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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Statesman, by Plato
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Statesman
+
+Author: Plato
+
+Translator: Benjamin Jowett
+
+Posting Date: November 7, 2008 [EBook #1738]
+Release Date: May, 1999
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK STATESMAN ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sue Asscher
+
+
+
+
+
+STATESMAN
+
+By Plato
+
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.
+
+In the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Parmenides, and the
+Sophist, we may observe the tendency of Plato to combine two or more
+subjects or different aspects of the same subject in a single dialogue.
+In the Sophist and Statesman especially we note that the discussion is
+partly regarded as an illustration of method, and that analogies are
+brought from afar which throw light on the main subject. And in his
+later writings generally we further remark a decline of style, and of
+dramatic power; the characters excite little or no interest, and
+the digressions are apt to overlay the main thesis; there is not the
+'callida junctura' of an artistic whole. Both the serious discussions
+and the jests are sometimes out of place. The invincible Socrates is
+withdrawn from view; and new foes begin to appear under old names. Plato
+is now chiefly concerned, not with the original Sophist, but with the
+sophistry of the schools of philosophy, which are making reasoning
+impossible; and is driven by them out of the regions of transcendental
+speculation back into the path of common sense. A logical or
+psychological phase takes the place of the doctrine of Ideas in
+his mind. He is constantly dwelling on the importance of regular
+classification, and of not putting words in the place of things. He has
+banished the poets, and is beginning to use a technical language. He is
+bitter and satirical, and seems to be sadly conscious of the realities
+of human life. Yet the ideal glory of the Platonic philosophy is not
+extinguished. He is still looking for a city in which kings are either
+philosophers or gods (compare Laws).
+
+The Statesman has lost the grace and beauty of the earlier dialogues.
+The mind of the writer seems to be so overpowered in the effort of
+thought as to impair his style; at least his gift of expression does
+not keep up with the increasing difficulty of his theme. The idea of the
+king or statesman and the illustration of method are connected, not like
+the love and rhetoric of the Phaedrus, by 'little invisible pegs,'
+but in a confused and inartistic manner, which fails to produce any
+impression of a whole on the mind of the reader. Plato apologizes for
+his tediousness, and acknowledges that the improvement of his audience
+has been his only aim in some of his digressions. His own image may be
+used as a motto of his style: like an inexpert statuary he has made the
+figure or outline too large, and is unable to give the proper colours
+or proportions to his work. He makes mistakes only to correct them--this
+seems to be his way of drawing attention to common dialectical errors.
+The Eleatic stranger, here, as in the Sophist, has no appropriate
+character, and appears only as the expositor of a political ideal, in
+the delineation of which he is frequently interrupted by purely logical
+illustrations. The younger Socrates resembles his namesake in nothing
+but a name. The dramatic character is so completely forgotten, that a
+special reference is twice made to discussions in the Sophist; and this,
+perhaps, is the strongest ground which can be urged for doubting the
+genuineness of the work. But, when we remember that a similar allusion
+is made in the Laws to the Republic, we see that the entire disregard
+of dramatic propriety is not always a sufficient reason for doubting the
+genuineness of a Platonic writing.
+
+The search after the Statesman, which is carried on, like that for
+the Sophist, by the method of dichotomy, gives an opportunity for many
+humorous and satirical remarks. Several of the jests are mannered and
+laboured: for example, the turn of words with which the dialogue
+opens; or the clumsy joke about man being an animal, who has a power
+of two-feet--both which are suggested by the presence of Theodorus, the
+geometrician. There is political as well as logical insight in refusing
+to admit the division of mankind into Hellenes and Barbarians: 'if a
+crane could speak, he would in like manner oppose men and all other
+animals to cranes.' The pride of the Hellene is further humbled,
+by being compared to a Phrygian or Lydian. Plato glories in this
+impartiality of the dialectical method, which places birds in
+juxtaposition with men, and the king side by side with the bird-catcher;
+king or vermin-destroyer are objects of equal interest to science
+(compare Parmen.). There are other passages which show that the irony
+of Socrates was a lesson which Plato was not slow in learning--as, for
+example, the passing remark, that 'the kings and statesmen of our day
+are in their breeding and education very like their subjects;' or the
+anticipation that the rivals of the king will be found in the class
+of servants; or the imposing attitude of the priests, who are the
+established interpreters of the will of heaven, authorized by law.
+Nothing is more bitter in all his writings than his comparison of the
+contemporary politicians to lions, centaurs, satyrs, and other animals
+of a feebler sort, who are ever changing their forms and natures. But,
+as in the later dialogues generally, the play of humour and the charm of
+poetry have departed, never to return.
+
+Still the Politicus contains a higher and more ideal conception of
+politics than any other of Plato's writings. The city of which there
+is a pattern in heaven (Republic), is here described as a Paradisiacal
+state of human society. In the truest sense of all, the ruler is not
+man but God; and such a government existed in a former cycle of human
+history, and may again exist when the gods resume their care of mankind.
+In a secondary sense, the true form of government is that which has
+scientific rulers, who are irresponsible to their subjects. Not power
+but knowledge is the characteristic of a king or royal person. And the
+rule of a man is better and higher than law, because he is more able
+to deal with the infinite complexity of human affairs. But mankind, in
+despair of finding a true ruler, are willing to acquiesce in any law or
+custom which will save them from the caprice of individuals. They are
+ready to accept any of the six forms of government which prevail in the
+world. To the Greek, nomos was a sacred word, but the political idealism
+of Plato soars into a region beyond; for the laws he would substitute
+the intelligent will of the legislator. Education is originally to
+implant in men's minds a sense of truth and justice, which is the divine
+bond of states, and the legislator is to contrive human bonds, by which
+dissimilar natures may be united in marriage and supply the deficiencies
+of one another. As in the Republic, the government of philosophers, the
+causes of the perversion of states, the regulation of marriages, are
+still the political problems with which Plato's mind is occupied. He
+treats them more slightly, partly because the dialogue is shorter, and
+also because the discussion of them is perpetually crossed by the other
+interest of dialectic, which has begun to absorb him.
+
+The plan of the Politicus or Statesman may be briefly sketched as
+follows: (1) By a process of division and subdivision we discover the
+true herdsman or king of men. But before we can rightly distinguish him
+from his rivals, we must view him, (2) as he is presented to us in a
+famous ancient tale: the tale will also enable us to distinguish the
+divine from the human herdsman or shepherd: (3) and besides our fable,
+we must have an example; for our example we will select the art of
+weaving, which will have to be distinguished from the kindred arts;
+and then, following this pattern, we will separate the king from his
+subordinates or competitors. (4) But are we not exceeding all due
+limits; and is there not a measure of all arts and sciences, to which
+the art of discourse must conform? There is; but before we can apply
+this measure, we must know what is the aim of discourse: and our
+discourse only aims at the dialectical improvement of ourselves and
+others.--Having made our apology, we return once more to the king or
+statesman, and proceed to contrast him with pretenders in the same
+line with him, under their various forms of government. (5) His
+characteristic is, that he alone has science, which is superior to law
+and written enactments; these do but spring out of the necessities of
+mankind, when they are in despair of finding the true king. (6) The
+sciences which are most akin to the royal are the sciences of the
+general, the judge, the orator, which minister to him, but even these
+are subordinate to him. (7) Fixed principles are implanted by education,
+and the king or statesman completes the political web by marrying
+together dissimilar natures, the courageous and the temperate, the bold
+and the gentle, who are the warp and the woof of society.
+
+The outline may be filled up as follows:--
+
+SOCRATES: I have reason to thank you, Theodorus, for the acquaintance of
+Theaetetus and the Stranger.
+
+THEODORUS: And you will have three times as much reason to thank me
+when they have delineated the Statesman and Philosopher, as well as the
+Sophist.
+
+SOCRATES: Does the great geometrician apply the same measure to all
+three? Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical ratio
+can express?
+
+THEODORUS: By the god Ammon, Socrates, you are right; and I am glad to
+see that you have not forgotten your geometry. But before I retaliate on
+you, I must request the Stranger to finish the argument...
+
+The Stranger suggests that Theaetetus shall be allowed to rest, and that
+Socrates the younger shall respond in his place; Theodorus agrees to the
+suggestion, and Socrates remarks that the name of the one and the face
+of the other give him a right to claim relationship with both of them.
+They propose to take the Statesman after the Sophist; his path they
+must determine, and part off all other ways, stamping upon them a single
+negative form (compare Soph.).
+
+The Stranger begins the enquiry by making a division of the arts and
+sciences into theoretical and practical--the one kind concerned with
+knowledge exclusively, and the other with action; arithmetic and the
+mathematical sciences are examples of the former, and carpentering and
+handicraft arts of the latter (compare Philebus). Under which of the two
+shall we place the Statesman? Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether
+the king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many? As
+the adviser of a physician may be said to have medical science and to be
+a physician, so the adviser of a king has royal science and is a king.
+And the master of a large household may be compared to the ruler of a
+small state. Hence we conclude that the science of the king, statesman,
+and householder is one and the same. And this science is akin to
+knowledge rather than to action. For a king rules with his mind, and not
+with his hands.
+
+But theoretical science may be a science either of judging, like
+arithmetic, or of ruling and superintending, like that of the architect
+or master-builder. And the science of the king is of the latter nature;
+but the power which he exercises is underived and uncontrolled,--a
+characteristic which distinguishes him from heralds, prophets, and
+other inferior officers. He is the wholesale dealer in command, and the
+herald, or other officer, retails his commands to others. Again, a ruler
+is concerned with the production of some object, and objects may be
+divided into living and lifeless, and rulers into the rulers of living
+and lifeless objects. And the king is not like the master-builder,
+concerned with lifeless matter, but has the task of managing living
+animals. And the tending of living animals may be either a tending of
+individuals, or a managing of herds. And the Statesman is not a groom,
+but a herdsman, and his art may be called either the art of managing
+a herd, or the art of collective management:--Which do you prefer? 'No
+matter.' Very good, Socrates, and if you are not too particular about
+words you will be all the richer some day in true wisdom. But how would
+you subdivide the herdsman's art? 'I should say, that there is one
+management of men, and another of beasts.' Very good, but you are in too
+great a hurry to get to man. All divisions which are rightly made should
+cut through the middle; if you attend to this rule, you will be more
+likely to arrive at classes. 'I do not understand the nature of my
+mistake.' Your division was like a division of the human race into
+Hellenes and Barbarians, or into Lydians or Phrygians and all other
+nations, instead of into male and female; or like a division of number
+into ten thousand and all other numbers, instead of into odd and even.
+And I should like you to observe further, that though I maintain a class
+to be a part, there is no similar necessity for a part to be a class.
+But to return to your division, you spoke of men and other animals as
+two classes--the second of which you comprehended under the general name
+of beasts. This is the sort of division which an intelligent crane would
+make: he would put cranes into a class by themselves for their special
+glory, and jumble together all others, including man, in the class of
+beasts. An error of this kind can only be avoided by a more regular
+subdivision. Just now we divided the whole class of animals into
+gregarious and non-gregarious, omitting the previous division into tame
+and wild. We forgot this in our hurry to arrive at man, and found by
+experience, as the proverb says, that 'the more haste the worse speed.'
+
+And now let us begin again at the art of managing herds. You have
+probably heard of the fish-preserves in the Nile and in the ponds of the
+Great King, and of the nurseries of geese and cranes in Thessaly. These
+suggest a new division into the rearing or management of land-herds and
+of water-herds:--I need not say with which the king is concerned. And
+land-herds may be divided into walking and flying; and every idiot knows
+that the political animal is a pedestrian. At this point we may take a
+longer or a shorter road, and as we are already near the end, I see no
+harm in taking the longer, which is the way of mesotomy, and accords
+with the principle which we were laying down. The tame, walking, herding
+animal, may be divided into two classes--the horned and the hornless,
+and the king is concerned with the hornless; and these again may be
+subdivided into animals having or not having cloven feet, or mixing or
+not mixing the breed; and the king or statesman has the care of animals
+which have not cloven feet, and which do not mix the breed. And now, if
+we omit dogs, who can hardly be said to herd, I think that we have only
+two species left which remain undivided: and how are we to distinguish
+them? To geometricians, like you and Theaetetus, I can have no
+difficulty in explaining that man is a diameter, having a power of two
+feet; and the power of four-legged creatures, being the double of two
+feet, is the diameter of our diameter. There is another excellent jest
+which I spy in the two remaining species. Men and birds are both bipeds,
+and human beings are running a race with the airiest and freest of
+creation, in which they are far behind their competitors;--this is a
+great joke, and there is a still better in the juxtaposition of the
+bird-taker and the king, who may be seen scampering after them. For,
+as we remarked in discussing the Sophist, the dialectical method is no
+respecter of persons. But we might have proceeded, as I was saying,
+by another and a shorter road. In that case we should have begun by
+dividing land animals into bipeds and quadrupeds, and bipeds into winged
+and wingless; we should than have taken the Statesman and set him over
+the 'bipes implume,' and put the reins of government into his hands.
+
+Here let us sum up:--The science of pure knowledge had a part which
+was the science of command, and this had a part which was a science of
+wholesale command; and this was divided into the management of animals,
+and was again parted off into the management of herds of animals, and
+again of land animals, and these into hornless, and these into bipeds;
+and so at last we arrived at man, and found the political and royal
+science. And yet we have not clearly distinguished the political
+shepherd from his rivals. No one would think of usurping the
+prerogatives of the ordinary shepherd, who on all hands is admitted to
+be the trainer, matchmaker, doctor, musician of his flock. But the royal
+shepherd has numberless competitors, from whom he must be distinguished;
+there are merchants, husbandmen, physicians, who will all dispute his
+right to manage the flock. I think that we can best distinguish him by
+having recourse to a famous old tradition, which may amuse as well as
+instruct us; the narrative is perfectly true, although the scepticism of
+mankind is prone to doubt the tales of old. You have heard what happened
+in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes? 'You mean about the golden lamb?'
+No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the sun
+and stars once arose in the west and set in the east, and that the god
+reversed their motion, as a witness to the right of Atreus. 'There is
+such a story.' And no doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos, and
+of the earthborn men? The origin of these and the like stories is to be
+found in the tale which I am about to narrate.
+
+There was a time when God directed the revolutions of the world, but
+at the completion of a certain cycle he let go; and the world, by a
+necessity of its nature, turned back, and went round the other way.
+For divine things alone are unchangeable; but the earth and heavens,
+although endowed with many glories, have a body, and are therefore
+liable to perturbation. In the case of the world, the perturbation is
+very slight, and amounts only to a reversal of motion. For the lord of
+moving things is alone self-moved; neither can piety allow that he goes
+at one time in one direction and at another time in another; or that God
+has given the universe opposite motions; or that there are two gods, one
+turning it in one direction, another in another. But the truth is, that
+there are two cycles of the world, and in one of them it is governed by
+an immediate Providence, and receives life and immortality, and in the
+other is let go again, and has a reverse action during infinite ages.
+This new action is spontaneous, and is due to exquisite perfection of
+balance, to the vast size of the universe, and to the smallness of the
+pivot upon which it turns. All changes in the heaven affect the animal
+world, and this being the greatest of them, is most destructive to men
+and animals. At the beginning of the cycle before our own very few of
+them had survived; and on these a mighty change passed. For their life
+was reversed like the motion of the world, and first of all coming to a
+stand then quickly returned to youth and beauty. The white locks of the
+aged became black; the cheeks of the bearded man were restored to their
+youth and fineness; the young men grew softer and smaller, and, being
+reduced to the condition of children in mind as well as body, began to
+vanish away; and the bodies of those who had died by violence, in a few
+moments underwent a parallel change and disappeared. In that cycle of
+existence there was no such thing as the procreation of animals from one
+another, but they were born of the earth, and of this our ancestors, who
+came into being immediately after the end of the last cycle and at the
+beginning of this, have preserved the recollection. Such traditions are
+often now unduly discredited, and yet they may be proved by internal
+evidence. For observe how consistent the narrative is; as the old
+returned to youth, so the dead returned to life; the wheel of their
+existence having been reversed, they rose again from the earth: a few
+only were reserved by God for another destiny. Such was the origin of
+the earthborn men.
+
+'And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos,
+or our present state of existence?' No, Socrates, that blessed and
+spontaneous life belongs not to this, but to the previous state, in
+which God was the governor of the whole world, and other gods subject
+to him ruled over parts of the world, as is still the case in certain
+places. They were shepherds of men and animals, each of them sufficing
+for those of whom he had the care. And there was no violence among them,
+or war, or devouring of one another. Their life was spontaneous, because
+in those days God ruled over man; and he was to man what man is now
+to the animals. Under his government there were no estates, or private
+possessions, or families; but the earth produced a sufficiency of all
+things, and men were born out of the earth, having no traditions of
+the past; and as the temperature of the seasons was mild, they took no
+thought for raiment, and had no beds, but lived and dwelt in the open
+air.
+
+Such was the age of Cronos, and the age of Zeus is our own. Tell me,
+which is the happier of the two? Or rather, shall I tell you that the
+happiness of these children of Cronos must have depended on how
+they used their time? If having boundless leisure, and the power of
+discoursing not only with one another but with the animals, they had
+employed these advantages with a view to philosophy, gathering from
+every nature some addition to their store of knowledge;--or again, if
+they had merely eaten and drunk, and told stories to one another, and
+to the beasts;--in either case, I say, there would be no difficulty in
+answering the question. But as nobody knows which they did, the question
+must remain unanswered. And here is the point of my tale. In the fulness
+of time, when the earthborn men had all passed away, the ruler of
+the universe let go the helm, and became a spectator; and destiny and
+natural impulse swayed the world. At the same instant all the inferior
+deities gave up their hold; the whole universe rebounded, and there was
+a great earthquake, and utter ruin of all manner of animals. After a
+while the tumult ceased, and the universal creature settled down in
+his accustomed course, having authority over all other creatures,
+and following the instructions of his God and Father, at first more
+precisely, afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off
+was the disengagement of a former chaos; 'a muddy vesture of decay'
+was a part of his original nature, out of which he was brought by his
+Creator, under whose immediate guidance, while he remained in that
+former cycle, the evil was minimized and the good increased to the
+utmost. And in the beginning of the new cycle all was well enough, but
+as time went on, discord entered in; at length the good was minimized
+and the evil everywhere diffused, and there was a danger of universal
+ruin. Then the Creator, seeing the world in great straits, and fearing
+that chaos and infinity would come again, in his tender care again
+placed himself at the helm and restored order, and made the world
+immortal and imperishable. Once more the cycle of life and generation
+was reversed; the infants grew into young men, and the young men became
+greyheaded; no longer did the animals spring out of the earth; as the
+whole world was now lord of its own progress, so the parts were to
+be self-created and self-nourished. At first the case of men was very
+helpless and pitiable; for they were alone among the wild beasts, and
+had to carry on the struggle for existence without arts or knowledge,
+and had no food, and did not know how to get any. That was the time when
+Prometheus brought them fire, Hephaestus and Athene taught them arts,
+and other gods gave them seeds and plants. Out of these human life was
+framed; for mankind were left to themselves, and ordered their own ways,
+living, like the universe, in one cycle after one manner, and in another
+cycle after another manner.
+
+Enough of the myth, which may show us two errors of which we were guilty
+in our account of the king. The first and grand error was in choosing
+for our king a god, who belongs to the other cycle, instead of a man
+from our own; there was a lesser error also in our failure to define
+the nature of the royal functions. The myth gave us only the image of
+a divine shepherd, whereas the statesmen and kings of our own day very
+much resemble their subjects in education and breeding. On retracing our
+steps we find that we gave too narrow a designation to the art which was
+concerned with command-for-self over living creatures, when we called it
+the 'feeding' of animals in flocks. This would apply to all shepherds,
+with the exception of the Statesman; but if we say 'managing' or
+'tending' animals, the term would include him as well. Having remodelled
+the name, we may subdivide as before, first separating the human from
+the divine shepherd or manager. Then we may subdivide the human art of
+governing into the government of willing and unwilling subjects--royalty
+and tyranny--which are the extreme opposites of one another, although we
+in our simplicity have hitherto confounded them.
+
+And yet the figure of the king is still defective. We have taken up a
+lump of fable, and have used more than we needed. Like statuaries, we
+have made some of the features out of proportion, and shall lose time in
+reducing them. Or our mythus may be compared to a picture, which is well
+drawn in outline, but is not yet enlivened by colour. And to intelligent
+persons language is, or ought to be, a better instrument of description
+than any picture. 'But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you
+speak?' No higher truth can be made clear without an example; every
+man seems to know all things in a dream, and to know nothing when he is
+awake. And the nature of example can only be illustrated by an example.
+Children are taught to read by being made to compare cases in which they
+do not know a certain letter with cases in which they know it, until
+they learn to recognize it in all its combinations. Example comes into
+use when we identify something unknown with that which is known, and
+form a common notion of both of them. Like the child who is learning his
+letters, the soul recognizes some of the first elements of things;
+and then again is at fault and unable to recognize them when they are
+translated into the difficult language of facts. Let us, then, take
+an example, which will illustrate the nature of example, and will also
+assist us in characterizing the political science, and in separating the
+true king from his rivals.
+
+I will select the example of weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of
+wool. In the first place, all possessions are either productive or
+preventive; of the preventive sort are spells and antidotes, divine and
+human, and also defences, and defences are either arms or screens, and
+screens are veils and also shields against heat and cold, and shields
+against heat and cold are shelters and coverings, and coverings are
+blankets or garments, and garments are in one piece or have many parts;
+and of these latter, some are stitched and others are fastened, and of
+these again some are made of fibres of plants and some of hair, and of
+these some are cemented with water and earth, and some are fastened with
+their own material; the latter are called clothes, and are made by the
+art of clothing, from which the art of weaving differs only in name, as
+the political differs from the royal science. Thus we have drawn several
+distinctions, but as yet have not distinguished the weaving of garments
+from the kindred and co-operative arts. For the first process to which
+the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving--I mean carding.
+And the art of carding, and the whole art of the fuller and the mender,
+are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes, as well as
+the art of weaving. Again, there are the arts which make the weaver's
+tools. And if we say that the weaver's art is the greatest and noblest
+of those which have to do with woollen garments,--this, although true,
+is not sufficiently distinct; because these other arts require to be
+first cleared away. Let us proceed, then, by regular steps:--There are
+causal or principal, and co-operative or subordinate arts. To the causal
+class belong the arts of washing and mending, of carding and spinning
+the threads, and the other arts of working in wool; these are chiefly
+of two kinds, falling under the two great categories of composition and
+division. Carding is of the latter sort. But our concern is chiefly with
+that part of the art of wool-working which composes, and of which one
+kind twists and the other interlaces the threads, whether the firmer
+texture of the warp or the looser texture of the woof. These are adapted
+to each other, and the orderly composition of them forms a woollen
+garment. And the art which presides over these operations is the art of
+weaving.
+
+But why did we go through this circuitous process, instead of saying
+at once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof? In
+order that our labour may not seem to be lost, I must explain the whole
+nature of excess and defect. There are two arts of measuring--one is
+concerned with relative size, and the other has reference to a mean or
+standard of what is meet. The difference between good and evil is the
+difference between a mean or measure and excess or defect. All things
+require to be compared, not only with one another, but with the mean,
+without which there would be no beauty and no art, whether the art of
+the statesman or the art of weaving or any other; for all the arts guard
+against excess or defect, which are real evils. This we must endeavour
+to show, if the arts are to exist; and the proof of this will be
+a harder piece of work than the demonstration of the existence of
+not-being which we proved in our discussion about the Sophist. At
+present I am content with the indirect proof that the existence of such
+a standard is necessary to the existence of the arts. The standard or
+measure, which we are now only applying to the arts, may be some day
+required with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth.
+
+We may now divide this art of measurement into two parts; placing in
+the one part all the arts which measure the relative size or number
+of objects, and in the other all those which depend upon a mean or
+standard. Many accomplished men say that the art of measurement has to
+do with all things, but these persons, although in this notion of theirs
+they may very likely be right, are apt to fail in seeing the differences
+of classes--they jumble together in one the 'more' and the 'too much,'
+which are very different things. Whereas the right way is to find the
+differences of classes, and to comprehend the things which have any
+affinity under the same class.
+
+I will make one more observation by the way. When a pupil at a school is
+asked the letters which make up a particular word, is he not asked with
+a view to his knowing the same letters in all words? And our enquiry
+about the Statesman in like manner is intended not only to improve our
+knowledge of politics, but our reasoning powers generally. Still less
+would any one analyze the nature of weaving for its own sake. There
+is no difficulty in exhibiting sensible images, but the greatest and
+noblest truths have no outward form adapted to the eye of sense, and are
+only revealed in thought. And all that we are now saying is said for the
+sake of them. I make these remarks, because I want you to get rid of any
+impression that our discussion about weaving and about the reversal of
+the universe, and the other discussion about the Sophist and not-being,
+were tedious and irrelevant. Please to observe that they can only be
+fairly judged when compared with what is meet; and yet not with what is
+meet for producing pleasure, nor even meet for making discoveries, but
+for the great end of developing the dialectical method and sharpening
+the wits of the auditors. He who censures us, should prove that, if our
+words had been fewer, they would have been better calculated to make men
+dialecticians.
+
+And now let us return to our king or statesman, and transfer to him the
+example of weaving. The royal art has been separated from that of other
+herdsmen, but not from the causal and co-operative arts which exist
+in states; these do not admit of dichotomy, and therefore they must be
+carved neatly, like the limbs of a victim, not into more parts than are
+necessary. And first (1) we have the large class of instruments, which
+includes almost everything in the world; from these may be parted off
+(2) vessels which are framed for the preservation of things, moist or
+dry, prepared in the fire or out of the fire. The royal or political art
+has nothing to do with either of these, any more than with the arts
+of making (3) vehicles, or (4) defences, whether dresses, or arms, or
+walls, or (5) with the art of making ornaments, whether pictures or
+other playthings, as they may be fitly called, for they have no serious
+use. Then (6) there are the arts which furnish gold, silver, wood, bark,
+and other materials, which should have been put first; these, again,
+have no concern with the kingly science; any more than the arts (7)
+which provide food and nourishment for the human body, and which furnish
+occupation to the husbandman, huntsman, doctor, cook, and the like, but
+not to the king or statesman. Further, there are small things, such as
+coins, seals, stamps, which may with a little violence be comprehended
+in one of the above-mentioned classes. Thus they will embrace every
+species of property with the exception of animals,--but these have been
+already included in the art of tending herds. There remains only the
+class of slaves or ministers, among whom I expect that the real rivals
+of the king will be discovered. I am not speaking of the veritable slave
+bought with money, nor of the hireling who lets himself out for service,
+nor of the trader or merchant, who at best can only lay claim to
+economical and not to royal science. Nor am I referring to government
+officials, such as heralds and scribes, for these are only the servants
+of the rulers, and not the rulers themselves. I admit that there may be
+something strange in any servants pretending to be masters, but I hardly
+think that I could have been wrong in supposing that the principal
+claimants to the throne will be of this class. Let us try once more:
+There are diviners and priests, who are full of pride and prerogative;
+these, as the law declares, know how to give acceptable gifts to
+the gods, and in many parts of Hellas the duty of performing solemn
+sacrifices is assigned to the chief magistrate, as at Athens to the
+King Archon. At last, then, we have found a trace of those whom we were
+seeking. But still they are only servants and ministers.
+
+And who are these who next come into view in various forms of men and
+animals and other monsters appearing--lions and centaurs and satyrs--who
+are these? I did not know them at first, for every one looks strange
+when he is unexpected. But now I recognize the politician and his troop,
+the chief of Sophists, the prince of charlatans, the most accomplished
+of wizards, who must be carefully distinguished from the true king or
+statesman. And here I will interpose a question: What are the true forms
+of government? Are they not three--monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy?
+and the distinctions of freedom and compulsion, law and no law, poverty
+and riches expand these three into six. Monarchy may be divided into
+royalty and tyranny; oligarchy into aristocracy and plutocracy; and
+democracy may observe the law or may not observe it. But are any of
+these governments worthy of the name? Is not government a science, and
+are we to suppose that scientific government is secured by the rulers
+being many or few, rich or poor, or by the rule being compulsory or
+voluntary? Can the many attain to science? In no Hellenic city are there
+fifty good draught players, and certainly there are not as many kings,
+for by kings we mean all those who are possessed of the political
+science. A true government must therefore be the government of one, or
+of a few. And they may govern us either with or without law, and whether
+they are poor or rich, and however they govern, provided they govern on
+some scientific principle,--it makes no difference. And as the physician
+may cure us with our will, or against our will, and by any mode of
+treatment, burning, bleeding, lowering, fattening, if he only proceeds
+scientifically: so the true governor may reduce or fatten or bleed the
+body corporate, while he acts according to the rules of his art, and
+with a view to the good of the state, whether according to law or
+without law.
+
+'I do not like the notion, that there can be good government without
+law.'
+
+I must explain: Law-making certainly is the business of a king; and yet
+the best thing of all is, not that the law should rule, but that the
+king should rule, for the varieties of circumstances are endless, and no
+simple or universal rule can suit them all, or last for ever. The law is
+just an ignorant brute of a tyrant, who insists always on his commands
+being fulfilled under all circumstances. 'Then why have we laws at all?'
+I will answer that question by asking you whether the training master
+gives a different discipline to each of his pupils, or whether he has a
+general rule of diet and exercise which is suited to the constitutions
+of the majority? 'The latter.' The legislator, too, is obliged to lay
+down general laws, and cannot enact what is precisely suitable to each
+particular case. He cannot be sitting at every man's side all his life,
+and prescribe for him the minute particulars of his duty, and therefore
+he is compelled to impose on himself and others the restriction of a
+written law. Let me suppose now, that a physician or trainer, having
+left directions for his patients or pupils, goes into a far country, and
+comes back sooner than he intended; owing to some unexpected change in
+the weather, the patient or pupil seems to require a different mode of
+treatment: Would he persist in his old commands, under the idea that all
+others are noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science,
+would not the continuance of such regulations be ridiculous? And if the
+legislator, or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to
+be prohibited from altering his own laws? The common people say: Let a
+man persuade the city first, and then let him impose new laws. But is a
+physician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force? Is
+he a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the
+cure? Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich
+man, and unjust, if by a poor man? May not any man, rich or poor, with
+or without law, and whether the citizens like or not, do what is for
+their good? The pilot saves the lives of the crew, not by laying down
+rules, but by making his art a law, and, like him, the true governor
+has a strength of art which is superior to the law. This is scientific
+government, and all others are imitations only. Yet no great number
+of persons can attain to this science. And hence follows an important
+result. The true political principle is to assert the inviolability
+of the law, which, though not the best thing possible, is best for the
+imperfect condition of man.
+
+I will explain my meaning by an illustration:--Suppose that mankind,
+indignant at the rogueries and caprices of physicians and pilots, call
+together an assembly, in which all who like may speak, the skilled as
+well as the unskilled, and that in their assembly they make decrees
+for regulating the practice of navigation and medicine which are to
+be binding on these professions for all time. Suppose that they elect
+annually by vote or lot those to whom authority in either department is
+to be delegated. And let us further imagine, that when the term of their
+magistracy has expired, the magistrates appointed by them are summoned
+before an ignorant and unprofessional court, and may be condemned and
+punished for breaking the regulations. They even go a step further, and
+enact, that he who is found enquiring into the truth of navigation and
+medicine, and is seeking to be wise above what is written, shall be
+called not an artist, but a dreamer, a prating Sophist and a corruptor
+of youth; and if he try to persuade others to investigate those sciences
+in a manner contrary to the law, he shall be punished with the utmost
+severity. And like rules might be extended to any art or science. But
+what would be the consequence?
+
+'The arts would utterly perish, and human life, which is bad enough
+already, would become intolerable.'
+
+But suppose, once more, that we were to appoint some one as the guardian
+of the law, who was both ignorant and interested, and who perverted the
+law: would not this be a still worse evil than the other? 'Certainly.'
+For the laws are based on some experience and wisdom. Hence the wiser
+course is, that they should be observed, although this is not the best
+thing of all, but only the second best. And whoever, having skill,
+should try to improve them, would act in the spirit of the law-giver.
+But then, as we have seen, no great number of men, whether poor or rich,
+can be makers of laws. And so, the nearest approach to true government
+is, when men do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national
+customs. When the rich preserve their customs and maintain the law, this
+is called aristocracy, or if they neglect the law, oligarchy. When an
+individual rules according to law, whether by the help of science or
+opinion, this is called monarchy; and when he has royal science he is
+a king, whether he be so in fact or not; but when he rules in spite of
+law, and is blind with ignorance and passion, he is called a tyrant.
+These forms of government exist, because men despair of the true king
+ever appearing among them; if he were to appear, they would joyfully
+hand over to him the reins of government. But, as there is no natural
+ruler of the hive, they meet together and make laws. And do we wonder,
+when the foundation of politics is in the letter only, at the miseries
+of states? Ought we not rather to admire the strength of the political
+bond? For cities have endured the worst of evils time out of mind;
+many cities have been shipwrecked, and some are like ships foundering,
+because their pilots are absolutely ignorant of the science which they
+profess.
+
+Let us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is the least
+bad, and which of them is the worst? I said at the beginning, that each
+of the three forms of government, royalty, aristocracy, and democracy,
+might be divided into two, so that the whole number of them, including
+the best, will be seven. Under monarchy we have already distinguished
+royalty and tyranny; of oligarchy there were two kinds, aristocracy and
+plutocracy; and democracy may also be divided, for there is a democracy
+which observes, and a democracy which neglects, the laws. The government
+of one is the best and the worst--the government of a few is less bad
+and less good--the government of the many is the least bad and least
+good of them all, being the best of all lawless governments, and the
+worst of all lawful ones. But the rulers of all these states,
+unless they have knowledge, are maintainers of idols, and themselves
+idols--wizards, and also Sophists; for, after many windings, the term
+'Sophist' comes home to them.
+
+And now enough of centaurs and satyrs: the play is ended, and they
+may quit the political stage. Still there remain some other and better
+elements, which adhere to the royal science, and must be drawn off in
+the refiner's fire before the gold can become quite pure. The arts of
+the general, the judge, and the orator, will have to be separated from
+the royal art; when the separation has been made, the nature of the king
+will be unalloyed. Now there are inferior sciences, such as music and
+others; and there is a superior science, which determines whether
+music is to be learnt or not, and this is different from them, and the
+governor of them. The science which determines whether we are to use
+persuasion, or not, is higher than the art of persuasion; the science
+which determines whether we are to go to war, is higher than the art of
+the general. The science which makes the laws, is higher than that which
+only administers them. And the science which has this authority over the
+rest, is the science of the king or statesman.
+
+Once more we will endeavour to view this royal science by the light of
+our example. We may compare the state to a web, and I will show you how
+the different threads are drawn into one. You would admit--would
+you not?--that there are parts of virtue (although this position is
+sometimes assailed by Eristics), and one part of virtue is temperance,
+and another courage. These are two principles which are in a manner
+antagonistic to one another; and they pervade all nature; the whole
+class of the good and beautiful is included under them. The beautiful
+may be subdivided into two lesser classes: one of these is described
+by us in terms expressive of motion or energy, and the other in terms
+expressive of rest and quietness. We say, how manly! how vigorous! how
+ready! and we say also, how calm! how temperate! how dignified! This
+opposition of terms is extended by us to all actions, to the tones of
+the voice, the notes of music, the workings of the mind, the characters
+of men. The two classes both have their exaggerations; and the
+exaggerations of the one are termed 'hardness,' 'violence,' 'madness;'
+of the other 'cowardliness,' or 'sluggishness.' And if we pursue
+the enquiry, we find that these opposite characters are naturally at
+variance, and can hardly be reconciled. In lesser matters the antagonism
+between them is ludicrous, but in the State may be the occasion of
+grave disorders, and may disturb the whole course of human life. For
+the orderly class are always wanting to be at peace, and hence they pass
+imperceptibly into the condition of slaves; and the courageous sort are
+always wanting to go to war, even when the odds are against them, and
+are soon destroyed by their enemies. But the true art of government,
+first preparing the material by education, weaves the two elements into
+one, maintaining authority over the carders of the wool, and selecting
+the proper subsidiary arts which are necessary for making the web. The
+royal science is queen of educators, and begins by choosing the natures
+which she is to train, punishing with death and exterminating those who
+are violently carried away to atheism and injustice, and enslaving those
+who are wallowing in the mire of ignorance. The rest of the citizens she
+blends into one, combining the stronger element of courage, which we
+may call the warp, with the softer element of temperance, which we
+may imagine to be the woof. These she binds together, first taking
+the eternal elements of the honourable, the good, and the just, and
+fastening them with a divine cord in a heaven-born nature, and then
+fastening the animal elements with a human cord. The good legislator can
+implant by education the higher principles; and where they exist there
+is no difficulty in inserting the lesser human bonds, by which the State
+is held together; these are the laws of intermarriage, and of union for
+the sake of offspring. Most persons in their marriages seek after
+wealth or power; or they are clannish, and choose those who are like
+themselves,--the temperate marrying the temperate, and the courageous
+the courageous. The two classes thrive and flourish at first, but they
+soon degenerate; the one become mad, and the other feeble and useless.
+This would not have been the case, if they had both originally held
+the same notions about the honourable and the good; for then they
+never would have allowed the temperate natures to be separated from the
+courageous, but they would have bound them together by common honours
+and reputations, by intermarriages, and by the choice of rulers who
+combine both qualities. The temperate are careful and just, but are
+wanting in the power of action; the courageous fall short of them in
+justice, but in action are superior to them: and no state can prosper in
+which either of these qualities is wanting. The noblest and best of all
+webs or states is that which the royal science weaves, combining the two
+sorts of natures in a single texture, and in this enfolding freeman and
+slave and every other social element, and presiding over them all.
+
+'Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less than of the
+Sophist, is quite perfect.'
+
+...
+
+The principal subjects in the Statesman may be conveniently embraced
+under six or seven heads:--(1) the myth; (2) the dialectical interest;
+(3) the political aspects of the dialogue; (4) the satirical and
+paradoxical vein; (5) the necessary imperfection of law; (6) the
+relation of the work to the other writings of Plato; lastly (7), we may
+briefly consider the genuineness of the Sophist and Statesman, which
+can hardly be assumed without proof, since the two dialogues have
+been questioned by three such eminent Platonic scholars as Socher,
+Schaarschmidt, and Ueberweg.
+
+I. The hand of the master is clearly visible in the myth. First in the
+connection with mythology;--he wins a kind of verisimilitude for this
+as for his other myths, by adopting received traditions, of which he
+pretends to find an explanation in his own larger conception (compare
+Introduction to Critias). The young Socrates has heard of the sun rising
+in the west and setting in the east, and of the earth-born men; but he
+has never heard the origin of these remarkable phenomena. Nor is Plato,
+here or elsewhere, wanting in denunciations of the incredulity of 'this
+latter age,' on which the lovers of the marvellous have always delighted
+to enlarge. And he is not without express testimony to the truth of his
+narrative;--such testimony as, in the Timaeus, the first men gave of the
+names of the gods ('They must surely have known their own ancestors').
+For the first generation of the new cycle, who lived near the time, are
+supposed to have preserved a recollection of a previous one. He also
+appeals to internal evidence, viz. the perfect coherence of the tale,
+though he is very well aware, as he says in the Cratylus, that there may
+be consistency in error as well as in truth. The gravity and minuteness
+with which some particulars are related also lend an artful aid. The
+profound interest and ready assent of the young Socrates, who is not too
+old to be amused 'with a tale which a child would love to hear,' are a
+further assistance. To those who were naturally inclined to believe that
+the fortunes of mankind are influenced by the stars, or who maintained
+that some one principle, like the principle of the Same and the Other
+in the Timaeus, pervades all things in the world, the reversal of the
+motion of the heavens seemed necessarily to produce a reversal of the
+order of human life. The spheres of knowledge, which to us appear wide
+asunder as the poles, astronomy and medicine, were naturally connected
+in the minds of early thinkers, because there was little or nothing in
+the space between them. Thus there is a basis of philosophy, on which
+the improbabilities of the tale may be said to rest. These are some of
+the devices by which Plato, like a modern novelist, seeks to familiarize
+the marvellous.
+
+The myth, like that of the Timaeus and Critias, is rather historical
+than poetical, in this respect corresponding to the general change in
+the later writings of Plato, when compared with the earlier ones. It
+is hardly a myth in the sense in which the term might be applied to the
+myth of the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Phaedo, or the Gorgias, but
+may be more aptly compared with the didactic tale in which Protagoras
+describes the fortunes of primitive man, or with the description of
+the gradual rise of a new society in the Third Book of the Laws. Some
+discrepancies may be observed between the mythology of the Statesman and
+the Timaeus, and between the Timaeus and the Republic. But there is no
+reason to expect that all Plato's visions of a former, any more than
+of a future, state of existence, should conform exactly to the same
+pattern. We do not find perfect consistency in his philosophy; and still
+less have we any right to demand this of him in his use of mythology and
+figures of speech. And we observe that while employing all the resources
+of a writer of fiction to give credibility to his tales, he is not
+disposed to insist upon their literal truth. Rather, as in the Phaedo,
+he says, 'Something of the kind is true;' or, as in the Gorgias, 'This
+you will think to be an old wife's tale, but you can think of nothing
+truer;' or, as in the Statesman, he describes his work as a 'mass of
+mythology,' which was introduced in order to teach certain lessons; or,
+as in the Phaedrus, he secretly laughs at such stories while refusing to
+disturb the popular belief in them.
+
+The greater interest of the myth consists in the philosophical lessons
+which Plato presents to us in this veiled form. Here, as in the tale
+of Er, the son of Armenius, he touches upon the question of freedom and
+necessity, both in relation to God and nature. For at first the universe
+is governed by the immediate providence of God,--this is the golden
+age,--but after a while the wheel is reversed, and man is left to
+himself. Like other theologians and philosophers, Plato relegates his
+explanation of the problem to a transcendental world; he speaks of what
+in modern language might be termed 'impossibilities in the nature of
+things,' hindering God from continuing immanent in the world. But there
+is some inconsistency; for the 'letting go' is spoken of as a divine
+act, and is at the same time attributed to the necessary imperfection of
+matter; there is also a numerical necessity for the successive births
+of souls. At first, man and the world retain their divine instincts, but
+gradually degenerate. As in the Book of Genesis, the first fall of
+man is succeeded by a second; the misery and wickedness of the world
+increase continually. The reason of this further decline is supposed to
+be the disorganisation of matter: the latent seeds of a former chaos are
+disengaged, and envelope all things. The condition of man becomes more
+and more miserable; he is perpetually waging an unequal warfare with the
+beasts. At length he obtains such a measure of education and help as is
+necessary for his existence. Though deprived of God's help, he is not
+left wholly destitute; he has received from Athene and Hephaestus a
+knowledge of the arts; other gods give him seeds and plants; and out of
+these human life is reconstructed. He now eats bread in the sweat of his
+brow, and has dominion over the animals, subjected to the conditions of
+his nature, and yet able to cope with them by divine help. Thus Plato
+may be said to represent in a figure--(1) the state of innocence; (2)
+the fall of man; (3) the still deeper decline into barbarism; (4) the
+restoration of man by the partial interference of God, and the natural
+growth of the arts and of civilised society. Two lesser features of
+this description should not pass unnoticed:--(1) the primitive men are
+supposed to be created out of the earth, and not after the ordinary
+manner of human generation--half the causes of moral evil are in this
+way removed; (2) the arts are attributed to a divine revelation: and so
+the greatest difficulty in the history of pre-historic man is solved.
+Though no one knew better than Plato that the introduction of the gods
+is not a reason, but an excuse for not giving a reason (Cratylus), yet,
+considering that more than two thousand years later mankind are still
+discussing these problems, we may be satisfied to find in Plato a
+statement of the difficulties which arise in conceiving the relation of
+man to God and nature, without expecting to obtain from him a solution
+of them. In such a tale, as in the Phaedrus, various aspects of the
+Ideas were doubtless indicated to Plato's own mind, as the corresponding
+theological problems are to us. The immanence of things in the Ideas, or
+the partial separation of them, and the self-motion of the supreme
+Idea, are probably the forms in which he would have interpreted his own
+parable.
+
+He touches upon another question of great interest--the consciousness of
+evil--what in the Jewish Scriptures is called 'eating of the tree of the
+knowledge of good and evil.' At the end of the narrative, the Eleatic
+asks his companion whether this life of innocence, or that which men
+live at present, is the better of the two. He wants to distinguish
+between the mere animal life of innocence, the 'city of pigs,' as it
+is comically termed by Glaucon in the Republic, and the higher life of
+reason and philosophy. But as no one can determine the state of man
+in the world before the Fall, 'the question must remain unanswered.'
+Similar questions have occupied the minds of theologians in later ages;
+but they can hardly be said to have found an answer. Professor Campbell
+well observes, that the general spirit of the myth may be summed up in
+the words of the Lysis: 'If evil were to perish, should we hunger any
+more, or thirst any more, or have any similar sensations? Yet perhaps
+the question what will or will not be is a foolish one, for who can
+tell?' As in the Theaetetus, evil is supposed to continue,--here, as the
+consequence of a former state of the world, a sort of mephitic vapour
+exhaling from some ancient chaos,--there, as involved in the possibility
+of good, and incident to the mixed state of man.
+
+Once more--and this is the point of connexion with the rest of the
+dialogue--the myth is intended to bring out the difference between the
+ideal and the actual state of man. In all ages of the world men have
+dreamed of a state of perfection, which has been, and is to be, but
+never is, and seems to disappear under the necessary conditions of human
+society. The uselessness, the danger, the true value of such political
+ideals have often been discussed; youth is too ready to believe in
+them; age to disparage them. Plato's 'prudens quaestio' respecting the
+comparative happiness of men in this and in a former cycle of existence
+is intended to elicit this contrast between the golden age and 'the
+life under Zeus' which is our own. To confuse the divine and human, or
+hastily apply one to the other, is a 'tremendous error.' Of the ideal
+or divine government of the world we can form no true or adequate
+conception; and this our mixed state of life, in which we are partly
+left to ourselves, but not wholly deserted by the gods, may contain some
+higher elements of good and knowledge than could have existed in the
+days of innocence under the rule of Cronos. So we may venture slightly
+to enlarge a Platonic thought which admits of a further application to
+Christian theology. Here are suggested also the distinctions between
+God causing and permitting evil, and between his more and less immediate
+government of the world.
+
+II. The dialectical interest of the Statesman seems to contend in
+Plato's mind with the political; the dialogue might have been
+designated by two equally descriptive titles--either the 'Statesman,' or
+'Concerning Method.' Dialectic, which in the earlier writings of Plato
+is a revival of the Socratic question and answer applied to definition,
+is now occupied with classification; there is nothing in which he takes
+greater delight than in processes of division (compare Phaedr.); he
+pursues them to a length out of proportion to his main subject, and
+appears to value them as a dialectical exercise, and for their own sake.
+A poetical vision of some order or hierarchy of ideas or sciences has
+already been floating before us in the Symposium and the Republic. And
+in the Phaedrus this aspect of dialectic is further sketched out,
+and the art of rhetoric is based on the division of the characters
+of mankind into their several classes. The same love of divisions is
+apparent in the Gorgias. But in a well-known passage of the Philebus
+occurs the first criticism on the nature of classification. There we
+are exhorted not to fall into the common error of passing from unity to
+infinity, but to find the intermediate classes; and we are reminded that
+in any process of generalization, there may be more than one class to
+which individuals may be referred, and that we must carry on the process
+of division until we have arrived at the infima species.
+
+These precepts are not forgotten, either in the Sophist or in the
+Statesman. The Sophist contains four examples of division, carried on
+by regular steps, until in four different lines of descent we detect
+the Sophist. In the Statesman the king or statesman is discovered by
+a similar process; and we have a summary, probably made for the first
+time, of possessions appropriated by the labour of man, which are
+distributed into seven classes. We are warned against preferring the
+shorter to the longer method;--if we divide in the middle, we are most
+likely to light upon species; at the same time, the important remark
+is made, that 'a part is not to be confounded with a class.' Having
+discovered the genus under which the king falls, we proceed to
+distinguish him from the collateral species. To assist our imagination
+in making this separation, we require an example. The higher ideas,
+of which we have a dreamy knowledge, can only be represented by images
+taken from the external world. But, first of all, the nature of example
+is explained by an example. The child is taught to read by comparing
+the letters in words which he knows with the same letters in unknown
+combinations; and this is the sort of process which we are about to
+attempt. As a parallel to the king we select the worker in wool, and
+compare the art of weaving with the royal science, trying to separate
+either of them from the inferior classes to which they are akin. This
+has the incidental advantage, that weaving and the web furnish us with a
+figure of speech, which we can afterwards transfer to the State.
+
+There are two uses of examples or images--in the first place, they
+suggest thoughts--secondly, they give them a distinct form. In the
+infancy of philosophy, as in childhood, the language of pictures is
+natural to man: truth in the abstract is hardly won, and only by use
+familiarized to the mind. Examples are akin to analogies, and have a
+reflex influence on thought; they people the vacant mind, and may often
+originate new directions of enquiry. Plato seems to be conscious of the
+suggestiveness of imagery; the general analogy of the arts is constantly
+employed by him as well as the comparison of particular arts--weaving,
+the refining of gold, the learning to read, music, statuary, painting,
+medicine, the art of the pilot--all of which occur in this dialogue
+alone: though he is also aware that 'comparisons are slippery things,'
+and may often give a false clearness to ideas. We shall find, in the
+Philebus, a division of sciences into practical and speculative, and
+into more or less speculative: here we have the idea of master-arts,
+or sciences which control inferior ones. Besides the supreme science
+of dialectic, 'which will forget us, if we forget her,' another
+master-science for the first time appears in view--the science of
+government, which fixes the limits of all the rest. This conception
+of the political or royal science as, from another point of view, the
+science of sciences, which holds sway over the rest, is not originally
+found in Aristotle, but in Plato.
+
+The doctrine that virtue and art are in a mean, which is familiarized
+to us by the study of the Nicomachean Ethics, is also first distinctly
+asserted in the Statesman of Plato. The too much and the too little
+are in restless motion: they must be fixed by a mean, which is also
+a standard external to them. The art of measuring or finding a mean
+between excess and defect, like the principle of division in the
+Phaedrus, receives a particular application to the art of discourse. The
+excessive length of a discourse may be blamed; but who can say what is
+excess, unless he is furnished with a measure or standard? Measure is
+the life of the arts, and may some day be discovered to be the single
+ultimate principle in which all the sciences are contained. Other forms
+of thought may be noted--the distinction between causal and co-operative
+arts, which may be compared with the distinction between primary and
+co-operative causes in the Timaeus; or between cause and condition in
+the Phaedo; the passing mention of economical science; the opposition of
+rest and motion, which is found in all nature; the general conception
+of two great arts of composition and division, in which are contained
+weaving, politics, dialectic; and in connexion with the conception of a
+mean, the two arts of measuring.
+
+In the Theaetetus, Plato remarks that precision in the use of terms,
+though sometimes pedantic, is sometimes necessary. Here he makes the
+opposite reflection, that there may be a philosophical disregard of
+words. The evil of mere verbal oppositions, the requirement of an
+impossible accuracy in the use of terms, the error of supposing that
+philosophy was to be found in language, the danger of word-catching,
+have frequently been discussed by him in the previous dialogues, but
+nowhere has the spirit of modern inductive philosophy been more happily
+indicated than in the words of the Statesman:--'If you think more about
+things, and less about words, you will be richer in wisdom as you grow
+older.' A similar spirit is discernible in the remarkable expressions,
+'the long and difficult language of facts;' and 'the interrogation of
+every nature, in order to obtain the particular contribution of each to
+the store of knowledge.' Who has described 'the feeble intelligence of
+all things; given by metaphysics better than the Eleatic Stranger in
+the words--'The higher ideas can hardly be set forth except through
+the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a kind of
+dream, and then again nothing when he is awake?' Or where is the value
+of metaphysical pursuits more truly expressed than in the words,--'The
+greatest and noblest things have no outward image of themselves visible
+to man: therefore we should learn to give a rational account of them?'
+
+III. The political aspects of the dialogue are closely connected
+with the dialectical. As in the Cratylus, the legislator has 'the
+dialectician standing on his right hand;' so in the Statesman, the king
+or statesman is the dialectician, who, although he may be in a private
+station, is still a king. Whether he has the power or not, is a mere
+accident; or rather he has the power, for what ought to be is ('Was
+ist vernunftig, das ist wirklich'); and he ought to be and is the true
+governor of mankind. There is a reflection in this idealism of the
+Socratic 'Virtue is knowledge;' and, without idealism, we may remark
+that knowledge is a great part of power. Plato does not trouble himself
+to construct a machinery by which 'philosophers shall be made kings,' as
+in the Republic: he merely holds up the ideal, and affirms that in some
+sense science is really supreme over human life.
+
+He is struck by the observation 'quam parva sapientia regitur mundus,'
+and is touched with a feeling of the ills which afflict states. The
+condition of Megara before and during the Peloponnesian War, of Athens
+under the Thirty and afterwards, of Syracuse and the other Sicilian
+cities in their alternations of democratic excess and tyranny, might
+naturally suggest such reflections. Some states he sees already
+shipwrecked, others foundering for want of a pilot; and he wonders not
+at their destruction, but at their endurance. For they ought to have
+perished long ago, if they had depended on the wisdom of their rulers.
+The mingled pathos and satire of this remark is characteristic of
+Plato's later style.
+
+The king is the personification of political science. And yet he is
+something more than this,--the perfectly good and wise tyrant of the
+Laws, whose will is better than any law. He is the special providence
+who is always interfering with and regulating all things. Such a
+conception has sometimes been entertained by modern theologians, and by
+Plato himself, of the Supreme Being. But whether applied to Divine or
+to human governors the conception is faulty for two reasons, neither of
+which are noticed by Plato:--first, because all good government supposes
+a degree of co-operation in the ruler and his subjects,--an 'education
+in politics' as well as in moral virtue; secondly, because government,
+whether Divine or human, implies that the subject has a previous
+knowledge of the rules under which he is living. There is a fallacy,
+too, in comparing unchangeable laws with a personal governor. For the
+law need not necessarily be an 'ignorant and brutal tyrant,' but gentle
+and humane, capable of being altered in the spirit of the legislator,
+and of being administered so as to meet the cases of individuals. Not
+only in fact, but in idea, both elements must remain--the fixed law
+and the living will; the written word and the spirit; the principles of
+obligation and of freedom; and their applications whether made by law or
+equity in particular cases.
+
+There are two sides from which positive laws may be attacked:--either
+from the side of nature, which rises up and rebels against them in the
+spirit of Callicles in the Gorgias; or from the side of idealism, which
+attempts to soar above them,--and this is the spirit of Plato in the
+Statesman. But he soon falls, like Icarus, and is content to walk
+instead of flying; that is, to accommodate himself to the actual state
+of human things. Mankind have long been in despair of finding the true
+ruler; and therefore are ready to acquiesce in any of the five or six
+received forms of government as better than none. And the best thing
+which they can do (though only the second best in reality), is to reduce
+the ideal state to the conditions of actual life. Thus in the Statesman,
+as in the Laws, we have three forms of government, which we may venture
+to term, (1) the ideal, (2) the practical, (3) the sophistical--what
+ought to be, what might be, what is. And thus Plato seems to stumble,
+almost by accident, on the notion of a constitutional monarchy, or of a
+monarchy ruling by laws.
+
+The divine foundations of a State are to be laid deep in education
+(Republic), and at the same time some little violence may be used in
+exterminating natures which are incapable of education (compare Laws).
+Plato is strongly of opinion that the legislator, like the physician,
+may do men good against their will (compare Gorgias). The human bonds
+of states are formed by the inter-marriage of dispositions adapted to
+supply the defects of each other. As in the Republic, Plato has observed
+that there are opposite natures in the world, the strong and the gentle,
+the courageous and the temperate, which, borrowing an expression derived
+from the image of weaving, he calls the warp and the woof of human
+society. To interlace these is the crowning achievement of political
+science. In the Protagoras, Socrates was maintaining that there was only
+one virtue, and not many: now Plato is inclined to think that there
+are not only parallel, but opposite virtues, and seems to see a similar
+opposition pervading all art and nature. But he is satisfied with laying
+down the principle, and does not inform us by what further steps the
+union of opposites is to be effected.
+
+In the loose framework of a single dialogue Plato has thus combined two
+distinct subjects--politics and method. Yet they are not so far apart
+as they appear: in his own mind there was a secret link of connexion
+between them. For the philosopher or dialectician is also the only true
+king or statesman. In the execution of his plan Plato has invented or
+distinguished several important forms of thought, and made incidentally
+many valuable remarks. Questions of interest both in ancient and modern
+politics also arise in the course of the dialogue, which may with
+advantage be further considered by us:--
+
+a. The imaginary ruler, whether God or man, is above the law, and is a
+law to himself and to others. Among the Greeks as among the Jews, law
+was a sacred name, the gift of God, the bond of states. But in the
+Statesman of Plato, as in the New Testament, the word has also become
+the symbol of an imperfect good, which is almost an evil. The law
+sacrifices the individual to the universal, and is the tyranny of the
+many over the few (compare Republic). It has fixed rules which are the
+props of order, and will not swerve or bend in extreme cases. It is
+the beginning of political society, but there is something higher--an
+intelligent ruler, whether God or man, who is able to adapt himself to
+the endless varieties of circumstances. Plato is fond of picturing the
+advantages which would result from the union of the tyrant who has power
+with the legislator who has wisdom: he regards this as the best and
+speediest way of reforming mankind. But institutions cannot thus be
+artificially created, nor can the external authority of a ruler impose
+laws for which a nation is unprepared. The greatest power, the highest
+wisdom, can only proceed one or two steps in advance of public opinion.
+In all stages of civilization human nature, after all our efforts,
+remains intractable,--not like clay in the hands of the potter, or
+marble under the chisel of the sculptor. Great changes occur in the
+history of nations, but they are brought about slowly, like the changes
+in the frame of nature, upon which the puny arm of man hardly makes an
+impression. And, speaking generally, the slowest growths, both in nature
+and in politics, are the most permanent.
+
+b. Whether the best form of the ideal is a person or a law may fairly be
+doubted. The former is more akin to us: it clothes itself in poetry and
+art, and appeals to reason more in the form of feeling: in the latter
+there is less danger of allowing ourselves to be deluded by a figure
+of speech. The ideal of the Greek state found an expression in the
+deification of law: the ancient Stoic spoke of a wise man perfect in
+virtue, who was fancifully said to be a king; but neither they nor Plato
+had arrived at the conception of a person who was also a law. Nor is it
+easy for the Christian to think of God as wisdom, truth, holiness, and
+also as the wise, true, and holy one. He is always wanting to break
+through the abstraction and interrupt the law, in order that he may
+present to himself the more familiar image of a divine friend. While
+the impersonal has too slender a hold upon the affections to be made the
+basis of religion, the conception of a person on the other hand tends to
+degenerate into a new kind of idolatry. Neither criticism nor experience
+allows us to suppose that there are interferences with the laws of
+nature; the idea is inconceivable to us and at variance with facts. The
+philosopher or theologian who could realize to mankind that a person
+is a law, that the higher rule has no exception, that goodness, like
+knowledge, is also power, would breathe a new religious life into the
+world.
+
+c. Besides the imaginary rule of a philosopher or a God, the actual
+forms of government have to be considered. In the infancy of political
+science, men naturally ask whether the rule of the many or of the few is
+to be preferred. If by 'the few' we mean 'the good' and by 'the many,'
+'the bad,' there can be but one reply: 'The rule of one good man
+is better than the rule of all the rest, if they are bad.' For, as
+Heracleitus says, 'One is ten thousand if he be the best.' If, however,
+we mean by the rule of the few the rule of a class neither better nor
+worse than other classes, not devoid of a feeling of right, but guided
+mostly by a sense of their own interests, and by the rule of the many
+the rule of all classes, similarly under the influence of mixed motives,
+no one would hesitate to answer--'The rule of all rather than one,
+because all classes are more likely to take care of all than one of
+another; and the government has greater power and stability when resting
+on a wider basis.' Both in ancient and modern times the best balanced
+form of government has been held to be the best; and yet it should not
+be so nicely balanced as to make action and movement impossible.
+
+The statesman who builds his hope upon the aristocracy, upon the
+middle classes, upon the people, will probably, if he have sufficient
+experience of them, conclude that all classes are much alike, and that
+one is as good as another, and that the liberties of no class are
+safe in the hands of the rest. The higher ranks have the advantage in
+education and manners, the middle and lower in industry and self-denial;
+in every class, to a certain extent, a natural sense of right prevails,
+sometimes communicated from the lower to the higher, sometimes from the
+higher to the lower, which is too strong for class interests. There have
+been crises in the history of nations, as at the time of the Crusades or
+the Reformation, or the French Revolution, when the same inspiration has
+taken hold of whole peoples, and permanently raised the sense of freedom
+and justice among mankind.
+
+But even supposing the different classes of a nation, when viewed
+impartially, to be on a level with each other in moral virtue, there
+remain two considerations of opposite kinds which enter into the problem
+of government. Admitting of course that the upper and lower classes are
+equal in the eye of God and of the law, yet the one may be by nature
+fitted to govern and the other to be governed. A ruling caste does not
+soon altogether lose the governing qualities, nor a subject class easily
+acquire them. Hence the phenomenon so often observed in the old Greek
+revolutions, and not without parallel in modern times, that the leaders
+of the democracy have been themselves of aristocratic origin. The people
+are expecting to be governed by representatives of their own, but the
+true man of the people either never appears, or is quickly altered by
+circumstances. Their real wishes hardly make themselves felt, although
+their lower interests and prejudices may sometimes be flattered and
+yielded to for the sake of ulterior objects by those who have political
+power. They will often learn by experience that the democracy has become
+a plutocracy. The influence of wealth, though not the enjoyment of
+it, has become diffused among the poor as well as among the rich; and
+society, instead of being safer, is more at the mercy of the tyrant,
+who, when things are at the worst, obtains a guard--that is, an
+army--and announces himself as the saviour.
+
+The other consideration is of an opposite kind. Admitting that a few
+wise men are likely to be better governors than the unwise many, yet
+it is not in their power to fashion an entire people according to their
+behest. When with the best intentions the benevolent despot begins his
+regime, he finds the world hard to move. A succession of good kings has
+at the end of a century left the people an inert and unchanged mass. The
+Roman world was not permanently improved by the hundred years of Hadrian
+and the Antonines. The kings of Spain during the last century were at
+least equal to any contemporary sovereigns in virtue and ability. In
+certain states of the world the means are wanting to render a benevolent
+power effectual. These means are not a mere external organisation of
+posts or telegraphs, hardly the introduction of new laws or modes of
+industry. A change must be made in the spirit of a people as well as
+in their externals. The ancient legislator did not really take a blank
+tablet and inscribe upon it the rules which reflection and experience
+had taught him to be for a nation's interest; no one would have obeyed
+him if he had. But he took the customs which he found already existing
+in a half-civilised state of society: these he reduced to form and
+inscribed on pillars; he defined what had before been undefined, and
+gave certainty to what was uncertain. No legislation ever sprang, like
+Athene, in full power out of the head either of God or man.
+
+Plato and Aristotle are sensible of the difficulty of combining the
+wisdom of the few with the power of the many. According to Plato, he is
+a physician who has the knowledge of a physician, and he is a king who
+has the knowledge of a king. But how the king, one or more, is to obtain
+the required power, is hardly at all considered by him. He presents
+the idea of a perfect government, but except the regulation for mixing
+different tempers in marriage, he never makes any provision for the
+attainment of it. Aristotle, casting aside ideals, would place the
+government in a middle class of citizens, sufficiently numerous for
+stability, without admitting the populace; and such appears to have
+been the constitution which actually prevailed for a short time at
+Athens--the rule of the Five Thousand--characterized by Thucydides as
+the best government of Athens which he had known. It may however be
+doubted how far, either in a Greek or modern state, such a limitation is
+practicable or desirable; for those who are left outside the pale will
+always be dangerous to those who are within, while on the other hand
+the leaven of the mob can hardly affect the representation of a great
+country. There is reason for the argument in favour of a property
+qualification; there is reason also in the arguments of those who would
+include all and so exhaust the political situation.
+
+The true answer to the question is relative to the circumstances of
+nations. How can we get the greatest intelligence combined with the
+greatest power? The ancient legislator would have found this question
+more easy than we do. For he would have required that all persons who
+had a share of government should have received their education from the
+state and have borne her burdens, and should have served in her fleets
+and armies. But though we sometimes hear the cry that we must 'educate
+the masses, for they are our masters,' who would listen to a proposal
+that the franchise should be confined to the educated or to those who
+fulfil political duties? Then again, we know that the masses are not our
+masters, and that they are more likely to become so if we educate them.
+In modern politics so many interests have to be consulted that we are
+compelled to do, not what is best, but what is possible.
+
+d. Law is the first principle of society, but it cannot supply all the
+wants of society, and may easily cause more evils than it cures. Plato
+is aware of the imperfection of law in failing to meet the varieties of
+circumstances: he is also aware that human life would be intolerable if
+every detail of it were placed under legal regulation. It may be a great
+evil that physicians should kill their patients or captains cast away
+their ships, but it would be a far greater evil if each particular in
+the practice of medicine or seamanship were regulated by law. Much has
+been said in modern times about the duty of leaving men to themselves,
+which is supposed to be the best way of taking care of them. The
+question is often asked, What are the limits of legislation in relation
+to morals? And the answer is to the same effect, that morals must take
+care of themselves. There is a one-sided truth in these answers, if they
+are regarded as condemnations of the interference with commerce in
+the last century or of clerical persecution in the Middle Ages. But
+'laissez-faire' is not the best but only the second best. What the
+best is, Plato does not attempt to determine; he only contrasts the
+imperfection of law with the wisdom of the perfect ruler.
+
+Laws should be just, but they must also be certain, and we are obliged
+to sacrifice something of their justice to their certainty. Suppose
+a wise and good judge, who paying little or no regard to the law,
+attempted to decide with perfect justice the cases that were brought
+before him. To the uneducated person he would appear to be the ideal of
+a judge. Such justice has been often exercised in primitive times, or at
+the present day among eastern rulers. But in the first place it depends
+entirely on the personal character of the judge. He may be honest,
+but there is no check upon his dishonesty, and his opinion can only be
+overruled, not by any principle of law, but by the opinion of another
+judging like himself without law. In the second place, even if he
+be ever so honest, his mode of deciding questions would introduce an
+element of uncertainty into human life; no one would know beforehand
+what would happen to him, or would seek to conform in his conduct to
+any rule of law. For the compact which the law makes with men, that they
+shall be protected if they observe the law in their dealings with
+one another, would have to be substituted another principle of a more
+general character, that they shall be protected by the law if they act
+rightly in their dealings with one another. The complexity of human
+actions and also the uncertainty of their effects would be increased
+tenfold. For one of the principal advantages of law is not merely that
+it enforces honesty, but that it makes men act in the same way, and
+requires them to produce the same evidence of their acts. Too many laws
+may be the sign of a corrupt and overcivilized state of society, too few
+are the sign of an uncivilized one; as soon as commerce begins to
+grow, men make themselves customs which have the validity of laws. Even
+equity, which is the exception to the law, conforms to fixed rules and
+lies for the most part within the limits of previous decisions.
+
+IV. The bitterness of the Statesman is characteristic of Plato's later
+style, in which the thoughts of youth and love have fled away, and we
+are no longer tended by the Muses or the Graces. We do not venture to
+say that Plato was soured by old age, but certainly the kindliness and
+courtesy of the earlier dialogues have disappeared. He sees the world
+under a harder and grimmer aspect: he is dealing with the reality of
+things, not with visions or pictures of them: he is seeking by the aid
+of dialectic only, to arrive at truth. He is deeply impressed with the
+importance of classification: in this alone he finds the true measure of
+human things; and very often in the process of division curious results
+are obtained. For the dialectical art is no respecter of persons: king
+and vermin-taker are all alike to the philosopher. There may have been a
+time when the king was a god, but he now is pretty much on a level with
+his subjects in breeding and education. Man should be well advised that
+he is only one of the animals, and the Hellene in particular should be
+aware that he himself was the author of the distinction between Hellene
+and Barbarian, and that the Phrygian would equally divide mankind into
+Phrygians and Barbarians, and that some intelligent animal, like a
+crane, might go a step further, and divide the animal world into cranes
+and all other animals. Plato cannot help laughing (compare Theaet.) when
+he thinks of the king running after his subjects, like the pig-driver
+or the bird-taker. He would seriously have him consider how many
+competitors there are to his throne, chiefly among the class of
+serving-men. A good deal of meaning is lurking in the expression--'There
+is no art of feeding mankind worthy the name.' There is a similar
+depth in the remark,--'The wonder about states is not that they are
+short-lived, but that they last so long in spite of the badness of their
+rulers.'
+
+V. There is also a paradoxical element in the Statesman which delights
+in reversing the accustomed use of words. The law which to the Greek was
+the highest object of reverence is an ignorant and brutal tyrant--the
+tyrant is converted into a beneficent king. The sophist too is no
+longer, as in the earlier dialogues, the rival of the statesman, but
+assumes his form. Plato sees that the ideal of the state in his own day
+is more and more severed from the actual. From such ideals as he had
+once formed, he turns away to contemplate the decline of the Greek
+cities which were far worse now in his old age than they had been in his
+youth, and were to become worse and worse in the ages which followed. He
+cannot contain his disgust at the contemporary statesmen, sophists who
+had turned politicians, in various forms of men and animals, appearing,
+some like lions and centaurs, others like satyrs and monkeys. In this
+new disguise the Sophists make their last appearance on the scene: in
+the Laws Plato appears to have forgotten them, or at any rate makes only
+a slight allusion to them in a single passage (Laws).
+
+VI. The Statesman is naturally connected with the Sophist. At first
+sight we are surprised to find that the Eleatic Stranger discourses
+to us, not only concerning the nature of Being and Not-being, but
+concerning the king and statesman. We perceive, however, that there is
+no inappropriateness in his maintaining the character of chief speaker,
+when we remember the close connexion which is assumed by Plato to exist
+between politics and dialectic. In both dialogues the Proteus Sophist
+is exhibited, first, in the disguise of an Eristic, secondly, of a false
+statesman. There are several lesser features which the two dialogues
+have in common. The styles and the situations of the speakers are very
+similar; there is the same love of division, and in both of them the
+mind of the writer is greatly occupied about method, to which he had
+probably intended to return in the projected 'Philosopher.'
+
+The Statesman stands midway between the Republic and the Laws, and is
+also related to the Timaeus. The mythical or cosmical element reminds us
+of the Timaeus, the ideal of the Republic. A previous chaos in which
+the elements as yet were not, is hinted at both in the Timaeus and
+Statesman. The same ingenious arts of giving verisimilitude to a fiction
+are practised in both dialogues, and in both, as well as in the myth at
+the end of the Republic, Plato touches on the subject of necessity and
+free-will. The words in which he describes the miseries of states seem
+to be an amplification of the 'Cities will never cease from ill' of the
+Republic. The point of view in both is the same; and the differences not
+really important, e.g. in the myth, or in the account of the different
+kinds of states. But the treatment of the subject in the Statesman is
+fragmentary, and the shorter and later work, as might be expected, is
+less finished, and less worked out in detail. The idea of measure and
+the arrangement of the sciences supply connecting links both with the
+Republic and the Philebus.
+
+More than any of the preceding dialogues, the Statesman seems to
+approximate in thought and language to the Laws. There is the same
+decline and tendency to monotony in style, the same self-consciousness,
+awkwardness, and over-civility; and in the Laws is contained the pattern
+of that second best form of government, which, after all, is admitted
+to be the only attainable one in this world. The 'gentle violence,' the
+marriage of dissimilar natures, the figure of the warp and the woof,
+are also found in the Laws. Both expressly recognize the conception of
+a first or ideal state, which has receded into an invisible heaven. Nor
+does the account of the origin and growth of society really differ in
+them, if we make allowance for the mythic character of the narrative in
+the Statesman. The virtuous tyrant is common to both of them; and the
+Eleatic Stranger takes up a position similar to that of the Athenian
+Stranger in the Laws.
+
+VII. There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness
+of the Sophist and Statesman, if they had been compared with the Laws
+rather than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they
+ought to be, on the authority of Aristotle and on the ground of their
+intrinsic excellence, as an undoubted work of Plato. The detailed
+consideration of the genuineness and order of the Platonic dialogues has
+been reserved for another place: a few of the reasons for defending the
+Sophist and Statesman may be given here.
+
+1. The excellence, importance, and metaphysical originality of the two
+dialogues: no works at once so good and of such length are known to have
+proceeded from the hands of a forger.
+
+2. The resemblances in them to other dialogues of Plato are such as
+might be expected to be found in works of the same author, and not in
+those of an imitator, being too subtle and minute to have been invented
+by another. The similar passages and turns of thought are generally
+inferior to the parallel passages in his earlier writings; and we might
+a priori have expected that, if altered, they would have been improved.
+But the comparison of the Laws proves that this repetition of his own
+thoughts and words in an inferior form is characteristic of Plato's
+later style.
+
+3. The close connexion of them with the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and
+Philebus, involves the fate of these dialogues, as well as of the two
+suspected ones.
+
+4. The suspicion of them seems mainly to rest on a presumption that in
+Plato's writings we may expect to find an uniform type of doctrine and
+opinion. But however we arrange the order, or narrow the circle of the
+dialogues, we must admit that they exhibit a growth and progress in the
+mind of Plato. And the appearance of change or progress is not to be
+regarded as impugning the genuineness of any particular writings, but
+may be even an argument in their favour. If we suppose the Sophist and
+Politicus to stand halfway between the Republic and the Laws, and in
+near connexion with the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, the Philebus, the
+arguments against them derived from differences of thought and style
+disappear or may be said without paradox in some degree to confirm their
+genuineness. There is no such interval between the Republic or Phaedrus
+and the two suspected dialogues, as that which separates all the earlier
+writings of Plato from the Laws. And the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and
+Philebus, supply links, by which, however different from them, they may
+be reunited with the great body of the Platonic writings.
+
+
+
+
+STATESMAN
+
+
+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Theodorus, Socrates, The Eleatic Stranger, The
+Younger Socrates.
+
+
+SOCRATES: I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the acquaintance
+both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.
+
+THEODORUS: And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three
+times as many, when they have completed for you the delineation of the
+Statesman and of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist.
+
+SOCRATES: Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my
+ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great
+calculator and geometrician?
+
+THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they
+are really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can
+express.
+
+THEODORUS: By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very
+fair hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will
+retaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger,
+who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with
+the Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers.
+
+STRANGER: That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and not
+leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus?
+
+THEODORUS: In what respect?
+
+STRANGER: Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young
+Socrates, instead of him? What do you advise?
+
+THEODORUS: Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose. The young always
+do better when they have intervals of rest.
+
+SOCRATES: I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in some
+way related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly
+face (compare Theaet.), the other is called by my name. And we should
+always be on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his
+conversation. I myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday, and
+I have just been listening to his answers; my namesake I have not yet
+examined, but I must. Another time will do for me; to-day let him answer
+you.
+
+STRANGER: Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates
+is proposing?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I do.
+
+STRANGER: And do you agree to his proposal?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist,
+then, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order
+of enquiry. And please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked among
+those who have science.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: Then the sciences must be divided as before?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I dare say.
+
+STRANGER: But yet the division will not be the same?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How then?
+
+STRANGER: They will be divided at some other point.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must
+find and separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we will set
+the mark of another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will
+conceive of all kinds of knowledge under two classes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not
+mine.
+
+STRANGER: Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must be
+yours as well as mine.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts,
+merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: But in the art of carpentering and all other handicrafts, the
+knowledge of the workman is merged in his work; he not only knows, but
+he also makes things which previously did not exist.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are
+practical and those which are purely intellectual.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us assume these two divisions of science, which is
+one whole.
+
+STRANGER: And are 'statesman,' 'king,' 'master,' or 'householder,' one
+and the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of these
+names? Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear.
+
+STRANGER: If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise
+one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: And if any one who is in a private station is able to advise
+the ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the knowledge which
+the ruler himself ought to have?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: But surely the science of a true king is royal science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he
+happens to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in reference
+to his art, be truly called 'royal'?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: He certainly ought to be.
+
+STRANGER: And the householder and master are the same?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
+
+STRANGER: Again, a large household may be compared to a small
+state:--will they differ at all, as far as government is concerned?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: They will not.
+
+STRANGER: Then, returning to the point which we were just now
+discussing, do we not clearly see that there is one science of all
+of them; and this science may be called either royal or political or
+economical; we will not quarrel with any one about the name.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER: This too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his
+hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his empire,
+compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of his mind.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly not.
+
+STRANGER: Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to
+knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly he has.
+
+STRANGER: Then we may put all together as one and the
+same--statesmanship and the statesman--the kingly science and the king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.
+
+STRANGER: And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on
+to divide the sphere of knowledge?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me of what sort.
+
+STRANGER: Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of
+calculation?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: And to this art of calculation which discerns the differences
+of numbers shall we assign any other function except to pass judgment on
+their differences?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How could we?
+
+STRANGER: You know that the master-builder does not work himself, but is
+the ruler of workmen?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: He contributes knowledge, not manual labour?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical
+science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.
+
+STRANGER: But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his functions
+as at an end when he has formed a judgment;--he must assign to the
+individual workmen their appropriate task until they have completed the
+work.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and the
+like, subjects of pure knowledge; and is not the difference between the
+two classes, that the one sort has the power of judging only, and the
+other of ruling as well?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That is evident.
+
+STRANGER: May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there are
+two divisions--one which rules, and the other which judges?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I should think so.
+
+STRANGER: And when men have anything to do in common, that they should
+be of one mind is surely a desirable thing?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind
+about the fancies of others?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER: And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the
+king?--Is he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign to him
+the art of command--for he is a ruler?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: The latter, clearly.
+
+STRANGER: Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the
+art of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a distinction
+similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which parts off the
+king from the herald.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How is this?
+
+STRANGER: Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the
+productions of others, which have been sold before?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly he does.
+
+STRANGER: And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive
+orders, and in his turn give them to others?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the
+art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the
+numerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as in the preceding
+comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for themselves, and of
+retailers,--seeing, too, that the class of supreme rulers, or rulers for
+themselves, is almost nameless--shall we make a word following the
+same analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or ruling-for-self science,
+leaving the rest to receive a name from some one else? For we are
+seeking the ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not
+a ruler.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the man
+who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's. And now let us
+see if the supreme power allows of any further division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.
+
+STRANGER: I think that it does; and please to assist me in making the
+division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point?
+
+STRANGER: May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of
+producing something?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced
+into two classes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them?
+
+STRANGER: Of the whole class, some have life and some are without life.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we please,
+a subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point?
+
+STRANGER: One part may be set over the production of lifeless, the other
+of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one
+half, and take up the other; which may also be divided into two.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Which of the two halves do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: Of course that which exercises command about animals. For,
+surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman,
+a science presiding over lifeless objects;--the king has a nobler
+function, which is the management and control of living beings.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed
+to be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a common
+care of creatures in flocks?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: But the statesman is not a tender of individuals--not like
+the driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared
+with the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, I see, thanks to you.
+
+STRANGER: Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the
+art of managing a herd, or the art of collective management?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: No matter;--whichever suggests itself to us in the
+course of conversation.
+
+STRANGER: Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too
+particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when you
+are an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the
+name,--can you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of
+herding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst
+twice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that number?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I will try;--there appears to me to be one management of
+men and another of beasts.
+
+STRANGER: You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and
+manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think
+that we had better avoid.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is the error?
+
+STRANGER: I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion
+which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a
+species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most
+excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were
+under the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would
+come to man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not
+chip off too small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through
+the middle; which is also the more likely way of finding classes.
+Attention to this principle makes all the difference in a process of
+enquiry.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean, Stranger?
+
+STRANGER: I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your
+good parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain
+myself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little clearer.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty
+in our recent division?
+
+STRANGER: The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the
+human race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this
+part of the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and
+all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have
+no ties or common language, they include under the single name of
+'barbarians,' and because they have one name they are supposed to be of
+one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to
+cut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species,
+comprehending the rest under another separate name, you might say that
+here too was a single class, because you had given it a single name.
+Whereas you would make a much better and more equal and logical
+classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and even; or of
+the human species, if you divided them into male and female; and only
+separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, and arrayed them
+against the rest of the world, when you could no longer make a division
+into parts which were also classes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a
+part and a class could still be made somewhat plainer.
+
+STRANGER: O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very
+difficult task. We have already digressed further from our original
+intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further
+away. But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there
+is a leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time,
+I wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
+
+STRANGER: That a class and a part are distinct.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What did I hear, then?
+
+STRANGER: That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar
+necessity that a part should be a class; that is the view which I should
+always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: So be it.
+
+STRANGER: There is another thing which I should like to know.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
+
+STRANGER: The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken,
+the exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the
+management of herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to answer
+that there were two species of animals; man being one, and all brutes
+making up the other.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the
+remainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the
+common name of brutes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That again is true.
+
+STRANGER: Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some
+wise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be,
+were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes
+against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the
+same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the
+appellation of brutes,--here would be the sort of error which we must
+try to avoid.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How can we be safe?
+
+STRANGER: If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be
+less likely to fall into that error.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: We had better not take the whole?
+
+STRANGER: Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How?
+
+STRANGER: You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which
+was concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living
+creatures,--I mean, with animals in herds?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: In that case, there was already implied a division of all
+animals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be tamed are called
+tame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And the political science of which we are in search, is and
+ever was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to gregarious
+animals.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: But then we ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole
+class at once. Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at
+the political science; for this mistake has already brought upon us the
+misfortune of which the proverb speaks.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What misfortune?
+
+STRANGER: The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little speed.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: And all the better, Stranger;--we got what we deserved.
+
+STRANGER: Very well: Let us then begin again, and endeavour to divide
+the collective rearing of animals; for probably the completion of the
+argument will best show what you are so anxious to know. Tell me, then--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
+
+STRANGER: Have you ever heard, as you very likely may--for I do not
+suppose that you ever actually visited them--of the preserves of fishes
+in the Nile, and in the ponds of the Great King; or you may have seen
+similar preserves in wells at home?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often
+heard the others described.
+
+STRANGER: And you may have heard also, and may have been assured by
+report, although you have not travelled in those regions, of nurseries
+of geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: I asked you, because here is a new division of the management
+of herds, into the management of land and of water herds.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: There is.
+
+STRANGER: And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective
+rearing of herds into two corresponding parts, the one the rearing of
+water, and the other the rearing of land herds?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the
+royal art, for it is evident to everybody.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them?
+
+STRANGER: I should distinguish between those which fly and those which
+walk.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true.
+
+STRANGER: And where shall we look for the political animal? Might not an
+idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: The art of managing the walking animal has to be further
+divided, just as you might halve an even number.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.
+
+STRANGER: Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part
+or class which the argument aims at reaching,--the one a speedier way,
+which cuts off a small portion and leaves a large; the other agrees
+better with the principle which we were laying down, that as far as we
+can we should divide in the middle; but it is longer. We can take either
+of them, whichever we please.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Cannot we have both ways?
+
+STRANGER: Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn,
+you clearly may.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Then I should like to have them in turn.
+
+STRANGER: There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we had
+been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to your
+request; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin with the
+longer way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better. And now attend
+to the division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear.
+
+STRANGER: The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature
+into two classes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Upon what principle?
+
+STRANGER: The one grows horns; and the other is without horns.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.
+
+STRANGER: Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian
+animals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you try to
+invent names for them, you will find the intricacy too great.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How must I speak of them, then?
+
+STRANGER: In this way: let the science of managing pedestrian animals
+be divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned herd, and
+the other to the herd that has no horns.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: All that you say has been abundantly proved, and may
+therefore be assumed.
+
+STRANGER: The king is clearly the shepherd of a polled herd, who have no
+horns.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That is evident.
+
+STRANGER: Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and
+endeavour to assign to him what is his?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.
+
+STRANGER: Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven
+feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
+
+STRANGER: I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one another.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will
+not mix the breed.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: And of which has the Statesman charge,--of the mixed or of the
+unmixed race?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly of the unmixed.
+
+STRANGER: I suppose that we must divide this again as before.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: We must.
+
+STRANGER: Every tame and herding animal has now been split up, with
+the exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs should be
+reckoned among gregarious animals.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining
+species?
+
+STRANGER: There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately
+employed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of geometry.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is that?
+
+STRANGER: The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter. (Compare
+Meno.)
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Just so.
+
+STRANGER: And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice
+two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly
+understand you.
+
+STRANGER: In these divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make another
+famous jest.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
+
+STRANGER: Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest
+and airiest of creation, and have been running a race with them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I remark that very singular coincidence.
+
+STRANGER: And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Indeed I should.
+
+STRANGER: And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the
+king is found running about with the herd and in close competition with
+the bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy
+life. (Plato is here introducing a new subdivision, i.e. that of bipeds
+into men and birds. Others however refer the passage to the division
+into quadrupeds and bipeds, making pigs compete with human beings and
+the pig-driver with the king. According to this explanation we must
+translate the words above, 'freest and airiest of creation,' 'worthiest
+and laziest of creation.')
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of
+what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist? (Compare Sophist.)
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
+
+STRANGER: That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and
+does not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her own
+way at the truest result.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.
+
+STRANGER: And now, I will not wait for you to ask, but will of my
+own accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.
+
+STRANGER: I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land
+animals into biped and quadruped; and since the winged herd, and that
+alone, comes out in the same class with man, we should divide bipeds
+into those which have feathers and those which have not, and when they
+have been divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought
+to light, the time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler,
+and set him like a charioteer in his place, and hand over to him the
+reins of state, for that too is a vocation which belongs to him.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good; you have paid me the debt,--I mean, that you
+have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the digression
+by way of interest. (Compare Republic.)
+
+STRANGER: Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the links,
+which together make the definition of the name of the Statesman's art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.
+
+STRANGER: The science of pure knowledge had, as we said originally, a
+part which was the science of rule or command, and from this was derived
+another part, which was called command-for-self, on the analogy of
+selling-for-self; an important section of this was the management of
+living animals, and this again was further limited to the management
+of them in herds; and again in herds of pedestrian animals. The chief
+division of the latter was the art of managing pedestrian animals which
+are without horns; this again has a part which can only be comprehended
+under one term by joining together three names--shepherding pure-bred
+animals. The only further subdivision is the art of man-herding,--this
+has to do with bipeds, and is what we were seeking after, and have now
+found, being at once the royal and political.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.
+
+STRANGER: And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you
+say?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
+
+STRANGER: Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled
+our intention?--There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the
+investigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out: this is where
+the enquiry fails.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand.
+
+STRANGER: I will try to make the thought, which is at this moment
+present in my mind, clearer to us both.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear.
+
+STRANGER: There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the
+political, which had the charge of one particular herd?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not
+horses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from
+all other shepherds.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
+
+STRANGER: I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen has a
+rival who professes and claims to share with him in the management of
+the herd?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: I mean to say that merchants, husbandmen, providers of food,
+and also training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the
+herdsmen of humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they
+themselves have the care of rearing or managing mankind, and that they
+rear not only the common herd, but also the rulers themselves.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Are they not right in saying so?
+
+STRANGER: Very likely they may be, and we will consider their claim.
+But we are certain of this,--that no one will raise a similar claim as
+against the herdsman, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and
+only feeder and physician of his herd; he is also their match-maker
+and accoucheur; no one else knows that department of science. And he is
+their merry-maker and musician, as far as their nature is susceptible of
+such influences, and no one can console and soothe his own herd
+better than he can, either with the natural tones of his voice or with
+instruments. And the same may be said of tenders of animals in general.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king
+be true and unimpeachable? Were we right in selecting him out of ten
+thousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human
+flock?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Surely not.
+
+STRANGER: Had we not reason just to now to apprehend, that although we
+may have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately
+worked out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal
+him as he truly is in his own nature, until we have disengaged and
+separated him from those who hang about him and claim to share in his
+prerogatives?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not mean to
+bring disgrace upon the argument at its close.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: We must certainly avoid that.
+
+STRANGER: Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different
+road.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What road?
+
+STRANGER: I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous
+tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then
+we may resume our series of divisions, and proceed in the old path until
+we arrive at the desired summit. Shall we do as I say?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.
+
+STRANGER: Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear; and
+you are not too old for childish amusement.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear.
+
+STRANGER: There did really happen, and will again happen, like many
+other events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the
+portent which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of
+Atreus and Thyestes. You have heard, no doubt, and remember what they
+say happened at that time?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the
+golden lamb.
+
+STRANGER: No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how
+the sun and the stars once rose in the west, and set in the east, and
+that the god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they now
+have as a testimony to the right of Atreus.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; there is that legend also.
+
+STRANGER: Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, very often.
+
+STRANGER: Did you ever hear that the men of former times were
+earth-born, and not begotten of one another?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is another old tradition.
+
+STRANGER: All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still
+more wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in
+the lapse of ages, or are repeated only in a disconnected form; but the
+origin of them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for
+the tale is suited to throw light on the nature of the king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole
+story, and leave out nothing.
+
+STRANGER: Listen, then. There is a time when God himself guides and
+helps to roll the world in its course; and there is a time, on the
+completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a
+living creature, and having originally received intelligence from its
+author and creator, turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in
+the opposite direction.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Why is that?
+
+STRANGER: Why, because only the most divine things of all remain ever
+unchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class. Heaven
+and the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been
+endowed by the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature,
+and therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbation. But their
+motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same place, and of the
+same kind; and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the
+least alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone
+able to move of himself; and to think that he moves them at one time in
+one direction and at another time in another is blasphemy. Hence we must
+not say that the world is either self-moved always, or all made to go
+round by God in two opposite courses; or that two Gods, having opposite
+purposes, make it move round. But as I have already said (and this is
+the only remaining alternative) the world is guided at one time by an
+external power which is divine and receives fresh life and immortality
+from the renewing hand of the Creator, and again, when let go, moves
+spontaneously, being set free at such a time as to have, during infinite
+cycles of years, a reverse movement: this is due to its perfect balance,
+to its vast size, and to the fact that it turns on the smallest pivot.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable
+indeed.
+
+STRANGER: Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been said
+the nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the cause of all
+these wonders. It is this.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
+
+STRANGER: The reversal which takes place from time to time of the motion
+of the universe.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that the cause?
+
+STRANGER: Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider this
+to be the greatest and most complete.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I should imagine so.
+
+STRANGER: And it may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to
+the human beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Such changes would naturally occur.
+
+STRANGER: And animals, as we know, survive with difficulty great and
+serious changes of many different kinds when they come upon them at
+once.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them,
+which extends also to the life of man; few survivors of the race are
+left, and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and
+remarkable phenomena, and of one in particular, which takes place at the
+time when the transition is made to the cycle opposite to that in which
+we are now living.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
+
+STRANGER: The life of all animals first came to a standstill, and the
+mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and grew
+young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again, and the
+cheeks the bearded man became smooth, and recovered their former bloom;
+the bodies of youths in their prime grew softer and smaller, continually
+by day and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a
+newly-born child in mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they
+wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who died by
+violence at that time quickly passed through the like changes, and in a
+few days were no more seen.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those
+days; and in what way were they begotten of one another?
+
+STRANGER: It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the
+then order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; the
+earth-born race, of which we hear in story, was the one which existed
+in those days--they rose again from the ground; and of this tradition,
+which is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who were
+nearest in point of time to the end of the last period and came into
+being at the beginning of this, are to us the heralds. And mark how
+consistent the sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth,
+follows the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life;
+simultaneously with the reversal of the world the wheel of their
+generation has been turned back, and they are put together and rise and
+live in the opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to
+some other lot. According to this tradition they of necessity sprang
+from the earth and have the name of earth-born, and so the above legend
+clings to them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly that is quite consistent with what has
+preceded; but tell me, was the life which you said existed in the reign
+of Cronos in that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the
+course of the stars and the sun must have occurred in both.
+
+STRANGER: I see that you enter into my meaning;--no, that blessed and
+spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but
+to the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of
+the universe; and the several parts the universe were distributed under
+the rule of certain inferior deities, as is the way in some places
+still. There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various
+species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects
+sufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any
+violence, or devouring of one another, or war or quarrel among them;
+and I might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to that
+dispensation. The reason why the life of man was, as tradition says,
+spontaneous, is as follows: In those days God himself was their
+shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, who is by comparison a
+divine being, still rules over the lower animals. Under him there were
+no forms of government or separate possession of women and children;
+for all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of the past. And
+although they had nothing of this sort, the earth gave them fruits in
+abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not planted
+by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open air,
+for the temperature of their seasons was mild; and they had no beds, but
+lay on soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of the earth.
+Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character
+of our present life, which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your
+own experience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem
+the happier?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible.
+
+STRANGER: Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.
+
+STRANGER: Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless
+leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men, but
+with the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to
+philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another, and
+learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and
+was able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom,
+there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand
+times happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had merely
+eaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another
+and to the animals--such stories as are now attributed to them--in this
+case also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But until some
+satisfactory witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge
+and discussion, we had better let the matter drop, and give the reason
+why we have unearthed this tale, and then we shall be able to get on.
+In the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the
+earth-born race had all perished, and every soul had completed its
+proper cycle of births and been sown in the earth her appointed number
+of times, the pilot of the universe let the helm go, and retired to his
+place of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of
+the world. Then also all the inferior deities who share the rule of the
+supreme power, being informed of what was happening, let go the parts
+of the world which were under their control. And the world turning
+round with a sudden shock, being impelled in an opposite direction from
+beginning to end, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, which wrought a new
+destruction of all manner of animals. Afterwards, when sufficient time
+had elapsed, the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased, and the
+universal creature, once more at peace, attained to a calm, and settled
+down into his own orderly and accustomed course, having the charge and
+rule of himself and of all the creatures which are contained in him, and
+executing, as far as he remembered them, the instructions of his
+Father and Creator, more precisely at first, but afterwords with less
+exactness. The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in
+him; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder,
+until attaining to the present order. From God, the constructor, the
+world received all that is good in him, but from a previous state came
+elements of evil and unrighteousness, which, thence derived, first of
+all passed into the world, and were then transmitted to the animals.
+While the world was aided by the pilot in nurturing the animals, the
+evil was small, and great the good which he produced, but after the
+separation, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded well
+enough; but, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and
+the old discord again held sway and burst forth in full glory; and at
+last small was the good, and great was the admixture of evil, and there
+was a danger of universal ruin to the world, and to the things contained
+in him. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, seeing
+that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all might be
+dissolved in the storm and disappear in infinite chaos, again seated
+himself at the helm; and bringing back the elements which had fallen
+into dissolution and disorder to the motion which had prevailed under
+his dispensation, he set them in order and restored them, and made the
+world imperishable and immortal. And this is the whole tale, of which
+the first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For
+when the world turned towards the present cycle of generation, the age
+of man again stood still, and a change opposite to the previous one was
+the result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in and
+stature, and the newly-born children of the earth became grey and
+died and sank into the earth again. All things changed, imitating and
+following the condition of the universe, and of necessity agreeing with
+that in their mode of conception and generation and nurture; for no
+animal was any longer allowed to come into being in the earth through
+the agency of other creative beings, but as the world was ordained to be
+the lord of his own progress, in like manner the parts were ordained
+to grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as they could, of
+themselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have arrived at
+the real end of this discourse; for although there might be much to tell
+of the lower animals, and of the condition out of which they changed
+and of the causes of the change, about men there is not much, and that
+little is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had
+possessed and tended them, they were left helpless and defenceless, and
+were torn in pieces by the beasts, who were naturally fierce and had
+now grown wild. And in the first ages they were still without skill or
+resource; the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and as
+yet they knew not how to procure it, because they had never felt the
+pressure of necessity. For all these reasons they were in a great
+strait; wherefore also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition
+were imparted to man by the gods, together with so much teaching and
+education as was indispensable; fire was given to them by Prometheus,
+the arts by Hephaestus and his fellow-worker, Athene, seeds and plants
+by others. From these is derived all that has helped to frame human
+life; since the care of the Gods, as I was saying, had now failed men,
+and they had to order their course of life for themselves, and were
+their own masters, just like the universal creature whom they imitate
+and follow, ever changing, as he changes, and ever living and growing,
+at one time in one manner, and at another time in another. Enough of
+the story, which may be of use in showing us how greatly we erred in the
+delineation of the king and the statesman in our previous discourse.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What was this great error of which you speak?
+
+STRANGER: There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an error
+on a much larger and grander scale.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and
+statesman of the present cycle and generation, we told of a shepherd of
+a human flock who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a
+god when he ought to have been a man; and this a great error. Again,
+we declared him to be the ruler of the entire State, without explaining
+how: this was not the whole truth, nor very intelligible; but still it
+was true, and therefore the second error was not so great as the first.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the
+statesman we must define the nature of his office.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: And the myth was introduced in order to show, not only that
+all others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our
+search, but in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is
+alone worthy to receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds
+and herdsmen, according to the image which we have employed, has the
+care of human beings.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of
+the divine shepherd is even higher than that of a king; whereas the
+statesmen who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects
+in character, and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and
+education.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Still they must be investigated all the same, to see whether,
+like the divine shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a level
+with them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
+
+STRANGER: To resume:--Do you remember that we spoke of a
+command-for-self exercised over animals, not singly but collectively,
+which we called the art of rearing a herd?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, I remember.
+
+STRANGER: There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or
+mentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place in
+our nomenclature.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How was that?
+
+STRANGER: All other herdsmen 'rear' their herds, but this is not a
+suitable term to apply to the Statesman; we should use a name which is
+common to them all.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True, if there be such a name.
+
+STRANGER: Why, is not 'care' of herds applicable to all? For this
+implies no feeding, or any special duty; if we say either 'tending' the
+herds, or 'managing' the herds, or 'having the care' of them, the same
+word will include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the
+rest, as the argument seems to require.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the
+division?
+
+STRANGER: As before we divided the art of 'rearing' herds accordingly as
+they were land or water herds, winged and wingless, mixing or not
+mixing the breed, horned and hornless, so we may divide by these same
+differences the 'tending' of herds, comprehending in our definition the
+kingship of to-day and the rule of Cronos.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That is clear; but I still ask, what is to follow.
+
+STRANGER: If the word had been 'managing' herds, instead of feeding or
+rearing them, no one would have argued that there was no care of men in
+the case of the politician, although it was justly contended, that there
+was no human art of feeding them which was worthy of the name, or at
+least, if there were, many a man had a prior and greater right to share
+in such an art than any king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: But no other art or science will have a prior or better right
+than the royal science to care for human society and to rule over men in
+general.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.
+
+STRANGER: In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a
+great error was committed at the end of our analysis.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it?
+
+STRANGER: Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such an
+art as the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no reason why
+we should call this the royal or political art, as though there were no
+more to be said.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER: Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name,
+so as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to
+divide, for there may be still considerable divisions.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How can they be made?
+
+STRANGER: First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human
+guardian or manager.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And the art of management which is assigned to man would again
+have to be subdivided.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle?
+
+STRANGER: On the principle of voluntary and compulsory.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Why?
+
+STRANGER: Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here;
+for our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas they
+are utterly distinct, like their modes of government.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide
+human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and
+the voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we
+not further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the
+true king and statesman?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the
+account of the Statesman.
+
+STRANGER: Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself
+as well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not
+yet perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having
+overdone the several parts of their work, lose time in cutting them
+down, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire
+to expose our former error, and also because we imagined that a king
+required grand illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable,
+and have been obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us
+discourse at large, and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end.
+And our discussion might be compared to a picture of some living being
+which had been fairly drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the
+life and clearness which is given by the blending of colours. Now to
+intelligent persons a living being had better be delineated by language
+and discourse than by any painting or work of art: to the duller sort by
+works of art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but what is the imperfection which still
+remains? I wish that you would tell me.
+
+STRANGER: The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth
+except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all
+things in a dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to know
+nothing.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question
+about our experience of knowledge.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Why so?
+
+STRANGER: Why, because my 'example' requires the assistance of another
+example.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire.
+
+STRANGER: I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in
+you: when children are beginning to know their letters--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What are you going to say?
+
+STRANGER: That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very
+short and easy syllables, and are able to tell them correctly.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and
+think and speak falsely of them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a
+knowledge of what they do not as yet know be--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Be what?
+
+STRANGER: To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge
+correctly about the letters in question, and then to compare these with
+the cases in which they do not as yet know, and to show them that the
+letters are the same, and have the same character in both combinations,
+until all cases in which they are right have been placed side by side
+with all cases in which they are wrong. In this way they have examples,
+and are made to learn that each letter in every combination is always
+the same and not another, and is always called by the same name.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing and
+compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of which we
+have a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true
+notion, which includes both of them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly.
+
+STRANGER: Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty
+about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly
+fixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in other cases
+is altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correct notion of
+combinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long and
+difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: There is nothing wonderful in that.
+
+STRANGER: Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever
+expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Hardly.
+
+STRANGER: Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the
+nature of example in general in a small and particular instance;
+afterwards from lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class,
+which is the highest form of the same nature, and endeavour to discover
+by rules of art what the management of cities is; and then the dream
+will become a reality to us.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as
+there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the
+care of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone; and, as I
+was saying, a model or example of this process has first to be framed.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly.
+
+STRANGER: What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy
+with the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no
+other example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of
+wool--this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to
+illustrate our meaning?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of
+division and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes;
+going once more as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come
+to that which is needed for our purpose?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: I shall reply by actually performing the process.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: All things which we make or acquire are either creative or
+preventive; of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and human, and
+also defences; and defences are either military weapons or protections;
+and protections are veils, and also shields against heat and cold, and
+shields against heat and cold are shelters and coverings; and coverings
+are blankets and garments; and garments are some of them in one piece,
+and others of them are made in several parts; and of these latter some
+are stitched, others are fastened and not stitched; and of the not
+stitched, some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of hair; and
+of these, again, some are cemented with water and earth, and others are
+fastened together by themselves. And these last defences and coverings
+which are fastened together by themselves are called clothes, and
+the art which superintends them we may call, from the nature of the
+operation, the art of clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman
+was derived from the State; and may we not say that the art of weaving,
+at least that largest portion of it which was concerned with the making
+of clothes, differs only in name from this art of clothing, in the same
+way that, in the previous case, the royal science differed from the
+political?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true.
+
+STRANGER: In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art
+of weaving clothes, which an incompetent person might fancy to have been
+sufficiently described, has been separated off from several others which
+are of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: And which are the kindred arts?
+
+STRANGER: I see that I have not taken you with me. So I think that we
+had better go backwards, starting from the end. We just now parted off
+from the weaving of clothes, the making of blankets, which differ from
+each other in that one is put under and the other is put around: and
+these are what I termed kindred arts.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I understand.
+
+STRANGER: And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made
+of flax and cords, and all that we just now metaphorically termed the
+sinews of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting
+and the putting together of materials by stitching and sewing, of which
+the most important part is the cobbler's art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely.
+
+STRANGER: Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared
+coverings in entire pieces, and the art of sheltering, and subtracted
+the various arts of making water-tight which are employed in building,
+and in general in carpentering, and in other crafts, and all such
+arts as furnish impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are
+concerned with making the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being
+divisions of the art of joining; and we also cut off the manufacture
+of arms, which is a section of the great and manifold art of making
+defences; and we originally began by parting off the whole of the magic
+art which is concerned with antidotes, and have left, as would appear,
+the very art of which we were in search, the art of protection against
+winter cold, which fabricates woollen defences, and has the name of
+weaving.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for the first process to
+which the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
+
+STRANGER: Weaving is a sort of uniting?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: But the first process is a separation of the clotted and
+matted fibres?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that
+carding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER: Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the warp
+and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was paradoxical
+and false.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.
+
+STRANGER: Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender
+has nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes, or are we to
+regard all these as arts of weaving?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER: And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are
+concerned with the treatment and production of clothes; they will
+dispute the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning
+a larger sphere to that, will still reserve a considerable field for
+themselves.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Besides these, there are the arts which make tools and
+instruments of weaving, and which will claim at least to be co-operative
+causes in every work of the weaver.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true.
+
+STRANGER: Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that
+part of it which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest
+of arts which are concerned with woollen garments--shall we be right?
+Is not the definition, although true, wanting in clearness and
+completeness; for do not all those other arts require to be first
+cleared away?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that
+the argument may proceed in a regular manner?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.
+
+STRANGER: Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds
+of arts entering into everything which we do.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?
+
+STRANGER: The one kind is the conditional or co-operative, the other the
+principal cause.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which
+furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, without which the
+several arts could not fulfil their appointed work, are co-operative;
+but those which make the things themselves are causal.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: A very reasonable distinction.
+
+STRANGER: Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other
+instruments of the production of clothes, may be called co-operative,
+and those which treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: The arts of washing and mending, and the other preparatory
+arts which belong to the causal class, and form a division of the
+great art of adornment, may be all comprehended under what we call the
+fuller's art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the process
+which are concerned with the actual manufacture of a woollen garment
+form a single art, which is one of those universally acknowledged,--the
+art of working in wool.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.
+
+STRANGER: Of working in wool, again, there are two divisions, and both
+these are parts of two arts at once.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that?
+
+STRANGER: Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the other
+processes of wool-working which separate the composite, may be classed
+together as belonging both to the art of wool-working, and also to one
+of the two great arts which are of universal application--the art of
+composition and the art of division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: To the latter belong carding and the other processes of which
+I was just now speaking; the art of discernment or division in wool and
+yarn, which is effected in one manner with the comb and in another with
+the hands, is variously described under all the names which I just now
+mentioned.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Again, let us take some process of wool-working which is also
+a portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of
+division which we found there, make two halves, one on the principle of
+composition, and the other on the principle of division.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Let that be done.
+
+STRANGER: And once more, Socrates, we must divide the part which belongs
+at once both to wool-working and composition, if we are ever to discover
+satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: We must.
+
+STRANGER: Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art of
+twisting threads, the other the art of combining them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be
+referring to manufacture of the warp?
+
+STRANGER: Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is the woof
+made?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: There is no other way.
+
+STRANGER: Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I
+think that the definition will be of use to you.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How shall I define them?
+
+STRANGER: As thus: A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise
+and breadthwise is said to be pulled out.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: And the wool thus prepared, when twisted by the spindle, and
+made into a firm thread, is called the warp, and the art which regulates
+these operations the art of spinning the warp.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And the threads which are more loosely spun, having a softness
+proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the degree of force
+used in dressing the cloth,--the threads which are thus spun are called
+the woof, and the art which is set over them may be called the art of
+spinning the woof.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of the part
+of weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when that part of the
+art of composition which is employed in the working of wool forms a web
+by the regular intertexture of warp and woof, the entire woven substance
+is called by us a woollen garment, and the art which presides over this
+is the art of weaving.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of
+entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in
+what was said.
+
+STRANGER: Very likely, but you may not always think so, my sweet friend;
+and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in
+your mind, as it very well may, let me lay down a principle which will
+apply to arguments in general.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Proceed.
+
+STRANGER: Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and
+defect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise
+or blame too much length or too much shortness in discussions of this
+kind.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us do so.
+
+STRANGER: The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the
+following:--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
+
+STRANGER: Length and shortness, excess and defect; with all of these the
+art of measurement is conversant.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts,
+with a view to our present purpose.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Where would you make the division?
+
+STRANGER: As thus: I would make two parts, one having regard to the
+relativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and there is
+another, without which the existence of production would be impossible.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to be
+called greater with reference to the less alone, and the less less with
+reference to the greater alone?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: Well, but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded
+by the principle of the mean, both in speech and action, and is not this
+a reality, and the chief mark of difference between good and bad men?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Plainly.
+
+STRANGER: Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are
+discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only
+relatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of
+them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason
+why?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the
+less, there will never be any comparison of either with the mean.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and
+their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid
+art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against
+excess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion
+a difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of
+art is due to this observance of measure.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search for
+the royal science will be impossible.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the
+inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point
+at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour
+to show that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one
+another, but also have to do with the production of the mean; for if
+this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action
+can be an undisputed master of his science.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.
+
+STRANGER: But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which
+we only too well remember the length. I think, however, that we may
+fairly assume something of this sort--
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
+
+STRANGER: That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a
+view to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument
+that the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the
+possibility of measuring more or less, not only with one another, but
+also with a view to the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand
+support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining;
+for if there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a
+standard of measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is
+neither.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True; and what is the next step?
+
+STRANGER: The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into
+two parts, as we have said already, and to place in the one part all the
+arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness with their
+opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the
+mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those
+words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the
+extremes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very
+different spheres.
+
+STRANGER: There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing
+themselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement is universal,
+and has to do with all things. And this means what we are now saying;
+for all things which come within the province of art do certainly in
+some sense partake of measure. But these persons, because they are
+not accustomed to distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble
+together two widely different things, relation to one another, and to a
+standard, under the idea that they are the same, and also fall into
+the converse error of dividing other things not according to their real
+parts. Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of
+things, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has found all
+the differences contained in it which form distinct classes; nor again
+should he be able to rest contented with the manifold diversities which
+are seen in a multitude of things until he has comprehended all of them
+that have any affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced
+them within the reality of a single kind. But we have said enough on
+this head, and also of excess and defect; we have only to bear in mind
+that two divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered which
+are concerned with them, and not forget what they are.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: We will not forget.
+
+STRANGER: And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to
+consider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the
+conduct of such arguments in general.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this new question?
+
+STRANGER: Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his
+letters: when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say
+that the question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge of
+that particular word, or of all words?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of
+all words.
+
+STRANGER: And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to
+improve our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is
+general.
+
+STRANGER: Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the notion
+of weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things
+have sensible images, which are readily known, and can be easily pointed
+out when any one desires to answer an enquirer without any trouble or
+argument; whereas the greatest and highest truths have no outward image
+of themselves visible to man, which he who wishes to satisfy the soul
+of the enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense (compare Phaedr.), and
+therefore we ought to train ourselves to give and accept a rational
+account of them; for immaterial things, which are the noblest and
+greatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other way, and
+all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. Moreover, there
+is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters than on
+great.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: Let us call to mind the bearing of all this.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
+
+STRANGER: I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we
+may have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal
+of the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the
+being of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long, and I
+reproached myself with this, fearing that they might be not only tedious
+but irrelevant; and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent
+the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. Will you proceed?
+
+STRANGER: Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering
+what has been said, should praise or blame the length or shortness of
+discussions, not by comparing them with one another, but with what is
+fitting, having regard to the part of measurement, which, as we said,
+was to be borne in mind.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to
+what is fitting; for we should only want such a length as is suited to
+give pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and reason tells us,
+that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry,
+not our first, but our second object; the first and highest of all being
+to assert the great method of division according to species--whether the
+discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should
+be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed
+indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to
+sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who
+censures the length of discourses on such occasions and cannot away with
+their circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have
+done with them, when he can only complain that they are tedious, but he
+should prove that if they had been shorter they would have made
+those who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of
+expressing the truth of things; about any other praise and blame, he
+need not trouble himself--he should pretend not to hear them. But we
+have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking.
+Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid
+example of weaving.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good;--let us do as you say.
+
+STRANGER: The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts
+of shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds
+at all. There still remain, however, of the causal and co-operative arts
+those which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first
+be distinguished from one another.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two
+halves; the reason will be very evident as we proceed.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Then we had better do so.
+
+STRANGER: We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs, since
+we cannot bisect them. (Compare Phaedr.) For we certainly should divide
+everything into as few parts as possible.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is to be done in this case?
+
+STRANGER: What we did in the example of weaving--all those arts which
+furnish the tools were regarded by us as co-operative.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any
+implement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as
+co-operative, for without them neither State nor Statesmanship would
+be possible; and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is a
+product of the kingly art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: No, indeed.
+
+STRANGER: The task of separating this class from others is not an easy
+one; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world
+is the instrument of doing something. But there is another class of
+possessions in a city, of which I have a word to say.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What class do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: A class which may be described as not having this power; that
+is to say, not like an instrument, framed for production, but designed
+for the preservation of that which is produced.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
+
+STRANGER: To the class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed,
+which are constructed for the preservation of things moist and dry, of
+things prepared in the fire or out of the fire; this is a very large
+class, and has, if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the
+royal art of which we are in search.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER: There is also a third class of possessions to be noted,
+different from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land or
+water, honourable and also dishonourable. The whole of this class has
+one name, because it is intended to be sat upon, being always a seat for
+something.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
+
+STRANGER: A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman,
+but of the carpenter, potter, and coppersmith.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I understand.
+
+STRANGER: And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and
+in which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained,--every
+kind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of
+earth or stone, and ten thousand other things? all of which being made
+for the sake of defence, may be truly called defences, and are for the
+most part to be regarded as the work of the builder or of the weaver,
+rather than of the Statesman.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and
+of the imitations produced by drawing and music, which are designed for
+amusement only, and may be fairly comprehended under one name?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
+
+STRANGER: Plaything is the name.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them, for none
+of these things have a serious purpose--amusement is their sole aim.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That again I understand.
+
+STRANGER: Then there is a class which provides materials for all these,
+out of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their
+works;--this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and offspring
+of many other arts, may I not rank sixth?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: I am referring to gold, silver, and other metals, and all
+that wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the art
+of carpentry and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and
+stripping the cuticle of plants, and the currier's art, which strips off
+the skins of animals, and other similar arts which manufacture corks and
+papyri and cords, and provide for the manufacture of composite species
+out of simple kinds--the whole class may be termed the primitive and
+simple possession of man, and with this the kingly science has no
+concern at all.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: The provision of food and of all other things which mingle
+their particles with the particles of the human body, and minister to
+the body, will form a seventh class, which may be called by the general
+term of nourishment, unless you have any better name to offer. This,
+however, appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor,
+cook, and is not to be assigned to the Statesman's art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER: These seven classes include nearly every description of
+property, with the exception of tame animals. Consider;--there was the
+original material, which ought to have been placed first; next come
+instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings, nourishment; small
+things, which may be included under one of these--as for example, coins,
+seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the character
+of any larger kind which includes them; but some of them may, with a
+little forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made to
+harmonize with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has
+been already divided into parts, will include all property in tame
+animals, except slaves.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect
+that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of
+the king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered;
+just as spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the
+weaver. All the others, who were termed co-operators, have been got rid
+of among the occupations already mentioned, and separated from the royal
+and political science.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree.
+
+STRANGER: Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more
+certain of the complexion of this remaining class.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us do so.
+
+STRANGER: We shall find from our present point of view that the greatest
+servants are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we
+anticipated.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they?
+
+STRANGER: Those who have been purchased, and have so become possessions;
+these are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not claim royal science.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER: Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of
+the other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalise the products
+of husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the market-place,
+others going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in
+exchange for money or for other productions--the money-changer, the
+merchant, the ship-owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to
+statecraft or politics?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: No; unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce.
+
+STRANGER: But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and
+too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in
+royal science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not.
+
+STRANGER: But what would you say of some other serviceable officials?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they, and what services do they perform?
+
+STRANGER: There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice,
+and divers others who have great skill in various sorts of business
+connected with the government of states--what shall we call them?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as
+you just now called them, but not themselves rulers.
+
+STRANGER: There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be
+a ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when
+I imagined that the principal claimants to political science would be
+found somewhere in this neighbourhood.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of some who have
+not yet been tested: in the first place, there are diviners, who have
+a portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the
+interpreters of the gods to men.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: There is also the priestly class, who, as the law declares,
+know how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices which
+are acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf blessings in return
+from them. Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial
+art.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, clearly.
+
+STRANGER: And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right
+track; for the priest and the diviner are swollen with pride and
+prerogative, and they create an awful impression of themselves by
+the magnitude of their enterprises; in Egypt, the king himself is not
+allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be
+of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in
+the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most
+solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistracies,
+and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient
+sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by
+lot to be the King Archon.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely.
+
+STRANGER: But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who
+now come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng, as the
+former class disappears and the scene changes?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Whom can you mean?
+
+STRANGER: They are a strange crew.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Why strange?
+
+STRANGER: A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every tribe;
+for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs
+and such weak and shifty creatures;--Protean shapes quickly changing
+into one another's forms and natures; and now, Socrates, I begin to see
+who they are.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange
+vision.
+
+STRANGER: Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him;
+and just now I myself fell into this mistake--at first sight, coming
+suddenly upon him, I did not recognize the politician and his troop.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Who is he?
+
+STRANGER: The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who
+must at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are
+ever to see daylight in the present enquiry.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That is a hope not lightly to be renounced.
+
+STRANGER: Never, if I can help it; and, first, let me ask you a
+question.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What?
+
+STRANGER: Is not monarchy a recognized form of government?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the
+few?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
+
+STRANGER: Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude,
+which is called by the name of democracy?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing
+out of themselves two other names?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they?
+
+STRANGER: There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and
+riches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days apply to them;
+the two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two
+forms and two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of
+aristocracy and oligarchy.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws or not,
+and whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their
+consent or against their consent, always in ordinary language has the
+same name.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: But do you suppose that any form of government which is
+defined by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of
+poverty or wealth, of voluntary or compulsory submission, of written law
+or the absence of law, can be a right one?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?
+
+STRANGER: Reflect; and follow me.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: In what direction?
+
+STRANGER: Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract
+our words?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
+
+STRANGER: If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out
+of the rest as having a character which is at once judicial and
+authoritative?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: And there was one kind of authority over lifeless things and
+another other living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step
+by step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable as
+yet to determine the nature of the particular science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing principle
+of the State cannot be the few or many, the voluntary or involuntary,
+poverty or riches; but some notion of science must enter into it, if we
+are to be consistent with what has preceded.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: And we must be consistent.
+
+STRANGER: Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the
+science of government, which is among the greatest of all sciences and
+most difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside? That we must discover,
+and then we shall see who are the false politicians who pretend to be
+politicians but are not, although they persuade many, and shall separate
+them from the wise king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That, as the argument has already intimated, will be our
+duty.
+
+STRANGER: Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain
+political science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible.
+
+STRANGER: But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a
+hundred, or say fifty, who could?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: In that case political science would certainly be the
+easiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of that
+number as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by the
+standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as
+many kings. For kings we may truly call those who possess royal science,
+whether they rule or not, as was shown in the previous argument.
+
+STRANGER: Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that any
+true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of
+one, two, or, at any rate, of a few.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the
+will, of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and
+whether they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their
+rule, must be supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some
+scientific principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us
+against our will or with our will, and whatever be his mode of
+treatment,--incision, burning, or the infliction of some other
+pain,--whether he practises out of a book or not out of a book, and
+whether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or reduces in some other
+way, or even fattens his patients, is a physician all the same, so long
+as he exercises authority over them according to rules of art, if he
+only does them good and heals and saves them. And this we lay down to
+be the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art of
+command.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.
+
+STRANGER: Then that can be the only true form of government in which
+the governors are really found to possess science, and are not mere
+pretenders, whether they rule according to law or without law, over
+willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves--none
+of these things can with any propriety be included in the notion of the
+ruler.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And whether with a view to the public good they purge the
+State by killing some, or exiling some; whether they reduce the size of
+the body corporate by sending out from the hive swarms of citizens,
+or, by introducing persons from without, increase it; while they act
+according to the rules of wisdom and justice, and use their power with
+a view to the general security and improvement, the city over which they
+rule, and which has these characteristics, may be described as the only
+true State. All other governments are not genuine or real; but only
+imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them are
+worse; the better are said to be well governed, but they are mere
+imitations like the others.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say;
+but as to their ruling without laws--the expression has a harsh sound.
+
+STRANGER: You have been too quick for me, Socrates; I was just going to
+ask you whether you objected to any of my statements. And now I see that
+we shall have to consider this notion of there being good government
+without laws.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the
+business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law
+should rule, but that a man should rule supposing him to have wisdom and
+royal power. Do you see why this is?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Why?
+
+STRANGER: Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest
+and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The
+differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of
+human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art
+whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course not.
+
+STRANGER: But the law is always striving to make one;--like an obstinate
+and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to
+his appointment, or any question to be asked--not even in sudden changes
+of circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he
+commanded for some one.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the manner
+which you describe.
+
+STRANGER: A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state
+of things which is the reverse of simple.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are
+we compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be
+investigated.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic
+contests in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men
+compete in running, wrestling, and the like?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; they are very common among us.
+
+STRANGER: And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by
+professional trainers or by others having similar authority? Can you
+remember?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
+
+STRANGER: The training-masters do not issue minute rules for
+individuals, or give every individual what is exactly suited to his
+constitution; they think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and
+to prescribe generally the regimen which will benefit the majority.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them
+all; they send them forth together, and let them rest together from
+their running, wrestling, or whatever the form of bodily exercise may
+be.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over
+the herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another,
+will not be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly
+what is suitable for each particular case.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: He cannot be expected to do so.
+
+STRANGER: He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority,
+roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will
+deliver in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last will be
+traditional customs of the country.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: He will be right.
+
+STRANGER: Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man's side all
+through his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty?
+Who, Socrates, would be equal to such a task? No one who really had the
+royal science, if he had been able to do this, would have imposed upon
+himself the restriction of a written law.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: So I should infer from what has now been said.
+
+STRANGER: Or rather, my good friend, from what is going to be said.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: And what is that?
+
+STRANGER: Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer,
+who is about to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long
+time away from his patients--thinking that his instructions will not be
+remembered unless they are written down, he will leave notes of them for
+the use of his pupils or patients.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he had
+intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other
+celestial influences, something else happened to be better for
+them,--would he not venture to suggest this new remedy, although not
+contemplated in his former prescription? Would he persist in observing
+the original law, neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the
+patient daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea
+that this course only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and
+heterodox? Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not all
+such enactments be utterly ridiculous?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Utterly.
+
+STRANGER: And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining
+what was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust, to
+the tribes of men who flock together in their several cities, and are
+governed in accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were
+suddenly to come again, or another like to him, is he to be prohibited
+from changing them?--would not this prohibition be in reality quite as
+ridiculous as the other?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is
+in point?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not recall what you mean at the moment.
+
+STRANGER: They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be
+improved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and
+then he may legislate, but not otherwise.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: And are they not right?
+
+STRANGER: I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle
+violence for their good, what is this violence to be called? Or rather,
+before you answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our
+previous instances.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of whatever
+sex or age, whom he compels against his will to do something for his
+good which is contrary to the written rules; what is this compulsion to
+be called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art,
+or a breach of the laws of health? Nothing could be more unjust than for
+the patient to whom such violence is applied, to charge the physician
+who practises the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his
+disease.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true.
+
+STRANGER: In the political art error is not called disease, but evil, or
+disgrace, or injustice.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.
+
+STRANGER: And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is compelled
+to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did before, the last
+and most absurd thing which he could say about such violence is that
+he has incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of those who
+compelled him.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich
+man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May not any man, rich or
+poor, with or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against
+the will of the citizens, do what is for their interest? Is not this the
+true principle of government, according to which the wise and good
+man will order the affairs of his subjects? As the pilot, by watching
+continually over the interests of the ship and of the crew,--not by
+laying down rules, but by making his art a law,--preserves the lives of
+his fellow-sailors, even so, and in the self-same way, may there not
+be a true form of polity created by those who are able to govern in a
+similar spirit, and who show a strength of art which is superior to the
+law? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they observing the one great
+rule of distributing justice to the citizens with intelligence and
+skill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as may be, to make them
+better from being worse.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: No one can deny what has been now said.
+
+STRANGER: Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other
+statement.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it?
+
+STRANGER: We said that no great number of persons, whoever they may be,
+can attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the
+true government is to be found in a small body, or in an individual, and
+that other States are but imitations of this, as we said a little while
+ago, some for the better and some for the worse.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? I cannot have understood your previous
+remark about imitations.
+
+STRANGER: And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out is
+highly important, even if we leave the question where it is, and do not
+seek by the discussion of it to expose the error which prevails in this
+matter.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or
+familiar; but we may attempt to express it thus:--Supposing the
+government of which I have been speaking to be the only true model, then
+the others must use the written laws of this--in no other way can they
+be saved; they will have to do what is now generally approved, although
+not the best thing in the world.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this?
+
+STRANGER: No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and any
+infringement of them should be punished with death and the most extreme
+penalties; and this is very right and good when regarded as the
+second best thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now
+speaking. Shall I explain the nature of what I call the second best?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.
+
+STRANGER: I must again have recourse to my favourite images; through
+them, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What images?
+
+STRANGER: The noble pilot and the wise physician, who 'is worth many
+another man'--in the similitude of these let us endeavour to discover
+some image of the king.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What sort of an image?
+
+STRANGER: Well, such as this:--Every man will reflect that he suffers
+strange things at the hands of both of them; the physician saves
+any whom he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to maltreat he
+maltreats--cutting or burning them; and at the same time requiring them
+to bring him payments, which are a sort of tribute, of which little or
+nothing is spent upon the sick man, and the greater part is consumed by
+him and his domestics; and the finale is that he receives money from the
+relations of the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of
+the way. And the pilots of ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of
+the same kind; they intentionally play false and leave you ashore when
+the hour of sailing arrives; or they cause mishaps at sea and cast away
+their freight; and are guilty of other rogueries. Now suppose that we,
+bearing all this in mind, were to determine, after consideration, that
+neither of these arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute
+control either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon an
+assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, that anybody who
+likes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he have no calling, may
+offer an opinion either about seamanship or about diseases--whether as
+to the manner in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied
+to the patient, or again about the vessels and the nautical implements
+which are required in navigation, and how to meet the dangers of
+winds and waves which are incidental to the voyage, how to behave when
+encountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old-fashioned
+galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build--and that,
+whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon
+the advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on
+triangular tablets and columns, or enacted although unwritten to be
+national customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated
+and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What a strange notion!
+
+STRANGER: Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are appointed
+annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that
+they are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate
+vessels and heal the sick according to the written rules.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Worse and worse.
+
+STRANGER: But hear what follows:--When the year of office has expired,
+the pilot or physician has to come before a court of review, in which
+the judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by lot
+out of the whole people; and anybody who pleases may be their accuser,
+and may lay to their charge, that during the past year they have not
+navigated their vessels or healed their patients according to the letter
+of the law and the ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of
+them is condemned, some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or
+pay.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: He who is willing to take a command under such
+conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty.
+
+STRANGER: Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is
+detected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and the
+true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the
+atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions
+about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a
+cloudy prating sophist;--further, on the ground that he is a corrupter
+of the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or
+piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule over
+their patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may inform
+against him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to
+be persuading any, whether young or old, to act contrary to the written
+law, he is to be punished with the utmost rigour; for no one should
+presume to be wiser than the laws; and as touching healing and health
+and piloting and navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for
+anybody may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such
+were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about
+generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation
+in general, or carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or
+planting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending
+herds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or
+any science conversant with number, whether simple or square or cube,
+or comprising motion,--I say, if all these things were done in this way
+according to written regulations, and not according to art, what would
+be the result?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be
+recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is
+bad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable.
+
+STRANGER: But what, if while compelling all these operations to be
+regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws
+some one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring nothing
+about the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest
+or favour, and without knowledge,--would not this be a still worse evil
+than the former?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience,
+and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and
+persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more
+ruinous error than any adherence to written law?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing
+in legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to
+break the law in any respect whatever.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as
+far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have
+knowledge?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they would.
+
+STRANGER: And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true
+Statesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by his
+art without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something
+other than that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed
+during his absence would be better.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we said so.
+
+STRANGER: And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws, in
+acting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only be
+acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would
+imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they had
+knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no
+longer.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.
+
+STRANGER: And the principle that no great number of men are able to
+acquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, it has.
+
+STRANGER: Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will
+never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible.
+
+STRANGER: Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of
+government can ever make to the true government of the one scientific
+ruler, is to do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national
+customs.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is
+called aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: Or again, when an individual rules according to law in
+imitation of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules
+according to law, we give him the same name, whether he rules with
+opinion or with knowledge.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.
+
+STRANGER: And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his
+name will surely be the same--he will be called a king; and thus the
+five names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That is true.
+
+STRANGER: And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by
+custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends
+that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in
+reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not
+such an one be called a tyrant?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the
+king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies,--because men
+are offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that
+any one can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in the
+spirit of virtue and knowledge to act justly and holily to all; they
+fancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he
+pleases of us; for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they
+would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he
+alone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect State.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.
+
+STRANGER: But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no
+natural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body
+and in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to
+approach as nearly as they can to the true form of government.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only
+and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder,
+Socrates, at the miseries which there are, and always will be, in
+States? Any other art, built on such a foundation and thus conducted,
+would ruin all that it touched. Ought we not rather to wonder at the
+natural strength of the political bond? For States have endured all
+this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not
+overthrown, though many of them, like ships at sea, founder from time
+to time, and perish and have perished and will hereafter perish, through
+the badness of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of
+ignorance of the highest truths--I mean to say, that they are wholly
+unaquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they
+believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Then the question arises:--which of these untrue forms of
+government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are
+all oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration
+which is beside our present purpose, and yet having regard to the whole
+it seems to influence all our actions: we must examine it.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must.
+
+STRANGER: You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the
+hardest and the easiest.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I
+mentioned at the beginning of this discussion--monarchy, the rule of the
+few, and the rule of the many.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the
+true one may be distinguished as a seventh.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you make the division?
+
+STRANGER: Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the
+few into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and
+democracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be
+divided.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle of division?
+
+STRANGER: On the same principle as before, although the name is now
+discovered to have a twofold meaning. For the distinction of ruling with
+law or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: The division made no difference when we were looking for the
+perfect State, as we showed before. But now that this has been separated
+off, and, as we said, the others alone are left for us, the principle of
+law and the absence of law will bisect them all.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That would seem to follow, from what has been said.
+
+STRANGER: Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws,
+is the best of all the six, and when lawless is the most bitter and
+oppressive to the subject.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: The government of the few, which is intermediate between that
+of the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil; but the
+government of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either
+any great good or any great evil, when compared with the others, because
+the offices are too minutely subdivided and too many hold them. And this
+therefore is the worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all
+lawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy
+is the form in which to live is best; if they are well ordered, then
+this is the last which you should choose, as royalty, the first form, is
+the best, with the exception of the seventh, for that excels them all,
+and is among States what God is among men.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: You are quite right, and we should choose that above
+all.
+
+STRANGER: The members of all these States, with the exception of the
+one which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but
+partisans,--upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols;
+and, being the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the
+greatest of Sophists.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument
+appears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians, as they are
+termed.
+
+STRANGER: And so our satyric drama has been played out; and the troop of
+Centaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave the stage, have at last
+been separated from the political science.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: So I perceive.
+
+STRANGER: There remain, however, natures still more troublesome, because
+they are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to discern;
+the examination of them may be compared to the process of refining gold.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is your meaning?
+
+STRANGER: The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and
+the like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to
+gold, which can only be separated by fire,--copper, silver, and other
+precious metal; these are at last refined away by the use of tests,
+until the gold is left quite pure.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to
+be done.
+
+STRANGER: In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been
+separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred
+nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the general and
+the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal
+art, and persuades men to do justice, and assists in guiding the helm of
+States:--How can we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek
+alone and unalloyed?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted.
+
+STRANGER: If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be
+brought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may assist
+in exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What question?
+
+STRANGER: There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in
+general?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: There is.
+
+STRANGER: And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide
+which of these arts are and are not to be learned;--what do you say?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I should answer that there is.
+
+STRANGER: And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the
+others?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no
+single science to any other? Or ought this science to be the overseer
+and governor of all the others?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: The latter.
+
+STRANGER: You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought
+to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or
+which teaches?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Far superior.
+
+STRANGER: And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade
+or not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
+
+STRANGER: Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of
+persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to
+rhetoric.
+
+STRANGER: And to what science do we give the power of determining
+whether we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or to
+refrain altogether?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To that science which governs the arts of speech and
+persuasion.
+
+STRANGER: Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics,
+being a different species, yet ministering to it.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: But what would you think of another sort of power or science?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What science?
+
+STRANGER: The science which has to do with military operations against
+our enemies--is that to be regarded as a science or not?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as
+other than a science?
+
+STRANGER: And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we
+are to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: If we are to be consistent, we must say different.
+
+STRANGER: And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are
+not to give up our former notion?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war
+is, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: No other.
+
+STRANGER: The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not
+political?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly.
+
+STRANGER: Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good.
+
+STRANGER: Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one
+another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he
+receives from the king and legislator,--showing his own peculiar virtue
+only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or
+by any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with one
+another contrary to the appointment of the legislator?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: No; his office is such as you describe.
+
+STRANGER: Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not
+royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to
+the royal power?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is
+political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to
+rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and
+what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters
+of the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they
+have no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them
+concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to
+have, special names corresponding to their several actions.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree.
+
+STRANGER: And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the
+laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them
+all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their
+common nature, most truly we may call politics.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly so.
+
+STRANGER: Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in
+a State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving
+supplied?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I greatly wish that you would.
+
+STRANGER: Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how
+the various threads are woven into one piece.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.
+
+STRANGER: A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult,
+appears to be necessary.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly the attempt must be made.
+
+STRANGER: To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from
+another, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who
+appeal to popular opinion.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand.
+
+STRANGER: Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would
+consider courage to be a part of virtue?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly I should.
+
+STRANGER: And you would think temperance to be different from courage;
+and likewise to be a part of virtue?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
+
+STRANGER: That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another
+and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How singular!
+
+STRANGER: Yes, very--for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be
+friendly to one another.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+STRANGER: Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally
+true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with
+their kindred in some respect.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me how we shall consider that question.
+
+STRANGER: We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we
+consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Explain; what are they?
+
+STRANGER: Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the
+movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music
+supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when
+others praised them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: And do you remember the terms in which they are praised?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not.
+
+STRANGER: I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought
+which is passing in my mind.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?
+
+STRANGER: You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider
+these notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under
+which they fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness,
+whether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality
+which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How?
+
+STRANGER: We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly,
+and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the
+common attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure.
+
+STRANGER: And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the
+other?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow
+and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in
+action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement
+and of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity. Of all such
+actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place,
+the names of either are changed into terms of censure.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
+
+STRANGER: Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed
+violence or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called
+cowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part
+these qualities, and the temperance and manliness of the opposite
+characters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle
+with one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the
+enquiry, we shall find that men who have these different qualities of
+mind differ from one another.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: In what respect?
+
+STRANGER: In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very
+likely of many others. According to their respective affinities to
+either class of actions they distribute praise and blame,--praise to
+the actions which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite
+party--and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise
+among them.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: The difference between the two classes is often a trivial
+concern; but in a state, and when affecting really important matters,
+becomes of all disorders the most hateful.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer?
+
+STRANGER: To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life. For
+the orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly
+doing their own business; this is their manner of behaving with all
+men at home, and they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the
+peace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for
+peace, which is often out of season where their influence prevails, they
+become by degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like
+themselves; they are at the mercy of their enemies; whence in a
+few years they and their children and the whole city often pass
+imperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What a cruel fate!
+
+STRANGER: And now think of what happens with the more courageous
+natures. Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing
+to their excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies
+against themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their
+native-land or enslave and subject it to its foes?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is true.
+
+STRANGER: Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist,
+they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one
+another?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: We cannot deny it.
+
+STRANGER: And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have we
+not found that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one
+another, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are
+endowed with them?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: True.
+
+STRANGER: Let us consider a further point.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it?
+
+STRANGER: I want to know, whether any constructive art will make
+any, even the most trivial thing, out of bad and good materials
+indifferently, if this can be helped? does not all art rather reject the
+bad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and from
+these elements, whether like or unlike, gathering them all into one,
+work out some nature or idea?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: To, be sure.
+
+STRANGER: Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never
+allow any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if
+this can be avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play,
+and after testing them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are the
+ministers of her purposes--she will herself give orders, and maintain
+authority; just as the art of weaving continually gives orders and
+maintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare the
+material for the work, commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the
+works which she deems necessary for making the web.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.
+
+STRANGER: In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the
+mistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this
+queenly power, will not permit them to train men in what will produce
+characters unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to
+create, but only in what will produce such as are suitable. Those
+which have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous
+inclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are violently
+carried away to godlessness and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of
+by death and exile, and punishes them with the greatest of disgraces.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That is commonly said.
+
+STRANGER: But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows
+under the yoke of slavery.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right.
+
+STRANGER: The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education,
+something noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the
+statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one
+hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger
+element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those
+which incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in
+the figure as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof--these,
+which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the
+following manner:
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: In what manner?
+
+STRANGER: First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and
+binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal
+nature, and binds that with human cords.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand what you mean.
+
+STRANGER: The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and
+the just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed
+by reason, is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is
+implanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; what else should it be?
+
+STRANGER: Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the
+inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he, only in
+the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Likely enough.
+
+STRANGER: But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names
+which are the subject of the present enquiry.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very right.
+
+STRANGER: The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes
+civilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when
+not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
+
+STRANGER: And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in
+these opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a
+State, but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.
+
+STRANGER: Can we say that such a connexion as this will lastingly unite
+the evil with one another or with the good, or that any science would
+seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible.
+
+STRANGER: But in those who were originally of a noble nature, and who
+have been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we not say
+that union is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art
+prescribes for them, and of all the bonds which unite the dissimilar and
+contrary parts of virtue is not this, as I was saying, the divinest?
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true.
+
+STRANGER: Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in
+imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other bonds, which
+are human only.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that, and what bonds do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: Rights of intermarriage, and ties which are formed between
+States by giving and taking children in marriage, or between individuals
+by private betrothals and espousals. For most persons form marriage
+connexions without due regard to what is best for the procreation of
+children.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: In what way?
+
+STRANGER: They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony are
+objects not worthy even of a serious censure.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: There is no need to consider them at all.
+
+STRANGER: More reason is there to consider the practice of those who
+make family their chief aim, and to indicate their error.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true.
+
+STRANGER: They act on no true principle at all; they seek their ease and
+receive with open arms those who are like themselves, and hate those who
+are unlike them, being too much influenced by feelings of dislike.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How so?
+
+STRANGER: The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own, and
+as far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this
+class, and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their own,
+whereas they should both do precisely the opposite.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How and why is that?
+
+STRANGER: Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during
+many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts
+forth into downright madness.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Like enough.
+
+STRANGER: And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and
+has no element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow
+too indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is quite likely.
+
+STRANGER: It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty
+in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion
+about the honourable and good;--indeed, in this single work, the whole
+process of royal weaving is comprised--never to allow temperate natures
+to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the
+warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, and
+by the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one
+smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
+
+STRANGER: Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who
+has both these qualities--when many, you must mingle some of each, for
+the temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is wanting in
+thoroughness and go.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly, that is very true.
+
+STRANGER: The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls
+short of the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action
+in a remarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is
+wanting, there cities cannot altogether prosper either in their public
+or private life.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they cannot.
+
+STRANGER: This then we declare to be the completion of the web of
+political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave
+and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two
+minds into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and
+having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political
+life admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities,
+whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and
+presides over them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a
+city, in no particular fails to secure their happiness.
+
+YOUNG SOCRATES: Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no
+less than of the Sophist, is quite perfect.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Statesman, by Plato
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