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or familiar;
+but we may attempt to express it thus:--Supposing the government of which I
+have been speaking to be the only true model, then the others must use the
+written laws of this--in no other way can they be saved; they will have to
+do what is now generally approved, although not the best thing in the
+world.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is this?
+
+STRANGER:  No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and any
+infringement of them should be punished with death and the most extreme
+penalties; and this is very right and good when regarded as the second best
+thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now speaking.  Shall
+I explain the nature of what I call the second best?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  By all means.
+
+STRANGER:  I must again have recourse to my favourite images; through them,
+and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What images?
+
+STRANGER:  The noble pilot and the wise physician, who 'is worth many
+another man'--in the similitude of these let us endeavour to discover some
+image of the king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What sort of an image?
+
+STRANGER:  Well, such as this:--Every man will reflect that he suffers
+strange things at the hands of both of them; the physician saves any whom
+he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to maltreat he maltreats--cutting
+or burning them; and at the same time requiring them to bring him payments,
+which are a sort of tribute, of which little or nothing is spent upon the
+sick man, and the greater part is consumed by him and his domestics; and
+the finale is that he receives money from the relations of the sick man or
+from some enemy of his, and puts him out of the way.  And the pilots of
+ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of the same kind; they
+intentionally play false and leave you ashore when the hour of sailing
+arrives; or they cause mishaps at sea and cast away their freight; and are
+guilty of other rogueries.  Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind,
+were to determine, after consideration, that neither of these arts shall
+any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control either over freemen or
+over slaves, but that we will summon an assembly either of all the people,
+or of the rich only, that anybody who likes, whatever may be his calling,
+or even if he have no calling, may offer an opinion either about seamanship
+or about diseases--whether as to the manner in which physic or surgical
+instruments are to be applied to the patient, or again about the vessels
+and the nautical implements which are required in navigation, and how to
+meet the dangers of winds and waves which are incidental to the voyage, how
+to behave when encountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old-
+fashioned galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build--
+and that, whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon
+the advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on
+triangular tablets and columns, or enacted although unwritten to be
+national customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated
+and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What a strange notion!
+
+STRANGER:  Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are appointed
+annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that they
+are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate vessels and
+heal the sick according to the written rules.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Worse and worse.
+
+STRANGER:  But hear what follows:--When the year of office has expired, the
+pilot or physician has to come before a court of review, in which the
+judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by lot out of
+the whole people; and anybody who pleases may be their accuser, and may lay
+to their charge, that during the past year they have not navigated their
+vessels or healed their patients according to the letter of the law and the
+ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of them is condemned,
+some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or pay.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  He who is willing to take a command under such conditions,
+deserves to suffer any penalty.
+
+STRANGER:  Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is
+detected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and the
+true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the
+atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions
+about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a
+cloudy prating sophist;--further, on the ground that he is a corrupter of
+the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or
+piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule over
+their patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may inform against
+him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to be persuading
+any, whether young or old, to act contrary to the written law, he is to be
+punished with the utmost rigour; for no one should presume to be wiser than
+the laws; and as touching healing and health and piloting and navigation,
+the nature of them is known to all, for anybody may learn the written laws
+and the national customs.  If such were the mode of procedure, Socrates,
+about these sciences and about generalship, and any branch of hunting, or
+about painting or imitation in general, or carpentry, or any sort of
+handicraft, or husbandry, or planting, or if we were to see an art of
+rearing horses, or tending herds, or divination, or any ministerial
+service, or draught-playing, or any science conversant with number, whether
+simple or square or cube, or comprising motion,--I say, if all these things
+were done in this way according to written regulations, and not according
+to art, what would be the result?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be
+recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful.  And human life, which is bad
+enough already, would then become utterly unendurable.
+
+STRANGER:  But what, if while compelling all these operations to be
+regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws
+some one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring nothing about
+the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest or favour,
+and without knowledge,--would not this be a still worse evil than the
+former?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience,
+and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and
+persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more
+ruinous error than any adherence to written law?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing in
+legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to break
+the law in any respect whatever.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as
+far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have
+knowledge?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly they would.
+
+STRANGER:  And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true
+Statesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by his art
+without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something other than
+that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed during his
+absence would be better.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, we said so.
+
+STRANGER:  And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws, in
+acting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only be
+acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would
+imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they had
+knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no
+longer.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Quite true.
+
+STRANGER:  And the principle that no great number of men are able to
+acquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, it has.
+
+STRANGER:  Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will
+never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Impossible.
+
+STRANGER:  Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of government
+can ever make to the true government of the one scientific ruler, is to do
+nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is called
+aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  Or again, when an individual rules according to law in imitation
+of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules according to law, we
+give him the same name, whether he rules with opinion or with knowledge.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To be sure.
+
+STRANGER:  And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his
+name will surely be the same--he will be called a king; and thus the five
+names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That is true.
+
+STRANGER:  And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by
+custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends that
+he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality
+appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not such an
+one be called a tyrant?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the king,
+of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies,--because men are
+offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that any one
+can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in the spirit of
+virtue and knowledge to act justly and holily to all; they fancy that he
+will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he pleases of us;
+for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they would acknowledge
+that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he alone would be the
+happy ruler of a true and perfect State.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To be sure.
+
+STRANGER:  But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no natural
+head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body and in mind,
+mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to approach as
+nearly as they can to the true form of government.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in
+custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at
+the miseries which there are, and always will be, in States?  Any other
+art, built on such a foundation and thus conducted, would ruin all that it
+touched.  Ought we not rather to wonder at the natural strength of the
+political bond?  For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and
+yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them,
+like ships at sea, founder from time to time, and perish and have perished
+and will hereafter perish, through the badness of their pilots and crews,
+who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths--I mean to say,
+that they are wholly unaquainted with politics, of which, above all other
+sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect
+knowledge.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Then the question arises:--which of these untrue forms of
+government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are all
+oppressive; and which is the worst of them?  Here is a consideration which
+is beside our present purpose, and yet having regard to the whole it seems
+to influence all our actions:  we must examine it.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, we must.
+
+STRANGER:  You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the
+hardest and the easiest.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I
+mentioned at the beginning of this discussion--monarchy, the rule of the
+few, and the rule of the many.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the
+true one may be distinguished as a seventh.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How would you make the division?
+
+STRANGER:  Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the few
+into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and
+democracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be
+divided.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  On what principle of division?
+
+STRANGER:  On the same principle as before, although the name is now
+discovered to have a twofold meaning.  For the distinction of ruling with
+law or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  The division made no difference when we were looking for the
+perfect State, as we showed before.  But now that this has been separated
+off, and, as we said, the others alone are left for us, the principle of
+law and the absence of law will bisect them all.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That would seem to follow, from what has been said.
+
+STRANGER:  Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws, is the
+best of all the six, and when lawless is the most bitter and oppressive to
+the subject.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  The government of the few, which is intermediate between that of
+the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil; but the government
+of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either any great good
+or any great evil, when compared with the others, because the offices are
+too minutely subdivided and too many hold them.  And this therefore is the
+worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all lawless ones.  If they
+are all without the restraints of law, democracy is the form in which to
+live is best; if they are well ordered, then this is the last which you
+should choose, as royalty, the first form, is the best, with the exception
+of the seventh, for that excels them all, and is among States what God is
+among men.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  You are quite right, and we should choose that above all.
+
+STRANGER:  The members of all these States, with the exception of the one
+which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but partisans,
+--upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols; and, being
+the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the greatest of
+Sophists.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument
+appears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians, as they are
+termed.
+
+STRANGER:  And so our satyric drama has been played out; and the troop of
+Centaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave the stage, have at last
+been separated from the political science.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  So I perceive.
+
+STRANGER:  There remain, however, natures still more troublesome, because
+they are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to discern; the
+examination of them may be compared to the process of refining gold.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is your meaning?
+
+STRANGER:  The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and the
+like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to gold,
+which can only be separated by fire,--copper, silver, and other precious
+metal; these are at last refined away by the use of tests, until the gold
+is left quite pure.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to be
+done.
+
+STRANGER:  In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been
+separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred
+nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the general and the
+judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal art,
+and persuades men to do justice, and assists in guiding the helm of
+States:--How can we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek
+alone and unalloyed?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted.
+
+STRANGER:  If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be
+brought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may assist in
+exhibiting him.  Please to answer me a question.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What question?
+
+STRANGER:  There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in
+general?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  There is.
+
+STRANGER:  And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide
+which of these arts are and are not to be learned;--what do you say?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I should answer that there is.
+
+STRANGER:  And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the
+others?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no
+single science to any other?  Or ought this science to be the overseer and
+governor of all the others?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  The latter.
+
+STRANGER:  You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought
+to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or which
+teaches?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Far superior.
+
+STRANGER:  And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade or
+not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Of course.
+
+STRANGER:  Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of
+persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to rhetoric.
+
+STRANGER:  And to what science do we give the power of determining whether
+we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or to refrain
+altogether?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To that science which governs the arts of speech and
+persuasion.
+
+STRANGER:  Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, being
+a different species, yet ministering to it.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  But what would you think of another sort of power or science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What science?
+
+STRANGER:  The science which has to do with military operations against our
+enemies--is that to be regarded as a science or not?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as
+other than a science?
+
+STRANGER:  And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we are
+to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  If we are to be consistent, we must say different.
+
+STRANGER:  And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are
+not to give up our former notion?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war is,
+can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  No other.
+
+STRANGER:  The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not
+political?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Exactly.
+
+STRANGER:  Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very good.
+
+STRANGER:  Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one
+another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he
+receives from the king and legislator,--showing his own peculiar virtue
+only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or by
+any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with one
+another contrary to the appointment of the legislator?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  No; his office is such as you describe.
+
+STRANGER:  Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal,
+but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the royal
+power?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is
+political or royal.  For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to
+rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and
+what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters of
+the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they have
+no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them concerned
+with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to have, special
+names corresponding to their several actions.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I agree.
+
+STRANGER:  And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the
+laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them all
+into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their common
+nature, most truly we may call politics.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Exactly so.
+
+STRANGER:  Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a
+State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving supplied?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I greatly wish that you would.
+
+STRANGER:  Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how
+the various threads are woven into one piece.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Clearly.
+
+STRANGER:  A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult,
+appears to be necessary.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly the attempt must be made.
+
+STRANGER:  To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another,
+is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who appeal to
+popular opinion.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I do not understand.
+
+STRANGER:  Let me put the matter in another way:  I suppose that you would
+consider courage to be a part of virtue?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly I should.
+
+STRANGER:  And you would think temperance to be different from courage;
+and likewise to be a part of virtue?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is it?
+
+STRANGER:  That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another
+and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How singular!
+
+STRANGER:  Yes, very--for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be
+friendly to one another.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes.
+
+STRANGER:  Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally
+true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with their
+kindred in some respect.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Tell me how we shall consider that question.
+
+STRANGER:  We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we consider
+beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Explain; what are they?
+
+STRANGER:  Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the
+movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music
+supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when
+others praised them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I do not.
+
+STRANGER:  I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought which
+is passing in my mind.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Why not?
+
+STRANGER:  You fancy that this is all so easy:  Well, let us consider these
+notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which they
+fall.  When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness, whether of mind
+or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality which we admire by
+one word, and that one word is manliness or courage.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How?
+
+STRANGER:  We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly,
+and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the common
+attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To be sure.
+
+STRANGER:  And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the
+other?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow
+and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in
+action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement
+and of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity.  Of all such
+actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place,
+the names of either are changed into terms of censure.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How so?
+
+STRANGER:  Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence
+or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or
+sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part these qualities,
+and the temperance and manliness of the opposite characters, are arrayed as
+enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their
+respective actions; and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that men
+who have these different qualities of mind differ from one another.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  In what respect?
+
+STRANGER:  In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very
+likely of many others.  According to their respective affinities to either
+class of actions they distribute praise and blame,--praise to the actions
+which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite party--and out
+of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise among them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  The difference between the two classes is often a trivial
+concern; but in a state, and when affecting really important matters,
+becomes of all disorders the most hateful.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To what do you refer?
+
+STRANGER:  To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life.  For the
+orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly doing their
+own business; this is their manner of behaving with all men at home, and
+they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the peace with foreign
+States.  And on account of this fondness of theirs for peace, which is
+often out of season where their influence prevails, they become by degrees
+unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like themselves; they are at
+the mercy of their enemies; whence in a few years they and their children
+and the whole city often pass imperceptibly from the condition of freemen
+into that of slaves.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What a cruel fate!
+
+STRANGER:  And now think of what happens with the more courageous natures. 
+Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing to their
+excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies against
+themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their native-land or
+enslave and subject it to its foes?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That, again, is true.
+
+STRANGER:  Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist,
+they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one
+another?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  We cannot deny it.
+
+STRANGER:  And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have we not
+found that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one
+another, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are
+endowed with them?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  True.
+
+STRANGER:  Let us consider a further point.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  What is it?
+
+STRANGER:  I want to know, whether any constructive art will make any, even
+the most trivial thing, out of bad and good materials indifferently, if
+this can be helped? does not all art rather reject the bad as far as
+possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and from these elements,
+whether like or unlike, gathering them all into one, work out some nature
+or idea?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  To, be sure.
+
+STRANGER:  Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never allow
+any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this can be
+avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play, and after testing
+them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are the ministers of her
+purposes--she will herself give orders, and maintain authority; just as the
+art of weaving continually gives orders and maintains authority over the
+carders and all the others who prepare the material for the work,
+commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the works which she deems
+necessary for making the web.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Quite true.
+
+STRANGER:  In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the
+mistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this queenly
+power, will not permit them to train men in what will produce characters
+unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to create, but
+only in what will produce such as are suitable.  Those which have no share
+of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous inclination, and, from
+the necessity of an evil nature, are violently carried away to godlessness
+and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of by death and exile, and
+punishes them with the greatest of disgraces.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That is commonly said.
+
+STRANGER:  But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows
+under the yoke of slavery.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Quite right.
+
+STRANGER:  The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education,
+something noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the
+statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one
+hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger
+element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which
+incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as
+spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof--these, which are
+naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the following
+manner:
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  In what manner?
+
+STRANGER:  First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and
+binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal
+nature, and binds that with human cords.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  I do not understand what you mean.
+
+STRANGER:  The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and the
+just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed by reason,
+is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is implanted, as I
+maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Yes; what else should it be?
+
+STRANGER:  Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the
+inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he, only in
+the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Likely enough.
+
+STRANGER:  But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names
+which are the subject of the present enquiry.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very right.
+
+STRANGER:  The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes civilized,
+and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when not partaking,
+is inclined to brutality.  Is not that true?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly.
+
+STRANGER:  And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these
+opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a State, but
+if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Quite true.
+
+STRANGER:  Can we say that such a connexion as this will lastingly unite
+the evil with one another or with the good, or that any science would
+seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Impossible.
+
+STRANGER:  But in those who were originally of a noble nature, and who have
+been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we not say that union
+is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art prescribes for
+them, and of all the bonds which unite the dissimilar and contrary parts of
+virtue is not this, as I was saying, the divinest?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Very true.
+
+STRANGER:  Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in
+imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other bonds, which
+are human only.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How is that, and what bonds do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  Rights of intermarriage, and ties which are formed between
+States by giving and taking children in marriage, or between individuals by
+private betrothals and espousals.  For most persons form marriage
+connexions without due regard to what is best for the procreation of
+children.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  In what way?
+
+STRANGER:  They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony are objects
+not worthy even of a serious censure.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  There is no need to consider them at all.
+
+STRANGER:  More reason is there to consider the practice of those who make
+family their chief aim, and to indicate their error.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Quite true.
+
+STRANGER:  They act on no true principle at all; they seek their ease and
+receive with open arms those who are like themselves, and hate those who
+are unlike them, being too much influenced by feelings of dislike.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How so?
+
+STRANGER:  The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own, and as
+far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this class,
+and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their own, whereas
+they should both do precisely the opposite.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How and why is that?
+
+STRANGER:  Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during
+many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts
+forth into downright madness.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Like enough.
+
+STRANGER:  And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and has
+no element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow too
+indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  That, again, is quite likely.
+
+STRANGER:  It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty
+in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion
+about the honourable and good;--indeed, in this single work, the whole
+process of royal weaving is comprised--never to allow temperate natures to
+be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and
+the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, and by the
+giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and
+even web, to entrust to them the offices of State.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  How do you mean?
+
+STRANGER:  Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who
+has both these qualities--when many, you must mingle some of each, for the
+temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is wanting in
+thoroughness and go.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly, that is very true.
+
+STRANGER:  The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls short
+of the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action in a
+remarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is wanting,
+there cities cannot altogether prosper either in their public or private
+life.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Certainly they cannot.
+
+STRANGER:  This then we declare to be the completion of the web of
+political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave
+and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two minds
+into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and having
+perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life admits,
+and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or
+freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, and,
+in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no particular fails to
+secure their happiness.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES:  Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less
+than of the Sophist, is quite perfect.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Statesman by Plato
+
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